The Role of General State Administration in Strengthening the Authoritarian System in the Late Years of the Second Polish Republic

This article endeavours to examine the transformations within the general state administration of Poland following 1935. The initiatives undertaken during this period were a response to the reshaping of the administration after the May Coup and the tumultuous, ad hoc measures of the Great Depression period. With an improved economic landscape, there emerged a more deliberate approach to modernisation, the reassessment of personnel and its augmentation. Two figures within the Ministry of the Interior, Władysław Raczkiewicz and Sławoj Składkowski, played pivotal roles in guiding these reforms. Consequently, the post-1935 period witnessed an acceleration in the modernisation of bureaucratic processes, as well as endeavours to modernise administrative techniques within local governance. These developments were accompanied by heightened societal pressures exerted by the administrative system. Evidence of such pressures included electoral fraud, escalating censorship, and the imposition of financial penalties to coerce ‘voluntary’ activities from the public. Additionally, there was mounting pressure from military entities, which expected the state administration to intensify efforts for national defence. These activities constituted significant facets of state administrative functions in the waning years of the Second Polish Republic, albeit without forsaking the routine operations of office.

The Role of General State Administration in Strengthening the Authoritarian… [299]   had been lacking before May 1926, such as direct and systematic engagement in election campaigns on behalf of the ruling camp.The incorporation of individuals lacking esprit de corps into the apparatus not only gave rise to selfmade talents, as was occasionally the case, but also individuals motivated primarily by personal gain.In the midst of political turmoil, the importance of integrity often waned.
In addition to systemic solutions, the Great Depression was a significant factor with a multidimensional impact on the ongoing changes.It prompted a dominance of economic considerations in shaping desirable courses of action, driven by the urgent need for savings.However, this focus did not necessarily result solely in negative consequences.The reform of district structures implemented in 1932 exemplified this shift, as it rationalised operations by eliminating economically weak and small units.Prior to this, the lack of strong pressure to streamline the budget of the Ministry of the Interior had allowed arguments about the political unpopularity of such steps to prevail.Conversely, several measures were undertaken purely for cost-cutting purposes, which, in turn, impacted the quality of administration 4 .Expectations from higher authorities in this regard sometimes sounded dire 5 .Staffing shortages, evident in areas like the police, contributed to reductions in discretionary funds and weakened intelligence efforts, particularly in monitoring communist circles.They led to an escalation of social unrest in 1932 and 1933, which might have been mitigated had the state possessed a more efficient apparatus 6 .Improvements 4 For example, layoffs or the failure to fill vacancies led to a mounting backlog in certain primary general state administration departments, particularly in criminal-administrative departments.Additionally, the absence of travel funds hindered regular inspections, thereby impeding supervision of office work and the detection of potential abuses.
5 There were recommendations to review files in the starost offices' archives '[t]o separate clean paper even in quarters and utilise it for immediate needs.[…] As writing materials are provided to the starosts in kind, with the exception of ink, therefore no expenses for writing materials other than ink will be acknowledged in the accounts of economic expenditures.Any relevant expenses will be expected to be covered by the starosts or culpable officials from private funds' ('wydzielenie papieru czystego nawet w ćwiartkach i zużyć na potrzeby bieżące. 6Piotr Cichoracki, Joanna Dufrat, Janusz Mierzwa, Oblicza buntu społecznego w II Rze czypospolitej doby wielkiego kryzysu (1930 -1935).Uwarunkowania, skala, konsekwencje, Kraków  2019, pp.236 -239.w w w .z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e .p l 126 J a n u s z M i e r z w a [300]   began to materialise as early as 1934, but for various reasons, it seems appropriate to regard 1935 as a significant watershed moment in multiple dimensions.This is primarily due to 1935 being the first year of an economic rebound after the Great Depression.While Polish economic indicators had not yet returned to the levels of 1928 by the outbreak of the Second World War, the improved economic situation provided an opportunity for modernisation and a more deliberate approach to reform, as will be discussed further below.The year 1935 marks an important turning point, also due to political shifts.The death of Piłsudski spurred a reorientation of the Sanation (Pol.Sanacja) political movement, leading to a hardening of its stance in seeking new legitimacy of power.This entailed a closer alignment of state policy with military needs and a stricter approach towards citizens.Additionally, the enforcement of the April Constitution of Poland during this period, while significant, remained secondary to the systemic changes of 1928 and 1933.It is noteworthy that from 1936, the position of Minister of the Interior was held by then-Prime Minister Sławoj Składkowski, which further influenced the style of systemic management within the Ministry.
