The impacts on the change of training architecture for UN Peacekeeping Operations in Brazil

Abstract This article seeks to analyze how norms and procedures created in International Organizations spread to member states. More specifically, the analysis focuses on how changes in the training architecture for UN peace operations, driven by the Brahimi report, caused institutional and procedural changes on the administrative, political and military spheres in Brazil. Combining official documents and analytical literature, through process tracing, we find that the main causal mechanism observed was emulation, given Brazil’s desire to adapt to use the capacity building as a tool for international action.


Introduction
T he United Nations (UN) was created in 1945 to maintain international peace and security.Since 1948, peace operations have been used as an instrument to ensure collective safety, with its legal basis implicit in Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of the United Nations Charter.However, since the UN does not have the personnel required for these peace operations, it is up to its member states, known as Troop Contributing Countries (TCC), to prepare and deploy the human dimension to be responsible for the implementation and fulfillment of the mandates.
Peace operations originally had military personnel deployed to occupy buffer zones, controlling and monitoring a strip of territory between two belligerent sides.With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of intra-state conflicts, the characteristics of peace operations changed1 .Groups in dispute had new peculiarities, and the mandates to be fulfilled by peacekeepers were increasingly complex.The tragedies in the 1990s with the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, the Srebrenica Massacre, and the failure in Somalia, prompted a reorganization in capacity building, particularly in relation to personnel training.
The debate on the UN's role in peace and security highlights two streams of criticism of the UN's proposed peace model.Academics such as Paris (1997;2010), Richmond (2004), and Kemer et al. (2016) question the theoretical and ideological assumptions that underpin the peace model proposed by the organization.On the other hand, critics aligned with Bellamy and Griffin (2010) and Guerra and Blanco (2018) address procedural flaws related to the best strategies to achieve the proposed objectives.
To overcome the challenges related to procedures, the UN Secretary-General convened a high-level Panel on UN Peace Operations, with the aim of "assessing the capacity of the United Nations to conduct peace operations effectively and to offer frank, specific and realistic responses on ways to make recommendations to increase this capacity" (United Nations 2000a).From this initiative, considering the importance of TCC in the training of human resources, it is possible to find space for the dissemination of new forms of training for countries.
In this framework, how does an international organization (IO) change and disseminate a training policy model?Are changes in international norms or practices advocated by the IO a source for change in domestic policies, institutions, and practices?Why do they happen?How do they manifest?To understand these aspects, the main objective of this article is to analyze how the reformulation of the UN's training architecture for peace operations, which took place at the beginning of the 21st century, impacted the Brazilian agenda for the training of its human resources for peace missions between 2004 and 2017.
Although recognizing the importance of the debate about principles that guide UN actions, the focus of this study is restricted to the organization's responses to procedural criticisms and the process of policy diffusion to the TCC.To this end, the article is organized into three sections besides the introduction and the conclusion.The first section is dedicated to presenting the theoretical and methodological framework.The second is dedicated to the evolution of the UN training architecture, outlining the changes in norms and procedures.The third is dedicated to the chronological investigation of the reflections on the Brazilian agenda, with focus on the public policy transferred, the actors involved, and the presentation of the empirical evidence that dialogues with the theoretical contribution, suggesting the primary causal mechanism present in the phenomenon.

International organizations and policy diffusion
There is a vast literature in Political Science and International Relations devoted to understanding the "process by which knowledge about public policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system is used to develop public policies in another political system" (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 5).The international literature is consolidated with a multidisciplinary approach mobilizing political scientists, sociologists, and economists, among other specialists.In this context, there is room to use different terms to name similar phenomena2 .
The choice of the object of analysis stems from three aspects: i) the UN, created in 1945 to maintain international peace and security, which is one of the international institutions with the greatest global reach; ii) after the 1990s, the organization's agenda for generating capabilities for peace operations gained relevance and underwent changes; and iii) due to the dependence of member states to deploy personnel and fulfill mandates related to missions, these changes need to have an impact on countries interested in engaging in its operations.
For Oliveira and Pal (2018), "in the globalized world, where state borders are permeable and public policy travels transnationally, policy diffusion is what naturally connects domestic policy to international policy."In this sense, policy diffusion is characterized by the process of adopting public policy following something suggested or already practiced in another time or space.
