The Case of New Immigrants from the CIS in Israel

The wavu of ,ll.!w i s h um igrat i o n from thu fil rmur Sov i et U n ion s i ncu tlw l a t u 1 980s h: u; cru: ll.ud var iou� gro u p� , iduological trunds and new political movemunt. s . ' l 'hu su t .L i n g u p o f po l i t ica l o rgan i zat ions among thu nuw i m m igrants in ) � rau l is p rusuntud h u ru a� a ruacti o n to powur-rulations , both with i n the Russ i an J u w i ;; h co m m u n i t y, a n d i n t l w l s rau l i soc iuty a rou nd it . 'l'h i s p a p u r p resun ts sonw u m p i r· i c fi n d i n gs of my fi u l d-work, con d u cted i n l s raul i n 1994 , about the dyna m ics o f t hu i nvolvement of new i mmigrants i nto Israeli 's political l i fe, their polit ical tenden ­ cius a n d thu acti v i t ius oftheir leaders . 1\vo political movements are presented h e ru: J . ) tlw i ndupundunt party of nuw i m m i grants, basud on tlw rupresentati vu� o f t hu Hu� s i a n-J uw i sh intl.!iligentsia, who considur Hussian and Hussian-Jewish culture and h istory to be com monly sh ared . On the other side they reali ze that in ord e r to mobi l i w w idu � u pport among thu potentia l Is raeli voters they have to �earch f i lr a special strategy to combine diflerent identities and ethnic symbols ; 2.) the ultra­ national ist movement of new i m m i grants , based on representati ves of the exist i ng ultra-Right parties , trying to unite the Russian Jews against the governm ental policy on the territories after the peace agreement with the Palestinians. Some aspect s o f the relat ionsh i p between n ew i m m igrants and Israeli Arabs, which l ead to the te nde ncy of many Russi an Jews to identify themselves with the ideas of the ultra-Right parties , are analysed as well .

The wave of Jewish immigration fr om the CIS since the late 80s has created various groups, ideological trends and political movements, about which little is known. Though it is consid ered to be the biggest "aliya" ' in the history of Israel, and though the problems of absorption of new "olim"2 occupied one of the most important places in Israeli inner politics and everyday life of the society, it remains a neglected area in anthropological research. Knowledge about this immigration is restricted to common gloomy associations with "professors with brooms", "girls-prostitutes in massage saloons", "hungry people, collecting rotten tomatoes at night at the market", or "playing the accordion in rainy streets". These images, especially when fe a tured in the Israeli press and used at the ros trum of the Knesset3, could teach one more about the social and political needs of those who create them, than about the new immigrants themselves.
Though the policy of "kli ta yeshara" (direct absorption), was accepted a few years ago with the aim to avoid the isolation of new immi grants fr om Israeli society (previously they were concentrated in Centres of Absorption), the new immigrants fo und their own ways and mechanisms to remain together in their "Rus sian circles", in the environment, where the language and information sources for their ori entation in Israel is available and convenient. The term "the ethnic community of Russian Jews" in Israel became one of the strongest categories of group-identity. This situation led to the raise of a class-hierarchy among the immigrants, to the emergence of a Russian Jewish elite and leadership, and to the creation of new ideological ::;tre<:un::;. But on the other side, rer naining i::;olated from other J::;raeliH, deve l op ing a dependency on governmen ta l and public organiwtions (Huch as the Ministry of Ab sorption, the M inistry of Science, the Jew i sh Agen cy, etc.), the new immigrants showed little iniere::;i in public afl�tirs and politics . They declared thai "their purpose is to surv ive eco nomically and culturally". The few very half� hearted attempts of new immigrants to form political parties on an ethnic basis, initiated by "vaii ki m" (i mmigrant-vetera ns, who arrived in Israel during the previous waves of "aliya', in the 70s and 80s), !�tiled in the e l ections ofl992 .
Tn t h e course of time, th e "ol im" learned Hebrew, the principles of po litics and the pol it ica I culture of th e Israeli society, which led th em to change their own id entity and to find their way in different pol itical and public organiza tions. This paper presents some empirical find ings of a field-work conducted in Israel at the end of 1993 -beginning of 1994, about political tendencies among new immigrants, the activi ties of"aliya" leaders and involvement of"olim" in th e political life of the country.
The central theme of thi s study is the dy namics of the involvement of new immigrants in Israel's political life. The purpose is twofol d: 1) to present two specific political movements of Russian Jews; 2) to explain why the use of symbols plays an important role in the relation ship between new immigrants and Israeli poli ticians.