This contextual background is essential in understanding the state of the Polish general state administration in 1935.While various researchers have addressed its functioning from different perspectives 7 , there remains a dearth of comprehensive reflection on its developmental trajectories, abruptly interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War.In this regard, the focus will initially be on examining the repercussions of changes in the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior on the direction of the Ministry's activities during the studied period.Subsequent analysis will delve into the acceleration of modernisation processes within the administration, encompassing areas such as office techniques, record-keeping practices, adjustments to administrative divisions, personnel policies, and promotion strategies, all aimed at enhancing efficiency and accessibility.Concurrently, attention will be paid to the escalating pressure exerted by the administration on society during this period, citing examples related to, among other things, elections, press freedom, and social  [301]   life rationing.It is worth noting that these two processes are intertwined, as modern bureaucracy increasingly intervenes in social affairs.Lastly, it is crucial to address the context of the impending war and explore whether it was utilised as a pretext to further intensify measures against the public.
An examination of the changes post-1935 must commence with an assessment of the leadership within the Ministry of the Interior.In the cabinet of Prime Minister Marian Zyndram-Kościałkowski, formed in October 1935, the Ministry was helmed by Władysław Raczkiewicz, a prominent figure within the Sanation movement and a long-standing member of the political establishment in the Second Polish Republic, who had served consistently as either a minister or a voivode.Of particular significance to us is Raczkiewicz's reputation as a liberal, which influenced the trajectory of his political endeavours.As noted by Marek Sioma, Raczkiewicz embarked on the implementation of a 'more citizen-friendly state' concept, building upon measures initiated by his predecessor, Marian Zyndram-Kościałkowski 8 .This approach was evident in Raczkiewicz's reformulation of nationality policies and his revised stance towards such groups as the Kashubians -a local Pomeranian ethnic and national minority -a direction he continued to champion during his tenure as Pomeranian Voivode 9 .However, this perspective had a broader trajectory.Within the administrative realm, Raczkiewicz emphasised enhancing public perception of the Ministry and fostering a more amicable relationship between citizens and officials 10 .Internal correspondences within the Ministry of the Interior advocated for 'a shift in legislative focus towards facilitating the needs of citizens and municipalities, while avoiding a rigid, authoritarian stance often associated with policing' 11 .This ethos guided the Ministry's approach under Raczkiewicz, which was particularly evident in its efforts to draft legislation pertaining to local self-government, as elaborated upon below.
9 Przemysław Olstowski, Władysław Raczkiewicz jako wojewoda pomorski (1936 -1939) w w w .z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e .p l 128 J a n u s z M i e r z w a [302]   An important systemic shift occurred with Sławoj Składkowski assuming the role of Minister of the Interior in May 1936.While he had previously held this position twice, this time was distinctive in two key aspects: firstly, he concurrently served as Prime Minister, and secondly, his appointment followed the enactment of the April Constitution, which bolstered the government's position within the political framework12 .On the other hand, the field of internal affairs afforded Składkowski greater autonomy, since the other ministers were primarily accountable to their patrons (i.e. the President or the Inspector General of the Armed Forces) and not to the Prime Minister13 .However, distinguishing between Składkowski's actions as Prime Minister and those as Interior Minister is challenging.Nonetheless, one could characterise the latter as primarily focused on maintaining public order, exemplified by his response to the 1937 peasant strike, and bolstering the capabilities of the security apparatus, including the expansion of State Police reserve units initiated under Raczkiewicz14 .Although the anticipated shift in policy towards national minorities did not materialise, Składkowski's surprise direct inspections persisted, causing upheaval within his administration due to their often tumultuous nature 15 .Intended to instil discipline within the apparatus, these inspections frequently became fodder for ridicule directed at the Prime Minister.
Meanwhile, it is worth noting that, despite the constitutional change, there were no significant systemic alterations at the legislative level regarding the powers of the Interior Minister.The principle of negative clause still applied, whereby anything not expressly assigned to other ministries fell under the purview of the Ministry of the Interior.
