Recent Scholarship on ‘Islamic' Discourse : an Evaluation and Assessment

The events of 9/11 era had a number of dramatic results for ‘Islam' and the Muslim world; and one such result was a surplus of endeavours through various mediums to conceptualise, hypothesise, and posit an ostensible ‘divide' between ‘Islam' (as a religion, ideology, and political system) and Western culture and society. In post-9/11 era, Islam was frequently used as a ‘violent' and ‘terrorist' religion and, on the other, there has been a prodigious demand for information about Islam, and things related to Islam. It gave a momentum, in the years to come, to an issue (among a multiple of issues and discourses) referred as “Islamism”—a term/ label, in many senses, used collectively but commonly for “Islamic fundamentalism”, “Islamic extremism”, “Islamic conservatism”, “radicalism”, “political Islam”, etc. This paper, in this backdrop, presents an assessment of the recent scholarship on “Islamism” as a discourse. It highlights and presents a detailed evaluation and estimation, with some critical and comparative notes, on some important works dealing with various aspects and facets of Islamism (radicalism and political Islam), and puts forward some insights on the future prospects of ‘Islamism' as a discourse.

Introduction from the Editorial Boards :: i Acknowledgments :: iii Table of

INTRODUCTION
It is a well-known fact that after the events of 9/11, a number of dramatic changes took place in the political landscape. At the same time, these events had a melodramatic effect for 'Islam' (as a religion, ideology, and political system), for Muslims (especially living in the non-Muslim countries), and for the Muslim world. One of these outcomes was a number of academic attempts to advance an ostensible 'divide' between 'Islam' and Western culture and society. In post-9/11 era, Islam was repeatedly labeled, designated, and branded as a 'violent' and 'terrorist' religion and there has been a prodigious demand for information about Islam, and things related to Islam, which, in turn, gave an impetus, in the coming years, to an issue (among a multiple of issues and discourses) referred as 'Islamism'-a term/ label, in many senses, used collectively, commonly, and interchangeably for 'Islamic fundamentalism', 'Islamic extremism', 'Islamic conservatism', 'radicalism', 'political Islam', and other related terms and labels.
This paper provides answer, through a literature assessment, to the development and advancement, expansion and extension, of Islamism as a discourse; looks into its various dimensions, and focuses on its future prospects as well being theoretical and theoretic in nature and analytical and comparative in methodology, this paper focuses on some important works which discuss various dimensions of Islamism. It and puts forward some insights on the future prospects on this critical discourse. The framework of the paper is as follows: in the introductory section, it throws light on the definitions and descriptions of 'Islamism' as a term as well as on the alternative use of terms like 'Islamism' and 'Political Islam', and 'Islamic Fundamentalism'. It is followed by a detailed assessment and evaluation, critically, of three important works on 'Islamism', viz: Hillel Frisch and Efraim Inbar's Radical Islam and International Security: Challenges and Responses (2008); Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman's Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden (2009); and Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn, Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance (2012). This evaluation is followed by a brief overview on the 'Moderate Islamism', with an explicit concentration on Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senza's Political Islam in the Age of Democratization (2013). In the conclusion, the focus is on the future of Islamism: wherein it is argued that 'Islamism' is not only a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon, but is a varyingly contested discourse, and one of the most significant, complex, and political ideologies of the 21 st century. It concludes that the more this discourse is discussed and debated, the more complex and intricate it becomes to determine precision and position of this discourse.