The two organizations, which I intend to describe in this paper belong to the "Right" wing oflsraeli politics. I shall ask why many Russian Jews sympathize with and join Right-wing move ments. This question is particularly relevant because it was precisely the support ofRussian Jewish "olim" that tipped the balance of power in favour of the Labour Party in the 1992 elec tions. The recent setting up of Right-oriented organizations of new immigrants could be the outcome of a number of reasons: disappoint ment of the "olim" with the policy of the "Left" government, wide propaganda of the "Right" opposition and constant tensions between Jews and Arabs, either living in the occupied territo ries or in Israel itself. In this paper I shall seek to analyze these aspects more explicitly. I shall 46 try to ::;how how the "olim" form their ethnic identity in l::;rueli society and how they :;et up their organizations, by making usc of sym bols and m ean i ngs of these identities. Symbols and their interpretation play one ofthc most impor tant roles in the fi>rgi ng of the political and ethnic identity ofRussian-Jcwish "olim". I shall try to show how different forms of"olim" organ ization represent various ways of shapi n g iden tity. On the other hand, I shall dwell on the means, used by the "aliya" leaders for the polit ical mobilization of new i mmigran ts, one of which is the interpretation of the "aliya" sym bols for their own political purposes. Conclud i ng, I shall sum up the findings ofthis study.

Key fa cts and theoretical background
To understand the chain of events in Israel and in the fo rmer Soviet Union, which led to the new political developments among the Russian Jews, one needs some background information on immigration in Israel in general, and on the Russian-Jewish immigration in the 90s in par ticular.
The Law of Return (passed by the Israeli Knesset in 1949) recognizes the right of all Jews in th e world to settle in Israel. Immigration embodied the most important issue of Zionism: Jews constitute a national group, which seeks self-determination in Israel, which is consid ered to be their historical land.
The first Jewish immigrants to Palestine mostly came from Eastern Europe and Russia. But after the establishment of Israel in 1948, the majority of Jewish immigrants came fr om the Middle East and North Africa. The ethnic gap between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews, together with differences in economic and edu cational opportunities, led to tensions between these two groups of the population. The trau matic experiences of Sephardic Jews during their absorption in a new country led to wide debates on how new immigrants should be treated and even questioning the necessity of mass "aliya" in general. A contribution to this debate was also made by Israeli Arabs -anoth er ethnic group, mostly hostile to any new wave of Jewish "aliya".
In the 60s-70s the immigration of Jews fr om the former Soviet Union begun; approximately 230.000 "olim" arrived during Lhc two decades. In the 80s immigration ceased altogether. In the period between 1989 and l 993, however, more th an 550.000 Russian Jew::; arrived to Israel. One of th e reasons fu r th is increase in the immigration in nux was the rcsuli ufthc rad ical chango in th e emigration policy of th e Soviet government in l 986, which was continued by the present leadersh ip ofRus::;ia, and the deci sion of the United States not to grant entry permission to Russian Jews, who had received an Israeli entry visa.
The Russian Jewish "aliya" generated a dras tic increase in the housing budget. A lot of poor small towns in the Negev and in the North of Israel became populated by Russian Jews, which led to the ethno-culiural change of these areas, where previously mainly Sephardic Jews lived.
The character of cities drastically changed, with Russian becoming the second, and in some areas th e prime spoken language. Many street inscriptions in the center of Tel -Av iv and Jeru salem are written in both Hebrew and Russian, and sometimes only in Russian; the "radio station for new immigrants" (REKA) broad casts 10 hours per day, including Saturdays, and there are more than 40 periodicals in Rus sian; new "Russian literature clubs" were opened and even a "Russian" theatre ("Gesher") per fo rms in two languages.
These fa cts illustrate a community-building process of Russian Jews in Israel. This is a new development in which a new political and eth nic identity is fo rged. The anthropological meth ods of research provide an extremely useful tool for the study of the way in which the "Russian Jewish" cultural identity has been shaped and how it is reflected in the behaviour of the "olim". It also allowed me to observe and to elucidate their tendency to belong to a specific ethnic group and to re-create "old-new" norms, which regulate their life style and political involve ment.

Theoretical remarks
Some theoretical comments are important here, since we deal with the terms "ethnicity" and "ethnic identity" of Russian Jews. Wherever· a movement of people occu rs fr om one country to another the main problem they have to fa ce is thei r economic ::;urvival in the new place. Thai is why dealing with the concept of "ethniciiy" one has to take into account that one is dealing with "varying expressions of ethnic identity ... which is th e matter of perception, but th ai perception is shaped and coloured by its ::;ucial environment" (Epstein 1978: 27).