Regarding the issue of modernisation, it is essential to acknowledge that this process was evidently under way before 1935.However, it was approached in a more systematic and deliberate manner following the Great Depression.Firstly, certain changes necessitated expenditure, which, albeit not necessarily substantial, proved unfeasible during the economic downturn.Secondly, with nearly a decade of Sanation rule, the administrative apparatus was already thoroughly subordinate and, while subject to potential restructuring, it could also be effectively utilised in modernising initiatives, particularly within local 129 The Role of General State Administration in Strengthening the Authoritarian… [303]   government framework.Thirdly, intellectually, the authorities were adequately prepared for these transformations, owing to the efforts of the Commission for the Improvement of Public Administration, operational since 1928.Several of its recommendations were revisited after 1935 16 .
Several measures were implemented, including technical enhancements such as the introduction of standardised forms, along with the establishment of a centralised system for their procurement by 193517 .These initiatives streamlined procedures, facilitating efficiency gains and financial savings.Additionally, efforts were made to enhance the civil registration system.In 1937, the establishment of the Central Population Register marked a significant improvement, while work on the Central Register of Foreigners continued until the outbreak of the Second World War18 .
The discussion also encompassed changes in the administrative structure of the state, including the proposed elimination of certain poviats (mid-level administrative districts), which, due to socio-political reasons, did not materialise.Additionally, alterations in the borders of voivodeships were considered.While the creation of the Podlaskie Voivodeship, with its capital in Brest-onthe-Bug, did not come to fruition19 , successful efforts were made to blur administrative boundaries between the former Prussian and Russian partitions.This was achieved through the reassignment of poviats across various voivodeships, including Poznań, Pomeranian, Warsaw, and Łódź Voivodeships20 .
During the studied period, we can observe the extension of modernisation efforts from the realm of general state administration to local government.This is exemplified by the measures taken in the latter half of the 1930s to draft pension, salary, and labour regulations for local government officials.The issue of their perceived inferior status compared to state employees, compounded by geographical disparities, had long incited discontent throughout the interwar period.However, for political reasons, these regulations were not implemented until the outbreak of the Second World War 21 .Furthermore, we can discern the effects of these processes in renewed discussions during the J a n u s z M i e r z w a [304]   second half of the 1930s regarding the potential introduction of uniforms in the general administration 22 .
An integral aspect of the modernisation processes after 1935 involved reforms in personnel policy.These endeavours were set in motion in the first half of 1935 with the establishment of the Bureau of Inspection, followed by the delineation of its operational principles 23 .Investigations conducted by Interior Ministry officials unearthed evidence that led to the preparation of prosecutorial indictments.Subsequently, absolute imprisonment sentences were handed down in seven trials post-1935, including three in the Pomeranian Voivodeship 24 .Former starosts were among the accused, facing charges ranging from financial mismanagement (including allocation of funds for political activities, support for pro-government organisations, or payment of agitators) to embezzlement of public funds.Numerous disciplinary proceedings were conducted against them, although the outcomes were not made public25 .Consequently, those found guilty of negligence or lesser offences were transferred out of the general state administration, sometimes into retirement with reduced pensions.These measures aimed to foster a renewed relationship between citizens and state administration, with the new strategy explicitly termed 'facing the common man' .Simultaneously, it sought to distance itself from the social deviances associated with the political environment of the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (Pol.Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rzą dem).In the Pomeranian Voivodeship, these issues resonated even more intensely due to the prevalent right-wing leanings of the local population and the contentious Kashubian ethnic issue 26 .
The scrutiny of personnel and the subsequent removal of undesirable elements presented opportunities for opening up primarily to the younger generation.This direction was announced by Prime Minister Marian Zyndram-Kościałkowski in his address and endorsed by Interior Minister Władysław Raczkiewicz 27 .This initiative aimed to address one of the challenges of the time, namely, the issue of unemployment among young individuals entering The Role of General State Administration in Strengthening the Authoritarian… [305]   the labour market, often possessing excellent qualifications.Indeed, this concern was highlighted in late December 1938 by the Deputy Voivode of Lviv, who emphasised the inability of the general state administration to provide individuals with positions that reflect their qualifications, resulting in the employment of university graduates28 for positions requiring lower education levels 29 .Furthermore, the initiative also facilitated access to leadership roles for officials who lacked a 'legendary' service record in the Polish Legions during the First World War but were born in the twentieth century and came of age during the period of independent Poland.This process gained momentum in the latter half of the 1930s, but its growth was abruptly halted by the outbreak of the Second World War.However, it is important to note that this did not entail a complete abandonment of involving individuals with a history of fighting for Poland's independence (in 1937, a circular letter issued by the Prime Minister addressed this matter), albeit on a much smaller scale compared to previous practices.