Defining 'Islamism'
Defining "Islamism", a disparately debated and diversely deliberated discourse, is distressed and fraught with difficulty and intricacy. Frequently invoked with caution and caveats, vigilance and warning, Islamism, for instance, as defined by Roxanne L. Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman(2009: 4)refers to the "contemporary movements that attempt to return to the scriptural foundations of the Muslim community, excavating and interpreting them for application to the present-day social and political world". A20 th and 21 st century phenomenon, Islamism refers, in Roxanne Euben's terminology (Euben, in Bowering, 2015: 55),to those Muslim groups and thinkers of last and present century "that seek to recuperate the scriptural foundations of the Islamic community, excavating and reinterpreting them for application to the contemporary social and political world".In Political Islam in the Age of Democratization, Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai (2013: 19) define Islamism as an "early twentieth-century construct, a specific Muslim religio-political response to an otherwise secular modernity"; and a "specific ideology adhered to by a distinct collection of non-state actors seeking the geographical revival of Islam in the post-imperial age".
Moreover, it is defined, by Sheri Berman(2003: 257); as "the belief that Islam should guide social and political as well as personal life" or "the building of an Islamic state" (Roy, 2006: 2) or "the brand of modern political Islamic fundamentalism that claims to recreate a true Islamic society, not simply by imposing shari'ah, but by establishing first an Islamic state through political action" (Ibid.: 58);as "a religious ideology that insists on the application of shari'ah law [or Islamic revealed law] by the state" (Benjamin and Simon, 2002:448-9); and even as an "anti-modernist ideology of reform in Muslim countries" (Ernest, 2004: 68); or simply, as "a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives", providing, in various means, "political responses for today's societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on re-appropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from Islamic tradition" (Guilain Denoeux, 2002: 61)."Islamism" is regarded, by Michael Laskier (2008: 115), "a virus that affects Islam and is a destabilizing phenomenon". Islamism, now-a-days, in simpler terms, describes a political or social movement, organization, or person that believes Islam or God's will applies to all areas of life.
Using 'political Islam' and 'Islamism' synonymously and extensively-throughout his The Future of Political Islam-Graham Fuller(2003)is of the opinion that Islamism is not an ideology, but "a religious-culturalpolitical framework for engagement on issues that most concern politically engaged Muslims" (Fuller,2003: 193;Italics in original). In his view, "an Islamist is one who believes that Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered in the contemporary Muslim World and who seeks to implement this idea in some fashion" (Ibid.: xi; Italics in original). He is of the opinion that "Islam itself, of course, is not a political ideology but a religion. Yet Islamism is different: while it has some aspects of political ideology, this ideology takes various forms. Islamism is a broad term embracing a body of quite variegated and even contradictory political, social, psychological, and economic-even class-functions. It is represented by differing types of movements that draw general inspiration from Islam"(Ibid.: 14).
Islamism encompasses and comprises a broad spectrum, not necessarily coherent or consistent across movements, and is not at all 'monolithic'; Islamism is really "a variety of political movements, principles, and philosophies that draw general inspiration from Islam but produce different agendas and programs at different times, often quite contradictory" (Fuller, 2003: 45). Similarly, in Bassam Tibi's terminology Islamism is "a concept of order in the global phenomenon of religious fundamentalism, aimed at remaking the world" based on God's Sovereignty (Tibi, in Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 14). A "political ideology", it is an outcome of the current form of political Islam-a process which leads to the "Shariatization and jihadization of faith pronounced as a return to tradition" ( Tibi, in Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 12). Although, the ideology of Islamism is different than the religion of Islam, but it is the Islamism which forms "the ideological foundation of political Islam, an aspect of the overall phenomenon of religious fundamentalism" .In a summary fashion, for Tibi, it can be stated that "Islamism is not a delinquency, but stands as a political phenomenon within Islam as a social reality". But, at the same time, he cautions that "Islamism is an Islamic variety of religious fundamentalism. Its emergence relates to a structural phenomenon in world politics and is not simply terrorism" (Tibi, in Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 12, 30).
Although the interchangeable use of terms like political Islam, Islamism, and Islamic fundamentalism is seen in most of the writings on the subject, but Islamism's description as "fundamentalism" is still the most commonly used English term that refers to "religiopolitical movements, Muslims or otherwise", although coined back in 1920s "Islamism" and "Islamic fundamentalism" are mostly used interchangeably (Euben and Zaman;2009: 4, fn. 2),and are defined by Mahmud A. Faksh (1997: xv), Islamism refers to "Islamic movements or groups that want to use Islam as a political force to mobilize the public, gain control, and reform society and state in accordance with their doctrinal religious agenda." Not only this, but Islamism is equated with "terrorism" as well. Especially in the post-9/11 era, "Islamism" has been more closely identified with "terrorism" so much so that the two "terms and the phenomena they name are often depicted as synonymous" (Euben and Zaman, 2009: 3). Thus, Islamism as a discourse is not a "monolithic" but diverse; it is a "modern phenomenon", and an "instrument of political mobilization" and change (Bokhari and Senzai, 2013: 20-22). And given that Islamism continues to evolve according to the circumstances and events, it would be incorrect to think of Islamism "as a fixed ideology to be accepted or rejected as a whole" (Fuller, 2003: xi).

Are 'Political Islam', 'Islamism', and 'Islamic Fundamentalism' Same?
Regarding the interchangeable use of terms like political Islam, Islamism, and Islamic fundamentalism, Bassam Tibi is of the opinion that this use is highly "debated", because Fundamentalism is an analytical term and the rejection of it is misleading. … Scholars who use the term "Islamism" as an alternative to fundamentalism are unknowingly contributing to the stereotyping of Islam by implicitly restricting the general phenomenon of the politicization of religion to it. In contrast …"Islamism" is an element of the phenomenon of political religion known as a variety of religious fundamentalism. This phenomenon is not limited to Islam; it is also present in other religions. However, jihadism as the military dimension of this phenomenon is specific to Islamism as an interpretation of Islam. This compels the inquiry of Islamism to be included in the field of security studies (Tibi, in Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 24). Similarly, Bokhari and Senzai (2013: 19) are of the opinion that 'Political Islam' refers to all political manifestations of Islam from the Prophet to present; 'Islamism', an ideology, refers to a 20 th century response to the Western secular nationstate based international system. Furthermore, what also becomes clear, in the terminology of Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn(2012), is that Islamism is a "multidimensional paradox", and is, at the end, both "identity and ideology", because, "Islamism is both an identity and ideology, it is simultaneously process and objective, tactic and strategy, reality and ideal. It is a totalizing ambition grounded in the diffusion between the public and private spheres, between the present and the transcendent. At the same time, the multitude of local contexts, out of which Islamism has emerged, have forced each individual group and movement to socially construct its own distinct emphases, its own focus and priorities, its own level of sociopolitical grounded-ness or abstraction." But at the same time, they highlight the cautiousness that the "modalities by which that new reality is sought, however, are diverse and divided"(Ibid. : 205-6).
"Islamism and Islamist denote",in the terminology of Peter R. Demant (2006: xxii, xxv)"the radical religious movement of 'political Islam'", and although "Islamic fundamentalism" is its popular synonym, "Islamism is no unified movement, and differs from country to country and from one period to the next"(Italics in original). For Demant, Islamism, "a politicized, anti-Western, and anti-modern reading" of Islam, is at is at once "an ideology and a social movement"and it takes Islam "from religion to ideology" (Ibid.: 89,177,180).As an ideology, Islamism is, for Demant, a "reaction against modernity produced by modernity, during modern times, using modern means, and irreversibly partaking of modernity"(Ibid.: 181;Italics in original).
In "Contemporary Islamism: Trajectory of a Master Frame", Matthew Cleary and Rebecca Glazier(2007: 2-3), are of the opinion that in the last quarter of the twentieth century, "Islamism emerged as a potent ideological force that has challenged-and continues to challengenationalist elites for power; one that has left academics struggling to explain why, in an era characterized by ever-increasing secularism, such an ideology has attracted the support of so many Muslims".
Thus, "Islamism" has been defined differently and debated variedly, and, hence has been burdened and laden with difficulty. There are various ways, in which scholars try to address this. There have been many books on this issue and its multifold aspects. Mention may be made of these few important works: A. Musallam Strindberg and Mats Wärn, Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance (2012).And the list continues, with more aspects and dimensions being debated and deliberated, highlighted and stressed, explored and studied. An assessment and evaluation of some important works on Islamism (especially of Frisch and Inbar, 2008;Euben and Zaman, 2009;and Strindberg and Wärn, 2012 (2008)consists of an organized forty-one (41) excerpted documents in nine chapters, by subjects such as: "Islamist Movements and Thinkers"; "Islamism, Democracy, and the Limits of Freedom"; "Women and Family in Islamist Discourses"; "Global Jihad", etc. Aiming to enhance and increase understanding of the Islamist phenomenon, the documents in this work, written by Islamists themselves, shed light on the origins, goals, and practices of Islamic-focused groups and movements throughout the Muslim world. Each document is identified and analyzed as to its significance, but very precisely and briefly.

