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Marcin Kurpios

**The Reception of Thucydides
in the Theory and Practice of
Hellenistic Historiography**

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Marcin Kurpios

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in the Theory and Practice of Hellenistic Historiography

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Foreword

The subject of this book is the Hellenistic reception of Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*, written in the last decade of the fifth century BC. This work, a product of the unique environment of late fifth-century Athens, reflects various aspects of Greek intellectual and cultural life, and is studied from innumerable perspectives. From the first reading of the *History* around 2400 years ago until the present day, it continues to stimulate both the scholar and the layman reader. Although at the time of Thucydides' writing generic divisions in literature were far less clearly defined, the *History* should be recognized as a milestone in the development of historiography.

There were historical moments at which Thucydides was the centre of attention, or, perhaps even more often, of controversy. Some of the turning-points, when influential interpretations of the *History* were introduced, are well documented and explored — for example, the near “Thucydides-worship” of historians under the Antonines and Severans, as attested by Lucian (c. 120–190 AD) and Cassius Dio (c. 164–229 AD). However, there are also periods for which the evidence is limited and difficult to define, a particularly fertile ground for misconception and stereotyping. In the case of Thucydides, such “dark ages” are definitely the years from approximately the death of Alexander the Great (323 BC) until Augustus' rise to imperial power after the battle of Actium in 31 BC. The aim of my study is to fill this gap, and to provide, it is hoped, a comprehensive and accurate account of whether and how Thucydides was read, evaluated and interpreted in the Hellenistic age.

The very beginnings of the ancient reception of Thucydides are paradoxical. On the one hand, the *History* found immediate and deliberate continuation in the *Hellenica* of Xenophon (c. 430–355 BC), which spans the events from approximately the end of Thucydides' narrative (summer 411 BC), down to the battle of Mantinea (362 BC). Theopompus of Chios (c. 378 – after 320 BC) was also considered to be Thucydides' successor, starting his work where the latter left off. The author of the so-called *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (first half of the fourth cent. BC) continued the work of Thucydides to at least 394 BC. On the other hand, Xenophon and Theopompus manifestly diverge from Thucydides in terms of the interests and structure of their works. Theopompus' *Hellenica* is thought of as deriving more from Herodotus than from Thucydides. The anonymous historian, author of the history preserved in papyrus fragments from Oxyrhynchus, has been classed by some as “Thucydidean”, but the surviving evidence is too scarce for such an assumption.

Heretofore, the common view prevailed that with the coming of the Hellenistic age, and throughout this entire period, Thucydides enjoyed even less recognition than he did soon after his death. With the sole exception of Polybius, Thucydides is thought to be completely “abandoned” as early as the turn of the third century BC. He “evaporates” from the theory and practice of historiography, to reappear somewhere at the beginning of the Imperial Period. This view of an almost complete rupture with Thucydides in the Hellenistic period was rooted in prejudice, for which it is necessary to look back to nineteenth-century scholarly inclinations in the study of the humanities, namely the impact of the positivist approach. The adherents of positivism believed that historiography can — and should — be modelled on the natural sciences, and conceived of history as potential source of strict general laws and objective truths. Nineteenth and early twentieth-century readings of Thucydides were determined by this positivist paradigm, and made of Thucydides the first “scientific historian”. Felix Jacoby (1876–1959), whose intellectual training took place during that time, identified the pinnacle of historiography with Thucydides; and the following generations of historians, especially those of the Hellenistic period, were assessed by him as having caused the genre’s deterioration. Such an overall vision of the development of Greek historiography, as established in Jacoby’s fundamental work *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, determined our understanding of Hellenistic attitudes towards Thucydides. To put it plainly, modern scholars examined Thucydides’ reception or influence in the Hellenistic age without any awareness of their own reception-based presumptions and prejudices.

The main contention of this book is that Thucydides’ *History* was recognized in the Hellenistic theory and practice of historiography. I argue that the scarcity of extant references to Thucydides in that period is no proof that he was entirely rejected. We need to remember the basic fact that only a small percentage of historical works written in the Hellenistic period has survived, and even with this limited source material, studies published to date do not analyse all the available evidence, always providing only a partial picture. I deal with these and associated issues in the Introduction.

My fundamental task has been to analyse all the extant evidence on the readership of Thucydides from the approximate time of his death, and throughout the Hellenistic period. Strikingly, no study on the reception of the *History* starts with such a necessary survey. This constitutes the second chapter of this book. The focus on explicit references to and quotations from Thucydides, even though they require profound and cautious analysis, provides a firm ground for further research. The definition of the character and

provenance of those references requires a great deal of space, but this was a necessary, unprecedented task.

In the third section, I propose a limited reinterpretation of Thucydides' chapter on methodology, and endeavour to extract the main questions it raises, which were the most likely to be familiar to and examined by further generations of historians. With reference to these main themes of the *Methodenkapitel*, I examine individual parallels and analogies between Thucydides and selected Hellenistic historians. This method, i.e. reading the essential passages of the *History* prior to any attempt to look for their traces in other historians, is arguably an advancement in comparison with the studies on the subject published so far.

The fourth chapter is devoted to references to and assessments of Thucydides in treatises connected to the theory or history of historiography (entitled Περὶ ἱστορίας). Firstly, I aim to answer the question of whether the poorly attested Peripatetic writings *On History* could have concerned the theory of history. Having shown that it is quite possible, I concentrate on the testimony of Theophrastus of Eresus (c. 372 – c. 287 BC) found in Cicero's *Orator*. Then comes the analysis of Praxiphanes of Mytilene's (end of fourth to mid-fourth cent. BC) reference to Thucydides, as reported by Marcellinus (fifth cent. AD), the only named "biographer" of the historian. At the end of this chapter Dionysius of Halicarnassus' (c. 60 BC – after 7 AD) partially extant *Letter to Pompeius* is interpreted as a theoretical-historical treatise. The peculiar moral implications of the judgements about Thucydides in this piece of writing are highlighted.

The last chapter challenges the opposition of Thucydides the "rationalist" to the Hellenistic current of "tragic history". Here I begin with definitions of the concepts of vividness and experience (ἐνάργεια and πάθος), used by later authors with reference to specific parts of the *History*. By underlining the epic context of these notions, I intend to shift the perspective from the affinities with tragedy, to the natural and expected features of historical narrative. As a result, I hope to demonstrate that Thucydides was admired and imitated in the Hellenistic age (and beyond) in surprisingly "unscientific" respects. I aim to specify which parts of the *History* were recognized for their artistry, and considered attractive for emotional recitation, rather than for clinical study of the laws of history.

I hope that this study provides possibly the most substantiated assessment of the significance of Thucydides for Hellenistic theory and practice of historiography. As such, it claims to be a contribution to the development of the historical studies in general, giving insights into the mechanisms of the continuation and discontinuation of historiography in the Classical age. Moreover, as Otto Luschnat (1911–1990) wrote, the question of to what degree Hellenistic historians knew Thucydides, or how they understood him, is by no

means solely a literary problem. The answer to that question will provide us with a deeper understanding of the Greek mentality, since methodology in the humanities is always inextricably linked with anthropology and the history of ideas. In other words, my inquiry concerns not only Thucydides as a historian and his reception by other historians in antiquity, but also sheds light on the world-view of the man and on that of his followers.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1. Thucydides' life and work

Thucydides was born around the year 460 BC.¹ We have only fragments of reliable information about his life.² The two extant ancient biographies of Thucydides gained little credibility among scholars. The first one, more extensive, is ascribed to a certain Marcellinus, and datable roughly to the middle of the fifth century AD. It contains some information about Thucydides' life, and treats the style of the *History*. However, it is a patchwork composed of earlier scholia and commentaries devoted to the historian, and overall has little real historical worth.³ The second *vita* is entirely anonymous, very brief, and in most points converges with Marcellinus.⁴ We also have the entry in the *Suda*, telling us the famous story of how Thucydides, while a child, attended a public reading of Herodotus and — moved by the performance — burst into tears.⁵ However, most of what we can learn about Thucydides with relative certainty comes from the man himself. In the first words of the *History*, our historian refers to himself as “Thucydides the Athenian”, but in a later chapter as “the

¹ This date is an approximate *terminus ante quem*. Thucydides says that he was elected general for the year 424/423, and that post could not have been held by a man younger than thirty (Thuc. IV 104, 4–5; cf. VI 12, 2 and 17, 1). The opening of his work (Thuc. I 1) implies that when the war was about to break out (436–432), he was mature enough to recognize that it would be enormous, and greater than any wars fought before. All dates in this chapter, if not indicated otherwise, refer to the period before Christ. A large part of the translations come from the editions of the Loeb Classical Library. Some, where indicated, are mine.

² The most informative studies on Thucydides' life and work are: Schwartz 1919, 22–31; Taeger 1925; Schadewaldt 1929; Finley 1942, 3–73; Grundy 1948; Gomme 1954b, 116–164; Adcock 1963; von Fritz 1967, 523–530; Luschkat 1970, 1087–1090; Grant 1974, 81–94; Malitz 1982, 257–289; Strasburger 1982, 777–800; Hornblower 1987; Meister 1990, 45–62; Brunt 1993, 137–159; Zagorin 2005, 7–22; Sonnabend 2011, 42–83.

³ Hence the full title in the manuscripts: ΜΑΡΚΕΛΛΙΝΟΥ ἐκ τῶν εἰς Θουκυδίδην σχολίων περὶ τοῦ βίου αὐτοῦ Θουκυδίδου καὶ τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἰδέας. On Marcellinus' *Vita* Ritter 1845 321–359, is still valuable. He shows that the *Vita*, at least in part, is conceived of as a philological treatise, characteristic of the Alexandrian grammarians. As to the historical accuracy in this biography Ritter had no doubt that “der geschichtliche Werth dieser Biographie sich auf Null reducirt” (p. 341). Piccirilli 1985, XXIV–XXVI, calls Marcellinus' *Vita* a “scholastic” source, and shows that its accuracy is highly questionable. See also Petersen 1873; Schöll 1878, 433–451; Luzzatto 1993a, 111–115; Maitland 1996, 538–558.

⁴ See Piccirilli 1985, XXX–XXXII. It is virtually impossible to date it.

⁵ *Suda*, s.v. Θουκυδίδης. Ritter 1845, 327, calls this description a “Märchen”.

son of Olorus”.⁶ This could suggest that his line of descent can be traced from Olorus the Thracian king.⁷ He could have been related to Cimon, son of Miltiades and to Hegesipyle, daughter of the king Olorus. Possibly, Thucydides the historian’s mother was the daughter of Thucydides the son of Melesias. The latter was connected by marriage with Cimon, whom he succeeded as the main political opponent of Pericles.⁸ Thucydides also mentions his contacts with Thrace when he relates his experience in the military. He reports that he was a στρατηγός in the Thracian region, when the Spartan commander Brasidas was about to capture the city of Amphipolis.⁹ The historian implies that he had close links with the eminent Thracian locals, and that he had rights to exploit gold mines there.¹⁰ Thus, he was apparently a rich man.¹¹ Apart from that, we are also told by Thucydides that he experienced the famous Plague in Athens (430).¹² After an unsuccessful rescue mission at Amphipolis, he was sent into exile for twenty years (424–404),¹³ which he probably spent in Thrace, working on the *History*.¹⁴ We do not know if he came back to Athens after 404, or when and where he died.¹⁵ The *terminus post quem* of his death is indicated in the

⁶ Thuc. I 1, 1: Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε κτλ. Thuc. IV 104, 4: Θουκυδίδην τὸν Ὀλόρου κτλ.

⁷ The name of Thucydides’ father was unclear for the ancients. Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 16, claims that the spelling “Ὀλορος” is incorrect, and the right spelling is “Ὀρολος”; but it is evident that Marcellinus, whoever he was, here follows a source that refers to a tomb, presumably of Thucydides, discovered in the deme of Koile (near the Melitian Gate) by Polemon of Ilium (ca. 220–160). At the beginning of the *Vita*, the name is twice spelled “Olorus”, and the idea that the very words of Thucydides should be corrected on the basis of this other evidence, seems erroneous. Cf. Ritter 1845, 329–330, 342; Luschkat 1956, 134–139.

⁸ King Olorus is mentioned by Herodotus (VI 39; VI 41), as the father of Hegesipyle who married the younger Miltiades. The name Ἡγησιπύλη for Thucydides’ mother occurs only in the biographical tradition (Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 2). This affinity has been discussed by Davies 1971, 234–235, who argues that Olorus of Halimous was a son of a daughter of Miltiades the Younger and of Hegesipyle, born to her in the 480s, and given his maternal great-grandfather’s name. See Davies 1971, 230–237; Hornblower 1987, 1–2.

⁹ Thuc. IV 104–106. Thucydides failed to bring succour to Amphipolis, but managed to save Eion on the way.

¹⁰ Thuc. IV 105, 1.

¹¹ Marcellinus (*Vit. Thuc.* 47) located Thucydides’ property at Skapte Hyle, but it is probably a guess based on Hdt. VI 46 (cf. Ritter 1845, 349–350: “Erdichtung”). See Krüger 1832, 3–11; Luschkat 1970, 1095–1097; Hornblower, CT II, 332–338.

¹² Thuc. II 48, 3: αὐτός τε νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἄλλους πάσχοντας.

¹³ Thuc. V 26: ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ ἔτη εἴκοσι μετὰ τὴν ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν στρατηγίαν κτλ.

¹⁴ Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 47; Dorandi 1991, 13. At par. 25 Marcellinus recounts and rejects the claim of Timaeus of Tauromenium that Thucydides spent his exile in Italy.

¹⁵ Various versions of the historian’s death are given by Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 31–33. Plutarch suggests that Thucydides died in Skapte Hyle in Thrace (*Cim.* 4.3), but provides no source for this claim. The alleged tomb of Thucydides was discovered by Polemon in second century

History — although the narrative breaks in the summer 411, Thucydides implies that he intended to continue it to 404 (V 26),¹⁶ hence we can assume that he lived at least up to this date.¹⁷

The military experience of Thucydides the general had left an indelible imprint on Thucydides the historian. He was certainly well acquainted with political and military institutions, diplomacy, negotiations and everything related to warfare. This obviously influenced his choice of subject, selection of material and the questions that he posed to his sources. Thus, the proper subject of the *History* is the so-called Second Peloponnesian War of 431–404,¹⁸ fought between Athens and its allies (the Delian League) on the one side and Sparta and its allies (the Peloponnesian League) on the other.¹⁹ Thucydides chose to focus, on the one hand, on the developments of what he conceived of as a single war, and on the other on the universal laws of human behaviour that manifested themselves during that conflict.²⁰ The narrative is very detailed up to the time of Thucydides' exile (424); the events after that date are not recounted with the same precision as the earlier ones. The description becomes more of a summary and the last book contains no speeches in *oratio recta*, which is striking as these

amongst the Κιμώνια μνήματα (Marc. Vit. Thuc. 17). The historian was meant to have been buried with his son, Timotheus. The tomb was placed in the deme of Koile, not Halimous, where — according to the stele — Thucydides was born. However, the Κιμώνια μνήματα can only refer to the burial of Κίμων Κοάλεμος and his mares (Hdt. VI 103). As Canfora 2006, 7, points out, to allow for the possibility that Thucydides and his son were buried there, it would be necessary to assume that the entire lineage was buried near those μνήματα, which is unlikely. The manner in which Marcellinus describes the tomb is suspicious, as he writes that “it is there that the tomb of Herodotus and Thucydides is pointed out”: ἔνθα δαίκνυνται Ἡροδότου καὶ Θουκυδίδου τάφος. Perhaps we should believe that this tomb was rather a monument designed to celebrate the two historians: Busolt 1898, 336–340; Malitz 1982, 259–260.

¹⁶ At V 26 Thucydides says that he lived through the entire war, in good disposition and with full capacity to observe what was going on: ἐπεβίων δὲ διὰ παντός αὐτοῦ αἰσθανόμενός τε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ προσέχων τὴν γνώμην κτλ. For the problem of incompleteness see below, 9–10.

¹⁷ There have been attempts to use the passage about the king Archelaus, where he is praised by the historian (Thuc. II 100), as a *terminus post quem*, but this requires the presumption that it was written after Archelaus' death in 399. Hornblower CT I, p. 376, thinks that “it is surely likely that it was written at or towards the end of Archelaos' reign, because it seems to sum up his achievement almost in the manner of an obituary.” Yet this seems too weak a basis for dating. Meister's (1990, 46) dating of Thucydides' death to some point between 399–395 is also purely conjectural.

¹⁸ The First Peloponnesian War is the modern name for the struggle between Athens and Corinth (with some interventions of Sparta) between c. 461–446, ended by the Thirty Years' Peace. See Lewis 1992a, 111–120.

¹⁹ On the outbreak and course of this conflict see Kagan 1969; 1974 and 1987; cf. Lewis 1992b, 370–432. On the Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition, see Andrewes 1992, 433–463. On the names used for the entire war as well as for its subdivisions, see Hornblower 1995, 60 n. 65.

²⁰ See the reflections of Malitz 1982, 263–264 and Strasburger 1982, 777–783.

constitute a large part of the preceding seven books. The account ends in 411, soon after the battle of Kynossema,²¹ the implications of which will be discussed below.

2. The composition, edition and circulation of the *History*

Thucydides' work probably did not bear any title at the time of its first edition.²² How and when it was published or made its way into the libraries is a complex question.²³ In the Classical period "oral publication" was probably the most common way of making one's work known.²⁴ It is reasonable to suppose that the case with Thucydides was not different, and that he also "published orally" certain parts of the *History*.²⁵ However, this can probably be true only for some passages of the work, which were particularly suitable for aural reception.²⁶ Thucydides probably wrote most of his work in Thrace, during his exile,²⁷ and the banishment made it difficult (or even impossible) for him to publish the work in Athens, either orally or in papyrus, after 424. Public readings of parts

²¹ After the account of the battle (Thuc. VIII 104–107), Thucydides narrates the departure of Alcibiades to Samos and of Tissaphernes to Ephesus. The last sentence (VIII 109, 1) reads: καὶ ἀφικόμενος πρῶτον ἐς Ἔφεσον θυσίαν ἐποιήσατο τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι ("He first went to Ephesus and there offered sacrifice to Artemis."). The abruptness is emphasized by πρῶτον, which implies that it is intended as the beginning of the further account of Tissaphernes' visit to Ephesus. See Hornblower, CT III, 1053–1054, for the probable content that Thucydides wanted to include in the non-existent or non-extant part.

²² At the end of the fifth century such work was not published under any title *sensu stricto*. It was probably headed and referred to with the words (with, perhaps, some modification) that open the first chapter: Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων. The Alexandrian title (given by the editors in the Museum) read θουκυδίδου ἱστορίαι or θουκυδίδου συγγραφή. See Luschkat 1970, 1108–1112. In the present book I consistently use the English title "the *History*". On the titles on papyri see also Pitcher 2009, 1–4.

²³ See the overview of Momigliano 1930, 1–48; Erbse 1961, 217–218; Irigoin 2003, 153.

²⁴ We have explicit, albeit not indisputable, evidence for the public recitation of parts of Herodotus. See Keynon, 1951, 1–39, part. p. 20; Canfora 2011, 372–373.

²⁵ Cf. Malitz 1982, 268–269; Thomas 1993, 225–244; Pöhlmann 1994, 20; Hornblower, CT III, 31; Canfora 2011, 370–374. Morrison 2004, 95, proposes to see Thucydides as a writer belonging to the "age of transition", which already appreciated the advantages of the written word, but at the same time composed his work with the oral "background" of his potential readers in mind.

²⁶ For the parts of the *History* that were considered especially suitable for aural reception because of their emotional impact, see chap. 5, 253–255.

²⁷ Plut. *Cim.* 4.2–3; Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 47; cf. Luc. *De hist. con.* 48. The information that it was in Skapte Hyle is uncertain. On these testimonies see Piccirilli 1985, 87–88; 105–106. As for Marcellinus' information about Thucydides' work on the *History* in Thrace, Prentice 1930, 117, is correct to state that "[...] ancient writers had little if anything more than we have now on which to base their opinion, and that is chiefly the two passages in which Thucydides himself speaks of his own work, namely, i. 1 and v. 26".

of the work, at an earlier date, are probable yet impossible to support by any evidence. Hence it was sometimes argued that the work was not published by Thucydides at all.²⁸ For over one hundred years Thucydidean studies were haunted by the composition-problem, namely of the stages and relative chronology of the origins of the *History*, connected with the question of the incompleteness of the work. The “separatists” accepted Franz W. Ullrich’s thesis of a two-stage composition and revision, and considered books VIII and V as left incomplete by the historian.²⁹ Building on that, they speculated as to which of Thucydides’ narrative parts and speeches, but also historical, political and philosophical ideas were “early” and “late”.³⁰ The apparent incompleteness has also led some scholars to reconstruct Thucydides’ “original” plan. For example, Hunter R. Rawlings looked for proof of an intended two-pentadic structure of the *History*, unrealized because of Thucydides’ untimely death.³¹ The thesis and its implications were resisted and systematically refuted by the “unitarians”. Today there is a consensus that the *History* was composed in a continuous process and conceived of as a unity from the very outset. Still, that Thucydides did not manage to “refine” the last book (especially to fill it with speeches in *oratio recta*) remains a possibility we cannot exclude, especially when taking into account the vicissitudes of the historian’s life.³²

²⁸ Prentice 1930, 117–127, concluded that Thucydides did not publish his work, leaving a pile of loose sheets gathered together and composed by someone else. This was cogently refuted by Dorandi 1991, 13; 29, showing through inquiry into the technical aspects of the *History* that the historian’s most plausible method was to make notes and then transfer them onto a papyrus roll as a draft, then to revise and compose the final version.

²⁹ “Die thukydideische Frage” originated with the study of Ullrich 1846. This scholar argued that the eighth book, as well as part of the fifth, are only unfinished drafts, since they contain no speeches at all (book VIII), or fewer than the other books (book V), plus they quote numerous documents verbatim (not paraphrased by the historian, as in other books). Ullrich inferred from this that Thucydides initially conceived of the war as over with the peace of 421, wrote the books I–V 24, but upon the renewal of war in 413 changed his mind, completed the Melian Dialogue and Sicilian narrative, and was in the process of completion of the rest when he died.

³⁰ Schwartz 1919, argued that much of book I is a late insertion, after the war’s end, and was intended to refute post-war recriminations against Pericles. Cf. Andrewes 1962, 64–85; idem, HCT V, 361–383; Dover, *ibidem*, 384–444; Momigliano 1984b, 242–243; Badian 1993, 125–162.

³¹ Rawlings 1981, 216–249, tried to show that we can discern a parallel architecture of two ten-year wars with a seven-year interval. The Melian Dialogue would be a turning point, introducing the second part.

³² Patzer 1937; Meyer 1955, 1–12, 93–99; M. I. Finley 1967, 118–169; Connor 1984a, 230–235; Connor 1984b. See the general discussions of Rawlings 1981, 250–254; Hornblower CT III, 1–4; Rusten 2009, 3–4. The conception of the “imperfect” eighth book was recently rejected by Liotsakis 2017, 165–170, and shown to be problematic given the elaborate narrative threads of this book.

Since there will never be certainty as to whether the work — as we have it — is actually unfinished or unpolished, the final phase of the hypothetical path of publication (the proper ἔκδοσις i.e. issue of the final version to wider readership for multiple copying) will remain the greatest unknown in the reconstruction of the fate of Thucydides' *History*. Some scholars advocated the view that the *History* was finished and first edited by Xenophon, who was also supposed to have used some of Thucydides' notes for the first two books of his own work, the Ἑλληνικά. This thesis originated in the words of Diogenes Laertius reading that "there is a tradition that he made Thucydides famous by publishing his history, which was unknown, and which he might have appropriated to his own use."³³ Picking this up, Luciano Canfora, for example, argued that the intervention in third person at V 26, 1 (Γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος) and the so-called "second preface" (V 26, 5) are Xenophon's. Further, Canfora claimed that the whole eighth book is written in a way characteristic of Xenophon, and that it was composed by him from Thucydides' notes. The scholar considers the first two books of Xenophon's Ἑλληνικά to be Thucydidean in content and focus, and thus believes that Xenophon had some of Thucydides' notes at his disposal, of which he made use in the writing of those books. Lastly, Canfora stressed the fact that some manuscripts contain Xenophon and Thucydides together and that the opening words of Xenophon's Ἑλληνικά are Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ("after that"; the work lacks a proper preface), which can be used to advance a view of some type of conjoined edition of Thucydides and Xenophon's Ἑλληνικά.³⁴ However, these theories have been convincingly refuted by Gomme, Dover and other scholars.³⁵ As they have shown, one of the issues that mislead Canfora and his supporters is the fact that some manuscripts combine Thucydides' books VI–

³³ Diog. Laert. II 57: λέγεται δ' ὅτι καὶ τὰ Θουκυδίδου βιβλία λανθάνοντα ὑφελέσθαι δυνάμενος αὐτὸς εἰς δόξαν ἤγαγεν.

³⁴ Canfora 1970, 68–77; 179–192.

³⁵ Gomme HCT IV, 9–10, replied to Canfora that the interventions at V 26 could have been written by Thucydides at the end of the war, and that it is not necessary to explain them as an intervention by a different author. Dover, HCT V, 431–444, provides a strong set of arguments, mostly linguistic (e.g. statistical analysis of the occurrence of such words as ἐπεὶ, or abstracts ending with -σις), that Thucydides is the author of section V 24–26. As for the testimony in Diog. Laert. II 57, Dover refutes, on grammatical grounds, the reading that implies an edition of some "unknown" books of Thucydides. As he demonstrates, it is Diogenes rather than Xenophon who could well be the author of these words, as he was especially fond of looking for connections between various intellectuals (here Thucydides–Xenophon). Canfora attempted to address Dover's arguments in the review of HCT V (1983, 386–410), but with little force. Canfora's thesis has also been refuted point by point by Ferlauto 1983, in a monograph devoted entirely to the "second preface" (see Verdin 1989, 271–273, for positive assessment of Ferlauto's analysis and its conclusion).

VIII with books I–II of Xenophon’s Ἑλληνικά. Instead of being an argument for Xenophon’s responsibility for Thucydides’ last book and the edition of the work, this conjoining finds explanation in the common tendency of copyists to group the historical works into pentads. In five-book clusters, they were later written down from the papyri into codexes.³⁶ As Xenophon continued Thucydides chronologically, it was natural for the editors to combine their works that way: firstly, books I–V of Thucydides’ *History* as a separate manuscript, then books VI–VIII of Thucydides’ *History* together with the books I–II of the Ἑλληνικά. This would also explain why Xenophon’s work contains no proper *prooemium* — it could have been excised by the editors in order to make the transition from Thucydides’ to Xenophon’s narrative more smooth. All in all, Xenophon was the first continuator of Thucydides, rather than his first editor and the continuation was, at the most, written under the influence of Thucydides, not from his notes.

In the third quarter of the fourth century the most substantial library in Athens was probably that of Aristotle, later inherited by the Peripatetic school.³⁷ Whether Thucydides’ historical work could be found on one of the shelves in this library cannot be proved but can be considered likely.³⁸ There is a number of papyrus fragments of the *History*, written between the third century BC and the sixth century AD.³⁹ Apart from that, there is evidence of the circulation of the work in ancient authors’ quotations and references (explored in chapter two). The *History* was analyzed by grammarians, and the extant scholia suggest the existence of a dedicated commentary on the *History* already in the Hellenistic period.⁴⁰ Therefore, the work made its way through antiquity and survived into the middle ages. Modern editions of the *History* are established mainly on seven medieval manuscripts, written between the tenth and

³⁶ See Irigoin 2003, 161–162, for Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ *Roman Antiquities*: in the codices, at the end of the tenth book there is a statement about “the end of the second book”; thus βύβλος clearly refers here not to a single book, but to the entire codex containing books VI–X. See also Pellé 2010, 600.