As part of the economic recovery efforts following the Great Depression, there was an initiative to overhaul the promotion policy.This was made feasible by the fact that after a decade of Sanation rule, individuals perceived as either genuinely or purportedly hostile to the Piłsudski faction had been purged from leadership positions.The proposed mechanisms aimed to streamline personnel movements within the Ministry of the Interior30 .At the same time, new criteria for qualifying officials were introduced in 1937.These criteria were simple and standardised, enabling a multidimensional evaluation of officers without unduly prolonging the process 31 .
As part of the Interior Ministry's post-Great Depression clean-up efforts, one element involved verifying staffing levels within the general administration.This ultimately led to filling vacancies that had accumulated prior to 1935.For instance, in the Pomeranian Voivodeship in 1939, there was a proposed increase in employment, with the voivodeship office expected to increase from 74 to 81 employees, and poviat starost offices from 210 to 256.These figures indicate significant changes in personnel levels 32 .Moreover, quantitative changes 132 J a n u s z M i e r z w a [306]   were accompanied by qualitative improvements.In the case of the Kielce Voivo deship, for example, there was a notable increase in staff qualifications.While in 1935 there were 30 officials with higher education, two years later, the number surged to 58.Among them were 8 starosts and 10 deputy starosts with higher education.As noted by the voivodeship inspector, 'despite the total increase in officials by only 6 individuals during this period, the addition of 14 officials with higher education signified a rejuvenation of the workforce, replacing less qualified staff with those possessing higher education credentials' 33 .Despite these encouraging developments, concerns persisted, particularly regarding the criminal-administrative offices, where backlogs continued to mount.
Regarding the escalation of administrative pressure on society, this 'tightening of the screw' stemmed from various processes.On one hand, it can be viewed as a natural outcome of the evolution of the political system.The culmination of this process, marked by the adoption of the April Constitution and electoral laws, solidified the Sanation political camp's grip on power, effectively cementing its dominance.Coupled with the absence of democratic oversight mechanisms, this created a situation where the administration became increasingly dependent on the central government rather than the public, prioritising the former's interests.Simultaneously, the deteriorating international landscape and the looming threat to national independence added impetus to extract concessions from society and enforce desired behaviours.The central authorities expanded their control over citizens.This was so much easier because, as one former senior official assessed during the Second World War, throughout the interwar period 'the idea of promoting citizens' interest and the priority of this interest over that of the administration was not propagated clearly enough, with regard to the administrative apparatus' .Consequently, when the slogan 'everything for the state' gained prominence, the welfare of the citizens was overlooked 34 .