Frisch and Inbar's Radical Islam and International Security:Challenges and Responses (2008) 1
Highlighting the intellectual and policy debate on the nature of the radical Islam phenomenon and how to respond to it, the goal of Frisch and Inbar's work is "to clarify the radical Islam phenomenon and to discuss ways to combat the challenge" (Frisch and Inbar;2008: 7).
Radical Islam, no doubt, poses a political challenge in the modern world which is like that of no other radical religious movement. Ideologically, it is perceived by Western policy makers as threatening the liberal-democratic ideology by which most states in the West abide and which most other states rhetorically espouse. In this framework, Radical Islam and International Security-a compendium of a dozen of articles, divided into three parts and preceded by 7-pages 'Introduction' by the Editors-serves as a welcome addition to the intellectual and policy debate on the nature of the radical Islam phenomenon and how to respond to it. It is obvious that meeting any challenge requires much more than writing articles and books, but it is also true that intellectual clarity is unquestionably a prerequisite for effective strategic action. To "clarify the radical Islam phenomenon and to discuss ways to combat the challenge" is the "modest" goal of this collection (Frisch and Inbar;2008: 7).
The first part (consisting of chapters 1-3) seeks to understand the Islamic challenge in broad comparative and historical terms; the second part (chapters 4-8) deals with specific regional case studies, seeking to identify contrasting patterns of uniformity and variation inradical Islam across a wide swath of terrain; while the third part (chapters 9-12) is policy-oriented, suggesting possible responses to the Islamic challenge. Here only those chapters are highlighted which discuss radical Islam or Islamism directly.
In the first chapter, "Religious Extremism or Religionization of Politics? The Ideological Foundations of Political Islam" (pp. 11-37), Bassam Tibi argues that radical Islam has little to do with traditional Islamic precepts, and since the "Arab defeat in Six Day War" there has been a "religionization of politics along with a politicization of Islam" (Tibi, inFrisch and Inbar, 2008: 11). An emerging irregular war waged in the name of Islam in the context of a religio-culturalization is the major feature of the Islamist challenge, and the conflict over the "Holy Land" of Israel/ Palestine is its major arena. Tibi rebukes European cultural and political elites for not recognizing the magnitude of the danger posed by the Islamists and their conviction and sincerity which will hardly be swayed by strategies of "engagement." Similarly, Tibi rejects Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations," not because a clash does not exist but because the Islamism these extremists espouse is an invention of tradition, not Islam itself. Rather than this clash of civilizations, he believes there is a clash between Islamists and proponents of free and democratic societies (Frisch and Inbar;2008: 29). Refuting the idea of "multiple modernities", Tibi concludes that "Islamism is not another modernity; it alienates Muslims from the rest of humanity in a modern world" (Frisch and Inbar;2008: 31). For Tibi, Islamism is a concept of order in the global phenomenon of religious fundamentalism; a "political ideology", which is an outcome of the current form of political Islam. For him, the ideology of Islamism is different than the religion of Islam, but it is the Islamism which forms the ideological foundation of political Islam. He is of the opinion that the goal of the Islamists is not the restoration of the Caliphate as some self-proclaimed experts contend; rather, the establishment of an "Islamic Order" (nizam Islami) is the top priority of political Islam. In the twenty-first century this has become a competition between Pax Islamica and Pax Americana (Frisch and Inbar;2008: 16).
Concurring with Tibi's prognosis that views Islam in evolutionary rather than essential terms, Ze'ev Maghen in chapter 2, 'Islam from flexibility to ferocity' (pp. 38-43), asks why in the minds of most Westerners and some Easterners, is Islam "associated today with fury, fierceness, fanaticism and intransigence"? Perceived to be a "harsh and uncompromising faith" now, for most periods of Islam's 1400-year history and across the length and breadth of "the Abode of Islam," the Shari'ah (Islamic law) was in fact rarely enforced, and Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was almost a paragon of flexibility to the point of championing canonical laxity (Maghen, in Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 38). His answer paradoxically lies in the tremendous influence of Western thought on the Islamic world rather than in its rejection, as argued by Bernard Lewis and others. Maghen's reading of recently written fundamentalist tracts and treatises provides evidence that this new Western way of looking at things had begun to penetrate the consciousness of the educated classes in Middle Eastern countries by the end of the first half of the twentieth century. The Islamists were no exception. This is when a fascinating and monstrous hybrid began to grow. Suddenly, the blurry lines and rounded edges characterizing Islamic law and life were unacceptable. "Islam, they frowned, is no laughing matter!" Maghen concludes with a fervent wish to see the "Religious corner-cutting, legal laxity and a 'laid-back' outlook" on life formerly characterizing Islam renewed or "what pristine Islam was all about" (Ibid.: 42).
In Chapter 3, "An economic perspective on radical Islam" (pp. 44-69) Arye Hillman warns that the world-view of the Islamists is inimical to economic development and, inasmuch as they have political influence, reduces the chances of such integration. A focus on economic consequences of radical Islam introduces two explanatory concepts: supreme values and rent-seeking behavior (Hillman, in Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 45). Hillman shows that the greater the influence of the Islamist value-system and ideology, the poorer the economic performance of that society is. This is followed by Part II, beginning by chapter 4, "The rise of jihadi trends in Saudi Arabia: the post Iraq-Kuwait war phase" (pp. 73-92) by Joseph Kostiner, who credits the Saudi Arabian elite for embarking on a policy of reconciliation between the different religious groups. In Chapter 5, "Islamic radicalism and terrorism in the European Union: the Maghrebi factor" (pp. 93-120) Michael Laskier looks specifically at the involvement of Islamists from the Maghreb (North Africa) and presents six recommendations to "curb these developments" (Laskier, in Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 115-17). Combating ideas with ideas is the solution is the theory, Jonathan S. Paris proposes in Chapter 6, "Explaining the causes of radical Islam in Europe" (pp. 121-133). This chapter examines identity issues among Muslims in the Europe and the new sense of global solidarity shared by European Muslims with other Muslims throughout world. Patrick James and Yasemin Akbaba in chapter 7, "The evolution of Iranian interventionism: support for radical Islam in Turkey, 1982 employ the tools of International Relations (IR) theory to study radical Islam in Turkey, particularly as it was influenced by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The study focuses on the "Iranian support for radical Islam in Turkey following the transition from the 1979 Revolution through 2003" (James and Akbaba, in Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 134).The state-proxy nexus takes on much greater importance in Rushda Siddiqui's analysis of the Islamic dimension of Pakistan's foreign policy, where support for proxy insurgents is a means to balance against a vastly more powerful neighbor, in chapter 8, "The Islamic dimension of Pakistan's foreign policy" (pp. 153-168).According to Siddiqui, Pakistan has been one of the first states in contemporary history to employ nonstate proxies to safeguard its interests in the region and in the international arena. But, today, the country is considered both a "state sponsor" and a "passive sponsor" of terrorism (Siddiqui, in Frisch and Inbar, 2008: 153). This is followed by part III, which focuses on the responding to the Islamist challenge, but is beyond the scope of this paper here. In sum, presenting different kinds of ideas in its three parts, Radical Islam and International Securitybegins with the term "Radical Islam" and ends with the term "radicalization"-serves as a welcome addition to the intellectual and policy debate on the nature of the radical Islam phenomenon and how to respond to it.