Barth gives emphasis to the fa ct, thai "eih n ic groups arc categories of ascription and iden tification by the actors themselves" (Barth l 969: 10). To the extent thai "these actors usc ethnic identity to categorize themselves and others for purposes of interaction" (Barth 1969: 13f.), they shape "ethnic" organizations. These organiza tions may use ethnic identity for various needs, for example political ones.
Thus, fo llowing these approaches, "ethnici iy" here is a combination of identity and ration al calculation. Ethnic behaviour is considered as a political phenomenon, which involves a struggle for power between groups of different ethnic origin and the defence of collective inter ests within one common social context.
The migration fr om one country to another could only be dealt with by describing the immi grant's social world of changes. This description will bring us to a better understanding of the transition experienced by the migrants (Marx 1990: 191). This method ofstudy focuses on both continuity and impact with reference to his/her fo rmer position and status as an individual, as well as on the political influence and self-iden tification in the new country. In this study it will be shown how the previous high professional and economic situation of the Jews in Russia and their new position in Israel influence each other and affe ct their image in their own com munity and in Israeli society in general.

Political tendencies among Russian Jewish "olim"
In the early days of the Russian-Jewish immi gration, in 1988-89, the "olim" were considered ready-made and "natural" supporters of the Likud party, since they had an antipathy for the socialist tradition of the system in the fo rmer Sov iet Union. The "conventional wisdom" was th at Ru :-� s i a n Jews would have nothing to do with the socialist Labour party. In a dd i tion, as they came f'rom a va::;t country w ith a h i ::;t ory of' mili ta ry conquests, they also would not under stand w hy a s m all country should give up terri tory. As a result ol't he::;e consideration:;, Likud'::; electoral propaganda in the Russian language for the 1992 electi on , attacked Labour':; policy as ruinous socialism with "empty ::;logan:;, red flags and May Day pa rade". Labour, in turn fo cused on the widespread feeling that the Likud govern ment had fumbled the absorption ef!ort wh il e devoting resourscs instead of building new settlements in the occupied territories. They promi sed to redirect money to the needs of the immigrants. The word "labour" was trans lated as "rabota" and association was created with the promise to "provide jobs to every new immigrant". This promise had a greater impact than any political tendency or ideology.
In 1992 many new immigrants voted La bour, more as a protest against th e policy of th e Likud government, which "did not do much for "aliya", than out of support for the socialist party. Many "olim" fe lt anger against the mis management of absorption. One of the "aliya" activists mentioned at the time, that immi grants will always be in opposition, because "one can never do enough for them". According to other informants, the new immigrants were not well informed about all the possibilities they had in order to make a political choice.
Russian-Jewish "olim" are considered to be responsible for bringing two mandates to the Labour party. Two years later they expressed disappointment with the unfulfilled promises they received fr om the Labour party before the elections of1992. The other explanation of their Right-oriented political views, which are wide ly echoed today in the press and media, is that the present wave of Russian immigration came to Israel with no ideological motivation, and most "olim" would prefer to live in the USA or in Europe. This is the reason why they are ready to support any political party that would guar antee them proper housing, jobs and education for their children. "Pure" political issues, such as the problem of territories and the relations with the Arabs, are less important to them. They arc only intere::;t ed in immed i ately secur ing th eir basic need:;. One of' my in ftlrmants explained th at he voted for "MERETZ" (a Left orien ted party) beca u ::;e everybody el:-�e in his of'fice had voted lor it. O u t ofthe same fee ling of solidarity another informant sent her children to "Hashomcr Hatzair" (a Left-oriented youth m ovement) .
After the elections ofl992 many ofihosc who had voted for Labour claimed that they were "disillusioned with the Leftists". Being disap pointed with th e governmen t'::; unkept promises and being discouraged by the struggles inside the Labour party, which they said, did not se cure for "Russian Jewish immigrants m an dates in the Kncssct", they claim th at in fu tu re they would look for other possibilities and choose other representatives, on both ideological and practical grounds. ln addition , as one of them explained: "Those who voted for the Labour party or fo r MERETZ did not expect peace with the PLO so fa st. They concentrated on the eco nomic promises ofthe Leftists, and ignored their political plans. Now the Russian Jews fe ar that the Palestinians' self-rule, which is granted in the agreement between the Israeli government and the PLO will jeopardize their security".