However, to study this phenomenon it is necessary to understand the domestic context that made the diffusion of policies possible.In this scope, the analysis of the change in the Brazilian engagement pattern is directly related to the creation of a window of opportunity for a significant change in the training agenda for peace missions.In this way, Capella (2018) brings two perspectives: the studies on agenda formation by Kingdon (2003) and the notion of subsystems by Baumgartner and Jones (1993).
In his work, Kingdon (2003) states that agendas change as a function of three flows -the problem flow, the public policy flow (solutions), and the political flow -connected by policy entrepreneurs in windows of opportunity.This makes sudden and abrupt changes in policy cycles possible.The identification of issues characterizes the problem flow.Alternatives for their solution are the public policy flow, and the political flow considers three elements: the national climate, political forces, and changes in government.According to Kingdon (2003), "[t]he integration of the three flows is referred to as the opening of a public policy window, which is the opportunity for entrepreneurs to present their proposals" (Kingdon 2003).
The second perspective is found in the work of Baumgartner and Jones (1993), which deals with subsystems and the macrosystem, considering the flow of issues between the two.Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, governments delegate authority to experts who compose subsystems, characterized by monopolies, with few participants and low visibility of decisions.In this sense, Carvalho (2018) argues that subsystems can be seen as a mechanism that allows the parallel discussion of various topics with the respective communities of experts.Thus, when a window enables the rise of the agenda to the macro-policy, the non-incremental solution occurs.
Regarding the tools, Jakobi (2009) posits that the instruments used in the processes of policy diffusion can be classified as i) discursive dissemination -through the transmission of ideas and good practices; ii) formation of standards -through the elaboration of conventions, rules or recommendations; iii) coordinative functions -by monitoring the adoption of what was established in the policy and coordinating the actions of its members; iv) financial means -through loans or donations; and v) technical assistance -offering various resources.In addition, Carvalho et al. (2021) emphasize that "the simple fact of allowing policy-makers to occupy common spaces, promoting dialogue, enables the sharing of practices and the consequent diffusion of policies".Therefore, they suggest the inclusion of another instrument: the opening of spaces for dialogue.
The complexity of diffusion implies a combination of processes and agents.To guide the identification of the main causal mechanism of the process, we adopt the definition of the degrees of diffusion presented by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000): i) copying, which involves direct and complete transfer; ii) emulation, which involves the transfer of the ideas behind the policy or program; iii) combinations, which involve mixtures of several different policies; and iv) inspiration, where policy in another jurisdiction may inspire a policy change, but the result is not guided by the original.
To achieve the purposes of the study, a single case study strategy is used, in light of the theoretical framework presented, by means of process tracing.The timeframe established coincides with the period in which Brazil commanded the military component of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), from 2004 to 2017.This delimitation is justified by the impact of this operation on Brazilian engagement and its effects on the process of capacity building.The prevailing participation of the Brazilian Army in the deployed troops and the absence of a public policy dedicated to the civilian and police components are limiting factors that direct the study at the domestic level toward the Brazilian Army's human resources training agenda for peace operations.
To guide the research, it is assumed that the standardization of the training architecture for UN peacekeeping missions has impacted the Brazilian agenda for human resource training, generating institutional and procedural changes.According to Cunha and Araújo (2018), after this definition, three steps guide the research: i) conceptualization of the causal mechanism; ii) operationalization, to verify if the hypothesized causal mechanism and its parts are observable in the evidence, and iii) analysis of the empirical evidence to make causal inferences.
A crisis, as a critical juncture, offers a high level of uncertainty and can trigger a process of learning, namely "the updating of beliefs based on lived or witnessed experiences, analyses or social interactions" (Dunlop and Radaelli 2020).On the other hand, if the urge to act is greater than the time to learn, decision-makers may prefer the process of coping, or bounded emulation.According to Lesch and Millar (2021) High levels of 'problem uncertainty' -that is uncertainty about the causes of policy problems and effectiveness of associated solutions -are likely to generate processes of 'epistemic learning' in which policymakers engage with experts to prompt policy action.At the same time, some crises can also generate high levels of issue salience, here termed 'policy urgency', which generates pressure on policymakers to act.(…).High levels of policy urgency can trigger processes of bounded emulation in which policymakers copy available solutions without updating their beliefs.(Lesch and  Millar 2021, 931) 3   Important for this study, emulation can be the result of legitimacy-seeking, and the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989), in which one government emulates another government policy to ''be like them''.But also, it can be just the impetus to act.