³⁷ Irigoin 2003, 134.

³⁸ The strong acquaintance with (and appraisal of) Thucydides on the part of the intellectuals associated with the Peripatos is demonstrated throughout my book (see esp. pp. 44–67). Aristotle’s familiarity with Thucydides is likely, although we have no explicit references (but see Pippidi 1948, 483–485; Weil 1960, 165; 311 n. 4: a list of places from the *Politics* potentially drawing on the *History*; Ste Croix 1975, 50–56). Some of Aristotle’s rhetorical rules expounded in the *Rhetoric* are likely to have been influenced by Thucydides (see Kurpios 2015, 225–256, esp. p. 228 with n. 13).

³⁹ On the papyri see chap. 2, pp. 40–43.

⁴⁰ Luschat 1954–1955, 14–58; Kleinlogel 2011, 257–271. A new edition of Thucydidean scholia was recently published by Klaus Alpers (2019; from the bequest of Alexander Kleinlogel).

fourteenth centuries. The seven main manuscripts constitute the basis for the reconstruction of the ninth-century archetype Theta,⁴¹ in most cases the sole direct ancestor of all extant manuscripts. Hence, the numerous *recentiores* derive from those seven.⁴² In this context we shall also mention the Latin translation of Thucydides by Lorenzo Valla (1452),⁴³ who had access to some manuscripts not dependent on those now extant.⁴⁴ The manuscripts transmit a version divided into eight books. However, Thucydides makes no clear statement on the division he himself projected, and other versions existed.⁴⁵ Presently, the authoritative text of the *History*, also used in this book, is the edition of Giovan B. Alberti (1972–2000), which superseded the earlier standard text of Henry S. Jones (1902), improved by John E. Powell in 1942. The previous, nineteenth-century editions worth mentioning were those of Ernest F. Poppo (1821–1840) and Karl Hude’s *Editio maxima* (1898).

3. Thucydides: a betrayed ideal?

Thucydides was long believed to be less popular in the Hellenistic age than his two peers from the Classical age: Herodotus and Xenophon. The former in particular is generally regarded as having made a considerable impact on Hellenistic historiography. Scholars found numerous “Herodotean” elements in the historians of Alexander, Hecataeus of Abdera, Hieronymus of Cardia,

⁴¹ Thus, the archetype has been written down during the “renaissance of the ninth century”, when the transliteration of old uncial books into the minuscule was undertaken on a large scale. On the developments in the transmission of Greek and Latin literature in this period see Reynolds, Wilson 1991, 58–65.

⁴² With one exception of the H, which was copied from a manuscript not deriving from the *Theta*. See Maurer 1995, 217–227 and 234 for *stemma codicum*. See also Hude 1898 (vol. 1), IX; Jones 1901, 288–294; Alberti 1972, IX–CXCII. On the first conception of seven manuscripts by Immanuel Bekker (1785–1871) see Hemmerdinger 1955, 9.

⁴³ The Italian priest and humanist, Lorenzo Valla (1405/7–1458) was commissioned by Pope Nicholas V to translate Thucydides’ *History*, as part of the pope’s project to have all Greek literature translated into Latin. Valla began the translation in 1448, and it took him two years. It was not published at that time; the manuscript of the final text is now preserved in the Vatican Library (Vat. lat. 1801). Before publication, Valla’s translation was widely copied, and therewith corrupted. Valla’s text was first printed by Joannes Rubeus Vercellensis in 1483, probably in Treviso (the editor was Bartholomaeus Parthenius). See Alberti 1957, 224–249.

⁴⁴ This is also the case for the editions of Henri Estienne (Stephanus) and Aemilius Portus, published in the sixteenth century. Maurer 1995, 212–216, assesses that Valla’s text of Thucydides was inferior to the manuscripts available to us.

⁴⁵ A certain chronographer used by Diodorus of Sicily reports that there was a nine-book division preferred “by some” (scholars? grammarians?). As I argue below, such a version was probably circulating soon after Thucydides’ death. In late antiquity there probably was also a thirteen-book edition. See Hemmerdinger 1948, 104–117; Kleinlogel 1965; Luzzatto 1993b, 167–181; 184–187.

Megasthenes, Manetho and Berossus.⁴⁶ Although neither Polybius nor Posidonius cites Herodotus by name anywhere in the extant books, the former was called by Simon Hornblower “one of the three most important successors of Herodotus as a political and military historian”, and the latter was regarded as addressing many problems (mostly geographical) to which Herodotus made a contribution. But with no explicit references it is not unproblematic to speak of Herodotus’ “influence” on those authors.⁴⁷ Overall, most of Herodotus’ impact on Hellenistic historians is to be considered influence inferred from the character of those authors’ (fragmentarily extant) works as compared to Herodotus, not from explicit allusions, which are but few.⁴⁸ The second most renowned Classical Age historian — Xenophon — has been also regarded as popular in Hellenistic culture. In the third century BC it was probably mostly through his philosophical writings: there are indications of his influence on the cynics and in the Stoa.⁴⁹ His impact as historian in that period probably grew with time; there was considerable interest in this part of his output in literary studies, and he also was part of the canon of Greek historians formulated in the Hellenistic age.⁵⁰ Contrary to Herodotus, Polybius’ acquaintanceship with Xenophon is more firmly attested.⁵¹

The ideas about Thucydides’ fate were fairly different. The first work that posed the question of Thucydides’ reception in antiquity was Heinrich G.

⁴⁶ On the Hellenistic reception of Herodotus Priestley 2014 is fundamental (see esp. pp. 1–5 for an overview). On Herodotus’ readership and influence in antiquity in general see Jacoby 1913, 504–520; Murray 1972, 200–213; Hornblower 2006, 306–318. Cf. an interesting article by Flory 1980, 12–28, which casts doubts on the possible popularity of Herodotus on the grounds of the technical aspects of his work (e.g. its length), as well as its content.

⁴⁷ Hornblower 2006, 313–314: “All of them are likely to have been strongly influenced by Herodotus in their general handling, though we should not forget that some of the features of ethnographic writing had already been fixed when Herodotus wrote.” McGing’s (2012, 33–49) study argued, not unconvincingly, for several points of contact between Herodotus and Polybius, in particular the similarities of some of their geographical descriptions. Cf. Scardino 2018, 309–319, which is highly sceptical as to McGing’s conclusions and to potential impact of either Herodotus or Thucydides on Polybius, especially due to the latter’s scanty references to both. The “Herodotean” traces in Polybius’ work can be found also e.g. in Ephorus (for Scardino’s assessment of Thucydides-Polybius see below, p. 132).

⁴⁸ See below, p. 59 on the references to Herodotus in the treatise *On Style* (only two vs. 15 of Thucydides and 20 of Xenophon). There is only one extant Hellenistic papyrus of Herodotus (see below, p. 41 with n. 34).

⁴⁹ Münscher 1920, 52–53; Luraghi 2017, 98–99 particularly stresses Xenophon’s philosophical influence.

⁵⁰ Cf. Münscher 1920, 60, 70; Treu 1967, 1903; see below on the quotations in the *On style* (20 instances vs. 15 of Thucydides).

⁵¹ There are two explicit references: Polyb. III 6, 9; X 20, 7. As for Xenophon, the earliest scraps of one papyrus with the *Hellenica* are from the second half of the first cent. BC (see below, p. 41 n. 34).

Strebel's pioneering dissertation published in 1935.⁵² Its purpose was to cover the impact of Thucydides on further generations of historians, rhetoricians, philosophers, poets and literary critics, from Thucydides' death to late antiquity. Strebel's study set the stage for future generations of scholars that posed the question of Thucydidean reception, and his conclusions, but even more importantly, his presumptions, persisted in similar studies for nearly a century. Strebel's idea was that Thucydides was largely neglected in the Hellenistic age, chiefly because of the purported influence of Isocrates' school on the historical genre. In the place of the Classical "Thucydidean historiography", there appeared more elaborate and stylized historical prose. According to Strebel, the very survival of Thucydides' *History* to our time is due only to the interest in it on the part of the Alexandrian grammarians.⁵³ The scholar believed that the growing tendency among historiographers to employ "artistic representation" ("die kunstvolle Darstellung") in their narratives created a gap between Thucydides and the Hellenistic historians. Such an assessment presumes that Thucydides could not have been read by the generations after him as an artistic piece of literature. Moreover, the antithesis of art and science was implied: historical writing can be *either* stylized *or* truthful, and Thucydides (as Strebel suggests) chose the latter. In Strebel's view, the only figure that could be regarded as heir to Thucydides in the Hellenistic period is Polybius. The link between the two historians is methodology: Polybius was different from other Hellenistic historians in that he criticized and rejected artistic skill in historiography and chose truth and objectivity instead. Strebel's reading of the *History* and its reception seems to epitomize, and be a product of, the great intellectual trends in the humanities of his time. It is rooted in wide-ranging ideas about not only Thucydides and Greek historiography, but also about historical writing in general. These ideas seem to have been largely shaped by the positivist approach, present also in Classical scholarship at the turn of the twentieth century. It is worth illuminating this philosophical setting in which Strebel's work came into existence.

The philosophical movement called positivism holds that the only source of certain knowledge is experience: introspective and intuitive knowledge should be rejected, as should metaphysics, because metaphysical claims cannot be verified by the senses. Science is about finding general laws, and, as formulated

⁵² Strebel, *Wertung und Wirkung des Thukydideischen Geschichtswerkes in der griechisch-römischen Literatur. Eine literargeschichtliche Studie nebst einem Exkurs über Appian als Nachahmer des Thukydides* (Diss. München 1935); the book is less than seventy pages long. In this section on the *status quaestionis*, the titles of the works devoted to the reception of Thucydides are given, as they are informative about the scope and purpose of these works.

⁵³ Strebel 1935, 26–27.

by the philosopher Auguste Comte in the early nineteenth century, society operates according to absolute laws, much as does the physical world. Following Comte, Émile Durkheim claimed that the social sciences may retain the same objectivity, rationalism, and approach to causality as the natural ones. Positivism was often equated with scientism, affirming the need to apply a scientific method to society and history. It had considerable academic influence — in the development of sociology, anthropology, the history of science, the study of law, and, *last but not least*, historiography. In the latter, it began to be a synonym for fact-based, event-oriented history that claims to be entirely objective.⁵⁴ It is against this background that we shall see the role assigned by Strebel to Thucydides: he is the highest point of the evolution of Greek historiography, a realization of the universal, everlasting, scientific and objective historical method.⁵⁵ Such a point of departure inevitably led to distorted judgement about the reactions to Thucydides in the Hellenistic age: in Strebel's view, Thucydides was neglected precisely because his method was "scientific", whereas Hellenistic historians indulged in mere literature, with its emotional or rhetorical features.⁵⁶

Strebel was of course neither the first nor alone in his vision: his conclusions are parallel to those circulating in Classical scholarship long before his study.⁵⁷ They found its most influential and consequential manifestation in the works of Felix Jacoby, especially in his monumental collection of historical fragments (*Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*). Jacoby adopted an evolutionary and teleological scheme of the development of historiography ("das entwicklungsgeschichtliche Prinzip"), which was the basis for the arrangement

⁵⁴ Comte's most important work is his six-volume *Cours de philosophie positive* (1830–1842). On Comte and Durkheim in general see Pickering 1993, 561–574; 605–623; Whatmore 2005, 123–128; Stedman-Jones 2005, 177–182. For Comte's philosophy of history see Pickering 1993, 633–634; 655–661; Pickering 2009b, 246–256. On the development of the positivist movement and its impact on the humanities see Pickering 2009a, 516–548; Pickering 2009b, 564–579.

⁵⁵ This is plain from the very first sentences of Strebel's dissertation (p. 7): "Die hellenische Geschichtsschreibung hat ohne Zweifel in Thukydides ihren Höhepunkt erreicht; in keinem zweiten Geschichtswerke der Griechen sind die ewig gültigen Gesetze der historischen Forschung so klar und folgerichtig entwickelt wie in Thukydides' Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Krieges, die im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes ein Vademecum für den Politiker genannt werden kann." cf. p. 13: "[...] dessen ganze Art der Geschichtsdarstellung mit ihrer strengen Objektivität [...]" (underlinings mine).

⁵⁶ On positivist roots and the implications of this vision see Humphreys 1997, 220; Hose 2009, 182–185; Cuyper 2010, 322–323. Cf. Süßmann 2012, 77–92.

⁵⁷ Bury 1909, 150: "Thucydides has set up a new standard and proposed a new model for historical investigation. [...] But the secret of his critical methods may be said to have perished with him." Cf. Schwartz 1938 (first published in 1928), 67–87.

of the historical fragments in his collection.⁵⁸ Thucydides was conceived of as a scientific, objective historian, who focuses only on facts, conforming to the positivist ideal of history.⁵⁹ With Thucydides' work, Greek historiography achieved, as Jacoby put it, τὴν ἐαυτῆς φύσιν, i.e. its "true nature", the highest point of its evolution in its most scientific form: contemporary history (Zeitgeschichte), which was the "history proper" ("die eigentliche Geschichte").⁶⁰ In other words, to Jacoby's mind, the historical genre made steady one-way progress up to Thucydides. The entire current of Zeitgeschichte was a follower ("Nachfolgerin") of Thucydides, but it was somewhat abandoned soon after him; apart from Polybius. The latter was, to Jacoby's mind, a continuator of Thucydides in his conception of "pragmatic history", which purportedly originated with Thucydides.⁶¹ This standpoint was established in Jacoby's collection of historical fragments, by its structure, organization and implied judgements about Thucydides and the Hellenistic historians.

Views and convictions about Thucydides and Hellenistic historiography formed in this way were projected onto interpretations of the former's impact on the latter, on assumptions made regarding Thucydides' reception. To put it more simply, the then current reception of Thucydides strongly impacted ideas about the ancient reception of the historian. That perspective became a type of paradigm that prevailed for decades in Classical scholarship. Strong paradigms are always the most difficult to change, probably because they are also the least discernible, since people tend to think through them, not about them. There were, however, steps that gradually reopened the debate, as scholarly inclinations in the humanities evolved. It was a slow and uneven process, and it was made by degrees, with years or even decades of gaps in between stages.⁶²

It was only after several decades when Otto Luschnat made an attempt to go beyond the dichotomy that determined Strebel's view, and made room for the possibility that the Hellenistic historians, while stressing certain aspects of historical writing that we now call "artistic", could also appraise those elements

⁵⁸ See his programmatic article *Über die Entwicklung der griechischen Geschichtsschreibung* (1909, 80–123).

⁵⁹ See e.g. Jacoby 1926, 20: "Thukydides gibt Fakten; nichts als Fakten." Jacoby 1949, 129: "[...] seen from the point of view of historical science Thukydides no doubt realized that aim."

⁶⁰ Jacoby 1909, 98; cf. p. 100: Thucydides as "Vollendung" of the development of historiographical genre.

⁶¹ Jacoby 1949, 86: "Thucydides discovered the concept of pragmatic history."

⁶² For instance, the paradigm was circulating in the sixties; e.g. von Fritz 1967, 3–4, stated that the fifth-century historiography was "auf die Fakten gerichtet", a clear positivistic slant.

in Thucydides.⁶³ Unfortunately, these were only passing remarks corroborated with no analysis. Luschnat still considered Polybius to be the sole “Thucydidean” historian of the Hellenistic age, and this “Thucydideanism” was basically like that of Strebel: objectivity and strict concentration on causality. The Polybian notion of “pragmatic history” was, of course, part of the connection between him and Thucydides.⁶⁴ A few decades passed, until the illuminating, albeit selective, survey of Simon Hornblower made the next step further.⁶⁵ As for the understanding of Thucydides himself, Hornblower seems to have followed the beaten track, with little room for Thucydides’ “artistic side”. However, while still emphasizing the “traditional” methodological affinities with Polybius, this scholar appointed a new “real successor” for Thucydides: Hieronymus of Cardia. The chief points of contact between the two authors are, according to Hornblower, the division of the narrative (by campaigning seasons), the absence of gods as causal factors, and the search for deeper causes and statistical accuracy.⁶⁶ Unfortunately, Hornblower surveys these potential similarities rather than exploring them and he does the same with other authors; thus the paper was far from conclusive. Yet on the whole Hornblower has proposed a new perspective: that the neglect of Thucydides was probably “far from total”, that one actually can think beyond Polybius, that there are fields and authors to be explored anew, but one has to go back to the evidence and examine it carefully. The old paradigm seems to be receding slightly and Hornblower’s Thucydides is definitely not as typecast as Strebel’s or Luschnat’s. Yet still, remarkably, the change of outlook is not articulated and the old convictions remain undetected or at least are not rejected explicitly.⁶⁷ Throughout more than

⁶³ Luschnat, *Thukydides der Historiker*, RE Suppl. XII, 1970, 1085–1354 (1291–1297 on the reception in the Hellenistic age); col. 1293, on Duris’ concepts of *μίμησις* and *ἡδονή*.

⁶⁴ Luschnat 1970, 1294–1295, is clear on the links between Thucydides and the Polybian notion of pragmatic history: “Eine besondere Stelle unter den Nachfolgern des Th. wird immer Polybios einnehmen, nicht nur als derjenige unter den Späteren, der ernsthaft versucht hat, wenigstens die politische Ursachenforschung wieder zu Ehren zu bringen, sondern auch wegen der Schaffung des Begriffs der ‘pragmatischen Geschichtsschreibung’, der in der Neuzeit so stark strapaziert worden ist.”

⁶⁵ Hornblower, *The Fourth-century and Hellenistic Reception of Thucydides*, JHS 115, 1995, 47–68.

⁶⁶ Hornblower 1995, 59. Cf. p. 49: “Polybius is problematic but influence is certain, if only at the level of methodology.”

⁶⁷ Note, for instance, that Hornblower has only good things to say about Strebel: “Better, in many ways [than Luschnat 1970 - MK], is an older work, an intelligent Munich dissertation of 1935 by Strebel. This not only provides valuable supplementation on some of the authors Luschnat deals with, but discusses authors wholly absent from Luschnat [...]” (p. 48). Even recently, Scardino 2018, 309, relies on Strebel in a generalizing claim that “it seems likely that scholarly work on Herodotus and Thucydides abated in the Hellenistic Period, and rose again

the following decade the idea of “scientific Thucydides” persevered, and some contributions seem to share presumptions about both Thucydides and the general evolution of historiography not far from those articulated nearly a century earlier by Jacoby, explaining the alleged rejection of Thucydides in the Hellenistic age in similar terms.⁶⁸ Polybius was still the exception that confirmed the rule, and Hornblower’s claims about Hieronymus were restated: the latter supposedly “absorbed the Thucydidean model”.⁶⁹ The paradigm shift was still to be made.

In the latter half of the twenty-first century’s first decade reception studies gained considerable momentum in Classical scholarship. Thucydides was one of the target authors. In the year 2010 a voluminous joint work was published, which was the outcome of three international conferences devoted to the reception of Thucydides from the fourth century until modern times.⁷⁰ As to the fate of Thucydides in the Hellenistic age, the book is unsystematic, but it is stimulating and facilitates a rupture with the enduring paradigm described above. In particular, Guido Schepens’ programmatic contribution to the volume was the first to seriously undermine the very foundations of the scheme originating in Jacoby. It shows how the idea of *Zeitgeschichte* as “history proper” distorted the interpretation not only of the character and development Hellenistic, but of ancient Greek historiography as a whole.⁷¹ One of the symptomatic factors of this distortion was, in Schepens’ view, the setting up of Thucydides as the supreme representative and “legislator” of the *Zeitgeschichte*, which was a

only in the first century BCE with the advent of Atticism and the works of Diodorus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, or Cicero and Livy in Rome.”

⁶⁸ Nicolai, *Thucydides continued*, [in:] A. Rengakos, A. Tsakmakis (eds.), *Brill’s Companion to Thucydides*, Leiden 2006, 691–719; 718: “Thucydides was not a successful model as far as historiography was concerned: the paradigmatic value of history as political science was discarded shortly afterward and fourth-century historians preferred to provide ethical paradigms than to focus exclusively on politics and war.” Cf. Scardino 2014, 616, writes about “von Thukydides festgelegten wissenschaftlichen Standards“ and “die komplexe Tatsachenforschung etwa eines Thukydides“ replaced with the Hellenistic rhetorical and sensational historiography (p. 639).

⁶⁹ These two are indicated as “the real Thucydidean historians of the Hellenistic age” (Nicolai 2006, 719). In the case of Hieronymus, Nicolai relies on Hornblower 1995. Nicolai’s and Hornblower’s views on Hieronymus and Polybius were replicated by Iglesias-Zoido, *El legado de Tucídides en la cultura occidental. Discursos e historia*, Coimbra 2011, 84–85.

⁷⁰ Fromentin, Gotteland, Payen (éds), *Ombres de Thucydide. La réception de l'historien depuis l'Antiquité jusqu'au début du XXe siècle. Actes des colloques de Bordeaux, les 16–17 mars 2007, de Bordeaux, les 30–31 mai 2008 et de Toulouse, les 23–25 octobre 2008*, Bordeaux 2010. See the overview of the project by Fantasia 2012, 209–222.

⁷¹ Schepens’ earlier article adumbrated that shift in perspective: Jacoby’s *FGrHist: Problems, methods, prospects*, [in:] G. Most (ed.), *Collecting Fragments/Fragmente Sammeln*, Göttingen, 1997, 144–172.

critical factor in shaping ideas about his reception in Hellenistic times.⁷² Schepens asked whether it is reasonable to expect that a single author could have so decisively influenced an entire genre in terms of its aims and methods. His answer is negative. As a result, Schepens seems to have posed a thesis contrary to the vision of Jacoby, namely that Thucydides' concentration on war and politics could have been generally perceived as an "anomaly" in the historical genre, rather than a model. This thought-provoking paper can be regarded an important milestone in studies on Thucydidean reception. The scholar made clear that two essential methodological points need to be taken into account in the study of Thucydides' reception: i. in the studies concentrated on the Hellenistic period the question of "general readership" and tendencies thereof are virtually impossible to answer because of the huge gaps in evidence; ii. the ancient and modern ideas about what was "Thucydidean" can diverge considerably.⁷³ Nonetheless, groundbreaking as it was in terms of theory and changes in perspective, the *Ombres* offered disappointingly little in terms of putting those new ideas into practice. Three contributions, however, deserve mention here. Éric Foulon's paper put into question what for nearly a century seemed to require no argument, namely whether and how well Polybius was acquainted with Thucydides.⁷⁴ The author came to the already widespread conclusion that Thucydides was a historiographical model ("paradigme en historiographie") for Polybius. In chapter three I shall pose that question anew and endeavour to show that a less stereotypical reading of both historians allows for a better understanding of the affinities between them.⁷⁵ Suzanne Saïd touched upon the potential affinity between Thucydides and Agatharchides in the understanding of the "mythical element" in historiography.⁷⁶ Her interpretation of both historians' conceptions in that respect is, however, hard to agree with.⁷⁷ Finally, Mélina Lévy discussed Dionysius of Halicarnassus' "imitation" of Thucydides in the *Roman Antiquities*.⁷⁸ The author believes we can speak of a reuse ("réemploi") of Thucydides' work by Dionysius in his own

⁷² Schepens, *Thucydide législateur de l'histoire? Appréciations antiques et modernes*, [in:] Fromentin 2010a, 123–124; 127; 133–134.

⁷³ *Ibidem*, 127–137.

⁷⁴ Foulon, *Polybe a-t-il lu Thucydide?*, [in:] Fromentin 2010a, 141–153.

⁷⁵ Foulon 2010, 153. See chap. 3, pp. 142–146.

⁷⁶ Saïd, *La condamnation du muthôdes par Thucydide et sa postérité dans l'historiographie grecque*, [in:] Fromentin 2010a, 167–189.

⁷⁷ See the polemic with Saïd's argument in chap. 3, pp. 168–169.

⁷⁸ Lévy, *L'imitation de Thucydide dans les opuscules rhétoriques et les Antiquités Romaines de Denys d'Halicarnasse*, [in:] Fromentin 2010a, 51–61.

historical work.⁷⁹ This stimulating thesis is not, however, corroborated with the evidence of such treatises as *On Thucydides* and the *Letter to Pompeius*, which clearly show Dionysius' thought. Arguably, only then can we attempt any final thoughts as to Dionysius' understanding of and affinities with Thucydides, which is an aim of the present book. In addition, in the *Ombres* Frédéric Lambert traced the references to Thucydides in the grammarians, and showed that Thucydides was used by them with comparable frequency to Herodotus.⁸⁰ Although this field remains generally out of the scope of the present work, the conclusions of Lambert are another piece of evidence which contradicts common assumptions about the neglect of Thucydides in the period in question. Further, in 2013 Klaus Meister's monograph on the reception of Thucydides appeared.⁸¹ Its scope is even broader than that of Strebel, as it covers the time from Thucydides' death up until the present day, and investigates not only Thucydides' reception in historiography, but also in rhetoric, literary criticism and in other fields.⁸² Such an admirable enterprise inevitably imposes limitations in terms of the degree of detail one can focus on in the case of each piece of evidence. The Hellenistic period seems to suffer the most in this respect, and the conclusions about particular authors' affinities with Thucydides tend to be unsubstantiated.⁸³ Still, even if his statements are not supported, Meister was probably the first to explicitly open the possibility that Thucydides might have been appreciated and even imitated by such authors as Duris of Samos. In the present book, this thesis is developed and examined through close analysis of the evidence involved and from multiple angles.⁸⁴ Meister's book was definitely a step forward, even if a small one, in breaking with the old paradigm. Somewhat similar in scope but not written by a single author is the *Handbook to the Reception of Thucydides* (2015), another joint work intending to cover the reception of the historian from antiquity to the present, including one contribution on his reception in antiquity.⁸⁵ In this paper, Valérie Fromentin and Sophie Gotteland, restating the suggestions of Schepens discussed above,

⁷⁹ Lévy 2010, 60.

⁸⁰ Lambert, *Présence et absence de Thucydide chez les grammairiens anciens*, [in:] Fromentin 2010a, 209–224.

⁸¹ Meister, *Thukydides als Vorbild der Historiker. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, Paderborn 2013. Meister was earlier among the adherents to the notion of the degeneration of historiography after Thucydides, cf. Meister 1990, 61–62 and n. 10.

⁸² Meister even includes 16th century humanists and 20th-century political philosophers.

⁸³ See my remarks on Meister's views below, esp. p. 141 n. 235 and throughout the entire book.

⁸⁴ See chap. 5, pp. 252–256.

⁸⁵ Fromentin, Gotteland, *Thucydides' Ancient Reputation*, [in:] Lee, Morley (eds.), *A Handbook to the Reception of Thucydides*, Malden-Oxford-Chichester 2015, 13–25.

pay attention to the problem of the long-lasting vision of the development of Greek historiography, and point to the distortive interpretations of Thucydides as “scientific” historian as the main obstacles to adequate assessment of his place in the Hellenistic age. However, as in the case of the *Ombres*, methodological consciousness does not translate into a new, systematic reading of Thucydides’ reception in the Hellenistic age. Still, we receive a refreshing, even if very selective, overview of the ancient evidence. To be sure, Polybius is the stereotypical sole “heir to the Thucydidean tradition”, but the question of the impact of Thucydides is now seen in a completely different light.⁸⁶ With this last piece, the ground for the “great reset” of our conception of Thucydides and Hellenistic historiography was prepared, yet shortly after scholars still preferred to write about Classical⁸⁷ or Late antiquity receptions.⁸⁸ But the old, long-lasting paradigm could not continue to prevail, and the subject began to call for the full, systematic and detailed treatment it deserves.