Euben and Zaman's Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought (2009) 2
A selection of 18 texts both from individual Islamic Intellectuals and from Islamic Sunni groups, Hamas and the Taliban, it is a wide-ranging anthology of key ideas and prominent thinkersfrom the early twentieth century "Islamist" thinkers/ intellectuals to the present (some even living)-who have formed and fashioned, shaped and designed "Islamism" over the past century. It brings together a broad spectrum of "Islamist" voices on a variety and multiplicity of issues-ranging from the relationship between Islam, Jihad, and violence to Islam, politics/ state and democracy, to gender and women's rights/ position.
In this anthology, the editors-Roxanne L. Euben (Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College) and Muhammad Qasim Zaman (Professor of Near Eastern Studies and Religion at Princeton University)-take "Islamism" to refer to the contemporary movements that attempt to return to the scriptural foundations of the Muslim community, excavating and interpreting them for application to the present-day social and political world (Euben and Zaman;2009: 4).Consisting of 19 chapters and divided into 5 parts (I-V),this anthology also includes 46-page introduction (by the editors) and biographical introductions and notes preceding each "text". These selected texts cover the topics on a variety and multiplicity of positions, ranging from the relationship between Islam and politics/ state, to Jihad and violence, and from Islam and democracy to gender, and women's rights/position. Thus, this selection brings into sharp relief the 'commonalities' in Islamist arguments about politics, gender, violence, Jihad, democracy, and much more.
Organized and arranged thematically and subject-wise, and not in chronological order, the "Islamists"-both activists and intellectuals, incorporating those trained as "Ulema" as well as "new religious intellectuals"-included in this  'Ata al-Sayyid  are discussed under Part V: Globalizing Jihad. In addition, "Hamas" and "The Taliban", which were established in 1987 and 1994 respectively, are also included in part IV. Below is presented an overview of each section/ part of this anthology.

Islamism as an "Emergent Worldview"
Each "text" is preceded by an "introduction" of the author, ranging from 5-11 pages each (5-6 pages in the majority cases), representing and portraying-as becomes apparent from the same-each writer ('alim/intellectual/thinker) as "Islamist" to fit as per the subject/text that follows. For example, in Part I, "Islamism: An Emergent Worldview", the four intellectuals and religious scholars discussed are portrayed as 'Islamists' in these ways: (a) Hasan al-Banna is described as the "father of contemporary Islamism, and with good reason" (Euben and Zaman, 2009: 49); (b) Mawlana Mawdudi is presented as one of the "prolific Islamist writers" who is "responsible" for Islamism in Indian subcontinent, but also as one who has "influenced", more than anybody else in the 20 th century especially, the "political vocabulary of Sunni Islam" (Ibid.: 79); (c) Malwana Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi is presented as "an influential contributor to the Islamist discourses from 1950s", whose thinking, in thee editors' view, "blurs the boundaries between Islamists and 'ulama" (Ibid.: 107); and (d) Sayyid Qutb is depicted as "one of the most influential architects of contemporary Islamist political thought" (Ibid.:129).
In the post-9/11 era, Qutb-whose ideology constitutes 'the fundamentals of radical Islamism'has been labeled and branded, for instance, as "one of the most influential Islamists of the 20 th century" (Shepard,2013);one of the "great thinkers of political Islam" (Akbaezadeh, 2012);"Founder of radical Islamic political ideology"; (Moussalli, 2012); "The ideological founding father of the salafi jihadi trend in Islamism" (Milton-Edwards, 2012);"an ideologue whose writings are a manifesto" and a strategy, a platform and a policy, "for revolutionary Islamists" (Musallam, 2005); "the foremost thinker of political Islam and continues to be the most influential ideological precursor of contemporary Islamism" (Tibi, 2008); "The Philosopher of Islamic Terror"  and "godfather of Muslim extremist movements around the globe" (Esposito, 2002), "the father of modern fundamentalism" (Irwin, 2001), and the list of such labels and descriptions continues.

