The Art of Compromise Legislative Deliberations on Marine Insurance Institutions

Dave De Ruysscher and Jeroen Puttevils look into the complex interaction – typical of the Low Countries – between various stakeholders (economic agents, city government and central government) that shaped the legislation of economic practices. Eschewing top-down (the central government imposes its rules) and bottom-up (merchants sought to have their customs legalised) models, and taking into account the powers enjoyed by city governments in the Low Countries, which were both ample but also constrained by the central government, the authors trace the development of one particular type of contract and transaction – sixteenthcentury marine insurance, a growing sector for which Antwerp became the key centre. By laying bare the negotiation process which preceded the compromise, they find that decisions on the legislation regarding marine insurance were both politically and economically induced. The three major agents (merchants, city government and central government) were not monolithic blocs: within the Antwerp mercantile community different opinions on marine insurance and its legislation could be heard. There were ‘national’ differences and small-time insurance purchasers thought differently about state legislation than their larger colleagues and insurers. Parties with political clout also had a stronger voice in negotiations.


Introduction
The recent synthesis by Oscar Gelderblom on commerce in Bruges, Antwerp and Amsterdam from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries proposes a new perspective on the political economy of trade.Intercity competition and adaptive efficiency of town magistrates in policy-making are put forward as the main reasons for institutional change in the realm of commerce.Cities were incentivised by profits made through trade and therefore tried to cater to the many needs of merchants (as concerning for example, property rights, infrastructure, debt recovery) in order to attract and retain this otherwise highly mobile community.According to Gelderblom, monarchs did little more than acknowledge the autonomy of the governments of commercial towns, leaving them the agency to structure the institutions in their markets.
City magistrates continuously adjusted their municipal legal system to respond to changing commercial strategies of merchants. 2The results of these developments were open-access institutions at the local level, which can be defined as sets of 'rules which apply uniformly to everyone in society, regardless of their identity or their membership in particular groups '. 3 This contribution, which focuses on sixteenth-century Antwerp, challenges Gelderblom's ideas in two respects.First, it zooms in on policymaking by the central government in matters of mercantile contracts.The historical evidence demonstrates that princely officials did not merely back the legislative powers of the Antwerp aldermen in this respect: their actions went beyond occasionally urging local measures or imposing minimal, yet the art of compromise 27 de ruysscher and puttevils irksome, control following complaints. 4Instead, officers and representatives of the central government actively engaged in creating institutional structures.This framework was forged by both the municipal and the princely authorities, which resulted from the institutional intertwinement between both levels of government and from their mutual consultations.
Secondly, this contribution emphasises that decisions of commercial policy, the mechanisms producing them as well as the constraints that lay at their basis were not exclusively economic, but rather both political and economic. 5The processes that produced legislation were fundamentally political, in fact.Even though the growth of commerce might have strengthened the positions of successful trading cities in the Low Countries vis-à-vis the princely authorities there, and in particular in Antwerp, they still remained 'bargaining metropoles' that had to negotiate with their sovereign. 6The Antwerp pensionaris and one of the mayors-aldermen of the city (the buitenburgemeester or 'external burgomaster') represented the municipal government with central institutions such as the Privy Council, the Council of Finance and the Council of Brabant, and they were involved in regular conferences. 7Princely councils in turn involved local governments in their legislative process because of their expertise, and because they were responsible for the implementation of central ordinances.Late medieval and early modern policy-making then, was a combination of deals and diplomacy.
Gelderblom argues moreover, that municipal governments pursued a policy of open access -the Antwerp market and its institutions were open to all merchants -because of mounting market integration and corresponding changes in commercial strategies among merchants. 8Local magistrates sensed what the optimal institutions were in a changing economic environment.
Following on that, they devised new rules or selected conventions from foreign merchants that guaranteed the lowest transaction costs and debt enforcement for their local merchant community, adapting their municipal laws accordingly. 9By doing so, according to Gelderblom, local officials overcame the legal heterogeneity that went together with the presence of the many merchant groups inclined to stick to their own rules and customs. 10The key points for the alternative proposition presented here can be demonstrated in the well-documented and intense debate on the rules and organisation of the market for marine insurance in Antwerp in the third quarter of the sixteenth century. 11Shifts in the Antwerp market around 1550 prompted a reassessment of the legal regime applying to marine insurance.
Under this heated discussion came compulsory registration of contracts, limitation of the number of brokers and their appointment by the authorities, and legal rules underpinning the contracts.These conditions were debated in negotiations between groups of merchants, the authorities of the prince and of the city of Antwerp, and the views of members of each group naturally differed.At the start representatives of the princely government had ideas that were in some respects stricter than those of the other political players.
These central officials in Brussels, as well as some large insurers, preferred compulsory registration of contracts and centralised brokering.Such policies, however, were fiercely opposed by the groups of occasional and smaller insurance underwriters and insurance purchasers.The local Antwerp the art of compromise 29 de ruysscher and puttevils government was also reluctant to devise terms of contract intended to serve as a standard in marine insurance negotiations and hesitated with regard as to which measures were necessary.However, once the Antwerp leaders were convinced to draw up rules of thumb on the contents of contracts, they -and also the princely commissioners -acknowledged contractual provisos that had been crafted by merchants, among them a couple that were even rejected by merchants of some nations (as these groups of foreign residents were commonly called).As a result of all this negotiating, it took some fifteen years before positions changed and a legislative framework could be set up that provided for standard rules of contract shared by all players in the Antwerp insurance market.Even so, although it had already been additionally decided in compromises, centralised registration of contracts remained vulnerable to contestation.