4. Towards a new paradigm?

The intellectual trends permeating Classical scholarship, the ideas about Thucydides and Greek historiography and the projection of modern ideas onto the reception of the *History* in the Hellenistic age, seem to be the greatest impediments to our understanding of the problem. Hence, it is crucial to go back to Thucydides himself. Since the study of Strebel, scholars have sought Thucydides’ *Nachahmers* without any attempt at a (re-) interpretation of Thucydides’ own work. No study on Thucydides’ reception begins with a reflection on the historian himself and his methodology. Hence, scholars have operated with *a priori* conceptions of what was “Thucydidean”, which they then compared with other authors. These *a priori* assumptions, as already established, usually stated that Thucydides was a “scientific” and “objective” historian. Even Meister does not try to expound his reading of at least the most relevant passages of Thucydides, recalled throughout the book in search of particular potential reactions to them. In effect, Meister and others very loosely

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, 16–17 (on Polybius); cf. 18–19 (Pseudo-Demetrius and Dionysius).

⁸⁷ The contribution of Gray, *Thucydides and His Continuators*, [in:] Balot, Forsdyke, Foster (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook on Thucydides*, Oxford 2017, 621–639, 621–639, covers Cratippus, Theopompus, the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, and Xenophon and then jumps to Diodorus of Sicily. Cf. Morley 2018, 349–351, on the volume’s approach to reception.

⁸⁸ Kennedy, *How to Write History: Thucydides and Herodotus in the Ancient Rhetorical Tradition*, diss. Ohio State University 2018, explores how Thucydides and Herodotus were used in ancient schools in the rhetorical curriculum, and how the former was imitated mostly by Late antiquity and Byzantine historians.

refer to the idea of what is “Thucydidean” and what is not. Such a method can hardly lead to the avoidance of projecting our stereotypical views onto the past. This is not to say that all the scholars were wrong in those *a priori* convictions about Thucydides; some of them formulated those in separate studies.⁸⁹ This also does not imply that one has to “reinvent” Thucydides and provide an entirely new reading of the entire work to study his reception. To be sure, it also does not mean that this book claims to be “paradigm-free”, unprejudiced, perfectly distanced or objective. Such a stance would be tantamount to falling into the same familiar trap of scientific thinking. It only means that when it comes to the comparison of particular Thucydidean passages with those of e.g. Posidonius, one should first demonstrate one’s understanding of the former, to provide a clear analysis of their affinities with the latter. That is what Roberto Nicolai expressed in a sadly unnoticed contribution, which, although not intended as a comprehensive study of the reception of Thucydides, was the first to raise the question of the need for the reinterpretation of Thucydides’ methodological declarations in their proper context, before any attempt to assess reactions to them in the Hellenistic age, in order to avoid projecting modern presumptions.⁹⁰ Hence this book, in the case of parallel-seeking, first proposes its own reading of Thucydides’ methodological declarations.⁹¹ Two vital points are on the one hand the reinterpretation of Thucydides’ methodological chapter, and on the other, a close reading of the Hellenistic authors’ historiographical ideas preceding comparisons with the *History*.

The list of reasons for which a new comprehensive study on the reception of Thucydides in the Hellenistic period is still a *desideratum* does not end here. One of the limitations of previous studies is also often simply their plan: these are either monographs attempting to cover two thousand years of Thucydidean reception, or single papers able to provide us with an overview, rather than a detailed exploration of the problems involved. The overly broad scope of those works, or the very moderate size of smaller contributions meant that they offered only brief treatments of the Hellenistic reception of Thucydides and were unsatisfactory due to their omission of evidence. No study covers all the

⁸⁹ Hornblower undoubtedly knew his Thucydides well and his reading was far from stereotypical, see e.g. Hornblower 1987 and the *Commentary on Thucydides* in 3 vols. (1991–2008); Luschkat’s entry on Thucydides in the *RE* is actually a concise but well-grounded monograph on the historian.

⁹⁰ Nicolai, *Ktema es aiei. Aspetti della fortuna di Tucidide nel mondo antico*, RFIC 123, 1995, 5–26, 5–26; “Tucidide, come d’altra parte tutti gli altri storici dell’antichità, dovrebbe essere sottoposto a una corretta analisi letteraria e storico-culturale, libera dai pregiudizi che la nostra scienza storica proietta sui suoi presunti predecessori” (p. 6).

⁹¹ See chap. 3, pp. 89–118.

Hellenistic sources that deserve treatment and can give us the fullest picture. This book thus not only provides a thorough analysis of the authors whom previous scholars dealt with only cursorily, but discusses authors wholly absent from them.⁹²

Several further remarks on the approaches adopted in this book need to be made. As pointed out above, the view of a complete rupture with Thucydides in Hellenistic historiography was rooted in the nineteenth-century positivist paradigm, in which Thucydides has been conceived of as a strictly objective, rationalist, political-military historian, and his place in the Hellenistic age was usually defined through this perspective.⁹³ As a “rationalist”, he has been traditionally seen in contrast to the so-called “tragic historians”, as an “impartial observer” to the school of “rhetorical historiography”, as a “political-military historian” to such individuals as Agatharchides or Posidonius. I do not contend that he can be fully reconciled with all these currents, as the differences are sometimes obvious and unquestionable. Nonetheless, I argue that the dividing line is not as clear as has been claimed until recently.⁹⁴ The very existence of sharply distinguished schools of Hellenistic historiography — “rhetorical” and “tragic” is probably more a scholarly construct than a literary reality of the time. “Tragic history” in particular was an alleged “distortion” of the political-military historiographical ideal, represented by Thucydides.⁹⁵ It remained poorly

⁹² Strebel ignores Ps.-Demetrius, the chronographic source of Diodorus of Sicily, Duris of Samos, Hieronymus of Cardia. Luschkat devotes a few columns to the Hellenistic historians; only Duris and Polybius are treated in a relatively more detailed manner. Hornblower omits Ps.-Demetrius, the chronographic source of Diodorus, and he obviously could not have included the second of the Hellenistic papyri of Thucydides, which was published in 2005 (P.CtYBR inv. 4601). Nicolai only discussed Polybius and Hieronymus of Cardia. In the *Ombres* the only Hellenistic historian treated separately is Polybius. In Meister the testimonies of Ps.-Demetrius, of the chronographic source of Diodorus, the Hellenistic papyri as well as Theophrastus and Praxiphanes are absent. Fromentin and Gotteland, apart from Polybius, mention only Ps.-Demetrius’ knowledge of the *History* and note the treatment of Thucydides by Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Apart from Hornblower and Meister, no study mentions Philochorus, and those two rely entirely on Jacoby.

⁹³ Schulter 1991, 100–101; Morley 2012, 115–139. On the nineteenth and early twentieth century approaches to Thucydides, esp. in Germany and Italy, see Piovan, Fantasia 2018.

⁹⁴ Cf. Humphreys 1997, 209–211.

⁹⁵ On the idea of tragic history see: Zegers 1959; Kebric, 1977, 15–17; Sacks 1981, 144–170; Fornara 1983, 124–134; Zucchelli 1985, 297–301; Gray 1987, 467–486; Vegetti 1989, 121–128; Pédech 1989, 368–466; Canfora 1995, 179–192; Rebenich 1997, 265–274; Candau 2001, 69–86; Zangara 2007, 70–75; Marincola 2009, 445–460. Already Walbank 1960, 216–234 has shown that we cannot speak of a separate genre of “tragic” history, since historiography from the very beginning had much in common with tragedy. Thus Duris’ or Phylarchus’ “dramatism” or vividness of representation was not an innovation characteristic of some new historiographical sub-genre. Cf. Marincola 2003, 285–287; Rutherford 2007, 504–514. Fromentin 2001, 77–92

recognized in reception studies that such a division of Hellenistic historiography into those separate currents, although not entirely groundless, made adequate assessment of Thucydides' relationship to the historians from the period impossible. Such crucial concepts as *πάθος* and *ἐνάργεια* were often associated primarily with tragedy. In this book I shall highlight the epic roots of these and connected notions and stress their place in historiographical theory and practice as natural rather than anomalous. With such an approach to historiography in general, i.e. by accentuating its epic conceptual and formal background, we can view Thucydides' place in the Hellenistic age from a different perspective.

The method of treatment of the fragmentary, indirect evidence, which is typical for the historiographical (but also other) sources from the Hellenistic period, also requires more attention than is found in the reception studies published so far. Rapid progress in the study of fragmentary authors in the last two decades is a factor that enables verification of some opinions about those authors' reactions to Thucydides' work. Numerous works have proved how crucial for understanding fragmentary historians is the analysis of intermediate authors,⁹⁶ and in my book I endeavour to make use of their findings in scrutiny of the intermediate authors which are necessary to read fragmentary evidence in an appropriate manner (e.g. in chapter two on a fragment of Theophrastus in Cicero).

Last but not least, the term that requires clarification is "reception", as it is the axis of my inquiry in this book. The concept is only briefly discussed even in the most "reception-focused" works, and is not usually systematically defined. The most explicit is Valerie Fromentin, who distinguishes between: i. continuation, ii. use as a source, iii. considering as model, imitating in terms of methodological, ideological and aesthetic choices.⁹⁷ In other works which posit the "reception" of Thucydides as their subject, it is only implicit in their choice of themes. As suggested in the foreword, this study goes beyond the sole notion of the influence of Thucydides on the later generations of historians. Therefore,

presents a compelling argument against the separate school of "tragic history". On the biased view of the division into "tragic" and "rhetorical" historiography see chap. 5, pp. 219–222.

⁹⁶ Also called "cover-texts", implying three aspects of their relation with the original: they preserve the lost text, blur its original context and meaning, and enclose it in a new context. The term was coined by Schepens 1997, 144–172. The most recent treatment of methodological issues involved in dealing with fragments is Lenfant 2013, 289–305; cf. the new series of contributions in the field of fragments: Gazzano, Ottone, Amantini 2011; Lanzillotta 2013. See also the groundbreaking case-study of Baron 2013 (part. pp. 3–16). Cf. Vattuone 2002, 177–232. On earlier reflections on the study of fragmentary evidence see Brunt 1980, 477–494.

⁹⁷ Fromentin, Gotteland 2015, 14–15 differentiates between continuation/using as source/influence i.e. being regarded as a model and imitated.

in this book “reception” is used in a broad sense and comprises manifold phenomena: (i) readership of Thucydides’ *History* and awareness of this work, (ii) possible inspirations drawn from the work, especially methodological reflection building upon Thucydides’ concepts, (iii) criticism or appreciation of the work by historians and literary critics, (iv) general relation of the literary features of the *History* to the tendencies in historical writing of the Hellenistic period, (v) allusions to, or imitations of, specific passages of the *History*. Thus delineated, the concept of reception will lead to a comprehensive study of all the aspects of the functions of Thucydides’ work in the period under consideration. However, it does not cover the entirety of existing Hellenistic literature, especially the novel, poetry and oratory; this would entail the examination of each single work in search of potential verbal echoes, thematic parallels etc. It would require a separate work on each author, such as the brilliant book of Simon Hornblower, which looks for connections between Thucydides and Pindar. In this case the subject is the reverse reception (of Pindar by Thucydides), but the size of the work and the density of its argument shows that in the case of inquiring into the relationship e.g. between Thucydides and *Aleksandra* a book-length study would be required. The present study is focused on Thucydides *in the theory and practice of historiography* as far as they relate to the historian, and even if it moves close to the borders of these confines, it never loses sight of them.⁹⁸ The choice of the evidence is a challenging problem, to which I now turn.

5. The scope of the evidence

One of the reasons why studies published so far have been either too wide-ranging or too selective is the scarcity of citations of Thucydides by name in the extant sources from the Hellenistic period. In such a situation, we have two options for what evidence to take into account. Firstly, we could assume a strict principle and seek traces of the reception of Thucydides only in those authors in which the historian is mentioned explicitly, i.e. called by name. This would entail the omission of some significant evidence, particularly texts involving methodological concepts, which can be compared with the methodological chapter of Thucydides (Callisthenes, Hieronymus, Duris, Posidonius), and those pointing indirectly to Thucydides’ influence (e.g. on Timaeus,

⁹⁸ For instance, I take into account the work *On Style*, and the references to Thucydides in the fragments of the treatises on historiography. Analyses of these sources concentrate strictly on their contribution to our understanding of views on Thucydides as seen in comparison to other historians.

Agatharchides). The other extreme is the quest for the slightest potential traces of Thucydidean influence in verbal echoes, thematic parallels, etc. in all Hellenistic historians.⁹⁹ This approach, in turn, seems incautious due to the fact that the proportion of extant Hellenistic historiography is very low.¹⁰⁰ Hence it is hard to prove allusions to Thucydides in cases of particular themes or single words, which could have drawn on some passages from the non-extant works, and not on Thucydides. Moreover, there are some elements that were characteristic of ancient historiography in general, and cannot be treated as proof of Thucydides' influence, even if we find in his work similar ideas expressed explicitly.¹⁰¹ However, there is also a "third way", adopted in the present book. It is arguably the most balanced selection of material, which corresponds with the scope of each of the chapters of the book. Namely, the book covers:

1. Places where Thucydides is mentioned by name, and evidence which testifies to his readership (chapter two).¹⁰² For a more complete picture, this part is not restricted to historical works *sensu stricto*. This point is self-evident: examination of the explicit references to Thucydides' *History* is a necessary part of the study on his reception.

2. Texts that concern issues raised by Thucydides in the so-called methodological chapter (chapter three).¹⁰³ I contend that this part of the *History* is the most likely to provoke reaction in the later generations of historians. Firstly, this part belongs to a *prooemium*, part of the first book immediately preceding the account concerning the reasons and pretexts leading to the Peloponnesian War. Without the first book, an ancient reader (especially author

⁹⁹ This seems to be the method of Meister 2013, which, nevertheless, omits numerous figures from the Hellenistic period as indicated above, p. 19 n. 81.

¹⁰⁰ See the thought-provoking study of Strasburger 1977, 3–52, which endeavoured to assess the approximate ratio of the extant pieces to the hypothetical entirety of Hellenistic historiography. The scholar begins with a list of the historical works that were, according to ancient sources, written in the Hellenistic age, and now lost; then he calculates their probable size in books (pp. 12–13), and compares it with the amount that has survived. The outcome is 1:40, that is ca. 2,5 percent of the histories written in the Hellenistic period is now available to us.

¹⁰¹ For instance, Aristobulus almost certainly made use of eyewitness accounts of the events (Arr. *Anab.* VII 18, 1–5, not included in Jacoby but probably based on Aristobulus). Moreover, he refers to his own autopsy and experience (FGrHist 139 F 41 *ap.* Strab. XV 1, 61; FGrHist 139 F 54 *ap.* Arr. *Anab.* VII 16, 1). This is not enough to postulate that this could be due to Aristobulus' reading of Thucydides' *History* (Thuc. I 22, 1, where first-hand knowledge is considered a natural source of information). The idea of autopsy was a *differentia specifica* of historiography from its very beginnings, and, as shown by numerous studies, a part of historiography's epic heritage (see chap. 5, pp. 229–231 with notes).

¹⁰² See the preliminary remarks to chapter two.

¹⁰³ Thuc. I 22, with references to the preceding (I 21) and the subsequent part (I 23), surrounding the methodological statements contained in I 22).

of historical works) would not understand the rest of the work properly, as it alludes to the considerations and conclusions involved in the book. Secondly, the chapter on method is an exceptionally conscious and explicit exposition of Thucydides' approach to the writing of history, impossible to ignore for his reader (again, especially for a historian). Thirdly, papyrological evidence — the greater part of the extant papyri (including one of the two extant Hellenistic) — contain the first book of the *History*.¹⁰⁴

3. Texts belonging to the category of *Περὶ ἱστορίας* (chapter four), discussing the theory of historiography in which Thucydides' name is mentioned (the Peripatetic evidence), and those that were not entitled *Περὶ ἱστορίας*, but arguably have the character of a historical manual, where Thucydides is discussed (Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius Geminus*).¹⁰⁵

4. Texts that change our perception of Thucydides in the context of tendencies in Hellenistic historiography (chapter five), in spite of them not mentioning the historian by name. In particular, it is the question of some of the qualities of Thucydides' narrative, emphasized in the treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Plutarch and Lucian, which were important in Hellenistic historiography.

The inclusion of Dionysius of Halicarnassus in a book on Thucydides' Hellenistic reception may seem unexpected, but is justified. In chapter three, his interpretation and adaptation of, as well as his polemic with, Thucydides' methodological chapters is explored, because they are complementary to and illuminating for the discussion of the chief themes of the chapter, e.g. those occurring in Agatharchides (τὸ μυσώδης) or in Posidonius (speeches). His reading of those notions in Thucydides is informative and provides a context for those of the "strictly" Hellenistic authors. As for his presence in chapter four, it is because of the Peripatetic, or even, more precisely, Theophrastean background of his ideas about historiography. There is a direct link between the strictly Hellenistic pieces of evidence of Peripatetic *Περὶ ἱστορίας* and Dionysius. The latter's testimony is the more valuable in this context, as the Peripatetic material in question is nearly entirely lost, and Dionysius can be read as indirect evidence for the reception of Thucydides in the theory of historiography in the Peripatetic "mainstream" from Theophrastus onwards. In one word, Dionysius can be — with proper care — used to illuminate his lost predecessors' views. In chapter five Dionysius appears as additional evidence for Thucydides'

¹⁰⁴ On this perspective see below, chap. 2, p. 41 n. 32 and chap. 3, p. 89 with notes 1–2.

¹⁰⁵ See chap. 4, pp. 208–212, for the thesis that this work is a theoretical treatise on historiography.

possible influence on the Hellenistic historians in terms of strategies to evoke an emotional response in the reader, and as one of the few authors so explicit on the crucial terminology involved.¹⁰⁶

The presence of some evidence from Plutarch, a I/II cent. AD author, also requires explanation. First of all, he points to ἐνάργεια and πάθος as features of the *History* and the choice of passages to which he refers in that context corresponds with the probable imitation of these passages in such Hellenistic authors as Timaeus or Polybius. Moreover, it is no accident that Plutarch, well acquainted with the Hellenistic historians and studying them in depth for his own purposes, points to the very specific stylistic and narrative qualities of the *History*, which are probably a model for some narrative parts in the Hellenistic historians. These parts, with their potentially Thucydidean features, can be better explained and elucidated with Plutarch's comments on the narrative episodes to which they arguably look as their model. Importantly, against this background it is possible to hypothesize about the non-methodological, literary impact of Thucydides on Polybius.

Conversely, one author that can be regarded as “obviously” Hellenistic, Diodorus of Sicily, is in this book not treated in his own right, but as one of the most important intermediate authors for the lost historians of the period. How to read Diodorus is one of critical problems of methodology, as he undoubtedly made use of many lost authors for his own work. There were various views on his treatment of the primary sources.¹⁰⁷ He was considered either as a mere “reproducer” of other authors,¹⁰⁸ or as an independent writer, drawing on his sources, but with considerable contribution of his own. Some scholars, arguing that Diodorus was more autonomous and conscious than had been believed, decided to reject him completely as a source of fragments.¹⁰⁹ Such a radical

¹⁰⁶ On the Peripatetic roots of Dionysius' concepts see chap. 4, pp. 208–209; chap. 5, 226–227; on his inclusion in chapters three and five see also introductory remarks to those chapters.

¹⁰⁷ On Diodorus and his sources in general see: Farrington 1947, 55–87; Palm 1955; Burde 1974, 43–59; Préaux 1978, 79–80; Ambaglio 1995, 301–338; Wiater 2006, 248–271; Sulimani 2008, 535–567; Dillery 2011, 198–200; Cordiano 2011, 159–183; Rathmann 2014, 49–113.

¹⁰⁸ For this view Schwartz 1905a, 663–704, has been seminal; cf. Hammond, 1937, 79–91: Diodorus as “careless and unintelligent compiler”, working with “habitual laziness”, which inclined to use only one source at the time (not to collate various sources). Cf. Kunz 1935, 20–26. See the overview in Sacks 1994, 213–216.

¹⁰⁹ Baron 2013, 13–14, is correct in his criticism of Pearson's method for identifying traces of Timaeus in Diodorus. Pearson's error is typical for the old “school” of *Quellenforschung*: he presumes that Diodorus uses only Timaeus in a given part of the work (where Timaeus is mentioned by name), and extrapolates the features from this part, onto others potentially deriving from Timaeus, by referring to such vague categories as “flavour of Timaeus”, “characteristic for Timaeus” etc. Still, Baron's decision to reassign everything to Diodorus throughout seems too radical and some of his conclusions are rather overstated.

paradigm shift was attempted by Kenneth Sacks.¹¹⁰ This scholar tried to prove that Diodorus is to be credited with the general shape, main themes, *prooemia* and “moral program” of the *Library*. Yet even though many of his observations are sound, certain important points are not expounded convincingly.¹¹¹ Equally important is the short article of François Chamoux, in which Diodorus’ certain degree of critical treatment of his sources, as well as his solid handling of chronology are demonstrated.¹¹² Chamoux has also drawn attention to the fact that the fragmentary state of the *Library* could distort our view of its characteristics, that Diodorus was held in high esteem by the ancients, and that the very number of sources used by him deserves appraisal. Nonetheless, as to Diodorus’ independence, Chamoux did not go so far as Sacks in crediting him with his own original historical philosophy.¹¹³ Therefore, even if in the *Library* there are traces of Diodorus’ autonomy, there are strong arguments, including cogent comparisons with control material (esp. Photius), for the view that Diodorus extracted, rather than reformulated, his sources. He even inherited from them some technical vocabulary.¹¹⁴ The main and secure step ahead, in comparison to the earlier standpoint of the “classical” Diodoran *Quellenforschung*, is to allow for the probability that he supplemented his main source, in the given part of his narrative, with additional ones.¹¹⁵ However, overall

¹¹⁰ Sacks 1990; cf. Sacks 1994, 213–232: “unity of theme”, “intellectual unity” etc. Sacks was not the first to search for the conceptual originality of Diodorus, see e.g. Drews 1962, 383–392, who argued for Diodorus’ authorial interventions throughout the *Library*.

¹¹¹ Sacks thinks that nearly all false cross-references are Diodorus’ own mistakes (1990, 82–83). Moreover, he believes that the inconsistencies between the narrative parts and the *prooemia* do not imply that Diodorus was mindlessly rewriting what he had found in his sources. Again, this is assumed by Sacks, rather than demonstrated. Moreover, Sacks sometimes groundlessly identifies some concepts as “Diodoran”, as if his contribution to their sense was significant (e.g. τύχη, *ibidem*, 41). Cf. *ibidem*, 106 (“Diodoran philosophy”). For other fallacies of this otherwise useful study see the severe criticism in the review by Walbank 1992, 250–251. As for the cross-references, it has been compellingly shown by Rubincam 1998, 67–87 that although some of them are indeed Diodorus’ own, they are in a large part certainly copied from his underlying sources.

¹¹² Chamoux 1990, 254–252.

¹¹³ His conclusion is balanced: “Ne lui demandons pas ce qu’il n’a pas prétendu nous donner: il n’était ni un philosophe de l’histoire comme Thucydide ou Polybe, ni un enquêteur original et plein de talent comme Hérodote” (p. 252).

¹¹⁴ As demonstrated by J. Hornblower 1981, 27–32, by checking Diodorus’ use of Agatharchides with Photius and of Posidonius with Athenaeus. Hornblower’s comparison demonstrates that, at least in these cases, Diodorus virtually rewrites his underlying material. Hornblower argues that this practice is characteristic of the whole work of Diodorus. Similar conclusions are found in Peremans 1967, 432–455; more recently Anson 2004, 11; 16–19; 28; 32; Sulimani, 2011, 57–108.

¹¹⁵ See the diligent analysis of Laqueur 1958, 257–290, who concludes that “In gewisser Weise ist er also weniger selbständig, als man bisher angenommen hat; er hat nicht aus den

Diodorus was not an author with his own concept of historiography, and for the Hellenistic reception of Thucydides, he should be analyzed as a “cover-text”, not as evidence on reception *sensu stricto*, not least because he most probably did not read Thucydides directly.¹¹⁶

I have also omitted Strabo, who, of course, knew and used Thucydides as he quotes him in his work numerous times. He brings no new information about Thucydides’ readership in the Hellenistic period, as he was contemporary with Dionysius of Halicarnassus, for which period there is no doubt about the circulation of the *History*. The latter provides sufficient evidence that Thucydides was well known and read in the Augustan Rome. Whereas Dionysius contributes much to understanding the views on and interpretations of Thucydides’ work, Strabo does not. Thus, he appears in this book as but an intermediate author for other historians.

genannten Quellen etwas selbständig Neues geschaffen, sondern er hat bereits einen gegebenen Rahmen übernommen. Aber in der Ausarbeitung ist er viel selbständiger, als angenommen wurde, indem er in diese Grundquelle die Exzerpte aus anderen Autoren hineinarbeitete.” Cf. Laqueur 1992.

¹¹⁶ On this question see chap. 2, pp. 70–71.

CHAPTER TWO

TESTIMONIES OF THE READERSHIP OF THUCYDIDES

1. Preliminary remarks

Simon Hornblower has rightly drawn attention to the fact that modern scholars tend to postulate what they should actually prove — that historians after Thucydides were well acquainted with his work. Taking that for granted, scholars find various methodological and stylistic correspondences between Thucydides and the Hellenistic historians.¹ Below I attempt to analyze testimonies of the readership of Thucydides' *History* by standing on the firm ground of explicit references, i.e. where the historian is mentioned by name. This approach aims to avoid speculation about probable allusions, the possible use of Thucydides as source, etc. Such considerations, although not entirely futile, operate within a huge shortage of data, as most of the Hellenistic historians' work is lost. Hermann Strasburger calculated that only approximately 2,5 percent of ancient Greek historiography is extant. In such circumstances, the search for verbal echoes, allusions, or possible parallels to Thucydides is risky.² There is always the possibility that something that we read as the given author's (e.g. from the Hellenistic period) allusion to, or use of Thucydides, is in fact a reference to some other — not extant, or even not known to us — historiographical text. This approach does not exclude the advancement of conjectures or new hypotheses. However, these must fulfil one condition — the explicit mentioning of Thucydides' *History*. To this method there is one exception in this chapter, namely in my discussion of the papyrological findings. Papyri that contain the *History* are not references to Thucydides *sensu stricto*, but rather complementary evidence for the use and/or editions of his work. Works on the reception of Thucydides published until now do not provide such a survey.³ Numerous testimonies to authors' acquaintance with Thucydides have

¹ This applies to each study that aims to find the influence of a given historian on further generations. See Hornblower 1994, 55–66, which prefers to speak of a “story”, rather than of the “development” of Greek historiography, as well as when he emphasizes the influence of various literary forms on historiographers, that are sometimes hardly distinguishable from the impact of the historians themselves.

² See above p. 26 n. 100. This is crucial when we try to prove that a given author used or “reacted” to Thucydides; we are never sure whether this or that parallel is not caused by similar passages occurring in authors other than Thucydides.

³ Hornblower 1995, 49, is cautious in his method, but does not analyse the explicit evidence in detail. Foulon 2010, 141–153, presents an excellent argument, but is restricted to the question of Polybius' acquaintance with Thucydides. Meister 2013, 41–42, mixes the question of the general readership of Thucydides with his influence on historical authors.

been heretofore passed over (as in the case of *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* and the evidence of the papyri), underrated (as in the case of Agatharchides), or incorrectly attributed (as in the chronographic source of Diodorus). This inquiry aims at a new, detailed and complete examination of the explicit references, and will be a point of reference for the whole argument. I begin with references to Thucydides from the Classical period, but my ultimate aim is, in line with the subject of this book, to present a picture of historians' acquaintance with Thucydides in the Hellenistic age. Earlier references to Thucydides help to provide a more complete idea of the evolution of his readership.

