Two Shipping Disputes between Gdańsk, Denmark and Lübeck of 1509 and 1510 in the Context of the Conflicts over the Kalmar Union

The attitude of Gdańsk towards the war between Denmark and Sweden of 1501– 1512 still has not been fully researched by historians. The city, which gained some autonomy in its contacts with foreign powers after 1454, remained neutral towards this conflict. This status did not change after Lübeck and the other Wendish cities had joined the war on the Swedish side, which increased the risk for Gdańsk with regard to shipping through the Danish Straits. Gdańsk maritime trade suffered losses due to the privateers commissioned by both Danish King Hans and the Lübeck city council. This article examines two cases of ships from Gdańsk that were seized. In 1509, the vessel of skipper Hans Paul, which carried armour for the garrison of Malbork Castle, was captured by Danish privateers, and on 30 May 1510, three ships that were sailing back to Gdańsk from Western Europe were seized by Lübeckers. The main purpose of this case study, which is based largely on the correspondence included in the official Gdańsk town records currently stored in the State Archives in Gdańsk, is to find out how those disputes were conducted and what impact they had on the city, its maritime trade and diplomacy. The cargo of armour seized in 1509 was recovered only with the help of a Polish envoy in Copenhagen, who cooperated with the envoy sent by the city of Gdańsk. In the second case, Gdańsk authorities made attempts (which included sending official letters and legations, and talks during the Hanseatic diets) to recover them at least until the 1540s, albeit to no effect. This failure was a consequence of Gdańsk’s neutral status, which limited the influence the city had over King Hans and the city authorities of Lübeck. Also, the safety of navigation in the Danish Straits was a priority for Gdańsk.


P a w e ł S a d ł o ń [308]
Maritime disputes and privateer activity as an issue in Gdańsk's relations with other Hanseatic towns and cities and Scandinavian kingdoms during the conflicts over the Kalmar Union, the Thirteen Years' War (1454 -1466) and the Anglo-Hanseatic War (1469 -1474) have already been researched by historians, but they mostly focused on the second half of the fifteenth century 3 and the reign of the Danish King Christian II (1513 -1523) 4 . The turn of the sixteenth century still requires further investigation 5 .
Gdańsk remained neutral during the Scandinavian wars at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries for at least two reasons: because of the Polish-Danish treaty of 1419 (renewed in 1509) 14 and primarily due to Gdańsk's own privateering during the Thirteen Years' War (1454 -1466). Gdańsk's politics resulted in disruption of the westward shipping through the Danish Straits and Schäfer, Leipzig 1899 (hereinafter cited as HR III/6); Hanserecesse von 1477-1530, Abt. 3, Bd. 7, hrsg. v. Dietrich Schäfer, Leipzig 1905 (hereinafter cited as HR III/7); Hanserecesse von 1477-1530, Abt. 3, Bd. 9, hrsg. v. Dietrich Schäfer, Friedrich Techen, Leipzig 1913 (hereinafter cited as HR III/9); Danziger Inventar 1531-1591, bearb. v. Paul Simson, München -Leipzig 1913Liv-, est-und kurländisches Urkundenbuch, Abt. 2, Bd. 3, hrsg. v Królewskich, t. 5, cz. 3, wyd. Marian Biskup, Warszawa -Poznań -Toruń 1975 (hereinafter cited as ASPK V/3). A large part of primary sources was edited and published, usually as abstracts, in aforementioned publications, which is hereinafter indicated in parenthesis. It should be also noted that the references provided in those publications are not up-to-date because the documents of the official Gdańsk town records stored in the State Archives of Gdańsk were reclassified during the twentieth century. 9 Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck, Altes Senatsarchiv (hereinafter cited as AHL, ASA), Externa. 10 For the role of the correspondence in settling maritime disputes as well as in the economic and social historiography of the Hansa in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see J. Mercantile Conflict Resolution,eadem,Introduction (II) Between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, Lübeck was the hub of Hanseatic and non-Hanseatic trade because of its privileges and location between the Baltic and Northern Seas with great importance for the westerndirected trade of Gdańsk and other Prussian, Livonian and Swedish cities 16 . At the same time, the sea route through the Danish Straits, which provided a direct link between Prussian and Livonian cities and the trade markets of Holland, England and the French Atlantic coast, was endangered too. In the years 1455 -1458 there was an open conflict between the Danish King Christian I and the city of Gdańsk which supported Christian's rival to the Swedish throne, Karl Knutsson (Bonde), and fought on the side of the Kingdom of Poland against the Teutonic Order allied with Denmark. Furthermore, between the Polish-Danish truce of 1458 and the peace of 1462, ships from Gdańsk which tried to avoid the Danish toll in Øresund by sailing through the Great Belt were seized by the Danes 17 . Burghers of Gdańsk were also unable to receive the exemption from the Sound toll during the last years of Christian I's reign and at the beginning of the rule of his son Hans (i. e. in 1481 and1483). Moreover, the burghers of Gdańsk did not receive any aid from Lübeckers in that matter 18 .