Whereas in the learning process policymakers can analyze a policy problem and generate new ideas, urgency causes policy action to be guided by "problem definitions that seem representative, or readily available policy solutions, either through geographical or ideational proximity" (Lesch and Millar 2021, 933).They chose action over inaction.In the limit, it is the difference between "doing it right" and "doing it right now".Börzel and Risse (2009) propose a different diffusion structure where "emulation is an indirect influence that promotes diffusion through lesson design and mimicry" (Nubong 2022, 236).Acting as an indirect influence, emulation could occur through "lesson-drawing" (instrumental rationality) or mimicry (normative rationality).Comparing the two frameworks, one could argue that the concept of "lesson-drawing" (instrumental rationality) is similar to the concept of process of learning, while "mimicry" (normative rationality) is similar to bounded emulation.
In the following section, the evolution of the UN architecture and its impact on the Brazilian agenda will be analyzed, based on the premise that the diffusion of the training policy for peace operations has emulation as its main causal mechanism.That is, it is more characterized by the transmission of the ideas behind the policy than by a direct and complete transfer, in a context "where international society has a strong impact on shaping the opinions that define appropriate norms of behavior" (Weyland 2005).

The Evolution of the UN Training Architecture
The changes to the UN peace operations capacity-building agenda stem from the convening of the High-Level Panel to review UN peace and security activities, which made timely, concrete, 3 For more information about differences between emulation and learning, see Maggetti and Gilardi 2016; Vagionaki and Trein 2019 and achievable recommendations to help the organization to better conduct such activities.The result is known as the "Brahimi Report" and listed dozens of recommendations related to peace operations, organizing them into i) doctrine, strategies, and decision-making; ii) rapid deployment capability; iii) resources and structures to plan and support operations; iv) information technology and technological resources; and v) implementation challenges.Among the aspects presented, it is highlighted that "the UN should establish the minimum training, equipment, and other standards necessary for forces to participate in peacekeeping operations" (United Nations 2000b).
In response, the UN aggressively reformed in order to strengthen and professionalize the entire peace operations process.One of the initiatives adopted, according to Odoi (2005), was the designation of the Military Division of the Department of Peace Operations (DPKO) to provide limited guidance and assistance to member states, which occurred through the Training and Evaluation Service (TES).Consequently, this action inaugurated the institutionalization of peacebuilding in the early stages as a formal activity of UN peace operations.
As Curran (2016) points out, at the political level, the UN response has been to centralize efforts to coordinate the practice of peace operations.In this way, UN Security Council Resolutions create the missions; the DPKO seeks to inform and guide these resolutions and support the missions; and the General Assembly seeks to provide a forum for all TCC to oversee and develop peacekeeping policy.
According to Uziel and Vargas (2011), there are other forums that play important roles in defining policies and conducting peace missions.Notable among them are the Secretariat, which implements decisions made; the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, which allocates resources and oversees the administrative performance of operations; and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), which deserves special consideration, because it formulates policies for the missions, the structure of the Secretariat, and establishes operational doctrines.
In addition to the reorganization of the UN, training for peace missions has also been impacted by "cross-cutting resolutions" introduced by the UN Security Council.A notable example is UNSCR 1325, which states that the UN should "provide Member States with training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and particular needs of women, and on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures" (United Nations 2000c).Furthermore: Stressing the importance of identifying gaps that have an impact on mandate delivery, improving the provision of support services to field personnel, addressing systemic issues, and making recommendations on the incorporation of lessons learned and best practices, in close cooperation with troop-and police-contributing countries and senior leadership, both in the field and at Headquarters.(United Nations 2018) According to Odoi (2005), the need for training standardization led to the development of training modules, conducted by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), through the Training and Evaluation Service (TES).Sharma (2003), argues that in the effort to standardize training, the TES approached member states to develop a coherent training program focusing on the work of peacekeeping training centers, which resulted in a project that became known as the "Standard Generic Training Module (SGTM)".
In a report from 2004 (United Nations 2004), the UN Secretary-General deliberated on this DPKO policy, presenting the training, monitoring, and evaluation methods, and specifying the objectives and priorities.In this scope, the training policy developed established benchmarks and certifications for the skills and competencies required of military, police, and civilian personnel.To this end, the implementation of the evaluation and monitoring system for training would be facilitated by introducing these Standardized Training Modules and establishing Integrated Training Centers.In this sense, the modules provide the baseline for evaluation, while the integrated centers provide the means necessary to assess the results of the training.