Most of the reception studies in this particular field disconnect the problem of the edition and history of the text of a given author from the developments in the history of the book as such.⁴ This factor is important for the question of the division of the work into books. The division into books is usually dependent on the technical restrictions imposed by the papyrus roll. The technical standards in the editions and use of papyri changed over time. Thucydides composed his work towards the end of the fifth century, whereas in the Hellenistic age the papyri used for the literary works underwent an evolution, which is traceable e.g. in the divisions of works into books.⁵ The present divisions of the literary works of the Classical period are in a large part the work of the Alexandrian φιλόλογοι, rather than of the authors themselves.⁶ This element is of importance for the reconstruction of the fate of Thucydides' *History* in the Hellenistic period. Specifically, the form of papyrus made it difficult to keep up with the whole work, or to "look it up" according to the need, especially when it comprised five rolls or more (in the case of Thucydides, eight or nine, cf. below). It is reasonable to suppose that, taking this inconvenience into account, some parts of such a work as Thucydides' were better known than others. In consequence, some better-known passages/chapters would be most likely remembered, reused, reformulated, or alluded to by further generations of historians.⁷ We will see that, apart from the indications that the entire work of Thucydides was read, the consideration of method belonging to book I (I 22–23) is probably one such passage.

⁴ Cf. Irigoin 2003, 170.

⁵ *Ibidem*, 194.

⁶ *Ibidem*, 141; 150.

⁷ Hornblower 1994, 62.

2. References from the Classical period

The first two explicit references to Thucydides are datable to the early fourth century BC, and it is possible (not certain, cf. below, pp. 38–39 with n. 22) that they can be attributed to the same author.

2.1 Cratippus of Athens (early 4th cent. BC)

In his essay *On Thucydides*, Dionysius of Halicarnassus quotes Cratippus' opinion of the historian (*Thuc.* 16, 2–3):

(2) ὁ ὦν προνοούμενος ἔοικεν ἀτελῇ τὴν ἱστορίαν καταλιπεῖν, ὥς καὶ Κράτιππος ὁ συνακμάσας αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ παραλειφθέντα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ συναγαγὼν γέγραφε, οὐ μόνον ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτὰς ἐμποδῶν γεγενῆσθαι λέγων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὀχληρὰς εἶναι. (3) τοῦτό γέ τοι συνέντα αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς τελευταίοις τῆς ἱστορίας φησὶ μηδεμίαν τάξιν ῥητορείαν, πολλῶν μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰωνίαν γενομένων, πολλῶν δ' ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις, ὅσα διὰ διαλόγων καὶ δημηγοριῶν ἐπράχθη.⁸

Cratippus was in all probability a younger contemporary of Thucydides, active in the early fourth century BC.⁹ We do not know in what work Cratippus had voiced the above opinion about the historian. Some scholars ascribe to him the fragmentarily preserved so-called *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, a historical narrative composed around the first half of the fourth century (see below, pp. 38–39). Before I try to extract from this fragment any information on the early circulation of Thucydides, some remarks should be made on the context in which Cratippus is adduced. Firstly, Dionysius does not refer to Cratippus in direct speech; this is not a verbatim quotation. The first view — that Cratippus

⁸ “In his anxiety for these, he seems to have left his history incomplete. Such, too is the view of Cratippus, who flourished at the same time as he, and who collected the matter passed over by him, for he says that not only have the speeches been an impediment to the narrative, but they are also annoying to the hearers. At any rate he maintains that Thucydides noticed this and so put no speech in the closing portions of his history, though there were many events in Ionia and many events at Athens that called for the use of dialogues and harangues” (translations of the *On Thucydides* are of Pritchett; on some implications of the translation cf. below, p. 36).

⁹ Other testimonies of Cratippus: Plut. *De glor. Ath.* I 345c–e = FGrHist 64 T 2; Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 31–33 = F 2; Ps.-Plut. *Vit. X Or.* 834 c–d = F 3. On this author in general see Pédech 1970, 31–45; Lehmann 1976, 265–288; Meister 2013, 21–23. He was formerly considered a later (third century BC) “Schwindelautor”, who by referring to Thucydides tried to enhance his own reputation (e.g. Schwartz 1909, 496). This view has been refuted by the majority of scholars, see Gomme 1954a, 53–55; Pédech 1970, 31–32; Luschkat 1970, 1271–1272; Lehmann 1976, 265–288; Schadewaldt 1982, 226; Schepens 2001, 71–77; Meister 2013, 21–23. Cratippus' *akmé* in the early fourth century is presently an *opinio communis*. One of the chief arguments for this dating are Plutarch's testimonies, which place him between Thucydides and Xenophon, in what is a clearly chronological framework (T 2). Dionysius, in our passage, calls him a “contemporary” (συνακμάσας αὐτῷ), not younger than Thucydides.

suggested that Thucydides neglected to finish his work when he realized that it was deteriorating in quality — is actually Dionysius' line of thought, followed by ὡς Κράτιππος ... γέγραπεν; then it is reported (with λέγων+AcI) that Cratippus thought that the speeches were obnoxious to the audience; lastly (φησὶ+AcI), that Cratippus believed that Thucydides decided to exclude the speeches in book VIII because he was aware of their imperfections. Considering that it is indirect speech, is difficult to tell how accurately Dionysius reports Cratippus here, but the manner in which he attaches him to his own line of argument (stating that the speeches are in many instances weak) recommends caution; we cannot exclude the possibility that the original context of his statements was fairly different. It seems to be Dionysius' imputation that Cratippus specifically assessed the speeches' technical features as weak. If we isolate the content that is attributable to Cratippus in the cited passage, we learn that the reason why Thucydides was supposed to have considered the speeches as an "impediment to the narrative, but also annoying to the hearers", is actually not given by Cratippus. His reasons could have been many and various, and it is actually implausible that the one given then by Cratippus was the speeches' inadequate disposition of material as conceived by Dionysius. Cratippus could have developed his argument against the speeches in a completely different context, which is now lost. Secondly, that Thucydides' name occurred in Cratippus could create an impression that the latter contributed to some debate specifically about Thucydides and his ideas. Such can be the effect of the secondary context in which Dionysius embeds Cratippus' statements: the entire treatise *On Thucydides*, where Cratippus is adduced, is about Thucydides. Yet Cratippus' statement about Thucydides' speeches was rather part of an ongoing debate about speeches in historiography in general, of which Thucydides was probably an important, but definitely not the sole, voice.¹⁰ The relationship between words and deeds, speech and action, neither originated with, nor necessarily revolved around, Thucydides. In the time of Cratippus the question was worth bringing up, and the debate continued in the following centuries and was interlinked with changes in tendencies in the theory and practice of rhetoric from the fifth century onwards.¹¹ The dispute was particularly lively in the time

¹⁰ See chap. 3 on Thucydides' statement about speeches and its possible reception by the Hellenistic historians. The most detailed and elaborately argued set of standards for speeches in a historical account was, as far as the extant evidence shows, Polybius.

¹¹ For instance, the movement towards rules and types, the growing emphasis on the notion of probability etc. In particular, notions of types and stereotypes as opposed to the individuality and uniqueness of historical events was the most vexing question in that discussion (Marincola 2007, 122–123).

of Dionysius, and this “most rhetorical of historians” took his stand on the problem i.a. in the *On Thucydides*, where the above views of Cratippus are reported.¹² The assessment specifically of Thucydides was perhaps a branch of that great debate, concentrated on Thucydides’ style in the speeches but also in the narrative parts. The core question to Dionysius and his literary opponents was whether the style of the *History*’s speeches is adequate for public speeches or historical works.¹³ Dionysius’ answer was negative in both instances, but he admits that it meant going against the mainstream of his time.¹⁴ Still, the part of the *On Thucydides* where Cratippus is cited is not a discussion of the stylistic features of the speeches, but of the *πραγματικός τόπος*, the organization of the material, precisely about *ἐξεργασία* (working out, treatment of the subject-matter). In relation to speeches, it is a charge stating that Thucydides was not always right in allocating the given amount of space to his speeches in the course of the account, and that these are either too long and too elaborate, or not elaborate enough in taking the importance of the circumstances into account.¹⁵ Cratippus’ fragment is thus adduced as proof that he had already discerned Thucydides’ inability to properly organize his material. Hence his intention can be distorted in the way already suggested.

That said, two reflections emerge as to Cratippus’ reception of Thucydides:

a. The reference in Dionysius seems to suggest that Cratippus “picked up” Thucydides’ work where the latter “left out” and undertook its continuation. It

¹² Dionysius’ views on speeches are also implicit in *Ant. Rom.* XI 1, 3–4; VII 66, 2–3, where speeches have a status near to that of causes. He himself filled his own historical work with plenty of speeches.

¹³ The *On Thucydides* is addressed to Quintus Aelius Tubero, a Roman lawyer and historian. Dionysius seems to suggest that he (Tubero) took Thucydides as his model for his historical work (Bowersock 1965, 129–130). He was dissatisfied with Dionysius’ assessment of Thucydides in the *On imitation*; the *On Thucydides* is Dionysius’ reaction to his objections, and develops the arguments set out there (Aujac 1991, 7–9). The content of the *On Thucydides* evoked, in turn, objections from another friend of Dionysius – Ammaeus – , which prompted him to write the second *Letter to Ammaeus*, supplementing the ideas of the *On Thucydides* (Pavano 1958, XXIX). On the context and aims of the treatise see Bonner 1939, 82–83.

¹⁴ See Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 50, where he summarizes the problem thus: Thucydides cannot be a model for public speaking (with this everyone would agree); but he is also not suitable for speeches in historiography: this was, in turn, an unpopular thesis (cf. *Thuc.* 2). He was more favourably impressed with the narrative parts than with the speeches. The main charge against Thucydides’ style in the speeches is their lack of clarity. The debate continued, and we have an interesting piece of polemic with Dionysian opinions from the first century AD (P.Oxy. 853; cf. Pritchett 1975, XXX–XXXI).

¹⁵ The discussion of *ἐξεργασία* starts at *Thuc.* 13 and continues up to chap. 20. The whole section of ch. 5–20 is on *πραγματικός τόπος*; 21–55 on *λεκτικός τόπος* (style *sensu stricto*). On the structure and content of the treatise see Aujac 1991, 9–16; Grube 1950, 95–100; Pavano 1958, XXVIII; Pritchett 1975, XXXV.

would thus be appropriate for Cratippus to criticize his immediate predecessor, for some aspects of the latter's work, perhaps in the introduction to his own historical account.¹⁶ It is plausible that Cratippus continued Thucydides' historical work by beginning where the latter broke off.¹⁷

b. Dionysius states that Cratippus criticized speeches in Thucydides, due to their being too frequent and "disagreeable" (ὀχληράς) to the audience. That is why, Cratippus seems to have concluded, Thucydides refrained from including speeches in book VIII. What he understood by the statement about the hearers is unclear. Thucydides does not explain why he put no speeches into the book in question, and this may constitute only a theory on the part of Cratippus.¹⁸ It seems only certain that he mentioned the historian's use of speeches, their relation to the narrative and impact on the listeners. Whether Cratippus assessed Thucydides' speeches as to their literary value, concentrating on their stylistic imperfections, is only a possibility, suggested by the Dionysian secondary context.

Finally, the implications of the testimony for the question of the readership and circulation of Thucydides' work:

1. Cratippus probably read Thucydides' work as a whole, or — at least — most of it. This is a natural inference from the fact that he expresses his view by taking into account the entire *History*. Had Cratippus had no idea about the content of the complete work, it would be absurd for him to speculate as to why Thucydides included no speeches only in the last part of the work.

2. As a consequence of point 1, we can assume that a complete version (with the exception of the problematic last book or books) of Thucydides' work was known and available to Cratippus, presumably in some Athenian library, as early as at the beginning of the fourth century BC.

3. The reference can also be read as suggesting that those parts of Thucydides' work, in which the speeches had been already inserted, were read aloud and received as troublesome (τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὀχληράς). The problem is how to understand the alleged phrase of Cratippus τοῦτό γέ τοι συνέντα αὐτόν (Pritchett: "Thucydides noticed this and so..."), specifically the word συνέντα. It can mean "to be aware of", "understand", but also "to observe";¹⁹ which is

¹⁶ Cf. Gray 2017, 623, slightly overemphasizing Cratippus' concern with Thucydides: "Cratippus must have written a sustained critique of Thucydides, which makes him unique among the other continuators, whose remains mention Thucydides only in one other place, but we do not know where it figured in his work, perhaps in a preface, perhaps a digression."

¹⁷ Cf. T 2 ap. Plut. *De glor. Ath.* III 345c–e. See Lehmann 1976, 275–277.

¹⁸ Lehmann 1976, 267–268, believes that Cratippus' testimony attests that Thucydides deliberately left his work "unfinished".

¹⁹ LSJ, s.v. συνίημι.

by no means a minor difference. In the first case, this would imply only Thucydides' own judgement of the speeches he inserted into the *History* (as unattractive for *potential* listeners); in the second option this judgement would be a result of his experience of the *actual* listeners' reactions. In which sense *συνήμι* is used by Cratippus (or Dionysius: indirect speech) in that testimony is probably impossible to tell on the sole basis of the extant fragments from this historian, which are very scanty. Thus we have to leave two alternatives, i.e. Cratippus either (i) claimed that Thucydides saw his speeches as troublesome, or (ii) he claimed that Thucydides saw the listeners' critical reception during the possible oral publication of the books I–VII (in our division). This would imply that before the composition of the final book “oral publication” or public recitations took place. Nevertheless, this cannot be but a possibility, equally supported by the text in question with the first option.

4. The testimony probably bears witness to the fact that Thucydides was already then discussed and assessed as to his literary features, especially his work's “approachability” for the common reader. Cratippus was writing with his own readers in mind and had to take their expectations and interests into account. Even if the latter's name was adduced as part of a larger debate, it is clear that certain aspects of Thucydides' *History* in particular were worth explicit mention.

5. Cratippus seems to have known a division of Thucydides' history other than into eight books. He describes the part of the work, where the speeches are lacking, in the plural (*ἐν τοῖς τελευταίοις τῆς ἱστορίας*).²⁰ In the eight-book division, that we usually apply, it is the (single) eighth book that contains no speeches. This would indirectly confirm the thesis of the “incompleteness” of the work, either — in the interpretation of Cratippus — as a conscious decision, or as caused by the historian's untimely death. From the length of the eighth book one could assume that the material now included in this book could have been intended by Thucydides to be redistributed, after adding the speeches, into two books (VIIIth and IXth). The eighth book is approximately as long as the preceding seven books, where speeches constitute about one third of the content of each book. Thus, the material of the eighth book, as we have it, plus the approximate length of speeches amounting to around 1/3 of the content, would give us two average books of the *History*. Cratippus could have had at his disposal the now single eighth book (provisionally?) divided into two.

²⁰ The omitted subject of *τελευταίοις* could be either *μέρεσι* (“parts of the work”) or *βιβλίοις* (“books”). Cf. how Polybius uses *τελευταίοις* in a similar way, signifying more than one book of Aratus' historiographical work (Polyb. I 3, 2).

To sum up, as early as the beginning of the fourth century Thucydides appears as one of the crucial points of reference as a historical writer. His work probably immediately entered the “mainstream” of Greek historiography, and found continuation in the work of Cratippus. The latter, as testimony suggests, decided to criticize him, as was usual for a historian to enter into polemic with his predecessors.²¹ We do not exclude the possibility that part of the *History* was publicly recited at some stage of the composition, which led Thucydides’ omission of speeches in *oratio recta* in the last book(s) of the work.

2.2 The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (first half of the fourth cent. BC)

The next extant mention of Thucydides after his death occurs in the so-called *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. It was composed around the mid-point of the fourth century BC, and the author was probably an Athenian. Arguments for the authorship of Cratippus are the most convincing and are accepted by the majority of scholars, but are not entirely unquestionable.²² It is thus safer to treat this work as not ultimately ascribed to a specific author. The surrounding text, where the reference to Thucydides appears, is full of gaps, and we can outline only a general context (Flor. A col.2 v. 31–43 Chambers):

ἐπι] | τηδευμ[α.....] | μηνα. υ[.....] | τος
καταπο[.....] | ρος αὐτίκα [.....] | τα κατὰ τὴν
[.....] | οἱς ὁ Πεδάρ[τος.....] | ἀρχὴν ἐπηγα[γε] |
οὔθ’ οὔτινες ἐ[.....] | τεν δυ] | ναστεῖαν’ οὐδ[.....] |φι] | λοτιμίας
ἀπε[.....] | νως διέσωσαν τὴ[ν] | Ἀθηναίων ἤτ[τηθήσαν
καρτερᾶ ναυμαχί] | α τῇ γενομένη [.....] | πε] | ρὶ ἧς καὶ Θουκ[υδίδης

²¹ This can also be one more argument for the early dating of Cratippus, since the most natural object of criticism for a historian was his immediate predecessor.

²² *Hellenica of Oxyrhynchus* is a historical narrative preserved in two sets of papyrus fragments, found at Oxyrhynchus in Egypt. Both are from the second cent. BC: P.Oxy. 842 (London Papyrus) and PSI 1304 (Florentine Papyrus). The dating of the composition is from the first half of the fourth century (most probably between 387/6 and 346), the content – Greek history after the year 411 to 394 (Nicolai 2006, 708: “to at least 394”), which is the final phase of the Peloponnesian War (esp. the Ionian-Decelean War, the battle at Notium, etc.). The author is believed to rely on autopsy. His identity has heretofore not been satisfactorily established. Various proposals were put forward: Ephorus, Androtion, Daimachus, Cratippus. He shows detailed knowledge of the situation at Athens, and a certain sympathy for Conon, which makes it quite plausible that he was an Athenian. The authorship of Cratippus has gained particular acceptance, e.g. Chambers 1993, XXV: “optimus candidatus igitur meo iudicio Cratippus est”; similarly Schepens 2001, 201–224 (with extensive further bibliography). On the work and possible authorship cf. also Breitenbach 1970/1974, 383–426; Lehmann 1976, 266 with n. 5; McKechnie, Kern, 1988, 8–16; Schepens 2000, 18–19; Nicolai 2006, 708–709; Bleckmann 2006, 32–35.

εἴρηκε.....] | Πεδαρίτο [.....] | μὲν τὼν α[.....] | τες εὐθέως
[.....]. ατην να[.....] |]κ[.....] || *desunt*
*versus nonnulli*²³

The partly reconstructed words — ἡττήθησαν καρτερᾷ ναυμαχίᾳ τῇ γενομένῃ [...] περὶ ἧς καὶ Θουκυδίδης εἴρηκε²⁴ — refer to the naval battle between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians in the year 411, described by Thucydides in book VIII 61.²⁵ The name Pedaritos, which occurs in the passage, belongs to a Spartan admiral, and is also mentioned by Thucydides in this moment of his narrative.²⁶

The author of the *Hell. Oxy.* is regarded as continuator of Thucydides, due to the immediate chronological connection between his and Thucydides' work and because of the direct reference to his predecessor. In addition, methodological affinities have also been found, which can point to the author's approach to historiography as similar to that of Thucydides.²⁷

For the question of the readership of, or acquaintance with Thucydides, the following conclusions can be drawn from the testimony:

1. The author read Thucydides' *History*, at least part of the eighth book, where the description of the battle occurs (VIII 61). He probably also knew the earlier section, where Pedaritos is introduced (VIII 28, 5).²⁸

²³ Translating these lines, given the degree of tentativeness in their reconstruction, would be pointless. McKechnie and Kern omit any translation of this part in their edition (1988).

²⁴ The words: καρτερᾷ ναυμαχίᾳ occur (in a slightly different form) in Thucydides' narrative, and hence are proposed in the restoration of the text by the editor. The relevant passage in Thucydides reads (Thuc. VIII 61, 3): ἐπεξελθόντων δὲ τῶν Χίων πανδημεὶ καὶ καταλαβόντων τι ἐρυμνὸν χωρίον καὶ τῶν νεῶν αὐτοῖς ἅμα ἕξ καὶ τριάκοντα ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων δύο καὶ τριάκοντα ἀναγαγομένων ἐναναμάχησαν· καὶ καρτερᾶς γενομένης ναυμαχίας οὐκ ἔλασσαν ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ οἱ Χίοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι (ἥδη γὰρ καὶ ὁπὲ ἦν) ἀνεχώρησαν ἐς τὴν πόλιν ("After, therefore, the Chians had sailed forth in full force and seized a strong position, and their ships at the same time to the number of thirty-six had put to sea against the thirty-two of the Athenians, they came to battle. It proved to be a stubborn fight, and the Chians and their allies did not have the worst of it in the action, but since it was by this time late they withdrew to the city" (all translations of Thucydides' *History* are by Smith).

²⁵ For this description see the remarks of Hornblower, CT III, 932–935.

²⁶ Thuc. VIII 61, 2: [...] ὃς Ἀντισθένης ἐπιβάτης ζυνεξήλθε, τοῦτον κεκομισμένοι μετὰ τὸν Πεδαρίτου θάνατον [...]; "they had brought, after the death of Pedaritus, with Antisthenes as a marine" (transl. of Smith, altered). See McKechnie, Kern 1988, 124; Chambers 1993, XII.

²⁷ As the author does not belong to the Hellenistic period, these alleged affinities need not be discussed here. See: Hornblower 1994, 31–32; Strasburger 1982, 779; McKechnie, Kern 1988, 21; Nicolai 2006, 708. Cf. Gray 2017, 626, who attempts to compare the language of the author of the *Hell. Oxy.* with that of Thucydides, pointing to similarities but with no conclusion of deliberate imitation.

²⁸ Cf. Hornblower, CT III, 834–835.

2. He refers to Thucydides without any additional qualifier; thus Thucydides was regarded as a well-known figure by him, or he considered him as such for his readers.

3. As a consequence of pt. 1, it seems that at least what we now treat as the eighth book of Thucydides was available for the author — in Athens, taking the author's probable provenance into account.

2.3 Indirect evidence from the Classical period

Taking the above conclusions into account, it is no surprise that one can trace the use of Thucydides' *History* in the fourth century historians. In particular, this is demonstrable in the work of Ephorus of Cyme (c. 405–330). According to my approach outlined above, for the Classical period I focus on explicit references to Thucydides only. The book is on Thucydides in the Hellenistic age and implicit references or engagement with the *History* is examined in the case of authors writing in that period. Ephorus certainly used Thucydides, which has been proved by numerous scholars,²⁹ I therefore omit detailed inquiry into this author. On Ephorus as reader of Thucydides and source of Diodorus see the discussion below (pp. 70–72 with notes), which accentuates that Ephorus perused the *History* for his own account, but also supplemented it with other sources, or even “coloured” Thucydides' narrative with material from fourth-century pamphleteers.

3. The Hellenistic period

3.1 The Hellenistic papyri of Thucydides

At present, we have 92 papyri containing parts of Thucydides' *History*.³⁰ Most of them (66 pieces) come from the excavations in Oxyrhynchus. A large part is

²⁹ Ephorus' works include a history of Cyme, a treatise on style, and two books which aimed at satisfying the demand for popular information on diverse topics characteristic of the period. His *magnum opus* was the thirty-book *History*, which avoided the mythological period, although it included individual myths, beginning with the Return of the Heraclidae and extending to the siege of Perinthus in 340. His son, Demophilus, completed the work with an account of the Third Sacred War. He was the first universal historian, combining a focus on Greek history with events in the barbarian east. Ephorus drew on a diversity of sources, historical and literary. Of special interest to Ephorus were migrations, the founding of cities, and family histories. Diodorus of Agyrium probably followed Ephorus' work closely for much of Archaic and practically all of Classical Greek history. See Barber 1935; Drews 1962, 383–392; Rubincam 1976, 357–361; Schepens 1977, 95–118.

³⁰ The most up to date list of Thucydidean papyri is in the LDAB database (<https://www.trismegistos.org/ldab>, online reference on April 10th 2021). There are editions by

dated to the Imperial Period.³¹ Taking the evidence as a whole, there seems to be a tendency for the frequent occurrence of the first books, rather than the later ones. The character of the findings suggests that the *History* was most commonly circulated not as a whole, but in single books.³² Still, there is one instance of a complete papyri edition of the *History*, datable to 100–150 AD.³³ Until now, only two pieces of papyri containing Thucydides' *History* dated to the Hellenistic period have been found. This is still more than the single Hellenistic papyrus of Herodotus (considerably younger than those of Thucydides) and one of Xenophon.³⁴

3.1.1 P.Hamb. II 163 (P.Hamb. graec. 646 + 666 Ro)

P.Hamb. II 163 was initially assigned to the first century AD.³⁵ However, scholars currently agree that it is of Hellenistic provenance, written around 250 BC.³⁶ It preserves fragments of the following passages from the *History*:

I 2, 2–3: The so-called Archaeology, the description of early Greek settlements (no walls, no agriculture, etc.),

I 2, 6–3.1: The Archaeology; Thucydides' statement about correctness of his reasoning as to the conditions in early Greece; further evidence for the weakness of Greek settlements at that stage of their development,

Fischer 1913; Haslam, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* vol. LVII, 1990. The most recent publication is of a second/third cent. AD piece from Karanis (P.Mich. inv. 5413) by Bosak-Schröder, Verhoogt 2018, 7–12. See Pellé 2010, 597–604, for good *status quaestionis* concerning the editions of Thucydidean papyri beginning with Fischer up to 2010. See also: Bouquiaux-Simon, Mertens 1991, 198–210; Bravo 2012a, 23–26; 47–59. The number of 92 papyri is remarkably high in comparison with the 51 of Herodotus and 53 of Xenophon, of which only 12 belong to his historical works (Ἀνάβασις and Ἑλληνικά).

³¹ Of all the papyri of Thucydides, 69 are datable to the period from the beginning of the second to the end of the third century AD.

³² The order is as follows: book I (23 papyri); II (18 papyri); III (12 papyri); VII (11 papyri); VIII (10 papyri); V (8 papyri); IV (7 papyri); VI (3 papyri). See Pellé 2010, 599; Kennedy 2018, 39–40; cf. Malitz 1990, 343. See also Iglesias-Zoido 2012, 396–401, on how the papyrological evidence attests to selective circulation of the *History* for didactic and rhetorical ends.

³³ Malitz 1990, 343. The almost certain example of a complete edition (as single “book”) of the *History* is P.Oxy. XVII 2100 + P.Oxy. LVII 3891 + P.Oxy. LXI 4109. See Pellé 2010, 599.

³⁴ The single Hellenistic papyrus of Herodotus (P.Duk. inv. 756) is datable to 150–100 BC. Thus, we have no Herodotean papyri from such an early time as the two of Thucydides, adduced in the present section. As for Xenophon, the third cent. BC P.Heid. Gr. 1 206 contains a scrap of the *Memorabilia*; the earliest papyrus with the *Hellenica* is from the second half of the first cent. BC. On the Herodotean papyri see Bravo 2012a, 26–46.

³⁵ Snell et al. 1954.

³⁶ Turner 1956, 95–98; Wilkinson 2005, 72, concurs with Turner. Pellé 2010, 598, is not so specific: “assegnabile al III sec. a.C.”

I 28, 3–5: The account of the beginning of the conflict between Corcyra and Corinth, their preparations for military action,

I 29, 3: The first battle between the two sides.

Thus, the papyrus contains only the first book of the *History*, more precisely — the Archaeology and the preliminaries to the Peloponnesian War. The papyrus, especially the handwriting, is of high quality.³⁷ There are fragments of some elegiac poems on the *verso*.³⁸ The external features allow us to call it an exquisite copy, prepared by an expensive scribe. This suggests specialized purposes (use by author of historical works/literary critic). The text of the papyrus varies remarkably from the standard one, especially in comparison with the papyri dated to the Imperial period. As Benedetto Bravo convincingly argues, it contained a less interpolated version of the *History*.³⁹

3.1.2 P.CtYBR inv. 4601

P.CtYBR inv. 4601 can be dated to c. 250–200 BC.⁴⁰ Its publication is relatively fresh (2005). The preserved pieces contain the following passages from the *History*:

VIII 93, 3: The account of the oligarchic revolution at Athens — the fall of the Four Hundred.

VIII 94, 3; VIII 95, 2–3: The account of the Athenian loss of Euboea.