Antwerp marine insurance in the middle of the sixteenth century: a market in transition meets with swift princely actions
In the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries marine underwriting was exported from Spanish and Italian cities to Bruges. 12When at the end of the fifteenth century Antwerp took over from Bruges as a result of the Flemish Revolt against Maximilian of Austria, many foreign merchants who had been trading in Bruges also moved on to Antwerp, taking with them their knowhow in insurance.Around 1520 premium insurance thus became occasionally practised in Antwerp, and it rose steadily in popularity among larger groups of merchants there when, around the turn of the 1520s, brokers offered services of premium underwriting at the Antwerp Exchange. 13tionally, a premium contract of marine insurance (a policy) was signed by one or more underwriters (insurers), who stipulated the payment of a sum of money for losses resulting from the various perils of naval trade (usually encompassing shipwreck, seizure or capture by pirates or privateers and the like).Premium insurance could be for parts of value of a ship or of merchandise.Typical was that premium underwriters themselves were neither vendors nor charterers of the insured merchandise.When a merchant wanted to cover the risk of shipping his merchandise, he contacted a broker.
The broker thereupon solicited merchants for insurance, thus negotiating the price (the premium) and the portion of value to be insured.The premium  de ruysscher and puttevils was expressed as a percentage of the insured value. 14If the risk was high, the premium was a higher percentage.Data as to the route of the vessel, the state of the ship and the season of travel was communicated by the brokers.That information in turn allowed insurers to assess the risks that they were taking and to adapt the premium rate accordingly. 15When the risk materialised the underwriters were obliged to pay out compensation, which corresponded to the value that they had insured.In Antwerp insurers were supposed to pay within two months following the substantiated claim of the insured.When a ship had gone missing and no tidings had been received though, the insured could not provide proof of loss.Under those circumstances, after one year he was entitled to forfeit his ownership of the insured cargo or ship to his insurers in exchange for the compensation that was agreed upon. 16 the 1530s and even in the 1540s, insurers in Antwerp were nearly always Italians or Spaniards.In the first decades of the sixteenth century, many shipments to the Low Countries had been insured with premium underwriters outside Antwerp, at Bruges for example 17 , and also abroad.
Thus in the 1490s and early 1500s premium insurance policies were signed at Burgos, for example, for alum transports from Mazarrón and Cartagena, as well as for shipments of wool and pastel from Bilbao and Bordeaux to the Southern Netherlands. 18From around 1520, when premium insurance was eventually offered at Antwerp, it were initially the Antwerp-based merchants from southern Europe who practised it there, as purchasers and as Around mid-century the Antwerp insurance market underwent new transformations that put pressure on the balance of interests in insurance contracts and on the mechanisms of contract formation at play.The ledgers of the Spanish insurance broker and Antwerp resident Juan Henriquez reveal an intriguing insight into this changing insurance market.In his time Henriquez was the most prominent marine insurance broker in Antwerp and in the period from 1 August 1562 to 24 September 1563 his business was so vibrant and voluminous that he dominated the brokerage market. 23Henriquez registered the identities of merchant-charterers and insurers, the destinations and the insured values for 1,621 insurance policies. 24The policies concerned marine insurance for cargos shipped to and from the Iberian Peninsula, the Mediterranean, (western) Africa, the American and Asian colonies, France, Britain and northern Europe.The accounts for each insurer and policy holder allow a breakdown of the insurance activities of both groups.