Changing their ideological argument, they now borrow symbols and terms fr om Russian and Russian-Jewish culture, fr om religious Judaism and fr om Zionist-Revisionist ideas. This combination of values emphasize the spe cific character of "Russian-Jewish" organiza tion, based on ethnic symbolics. The conflict, which arises in this context is one between the urge to define their own political-ethnic move ment separately and the urge to be part of more inclusive groups, such as Israelis, Jews, Ashkenazi, etc. Their "Russian Jewish" group identity is thus coming in conflict with their identity as a part of the Israeli society and the Jewish nation. Dolgin and Magdoffnote on the possibility oflocating ethnicity on one level and nationalism on another: "the process through which potentially conflicting identities can ap pear harmonious by the allocation of different aspects of identity to different domains" (Dolgin and Magdoff 1977: 354).
In this context I shall now describe two cases of political organizations ofthe new immigrants.
The fact thut th ese movements arc still in th e ir prelim i n ary pha�:�c of organization and do not have ol'licial names, may complicate the de scription of the s pecifi c character of each of them. For t hi�:� reason and forthc purpose of this paper they arc here culled: 1) the Party of "Olim" and 2) t h e Ul tra-National ist Movement of Russian Jews. I am aware of the fa ct that these denominations urc a rb i tra ry, und do not fu lly reflect their sc lf�pcrccptions. Neverthe less th is division is i m po rtant for a more clear explanation of the choract.er und proble m s of both poli ti cal groups.
The fir�:�t party is based on the representa tives of the .H.ussian-Jewish intelligentsia of "olim", who consider Rus�:�i an and Russian-Jew ish culture and history to be commonly shared. But they also realize that if they iorm their party only on the ethnic base they wi ll not be able to mobilize wide support in Israeli society. This is why they search for a special strategy to combine different identities and symbols.
In the second movement Russian Jewish activists, "olim" and "vatikim" begin manifest ing themselves politically, trying to work out a political program, based on the ideology of the existing ultra-Right political parties in Israel. The leaders, mostly "refusniks", who survived Russian camps and jails, try to create a "nostal gic myth" of their repatriation to the Land of Israel. This myth is also shared by the orthodox representatives, who emphasize the importance of religious values and the concept of the Jewish nation, connected, in their terms, to "land", "blood" and "historic past".
The Party of "Olim" -a movement of Russian-Jewish intelligentsia or another ethnic party?
The "aliya" and absorption policy were the cen tral issues of the election campaign of most of the parties. It was placed third, right after the issue of the peace process and an economic program. However, not a single new immigrant was included on the major parties' lists of can didates. That triggered the fo rmation of parties aimed at the immigrant vote. One was called "Tali", another "Am Ehad", the third one -''Yad be-Ya d" -a coalition of new immigrants and lsrael i pensioners. The biggest and the best known was called "DA'' -officially an acronym for Democracy and "Aliya", but with the imme diate ly undcr�:�tood meaning of ''Ye�:�" in Hu�:� siun. The head of "DA", Yu li Kosharovsky wu�:� welcomed as a hero upon his arrival to Israel on March 12, 1989, after waiting 18 years fo r an exi t visa. But his leadership in Russia among "refusniks" did not grant him an automutic entry in the Israeli political arena. After fa iling in the 1992 elections, his party, "DA", withered away. Al l those parties were starved of ca m paign fu nds. They could not cross the threshold of 1.5 per cent oftotal votes needed to enter th e Knesset.
None of the "olim" movements succeeded in having candidates elected to the Israeli Parlia ment. None ofthe representative ofthe Russian Jews (most of whom were "vatikim"), who were also members of big parties, managed to secure for themselves a place high enough on the party's electorial list that would ensure them election to the Knessct. Beyond that, those who were leaders of "olim" parties then, are not convinced that they should repeat their last experiance. Yu li Kosharovsky, for example, is not interested in rebuilding his "DA" party before the next election. To day he is convinced that new immigrants have to prove themselves as equal members in the existing parties. As a good example for this possibility he mentioned the municipal elections of 1993, in which a lot of Russian Jews became candidates and won, as was the case in Jerusalem, Ashdod, Haifa and other cities.
Nevertheless, two years after the elections, in January 1994, the issue of a new "Russian" party was raised again in the coordination coun cil of the "olim" organizations.