The manifestations of the increasing pressure exerted by the general state administration on the public were manifold.One significant aspect was the interference in the electoral process.It is widely recognised that the 1928 parliamentary 33 'ponieważ w tym okresie ilość urzędników ogółem wzrosła jedynie o 6 osób przeto pozostałych 14 urzędników ze studiami wyższymi -to narybek świeży uzyskany w drodze wymiany starego elementu mniej kwalifikowanego na element urzędniczy ze studiami wyższymi'; Sprawozdanie Inspektora Starostw z inspekcji ogólno-organizacyjnych i częściowo merytorycznych, przeprowadzonych w starostwach powiatowych i grodzkich województwa kieleckiego w czasie od 1 kwietnia 1936 r. do 31 marca 1937 r., Archiwum Państwowe w Kielcach (hereinafter cited as APK), Urząd Wojewódzki Kielecki (hereinafter cited as UWKi), ref. no. 2312, pp. 61-62. 34 'nie wysunięto dość wyraźnie, z doniosłością na cały aparat administracyjny, hasła interesu obywatela i pierwszeństwa tego interesu przed interesem administracji'; J. Suski, op.cit., p. 71.w w w .z a p i s k i h i s t o r y c z n e .p l 133 The Role of General State Administration in Strengthening the Authoritarian… [307]   campaign established new benchmarks in this regard 35 .However, the alteration of electoral laws governing the Sejm and Senate (i.e. the two chambers of the Polish Parliament) in 1935 exacerbated the situation for opposition parties, effectively denying them any meaningful chance of securing significant representation in these legislative bodies.Confronted with this reality, opposition parties opted to boycott the elections.In this context, voter turnout became more important than the actual vote, serving as an indication of support for the ruling political camp.Consequently, rather than conventional campaigning, there was a clash between pro-turnout slogans and calls for election boycotts 36 .Voivodes and starosts, as in previous years, played a role in selecting candidates.However, from 1935 onward, they were also involved in determining the composition of electoral colleges.To ensure adequate voter turnout, the authorities resorted to police pressure or deployed the so-called 'turnout guard' , a tactic that had been employed previously.Moreover, prominent agitators faced threats of prosecution charges37 .
The general state administration was even more involved in the snap elections of 1938.The co-creator of this system, Walery Sławek, fell victim to these activities, as did his colleagues.In this instance, Składkowski explicitly instructed his subordinates to undermine Sławek by manipulating the candidate lists and then to bolster the vote share of his competitors38 .During this period, electoral fraud was widespread.Tactics included inflating vote shares, tampering with protocols, bribing committee members, allowing unauthorised individuals to vote, and coercing residents into voting 39 .
Another issue related to the increasing pressure of the system was the press laws.The significant changes introduced in this domain after the May Coup aimed to establish some form of administrative control over press freedom, often through such measures as confiscations or financial penalties.Additionally, these measures were often accompanied by various forms of non-legal interventions 40 .Starting from 1930, the focus shifted towards controlling distribution 134 J a n u s z M i e r z w a [308]   or causing as much material damage to publishing houses as possible, which effectively amounted to preventive censorship 41 .The issuance of the Decree on Press on 21 November 1938, marked the end of a series of ad hoc and fragmentary solutions applied by state authorities (which resulted from the inconsistencies in the old laws in force left over from the partition period and the new Criminal Procedure Code).However, it also entailed tighter control over publishing houses.The response to the actions planned on this occasion was the so-called White Sunday on 6 November 1938, during which 'no magazine independent of the government escaped confiscation' 42 .It is important to note that until the outbreak of the war it was political considerations that primarily drove censorship interference; violations of military secrecy, for that matter, were relatively rare 43 .Much relied on the discretion of officials, although it is evident that almost anything could be subsumed under the guise of protecting state interests.This included commenting on changes in the charter of the Bank of Poland (to maintain confidence in the currency), as well as disseminating information about repressions against the Polish population in Germany and the Free City of Danzig (Pol.Gdańsk), or the deportation of editor Stanisław Cat-Mackiewicz to the internment camp in Bereza Kartuska.If a piece of potentially negative information for the ruling political camp could not be suppressed under the indicated restrictions, alternative measures were employed.For instance, in one case, the following announcement was released: 'due to the illness of the President of the Republic of Poland, the National Assembly will soon be convened and Marshal Edward Śmigły-Rydz is mentioned among the candidates […] yet this information is irrelevant and [therefore] should be prevented from appearing in the press' 44 .This factor must be considered when assessing the reliability of the content of the press in the final years of the Second Polish Republic.
When discussing oppression by the administration, it is essential to acknowledge the presence of violence in its most explicit form.The Second Polish Republic was not immune to such occurrences, and the years 1935 -1939 were no exception, as evidenced by events such as the 1937 peasant strike and 41 Michał Pietrzak, Reglamentacja wolności prasy w Polsce (1918( -1939( ), Warszawa 1963, pp. 200 -201. 42 , pp. 200 -201. 42 'żadne niezależne od rządu czasopismo nie uniknęło konfiskaty'; J. Mierzwa, Unifikacja, modernizacja, opresja, p. 727. 43 Grażyna Wrona, Nadzór nad prasą w Krakowie (1918-1939)  [309]   incidents in Cracow and Lviv a year earlier.These incidents resulted in approximately 70 fatalities, suggesting a continuation of trends observed in the first half of the 1930s.The establishment of the internment camp in Bereza Kartuska in June 1934 further underscores this continuity.After 1935 it continued to serve as a repression tool.However, there was a notable shift in the composition of inmates -while it was initially used to incarcerate political prisoners, from 1937 onward, a significant percentage consisted of criminals or 'economic saboteurs'45 .The announcement of such measures was already evident in public speeches by members of the Council of Ministers as early as 1936 46 .