As peace operations have evolved, there has been a dearth of official documents with guidelines and principles to direct such preparation.Thus, in 2008, the Capstone Doctrine was created, documenting experiences to benefit UN peace operation planners and implementers.According to another report (United Nations 2008), the Policy, Assessment and Training Division, to identify training priorities, conducted a strategic assessment of current and future needs.
In the same document, it is noted that the feedback received indicated a strong demand for the establishment of training standards, policies, guidelines, and best practices to improve preparedness for peacekeeping missions.Accordingly, DPKO, through the Integrated Training Service (ITS) focused on the following objectives: According to a document written in 2017 (United Nations, 2017), the ITS reviews pre-deployment training, the CPTM, and the Specialized Training Materials (STM) periodically to ensure that what was identified in the Training Needs Assessment (TNA) is met.The UN (2014) thus confirmed the importance and validity of much of the content of the 2009 CPTM, although recommending its update, with focus on mandate implementation.Therefore, the 2017 version of the CPTM goes beyond just describing policy and guidance, to building capacity to implement such policy and guidance.
An analysis of the literature and official documents shows that while broad approaches to peacebuilding debate the validity of the economic and political models of peace operations, there is considerable change in the role played by professionals deployed in these missions.Faced with this challenge, it is clear that the UN, through the Department of Peace Missions, has made an effort to reformulate methods, processes, and personnel training programs, to create tools to bring this transformation to the front line and to disseminate these standards to member states.

The impact on the Brazilian training agenda for peace operations
The spectrum of changes promoted in the UN training architecture is wide, being characterized by political, social, economic, and cultural discussions, reflected in numerous debates, reports, institutional rearrangements, and the production of normative documents.Throughout these transformations, Brazil has tried to adapt, promoting institutional and procedural changes.
To understand how this impact occurred, this next section is structured in three axes.Initially, the role and interests of domestic actors in increasing Brazil's engagement in peace operations will be analyzed.Next, the manner in which this process occurred will be outlined, presenting the chronology of changes at the international and domestic levels.Finally, the Brazilian role on the UN training highlighting the diffusion process will be examined.

The increase in Brazilian engagement
In the 21st century, Brazilian participation in peace missions has grown quantitatively and qualitatively, which has generated discussions about the relationship between the country's foreign and defense policies.According to Hamann (2016), when analyzing the evolution of Brazilian participation in peace operations, an irregular pattern is observed.Since Brazil took part in operations in Angola, Mozambique, East Timor, and, particularly, Haiti, the country has achieved a new profile.
Nasser ( 2012) is correct in arguing that Brazil's participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) occurred due to the disposition to project power in international relations and the desire to provide active solidarity to societies victimized by armed conflict.Cavalcante (2010) points out that after voting to authorize the deployment of a multinational force under Chapter VII and then accepting command of MINUSTAH (also authorized in light of Chapter VII) this initiative was not completely in line with some constitutional principles guiding Brazil's international relations and the official discourse sought to justify participation in peace missions with demands related to social justice.
Analyzing the phenomenon in light of the Punctuated Equilibrium model, we observe that this pattern change occurs with the creation of a window of opportunity mobilized by the convergence of three decision-making flows.The problem flow is characterized by the invitation received by the Brazilian government to lead MINUSTAH, making the engagement of a large number of troops and the assumption of the position of force commander possible.The solution flow is characterized by the decision-making process that involves an inter-ministerial process to study technical feasibility and cost tolerance.The political flow presents the national climate, the interests of organized political forces, and changes in people in strategic positions that occurred with the reformulation of the country's foreign policy.
In this aspect, the change in the aspirations of Brazilian Foreign Policy, defended by the President of Brazil in his speech on Diplomat's Day, stands out: Developing countries need to put their problems at the center of the debate, they must participate in the elaboration of the international agenda.Brazil is willing to act without arrogance, without megalomania, and without hegemonic pretensions, but with the feeling that we are a great country and that we have something to say to the world.For this reason, we are present in the stabilization of Haiti.For this reason, we aspire to reform the UN and its collective security mechanisms (Brasil 2008).
Addressing the formation of the agenda from the perspective of Baumgartner and Jones (1993), engagement in peace operations was a military agenda present in the subsystems, as highlighted by General Heleno, the first MINUSTAH Force Commander, in an interview with Pinheiro (2015): "the Army was interested in participating as training, as a source of resources, as an opportunity to participate in a real mission, as a form of logistical and doctrinal improvement".Thus, when there is room in the macrosystem for increased Brazilian engagement in peace operations, it is observed that the actors involved at the domestic level are elected officials acting in line with the new foreign policy vision and military personnel engaged in the process of capacity building.