Direct navigation through the Danish Straits was considered a threat to Lübeck's commercial interest, in particular, due to the presence of Hollanders and, to a lesser extent, the English in the Hanseatic trade centres of Prussia and 15 M. Biskup, Stosunek Gdańska do Kazimierza Jagiellończyka, p. 180;idem, Gdańska flota kaperska, pp. 36 -37;idem, Trzynastoletnia wojna z zakonem krzyżackim 1454-1466, Warszawa 1967Walter Stark, Lübeck und  Livonia, which was noticeable already in the fourteenth century 19 . As a result, the Wendish attempt to impose a naval blockade of Øresund during the war against Denmark in 1509 -1512 was also aimed against the Hollandish shipping (especially in 1510 -1511, however, the hostilities lasted until the truce of 1514) 20 . Hollanders also had an aggressive attitude towards their Wendish competitors 21 but it was Lübeck's enmity towards the presence of Hollanders in the Baltic markets that hurt the interests of other Hanseatic cities in Prussia and Livonian the most. Both the diplomatic (carried out in, for example, Bruges, where a Hanseatic Kontor was located, until 1502 22 ) and the military efforts directed against Hollanders exacerbated the general conflict of interest within the Hanse, which occurred between Lübeck on the one hand, and Gdańsk and other Prussian and Livonian cities on the other, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. It was caused by a growing economic integration of the latter with their Polish hinterland, which had a major impact on their direct cooperation with Hollandish merchants, i. e. without Lübeck's intermediation 23 . In addition, Lübeck and Gdańsk were in different political situations, because the latter did not belong to the Holy Roman Empire 24 . This was also one of the  15. und 16. Jahrhundert, Hansische Geschichtsblätter, Jg. 117: 1999, pp. 45 -46;idem, Neptune and the Netherlands: State, Economy, and War at Sea in the Renaissance, Leiden 2004, pp. 207-210. 21 For the concept of the 'offensive' presence of Hollanders on the Baltic Sea and their 'defensive' presence on the North Sea during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see L. Sicking,Die Offensive Lösung,idem,Neptune and the Netherlands,pp. 207,242,[286][287][288]  excuses used by Emperor Maximilian I in the 1500s to repress Gdańsk and its burghers 25 . Maximilian also backed Lübeck in its fight against Denmark, but not against Hollanders after 1509 26 . However, the emperor was not involved in the resolution of both maritime conflicts discussed here. The Danish embargo on Swedish trade had a smaller impact on Gdańsk shipping, although the city was the second biggest intermediary for Swedish trade with Western Europe, second only to Lübeck. The maritime connection between Gdańsk and Stockholm was mutually beneficial, as argued by Marian Biskup, due to Gdańsk's neutral status and the changing (until 1508) attitude of Lübeck towards Sweden. Thus, Sweden needed a stable trade partner, especially during the war against Denmark. In turn, Gdańsk gained an outlet for its exports and a source of raw materials, especially the osmund iron from Sweden that was reforged in Gdańsk 27 . However, according to Marian Małowist, the maritime trade with Western Europe was still more important for Gdańsk's economy 28 . Thus, the disruption of trade with Sweden, caused by the uprising of Sten Sture the Elder, the Danish naval blockade imposed in 1501 and Gdańsk's neutral stance in the Danish-Swedish conflict 29 , was undoubtedly less harmful to Gdańsk burghers than the possible closing of Øresund. In any case, the maritime shipping from Gdańsk to Sweden was never completely brought to a halt even after 1501, although it decreased 30 . This continuous trade between Sweden and Gdańsk caused maritime disputes over Danish privateering activity.