During the debate, a few participants pre sented a new project, based on the statement that the immigration of the 90s is the most intelligent part of the Israeli society. The choice is between fo rming a new party, based on this "intellectual elite" of the Russian-Jewish com munity, or joining another, preferably small party, which would combine voices of Russian Jews and those of regular voters for that party, in order to guarantee securing a few mandates in the Knesset in fu ture elections. One of the calculation:-; is that even ift he ethnic party will not succeed , it will enha nce the chance of repre sentatives of Russian Jews in other parties to ent er the Kn es:-wt. It was s tated th at very con crete und posit ive possibili ties exist today to organize a party, which will represent the inter ests of"olim". But, as one of th e organizers put it: the problem is that the community of Rus sian Jews is spread all over the country and there is no real obvious basis fo r its unification. According to his analys i s it is important fo r the new party to be lead by pro fessi on al s, p ro fes sors from the former Soviet Union, who would an alyze and advise on the real common grounds that could be used in writing up the program of the new party. The solution of th e organizers is thai program should be based on one concep tion, in order to avoid conflicts inside the party itself. The sponsors ofthe new party should be Jewish businessmen fr om Russia, who would be ready to invest capital here, as a way of safeguarding it, ifforccd to leave their country of origin.
Analysing the development of a new strategy of the organizers, it becomes clear that the emphasis on "professionalism" and on the ne cessity of in depth research, which would fo llow the setting up of the new "olim" party would give the specialists-"olim" access to financial sources. People join "olim" organizations only if it serves their interests, and these are largely economic ones. Professional possibilities which could be opened to a large number of sociolo gists, politologists, lawyers, financial consult ants and other "olim"-specialists attract their involvement on the political scene, generated by the economic aspect of the problem.
In emphasizing "professionalism" as a pro test of the Russian-Jewish intelligentsia against its inferior position today in Israel, a person's status among "olim" is determined by the pro fe ssional position which he occupied before the emigration. These people themselves empha size the low status of the "uneducated", thus strengthening their own position in the commu nity. In this context, they also mention the difference between "olim" who emigrated fr om Moscow, Saint Petersburg and a few other big cities in Russia, and those, who emigrated fr om the "province", fr om the periphery, such as Byelorussi a, Middle Asia, M ol d ovu , etc. It is cl aimed thai those who ca me from the central cities of Russia had better oppo rtunities to receive education and were more involved in the cultural and political life ofihe coun t ry. In the community-building process among the new immigrants of the 90s in Israel, these people make up the apex of the new elite of Russian Jews and ofihe Russian-Jewish party. As intel lectuals, they arrived with a "positive identity", as Epstein defines a sense of worthiness and self�estcem (Epstein 1978 : 1 02). In Israel the "Russians", as they arc generally called, re gardless of their origin, have been stigmatized as drunkards, prostitutes and criminals. In addition, their bad economic situation and low professional position transferred them fr om a "positive identity" to a "negative" one. They believe that political organization ofthcir own, set up on ethnic basis could improve their own self-definition and their image in the Israeli society. But these people are also liberals and humanists. This is the reason why they do not see their fu ture party as "ethnically closed". Here again the conflict arises between their ethnical identity and their wish to belong to the wider group of the Israeli society. Reflecting this aspect, one of the ideas was to call the new movement the "Party of the Absolute Demo crats", based on the book of Mark Davidor\ Gosudarstvo i narod (State and People). The name ofthe new party was supposed to attract not only the intelligentsia of the "olim", which was in one way or another taken for granted, but also wide circles of Israeli democrats. The ideological basis of the party would be built on economic reform and on introducing the refer endum as a fo rm of decision making, which the author sees as an important principle of democ racy. The party, according to Davidor, would join any coalition, Right or Left, depending on its attitude to "olim".
Davidor also compares the would-be party with other ethnic parties, which succeeded in the history of Israeli politics, such as Shas, an orthodox party ofMoroccan Jews in the 80s-90s and the Progressive party of German Jews in the 50s. In the 1930s Israel had a wave of immigrants that were, according to Davidor, far more highly qualified than the rest of the Jew-ish popul ut ion: the Germun Jews, who fled Hitler und w ere not Zioni::;t�;. Their Progre::;sive Party i::; known u::; a ::;ucces::; in lsrue l i politics. The fa i lure ofTami, unuther dhnic party, in the 80s, is not m enti oned.
Ultra-Nationalist Movement of "Olim" -Conference "Aliya for the Land of Israel" The second movement of new immigrants start ed out of several attempts of representatives of ultra-Ri ght parties to unite the "olim" for their struggle against the governmental policy on the occupied territories after the peace agreement with the Palestinians was ::; i gn ed in September 1993. Th e opposition recognized the high poten tial of th e "olim", many of whom live in settle ments in Ju dea and Samaria, for th e purpose of this battle. Seminars and meetings between political leaders and new immigrants were or ganized not long after the beginning of the anti agreement campaign.