Under these conditions, we see that, at the domestic level, new Brazilian foreign policy guidelines prioritizing greater Brazilian participation in multilateral activities are directly related to the country's engagement in leading the military component of MINUSTAH.As a consequence, there is a window of opportunity to improve training, reception, and the evolution of ground military doctrine, which emerges from the subsystem and receives the spotlight during the analyzed period.

Brazilian training for peace operations
The planning, execution, and control of activities related to human resources training in the Brazilian Army are guided and coordinated by the Brazilian Army's Military Training System (SIMEB).This system is a normative and doctrinal document which establishes the foundations, principles, and guidelines of the instruction system.In this sense, the instructions published in 2018 (Exército Brasileiro 2018) state that "training is developed aiming to achieve operational efficiency, streamlining the physical resources of military organizations, within established deadlines, through appropriate methods, processes, and techniques (administrative and operational)".
According to the 2013 document (Ministério da Defesa do Brasil 2013) training for peace missions must be focused on the fulfillment of the tasks foreseen for the deployed units.Braga (2017), argues that in 2004, due to the short time period between the approval of the mandate and its entry into force, the planning and preparations of the first MINUSTAH contingent occurred at a frenetic pace.Based on reports of experiences from participation in previous missions, each Military Command District was responsible for training the personnel to be deployed.
In 2005, upon the return of the third Brazilian contingent from MINUSTAH, aligned with UN guidelines, the Peace Operations Training Center (CIOpPaz) was created with a structure based on the Brazilian Army.The training process started being centrally guided, and gained speed and refinement.According to Teixeira (2017), in 2007 the CIOPaz was transferred to new facilities and, besides the preparation of MINUSTAH contingents, several other stages were created.The beginning of the insertion of civilians in training is noteworthy, as well as the conduction of symposiums and seminars, with emphasis on the Senior Mission Leadership Course (SML), held in 2008, in partnership with DPKO, with the involvement of 24 General Officers, police officers and civilians from various countries, candidates for senior leadership of peace missions.
Aligned with the National Defense Strategy (END), after the Haiti earthquake and the demand for the 2nd Battalion in MINUSTAH, the Brazilian Army's CIOpPaz was renamed Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center (CCOPAB), which answers to the Ministry of Defense.Teixeira (2017) posits that this new period was marked by the "adaptation of school documents to the current norms, the updating of programs, and the academic integration with several higher education institutions''.Another characteristic of this phase was the intensification of the exchange of instructors and students from countries of the Latin American Association of Training Centers for Peace Operations (ALCOPAZ).
Therefore, there have been institutional changes at the domestic level, characterized by the creation of training institutions for peace operations, adapting the Brazilian structure to the normative and procedural expectations of the UN architecture reform.This process uses both technical assistance offered by the SGTM and later the CPTM, and receives evaluation and certification visits.However, diffusion also occurs through the transmission of processes and forms of training.
For Geraldo et al. (2020), "the CCOPAB allowed the consolidation of a doctrine of preparation for peace operations suggesting the conception of the 'Green Approach and the Blue Approach'" (see table 1).This typology is defined to identify the system that provides the theoretical underpinning that supports preparedness for peace operations.The Center has a specialized teaching structure with technical support and "the flexibility to absorb new techniques and to modernize methods and processes (Exército Brasileiro 2018).Meanwhile, guided by the bibliography issued by the UN, the CCOPAB seeks doctrinal alignment, cooperating with the updating of Brazilian instruction under the parameters issued by the international organization.
According to Curran (2016), the challenge of peacekeeping training is to inform the "routine duties" of military personnel when deployed in UN peacekeeping operations, since the typical tasks of peacekeeping environments are probably not present in conventional training.Aiming to overcome this challenge, the role of the Green Approach is conceived through SIMEB and provides the basic information "to the formation of the leader at all levels, the training of combatants and the training of the units constituted at all levels" (Exército Brasileiro 2018).Using the techniques, tactics, and procedures developed through the Green Approach, the Blue Approach aims to train, evaluate and certify, in light of the UN doctrine summarized in the CPTM and the STM, Brazilian troops in training for peace missions.

UN Doctrine Instruction for troop dissemination
Training of specific subjects (CIMIC, translators, intelligence, etc.) Training professionals that will occupy specific positions.