In the needs of the garrison of Malbork Castle 32 , due to the threat from the Teutonic Order 33 . It was carried out by a Gdańsk merchant Johann Harxson, called 'Slampamp' 34 . Three barrels of armour were carried along with other goods that belonged to Gdańsk merchants, at the bottom of a ship owned by burghers of Gdańsk and Słupsk (Ger. Stolp), with Hans Paul (Pawel) as a skipper 35 . On the other hand, in some sources regarding this case, only information about sailing in ballast can be found 36 . The contradiction between those accounts can be explained by the existence of a custom called Führung. It was the right of ship crew members to carry a certain amount of cargo on their account (as part of a seaman's wage), which was not included in the ship's cargo list 37 . What makes this explanation even more likely is the regulations introduced in Gdańsk in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries under which a skipper was allowed to carry one last of cargo as his Führung (i. e. 2,000 kg according to the estimations by Stanisław Matysik 38  Hans Paul's ship encountered a Danish privateer under the command of the so-called 'Grote Cordt' in the western Baltic Sea 39 . Such vessels were tasked with enforcing the embargo that had been imposed by Denmark on all trade with Sweden in 1501 40 and repeated after the 1504 -1505 armistice 41 . The embargo had already been acknowledged by the Gdańsk city council 42 , and later considered legitimate by the Polish King Sigismund I in 1509 43 , although the city's shipping to and from Sweden was never formally stopped 44 . According to the Gdańsk source (related to the later restitution activity), the incident took place near Bornholm ('bye Bornholm') 45 . However, the Danish source specified a different location -between the Jasmund Peninsula (the Island of Rügen) and the Island of Hiddensee ('twisschen Jaszmonde unnd He densze') 46 . Considering that the former was probably based on second-hand information (as the Gdańsk city council and burghers could not have the opportunity to contact directly the ship crew that was brought to Copenhagen) 47 and that the latter contains more detailed information 48 , the Danish version is more plausible.
To estimate the time of this incident one has to find out when the information about the seizure of the ship reached Gdańsk, provided that formalities related to the reclamation efforts started as soon as it was possible. The legation led by Gdańsk  after 23 June 1509, came to Copenhagen on 10 July 1509 50 . Gdańsk city council's notification about this event was prepared for the Danish king as late as 18 July 51 and brought along with a similar (not preserved) letter from Pampowski to Copenhagen on 3 August 52 . It means that probably in late June and the first days of July, the information about skipper Hans Paul's problems still did not reach Gdańsk. Taking into account the time needed for the spread of information, it can be assumed that the ship's seizure happened no later than in May or early June 1509.
The accounts from Gdańsk and Denmark did not differ from each other too much. When the privateers asked skipper Hans Paul about the cargo, he mentioned only the ballast, concealing the transport of three barrels with armour, as well as the other cargo. It was found only after the search that took place later, off the coast of Hiddensee. After that, the skipper supposedly admitted that he had been aware it was a prohibited cargo due to the aforementioned embargo. According to the Danish version of the events, he also tried to convince Grote Cordt to let him go after throwing the barrels overboard, which did not succeed. On the other hand, the rest of the crew, who had been interrogated by the privateers, assured that they knew nothing about the transport of armour 53 . Later, complaints were made about the behaviour of the privateers breaking up sailors' chests 54 as well as other barrels. Moreover, they tore merchants' letters into pieces and threw them overboard 55 . Finally, as a consequence, Hans Paul was accused of shipping contraband to Sweden. Such a thing would have been a violation of the Danish embargo.
The ship was brought to Copenhagen as a prize, with all the goods it transported 56 . In the capital of Denmark, the crew members, apart from Hans Paul, gave sworn depositions admitting that they did not know about the skipper's cargo of armour. This was later exploited by King Hans's chancellery during the conflict over restitution with Gdańsk authorities 57 . The skipper presumably was still in Copenhagen at least at the end of July 1509 58 .