³⁷ Cavallo, Maehler 2008, 50: “fairly small practiced hand”, which can be contrasted e.g. with P.Köln V 203, a phrase from New Comedy: “large, unskilled, uneven handwriting with a thick pen”. See *ibidem*, 56, on the great regularity and elegance of the letters and lines of P.Hamb. II 163.

³⁸ Pellé 2010, 601 with n. 3.

³⁹ Turner 1956, 98: “The number of variant readings found in these scraps in less than eighty words of Greek contrasts strikingly with the much closer conformity to the manuscript tradition found in the papyri of Roman date.” Bravo 2012a, 47–52. According to Bravo, there were two main versions of the *Histories*, and most of the medieval codexes transmit a worse, heavily interpolated one. The Hellenistic piece in question belongs, in his view, to the “clearer” branch, closer to the original words written by Thucydides. The interpolated text was probably produced in the first quarter of the first century AD. See Bravo 2012b, 201–234.

⁴⁰ Thucydides’ fragments were attached in the cartonnage to documents from the year 138–137 BC – mainly petitions to Boethos, epistrategos of the Heracleopolite nome (to be edited by R. Duttonhöfer). Wilkinson 2005, 69–74, is the first edition of the Thucydidean fragments belonging to this collection. The *terminus ante quem* is determined by the dating of the documents (all from c. 138–137 BC). Wilkinson detected technical affinities with hands assigned to the middle of the third century BC, for example P.Lit. Lond 73, and especially to P.Hamb. II 163 (Thucydidean papyrus from this period, adduced above). Pellé 2010, 598, dates this papyrus imprecisely, to the turn of the IIInd cent. BC.

The papyrus is of good quality; the back of the fragments is blank.⁴¹ As in the case of P.Hamb. II 163, we can infer that it was a professional, expensive edition of the eighth book of the *History*. The text varies frequently, given the small number of readable words (less than 40), from the standard *textus receptus*; six times more than any other known manuscript.⁴² From the above we can draw the following conclusions and advance the following theses:

1. Of the two Hellenistic papyri of the *History*, P.Hamb. II 163 seems to be an edition of the first book used by an individual versed in literature (cf. poetry on the *verso*). The P.CtYBR inv. 4601 is a professional edition of the eighth book (cf. the blank *verso*). They are not, as in large number of other literary papyri, written on reused documents. Their handwriting is diligent, which required a skilled and therefore expensive scribe.⁴³ Therefore, these papyri were probably not for school use, and came from professional editions of the *History*.

2. The small number of extant Thucydidean papyri from the Hellenistic period, in comparison with the second and third cent. AD, does not necessarily imply that Thucydides, as Pellé put it: “aver goduto di particolare favore in epoca imperiale”.⁴⁴ The number of Thucydidean papyri that we have is only slightly smaller than the papyri of Herodotus and Xenophon taken together (cf. n. 30 above). Only two Hellenistic papyri of Thucydides are still more than what remains of Herodotus and Xenophon. If we were to judge only by the papyrological evidence in terms of numbers, Thucydides would have to be regarded as a more popular historian than the two Classical authors mentioned. Yet this would be an obvious oversimplification. The number of papyri that reached our times, although not entirely without significance, is not representative of the circulation of the given authors' texts in antiquity.⁴⁵ The numbers cannot be ignored, but their significance should not be overestimated.

3. The Thucydidean text contained in the Hellenistic papyri varies considerably from later witnesses of Thucydides' *History*. This suggests that the text was then not yet standardized, if it was strictly standardized at all (cf. divergences in the Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, below).

⁴¹ Wilkinson 2005, 69.

⁴² *Ibidem*, 72–74. The editor relied primarily on Alberti's edition of Thucydides.

⁴³ Cf. Cribiore 2009, 320–337; Bülow-Jacobsen 2009, 3–29; W. Johnson 2009, 262–263.

⁴⁴ Pellé 2010, 598, cf. p. 600.

⁴⁵ Cf. Cuvigny 2009, 50.

3.2 Theophrastus of Eresus (ca. 372/1–288/7 BC)

The first explicit *Leserzeugnis* of the *History* from the Hellenistic age is Cicero's account of Theophrastus' words about Herodotus and Thucydides. Theophrastus is adduced by Cicero in the *Orator*, when he outlines the development of literary prose.⁴⁶ This account begins with Thrasymachus and Gorgias and passes through Theodorus of Byzantium, and "numerous others". Excessive rhetorical embellishment is censured, but Herodotus and Thucydides are distinguished, because, as Cicero remarks, they were moderate in using it. Then our reference to Theophrastus emerges. The underlined text is what William W. Fortenbaugh delineates as the fragment proper of Theophrastus (Cic. *Or.* 39 = fr. 697 FHS&G):

*haec tractasse Thrasymachum Calchedonium primum et Leontinum ferunt Gorgiam, Theodorum inde Byzantium multosque alios quos λογοδαιδάλους appellat in Phaedro Socrates. quorum satis arguta multa sed ut modo primumque nascentia minuta et versiculorum similia quaedam nimiumque depicta. quo magis sunt Herodotus Thucydidesque mirabiles; quorum aetas cum in eorum tempora quos nominavi incidisset, longissime tamen ipsi a talibus deliciis vel potius ineptiis afuerunt. alter enim sine ullis salebris quasi sedatus amnis fluit, alter incitator fertur et de bellicis rebus canit etiam quodam modo bellicum. primisque ab his, ut ait Theophrastus, historia commota est ut auderet uberius quam superiores et ornatius dicere.*⁴⁷

Fortenbaugh made the most complete inquiry up until now into the corpus of fragments edited within the Theophrastus Project.⁴⁸ He advances several hypotheses as to its delineation and degree of exactness. However, due to the

⁴⁶ On the *Orator* in general see: Sandys 1885, LI–LXXVI; Schlittenbauer 1903, 181–248; Sabbadini 1916, 1–22; Yon 1958, 70–84; Hubbell 1963, 297–302; Narducci 2002, 427–443.

⁴⁷ "It is recorded that the first persons who practiced this species of composition were Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian, and Gorgias the Leontine; and that these were followed by Theodorus the Byzantine, and a number of others, whom Socrates, in the *Phaedrus* of Plato, calls Speech-wrights; many of whose discourses are sufficiently neat and entertaining; but, being the first attempts of the kind, were too minute and puerile, and had too poetical an air, and too much colouring. On this account, the merit of Herodotus and Thucydides is more conspicuous: for though they lived at the time we are speaking of, they carefully avoided those studied decorations, or rather futilities. The former rolls along like a deep, still river without any rocks or shoals to interrupt its course; and the other describes wars and battles, as if he was founding a charge on the trumpet; so that history, to use the words of Theophrastus, was first moved by these, and began to express herself with greater copiousness and embellishment." (transl. Hubbell with alterations)

⁴⁸ Fortenbaugh 2005a, 316–320. Sandys 1885, 48; Mayer 1910, 29–30; Kroll 1913, 47–48; Grube 1952, 175 and Innes 1985, 267 are only remarks or unsystematic comments made in passing.

enormous size of his enterprise, his treatment of that piece in particular is not detailed. Fortenbaugh in his edition comments that: “it is only in the last sentence of our text that Cicero draws on Theophrastus. The Latin words *commota est* appear to translate some form of the Greek verb κινεῖν.”⁴⁹ I will not enter below into the question of delineation, which is touched upon here by Fortenbaugh, but focus on what he considers the “fragment proper”, the last single sentence. Does “to draw on” mean that Cicero paraphrases the idea of the Peripatetic, or adheres to some of his wording, and where? Is it possible to verify this? What further consequences and implications or potential answers would this bring for our assessment of this testimony?

3.2.1 Cicero’s method of quoting

It will be useful to inquire into similar references in Cicero. By “similar” I mean references introduced by what I am further going to call the “*ut ait* formula” (= UAF), for this is the way in which Cicero quotes Theophrastus in our fragment. To be sure, it is not an attempt to provide a comprehensive guide to all such references.⁵⁰ The focus is on instances which plainly illustrate the specific implications of this manner of quotation, and on their application to our testimony. There are 69 references “accompanied” by the UAF in Cicero’s extant works.⁵¹ There is a tendency for such references to occur in the letters, and in his philosophical and rhetorical works. Naturally, many of these references are unverifiable in terms of adequacy, so this is simply not a possibility, even in a book-length study. Even so, we can attempt a selective demonstration of what the UAF most likely (not definitely) means for our assessment of the fragment of Theophrastus.

What does the UAF actually denote? In the OLD s.v. *ait* we find a separate section for Cicero’s use of the word, glossed: “*Ut ait* quispiam [...] in quoting an unusual expression, as one says.” The dictionary seems to suggest that if Cicero finds a certain expression particularly striking, rare, or shrewd, he puts

⁴⁹ Fortenbaugh 2005a, 318.

⁵⁰ For more general studies see Howind 1921 (part. p. 8 on *ait*); Armleder 1959b, 20 on *ait*; Skutsch 1960, 220–223; for philosophical works see Zawadzki 2011.

⁵¹ I take solely quotations with *ut ait* in the present tense and third person singular, references with third person plural (*ut aiunt*) do not indicate the author of the purportedly recounted words. The number of quotations introduced with the UAF: poets: 32; philosophers: 14 (including 5 of Theophrastus); historians: 8; others (historical figures/unspecified/unknown): 15. Of Latin poets the most often quoted are Ennius, Lucilius, and Accius; of Greek, Homer. Of philosophers half of the references with the UAF are to Theophrastus and Aristotle.

the UAF before it. However, this is imprecise; consider, for example, this quotation of Plautus in *De or.* II 39, 4 (~ Plautus, *Trinummus* 705):

*Tum Catulus 'etsi,' inquit 'Antoni, minime impediendus est interpellatione iste cursus orationis tuae, patiere tamen mihi que ignoscas; "non enim possum quin exclamem," ut ait ille in Trinummo: ita mihi vim oratoris cum exprimere subtiliter visus es, tum laudare copiosissime.*⁵²

As we can see, the UAF also comes *after* the sentence Cicero refers to.⁵³ Sometimes the UAF is put in between the words that Cicero intends to adduce.⁵⁴ Therefore, the position of the UAF is not fixed, but in quotation of poetry the words that purport to be the given poet's are in inverted commas. The verification of such a quotation depends only on the availability of control material; delineation is quite easy to make. A unique example is when Cicero quotes Lucilius with a Latinized Greek word.⁵⁵

Revealing evidence is provided by passages where Cicero cites using the UAF, leaving the Greek text. These are a clear illustration of how haphazardly Cicero mixes cited words, here (purportedly exact) Greek, with his own thoughts. Eleven such quotations, accompanied by the UAF, occur in Cicero's letters.⁵⁶ For example, *Ep. ad Att.* X.8.7 (~Thuc. I 138, 3):

⁵² "At this point Catulus interposed, saying, 'Antonius, although that flowing discourse of yours should never be checked by interruption, still you will bear with me and forgive me. For, as the man says in *The Threepenny Piece*, 'I cannot help applauding': so exquisitely, as I think, have you described the power of the orator, and with such wealth of diction have you extolled it'."

⁵³ Cf. *Lael. de Am.* 22, 4: *Principio qui potest esse vita 'vitalis', ut ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benivolentia conquiescit?* ("In the first place, how can life be what Ennius calls 'the life worth living,' if it does not repose on the mutual goodwill of a friend?" transl. Falconer). Cf. *De fin.* V 92.

⁵⁴ *De fin.* V 68, 18: *ex ea difficultate illae 'fallaciloquae', ut ait Accius, 'malitiae' natae sunt.* ("This is the difficulty that gave birth to those base conceits deceitful-tongued, as Attius has it" (all translations of *De finibus* are of Rackham).

⁵⁵ *De fin.* II 23, 17: *vitantes cruditatem, quibus vinum defusum e pleno sit chrysizon, ut ait Lucilius, cui nihildum situlus et sacculus abstulerit.* ("Careful of their digestion; with wine in flask decanted from a new-broach'd cask, as Lucilius has it, wine of tang bereft, all harshness in the strainer left."). Here we have no inverted commas, no Greek, and still we are quite certain as to which word Cicero aims at conveying in a "pure" form (*chrysizon*). We can even conjecture where quotation begins and ends, as the rest involves Latin words that are very uncommon for Cicero (*situlus* and *sacculus*).

⁵⁶ For the method and accuracy of quotations in letters of Cicero see Stahlenbrecher 1957; Armleder 1957; Armleder, 1959a, 39–40. The most recent and comprehensive treatment is Behrendt 2013 (with an exhaustive and systematic *status quaestionis*: pp. 9–32). On the Greek in Cicero's letters see Steele 1900, 387–410; McCall 1980; Baldwin 1992, 1–17. On the Greek in letters to Atticus: Shackleton-Bailey 1962, 159–165 and idem 1963, 80.

*qui cum fuisset, ut ait Thucydides, τῶν μὲν παρόντων δι' ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνώμων, τῶν δὲ μελλόντων ἐς πλείστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής, tamen incidit in eos casus quos vitasset si eum nihil fefellisset. qui etsi is erat, ut ait idem, qui τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι ἑώρα μάλιστα, tamen non vidit nec quo modo Lacedaemoniorum nec quo modo suorum civium invidiam effugeret nec quid Artaxerxi polliceretur.*⁵⁷

This quotation was considered by David R. Shackleton Bailey to be “no doubt from memory”, as it diverges from the standard text of Thucydides.⁵⁸ In this passage we can see how fluently Cicero interchanges Thucydides’ expressions with his own. Had Cicero chosen to translate here, and were Thucydides not extant, we would probably be at a loss as to what comes from the historian, and what is Cicero’s addition; and there are other similar cases.⁵⁹

Another situation is when Cicero puts the UAF in the middle of the adduced sentence, and cuts out several words.⁶⁰ The instances from Cicero’s letters, where Greek words are adduced with the UAF, show, firstly, that such references (with the UAF) vary considerably in the number of precise words following or

⁵⁷ “For Thucydides tells us that though Themistocles was ‘the best judge of current affairs on the shortest reflection, and the shrewdest to guess at what would happen in the future,’ yet he fell into misfortunes, which he would have escaped, had there been no error in his calculations. Though he was, as the same writer says, ‘a clear-sighted judge of the better and the worse course in a doubtful crisis,’ yet he failed to see how to avoid the hate of the Spartans and his own fellow-citizens, nor what promise he ought to make to Artaxerxes” (all translations of Cicero’s *Letters* are of Winstedt).

⁵⁸ Shackleton Bailey, *Comm.* IV, 408–410. Thucydides, with differences from Cicero’s quotation underlined: τῶν τε παραγρημα δι’ ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνώμων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλείστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής [...] τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι προεώρα μάλιστα (in cases of displaying differences between the Greek texts English translation is omitted).

⁵⁹ It is also easy to see in the following *Ep. ad Att.* VII.1.6 (~Thuc. I 97, 2): *sed haec fuerit, ut ait Thucydides, ἐκβολὴ λόγου non inutilis*. (“This, in Thucydides’ phrase, is a digression – but not pointless.”). Shackleton Bailey, *Comm.* III, 277–283, on this part. p. 280, aptly remarks that *non inutilis* is in a way ascribed to Thucydides, although in the Greek no similar expression occurs. Another intelligent supposition on the part of Shackleton Bailey is that this attribution may be an effect of Cicero’s reading of the implications of Thucydides’ words, which could plainly mean that he makes the digression for its usefulness, understood as filling the existing gap in historiography.

⁶⁰ *Ep. ad Att.* IX.15.4 (~Hom. *Od.* III 26): *sed tamen ἄλλα μὲν αὐτός, ut ait ille, ἄλλα δὲ καὶ δαίμων ὑποθήσεται. quicquid egero continuo scies* (“But nevertheless as the poet has it, some things I’ll venture and some things God will prompt. Whatever I do you shall know forthwith”). Part of the Homeric text is cut out by Cicero, and is in a way “replaced” by the UAF, see: Hom. *Od.* III 26: the Greek of 26–28, with the excised words underlined: “Τηλέμαχ’, ἄλλα μὲν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ σῆσι νοήσεις, ἄλλα δὲ καὶ δαίμων ὑποθήσεται”. See Shackleton Bailey, *Comm.* IV, 388–391; p. 390 on the *ut ait* sentence. Behrendt 2013, 259–260 interprets the interference of *ut ait* as an indication of removing the words from the specific person and circumstances, whereby it gains a more general sense.

preceding *ut ait*, from one to an entire sentence. Secondly, they demonstrate how the position of the UAF also varies, and cannot serve, when we have a translation instead of Greek, as an indication of what comes from the given author. Even when the Greek original is given, words are excised (Homer), phrasing altered (Thucydides), or ideas imputed (Thucydides). Still, all the verifiable (especially the above) examples have one thing in common: there is always at least one word reproduced verbatim. There are, of course, instances where this is not demonstrable, but the general tendency is evident. In other words, the majority of Cicero's references accompanied by the UAF involve at least one word purporting to come from the given author's text. Where the UAF occurs, Cicero's primary aim is evidently to keep to the wording of his author, probably because he believes this conveys the idea, thought, or concept better than anything else. That can be either in Latin or in Greek. Cicero seems to say: "as he put it", and this is how we should understand the UAF. A further tentative rule is that the allegedly precise words always come immediately before, or immediately after the UAF + author's name (or *ille*, *idem*, etc.). Moreover, where the UAF occurs, Cicero refers to a specific place in a specific text, rather than to an unspecific or general manner, i.e. "how someone used to put it". To be sure, Cicero could have distorted the original context of the words, and their sense has to be inquired into further.

3.2.2 *Commota est* as translation of κινεῖν

Daniella Dueck has recently shown that in his quotations of poetry Cicero is far more likely than any other Latin author to translate his Greek originals.⁶¹ This is also true for quotations with the UAF: only two of them appear in the Greek original.⁶² Thus, in the case of poetry, the UAF appears even when the quotation is actually a translation. Cicero evidently considers his own rendering as adequately revealing the given author's thoughts, as the Greek would do. When we combine this with inferences about the character of quotations with the UAF from the letters (an attempt to deliver the genuine word(s) of a given author in Greek), we can assume with a great degree of probability that in the case of the reference to Theophrastus in the *Orator*, 39 at least one word/phrase is a translation reproducing the latter's expression. Still, as we have concluded from the letters, we can take Cicero's own thoughts for the quoted author's when we do not have the original to verify them, as there is no rule for the range of the quoted text. This becomes a serious problem in our fragment, where Cicero "apparently"

⁶¹ Dueck 2009b, 314–334; cf. Dueck 2009a, 170–189.

⁶² Sophocles: *Ep. ad Att.* II.7.4; Homer: *Ep. ad Att.* IX.15.4.

(Fortenbaugh's expression) translates Theophrastus, for the Greek is not separated from the Latin, as in the letters, and inverted commas are likewise lacking. How are we to decide what is translated, what Theophrastus actually intended to say about Thucydides and Herodotus in *Orator* 39? In other words, can we attempt an "internal delineation" in the fragment demarcated by Fortenbaugh?

Over a hundred years ago John Sandys put forward a thesis that in our fragment *commota est* could be Cicero's rendering of some form of the Greek κινεῖν used by Theophrastus.⁶³ Fortenbaugh reported and accepted what Sandys had suggested,⁶⁴ adduced no more evidence and did not try to provide any support for the hypothesis that this is a translation. To be precise, Sandys has not actually proved that *commota est* is a translation; he merely cited several passages where the Greek verb "to move" is used in the sense that would fit the context of *Orator* 39. Besides, his list of parallels is incomplete and a mere record. They can and should be examined within individual contexts, but only after substantiation of the claim that Theophrastus did use the verb.

The correct way to approach this problem is our knowledge of Cicero's handling of Greek terms.⁶⁵ Since Theophrastus was a philosopher, we can apply to him Cicero's statement on the method of conveying Greek technical terms. From *De finibus* we learn that there are three main ways in which Cicero renders Greek concepts into Latin: etymological, *ad sensum*, and periphrastic (a fourth possibility is to leave the Greek word intact).⁶⁶ An etymological translation (which Cicero calls *verbum e verbo* translation) occurs when there is no corresponding term in Latin, and an existing Latin word is given new (technical, philosophical) sense which is unique for this word in the language

⁶³ Sandys 1885, 48.

⁶⁴ Fortenbaugh 2005a, 318.

⁶⁵ On this question in general see: Rose 1921, 91–116; G.F. Powell 1995, 115–143. Glucker 2012, 37–96 is now the most comprehensive account of, and commentary on, Cicero's remarks on his translation of Greek terms. Clavel 1868, 315–378, provides an excellent *Ciceronianum lexicon graeco-latinum*, which Glucker attempted to supplement with a more contextualized analysis of all passages where Cicero expresses himself on his treatment of Greek terms.

⁶⁶ Cic. *De fin.* III 15: *si enim Zenoni licuit, cum rem aliquam invenisset inusitatam, inauditum quoque ei rei nomen inponere, cur non liceat Catoni? nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse erit ut interpretes indiserti solent, cum sit verbum, quod idem declaret, magis usitatum. equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci, si aliter non possum, idem pluribus verbis exponere. et tamen puto concedi nobis oportere ut Graeco verbo utamur, si quando minus occurrerit Latinum* ("If Zeno was allowed to invent a new term to match the discovery of an unfamiliar idea, then why not Cato? None the less, there is no need for an exact word-for-word correspondence when a more familiar term already exists to convey the same meaning. That is the mark of an unskilled translator. My usual practice, where there is no alternative available, is to express a single Greek word by several Latin ones. And I still think we should be allowed to use a Greek word when there is no Latin equivalent").

to which it is transferred (*inauditum rei nomen inponere*). The correspondence between them is their principle sense (e.g. κατάληψις-*comprehensio*). This can be identified as a “semantique calque”: the extension of a meaning of an existing Latin word, modelled on its use in the Greek language. A translation *ad sensum* occurs where Cicero considers the Latin word to convey satisfactorily the sense and connotations of a given Greek notion, and chooses it in spite of an existing etymological counterpart.⁶⁷ Such instances are meant to apply to *verbum, quod idem declaret, magis usitatum*, and he considers the ability to find it a mark of a skilled translator. Periphrasis and omission of the Greek word occur when Cicero is unable to employ either of the two techniques described above: *si aliter non possum / si quando minus occurret Latinum* respectively. From this we can outline a general rule: if the given semantics, which are drawn from the immediate context, are unique for the word in the Latin language, and Cicero adduces a specific author (e.g. Theophrastus) in this specific context, we can expect this to be a sign of Cicero’s effort to render a Greek term.

In order to verify which Latin word Cicero tends to choose to represent the Greek one, we can look to the more or less extensive translations that purport to be exact, where the original work has survived independently of Cicero. We have one attempt at an exact quotation by Cicero, where the Greek word is κινεῖν. In this passage, Cicero consequently renders κινεῖν with *movere*, without exception, thirteen times.⁶⁸ Further, we know that in Greek κινεῖν the semantics of “innovation”, or “making changes”, should be considered a very specific sense of a very common word (*quasi* technical, as I argue in chap. 4, pp. 197–202). Does Cicero know and draw on, anywhere else than in *Or.* 39, such a specific sense of *movere*? The answer is, as far as my investigation into the verbs *movere* and *commovere* in Cicero attests, that they are never used by Cicero in such a sense as in *Or.* 39. Furthermore, such a semantic sense of *movere* is not to be found in Latin language at all (this semantic use still requires close examination).⁶⁹ Of course, this needs to be qualified with the fact that it could

⁶⁷ Glucker 2012, 56–58.

⁶⁸ *Tusc.* I 53–54 ~ *Plat. Phdr.* 245c–246a.

⁶⁹ A detailed study of κινεῖν and its implications is a desideratum. It is a typical word for “being moved” in a psychological or political sense, and this semantic coincides with Greek κινεῖν perfectly. However, the sense of “innovation” etc. is completely absent not only from Cicero (see e.g. Abbott et al. 1964, 189), but also from Latin in general. The only instance is Quintilian, in a passage that draws on Aristotle, who is quoted by another author as using κινεῖν in the specific sense.

have appeared in a work that is now lost.⁷⁰ All in all, *commota est*, as it stands in *Or.* 39, is most probably a *verbum e verbo* translation (in Cicero's terms) and a semantic calque (in modern linguistic terms): an extension of a meaning of an existing Latin word modelled on its use in the Greek language. Such a case can be treated as the foremost argument for the thesis that Cicero tries to translate a Greek notion, imposing on it a semantically unrelated Latin word.⁷¹

One thing we need to consider is that in *Or.* 39 Cicero uses the form *commota est*: passive voice, with a prefix. This could suggest accordingly that Theophrastus used κατακινέω in the passive voice. John Gucker analyzed similar examples of translations with prefixes, where Cicero explicitly states that his aim is to provide an etymological rendering of the Greek notion (*verbum e verbo* translation).⁷² The prefix *con-* is there, unsurprisingly, a counterpart of κατα-, giving the connotation of something being done "completely". In these instances, Cicero imposes an entirely new, philosophical sense on words already existing in Latin. Still, on several occasions, Cicero uses *commotio* in a philosophical-technical context, and he does so probably to render the Stoic concept of ψυχῆς κίνησις.⁷³ So, we have at least one example where Cicero adds the prefix which in the Greek word is not present. Furthermore, κατακινέω is rare enough in Greek to assume that Cicero acted similarly with the expression of Theophrastus. For some reason he decided that the prefix should be added, and we may only speculate on how he understood this choice.⁷⁴

Thus, Theophrastus most probably used the verb κινεῖν. As for the passive voice, it is not impossible that Theophrastus used it. In Aristotle, κινεῖν meaning "innovation" also occurs in the passive aorist (*Pol.* 1268 b34–38). If such reasoning is correct, it seems that Cicero made an effort, at least for one verb, to adduce Theophrastus' wording, to the extent that he attempts to "stretch" a Latin word to cover in a semantic sense the Greek author's expression.

⁷⁰ However, this would also require us to assume that Cicero knew this work, and in this one place used *commovere* in this peculiar sense only once in his extant works. This appears to be not impossible, but still improbable.

⁷¹ Ernout 1954, 86 ff; G.F. Powell 1995, 292.

⁷² Gucker 2012, 52–53: κατάληψις = *comprehensio* (*Luc.* 17); προάγω = *produco* (*De fin.* V 52; IV 72); see Rose 1921, 103.

⁷³ Clavel 1868, 346 registers this solely in a very general reference "Stoic. Defin.", with no specific passage quoted. I have managed to find three passages where Cicero discusses *animi commotio*, which most probably renders ψυχῆς κίνησις, all from *Tusc.* III 8, 6; IV 11, 7; IV 47, 11.

⁷⁴ κατακινέω in the passive is not to be found at all. Perhaps this was due to the meaning κινεῖν has in this particular instance, e.g. it meant that Herodotus and Thucydides made the final or most adjustments in the development of historiography, but see below the parallel instances of κινεῖν.

3.2.3 Implications of the other words in the fragment

Is *commota est* the only rendering of Theophrastus' words? We know that there is no rule as to what range of text Cicero reproduces in similar quotations (with the UAF), and what he adds himself (e.g. as a result of his inference from the original text). Since we have established with relative confidence that *commota est* reflects precisely Theophrastus' expression, this could be enough to fill the rule of "ut ait quotations".