Unit Certification and Evaluation (Basic and Advanced Peace Operations Internship) Check the troop's level of preparedness.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
To make the dissemination of the Blue Approach feasible, the Training Center trains decision-makers to make the necessary adjustments in the troops' training.This occurs through the Training Course for Commanders of Military Organizations and Staff for Peace Missions and the Training Course for Subunit and Platoon Commanders for Peace Missions.In this context, Giannini and Costa (2017) exemplify the training in the occupation of strong points, which did not appear in the Brazilian doctrine or the UN doctrinal material and, as a result of lessons learned, were part of the troops' training in the pacification and consolidation phases.
The training of those responsible for the preparation in the CCOPAB uses the "trainers of trainers" process, detailing the material, deepening the debates, and enabling the officers to transmit the knowledge to all involved.Considering the wide range of demands for some specific functions of the contingent, such as the relationship with local leaders, Non-Governmental Organizations, and International Organizations; Civil-Military Coordination operations (CIMIC); Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) reporting management; among other aspects not related to Military Doctrine, in the Blue Approach, the CCOPAB offers internships and training dedicated to the military that will occupy specific positions.
Crowning the preparation of the Blue Approach, using the reports of previous missions, lessons learned and experience of the teaching staff to provide accurate feedback, the CCOPAB conducts Peace Operations Internships.Dynamic scenarios are created, with the participation of professionals and academics from various fields of knowledge, to bring situations closer to the characteristic atmosphere of a multidimensional peace operation, demanding proactive and professional actions from commanders and troops.Simulated military problems are organized to evaluate training in the Blue Approach, requiring proficiency of decision-makers and executors, identifying the appropriate combination of the instruction objectives of the Green Approach in the context of peace operations.

The Brazilian role in the diffusion of UN training architecture
The expertise accumulated during engagement in MINUSTAH and the acquisition of peacekeeping training knowledge by Brazil are undisputable, which can be proved by the UN's certification of the CCOBAP and its courses.As a result, since 2014 Brazil started deploying a Mobile Training Team (MTT) to cooperate with the training of friendly nations in the Global South.
In discussing the feasibility of using MTT as a Brazilian cooperation mechanism for peacekeeping training, Nunes and Cavalcanti (2015) argue that the results obtained in Angola have proved that it could become an effective vector for disseminating a competent and positive image of Brazil.Lemos and Ramirez (2016) state that "the positive feedback of this activity is based on the conception of each MTT, which is formed according to the characteristics of the recipient Nations, the courses to be administered and the target public".
According to a 2019 document (Ministério da Defesa do Brasil 2019), the MTT is carried out under the thematic, methodological and curricular guidance offered by the UN Department of Peace Operations to Member States.Marcondes et al. (2019) highlight that one essential component of the development of MTT relates to the fact that some Brazilian Army officers selected to command the CCOPAB have served previously at DPKO or at the Brazilian Mission to the UN.This means that they have been socialized on the UN peacekeeping system.
Indeed, the Brazilian initiative that occurs since 2014 is a response to the recommendations of the Global Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment 2012-2013 (United Nations 2014), which has shown a general deficiency in training, notably in knowledge related to the UN CPTM.Furthermore, it is in line with the Report of the International High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, which examined a considerable range of tactical, operational and strategic issues related to the conduct of UN operations, highlighting the importance of the UN's role as a "focal point in coordinating a stronger global training partnership" (United Nations 2015).
Although scholars like Blanco (2017) argue that "unless Brazil starts enhancing its own understanding of peace and structurally modifies the way it engages, the country will remain voluntarily building its own subalternity and peripheral position", Marcondes et al. (2019) concludes that MTT "can be interpreted as a desire on the part of Brazilian decision makers to renegotiate a peripheral stance in the global governance of UN peace operations" and "the Southern vector of Brazil's cooperation investments in UN peacekeeping training responds to a logic of status seeking in the regional/international system."Consequently, these findings have important consequences for the broader domain of international diffusion in peacekeeping training.One can see the multiple presences of diffusion instruments to understand how norms and procedures in the UN training architecture have spread to Brazil, generating institutional and procedural changes (see table 2).Furthermore, the certification of the Brazilian center as a reference allows Brazil to move from being a "receiver" of capacity to being a "supplier", opening a window of opportunity to, through South-South Cooperation, support the host country in the capacity-building generation, thus consolidating as a disseminator of UN policy.