Reclamation efforts made by the Gdańsk authorities and burghers were, as already mentioned, associated with the legation of municipal secretary Zimmerman to Copenhagen in 1509 59 . It was followed by an unsuccessful mission of another Gdańsk secretary Ambrosius Storm, who had been sent to Denmark a year earlier 60 . Gdańsk's second attempt to settle the claims for restitution of seized ships was probably connected with the beginning of peace negotiations between King Hans and his Swedish enemies, as well as with the Polish diplomatic activity towards Scandinavian kingdoms and the Wendish cities. In the spring and summer of 1509, a delegation sent by Swedish Riksrådet and Regent Svante Nilsson negotiated peace terms with their Danish counterparts in Copenhagen 61 . From the point of view of the Gdańsk city councillors, it heralded probably the turning point in the Scandinavian conflict, especially since another (also rejected) proposal for an anti-Danish alliance was sent to other way around was a common practice at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries because the cargo was typically examined at the harbour, see A. Kammler,op. cit.,p. 34. 57 Depositions of helmsman (sturman) Laurentz Runge and sailors (botzmanne) Jacob Rode, Clawes Hoppe and Diems Smith are mentioned in: HR III/5, no. 461; see also HR III/5,. The appearance of crewmembers other than skippers in primary sources concerning Hanseatic maritime disputes at the turn of the sixteenth century is very rare. It was probably connected with the decline of the social and economic status of sailors during that period. For Gdańsk  At the same time, the Polish legation to Denmark and Sweden was prepared. It was connected with the Danish diplomatic missions to the Polish King Sigismund I in November 1508 and May 1509. The negotiations concerned the proposition of royal marriage between Prince Christian of Denmark and Sigismund's daughter Elisabeth, the renewal of the 1419 alliance and the problem of the embargo on maritime trade between Gdańsk and Sweden 63 . Before the legation was sent, there was an opportunity for detailed consultations between King Sigismund, his Grand Chancellor Jan Łaski and a de lega tion from Royal Prussia, including the Bishop of Warmia (Ger. Ermland) Lucas Watzenrode and Gdańsk Burgomaster Jürgen Mandth, which took place on 30 March 1509 during the Sejm in Piotrków 64 . During those talks, Gdańsk city authorities expressed to King Sigismund their deep scepticism towards the renewal of the alliance with Denmark and the potential imposition of the Polish embargo on trade with Sweden in addition to the existing Danish one. Further consultations were held in Gdańsk between the city council and Sigismund's secretary Joannes Dantiscus (who nota bene originated from Gdańsk) in May 1509 65 . Finally, Hans von Köckritz -a Lusatian knight in the service of King Sigismund I -was sent as an envoy to Copenhagen via the Hansetag in Lübeck which was held in June 1509 66 . He came to Copenhagen in June 1509, where he had an opportunity to conduct talks both with his Danish hosts as well as with the Swedish delegation that came to Copenhagen for peace negotiations. During the journey, he sent a letter to Gdańsk in which he wrote, among other things, about his help in Gdańsk's restitution efforts 67 .
As mentioned above, Zimmerman left Gdańsk not earlier than 23 June and reached the Danish capital on 8 July 1509, but due to the long absence of King Hans and Danish-Swedish peace talks he had to wait almost a month for an opportunity to address the Danish monarch and he was not even allowed to have an audience with the king 68  Even though the envoy wrote about Hans Paul in the letter to Gdańsk of 28 June 1509 77 , he was not included in that list 78 . It was probably due to the lack of documents and certificates that were, as mentioned above, sent from Gdańsk as late as 18 July. When Slampamp's messenger delivered them to Zimmerman on 3 August, the envoy went to the Danish king for an additional audience as early as the next day 79 . However, his attempt to explain the circumstances of the armour shipment for Malbork Castle during a conversation with King Hans was unsuccessful 80 . Later that day Gdańsk envoy met with von Köckritz to discuss their cooperation in that and other matters 81 .