As for *primisque ab his* and *historia*, the syntactic structure of this part of the sentence, and the position of the UAF, indicate that this should also be considered a translation of Theophrastus, because of the rule outlined above: the precise words come usually immediately before, or immediately after, the UAF. So, if this part of the sentence runs *primisque ab his, ut ait Theophrastus, historia commota est*, we have only two possibilities: either a) the entire phrase is a translation, or b) *primisque ab his* is Cicero's addition. Since we take *commota est* for a translation on the grounds given above, we should rather assume that *historia* is also a translation (as the word comes immediately after the UAF). In such references we see that Cicero would not "break" the quotation accompanied by the UAF with his own word. Thus, ἱστορία most probably occurred in Theophrastus' text together with κινεῖν. To consider *primisque ab his* as Cicero's addition is impossible to rule out, but still quite unlikely when taking the conventional usage of κινεῖν into account. The Theophrastean sentence as reconstructed up to now would read:

*οὔτοι δὲ πρῶτοι τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐκίνησαν

Alternatively, in passive voice, in line with Cicero's Latin:

*ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ πρῶτων ἱστορία κινήθησα

If we were to pick out the next most significant words from the fragment, these would be *uberius et ornatus*: "[Herodotus and Thucydides were the first to speak] *more fully and ornately*". Is this Cicero's paraphrase, a summary of Theophrastus' opinions, or does he rather adhere to his phrasing?⁷⁵ The combination *uberius et ornatus* is not an unusual compound for Cicero, and apart from *Or.* 39 it can be traced in no less than six passages in Cicero's extant works.⁷⁶ This would suggest, at first sight, that it is Cicero's expression, loosely attributed to Theophrastus (e.g. as Cicero's inference from, or summary of, what Theophrastus

⁷⁵ Fortenbaugh does not consider this question.

⁷⁶ *De or.* III 70, 10; *Or.* 46, 6; *Brut.* 198, 14; *Luc.* 130, 1; *Cat. mai.* 57, 4; *Ep. ad fam.* V. 12.2.

said about the historians).⁷⁷ It is striking that this compound occurs seven times in Cicero, and is virtually absent from Latin literature apart from him.⁷⁸ Before considering what can be concluded from this, we have to examine the contexts where *uberius et ornatus* appear in Cicero.

In *Orator* 46–47, Aristotle’s technique for composing and discussing *θέσεις* is discussed; the passage is not about style *sensu stricto*, and *uberius et ornatus* is an epithet denoting a general fluency and copiousness. This is certainly neither a technical context nor a specific use of the words. In *De or.* III 70, 10 *uberius et ornatus* describes Antonius’ language, in a section which is an extended discussion of *ornatum*, but this epithet refers not to the subject proper, but is a remark made in passing, that in book II Antonius had said certain things *uberius et ornatus*.⁷⁹ Why Cicero would consider Antonius’ speeches *ornatus* is difficult to say, but as it stands, the compound looks as if it were Cicero’s routine expression for “discussing something fully and ornamentally”.⁸⁰ In *Brutus* 198, the context is the qualities of oratory of Scaevola and Crassus. Cicero imagines the trained and untrained critic adjudicating on Crassus’ and Scaevola’s abilities. The conclusion is that even though Crassus would fulfill all three *officia* of the orator, one who is *intellegens et doctus* would discern that Scaevola’s *dicendi genus* is *ornatus et uberius*.⁸¹ It seems to be the sole instance where Cicero uses *uberius et ornatus* in the context of style. Further, it has been shown that *ornatus* or *ornate dicere* is a Latin counterpart of one of the four Theophrastean qualities of good style (*ἀρεταὶ λέξεως*), besides correct

⁷⁷ Cf. the example in n. 59.

⁷⁸ Even on this one occasion *ornatus* and *uberius* are not actually combined but rather loosely set alongside each other: Tac. *Dial.* XVIII 2, 4: C. *Gracchus plenior et uberior, sic Graccho politior et ornatio* Crassus.

⁷⁹ Cf. Mankin 2011, 162.

⁸⁰ When we look to Antonius’ discourses in book II, we see that one of them comprises pars. 28–73 (oratory is no science, only forensic oratory requires some precepts, etc.), and one 291–367, the latter being a detailed discussion of arrangement, *ἡθος*, panegyric speeches, and *memoria technica*. Approximately 1/3 of book II is covered by Antonius’ arguments, and by commenting on that in the following book, Cicero probably has the exhaustiveness of Antonius’ case in mind, which he calls *uberius*. In *Lucullus* 130, 1 *uberius et ornatus* come with *explicare*, cf. Plin. *Ep.* 4.17.11, and this is a case similar to the reference to Antonius in *De oratore* – it is a remark made in no particular context or discussion of style. The same applies to *Cat. mai.* 57, 4 and *Ep. ad fam.* V. 12.2.

⁸¹ The background is the division between two styles: *unum attenuate pressequae, alterum sublate ampleque dicentium* (*Brut.* 201–202), which is an allusion to the *χαρακτήρα λέξεως*. What does Cicero mean by this? In the description of Scaevola’s performance he writes that he spoke *politius, elegantius, melius*, that he said a great deal (*quid ille non dixit; multa de*) on the testamentary law and ancient prescriptions, about strict interpretations of the law, on the observance of the civil law in general; finally, he said *omnia perite, scienter, breviter, presse, satis ornate* and *pereleganter*.

Greek (Ἑλληνισμός), clarity (σαφήνεια) and propriety (τὸ πρέπον).⁸² There is no agreement as to whether *ornatum* is a rendering of Greek κατασκευή⁸³ or rather κεκοσμημένον.⁸⁴ Both options may be correct, because of the very slight difference between them; they are used almost interchangeably.⁸⁵ It is crucial that *ornatum* is referred to by Cicero explicitly as Theophrastean at *Or.* 79. The second word, *uberius*, defined by Cicero as characteristic of the middle style (*Or.* 91–92), is a Latin rendering of the Greek περιττόν, a term explicitly attested for Theophrastus by Dionysius.⁸⁶

We do not have proof that Theophrastus conjoined the two words. We can only ask whether they occur in combination in other Greek sources. Probably the most relevant for our question is Dionysius' use of the two terms together, in his description of Thucydides' λέξις.⁸⁷ This combination also appears once in *De compositione verborum*, as a quality of φράσις.⁸⁸ We can add that they are unlikely to appear elsewhere, except in contexts not concerned with language. For example, the compound occurs in descriptions of linguistic embellishment,⁸⁹ art and food.⁹⁰ But it is probably not a coincidence that the only author that explicitly uses the compound phrase in a technical sense and in the context of style is Dionysius. He was well acquainted with, and undeniably influenced by, Theophrastus' linguistic and rhetorical theories (cf. chap. 5, pp. 226–227). It is therefore not unlikely that he borrowed the phrase from the latter's technical vocabulary.⁹¹

Neither περιττόν nor κατάσκευος are so habitually combined in Greek with the verbal form “to speak”, as Cicero does with *ornatius et uberius* (*ornatius et*

⁸² Stroux 1912, 9–28; Kennedy 1963, 273–278, who aptly summarizes the virtues. Fortenbaugh 2005b, 59; Kennedy 1972, 225; Innes 1985, 252. Grube 1952, 180 argues that the virtues are all to be found in Aristotle, and they are not Theophrastus' invention.

⁸³ Stroux 1912, 10; 18–28; Kennedy 1963, 276; Lausberg 1990, 862 s.v. κατασκευή refers us to *ornatus*; cf. Lausberg 1990, 769–770 on *ornatus*.

⁸⁴ Solmsen 1931, 241; Schenkeveld 1964, 73. Leeman, *ad loc.*, 241–242: *ornate*= κόσμος.

⁸⁵ Cf. Fantham 1988, *passim*, who consequently writes κατασκευή/ κόσμος, avoiding decisive rendering.

⁸⁶ Dion. Hal. *Isoc.* 3, 1 = fr. 691 FHS&G. It is a fragment from Theophrastus' *On Style*, where it is reported that τὸ μέγα, σεμνόν and περιττόν come from the given choice of words, their composition, and the use of figures. See Leeman, *ad loc.*, 292–295; Stroux 1912, 19.

⁸⁷ Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 1 *ad fin.*: περιττή καὶ ἐγκατάσκευος ... λέξις, ἥς ὅρος καὶ κανὼν ὁ Θουκυδίδης.

⁸⁸ *Comp.* 18. Cf. *Epitome* 18, 16. See also *Schol. in Il.* XII 53–54: περιττή δὲ ἡ κατασκευὴ τῆς ἀπαγγελίας.

⁸⁹ Plut. *De Is. et Os.* 356c.

⁹⁰ Art: Diod. Sic. XXXI 35, 1; food: Ath. IX 384a.

⁹¹ As mentioned above, we have no proof that Theophrastus conjoined the two words, but we have to take into account the exceptionally fragmentary state of the Theophrastean corpus, especially where the rhetorical works are concerned.

uberius dicere). The use of the words, in either form, with *verba dicendi* seems rare.⁹² In Dionysius, where the compound of the notions is attested, they are conceived of as quality of λέξις. Still, *dicere* in our fragment is dependent on *audere*, and we can pose the question whether Cicero here also renders Theophrastus' wording. In Latin, *audere dicere* ("dare to say") was common as early as in Plautus.⁹³ Its Greek counterpart is τολμῶ λέγειν or θαρρεῖν λέγειν (or εἰπεῖν).⁹⁴ It seems that both Latin and Greek developed this simple expression independently. Thus, on the one hand there is no way to prove that Cicero is copying Theophrastus in this instance, but on the other hand it remains a possibility.

To sum up, Cicero uses *uberius et ornatius* as a compound in several other places in a non-technical sense (but always with reference to language). He is the only Latin author to employ the expression. Dionysius knows the Greek counterpart of the phrase, and attests to the Theophrastean usage of both terms that constitute it. Hence, it is not groundless to take *uberius et ornatius* as Cicero's translation of what he read in Theophrastus about Herodotus' and Thucydides' stylistic contributions to historiography. Cicero, like Dionysius, could have acquired the phrase as part of his rhetorical training and then used it more freely in other contexts. We can thus propose the following reconstruction:⁹⁵

*ὕπὸ τούτων δὴ πρώτων ἱστορία κινηθεῖσα, ὥστε τολμᾶν λέγειν περιττότερον ἢ πρότερον καὶ μείζονι κατασκευῇ κτλ.

As the second option, we can read *uberius et ornatius dicere* as Cicero's *compression* of what he found in Theophrastus. This can be seen as similar to the above instance in the *Brutus*, where he also subsumes numerous and various traits of speech under this collocation. This would be not without bearing on our understanding of the fragment, as compression is *ex definitione* a compression of *something*, and we may ask further, what this "something" with regard to Theophrastus' description of Herodotus' and Thucydides' language actually was. It would suggest some kind of systematic enquiry into both historians' works. This in turn implies that they had to be known and studied in the Peripatetic school at the time Theophrastus lived. It is very probable that he

⁹² I managed to find one instance with εἰπεῖν: Dion. Hal. *Isae*. 20: εἰπεῖν ... περιττώς, ὃ βούλεται κτλ.

⁹³ *Amph.* 373; 566; *Capt.* 630; 662; *Men.* 732; *Rud.* 734; see also Ter. *Eun.* 659.

⁹⁴ Lewis and Short s.v. *audeo*, with reference to Cic. *Lig.* 8: audeam dicere: "I dare say, venture to assert" = τολμῶ λέγειν. See e.g. Isoc. *Panath.* 149; *Antid.* 61; Plat. *Phlb.* 13d; *Resp.* 503b; Ar. *Plut.* 593.

⁹⁵ For arguments as to particular words see Kurpios 2016, 219–223.

used the text of the *History* already included in the library of Aristotle, which he inherited as the head of the school.

At this point we cannot attribute the testimony to a precise work of Theophrastus, which is fundamental for our understanding of the latter's reception of Thucydides. I shall get back to this question in the chapter on Thucydides in the works entitled *Περὶ ἱστορίας*, as it is intertwined with the problem of the content and character of such treatises, which is explored there. I offer there a closer inspection of the implications of the verb *κινεῖν*, used — as demonstrated above — by Theophrastus to describe the contribution of Herodotus and Thucydides to historiography.

3.3 Praxiphanes of Mytilene (end of 4th–mid 3rd cent. BC)

Another testimony for the readership of Thucydides comes from a work entitled *On the life of Thucydides* (probably composed around the fifth cent. AD).⁹⁶ In a section that closes the account of the historian's life, Marcellinus refers to Praxiphanes of Mytilene's⁹⁷ *Περὶ ἱστορίας*, in which Thucydides was mentioned (Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 29 = F 18 Wehrli = F 21 Matelli):⁹⁸

ὁ δὲ μέτριος καὶ ἐπιεικὴς τῆς ἀληθείας ἦτων. Μὴ ἀγνοῶμεν δὲ ὅτι ἐγένοντο Θουκυδίδαι πολλοί, οὗτός τε ὁ Ὀλόρου παῖς, καὶ δεῦτερος δημαγωγός, Μελησίου, ὃς καὶ Περικλεῖ διεπολιτεύσατο· τρίτος δὲ γένει Φαρσάλιος, οὗ μέμνηται Πολέμων ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀκροπόλεως, φάσκων αὐτὸν εἶναι πατρὸς Μένωνος· τέταρτος ἄλλος Θουκυδίδης ποιητής, τὸν δῆμον Ἀχερδούσιος, οὗ μέμνηται Ἀνδροτίων ἐν τῇ Ἀτθίδι, λέγων εἶναι υἱὸν Ἀρίστωνος· συνεχρόνισε δ', ὥς φησι Πραξιφάνης ἐν τῷ περὶ ἱστορίας, Πλάτῳ τῷ κωμικῷ, Ἀγάθῳ τραγικῷ, Νικηράτῳ ἐποποιῷ καὶ Χοιρίλῳ καὶ Μελανιππίδῃ. καὶ ἐπεὶ μὲν ἔζη Ἀρχέλαος, ἄδοξος ἦν ὥς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, ὥς <ὁ> αὐτὸς Πραξιφάνης δηλοῖ, ὕστερον δὲ δαιμονίως ἐθαυμάσθη.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ The full title in the manuscripts is ΜΑΡΚΕΛΛΙΝΟΥ ἐκ τῶν εἰς Θουκυδίδην σχολίων περὶ τοῦ βίου αὐτοῦ Θουκυδίδου καὶ τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἰδέας, on this work see p. 5 n. 3 above.

⁹⁷ On Praxiphanes see: Aly 1954, 1769–1784; Podlecki 1969, 125; Wehrli 1969, 93–115; Matelli 2012, 525–578.

⁹⁸ For general remarks about the testimony see: Strebel 1935, 21; Momigliano 1971, 66–67; Piccirilli 1985, 112–114; Tuplin 1993–1994, 194–196.

⁹⁹ “Let us not be ignorant that there were many (named) Thucydides: this one was a child of Olorus, a second a demagogue, son of Melesias, who was active in politics against Pericles. A third was a Pharsalian by birth, whom Polemon recalls in the book *On the Acropolis*, saying that his father was Memnon. A fourth was Thucydides the poet, who was Acherdousian by deme, whom Androton recalls in the *Atthis*, saying that he was a son of Ariston. He lived at the same time as Plato the comic playwright, Agathon the tragedian, Niceratus the epic poet and Choerilus and Melanippides, as Praxiphanes says in his book *On History*. And until Archelaus was living,

3.3.1 Which Thucydides is meant here?

The first problem we have to address here is the subject of the verb συνεχρόνισε. Some scholars have argued that it refers not to Thucydides the historian, but to Thucydides the poet.¹⁰⁰ If this were correct, it would make the entire discussion of the fragment of Praxiphanes pointless, since it would have nothing to do with the historian. Yet the wider narrative structure of the account does not allow such a claim. Firstly, new information about Thucydides *the historian*, who is the main subject of Marcellinus' work, is introduced with particle δὲ and verbs in the 3rd person singular, which always marks the beginning of a new thought. Secondly, when the passage about "fame after death" ends, in 31, the subject is αὐτὸν, a reference to the subject of the preceding sentence, the content of which certainly refers to Thucydides the historian.¹⁰¹ If we assume that Thucydides the poet is the subject of Praxiphanes' fragment, αὐτὸν in the following sentence makes absolutely no sense. Thus, we can safely conclude that the subject is Thucydides the historian.

3.3.2 The accuracy of Marcellinus' reference to Praxiphanes

Are the words attributed to Praxiphanes actually his expressions? Material that would allow us to verify Marcellinus' usage of quotation is scarce. Still, in our fragment there certainly is a difference between the first reference (ὡς φησί Πραξιφάνης) and the second one (ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς Πραξιφάνης δηλοῖ). The word φησί undoubtedly marks a paraphrase or allusion to a given author's words. The second introductory formula, δηλοῖ, points in other places in Marcellinus to reasoning based either on text or on certain facts, and it seems that in these references (with δηλοῖ/δῆλον) the reasoning is always Marcellinus' own.¹⁰² Therefore, it is most probable that the words preceding the mention of Praxiphanes, i.e. ἄδοξος ἦν ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον, is Marcellinus' *inference* from Praxiphanes' text, not its quotation or paraphrase.

(Thucydides) was unknown for the most part, as Praxiphanes makes clear, but later he was admired like a god" (transl. Martano).

¹⁰⁰ See Ritter 1845, 331; Jacoby IIIb Suppl. 1954, 163; Fornara 1983, 131–132. Piccirilli 1985, 112–113, leaves the question undecided.

¹⁰¹ Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 30–31: [...] δαίμονίως ἐθαυμάσθη. Οἱ μὲν οὖν αὐτὸν ἐκεῖ λέγουσιν ἀποθανεῖν κτλ. The particle δὲ occurs in the sequence of 3rd person singular verbs, always referring to Thucydides the historian: cf. par. 22: ἤκουσε δὲ; 23: οὐκ ἐπολιτεύσατο, see pars. 24; 26; 29; 35.

¹⁰² δηλοῖ/δῆλον in Marcellinus: pars. 16–17: stele δηλοῖ: "shows, testifies" that Thucydides was son of Olorus; cf. 32; 41: "it follows from, it is proved by"; 43: as an indication of reasoning from the facts; 56: "to transmit information, sense" (ὀλίγοις ὀνόμασι πολλὰ πράγματα δηλών).

The second aspect of delineation is whether the words ὕστερον δὲ δαιμονίως ἐθαυμάσθη should be understood as coming from Praxiphanes, or whether they are an addition by Marcellinus. Again, the second option seems more likely, on the grounds indicated above.¹⁰³ It is thus inaccurate to say, as Michele Corradi does, that Marcellinus “cites” Praxiphanes in this section.¹⁰⁴ This does not mean that from Marcellinus we have an entirely erroneous idea about Praxiphanes’ words on Thucydides. We have only to be aware that the underlying text, particularly the second part (where δηλοῖ occurs) could be considerably different, in terms of wording, extensiveness, and overall sense. This *caveat* having been stressed, we can here make some conclusions about Praxiphanes’ knowledge of the *History*. Where Praxiphanes read Thucydides’ text is difficult to state. There is no direct evidence that he lived in Athens, but he most probably spent some time there, before Theophrastus’ death. He worked at Rhodes, and participated in its branch of the Peripatetic school.¹⁰⁵ It is possible that Praxiphanes acquainted himself with Thucydides in the Athenian library of the Peripatetic school. His treatment of Thucydides, like that of Theophrastus, is further discussed in chapter four, in the context of the Περὶ ἱστορίας treatises.

3.4 Pseudo-Demetrius’ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας (ca. 250 BC)

Numerous quotations of Thucydides occur in the treatise Περὶ ἑρμηνείας (further quoted as *De elocutione*) of an unknown Hellenistic author. The work was composed around the mid-point of the IIIrd cent. BC, possibly in Alexandria, and was formerly ascribed to Demetrius of Phalerum.¹⁰⁶ The provenance of the author has been recognized as Peripatetic. Demetrius quotes Theophrastus many times, his notions are Theophrastean, and his approach to literature is largely similar to what we know about Aristotle and Theophrastus

¹⁰³ Cf. Corradi 2012, 509; Tuplin 1993–1994, 183 tends to treat this second part as coming from Praxiphanes as well.

¹⁰⁴ Corradi 2012, 508.

¹⁰⁵ It is most likely that he was Theophrastus’ pupil in Athens, but left the school for Rhodes before the death of his master; see Matelli 2012, 527 n. 9.

¹⁰⁶ The dating of the treatise in scholarly dispute varied from the third century BC to the second century AD. See an overview in Grube 1961, 22–23 with n. 26. Early first cent. AD was argued for e.g. by Kroll 1940, 1078–1079. Early dating (third cent. BC) e.g. Kennedy 1963, 285–286. First cent. BC: Chiron 2001, 311–370 (with a comprehensive *status quaestionis*, 15–32). A very compelling argument for an early Hellenistic date (about 270 BC) is offered by Grube 1961, 39–56. The treatise is no longer ascribed to Demetrius of Phalerum. The last representative of such view was – to my knowledge – Liers 1881. The author remains anonymous; his Peripatetic background is unquestionable.

from other sources.¹⁰⁷ The scope of the treatise is literary style, stylistic divisions and categories, illustrated with Classical and early Hellenistic texts.

In the *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* Thucydides is adduced chiefly in the context of the grand style (*μεγαλοπρεπής*). It is one of the four main styles of writing defined by Demetrius: the plain, the grand, the forcible and the elegant.¹⁰⁸ The *differentia specifica* of grand style is its impressiveness, achieved through content, diction and arrangement of words (esp. long-syllable rhythms, lengthy clauses). The latter feature in particular can be ascribed, according to the author of the treatise, to Thucydides. Quotations from Thucydides occur in close proximity to sections where Theophrastus is mentioned.¹⁰⁹ Perhaps in his analysis of the theoretical framework of Theophrastus the author combined his own selection of passages from the historian. Yet it is hardly possible that this author, with his Peripatetic background, conceived a completely new idea, that Thucydides should be treated as a representative of the grand style. It is more probable that he found Thucydides already analyzed and classified, and adduced him exactly because of his narrative qualities, already recognized in the Peripatetic school by this time. All references to Thucydides from *De elocutione* are printed in their context and analyzed in the Appendix.¹¹⁰ Here a summary and final conclusions about these references are presented. In the *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* Thucydides is adduced fifteen times. Within this treatise, it is a number comparable to Demosthenes (18), Plato (19 references) and Xenophon (20). The author most often quoted in the treatise is Homer (37 references). Interestingly, Herodotus is quoted only twice in the whole treatise, and both references are only to the words opening his work (I 1, 1). The overall character of the references to Thucydides, taking their relationship to the standard text, is as follows (for details see the Appendix):

1. Four exact quotations that are fully consistent with the standard text.
2. Seven quotations inconsistent with the standard text.

¹⁰⁷ Solmsen 1931, 241–267; Grube 1961, 52–53; Kennedy 1963, 284–290; Wisse 1989, 176. However, Marini 2007, 18, has recently suggested some degree of independence for the author: “[...] testi che sono per Demetrio un punto di riferimento costante, ma mai seguito pedissequamente.”

¹⁰⁸ *De eloc.* 36–41; 43–45; cf. Grube 1961, 23–25.

¹⁰⁹ See par. 113: Thucydides cited on composition of words, but also as an illustration of the *μεγαλοπρεπής* style: Theophrastus quoted in 114 on the *ψυχρόν*, the contrary to *μεγαλοπρέπεια*; 181: Thucydides as avoiding *μετροειδές*; Theophrastus quoted in 173 on the definition of *καλὰ ὀνόματα*; 228 (the epistolary style): Thucydides adduced in the context of writing of letters: Theophrastus quoted in 222 on *τὸ πιθανόν* in the context of *ἐνάργεια*. In sum, from par. 38 onwards, Thucydides is quoted as the representative example of the grand style, in close proximity to Theophrastean definitions, opinions and notions concerning these matters (Theophrastus is on these occasions quoted precisely).

¹¹⁰ See Appendix: pp. 279–286.

3. Four allusions to Thucydides' work as a whole.
4. One doubtful reference, either to a particular passage, or to some non-extant letter of Thucydides.

The following books are quoted, with the following frequency:

Book I: 3 quotations (two correct, one slightly altered).

Book II: 5 quotations (all with altered text).

Book III: 0 references.

Book IV: 2 quotations (one extremely altered); the second showing knowledge of a larger section.

Book V: 0 references.

Book VI: 1 quotation (correct).

Book VII: 2 arguable references (see the Appendix, summary pt. 3).

Book VIII: 0 references.

The following conclusions can be drawn as regards the author's knowledge of Thucydides:

1. He shows knowledge of at least four books of the *History* (I, II, IV, VI). Acquaintance with parts of book VII is probable. Since references comprise almost all books, we may hypothesize that the author of the *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* had a complete edition of Thucydides at his disposal.

2. A significant number of exact citations comes from book II, and these are all inconsistent with our standard text of Thucydides. Thus, the author used some variant of the text of this book; perhaps because the treatise had been written before the standard text was established.

3. The complete absence of examples or quotations from three books (III, V, VIII) is remarkable. These books contain certain passages assessed by modern scholars as purportedly fundamental to the *History*.¹¹¹ This should make us cautious about the difference between what seems essential for modern readers or scholars and what was sought in the *History* by the ancients. The reasons for this lack of quotations from these books can be many and various, but this was not caused by their stylistic traits, as they do not differ considerably from the rest, except that book VIII contains no speeches. However, we should note that, to compare, Xenophon's quotations in the treatise are more "representative" for his work.¹¹²

4. The author's proper understanding of Hermocrates' speech (Thuc. IV 59–64) and the character of the reference to it need to be stressed. Ps.-Demetrius

¹¹¹ E. g. book III: the "stasis chapter"; V: the Melian Dialogue, VIII: the rule of the Four Hundred.

¹¹² Quotations from *Anabasis* are from books I, III, IV, V, VI, VII; from *Cyropaedia* books I, II.

evidently recalls the sense of the speech, summarizing its aim and content as something known and obvious to him.

5. Most of the references/quotations are from the narrative parts of the *History*; only one is from a speech of Hermocrates.

The quotations in the *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, like the Hellenistic papyri, show considerable divergences from the standard text of Thucydides which we know from the manuscripts. Unfortunately, they cannot be collated because they do not connect with any passage of the *History*. Since they are datable to the period of 250–200 BC, it is an indication that the text of the *History* could have been standardized in the second cent. BC,¹¹³ or at least not earlier than 200 BC. Hence, the text used by the author of *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* and the versions from the papyri belong either a. to the same branch of the transmission of the *History*, which was later replaced by another line, b. to two or more branches, variants of the text circulating in Egypt.

We would point to Alexandria and the Library as the most likely place where the text was established. However, this would be incongruous with the tendency in Alexandrian transmission, which was usually very faithful to the original received texts, even when there were grounds to regard it as corrupt.¹¹⁴ This question requires further study of the manuscripts. In particular, the *lectiones* of the *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* and the Hellenistic papyri should be collated with the lessons deriving from the manuscript Pm and the subarchetype β, which are a source of many lessons/errors different from those in the archetype Θ, and are dependent on a hypothetical older Λ (earlier than fifth cent. AD).¹¹⁵ A question that could be posed is whether *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας* and the papyri agree with the manuscripts deriving from β, and thus belong to the branch of transmission reconstructed as Λ.

3.5 Agatharchides of Cnidus (215 – post 145 BC)

In the first book of Diodorus of Sicily's *Βιβλιοθήκη*, Thucydides is mentioned and praised beside Xenophon. The context is a description of Egypt; the section where the reference to Thucydides occurs is I 32–41, focused on the Nile. The remark in question appears at I 37, 4, where Diodorus (actually Agatharchides, see below, pp. 63–64) begins his discussion of the reasons for the swelling of the river. He provides something we may call *status quaestionis* — starting

¹¹³ Cf. Wilkinson 2005, 72 n. 23.

¹¹⁴ Irigoin 2003, 238, 159.