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From this data (Table 1) it is evident that by the early 1560s the Antwerp sector for marine insurance had become more international.Iberian and Italian merchants were still figuring prominently as underwriters but they had been joined by many more merchants from the Low Countries.Moreover, the books of Juan Henriquez show that in the early 1560s occasional and small-scale underwriters and policy holders, who were more often Netherlanders than before, participated in the insurance sector as well. 26Opening up the Antwerp insurance market proved a distinct challenge for the existing infrastructure: before about 1550 most parties that were involved in insurance had belonged to the same circles of elitist financiers and traders.As a result, constraints in insurance contracting had hinged on reciprocal sociability and reputation management, which occasionally -when insured and underwriter had the same nationality -could be enforced by the leaders of their nation. 27As interests expanded however, with insurers and policy holders coming from a growing and diverse group of traders, the market was becoming more anonymous.
On top of these challenges caused by market growth and increased interaction, the Antwerp insurance market was hit by an exogenous shock in the later 1540s and early 1550s: raids of Scottish and French privateers caused an increase in the litigation between policy holders and insurers waged before the Antwerp municipal court of aldermen.Registered deeds of judgment of the years mentioned demonstrate that lawyers for marine underwriters repeatedly attempted to refute the many claims for compensation with which they were confronted. 28As early as 1548 these events triggered the interest of Mary of Hungary, the governess-general of the Netherlands, who asked her councillors to report on what was transpiring in the Antwerp insurance market. 29An initial action in response to the problems then, came from the central government.Following the councillors' advice, drafts of legislation were drawn up, the contents of which reveal a notable change in policy.the art of compromise

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Whereas in 1537 a princely ordinance had regulated the enforcement of claims from marine insurance contracts 30 , in 1548 the central government of the Netherlands went one step further.Until then projects of ordinance mostly concerned the arming of ships and the fitting-out of convoys, for it was thought that insured ships were less armed and thus more prone to capture.Here however, even though the purpose of the ordinance was to reduce the use of marine insurance, for the first time rules were also fixed for determining the contents of marine insurance contracts.Furthermore, these rules were devised as open-access institutions: they would apply to all parties to insurance contracts made in Antwerp, irrespective of their status or nation.
The princely actions thus conformed to the open access policy of the Antwerp municipal court in matters of marine insurance.However, in contrast to the Antwerp aldermen-judges, the princely initiative was concerned not merely with rules of procedure and debt recovery (as demonstrated below) but also with contractual content.In the earliest stages of the proposal princely councillors were asked to seek the opinions of merchants with expertise in the matter. 31Their consultations with merchants (among them members of the Castilian consulate in Bruges), captains and seamen of ports in the Low Countries took place in 1549, and draft ordinances were distributed and amended with their comments. 32One such draft, dating from June 1549, limited the portion of merchandise that could be insured to one third for ships that did not sail to the Mediterranean; in addition, versions of the ordinance also ruled out hull insurance policies.When the subsequent princely law was finally issued in January 1550 though, it allowed for some open-access terms of insurance contracts providing for example, that any marine insurance of cargo would encompass a maximum of nine tenths of its value 33 , while also  Collections artistiques de l'Université de Liège.
the art of compromise 37 de ruysscher and puttevils permitting hull insurance policies under certain conditions. 34It seems then, that the opinions of consulted merchants had indeed been taken into account.