Two days later, on 6 August 1509, in the presence of the Danish king, Zimmerman received a written response to his complaints, in which the king refused to return or compensate for the seizures of goods and ships belonging to the merchants of Gdańsk, including Hans Paul's 82 . In this case, King Hans justified his decision by the sworn depositions made by the ship crewmembers and by the relations of the privateers, based on which the barrels with armour were classified as contraband 83 . This means that the documents prepared by the Gdańsk city council and Pampowski were not even taken into consideration. Zimmerman only achieved the opportunity for an additional audience after reading the king's response 84 . After the consultations with von Köckritz 85 , he prepared his own written response to it 86 . The content of this document had also been consulted with the Polish envoy before Zimmerman tried, unsuccessfully, to personally submit it to the Danish king on 9 August 1509 87 . With regard to Hans Paul's ship, Zimmerman repeated the official statements of the Gdańsk city authorities and Pampowski, also emphasising that the Danish king was already familiar with them. Moreover, he mentioned the possibility 75 HR III/5, no. 459, 460, 461;Danish King Hans to Gdańsk, Copenhagen, 24 June 1510, APG 300, D/14, 280 (HR III/5, no. 621, 622 . Both envoys had to prepare a written statement to comply with this, which they did as quickly as on 14 August 1509 89 , along with the reclamation receipt provided by Zimmerman on the same day 90 . Interestingly, it was the only case of a Gdańsk ship seized by Danish privateers on its route beyond the Baltic Sea, and also the only one in which Zimmerman reached an agreement with King Hans during his legation of 1509 91 . It would have been impossible without the support of von Köckritz (i. e. the consultations with Zimmerman and the argument involving the possible intervention of the Polish king), who had already written several times to the Gdańsk city council about his willingness to cooperate with the city authorities on the shipping disputes 92 . Both envoys dealt with other issues during their missions, such as the aforementioned talks that were held by von Köckritz with his Danish and Swedish counterparts in Copenhagen, which lead to the renewal of the treaty concluded in 1419 between Poland and Denmark 93 . He also helped Zimmerman in negotiations with Danish authorities on the issues regarding the fish market in Scania 94 . As was usual during various legations, their efforts to return Hans Paul's ship, together with the shipped armour, were not the only task of their missions, especially for the Polish envoy. The analysis offered above confirms Marian Biskup's argumentation that the assistance of the latter was a key factor in reaching the agreement and that King Hans favoured the agreement because he wanted Gdańsk to remain neutral 95 .
The result of the peace talks between the Danish Crown and the Swedes, which were held during the stay of Zimmerman and von Köckritz 97 . These events increased the risk for the maritime trade of Gdańsk, which was further hindered by the formal war declaration between the Wendish cities and Denmark made on 21 April 1510 98 . As in the previous years, Gdańsk remained neutral, despite the efforts of both Lübeck and Denmark to get the city on their side. During the Hansetag in the summer of 1509, precisely, on 6 August 1509 representatives of the Wendish cities wrote to Gdańsk authorities with the proposition of breaking the past treaties with Denmark and establishing cooperation with them 99 . In response to that, on 23 August 1509, the Gdańsk city council wrote and sent a letter highlighting the potential threat to their ships on their way home from Western Europe through the Danish Straits 100 . The legation of Lübeck municipal secretary Hartwig Brekewolt to Gdańsk after 13 October 1509 101 probably had the same purpose as Lübeck's proposal of an alliance against King Hans made in November of the same year 102 . Gdańsk refused to enter into an agreement, although a squadron of ships from Lübeck, which had previously fought against Denmark, found shelter there during the winter of 1510 after a heavy storm at the end of 1509 103 .
At the beginning of the new sailing season of 1510, both sides tried again to ally with Gdańsk. On 20 March 1510, Lübeck asked for aid in the upcoming war with Denmark, warned against sailing west through Øresund and discouraged any support to King Hans 104 , which meant that Lübeck announced the activity of their privateers against Denmark. A similar letter was sent to Gdańsk from Copenhagen four days later 105 . In both answers, to Lübeck on 142 P a w e ł S a d ł o ń [322] 18 April 1510 106 and to Denmark the next day 107 , Gdańsk city council declared and justified their neutral status and refused to cease trade and shipping with either side, including sails through Danish-controlled Øresund. In the context of the correspondence between Gdańsk and Lübeck of 1510, it is quite clear that there was a kind of assurance from the latter, given during the mission of Brekewolt, about the safety of navigating through the aforementioned strait by ships from Gdańsk, as long as they would not enter Danish ports. At least Gdańsk authorities interpreted it in that way. Nevertheless, there were also strong suggestions from Lübeck to sail through the Great Belt instead of Øresund 108 , where a Danish toll-collecting station was located. The Wendish-Hollandish competition did not appear in the discussed correspondence as a reason for the hostile actions against the maritime trade of Gdańsk going through the Danish Straits.