One of these attempts of opposition parties was the setting up of an ultra-Right movement of "olim" during a conference thai was organ ized by Russian-Jewish members of existing ultra-Right parties. Though this conference was only a preliminary phase in the crystallization of the specific political movement (compared to more concrete steps, made by the fo unders of the new "olim" party, described above), it seems to me that the analysis of its symbolics is impor tant for the better understanding of political development among Russian Jews.
In contrast to the study of the party of Rus sian-Jewish intelligentsia, presented above, in which the strategy of the organization was emphasized, the second movement is analysed fr om a different angle. The main idea here is the power of argumentation within the community, which should be understood fr om the "encom passing discourse which constitutes the context fr om which arguments derive their persuasive power" (Tennekes 1988: 46). The conference "Aliya for the Land of lsrael" is a good example of how this discourse is reproduced in the spe cific social context.
Before the conference, one of the organizers, who is also a fo rmer "Prisoner of Zion" ex-plained thai th e con ference "Al iya for the Lu nd of l sruel", the fi rst one in the hi::;tory of the Russian Jews' repuiriation "i::; an urgent gath ering of immigrant::; in order to create the crit ical counierbalunce in the national-oriented struggle and an opportunity to lei them join the baiile". "The sky is the limit. We are half a million people, and this means not only a considerable number of mandates in the Knessei, but also u drastic demographic change", said in his ;; peech Yu li Edelstein, one of the leaders ofihe Zionist Forum and an initiator of the conference.
During the conference new immigrants, including well-known fo rmer "refusniks", launched a new movement, "which will become soon a new political party". The main aim of this movement is to prevent territorial concessions on the Golan Heights and in the terri tori es of Judea and Samaria.
An emotional culmination of the meeting was the appearance of Miriam, the widow of Mordechai Lapid, a Russian Jew, who was killed together with his son by terrorists. The Lapid family has been living in one of the religious settlements in the territories.
"I hear the Russian language and that re minds me of my husband and my son. We knew that the Russian "aliya" is the biggest hope of Israel, because we want this land to belong to Jews only, and we shall not share it with anyone else", she said through tears. Near-by sitting women started to cry aloud. Later, someone suggested to elect Miriam Lapid prime-minis ter, because "she will not extend her hand to the murderer Arafat, were it only because an ortho dox woman does not extend her hand to a man".
Another orthodox activist, a fo rmer Head of the Chabad (Lubavitch) organization in Mos cow, called on the audience to eat only kosher, because "when you eat pork -you have to know that with this pork Arabs lubricate their guns".
Two main lines of thought run parallel: em phasizing religious and "Jewish" values (most ly by representatives of religious movements, such as Tseirei Habad, Shivat Zion, Amana, etc.); and non-religious, "national" Israeli sym bols (by Right-wing Zionist parties, such as Likud, Moledet, Te hiya, Beitar, and a few oth ers), who tried to remind the audience that the fi rst Zionists, a l read y in l 882 had been Russian Jews, who had built the fi rst kibbut;, o f'Dega nia and the fir::;t hou::;es of'Tei-Av iv. Th ey were th us trying to create a n o::;talgi c link betw een th e Ru ssian pi on ee rs, who had changed the f'ace of' th e Middle East at thai time, and the new immigra nt::;, who were going to chan ge it now. For other, non-layman, purposes, this was also an attempt to show a reli gi ous link of the Jewish people with the Land of Israel and the tom bs of the Patriarchs. In t.hi::; context, the symbol of' Muslim guns lubricated with pork fa t, was an absolute distortion of reality, in both its re ligious and secular sense, but more impor tant for dramnti zing the sins of one ethnic group towards the other and fi>r stressing reli gious intolerance.
The fa ct that only one Knesset member ac cepted th e invitation to attend the con ference led to divided attitudes. One of the activists used the tribune to shout: "Most politicians did not come here and so much the better, otherwise TV would be hanf,>ing on them. We shall not be an appendix to existing parties. We are going to be an avantgard, Israe lis, confident in themselves. Until now we were the 'Russians' fr om other parties, but we are not Russians. We are Jews and we are not racists. But in Russia we hoped that we shall come to the Jewish state. If it is Jewish there is no place here for Arabs, the whole land is ours. We are one big power".