Islamists and their Role in "Remaking the Islamic State"
Part II, "Remaking the Islamic State", includes the writings of: Ayatollah Khomeini, who is illustrated as one who "epitomizes Islamism", on second place after Osama bin Laden, "more vividly for Western observers" (Euben and Zaman, 2009: 155); Baqir al-Sadr, whose legacy extends well beyond the "intricacies of Shi'i politics in contemporary Iraq", (Ibid.: 185) as the "most prominent symbols of Shi'i resistance to Saddam Hossein regime" (Ibid.: 181); Hasan al-Turabi is presented as the "influential Sudanese Islamist" (Ibid.: 207); while as Yusuf al-Qaradawi is regarded as the "most prominent scholar and preacher in Sunni Islam" of 21 st century (Ibid.: 224), who is also an important figure who represents a new brand in Islamism-the "moderate Islamism" (Ibid.: 303).
In this part, the selections are taken from Khomeini's "Islamic Government" on Islam and Revolution; al-Sadr's "The General Framework of the Islamic Economy" focuses on the principles of multifaceted ownership, economic freedom, and of social justice; Turabi's selection is taken from his "The Islamic State" which discusses the "universal characteristics of an Islamic state" derived from the "teachings of Qur'an as embodied in the political practice of the prophet Muhammad [pbuh] and constitute an eternal model that Muslims are bound to adopt as a perfect standard for all times" (Ibid.: 213); and followed by Qaradawi's detailed answer to a answer on the relationship between "Islam and Democracy": the crux of the question is: Is it true that Islam is opposed to democracy and that democracy is a form of unbelief or something reprehensible?

Islamists and Islamism vis-a-vis"Gender" Issues
"Islamism and Gender" is the theme of Part IIIof this anthology, including the writings of Iranian Murtazza Mutahhari, Egyptian Zayanb al-Ghazali, and Moroccan Nadia Yassine. Mutahhari is presented an "Islamist" in the sense that he is "widely organized as one of the most important intellectuals" associated with the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Ibid.: 249); al-Ghazali is characterized as the "unsung mother" of contemporary Islamist movements, whose life and works have received "less scholarly and popular attention", a "pioneering" da'iya (female preacher) "dedicated to bringing Muslims to Islam through education, exhortation, and example" (Ibid.: 275);while as Nadia Yassine-the "unofficial spokeswoman for the most popular Islamist group in Morocco", Jama'at al-'Adl wa'l Ihsan (the Justice and Spiritual Association, or JSA) as well as the official leader of JSA's women division (Ibid., p.302) who has arguably joined, along with al-Qaradawi, to the brand of "moderate Islamism", exemplifies all the "promise, pragmatism, and complexity [that] the label [moderate Islamism] suggests" (Ibid.: 302). Playing a "crucial role" in bringing "the JSA's blend of Islamism, Sufism, and nonviolent populism to a new generation of Moroccans", she at once "articulates and embodies the uneasy union of Islamism and feminism, challenging a host of assumptions about each along the way" (Ibid.).
In this Part, the chapters illuminate Islamist gender norms by revealing the character and content of Islamist concerns about the place and purity of Muslim women, for "gender is frequently an implicit preoccupation among Islamists" (Ibid.: 40). Consisting of three chapters, this part discusses "The Human Status of Woman in the Qur'an" by Mutahhari-a full-fledged and detailed answer to the crucial, critical, debated, and debatable questions: what kind of entity does Islam envisage woman? Does it consider her the equal of man in terms of dignity and respect accorded to her, or is she thought of as belonging to an inferior species? (Ibid.: 254). It is followed by al-Ghazalli's two "texts": one is "excerpts from the 1981 interview", entitled "An Islamist Activist", and second is "From Days of my Life, chapter 2"-chapter 2 of her memoir, Ayam min Hayati (Cairo, 1978)-which reveals her connections with the Muslim Brotherhood. Finally, Nadia Yaasine's "Modernity, Muslim Women, and Politics in the Mediterranean" puts fort JSA's and Yaasin'e stand on gender issues: (a) Justice and Spiritual Association (JSA), contrary to conventional stereotypes, advocates both "nonviolence and the sine qua non participation of women as the best means of reproducing the model of social justice promoted by the original Islam" (Ibid.: 314); and (by way of conclusion regarding the Scarf) (b) The Islamic Scarf, "a significant symbol of the transformation of a movement", is a testimony of faith, as well as expresses threefold break: "When a woman wears the Islamic scarf, she reclaims her spirituality, reconquers the public sphere (because the Islamic scarf is a projection of the private sphere within that public space), and finally makes a political declaration of dissidence against the established order, be it national or international" (Ibid.: 316-7).