At the end of July 1510, Lübeck sent to Gdańsk another warning of the risk of their own privateering activity in Øresund, along with the guarantee of security on other sea routes, due to the expected return of ships from Western European seaports to Gdańsk 109 . However, it came too late. In the previous months, Gdańsk ships had already been seized. The preserved correspondence between the cities and other sources make it possible to analyse at least three cases of ships that were captured by Lübeck privateers on 30 May 1510 110 in the Danish Straits, namely at the Kullaberg Peninsula and in Øresund itself, near Helsingør 111 . The loss of a ship that belonged to skipper Anders Blancke and sailed from Zeeland was later 112 valued (including the cargo that belonged 143 Two Shipping Disputes between Gdańsk, Denmark and Lübeck… [323] to Gdańsk burghers) at 2,232 Prussian marks 113 . The ship owned by Gdańsk burgher Hans Stake sailed home from England, and its cargo was worth 1,498 Prussian marks 114 . The third ship sailed from Zeeland under the command of Arndt Smidt, and the seized property (both ship and its cargo) was worth 1,339.5 Prussian marks 115 . All those ships were brought to Lübeck 116 , which meant a tangible loss for several Gdańsk merchants 117 due to both the value of the lost goods, and the deterioration of trade between Prussia and foreign countries, even located as remotely as Portugal 118 .
In Lübeck, the ships and cargoes were immediately treated as rightful prizes that were tradable. There was at least one ship 119 that was sold before December 1510 as well as the cargo of lime from Hans Stake's vessel 120 that was sold at an unspecified time. At that time, Herman Falke, also a Lübeck burgher and a member of the local municipal elite, made transaction proposals to all three skippers while in Lübeck 121 . Apparently, no time was given for any restitution  Gdańsk to Lübeck, 12 July 1510, APG 300, 27/8, pp. 69v -70 (HR III/6, no. 9); Gdańsk to Rostock, 24 November 1510, APG 300, 27/8, pp. 80 -80v (HR III/6, no. 69);HR III/6, no. 77: 6;Gdańsk to Lübeck, 24 May 1511, APG 300, D/71, 106 (HR III/6, no. 185). 117 Valentin Nagel and Bernd von Rees were also among them, see Gdańsk to Lübeck, 24 May 1511, APG 300, D/71, 106 (HR III/6, no. 185). 118 Gdańsk to Lübeck, 12 July 1510, APG 300, 27/8, pp. 69v -70 (HR III/6, no. 9); Lübeck to Gdańsk, 31 July 1510, APG 300, D/31, 584. 119 HR III/6, no. 77: 6. 120 HR III/7,no. 43: 2. 121 HR III/7,no. 39: 228;HR III/7,no. 113: 86. 144 P a w e ł S a d ł o ń [324] procedures and written claims, which were sure to be expected from Gdańsk burghers and authorities after the seizure of the ships. Privateering activity against Gdańsk merchant shipping in the Danish Straits caused dissatisfaction among Gdańsk burghers, and demands for the requisition of Lübeck property were made but they were rejected by the Gdańsk city council 122 . On 12 July 1510, Gdańsk city councillors sent an official protest against privateering followed by a demand for restitution of seized goods and ships in general, not specifically with regard to that three ships 123 . It was repeated 12 days later in a letter concerning the Hanseatic Kontor in Bruges 124 . This issue was also mentioned in correspondence with other Wen dish cities (e. g. in a letter sent to Rostock on 5 November 1510) 125 and included in the list of objectives for Zimmerman's legation to those cities, which was sent in December 1510 126 . During this mission, the envoy from Gdańsk took part in the diet of the Wendish cities in January 1511, during which (on 20 and 21 January 1511) he raised the issues of freedom of navigation in Øresund (in place of the route through the Great Belt proposed by Lübeck), the security of Gdańsk merchant ships harassed by Lübeck privateers, and the demands for restitution and compensation for the financial losses inflicted on Gdańsk shipping. This, however, did not yield any results 127 .