Others were more sceptic, explaining that pol iticians do not take this gathering seriously, or maybe they try to show the dependence of Russian Jews on the existing political system.
The symbolic context of this event may rest in the fact that this was not just another meet ing: it was an attempt by some would-be leaders to secure a public mandate that would strength en them in their relationship with the authori ties.
The analysis of the political discourse during the conference shows that the speakers did not have to convince the audience. The 500 people who arrived to the conference "knew" all the arguments presented at the rostrum. We were witnessing the process of "consciousness-rais-ing", the d escription of' reality a::; t h ey under ::;t.a nd it, the interpretation of' the situation with warni ngs, with a symbolic and authoritative d iscourse. There arc a lot ofcxampl es in anthro pologi cal] iteratu rc nf'how symbols inspire prac tice. Symbolic presen tation of"well-known" f�1cts d u ri ng the event has a strong influence on action. Th e mastery of' speakers "over •• ui hori tativc discourse enables them to present in sig·hts which others fe el are true, though they themselves could never have expressed them so well" (Tcnneke::; 1988: 4 7).
The strong tendency of many Ru ssian Jews to identify themselves with the ide::ts or the ultra-Right parties, in cl u d ing hosti l i ty not only towards the Palestinians living in the ten·ito ri es, but also towards I sracliArabs, is the result of a high degree or disconnection and un as s umption of mutual hatred between the two communities -Jewish and Arab.
In interviews with Arab leaders, most of them mentioned that the new immigrants are used as a political issue, the whole aim of which is to achieve political power and jeopardize the peace process in the territories and the life of Arab citizens of lsrael (Majid Al-Haj 1992).
Findings of my field-work show that in most cases an important reason for this mutual an tipathy is the economic one, which in turn leads to the use of stereotypes and the raising of mutual accusations fr om other fields of life.
"They (Russian Jews) are cheap labour. Their garbage cleaners earns 7 shekels per hour, Arabs ask minimum 10 shekels. They take all our jobs", told me one of the owners of a "man power office" in northern Israel. Israeli Arabs are very much concerned with the Russian Jewish immigration, viewing its economic as pect. The competition is strong, not only for the low-paid and unqualified jobs, but also among physicians, scientists, engineers, etc.
The attitude of those new immigrants who have the possibility of meeting Arabs, is not limited to the economic aspect. Luba, a music teacher, who is a Russian Jew, who gives music lessons in an Arab village told me her story: "When it was suggested to my fr iends and myself-then we worked at the music school in Nathania -to teach in Bakka -al-Gharbiya, most of my fr iends refused Lo go there. They we re afraid, they never saw an Arab in their life, and what they saw on the TV screen were Palestin ian terru ri::; Ls with gun:;. Only eight of' us agreed, mostly beca u se of' Lhe money, but I al::;o wanted to teach violin, and in other places I h a d to Leach piano, which wa::; nut. my specialization. I thought. that. Ara bs were second ru nk citizens, like we u sed Lo feel in Ru::;::;iu us Jews, and hud no fear to go to their village ... But they disap pointed me, the way they t reated us, new i mmi grants. They told us: you want Lo drink, bring your own col1cc; they let us wait. fo r hours ncar closed doors in the rai n, unti l so mebody iinally came to let. us in ... And when we wanted to complain they told us: ifynu don't like it here go away! There are a lot of you playing in the streets of every big ci ty . .. ".
Other teachers emphasized more the economic aspect ofLhcir meeting with Arabs , and made it clear that they had been fo rced to come to the village, because of their financial situation. Almost all ofthcm said th at they "did not like to teach Arabs" and would prefer to work with Jewish children.
" 'If I was told in Saint Petersburg that I would have to teach in an Arab village I would have thought twice before I asked for my immigra tion permit', one of them explained. 'It is not a matter of intellectual level, most of my pupils are sons oflawyers and engineers, but they live much better than Jews, look at their villas, they are rich and they allow themselves to exploit us, they pay little and humiliate us. What are we, Palestinians fr om Gaza ?' " The relationship between the Russian Jews and the Arabs living in neighbouring districts depends on the level of intensity of their inter relationship and mutual dependency. A social network is created, mostly based on the eco nomic fa ctor. When there is no competition for resources, the link between the two ethnic groups almost does not exist and stereotypes appear, introduced by people who have a polit ical interest in it. When there is an economic dependence on both sides, the relationship mostly leads to competition and to hostility. The p restige criterion thus leads Lo the u sc of' na tionalistic symbol:;.