Islamists and their Writings on Violence, Jihad, and 'Globalizing Jihad'
Part IV, "Violence, Action, and Jihad" consists of the writings, Charter, and Interviews of 'Abd al-Salam Faraj, 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, 'Hamas', Fadlallah, and 'The Taliban' respectively; and Part V, "Globalizing Jihad", consists of the fatwa of bin Laden (or his declaration of war against America) and Muhammad 'Ata al-Sayyid's "Final Instructions". The main argument put forward in these two sections is that "Jihad is arguably Islamists' most consistently explicit concern" (Ibid.: 40). Here, both individuals as well as groups are presented as "Jihadists".
Faraj has been described as "twenty-seven year old electrical engineer from Cairo", who was executed six months later, along with four other members of Jama'at al-Jihad, for the murder of Egyptian president, Anwar al-Sadat, on October 6, 1981 (Ibid.: 321); 'Abd al-Rahman, a blind Egyptian Shaykh, who was the "charismatic maestro" responsible for the "urban war" or of 1993 bombings in USA (p.344); 'Hamas'-the abbreviated name of Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement), established in 1987, meaning in Arabic "fervor" or "zeal"-has been described as a "terrorist organization and a network of social welfare, an Islamic liberation theology" (Ibid.: 356); while as Fadlallah is described as "one of Lebanon's best known Islamists and its most influential religious scholars" (Ibid.: 387) and 'The Taliban'-who emerged in 1996 in Afghanistan's scene-reveal, both before and after 9/11, "a very different facet of Islamism" than those represented by other Muslim activists, groups, intellectuals, including those presented here in this volume (Ibid.: 414). On the same lines, bin Laden is described not only as the "most famous Islamist of the twentyfirst century" but as the "primary founder and financer of al-Qa'ida", who is, for some, "a warriorpriest", and to others a "terrorist" who has twisted Islam for "discriminate violence" (Ibid.: 425), while as 'Ata al-Sayyid is described as "one of the five hijackers on American Airlines flight 11, the airplane that tore into the North Tower of World Trade Centre"-what is commonly known as the 9/11(Ibid.: 460). Collectively, these two parts put forth the argument that Jihad is arguably Islamists' most consistently explicit concern. For example, in Muhammad 'Ata al-Sayyid's "Final Instructions", as the editors' note, the language is "often brutally crass or simple-mindedly therapeutic"-in the light of observations of various scholars-and is "unyieldingly rigid" in its "conceptual framework" (Ibid.: 463-4). Nevertheless, this document also "provides a window", as the editors' note (in "Biographical Introduction of 'Ata al-Sayyid), "onto a worldview in which Islam is not simply a repository for reflexive rage or rhetorical camouflage for what are essentially socio economic grievances, but rather a particular lens on religion, history, geopolitics, and power" (Ibid.: 464).
Aimed and targeted, predominantly, to enhance and increase understanding of the Islamist phenomenon, the documents in this work, written by Islamists themselves, shed light on the origins, goals, and practices of Islamic-focused groups and movements throughout the Muslim world. Each document is identified and analyzed as to its significance, but very precisely and briefly. But what makes Euben and Zaman's anthology most distinctive, unique, and characteristic, in comparison to other anthologies/ works on "Islamism" on a similar pattern (for example, Donohue and Esposito, 2007;Calvert, 2008)is its "unique" feature of providing the reader with "biographical introductions" or "biographical notes" by the editor's. These introductions precede each selection, showing their expertise and understanding of these intellectuals and the subjects dealt. Doing more than just introducing these 'Islamist' authors, they explore the background, networks, and issue that link each writer with broad patterns of Islamist political thought. It is this unique and additional feature that distinguishes and differentiates Euben and Zaman's work and makes it a 'better guide', a must read for everyone interested in contemporary Islamist through in particular and in listening to the new and old voices, although "Islamist" and "conservative". The 46-pages "Introduction" (Euben and Zaman, 2009: 1-46)and the significant, comprehensive and well-informed introductions to each chapter are worthy of, and call for, a cautious reading and understanding, for this anthology situates the selected intellectuals, or by that way "Islamists" and their thought within the distinctive Islamic intellectual tradition in all its complexity.
Thus, although a good and rich anthology of Islamist readings, there are some shortcomings in this anthology as well. For example, the editors provide, in the "biographical introductions" of the author's, some highlights about the "texts", that follow, as well (e.g., as in chapters 8, 10, 15, and 19) but do not do so for majority of them. One more important point that needs to be highlighted is that some of the "Islamists" included here have been included and labeled as "liberal" by others: case in point is Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, who is also included in Charles Kurzman's anthology, Liberal Islam (1998) under the section "Freedom of Thought".
No doubt, Qaradawi is regarded/ labeled as the "moderate Islamist", but the overall impression of the book is that all are (hard-line) 'Islamists', by that way "Jihadists". Same is the case with Nadwi, for no other work has introduced him as a hardline/conservative "Islamist" so far.
Furthermore, while discussing Qutb (who is regarded as the main source of "radicalism", "Jihadism", and main inspiration behind al-Qaeda and other "terrorist" or "militant" groups), at the same time, the editors' argument that he "echoes of a mystic's [although he was not a Sufi] direct encounter with the fountainhead of truth and knowledge are hard to miss in Qutb's writings, especially in his commentary of the Qur'an[Fi Zilal al-Qur'an/ In the Shade of the Qur'an]" (Euben and Zaman, 2009: 24); and, for this remark, they quote the following opening lines of his Preface of Qutb's commentary: "Life in the shade of the Qur'an is a blessing … unknown to anyone who hasn't tasted it" (Ibid.: 24; Italics by the editors). Such contradictory statements add to the complexity.
Finally, it seems confusing and perplexing to see essays and excerpts on "women's rights", "status of women" etc.-i.e., "gender" issuesunder "Islamism" label. All the scholars/ writerswhether early modernists or present-day (living) intellectuals, both male and female-who discuss issues/ themes related to women, especially regarding their "status", "role", "rights", etc. are labeled and termed as "feminist" scholars, and as such this discourse is termed as "Feminism"whether in East or in the West-with added prefixes like "Islamic", "Western" etc. So here too, one may possibly say, the editors create confusions in readers' minds.