Conclusion
In light of the operationalization of the concept of policy diffusion and transfer in the reformulation of the architecture of training for UN peace operations, which occurred after the Brahimi Report, this article analyzed the impact, on the Brazilian agenda, of training to its human resources for this type of activity, between 2004 and 2017.The debate arose from the UN demand to present responses to the procedural criticisms generated by the failures of the 1990s and the fact that capacity generation for peace missions is carried out by the TCC.
Thus, considering that the UN does not have human resources and that the training of the personnel employed is carried out by its member states, a process of standardization of this capacity generation and diffusion of this policy to the TCC has been observed.In this sense, the concept of international diffusion and transfer of public policies is related to the Brazilian adoption of the training doctrine developed by the organization (Blue approach), adapting it to the current Military Doctrine (Green approach).
In this context, using the model proposed by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) in a multilevel analysis to guide the search for the main causal mechanism in evidence, it is observed that the increase in Brazilian engagement in peace operations is directly related to the change that occurred in Brazilian foreign policy at the beginning of the twentieth century.Such change, characterized by greater Brazilian activism focused on international cooperation and a discourse advocating institutional reforms to expand Brazil's normative potential in the world, created a window of opportunity due to Brazil's interest in participating in multilateral activities, which reflected in the acceptance to command MINUSTAH.
As a result, the country's participation in peace missions grew exponentially, inaugurating the deployment of troops under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.Beyond the debate on the coherence of this action with the principles of international relations provided in the Brazilian Constitution and the discourse relating participation in peace missions to demands related to social justice, this action put the training agenda for peace operations in evidence at a time when the UN was taking the first steps in the implementation of its new training architecture.
In this scope, it is strongly suggested that Brazil's adoption of the norms created with the reform of the UN training architecture and its concern in having its training center and courses certified by UN, more than characterizing the adoption of the policy by its purpose, is a symbolic act aiming to renegotiate the Brazilian position in the domain of peacekeeping training.This is in line with the theoretical expectation of emulation as the main mechanism and with the foreign policy intentions, as well as the Brazilian discourse of reorganizing the structure of the institution with greater relevance of the countries of Global South.
However, even though it is possible to identify the main causal mechanism present in the phenomenon, and although the norms created at the UN generated institutional changes in Brazil, the research was limited to the analysis of the diffusion process.Another debate that the renewal of the training architecture suggests is related to the study of the efficiency and effectiveness of the changes adopted and the impact of the changes on the Brazilian professionals deployed.In other words, far from being a definitive article on the subject of human resource training for peace operations, the present analysis highlights the process of policy transfer and diffusion.
As a concluding framework, the discussions presented contribute new insights both on emulation as the main causal mechanism of policy diffusion, as well as on how emerging countries can use International Organizations to achieve their strategic objectives.However, this study confirms the demand for further studies on international organizations and public policy diffusion, suggesting the use of methods that allow for in-depth and detailed analysis of specific cases.
(i) provide clear policies and guidance on training;(ii) improve standards provided to member states for pre-deployment training of police and military personnel and improve pre-deployment training of civilian personnel;(iii) provide IMTCs with the support and guidance they need to better deliver training to personnel in the field; and(iv) provide enhanced training in cross-cutting areas, including communication, management, and leadership skills (United Nations 2008).Thus, one of the consequences of this report was the development of the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials (CPTMs) in May 2009, which is an update of the SGTM, expanding the understanding of the UN system's policy and legislation, as well as training requirements.Beyond the semantic change, one notes the importance and depth with which the CPTM addresses complex issues of peace operations, trying to achieve the objectives listed for the ITS in the Peace Operations Needs Report.In 2015, the UN commissioned a new high-level report on peacekeeping.The Report of the International High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, examined a considerable range of tactical, operational, and strategic issues related to the conduct of UN operations, highlighting the importance of the UN role as a "focal point in coordinating a stronger global training partnership."In this context, the Panel highlights two points that directly impact the training architecture: (a) The Secretariat support Member States in establishing a strong global training partnership based on a training certification system to help to target limited resources among Member States; (b) Training efforts should increasingly target the "new basics" of United Nations peacekeeping in more difficult environments and focus on operational shortfalls that affect security and effectiveness in the field.Mobile training teams should be strengthened to help to deliver this enhanced training effort (United Nations 2015).

Table 2 . Chain of causation in time
Fonte: Authors