An outsider's proposal
In October 1555, Giovanni Battista Ferrufini, a merchant who had probably come from Piedmont but who by that time resided in Antwerp, submitted a petition to the Council of Finance of the Netherlands.In his official request he complained about daily discussions and lawsuits in Antwerp, and about the 'deceit and abuse' ('tromperies et abuz') in marine underwriting in that city.Ferrufini proposed to make it mandatory for all merchants engaging in marine insurance policies in Antwerp to have their insurance contracts drawn up by a public broker.This official would devise the contents of insurance contracts in the 'best form possible' and arrange for their authentication with the sovereign's seal by an assistant notary.This certification served the purpose of distinguishing the policies from other -unofficial -contracts, which were not able to be brought to court.Ferrufini clearly intended to make a profit: without calling it by its name, his proposal actually comprised a monopoly combining insurance brokerage with said registration.Moreover, he proposed to establish the function of public broker in the form of an office, which was to be granted to a beneficiary ad vitam.Ferrufini asked the prince to award him the office in exchange for an annual sum of 500 guilders (£ 83.33 gr.Fl.), which would be paid for the remainder of his life after a trial period of ten years, a remunerative proposal for the central government.Ferrufini would furthermore profit from his proposal to charge for each insurance contract 0.25 percent of the value insured. 35en so, some features of Ferrufini's request point to the fact that its author was not firmly embedded in the Antwerp insurance scene.To his petition a statement was added that had been signed by thirty-three Antwerpbased merchants of different nationalities, supporting Ferrufini's project, and which confirmed the mentioned brokerage rate as being common in Antwerp.
Notwithstanding the fact that these merchants declared they insured freights, this rate was true for only a minority of them.Six of the merchants endorsing Ferrufini's proposal were mentioned as insurers in the accounts of Henriquez, dating a few years later, and six as insurance purchasers, among them four of the former six underwriters.the art of compromise 39 de ruysscher and puttevils the added statement on their own behalf.However, consulting usually also involved local magistrates and stakeholders (as will be seen below).
What is more, the outsider characteristics of 42 They regarded procedural periods of payment of compensation by the underwriters (two months, one year), the sharing of damages that had been produced during the saving of a ship over all those having freights in that ship (i.e.gross or general average) and the rule that insurance after loss was legitimate only if the insured had been unaware of the loss.The possibility for an insurance purchaser to forfeit his rights of ownership on insured merchandise to the underwriters of the insurance contract, after one year, was also described as a custom.See: aca, v, deeds of judgment of the amc: 1239, f. 117v and f. 138v (19 July 1544).On the sharing of damages: aca, v, 1241, f. 104r (16 July 1547), f. 283r (8 March 1548 n.s.), 1244, f. 61r (24 December 1555), and f. 126v (12 March 1556 n.s.).On the lawfulness of insurance after loss: aca, v, deeds of judgment of the amc, 1241, f. 49r (7 May 1547), 1242, f. 51v ( 10April 1548 n.s.) and 1238, f. 62r (17 September 1543).
article -artikel contracts. 43Ferrufini admitted this practice to a certain extent in his 1557 additions as well, because he insisted on the need for a princely law, which he stated was necessary because customs of Antwerp regarding marine insurance had 'not been declared' ('ne fusrent oncques déclairés'). 44 To his 1557 clarifications Ferrufini thus added a standard policy, containing what he considered to be 'the style' and 'the customs' of contracts of marine insurance in Antwerp.Given the sparse number of existing Antwerp insurance customs and the lack of rules relating to provisions in insurance contracts, Ferrufini had devised a common style of insurance policies in his model standard contract, rather than defending an existing one.The mandatory insurance contract that he proposed, in addition to his call for princely legislation imposing it, can be considered arguments underscoring Ferrufini's largely pretended aim for the common good.Notwithstanding, Ferrufini's contribution to the development of Antwerp marine insurance lay in the fact that he was the first to submit a proposal of extant legislation regulating many terms of contract in response to fraudulent practices and general lack of security in the insurance sector.Ferrufini anticipated princely concerns therefore, which had become public in the central government's law of 1550 and in another one of 1551 45 , and he set in motion a process that would ultimately bring about standards for terms in insurance contracts in the Antwerp market.