Anders Strindberg and Mats Wärn's Islamism: Religion, Radicalization, and Resistance (2012) 3
Strindberg and Wärn's work on 'Islamism' is primarily and principally focused on an arduous attempt to understand where, how, and why Islamism emerges within the wider framework of Islamic discourse, and what accounts for the often vastly different political agendas, tactical choices and strategic objectives of individual Islamist groups (Strindberg and Wärn, 2012: 7).The primary objective is to shed light on the nature of Islamism, by examining, in its nine chapters (including the Introduction and Conclusion, as well), the complex interplay of diversity and unity, and at the same time, re-examining critically the received view within Western scholarship. It thus attempts to answer a core set of questions (among others):What is relationship of Islamist groups to the specific sociopolitical contexts from which they emerge? What factors determine groups' tactical and strategic choices? Is Islamism particularly prone to militancy and, if so, why? Drawing on the theoretical and methodological insights produced within various fields-spanning from sociology and psychology, to anthropology and political, along with various case studies (of various global Islamic movements)-the book under review takes an interdisciplinary approach in answering these questions.
Spanning over nine (9) chapters, from Introduction to Conclusion, the book makes discussion on Islamism from diverse point of views, viz: Definitions and representations: the legacy of Orientalism; 'The Fanonian Impulse': Islamism as identity and ideology; Roots and branches: From the Muslim Brotherhood to Hamas; Islamists without borders: al-Qa'ida and its affiliates; Hezbollah: Islamism as obligation to resistance and governance; Bitter harvest: Algerian Islamism; Western Europe: Islamism as Mirror Image; and in the Conclusion, it draws attention to Islamism and a fragmented quest for dignity. In these chapters, the book makes the reader understand through various current and In this volume-by way of answering such questions like what makes a movement Islamist?-Strindberg and Wärn claim that "almost all of the groups and movements examined in these case studies [from Hamas and Hezbollah to Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qa'ida] are to some degree militant" (Ibid.: 7). For them, there are two main reasons for this selection: first, these "major militant groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qa'ida have come to define Western imaginings of Islamism, especially in the wake of 9/11 and the 'global war on terror'"; and secondly, because of their "iconic status, calling attention to the complex social dynamics, political nuances and widely divergent aspirations" have, in fact, "implications for the study of Islamism more generally" (Ibid.).This, then, provides, argues the book, a powerful case for an effort "to critically rethink our assumptions and models for the study of Islamism in general; to acknowledge the intellectual harm caused by neo-Orientalist scholarship, and the disservice it does to the communities it purports to study and to the government officials and policy makers who rely on its findings" (Ibid.).
Without any doubt, Islamist discourse "appear[s] universal, but its interpretations, uses, and implications are numerous" (Ibid.: 7), and thus, the contemporary Islamism has its genesis in a "purposive move" to address, to tackle, and to deal with an "existential threat" (Ibid.: 68). Making discussions, so to say, on Hamas and Hezbollah, Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qai'da, and on Algerian Islamism and on Islamism as "mirror image" in Western Europe, the book challenges the persistent, constant and powerful and dominant myth/allegory that "Islamism is a monolith; a monolith, moreover, that is somehow detached from the various sociopolitical and historical contexts that surround it" (Ibid.:186).
Although, Islamism has emerged, in the past century or so, as one of many political and intellectual currents born in the centrifuge of modernity as a means of dealing with its challenges, in succeeding centuries-as the chapters of this volume demonstrate-different Islamist groups and movements have taken very "different paths in their particular struggles, translating the faith dimension in the different and often conflicting ways, in part depending on whether they have come to emphasize the process of liberation or its objectives -resistance or statehood" (Ibid.: 188). Moreover, the book also makes it emphatically clear that the Islamist struggle must also be understood as a "third wordlist struggle for independence against foreign intrusion and domination, past and present" (Ibid.: 191); and thus, the authors, among others, conclude: The effect of differentiated local contexts and challenges is that groups and movements labeled 'Islamist' have formulated disparate and sometimes flatly contradictory understandings of Islamist ideology and strategy. Islamist movements and thinkers articulate and advocate an array of shifting ideas and tendencies; some inclusive and accommodating of those not like themselves; others implacably hostile and absolutist to everyone outside a narrowly conceived ingroup. Some, like Hamas, have chosen a territorially bounded national path while others, like the jihadists of al-Qa'ida, have developed a transnational narrative and methodology in order to promote their struggle (Ibid.: 194). Furthermore, what also becomes clear is that as Islamist narratives and aspirations went from clashing with colonialism to confrontation with neo-colonialism, it also moved to challenge local post-colonial elites in a struggle for power framed by the turbulence of de-colonization and state building (Ibid.: 195). Finally, Islamism is a "multidimensional paradox", and is, at the end, both "identity and ideology": "it is simultaneously process and objective, tactic and strategy, reality and ideal" and is a "totalizing ambition grounded in the diffusion between the public and private spheres, between the present and the transcendent" (Ibid.: 205). At the same time, the multitude of local contexts out of which Islamism has emerged have forced each individual group and movement to "socially construct its own distinct emphases, its own focus and priorities, its own level of sociopolitical groundedness or abstraction" (Ibid.); and thus the "modalities by which that new reality is sought, however, are diverse and divided" (Ibid.: 206).
One can, and of course one should, differ and disagree with many viewpoints and arguments made by Strindberg and Wärn in the different parts of the volume. But, on the whole, it is a welcome addition to this most interesting and diversely debated theme/topic, and one of the most significant political ideologies of the 21 st century. Making discussions on various facets and aspects of Islamism and providing original and insightful analysis on the emergence and nature, formation and causes of Islamism, it is an interesting read in knowing and exploring, critically and conventionally, Islamism in 21 st century.

Islamism?
But there are other works too, which reveal and divulge on other faces-which are moderateof "Islamism". One such recent attempt is Political Islam in the Age of Democratization(2013) by Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai. 4 It offers a comprehensive view of the complex nature of contemporary political Islam and its relationship to democracy, by focusing on the process of democratization vis-à-vis political Islam or Islamism. Using 'democratization' as a theoretical framework, the book examines and analyses the landscape in which Islamism is evolving (Bokhari and Senzai;2013: 11), and is designed to contribute to the scholarly debate on political Islam. It thus provides a compelling and insightful analysis of Islamism and the role that religion is likely to play in any future Muslim democracy.
Bokahri and Senzai divide Islamists into various categories, like "Participatory", "Conditionalist", "Rejectors" Islamists, and conclude that they have played a central role and will continue to do so in the years and decades ahead as the region transitions through this democratization process. Islamists of varying shades, for Bokari and Senzai, become major players as authoritarian states break down and autocratic leaders lose their grip on power. Their widespread support may wax and wane, but it is not likely to disappear. At the same time, they make it clear that 'Political Islam' refers to "all political manifestations of Islam" from the Prophet to present; while as 'Islamism', an ideology, refers to a 20 th century "response to the Western secular nation-state-based international system" (Ibid.: 19).
Presenting the Islamism and Islamists, present in various countries, as case studies (chapters 4-10) Bokahri and Senzai mention and discuss them with various labels. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood (of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Yemen, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia), the world's first Islamist group is presented as "Participatory Islamists" (chapter 4); Salafis/ Salafism of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states as "Conditionalist Islamists" (chapter 5); Al-Qaeda, Taliban (of Afghanistan and Pakistan) and their transnational and national Jihadismas "Rejector Islamists" (chapters 6 & 7); Iran as "Participatory Shia Islamists" (chapter 8); Iraqi Shia Islamists and Hezbolllah as "Arab "Shia Islamism" (chapter 9); and Turkey's AK Party as a case study for "Post-Islamism" (chapter 10). Some of the central and challenging arguments, Bokahri and Senzai, put forward in this book regarding Islamism and post-Islamism, are: • The Muslim Brotherhood (MB)-in its different periods like 1990s, post-9/11 and post-Arab Spring-represents the most significant example of 'democrats within Islamism' (Ibid.: 74)-a phrase borrowed from the title of Azam Tamimi's book on Rachid Ghanouchi (2001).
• Salafism, a religious trend as opposed to a coherent political ideology, for much of its history has been a non-Islamist force that still suffers from a chronic poverty of political thought (Bokhari and Senzai, 2013: 99).