¹¹⁵ See Alberti 1972, XL–LXI.

from Hecataeus of Miletus and the “early school” — of the descriptions of Egypt. Then our reference to Thucydides emerges:

Ξενοφῶν δὲ καὶ Θουκυδίδης, ἐπαινούμενοι κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ἱστοριῶν,
ἀπέσχοντο τελέως κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν τῶν τόπων τῶν κατ’ Αἴγυπτον.¹¹⁶

The two historians are contrasted on the one hand with the “early school” as they refrained from myth,¹¹⁷ and on the other with other historians as regards the accuracy (or veracity) of their historical works.¹¹⁸ Still, both are considered irrelevant to the question of the Nile, since they do not provide any description of it. Before considering the possible implications of this passage for the readership of Thucydides, the question of the attribution of the chapter in question to Agatharchides needs to be addressed. Jacoby prints the entire section I 32–41, 3, to which the above quotation belongs, as a fragment of Agatharchides (FGrHist 86 F 19). In Brill’s New Jacoby this fragment is even extended to I 41, 9 (BNJ 86 F 19).¹¹⁹

The first book of the Βιβλιοθήκη was, especially by earlier scholarship, treated nearly as an “epitome” of Hecataeus of Abdera’s Αἰγυπτιακά. Diodorus was supposed to rewrite what he had found in Hecataeus’ description of Egypt.¹²⁰ However, this view has more recently been questioned, if not ultimately refuted. It has been shown that in book I Diodorus relied on several sources, rather than “slavishly” copying Hecataeus.¹²¹ This is a controversy

¹¹⁶ “Xenophon and Thucydides, who are praised for the accuracy of their histories, completely refrained in their writings from any mention of the regions about Egypt” (all translations of Diodorus are of Oldfather).

¹¹⁷ Diod. Sic. I 37, 3–4: οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν Ἑλλάνικον καὶ Κάδμον, ἔτι δ’ Ἑκαταῖον, καὶ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι, παλαιοὶ παντάπασιν ὄντες, εἰς τὰς μυθώδεις ἀποφάσεις ἀπέκλιναν· Ἡρόδοτος δὲ ὁ πολυπράγμων, εἰ καὶ τις ἄλλος, γεγονὼς καὶ πολλῆς ἱστορίας ἔμπειρος ἐπιχειρήκε μὲν περὶ τούτων ἀποδιδόναι λόγον, ἡκολουθηκὼς δὲ ἀντιλεγόμεναις ὑπονοίαις εὐρίσκειται· Ξενοφῶν δὲ καὶ Θουκυδίδης [...]. (“Hellanicus and Cadmus, for instance, as well as Hecataeus and all the writers like them, belonging as they do one and all to the early school, turned to the answers offered by the myths; Herodotus, who was a curious inquirer if ever a man was, and widely acquainted with history, undertook, it is true, to give an explanation of the matter, but is now found to have followed contradictory guesses; Xenophon and Thucydides [...]” transl. Oldfather)

¹¹⁸ Cf. Diod. Sic. I 37, 4 (on Theopompus and Ephorus); I 39, 13 (on Ephorus).

¹¹⁹ The entry in BNJ is of S. M. Burstein. It seems that Jacoby’s delineation is more sound, since at I 41, 4 there is a reference to Agatharchides himself, and such self-reference, although not impossible, is rather doubtful.

¹²⁰ See the influential entry by Schwartz 1903, 670–672; cf. Meister 1990, 178.

¹²¹ Spuerri 1959, 114–116; 160–163, demonstrates that for the cosmogony at Diod. Sic. I 7–8; similar conclusions are found in Chamoux 1993, XI–XII and 5–6. The more recent analysis of Muntz 2011, 574–594, is excellent in its simplicity; the scholar systematically compares the fragments securely attributable to Hecataeus’ Αἰγυπτιακά (referred to by other authors) with Diodorus’ account in book I, and shows that they are far from compatible with one another. In

between the *Einquellentheorie* and the *Vielquellentheorie*; moderate versions are also to be found, which assume one “main” source and several ancillary ones.¹²² Agatharchides was identified as one of them. Section I 32–41 was first detected as drawing on Agatharchides’ Ἀσιατικά¹²³ by Helmut Leopoldi, and other scholars followed.¹²⁴ Anne Burton argued — unconvincingly — that Diodorus draws on Agatharchides via Artemidorus.¹²⁵ Although Leopoldi’s

most instances, the relationship between what was traditionally ascribed to Hecataeus in Diodorus, and passages deriving from Αἰγυπτιακά in other sources, is of such a character that it proves rather the opposite (i.e. that Hecataeus could not be Diodorus’ source in the given places: *ibidem*, 580–581). Muntz also refutes other arguments, esp. that of Murray (1970, 141–171), focusing particularly on how the information Diodorus provides in book I was common knowledge in antiquity, and did not have to rely exclusively on Hecataeus.

¹²² Burton 1972, 34: “Diodorus undoubtedly made some use of Hecataeus of Abdera, while at the same time incorporating material from other widely different authors [...]”; cf. Meister 1990, 178: “In Wirklichkeit läßt sich nachweisen, daß weder die Einquellentheorie noch die Vielquellentheorie zutrifft, sondern daß man im allgemeinen mit einer Hauptquelle und einer Nebenquelle (manchmal auch mehreren Nebenquellen!) rechnen muß; weiterhin sind eigene Einschübe Diodors anzunehmen.” Thus, Meister assumes that the source for book I was “Hauptsächlich Hekataios von Abdera”. For my stance as to Diodorus’ treatment of his sources see the section on methodology in the introduction to the present work.

¹²³ Diodorus says he drew on this work (Diod. Sic. III 11), and this is almost certain for chapters 5–10 (possibly 2–10) of the third book – the description of Ethiopia. This description occurred, as Diodorus suggests, in the second book of the Ἀσιατικά. The exact title of this work is not certain. Jacoby argued that it was Περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν (according to T 2). Even so, F 1, F 3, and F 4a–b suggest that more probable is Περὶ Ἀσίας or Περὶ τῆς Ἀσίας. The work in question was composed of 10 books, probably from the archaic period to the time of the Diadochi (cf. BNJ 86 T 2 *ap. Phot. Bibl.* 213, p. 171b, with the commentary of Burstein; cf. Meister 1990, 150–151). A precise reconstruction of the work is not possible, as only four fragments survive, and they do not provide any indications as to their context. Burstein 1989, 18–19, speculated that the succession of Near Eastern empires from Assyria to Macedonia was the basic scheme of the work.

¹²⁴ Leopoldi 1892, 19–32, considered Agatharchides to be the immediate source for Diodorus in these chapters for the following reasons. Firstly, Diodorus seems to copy his source when criticizing Ephorus for inaccuracy (as to the question of the Nile) at I 37, 4 and 39, 13, while in later books (VII 12; IX 16–37; XI–XV (partially) he uses him intensively with appreciation. Secondly, there are specific phrases recurring in this part of the account, esp. involving the notion of ἐνάργεια (I 37, 4; 38, 3; 39, 5–7; 40, 5–6; 41, 3). Next, at I 39, 7, Ephorus’ theory of the swelling of the Nile is called καὶνοτάτη, which Leopoldi interprets as “the most up to date”; this is supposed to prove that these are the words of Agatharchides, since if it were Diodorus’ statement, he should point to Agatharchides’ theory, which he quotes later, as the most fresh. Finally, there is a considerable (for Leopoldi) discrepancy between Diodorus’ and Artemidorus’ descriptions of the Nile, which disprove the idea that the latter could be Diodorus’ underlying source here. See also Schwartz 1905a, 670; Jacoby’s comments in FGGrHist 86 F 19; recently Burstein in the BNJ (entry published online in April 2012; online ref. on December 10th, 2020), restates that Leopoldi “convincingly showed that Diodorus excerpted his account of the Nile from Agatharchides’ *On Affairs in Asia*”.

¹²⁵ Burton 1972, 20–25, concludes that in the first book Agatharchides is the “ultimate source”, known by Diodorus via Artemidorus, who is the “immediate source” here. Following

arguments for the attribution seem correct, we can still pose the question whether Diodorus took over the above brief statement on Thucydides and Xenophon from Agatharchides in an unchanged form. Leopoldi's observations as to the distinct language of the section I 37–41 would incline us to believe that this is exactly what Agatharchides said. Control material is available through comparison of Photius' epitome of Agatharchides' book on the Red Sea with the parallel account in Diodorus III 12–48.¹²⁶ There are indications that in this case Diodorus rewrites Agatharchides; some verbatim repetitions of remarks made in the first person by Agatharchides have been detected.¹²⁷ Moreover, in

the above steps in the reasoning of Leopoldi (referred above, n. 124), Burton reaches her conclusion thus: the scorn poured on Ephorus is characteristic of Artemidorus (pp. 21–22, supported with Strab. III 1, 4); further, there is a problem with a temporal understanding of *καινοτάτη* at 39, 7 – it can also be translated in the sense “the strangest, without precedent” (p. 22), hence it is a weak argument for Agatharchides being Diodorus' source here. Finally, Agatharchides' description of the Nile in Phot. *Bibl.* 250, p. 447b 27, is also unlike the one in Diodorus, and cannot serve as evidence that Diodorus uses him, rather than Artemidorus, in book I. My judgement on the above tends to accept Leopoldi's thesis (Agatharchides as immediate source), rather than Burton's (Agatharchides the ultimate source). The fact that Ephorus was also criticized by Artemidorus counts little here; Duris of Samos also reprimands Ephorus (FGrHist 76 F 1, *ap.* Phot. *Bibl.* 176, p. 121a 41), so Burton goes too far in identifying the critique as something peculiar to Artemidorus. Her judgement that the manner in which, in the passage in question, Ephorus is charged with a lack of accuracy is “consistent with the character particularly of Artemidorus, who is known to have had a passion for accuracy”, seems to have a weak basis. Is not Burton's conviction about her knowledge of the “character” of Artemidorus overoptimistic? Is Agatharchides' “passion for accuracy” known to be smaller than that of Artemidorus? As for the temporal aspect of *καινοτάτη*, it is quite arbitrarily discarded by Burton (p. 22: “A more accurate translation might be “most novel” without any emphasis on the temporal aspect. Ephorus' theory is indubitably the strangest of those proposed”). Her interpretation rests solely on the evaluation of Ephorus' explanation for the swelling of the Nile (water accumulating in stone-cracks). Is this theory “stranger” than the subsequent one, ascribed to some “wise men” from Memphis, that the Nile flows uphill from the uninhabited world? We should rather look for other proof for the non-temporal sense of *καινοτάτη*. It can also be an amalgam of the two meanings, where something newly proposed is also the most atypical. Oldfather, and recently Burstein, follow Leopoldi by rendering the word as “the most recent”, and until now I see no convincing way to refute that choice. The last part of Burton's argument is at best negative, and of no account as to the theory that Diodorus draws on Artemidorus in the passage. Thus, I consider Leopoldi's position as to Agatharchides being Diodorus' underlying source – used directly – still valid. Cf. Chamoux 1993, 11, is inconclusive (“[...] Agatharchide de Cnide, cité au ch. 41, lui-même utilisé soit directement, soit par le truchement d'Artémidore”), but in n. 19 refers to Palm 1955, 27–55, which, to his judgement, leaves no doubt that Diodorus had direct access to Agatharchides.

¹²⁶ That Photius is a reliable transmitter of Agatharchides, and therefore a proper means of control for Agatharchides' fragments in other texts, has been shown by Palm 1955, 15–26. On Photius' treatment of historiographers in general see Cresci 2011, 209–230.

¹²⁷ J. Hornblower 1981, 27–28. Particularly important is Diod. Sic. III 38, where Diodorus repeats the words of Agatharchides from Photius. Hornblower concludes that Diodorus extracts, rather than condenses, his source. Sacks 1990, 86–87, claims that at Diod. Sic. III 38 Diodorus

our section (Diod. Sic. I 37–41), the important notion ἐνάργεια recurs, which, as again we read through Photius, is one of the central historiographical concepts of Agatharchides.¹²⁸ All things considered, I think it is safe to assume that chapters I 37–41 derive directly from Agatharchides as to the content, but also to a certain extent reproduce his wording. If this is correct, our fragment can be analysed as a testimony on Agatharchides' acquaintance with Thucydides.¹²⁹

The passage in which Thucydides appears belongs — as already indicated — to the work on Asia. The section I 37, 1–6 is written like a *status quaestionis* of the Greek historians' knowledge of Egypt, with an overview of their fallacies. Hence, if the section really draws on Agatharchides to a large extent, it could be a part of a *prooemium* to the book about Egypt. Burstein comments that Thucydides is mentioned here because he belongs to the six historians “considered canonical by grammarians such as Agatharchides”.¹³⁰ Whether it is correct to explain the reference to Thucydides through the alleged profession of the Cnidian is doubtful. First of all, it is questionable whether Agatharchides can be viewed as a “grammarian”. What Photius says of him at the beginning of his entry about Agatharchides' life — that his τέχνη proves him to be a γραμματικός — can be misleading.¹³¹ This phrase can point to his craft or profession, but does not determine completely Agatharchides' intellectual interests, overall activity, or inclinations. In the same chapter, Photius underlines the historical character of the majority of his oeuvre, and the key terms he uses in reference to Agatharchides are ἱστορία, πραγματεία and the verb συγγράφειν.¹³²

supplemented the text of Agatharchides with his own statements on the questioning of eyewitnesses. Rubincam 1998, 86, refutes Sacks' hypothesis, stressing the fact that in the part of the Βιβλιοθήκη in question Diodorus relies solely on Agatharchides, and it is improbable that he intervenes with the sole words about eyewitnesses there. This problem had earlier been discussed in detail by Peremans 1967, 432–455, who shows that Diodorus does indeed at times supplement his source as compared with excerpts in Photius, but as for Diod. Sic. III 38 such an intervention is untenable. Similarly Préaux 1978, 79.

¹²⁸ Diod. Sic. I 39, 6; 40, 5; 40, 6; 41, 8. On ἐνάργεια in Agatharchides see chap. 5, pp. 256–258. Immisch tried to argue for the opposing view (to prove Photius' reliability as a source for Agatharchides through comparison with Diodorus), which seems erroneous.

¹²⁹ On Agatharchides' sources in general see Woelk 1966, 255–267.

¹³⁰ Burstein 2012, *ad loc.* Burstein relies here on Nicolai 1992, 311–323.

¹³¹ BNJ 86 T 2 *ap. Phot. Bibl.* 213, p. 171a: τέχνη γραμματικὸν ἐπεδείκνυτο.

¹³² BNJ 86 T 2 *ap. Phot. Bibl.* 213, p. 171a: ἀνεγνώσθη Ἀγαθαρχίδου Ἱστορικόν ... τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπῃν δὲ εἰς θ' καὶ μ' παρατείνεται αὐτῷ ἡ ἱστορία· ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς βιβλία τὴν Ἑρυθρὰν αὐτῷ πᾶσιν καὶ τὰ περὶ ταύτην ἐξῆστοροῦσι. τὴν οὖν εἰρημένην ἅπασαν συγγραφὴν ... πλήν γέ εἰσιν οἱ φασιν αὐτὸν καὶ ἑτέρας συγγεγραφεῖν πραγματείας (“We have read Agatharchides' historical work ... his account of the affairs in Europe consists of forty nine books. There is, however, also an account of the entire Red Sea and its surroundings. The whole historical work

Strabo likewise calls him a “historian”, coming from the Peripatetic circle.¹³³ We know that his patron was a “Peripatetic”, Heraclides of Lembus, a prominent figure on the court of Ptolemies, who also wrote a historical work in 37 books.¹³⁴ It is therefore this historiographical background against which we should discuss Agatharchides’ reference to Thucydides in Diodorus. What can be said on the basis of our brief mention of Thucydides and the above considerations?

1. It allows us to assume a certain degree of knowledge of Thucydides on the part of Agatharchides. The part of the sentence: ἀπέσχοντο τελέως κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν τῶν τόπων τῶν κατ’ Αἴγυπτον, suggest an acquaintance with the entire work of Thucydides. It seems to be implied in the statement that Thucydides “completely” (τελέως) kept away from the regions of Egypt throughout his work, and bolstered by the sense of κατὰ + *accusativus*.¹³⁵ Had Agatharchides not known the content of the entire *History*, it would have been inadequate to express himself this way. Therefore, Agatharchides read Thucydides’ work, or, at the very least, knew its scope only secondhand (which seems less likely).

2. Since Agatharchides was probably a member of the Museum, and had access to its collections and archives,¹³⁶ we should point to this institution’s library as the plausible place where he found Thucydides’ work and read it. If this supposition is correct, it would be proof that Thucydides was, at the beginning of the second cent. BC, an author known and circulating in the intellectual milieu of Alexandria.

3. Not without significance is the middle phrase: ἐπαινούμενοι κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῶν ἱστοριῶν — “praised for the accuracy/truthfulness of their histories”. The *Leitmotif* of the entire chapter I 37, where Thucydides and four other historians are mentioned, is historical ἀλήθεια as opposed to μυθῶδες and ἄγνοια. The passage is, as already indicated, focused on historiographical

mentioned above ... some say that he also composed another historical account.” All translations of Photius in the present chapter, if not indicated otherwise, are my own).

¹³³ BNJ 86 T 1 *ap.* Strab. XIV 2, 15: Ἀγαθαρχίδης, ὁ ἐκ τῶν Περιπάτων, ἀνὴρ συγγραφεύς.

¹³⁴ BNJ 86 T 2 *ap.* Phot. *Bibl.* 213, p. 171a: ὑπογραφέα δὲ καὶ ἀναγνώστην ὁ τοῦ Λέμβου Ἡρακλείδης. Heraclides was a diplomat in the service of Ptolemy VI, and negotiated the treaty with Antiochus IV, that ended the Sixth Syrian War in 169 BC. Hence, as he was to an extent politically active (to call him a statesman would probably be an overstatement), it is plausible that his historical work was a political-military history; it was voluminous, and we may speculate that it covered in particular the political developments of his own times. On Heraclides see the testimonia and fragments in Müller, FHG 3, 167–171; his historical work is preserved especially in the quotations of Athenaeus. Cf. Meister 1990, 150.

¹³⁵ LSJ, s.v. κατὰ + acc., registers such senses as “downwards”, “over”, “throughout”, “distributively, of a whole divided into parts”, etc.

¹³⁶ Diod. Sic. III 38, 1, on the attribution of this statement to Agatharchides see above, p. 64 n. 127.

accuracy. The word ἐπαινούμενοι suggests some wider appreciation, not only Agatharchides' own, of Xenophon's and Thucydides' works. Who is meant here to have "praised" the historians? One possibility is that Agatharchides has in mind some non-extant passages — known to him — from other historians, where Xenophon and Thucydides were positively assessed. Unfortunately, due to the lack of any additional evidence, this remains hypothetical. The more plausible answer might be: Agatharchides' intellectual circle in Alexandria; perhaps including his master Heraclides.

3.6 Polybius (c. 200 – c.118 BC)

Polybius is believed to be well acquainted with Thucydides, on the basis of his (often only assumed, rather than proven) allusions to him, or judging by methodological and conceptual parallels, found by modern scholars.¹³⁷ However, he only mentions Thucydides in passing, in the section about Philip and Theopompus' treatment of the king (Polyb. VIII 11, 3):

Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ περὶ τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς διαλήψεις οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδοκῆσειε τῷ προειρημένῳ συγγραφεῖ ὅς γ' ἐπιβαλόμενος γράφειν τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς πράξεις ἀφ' ὧν Θουκυδίδης ἀπέλιπε, καὶ συνεγείσας τοῖς Λευκτρικοῖς καιροῖς καὶ τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν ἔργων, τὴν μὲν Ἑλλάδα μεταξὺ καὶ τὰς ταύτης ἐπιβολὰς ἀτέρριψε, μεταλαβὼν δὲ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὰς Φιλίππου πράξεις προύθετο γράφειν.¹³⁸

The character of the reference can be described as "incidental", i.e. one that is not made in respect of Thucydides himself. Polybius' subject here is the διάληψις (division, plan) of Theopompus' Ἑλληνικά.¹³⁹ Polybius says that Theopompus began where Thucydides had ended (ἀπέλιπε, lit. "left off"), then described the deeds of the Greeks, but in one moment he (Theopompus) switched to the history of Philip. This, in Polybius' opinion, is a historiographical mistake. It has been stressed that Polybius mentions Thucydides'

¹³⁷ See e.g. how "optimistic" Foulon is as to Polybius' reliance on Thucydides throughout his historiographical enterprise (see Foulon 2010, 141–153). For other examples see chap. 3, pp. 130–131 with notes.

¹³⁸ "Again, no one could approve of the general scheme of this writer. Having set himself the task of writing the history of Greece from the point at which Thucydides leaves off, just when he was approaching the battle of Leuctra and the most brilliant period of Greek history, he abandoned Greece and her efforts, and changing his plan decided to write the history of Philip." (transl. Paton)

¹³⁹ The passage belongs to a discussion of the events of the years 213–212 BC. This book is only fragmentarily preserved. Theopompus appears as a "target" of Polybius' charges against the former's treatment of Philip.

name only on this single occasion in his whole work.¹⁴⁰ This has led some scholars to the conclusion that Polybius did not read through the entire work of Thucydides.¹⁴¹ However, Polybius' *History* is not preserved in its entirety, and we should allow for the possibility that he refers to Thucydides in the non-extant pieces of his work.¹⁴² We are not dealing with the fact of only one reference to Thucydides, but with the fact of only one *preserved* reference. Hence, all we can deduce from this explicit reference is the following:

1. Polybius knew where Thucydides' *History* ended, with the precision which allows him to combine the end of his work with the beginning of Theopompus' historical work.

2. He had at least superficial knowledge about the content of Thucydides' *History* — he states that it treated “the deeds of the Greeks” (τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς πράξεις).

To be sure, the reference in question does not imply that Polybius read through Thucydides' work, but attests to his awareness of it and the likelihood, at least, that he read it.

3.7 Anonymous source of Diodorus of Agyrium (ca. 330–60 BC)

Apart from the reference to Thucydides ascribed to Agatharchides, as analyzed above, in Diodorus there are three more references to our historian. Two of them occur at the beginning and end of the narrative covering the years 432–411, which is precisely the scope of Thucydides' *History*. Diodorus, when he begins the account of the Peloponnesian War, says that this is where Thucydides starts from (ἀρξάμενος), and when he brings this period to an end, he says that here Thucydides ends (κατέστροφε). These are the references in their contexts:

Diod. Sic. XII 37, 1–2:

(1) Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ περὶ Ποτίδαιαν νενικηκότες ἐπιφανεῖ μάχῃ, Καλλίου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ πεσόντος ἐν τῇ παρατάξει, στρατηγὸν ἕτερον ἐξέπεμψαν Φορμίωνα.

¹⁴⁰ Ziegler 1952, 1523, remarks: “Bei der Ausführlichkeit, mit der er sich über die Grundsätze der Geschichtschreibung sowohl wie über seine Vorgänger auf diesem Felde geäußert hat, ist es verwunderlich, daß er über Thukydides – bis auf die kurze Bemerkung VIII 11, 3, daß Theopompos mit seinen Ἑλληνικά an ihn angeknüpft habe – gar nichts gesagt hat (falls nicht in den verlorenen Partien etwas gestanden hat, was aber nicht sehr wahrscheinlich ist).” See also Walbank, HCP II, 86–87; Walbank 1972, 40–48; Foulon 2010, 141.

¹⁴¹ Pédech 1964, 95, 421 n. 75; Hornblower 1994, 60–61, emphasizes that Polybius' knowledge of Thucydides' work was probably uneven.

¹⁴² Ziegler 1952, 1523, considers such a possibility as “nicht sehr wahrscheinlich”, but does not provide any argument for this view.

οὗτος δὲ παραλαβὼν τὸ στρατόπεδον καὶ προσκαθήμενος τῇ πόλει τῶν Ποτιδαιατῶν συνεχεῖς προσβολὰς ἐποιεῖτο· ἀμυνομένων δὲ τῶν ἔνδον εὐρώστως ἐγένετο πολυχρόνιος πολιορκία. (2) Θουκυδίδης δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐντεῦθεν ἀρξάμενος ἔγραψε τὸν γενόμενον πόλεμον Ἀθηναίοις πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους τὸν ὀνομασθέντα Πελοποννησιακόν. οὗτος μὲν οὖν ὁ πόλεμος διέμεινεν ἐπὶ ἔτη εἴκοσι ἑπτὰ, ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης ἔτη δύο πρὸς τοῖς εἴκοσι γέγραφεν ἐν βίβλοις ὀκτώ, ὡς δὲ τινες διαιροῦσιν, ἑννέα.¹⁴³

Diod. Sic. XIII 42, 5:

Τῶν δὲ συγγραφέων Θουκυδίδης μὲν τὴν ἱστορίαν κατέστροφεν, περιλαβὼν χρόνον ἑτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ δυοῖν ἐν βύβλοις ὀκτώ· τινὲς δὲ διαιροῦσιν εἰς ἑννέα· Ξενοφῶν δὲ καὶ Θεόπομπος ἄφ' ὧν ἀπέλιπε Θουκυδίδης τὴν ἀρχὴν πεποιήνται, καὶ Ξενοφῶν μὲν περιέλαβε χρόνον ἑτῶν τεσσαράκοντα καὶ ὀκτώ, Θεόπομπος δὲ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς πράξεις διελθὼν ἐπ' ἔτη ἑπτακαίδεκα καταλήγει τὴν ἱστορίαν εἰς τὴν περὶ Κνίδον ναυμαχίαν ἐν βύβλοις δώδεκα.¹⁴⁴

One similar mention of Thucydides appears in the next book (XIV 84, 7):

Περὶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον Ἀέροπος ὁ τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς ἐτελεύτησε νόσφ, βασιλεύσας ἔτη ἕξ· τὴν δ' ἡγεμονίαν διαδεξάμενος Πausanίας υἱὸς ἦρξεν ἐνιαυτόν. Θεόπομπος δ' ὁ Χῖος τὴν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν σύνταξιν κατέστροφεν εἰς τοῦτον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ Κνίδον ναυμαχίαν, γράψας βύβλους δώδεκα. ὁ δὲ συγγραφεὺς οὗτος ἦρκεται μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς περὶ Κυνὸς σῆμα ναυμαχίας, εἰς ἣν Θουκυδίδης κατέληξε τὴν πραγματείαν, ἔγραψε δὲ χρόνον ἑτῶν δεκαεπτὰ.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴³ “And the Athenians, who had won a striking victory around Potidaea, dispatched a second general, Phormion, in the place of their general Callias who had fallen on the field. After taking over the command of the army Phormion settled down to the siege of the city of the Potidaeans, making continuous assaults upon it; but the defenders resisted with vigour and the siege became a long affair. Thucydides, the Athenian, commenced his history with this year, giving an account of the war between the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians, the war which has been called the Peloponnesian. This war lasted twenty-seven years, but Thucydides described twenty-two years in eight Books or, as others divide it, in nine” (transl. Oldfather).

¹⁴⁴ “Of the historians, Thucydides ended his history, having included a period of twenty-two years in eight Books, although some divide it into nine; and Xenophon and Theopompus have begun at the point where Thucydides left off. Xenophon embraced a period of forty-eight years, and Theopompus set forth the facts of Greek history for seventeen years and brings his account to an end with the sea-battle of Cnidus in twelve books.” Translations of Diodorus are Oldfather’s unless indicated otherwise.

¹⁴⁵ “At this time Aëropus, the king of the Macedonians, died of illness after a reign of six years, and was succeeded in the sovereignty by his son Pausanias, who ruled for one year. Theopompus of Chios ended with this year and the battle of Cnidus his *Hellenic History*, which he wrote in twelve books. This historian began with the battle of Cynossema, with which Thucydides ended his work, and covered in his account a period of seventeen years.”