From consultation to protest to legislative negotiations
The central authorities responded to Ferrufini's petition by seeking additional information.The Council of Finance delegated the issue to Gaspar 44 Génard, 'Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini', 203; Moscarda, 'L'italiano Giovan Battista Ferrufini', 82.

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Schetz for analysis.As trading agent of the sovereign, Schetz was one of the 'principal merchants' close to the monarch and he had expertise in marine underwriting. 46Although he had endorsed Ferrufini's claims by signing the added statement regarding the brokerage remuneration, he was appointed to carry out further investigation.A conflict of interests of this kind was not unusual.'Principal merchants', among them supporters of Ferrufini's proposal, were thought to represent the community of all merchants in Antwerp 47even if they were not unanimous in their opinions -and to be leading experts in mercantile matters. 48In his report Schetz confirmed that the Antwerp insurance market was quite chaotic and required princely regulation, namely with a mandatory contract form; he also favoured Ferrufini's proposal that one officer centralise the writing and registration of all policies, but he added that more had to be paid to the treasury of the prince.Already at that time Schetz expected disagreement among Antwerp's merchants. 49On 5 December 1556 Schetz' report was sent to the Antwerp magistracy for further counsel on the feasibility of Ferrufini's projects and on the wishes of merchants. 50These actions therefore make evident that -in contrast to Ferrufini -the princely authorities aimed at seeking legislation that was broadly backed by the Antwerp government and its resident merchants.
In the following years these endeavours at consulting resulted in a joint undertaking in which princely and foremost municipal commissioners sought to draw up an ordinance containing rules that were likely to be accepted by merchants trading in Antwerp.This enterprise was another consequence of protests against the Ferrufini proposal.Reactions materialised in October 1557 and in February 1558, when the plans became known in their entirety.Notably, the lobbying efforts mentioned above did not concern nations arguing in favour of the law of their home region 62 , even though discussions most probably also touched upon some insurance techniques that were not accepted by every nation. 63This topic had much to do with a conviction that in contractual matters local law had to apply.The rulers of the Genoese nation for example, stressed that it was the Antwerp aldermen who issued an article -artikel ordinance, and not the princely government. 64All the petitioners of February 1558 recognised the need for reform but insisted that any project of ordinance should necessarily be deliberated in conjunction with merchants, both because of their expertise and in order to seek their consent. 65Theretofore, consultations had been the normal practice, and merchants stressed that they should also be involved in devising terms of contract and rules of thumb.In other words, the majority of merchants did not protest against an ordinance regulating the contents of contracts.Instead, they reacted against the restrictions of controlled brokerage, against registration and against unilaterally imposed legislation.
From October 1557 onwards, the Antwerp magistracy delayed In the early autumn of 1558 Ferrufini gave in and downsized his plans further by agreeing to the free choice of brokers instead of the earlier proposed monopoly of four who were to assist the official registrar. 68Near the end of December 1558 and following negotiations with merchants and city officials, the four commissioners mentioned wrote a compromise text, together with a form of insurance contract.In spite of the opposition to monopolised registration, this compromise stated that a superintendent would write down all insurance contracts, yet it did confirm that brokerage was to remain free.The superintendent could only act as broker if the parties chose him as such.The mandatory standard insurance contract that was added to the 1558 project was in some respects close to the one that had been submitted by the art of compromise

1
The authors wish to thank John Eyck, the editors of bmgn -Low Countries Historical Review and the anonymous reviewers for the corrections on earlier versions of this text.2 O. Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce: The Institutional Foundations of International Trade in the Low Countries, 1250-1650 (Princeton 2013) 2. 3 S. Ogilvie and A.W. Carus, 'Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective', in: P. Aghion and S.N.Durlauf (eds.),Handbook of Economic Growth (Amsterdam etc. 2014) 403-513, 429.