Subsequently, three merchants from Gdańsk, namely Philip Bischop, Bernt von Rees and Valentin Nagel, acted on their own by sending to Lübeck their plenipotentiary Wilhelm Rugenordt on 24 May 1511 128 , but the sources from the entire first half of the sixteenth century indicated that those disputes were never settled. On the other hand, the ship crewmembers and skippers were probably not held in captivity, because such a problem was not mentioned in the sources. Moreover, one of the skippers, namely Arndt Smidt, was attacked by Lübeck privateers again on 19 June 1511 when he sailed from Zeeland to Gdańsk with the goods belonging to Bernd Basman, Paul von Femern and aforementioned Bernt von Rees and Valentin Nagel 129 . In the same year, 145 Two Shipping Disputes between Gdańsk,Denmark and Lübeck… [325] Gdańsk made efforts to settle the disputes with Lübeck and secure their westward shipping during the Hansetag in June 1511. This is evidenced by two separate instructions prepared for the Gdańsk delegation 130 : one regarding the Hanseatic issues in general 131 and the other regarding the Lübeck 132 issues in particular, both of which included the disputed seizures of ships and goods 133 . Before the Hanseatic diet in Lübeck, consultations with other Prussian towns and cities and the Polish King Sigismund I took place. The king assumed that the aforementioned treaty between Poland and Denmark renewed in 1509 was sufficient to ensure the safety of ships and merchants from Gdańsk 134 . Nevertheless, von Köckritz was sent again as a Polish envoy to that Hansetag 135 , along with the delegates from Gdańsk and other Prussian towns and cities 136 . Setting the agreement on the safe passage through Øresund as a condition to start talks about other issues showed the determination of the Gdańsk delegation during this Hansetag 137 . They focused more on the Lübeck privateers operating in Gdańsk Bay in 1511 and, in particular, on the safety of the Danish Straits, rather than on the financial losses suffered by Gdańsk merchants in 1510 138 . Despite the Wendish-Hollandish maritime hostilities (e. g. Lübeck's complaints about the presence of Hollanders in Gdańsk appearing from January 1511 139 , and the seizures of Hollandish ships in the Gulf of Gdańsk 140 ), both issues were discussed only in the context of the conflict with Denmark. As a result, the agreement between Gdańsk and Lübeck of 26 June 1511 delayed the solution of Gdańsk shipping loss problems until the end of the war with Denmark or the next Hansetag. Also, a commitment to restrict any individual actions by Gdańsk burghers to obtain compensation from Lübeck was made 141 . It was more important to secure the shipping routes to Western Europe and in Gdańsk Bay against Wendish privateers. However, this agreement 130 Incorrect information about the delegates from Gdańsk acting as observers and not as participants during the Hansetag in 1511 was provided in: H. Samsonowicz After the Treaty of Malmö had put an end to the war between Denmark, Sweden and the Wendish cities in 1512, Gdańsk still tried to receive compensation for the shipping losses suffered in 1510 and 1511 during the Hanseatic diets. The claims for the three ships seized in the Danish Straits in 1510 appeared during the Hansetag held in Lübeck in June and July of 1517 144 , for which a detailed list of the financial losses was prepared 145 . In the following year, during the next Hansetag, a delegation from Gdańsk held a long discussion with their Lübeck counterparts about those claims and other disputes caused by the activity of Wendish, primarily Lübeck, privateers during 1510 and 1511. Lübeck rejected those claims arguing that the Wendish cities warned against the privateers and that the burghers of Gdańsk were able to take legal actions in Lübeck 146 . Among other things, the cases of Hans Stake, Anders Blanke and Arndt Schmidt were mentioned in the instruction for the delegates from Gdańsk to the Hansetag in May and June 1530, where the problem of past maritime disputes between the two cities was discussed 147 . A similar situation likely occurred during the Hansetag of 1535 when the representatives of Gdańsk discussed the problem of actions against Gdańsk shipping taken by Lübeck privateers in 1510 and 1511 and during the 1520s and 1530s 148 . A copy of the financial losses list that was prepared in 1517 can even be found among the documents covering maritime disputes that were collected by Lübeck authorities for the Hansetag in 1540 149 .