The gradual imposition of social restrictions should also be viewed as a form of oppressive governance that reflected a severity imposed on citizens.This trend, evident from the inception of the Second Polish Republic, intensified in the latter half of the 1930s.It signalled a growing inclination to oversee and regulate various aspects of citizens' lives.According to Julian Suski, it led to a situation where, 'in practice, this trend resembled European totalitarian regimes, albeit without a meticulously planned strategy encompassing all facets of life or employing ruthless oppression that overcame any resistance' 47 .However, the consequences extended further, giving rise to what came to be known as 'social actions' -directives issued by higher state authorities to starosts, which extended beyond their typical competences.These directives encompassed a wide range of activities, including campaigns to encourage participation in state loans, fundraising for the needy, or the construction of public infrastructure 48 .Additionally, tax pressures were sometimes leveraged to enforce aesthetic improvements on buildings, despite the absence of formal regulations justifying such repressive measures 49 .While some of these actions stemmed from zealous officials at the provincial level, they often found inspiration from higher political echelons.It is noteworthy that even in the face of impending war, Prime Minister Składkowski remained focused on these endeavours, J a n u s z M i e r z w a [310]   persisting in activities such as constructing latrines or whitewashing fences.An analysis of his inspection protocols, not only from 1938 but also from 1939, underscores the significance of these initiatives during this period 50 .
The processes in question were further complicated by actions stemming from the escalating international situation.Assuming the role of General Inspector of the Armed Forces in 1935, Edward Śmigły-Rydz recognised the growing threats posed by Poland's neighbours juxtaposed with the vulnerabilities of its own military forces.In response, efforts were made to accelerate military modernisation and to bolster the readiness of the civil administration to confront impending challenges.This entailed updating procedures and inventories, with a particular focus on verifying the personnel employed in military departments within voivodeship and starost offices.This process persisted until the final days of August 1939 51 .However, it is worth noting that the precise timing of the administration's transition to a wartime footing remains a subject of debate.An examination of starost office inspections conducted as late as the first months of 1939 clearly indicates that military concerns were not yet paramount.Critical remarks primarily targeted security and criminaladministrative departments.Moreover, an analysis of inspection plans for starost offices does not reveal any discernible increase in attention toward military affairs.
In the midst of impending war, the administration's approach to the public began to evolve.On one hand, there was a renewed emphasis on 'facing the common man' , driven this time by the looming threat of armed conflict.As Śmigły-Rydz assumed direct responsibility for preparing the army for war, he recognised the limitations of available resources.He understood that success would not solely depend on military prowess but also on the broader system that supported the military.This perspective was not entirely new, as the interconnectedness between society and the armed forces had been recognised since the early years of the Second Polish Republic 52 .However, after 1935, there appeared to be a heightened focus on comprehensive solutions.Starting in 1936, Coordination Committees were established at individual corps district commands to facilitate collaboration between the military and society.The administration intensified its engagement with social organisations such as the Polish Red Cross and the Air and Chemical Defence League (Pol.Liga Obrony Powietrznej i Przeciwgazowej).These organisations played crucial 50 W. Kozyra, Polityka administracyjna ministrów spraw wewnętrznych, p. 585. 51Pismo dyrektora Biura Wojskowego MSW A. Wyszyńskiego, Warsaw, 1 April 1937, AAN,  MSW, dopływ -III, ref. no.246, p. 47; Pismo wojewody kieleckiego do ministra spraw wewnętrznych, Kielce, 23 August 1939, APK, UWKi, ref. no. 24041, p. 7;W. Kozyra, Polityka ad ministracyjna ministrów spraw wewnętrznych, pp. 577-578. 52 Janusz Odziemkowski, Armia i społeczeństwo II Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa 1996.