Gelderblom,
Cities of Commerce, 119 (Charles V insisting on procedural reform following complaints) and 120-121 (the Duke of Alba imposing the appointment of a commissioned registrar of insurance policies, without infringing on the competences of the Antwerp judges in insurance matters).Ibid., 199-200.W. Blockmans, 'Voracious States and Obstructing Cities: An Aspect of State Formation in Preindustrial Europe', Theory and Society 18 (1989) 233.Also: Ch.Tilly and W. Blockmans, Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800 (Boulder 1994); D. Stasavage, States of Credit: Size, Power, and the Development of European Polities (Princeton 2011).7 G. Marnef, Antwerp in the Age of Reformation: Underground Protestantism in a Commercial Metropolis, 1550-1577 (Baltimore 1996) 18-19.8 Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce, 201-203.9 Ibid.10 Ibid., 13-14, 133.article -artikel However, as will be demonstrated in what follows, despite the fact that growth and expanding networks invited institutional adaptations, the concrete openaccess solutions crafted by the magistracy of the cities and the officers of the central government were not fully determined by the phenomena named by Gelderblom.Rather, rules prescribing and regulating the contents of contracts were the product of a frequently long search for a compromise between authorities of the municipal and central governments, members of their political elite and groups of traders, all with different levels of enterprise and political clout.In point of fact, all of them had varying views on whether an open-access policy was appropriate and on what open-access rules of contract should look like, views that did not per se depend on the laws of the home regions of foreign merchants, yet which were not devoid of power play and particularism.
12 J.P. van Niekerk, The Development of the Principles of Insurance Law in the Netherlands from 1500 to 1800 I (Kenwyn 1998) 7, 201.13 For the importance of the Antwerp Exchange in the dispersal of premium insurance at Antwerp in the first half of the sixteenth century, consult: D. De ruysscher, 'Antwerp 1490-1590: Insurance and Speculation', in: A. Leonard (ed.), Marine Insurance: Origins and Institutions: 1300-1850 (London 2015).
in peaceful waters towards a harbour.However, many ships stranded or sunk in the treacherous coastal waters.Notice the cannons providing protection to the ship and its cargo.Engraving by Hieronymus Cock after an original by Pieter Brueghel the Elder (1565).Museum Plantin-Moretus/Prentenkabinet ( Antwerp).