Conclusions
Every wave of immigrants presents a uniqu e process of absorption and its re flection on p u b lic consciousness. The absorption of Russi:m Jews in the 90s was influenced by their past and by the specific social conditions in which they fo und themselves in the "receiving" society.
In the fo rmer Soviet Union their nationality was indicated in their passports, a fa ct that forced them either to shape their Jewish iden tity, or to assimilate. Those who chose the fi rst and arrived to Israel had to undergo transfor mation fr om "Jews" to "Russians", the label which was fo rced on them in the Israeli society by the image, that was created and spread by those who are interested in it. And, as I tried to show in this paper this definition serves both the "Aliya" leaders (in the case of the party of the Russian-Jewish intelligentzia), and public officials (in the case of complaints of music teachers) for their own purposes and interests.
As representatives of this ethnic group (de fined by the "officials" and applied by the "cli ents"), the Russian Jews are trying to become active members in the political arena. If in the first years of the "aliya" they were still busy searching for jobs and studying Hebrew, in 1994 they fe lt secure and confident enough to create a wider network of relations not only with the officials, whom they are directly de pendent on, but also with those, who are much more dependent on them. Their demographic increase also meant an increase in political power.
The setting up of political organizations among the "olim" is a reaction to power-rela tions, both within the Russian-Jewish commu nity, and in the Israeli society around it. It is a result of social developments, which trigger political discourse and activities denying the legitimate power of existing political parties. Forming their "positive identity", the "olim" manifest their own power inside their group and outside it, especially in the political arena of Israel, where this identity and its symbolic presentation serves as a protest against the existing order and the exi::;ting legislation. Sym bols play a very irnportant role both in f(Jrming pol i ti cal organizations of new i mmi grants, and in Lhe mobilization of new members into thc::;e organizations. Further research is necessary to establish how Israeli pol iticians us c the "aliya" sy mbol s among the Russia n Jews lor their own purposes and how the "aliya" leaders thcm selvc::; usc tho same symbols to advance their demands and to defend their rights.
1 have tried to dc::;cribe two specific political groups ofH.ussian Jcwi:i. Both ofth cm arc still at th ci r preparatory phase of organization. Ifthere will be no dramatic chan ges they have two more years to prepare for th e election to the Knessct. According to information from th e Zionist Fo rum there are five more political groups among the Russian Jews. The l eadership of one ofthem identifies with the Labour party, as a reaction to the Right-wing orientation of those, described in this paper. It is also possible that an ultra Right movement will be prohibited by the elec torial law, as was the case with a "Kach" party and "Cabana chai" movement in 1992. The outlawing of this organization could however result in its partisans supporting other Right wing parties that will legally run, or driving the movement "underground".
According to Sochnut representatives in the fo rmer Soviet Union, a growing number of Rus sian Jews have applied to emigrate to Israel after the electoral success in Russia of the ultra nationalist and anti-semite leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. This new influx would increase the influence of new immigrants on the Israeli political arena. It might also mean that new "potential voters" would arrive before next elec tions in 1996. In all likelihood they would con tinue to be considered as non-Zionists: people who fe ar violence towards the Jewish popula tion in Russia -and in other fo rmer Soviet republics -and have no other choice, but to immigrate to Israel. Further research is needed to study the process oftheir political absorption in the social context of their integration in the Israeli society. Moreover, it is necessary to study the role of ultra-orthodox Jews, especially rep resentatives of political organizations and move ments, such as Tzeirei Chabad, Amana, etc., and their influence on the process of shaping 54 the pol itical identity of the new immigrants from the CJS.
Furthermore, the analysis of the re lation ship between Russian-Jewish immigra nts and Israeli Arabs in the period of peace n egotiations between Israelis and Palestinians , wi II contrib ute to a better understanding of pol itica l ten dencies among the "olim" as well.
Notes 1.. "Ai iya" (in Hebrew) -goin g up. The meaning is to a�cend to J eru salem , which i s situated in the mountains. In ideol ogica l Zionist sen:>e, .Jews do not immigrate to Israel but repatriate to their historic fatherl and.
4. Mark Davidor was the leader of the movement of "ohm-pensione rs" in 1992. Tn th e 80:-; he was a member ofthe ultra-Hi ght "Moledet" party, which preaches the "transfer" policy of all Arabs away fr om the territory of the Land of Israel. Davidor explained that the idea of the "tran Rfer" did not seem terrible to many Hussian Jews, since "they come from a country, where entire n a t i on s have been transferred from pl ace to place", but he did not mention that this policy would appear in the program of the new party.