•
No doubt Islamic Republic of Iran represents the unique case of an Islamist state actor, but Iranian Islamism is not a monolithic, as there is a great deal of diversity among the Iranian' attitudes toward democracy (Ibid.: 147-8).
• Hezbollah, Hizb al-Dawah, and other similar movements had no ideological aversion to democracy (which was due to geo-political considerations and not religious and ideological ideals, thus setting them apart from their Sunni counterparts, who are either conditionalists or rejectors (Ibid.: 167).
• AK Party of Turkey, a prime example of a post-Islamist group making the journey out of Islamism (Ibid.: 173), best exemplifies the "post-Islamism" (Ibid.:182). However, the term "post-Islamism" should rather be understood in a sense that through the AK Party Islamism had achieved political power.
In the Conclusion, (Ibid.: 185-95) Bokhari and Senzai focus on the "Prospects for Muslim Democracies" vis-à-vis Political Islam/Islamism (Ibid.: 185). Examining the democratization and Islamism throughout the Muslim world, through the complex geopolitics of political Islam, the book highlights the political Islam's future trajectory in the post-modern world as well as the theoretical framework of "Muslim democracies" which is likely to emerge in coming decades. They thus conclude, predict, and envisage that • Islamists have played a central role and will continue to do so in the years and decades ahead as the region transitions through this democratization process (Ibid.: 185).Islamists of varying shades become major players as authoritarian states break down and autocratic leaders lose their grip on power. Their widespread support may wax and wane, but it is not likely to disappear (Ibid.).
• Religion will likely play an important role in Muslim politics as this democratization process unfolds (Ibid.); and will play a role in any type of Muslim democracy that emerges from the interplay between participator and conditionalist Islamism and democratization (Ibid.: 194).

•
The outcome of Islamist democratization will likely lead to Muslim democracies, as opposed to Muslim democracy(Ibid.: 186; Italics in original), because-throughout the Muslim world, from Egypt to Iran, Turkey to Pakistanthe majority of Islamists are participatory in regard to democracy (Ibid.: 189) • Islamists will remain an integral part of democratization and strive to capitalize on the popular sentiment to integrate Islam into the political arena (Ibid.: 195).
But, in comparison to making this discourse to be made clear, comprehensionable, and understandable, all this has resulted in creating more confusions, perplexities, and misunderstandings: and the main reason, for this worry and aggravation, is that the Muslims intelligentsia and the Islamic movements who have been branded and categorized under in this 'label', have either been prefixed with such labels as "hard core", "radical" or "moderate" Islamists/ Islamism-or, in Graham Fuller's (2003: xix) terminology, has been characterized by the division of 'radical/fundamentalist' Islamism versus 'modernist' or 'liberal' Islamism.

Conclusion: On the Future of Islamism
The above assessment shows that much has been written on 'Islamism' as a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon, as an interesting and diversely debated discourse, and as one of the most significant, but complex, political ideologies of the 21 st century.But, at the same time, these works reveal that the more this discourse is discussed and debated-from varied viewpoints and perspectives-the more complex and intricate it becomes to conclude what this discourse actually/exactly is. Also, keeping in view its varied definitions and descriptions, as well as its multiple aspects and facets of Islamism, what becomes obvious is that this discourse will continue to be debated and discussed with more zeal and fervor in the coming years as well.
In such a situation, what we find hard, difficult, and challenging, is to answer and predict the future prospects of Islamism. To answer this crucial question, it is worthy to quote the Graham Fuller's insights and from the analysis and conclusions of Cleary and Glazier. Fuller is of the opinion that "Islamism is not the only vehicle for reform and change by any means, but it will be the dominant one, especially in closed societies", but what is true is that "Islamism in some of its current guises will certainly run its course and recede in popularity and importance over time-indeed, that process is already observable in a few more fringe or extremist movements. But Islamism as a phenomenon will never fully disappear, because its message in one sense is timeless for Muslims: that Islam has something important to say about the political and social order. Political Islam will thus evolve and change, divide and unite, wax or wane in its popularity, but it will not disappear" (Fuller, 2003: 14)Similarly, on envisaging of the future of Islamism or political Islam and the role of jihadism in it, Cleary and Glazier (2007: 17) conclude that "it is still unknown" and is "unclear" because "the future of Islamism could lie down either path". What is clear, in their opinion, is that "a lot will depend upon how the movement is framed, who it reaches out to, and who will identify with this new cause".
To conclude, it is difficult at this critical-cumcrucial juncture to argue that whether 'Islamism' is only a 'Political Discourse', an 'Ideology', or summarily a 'Multidimensional Paradox' (Parray, 2015b)or in other words, it is precarious to predict the future prospects of Islamism: only time will reveal what consequences this discourse (in its all representations) discloses? Where it will lead us to? And in what form/ model will it materialize?