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Heavily armed ships were one of the options to protect one's commodities but they too could meet stormy weather, heavy seas and marine creatures.Engraving by Hieronymus Cock after an original byPieter Brueghel the Elder (c.1541-1560).
Ferrufini's proposals are shown clearly by their contents.In his petition Ferrufini referred to the 'commun stille ès escriptures et polis des dictes assurances' (the common style in contracts and policies of said insurance) 40 , and later, when in April 1557 he clarified some of his ideas, he claimed that brokers often falsely presented new practices and provisions of contract as usages and customs ('soubz umbre de cesdictz uz et coutumes'). 41However, even though Ferrufini envisaged these notions as reflecting rules of thumb and as having commonly known contents, since he did not define them in any way, not many of these rules were known in the Antwerp insurance business around 1555.In the period between 1488 and 1555, deeds of judgment of the Antwerp municipal court of aldermen contain only few references to 'customs' relating to marine underwriting and naval accidents that were brought forward as arguments in the courtroom.Moreover, although such mentions of customs concerned open access rules that were imposed by the municipal court on all members of the urban mercantile community, they mostly related to procedural issues and delays and they did not so much concern actual terms of insurance. 42As for the contents of contracts, there were virtually no municipal or mercantile standards.As late as the 1560s the nation of Castilians in Bruges emphasised that no one knew what the marine insurance customs of Antwerp regarding contractual provisions were, even though around that time reference was commonly made to the 'customs of the Antwerp Exchange' in insurance 40 agrb, pea, 145, f. 136r (request of Giovanni Battista Ferrufini to the Council of Finance, 1 October 1555).See also: P. Génard, 'Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini et les assurances maritimes à Anvers au XVIe siècle', Bulletin de la Société de géographie d'Anvers 7 (1882) 197; D. Moscarda, 'L'italiano Giovan Battista Ferrufini, sovrintendente alle Assicurazioni in Anversa', in: E. Capuzzo and E. Maserati (eds.),Per Carlo Ghisalberti: Miscellanea di Studi (Napels 2003) 80.All historians writing on Ferrufini's proposal (including Jan Goris, Emile Coornaert, Wilfrid Brulez, Hans Pohl, up to Gelderblom) based their accounts on Génard's article; therefore, they will not be cited hereafter.41 aca, pk, 1019/120, Further explanations by Giovanni Battista Ferrufini, April 1557.See also: Génard, 'Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini', 204; Moscarda, 'L'italiano Giovan Battista Ferrufini', 83.

43
See: S.M. Coronas González, 'La ordenanza de seguros maritimos del consulado de la nación de España en Brujas', Anuario de historia del derecho 54 (1984) 390, footnote 18 '[...] el qual uso y costumbre [of Antwerp] nunca se a visto por escrito, ny ay persona que sepa el dicho uso ny costumbre [...]'; Ch.Verlinden, 'Code d'assurances maritimes selon la coutume d'Anvers, promulgué par le consulat espagnol de Bruges en 1569', Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor de uitgave der Oude Wetten en Verordeningen van België 16 (1950) 60 (referring to the introduction to the French printed version).It seems that this remark concerned the ongoing situation of confusion as to standards in terms of contract, and that it did not follow on from differences between the 1563 princely law (see further) and practices of the Antwerp municipal court.The references to 'customs of the Antwerp Exchange' in insurance contracts, from the later 1550s onwards, do not point to a set of customs, but rather to general insurance practices (especially when combined with a reference to the customs of the London Strada, which was still common in the 1560s) or to mercantile usages known in Antwerp and/ or (mostly procedural) practices of the Antwerp municipal court in matters of insurance.

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plans.The Antwerp aldermen, who had not ventured in detailing rules of thumb with regard to clauses of contract, also hesitated because it proved impossible to reach a compromise.66The repeated protest then turned efforts toward consulting into full negotiations about the contents of a princely ordinance, which now also involved the Antwerp municipal leaders.In the summer of 1558 the princely government responded to the petitions, which the Antwerp magistracy had forwarded, by appointing new commissioners Gaspar Schetz, Lazarus Tucher, Gaspar Ducci and Anton Palos.67This selection of a group of commissioners from different communities (Dutch, German, Italian and Portuguese merchants) further reflects the particularist tendencies of nations, despite the fact that they had formally joined forces against Ferrufini's schemes in February 1558.

origin Estimated number of merchants active in Antwerp Number of insurers % of total insured value Number of policy holders % of total insured value
Table 1.Underwriters and policy holders brokered by Juan Henriquez by merchant group in 1562-1563.25 23 Henriquez was mentioned by name in the standard policy form imposed by the central government in October 1563, and was in his time considered essentially monopolous.See: (Leiden 2004) 258, footnote 186.In Antwerp some £ 583,856 gr.Fl. was brokered by Juan Henriquez in the period of August 1562 until September 1563.In February 1558, it was said that some other brokers (their number is unknown) earned between 200 and 300 guilders (£ 33 to £ 50 gr.Fl.) yearly in insurance brokering (aca, Privilegiekamer (hereafter pk), 1019, 127 (petition, February 1558)), which (Master's thesis, Ghent University 1967).25 Source: Wastiels, Juan Henriquez, 870-884.Merchant group size estimates are based on: W. Brulez, 'De handel', in: W. Couvreur (ed.), Antwerpen in de XVIde eeuw (Antwerpen 1975) 128-131; Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce, 33.
36For six others, indications are that they -artikel were insurance underwriters at some point in their life. 37vertheless, the other (nineteen) endorsing merchants do not appear to have been involved in insurance in Antwerp.38All of them did belong to the highest stratum of the mercantile community of the city though.They included prominent bankers and royal representatives, such as Anton Palos, who was the agent of the Portuguese king, and Lazarus Tucher, who had been financial agent of the Habsburg emperor.It is likely that Ferrufini matched the same profile of outsider: there are no traces of his being involved in insurance, as policy holder or underwriter, before October 1555.