Both the burghers and the city council of Gdańsk failed in their efforts to acquire the restitution of seized goods and the compensation for the financial losses caused by Lübeck privateers on 30 May 1510. The ships were not seized because of sailing from Zeeland and England but due to the Wendish blo ckade 142 See the opinion expressed by historian P. Simson,op. cit.,p. 353. 143  of Øresund 150 . Gdańsk city authorities made a mistake by postponing the settlement indefinitely when the agreement with Lübeck was made in 1511. On the other hand, they did not have such support from King Sigismund I as in the case of Hans Paul's ship in 1509. Previous and later efforts made by sending official letters or holding talks during the Hanseatic diets were insufficient against Lübeck's stance in this matter. Interestingly, the Gdańsk city council did not escalate that conflict in the way they did after the aforementioned assault by the Lübeck fleet on the Hollandish ships near the Hel Peninsula in August 1511, when a group of Lübeck sailors who attacked the Hollanders was arrested and later beheaded in Gdańsk on 9 September 1511 151 . The importance of those maritime disputes was apparently different. It is worth mentioning that during the compensation efforts made later, i. e. after 1512, their evolution from a diplomatic to a legal problem is noticeable 152 .
In the case of both discussed incidents, the ships sailed to Gdańsk without violating the naval blockade. In 1509, skipper Hans Paul was falsely charged, and a year later the ships were seized despite previous arrangements with the envoy from Lübeck regarding the security of Gdańsk navigation in Øresund. According to examined sources, none of the vessels was seized because of sailing from Holland, Zeeland or England. Admittedly, the seamen on board those ships were not victims of lethal violence, although they were ill-treated by privateers during the inspection of Hans Paul's ship. Those regular seamen were not involved in the restitution efforts that followed both incidents. On the other hand, the valuable cargo that was lost on board the three ships in 1510 belonged to the members of the ruling elite of Gdańsk which shaped the external policy of the city, e. g. Philip Bischof who became a burgomaster in 1517 153 . The actions undertaken by Lübeck privateers in Øresund in 1510 threatened both the political and personal interests of those elite members, unlike the briefly mentioned cases of the seizures conducted by the Danes on the Baltic Sea in 1501-1509 and the discussed incident involving Hans Paul's 150 In a letter of 1512 there is an assurance that neither the cargo nor the land from where Arnd Smith's ship sailed back to Gdańsk were hostile to Lübeck, but it was sent to the municipal authorities of Riga, which did not take part in the dispute, see Gdańsk to Riga, 31 March 1512, APG 300, 27/8, pp. 166v -167 (HR III/6, p. 282, footnote 2). 151  ship, which caused a problem also for the aforementioned Pampowski and King Si gis mund I.
Gdańsk city council did not question the legality of the actions taken by the Danish and Lübeck privateers during the conflict of 1501-1512 154 . To settle the disputes that resulted from their actions against Gdańsk shipping, the city authorities used diplomatic methods, most often by sending official correspondence, and less often by holding talks during the Hanseatic diets and legations, during which municipal secretaries made efforts for the restitution of the seized goods and ships and the compensation for the suffered financial losses. As a neutral party in this war, Gdańsk had limited influence over the Danish King Hans and Lübeck city councillors, who had the final word and decided on the return of seized prizes along with their freight. The Polish King Sigismund I was not fully involved in such problems of Gdańsk burghers and the assistance provided by his envoys depended on the interest of his international policy 155 . Throughout the entire period of this war, neither Lübeck nor Denmark wanted to engage in a military conflict with Gdańsk, despite the disputes 156 . Also, Danish privateering on the Baltic Sea seemed to be less dangerous for the fundamental economic interests of Gdańsk burghers, namely the westward trade, than the privateering conducted at the behest of Lübeck in Øresund. This could be the explanation for the diplomatic efforts undertaken by Gdańsk in 1510 and 1511 when the settlement of the claims regarding the financial losses suffered by Gdańsk merchants in 1510 was moved to the background. There is a need for further research on this topic to better understand the rapid end of Gdańsk's neutrality policy in the years 1521-1523, when