Table 2 .
51Afterwards, many merchants residing in Antwerp who did not agree with Ferrufini's intended monopolisation of the brokering and registration of insurance contracts, submitted elaborate petitions to the Antwerp government.52Intotal,nolessthan165merchantsroseupagainstFerrufini'splans.53Entiregroups of foreign merchants trading in Antwerp were mobilised in the protest.In the turmoil nine of Ferrufini's former supporters changed sides.54Togaugepotentiallydifferentinterestswithin the mercantile community (larger versus smaller insurers and insurancetakers), the present study has linked the names of those of who endorsed the 1555 Ferrufini proposal and the names of the protesters with the 1562-1563 accounts of Juan Henriquez, the aforementioned marine insurance broker, thereby determining the extent of their marine insurance activities.Position in regard to the Ferrufini-proposals of underwriters and policy holders brokered by Juan HenriquezIn October 1557 protesters reacted against the intended monopolisation in brokerage and registration.In February 1558 protest grew even stronger, despite the fact that Ferrufini had adjusted his initial plans to some extent.Specifically, some prominent members of Italian nations had argued that elected merchants should be appointed as brokers or registrars of insurance contracts.57Inresponse,Ferrufiniproposedthat,next to one 'superintendent', who was meant to act as registrar, there would be four commissioned brokers.58As a result of this proposal, important nations or foreign communities could elect a member to oversee insurance contracts and receive commissions.Moreover, the leaders of the Genoese nation lobbied for appointed merchants writing the insurance ordinance 59 as well as a model for the insurance contract.60Lobbyingefforts stopped though, because of protests advanced by the majority of merchants -for a large part small-scale insurance purchasers and underwriters -in favour of freedom in selecting brokerage.They considered the softened monopoly of centralised registration and brokerage by way of four commissioners to be a significant breach of mercantile liberties, and their protest caused those advocating the four-broker model to concede.In February 1558, merchants of all nations - 56 Source: Génard, 'Jean-BaptisteFerrufini', 210-  212, 233, 247; Wastiels, Juan Henriquez, 870-884.Abbreviation St. Dev. in table: standard deviation.amongthemearlier supporters of Ferrufini and leaders of the Genoese nation -subsequently stressed that they should be able to choose their insurance broker freely, as well as the clauses of the contracts, and that no registrar should be appointed.61 aca, pk, 1019/98, Petition, s.d., in Italian, proposing four elected brokers assisted by a scrivener and 100, Petition of merchants, s.d., early 1558, 62 aca, pk, 1019/100, Petition of merchants, s.d., early 1558 and 119, Petition of the Genoese nation, s.d., early 1558.63An example is barratry, which was loss due to the conduct of the captain or his crew.In the midsixteenth century, it was not accepted in Genoa and in Spanish insurance centers, whereas in the Low Countries, London and Rouen it was a risk in A model contract was at some point proposed by Italian merchants.See aca, pk, 1019/186, Short report, s.d.Génard, 'Jean-Baptiste Ferrufini', 215-232.cargo insurance policies for which underwriters commonly provided coverage.See G. Rossi, Insurance in Elizabethan London: The London Book of Order (PhD University of Cambridge 2012) 173-176; Van Niekerk, The Development, vol. 1, 376-379.