The crucial question is of the attribution of the above references — are they Diodorus' own, Ephorus', or are they rewritten from another source? It would be a reasonable supposition that in his account of the years 432–411, that is from XII 37, 2 up to XIII 42, 5, Diodorus uses Thucydides as his source. This would explain why he mentions Thucydides at the beginning and the end of this account.¹⁴⁶ However, it has already been shown by Christian A. Volquardsen that the fact that Thucydides is mentioned at the beginning and the end of the section does not imply that Diodorus relied entirely on him in this section. From this scholar onwards, Thucydides was traditionally considered as certainly not the immediate reference for Diodorus in these books.¹⁴⁷ The conclusion of Volquardsen was the attribution of most of the material in books XI–XV to Ephorus.¹⁴⁸ Recently, Klaus Meister, in his book on the reception of Thucydides, stated that Diodorus used Thucydides through Ephorus, because Thucydides is adduced in the books where Ephorus seems to be the main source.¹⁴⁹ A similar approach is that of Hornblower, who affirms the idea that Ephorus certainly read and perused Thucydides when composing his work.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ We can detect several passages where Thucydides could be Diodorus' work of reference, e.g. Diod. Sic. XII 39, 5–40, 5 = Thuc. I 140–141 + Thuc. II 13 (Pericles' role in steering the demos into the war); Diod. Sic. XII 41–42 = Thuc. II 2–8 (The case of Theban assault upon Plataea and its outcome). Hornblower adds possible Thucydidean inspiration for the description of the civil strife in Corcyra: Diod. Sic. XIII 48 = Thuc. III 82–83. According to the scholar (1995, 56), this passage “[...] relates a recrudescence of stasis at Corcyra itself under the year 410, in an obviously Thucydidean manner.”

¹⁴⁷ Volquardsen 1868, 39–41, argued that Thucydides cannot have been Diodorus' immediate source, for the following reasons: a) There are numerous chronological inconsistencies with Thucydides' *History* in Diodorus' account of the Peloponnesian War (*ibidem*, 39–40 and 123–126), b) certain facts are included e.g. information in Diod. Sic. XII 42, which appear much later in Thucydides (Thuc. III 101) (*ibidem*, 40), c) some events are described in different order (*ibidem*, 40–41; e.g. Diod. Sic. XII 43). Finally, immediately after the first mention of Thucydides, the reasons for the Peloponnesian War are described – different from those given by Thucydides.

¹⁴⁸ Schwartz 1905a, 679: “[...] ein fortlaufendes Excerpt aus Ephoros.” Meister 1990, 179, names only Ephorus and Timaeus as the main sources in books XI–XIV; Sacks 1990, 13: “[...] Diodorus seems to have followed him [Ephorus – M.K.] closely in constructing much of the narrative of these books [...]”; cf. *ibidem*, 26–27; Stylianou 1998, 49 n. 139. Chamoux 1993, p. XXIV, indicates Antiochus of Syracuse, Ephorus and Thucydides for the XIIth book; Apollodorus, Ephorus, Philistus, Polyclitus of Larissa, Theopompus, Timaeus and Thucydides for the XIIIth book; Callisthenes, Ctesias, Ephorus, Philistus, Theopompus, Timaeus and Thucydides for the XIVth book. On the scope and sources of Ephorus' historical work see: Schwartz 1907, 1–16; Drews 1963, 244–255; Drews 1976, 497–498; Schepens 1977, 95–118; Alonso-Núñez 2002, 38–41.

¹⁴⁹ Meister 2013, 52. No evidence or scholarly work is adduced to support this claim; Meister probably relies on the *opinio communis* originating in Volquardsen.

¹⁵⁰ Hornblower 1995, 55–57 (quot. from p. 57): “It is a commonplace that Ephorus organised his material differently from Thucydides, and intruded much explicit moralising of a

Volquardsen argued that in the books in question Diodorus used Ephorus as a narrative source, and additionally some type of tabular work, which arranged the events in a chronological scheme.¹⁵¹ This source was named “chronographic”, in contrast to the “narrative” one.¹⁵² It would contain dates and events, plus additional information, e.g. the opening and closing points of various authors’ histories.¹⁵³ Our quotations of Thucydides belong to this category of “chronographic entries”, as Stylianou called them,¹⁵⁴ and should not be attributed to Ephorus. Thus, even if it is a reasonable assumption that Ephorus read Thucydides, it tells us little about the above references to Thucydides by name in Diodorus. First of all, they are almost certainly not of Ephorus’ authorship, but rather of the “chronographic source”. This can be easily illustrated by the character of similar transitional passages in books XI–XVI. Particularly similar to one another are those that point to where the given historian ended his work, and who “picked up” the history where he had left off. They always contain the same information, provided in the same order: the historian’s name, the chronological scope of his work (beginning and end), number of books.¹⁵⁵ Their phrasing is strikingly schematic and unique for the Βιβλιοθήκη,¹⁵⁶ so there can be no doubt that they were written by the same author. That they are not of Ephorus’ authorship is proven by the fact that Ephorus himself is cited in this way;¹⁵⁷

fundamentally non-Thucydidean sort; this is one of the things which commended him to Diodorus.” See also Barber 1935, 98.

¹⁵¹ Volquardsen 1868, 51–60. His conclusion is as follows: “Dass von einer Benutzung des Thukydides durch Diodor in diesem Theile seines Werks bei einem solchem Verfahren nicht die Rede sein kann, ist wohl klar genug. Er muss eine Quelle vor sich gehabt haben, welche, ohne scharf die einzelnen Jahre zu unterscheiden, die Kriegereignisse in eine Reihe von Capiteln geordnet hatte” (p. 41).

¹⁵² See Stylianou 1998, 25–49 and 31.

¹⁵³ Cf. the comments of Parker, *Ephoros*, BNJ 70 F 214 *ap.* Diod. Sic. XV 60, 5.

¹⁵⁴ Stylianou 1998, 45.

¹⁵⁵ Diod. Sic. XI 37, 6 (Herodotus); XII 42, 5 (Thucydides); XII 71, 2 (Antiochus of Syracuse); XIII 103, 3 (Philistus); XV 37, 3 (Hermeias); XV 89, 3 (Xenophon); XV 94, 4 (Athanas); XV 95, 4 (Dionysodorus); XVI 3, 8 (Theopompus); XVI 4, 3 (Demophilus); XVI 71, 3 (Theopompus); XVI 76, 5 (Ephorus).

¹⁵⁶ Each such transitional passage begins with the phrase Τῶν δὲ συγγραφέων; the word for the beginning of the given historical work is always ἀρχῶ, for the end – καταστρέφω; for the scope of the work – περιλαμβάνω (with χρόνος, e.g. περιλαβὼν χρόνον); for the work itself – usually σύνταξις, etc. In most instances even the same tenses of the verbs are used.

¹⁵⁷ Diod. Sic. XVI 76, 5: Τῶν δὲ συγγραφέων Ἐφορος μὲν ὁ Κυμαῖος τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐνθάδε κατέστροφεν εἰς τὴν Περὶνθου πολιορκίαν· περιεῖληφε δὲ τῇ γραφῇ πράξεις τὰς τε τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν καθόδου. “Ephorus of Cymē, the historian, closed his history at this point with the siege of Perinthus, having included in his work the deeds of both the Greeks and the barbarians from the time of the return of the Heracleidae” (transl. Welles).

as well as his son,¹⁵⁸ and Theopompus' Φιλίππικά,¹⁵⁹ which excludes Ephorus as their author on obvious chronological grounds. That they are not of Diodorus' authorship can be concluded from the fact that such transitional passages, with these characteristic formulae, do not occur outside books XI–XVI. It is improbable that Diodorus would introduce by himself such strict and schematized references only in several books, in the middle of his whole work. Interestingly, the occurrence of such passages from XI 37, 6 up to XVI 76, 6 (a passage that summarizes Ephorus' work itself) covers itself with the evident use of Ephorus as a narrative source in these chapters.¹⁶⁰ Still, it is evident that Diodorus uses not only Ephorus there, since e.g. he confronts him with the account of Timaeus a number of times.¹⁶¹

All in all, the three above references to Thucydides did not occur in Ephorus, but in the other source used in the composition of this part of Βιβλιοθήκη, almost certainly in this “chronographic” work. The date of the composition of this work is hard to ascertain. We can try to assess it by the dates of authors that appear in the transitional passages, and the approximate date of the composition of Diodorus' Βιβλιοθήκη. The youngest authors mentioned in the passages are Ephorus' son, Demophilus¹⁶² and Theopompus (Φιλίππικά). From the date of the composition of the latter work we can assume the decade 330–320 (the probable period for the composition of Φιλίππικά) as the *terminus post quem* for the creation of the “chronographic” work. The *terminus ante* will be Diodorus' own work, that is 59/60–30 BC; but it is of course absurd to locate the date of the composition at the extreme end of Diodorus' work; so the more sound *terminus ante* is 60 BC.

In sum, the source where references to Thucydides appear was compiled, as a very cautious estimate, in the years 330–60 BC. Scholars have tried to point to Castor of Rhodes (first cent. BC) as the author of the chronicle, but there is

¹⁵⁸ Diod. Sic. XVI 4, 3: Τῶν δὲ συγγραφέων Δημόφιλος μὲν ὁ Ἐφόρου τοῦ ἱστοριογράφου υἱός.

¹⁵⁹ Diod. Sic. XVI 71, 3: Τῶν δὲ συγγραφέων Θεόπομπος ὁ Χῖος ἐν τῇ τῶν Φιλίππικῶν ἱστορίᾳ κτλ.

¹⁶⁰ Diod. Sic. XII 41, 1 is the first explicit reference to Ephorus after a long pause from V 64, 5. From XII 41, 1 to XV 60, 4–5 Ephorus is quoted twice with ἀναγράφειν (ὡς Ἐφορος ἀνέγραψε); with γράφειν – once, with φημί (e.g. καθάπερ φησὶν Ἐφορος) four times; once with ὡς (ὡς δ' Ἐφορος).

¹⁶¹ E.g. Diod. Sic. XIII 54, 5: ὡς μὲν Ἐφορος ἀνέγραψε [...], ὡς δὲ Τίμαιός φησιν; cf. XIII 60, 5; XIII 80, 5; XIV 54, 5. It seems that Schwartz's description of the books in question as an “Excerpt aus Ephoros” is exaggerated.

¹⁶² His dates are uncertain; we can only estimate roughly that he composed his historical work not earlier than 340–330 BC (Ephorus' birth: 405/400 – 25 years until his son's birth – 30/40 years for his ἀκμή and literary activity).

no substantial basis to argue for this.¹⁶³ We have to accept the fact that the author remains anonymous. What are the implications for Thucydides' readership?

1. The author had access to Thucydides' *History*, and probably made some use of Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War. Thus, between 330–60 BC, when the unknown compiler was working, the *History* was a “work of reference” for the period 432–411 BC. No other historian is indicated by the author as a source of knowledge of the events from these years.

2. On the basis of point 1, we can suppose that the “chronographer” knew Thucydides' *History* as a whole, since he knew where it begins and ends and outlines its content; note the phrase: πόλεμον Ἀθηναίους πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους τὸν ὀνομασθέντα Πελοποννησιακόν.

3. From the two references we can see that the compiler assumed the eight-book division of Thucydides' work. Yet at the same time he testifies to the existence of “some” individuals who thought that it should be divided into nine (ἐν βίβλοις ὀκτώ, ὥς δέ τινες διαιροῦσιν, ἐννέα). This fact seems to be so important for the author that it is repeated in both instances. There is only one more example among the passages belonging to the “chronographic” source, where an alternative number of books is given, and the phrasing is identical (parenthetical ὥς δέ τινες διαιροῦσι).¹⁶⁴ This is not a superficial knowledge of Thucydides; quite the contrary — it is an awareness of editorial issues concerning the *History*. The question arises, who are these τινες who preferred to divide Thucydides' work into nine books? From the immediate context of this phrase, we can infer that these are:

- i. authors other than the compiler himself, perhaps from another intellectual circle,
- ii. active between Thucydides' death and the composition of the work,
- iii. also acquainted with Thucydides, and voicing their opinion as to the division of the *History*, perhaps in their own works.

The most general and secure inference is that more than one author is meant here, and that some type of scholarly/literary controversy over the division of Thucydides seems to be implied. As demonstrated above, Cratippus also speculated on the reason for the lack of speeches in “the final books” of Thucydides' *History* — ἐν τοῖς τελευταίοις τῆς ἱστορίας. It seems that the

¹⁶³ Perl 1957, 141 n. 4. Stylianou 1998, 25–26, shows that this hypothesis is unlikely.

¹⁶⁴ Diod. Sic. XV 37, 3: Τῶν δὲ συγγραφέων Ἑρμείας ὁ Μεθυμναῖος τὴν τῶν Σικελικῶν σύνταξιν εἰς τοῦτον τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν κατέστροφε, γράψας βύβλους δέκα, ὥς δέ τινες διαιροῦσι, δώδεκα. “Of the historians, Hermeias of Methymnē brought to a close with this year his narrative of Sicilian affairs, having composed ten books, or, as some divide the work, twelve” (transl. Sherman).

eighth book was divided into two parts by certain historians/critics, and Cratippus was one of them.¹⁶⁵ The statement about an alternative division made by the “chronographer” additionally confirms that in the Hellenistic period there were two “schools” as to the division of the *History*.

4. Why does the chronographer refer to Thucydides in such a way: Θουκυδίδης δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος? Was the figure of Thucydides so unknown to his contemporaries, that it was necessary to indicate his place of origin? This would be inconsistent with the existence of *τινες* who preferred some other division of Thucydides’ work (which implies that they knew the *History*). Of the schematic passages quoted above, only Herodotus and Philistus are not accompanied by the indication of their origin.¹⁶⁶ It can be, of course, a mere addition, without significance. Although it appears quite unexpected, it is hard to deduce anything valuable from this coincidence, except for the possibly better knowledge of Philistus and Herodotus on the part of the readers of the anonymous chronographer.

5. The rest of the historians cited by the author are also not without significance. From the Athenian historians, apart from Thucydides, only Herodotus and Xenophon are taken into account. There are also three Sicilian historiographers, from Chios — one historian, from Boeotia — two (mentioned together), from Cyme — one, one (Ephorus’ son) — not indicated, perhaps Cyme as taken for granted. All are subsumed under the name συγγραφεύς.

3.8 Indirect evidence: Philochorus of Athens (c. 340–260 BC)

Philochorus was a scholar-historian who wrote at least twenty-seven works, ranging from local history (of Attica, Delos and Salamis) to chronography, cult and literature, of which the most famous is the Ἀτθίς (*Attic History*).¹⁶⁷ He was probably the most highly-regarded Attidographer, judging from the number of times his work was used and cited.¹⁶⁸ The *Atthis* was seventeen books long, of

¹⁶⁵ It is the only book in Thucydides with no speech quoted directly.

¹⁶⁶ The rest are always qualified with their origin: Ἑρμείας ὁ Μεθυμναῖος; Ξενοφῶν μὲν ὁ Ἀθηναῖος; Ἀντίοχος ὁ Συρακόσιος; Ἀθάνας ὁ Συρακόσιος; Διονυσόδωρος καὶ Ἀναξίς οἱ Βοιωτοί; Θεόπομπος ὁ Χίος; Δημόφιλος μὲν ὁ Ἐφόρου τοῦ ἱστοριογράφου υἱός; Ἐφορος μὲν ὁ Κυμαῖος.

¹⁶⁷ Jacoby FGrHist 328. On Philochorus’ life and works in general see the entry in the Suda, s.v. Φιλόχορος (= T 1); Harding 2008, 8–9; Harding 2012, 1131. The latter calls him “a truly Hellenistic man, a man of religion (official prophet and diviner), a patriot”; he was arrested and put to death by Antigonus Gonatas for supporting Ptolemy II Philadelphus at the time of the Chremonidean War.

¹⁶⁸ Harding 2008, 10, stresses the fact that we have more fragments of Philochorus than of any other Attidographer, which shows that he was the most frequently cited author in the genre.

which two were devoted to the end of the fifth century.¹⁶⁹ In his research Philochorus used written sources and his own experience from his own time. As Jacoby has shown, Philochorus, when writing about the distant past, which for him would include the sixth and fifth centuries, used any written sources and documents available to him.¹⁷⁰ For the earlier period he probably made extensive use of the *Atthis* of Androtion,¹⁷¹ but the fragments also show that he was familiar with the works of Herodotus, Ephorus and Theopompus. His acquaintance with, or partial dependence on, Thucydides was also indicated in the reception studies, but with no substantiation, or omitted entirely.¹⁷² To be sure, Philochorus in the extant fragments nowhere explicitly refers to Thucydides, so scholars rely on the interconnections between certain parts of the narratives of the two authors; the ground is thus not firm from the very start. Jacoby collected a list of the fragments that arguably draw on Thucydides, and I shall survey those that can be informative in this respect.

This, Harding argues, indicates that his *Atthis* was judged in antiquity to be the most authoritative of all the works in this genre.

¹⁶⁹ The other books covered: the early period down to Solon (2 books), the fourth century (2 books). The remaining eleven books covered the sixty years from 320 to 260. Philochorus' main interest was thus the period of his mature years, i.e. the *Atthis* was actually a type of contemporary history, such as was written by Thucydides. We have over 170 fragments of the *Atthis*. From these we can form an impression of the structure and character of his work. It was arranged in the chronological format typical of the genre, i.e. by kings and archons, and seems to have presented its information in unadorned prose (see Dion. Hal. *Ad Amm.* 1, 9), although we should be wary of assessing its style in general as many fragments are not verbatim quotations but come from scholia, which give paraphrases, summaries etc. On the form, content and structure of Philochorus' *Atthis* and similar works see Jacoby 1949, 79–128.

¹⁷⁰ On the sources of the *Atthis* and analogous works Jacoby 1949, 149–225 is still fundamental.

¹⁷¹ This is suggested by the frequency with which the two are cited together. Harding states that Philochorus also derived his material from Androtion for the history of the fifth century, see e.g. Harding 2008, 132 on Androtion F 43 = F 163 Harding = Philochorus F 136 *ap.* Harpocration, *Lexikon* s.v. συγγραφεῖς: “Even for the history of the fifth century Philochorus often derived his material from Androtion, as he clearly did here.” In my view, Harding pushes Philochorus' dependence on Androtion further than is necessary; it is plausible that he used Thucydides' work directly, which is to be shown in the present section. Cf. Hornblower 1995, 58; 49.

¹⁷² In fact, scholars who point to Philochorus' acquaintance with Thucydides all go back ultimately to Jacoby's edition of the fragments and his monumental work on the *Atthis*. This is quite understandable given the complexity of the material: the extant passages of Philochorus are often very concise and mixed with other sources, and sometimes it is very hard to isolate the Philochoran material, etc. Jacoby refers to his commentary on FF 8–10, 34, 38, 39, 94, 117, 118, 121, 128 ff. See Jacoby, *Introduction* to FGrHist 328, 230–231 with n. 80. Cf. Jacoby 1949, 95: “Still the criticism seems to have made a certain impression on Philochorus at least who used Thucydides frequently.” cf. p. 103; Hornblower 1995, 58: “Philochorus' dependence on Thucydides is likely.” (relying on Jacoby); cf. Meister 2013, 44 (with no argument, going back to Hornblower). Other reception studies ignore Philochorus entirely.

To take the first example, Philochorus' *Atthis* contained an account of the so-called Second Sacred War (dated to the year 449). It was a Spartan intervention against the Phocians, aimed at restoring the Delphians' control over the Delphic sanctuary.¹⁷³ Two extant fragments of Philochorus are relevant here, of which one will be quoted (F 34b = 129b Harding = Scholion V to Aristophanes, *Av.* 556):¹⁷⁴

Ἐν ἐνίοις τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ταῦτα λέγεται [...] τοῦ Ἱεροῦ πολέμου μνημονεύει τοῦ γενομένου Ἀθηναίοις πρὸς Φωκέας ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱεροῦ. ἐσχεδιάσται δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῶν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸς Φωκέας ὑπὲρ τούτου ἐπολέμησαν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ Φωκέων διὰ τὸ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ἔχθος. γεγόνασι δὲ δύο πόλεμοι ἱεροί· πρότερος μὲν Λακεδαιμονίοις πρὸς Φωκεῖς ὑπὲρ Δελφῶν, καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ ἱεροῦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν προμαντείαν παρὰ Δελφῶν ἔλαβον· ὕστερον δὲ τρίτῳ ἔτει τοῦ πρώτου πολέμου Ἀθηναίοις πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους ὑπὲρ Φωκέων. καὶ τὸ ἱερὸν ἀπέδωκαν Φωκεῦσι, καθάπερ καὶ Φιλόχορος ἐν τῇ δ' λέγει. καλεῖται δὲ Ἱερός, ὅτι περὶ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱεροῦ ἐγένετο. ἱστορεῖ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ Θουκυδίδης καὶ Ἐρατοσθένης ἐν τῷ θ' καὶ Θεόπομπος ἐν τῷ κε.¹⁷⁵

This account is parallel to that in the first book of Thucydides (I 112, 5):

Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸν ἱερὸν καλούμενον πόλεμον ἐστράτευσαν, καὶ κρατήσαντες τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱεροῦ παρέδοσαν Δελφοῖς· καὶ αὖθις ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποχωρησάντων αὐτῶν στρατεύσαντες καὶ κρατήσαντες παρέδοσαν Φωκεῦσιν.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ See Hornblower, CT I, 181–182. Thucydides' narrative is very selective; prior to the Spartan action there probably was a seizure of the sanctuary by the Phocians from the Delphians.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. F 34a = 129a Harding = Scholion RV to Aristophanes, *Av.* 556.

¹⁷⁵ "In some of the commentaries one finds the following ... 'he is talking about the Sacred War that the Athenians fought against the Phokians over the sanctuary at Delphi', but this is pure invention on their part. For they did not fight against the Phokians over this (sanctuary), but on their behalf, out of their hostility towards the Lakedaimonians. There were two Sacred Wars. The first (was fought) by the Lakedaimonians against the Phokians over Delphi and, after they were victorious, the Lakedaimonians acquired the right of consulting the oracle first (promanteia) from Delphi. Later, in the third year after the first war, the Athenians (fought a war) against the Lakedaimonians on behalf of the Phokians. And they handed back the sanctuary to the Phokians, just as Philochorus says in the fourth (book). It is called 'Sacred', because it was fought over the sanctuary at Delphi. It is also recorded by Thucydides and Eratosthenes in the ninth and Theopompos in the twenty-fifth." All translations of Philochorus' fragments, if not otherwise indicated, are of Harding (2008).

¹⁷⁶ "After this the Lacedaemonians undertook the so-called Sacred War, and, getting possession of the temple at Delphi, delivered it to the Delphians; and afterwards, when they had withdrawn, the Athenians made an expedition, got possession of it, and delivered it again to the Phocians."

The scholiast thus reports that Philochorus said (Φιλόχορος λέγει) that the Athenians recaptured the sanctuary and handed it over to the Delphians, but he says that it was “in the third year” (ὕστερον δὲ τρίτῳ ἔτει τοῦ πρώτου πολέμου), whereas Thucydides has αὐθις ὕστερον. Jacoby tried to resolve this incongruence between the two historians by emending ἔτει to μηνί, but Hornblower argued against this, as Philochorus seems to have written clearly about “two wars” on this occasion (γεγόνασι δὲ δύο πόλεμοι ἱεροί), which leads him to the conclusion that the two authors simply disagreed on chronology in this case.¹⁷⁷ However, there seems to be no disagreement at all: Thucydides’ αὐθις ὕστερον does not imply immediate occurrence, the sense of αὐθις is “again”, “anew”, “in turn”, “back again”, of ὕστερον “later”, “afterwards” etc. This is not contradictory to ὕστερον δὲ τρίτῳ ἔτει attributed by the scholiast to Philochorus; it is only more, not different, information on the chronology of the events in question; not surprisingly so, as Thucydides’ account is in general particularly concise and selective here (cf. above n. 173). Remarkably, the scholiast quotes several authorities on this war; Philochorus is quoted first, as if he were the most reliable or elaborated more on the subject than the others, then Thucydides is mentioned as the second source. Interestingly, only for Thucydides’ account is it not specified in which book the narrative on the war is to be found. It is thus probable that Philochorus is the scholiast’s primary source here. Whether this testimony shows Philochorus’ knowledge or dependence on Thucydides is not self-evident, especially given that Thucydides’ account contains fewer details; thus Philochorus, even if he used Thucydides for the account, probably would have supplemented it with other sources.

The next fragments are on the military strength of Athens before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, i.e. F 38¹⁷⁸ and F 39. The latter one reads (F 39 = F 141 Harding *ap.* Hesychius, *Lexikon* s.v. ἱππῆς: Ἱππεῦσιν):

¹⁷⁷ Hornblower, HCT I, p. 183. Plutarch, *Per.* 21.2 has εὐθὺς (“immediately after”), which is closer to Thucydides, but still not equivalent. Jacoby, FGrHist IIIb. Suppl. 2, 320 n. 3: “The question of the absolute chronology still remains dubious. But certainly Plutarch (’s authority) has rightly understood the Thucydidean αὐθις ὕστερον when he says εὐθὺς. Consequently τρίτῳ ἔτει in the careless excerpt (which must not in its whole contents be ascribed to Ph.156) is incredible, whether ἔτει be a mistake for μηνί [...]” Harding 2008, 133, follows Jacoby in this: “Of the two scholia the second is clearly better informed, though it is probably not right in placing the Athenian response to the Spartan action ‘in the third year’ (that figure is usually emended to ‘in the third month’, see e.g. Jacoby, Text: 320; Gomme, HCT: 1.337–8; but see ATL: 3.178 n. 65).” Harding does not speculate on Philochorus’ sources in this part.

¹⁷⁸ F 38 = F 140 Harding = Harpocration, *Lexikon* s.v. στρατεία ἐν τοῖς ἐπὶ νόμοις. We may assume that Philochorus here, too, wrote a digression about the organization of the Athenian army, which probably went beyond the summary statements of Thucydides.

‘Ἄλλ’ εἰσὶν ἱππῆς ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ χίλιοι’. σύστημα πολεμικῶν ἀνδρῶν χιλίων ἵππους τρεφόντων. Φιλόχορος δὲ ἐν τετάρτῳ εἴρηκε, πότε κατεστάθησαν χίλιοι· διάφορα γὰρ ἦν ἱππέων πλήθη κατὰ χρόνον Ἀθηναίοις.¹⁷⁹

It can be regarded as parallel to Thucydides’ account in the second book (II 13, 1–9):

(1) Ἦτι δὲ τῶν Πελοποννησίων ξυλλεγομένων τε ἐς τὸν Ἴσθμον καὶ ἐν ὁδῷ ὄντων [...] (6) χρήμασι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἐθάρσυνεν αὐτούς, ὀπλίτας δὲ τρισχιλίων καὶ μυρίους εἶναι ἄνευ τῶν ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις καὶ τῶν παρ’ ἑπαλξιν ἑξακισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων. (7) τοσοῦτοι γὰρ ἐφύλασσον τὸ πρῶτον ὅποτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐσβάλοιεν, ἀπὸ τε τῶν πρεσβυτάτων καὶ τῶν νεωτάτων, καὶ μετοίκων ὅσοι ὀπλίται ἦσαν [...] (8) ἱππέας δὲ ἀπέφαινε διακοσίους καὶ χιλίους ζὶν ἵπποτοξόταις, ἑξακοσίους δὲ καὶ χιλίους τοξότας, καὶ τριήρεις τὰς πλωίμους τριακοσίας.¹⁸⁰

By reading these pieces alongside one another, we learn that they correspond as to their content.¹⁸¹ Jacoby speculated that Philochorus was probably more elaborate and detailed than Thucydides in this respect. To be sure, there is no explicit reference to Thucydides, and from the text itself it is difficult to demonstrate Philochorus’ direct or indirect dependence on him.

Another cluster of fragments concerns the Athenian synoecism, from which I shall quote the potentially most revealing one, where Philochorus is adduced by Strabo (F 94 = F 8 Harding *ap.* Strab. IX 11, 20).¹⁸²

Τοσαῦτ’ οὖν ἀπόχρη προσθεῖσιν ὅτι φησὶ Φιλόχορος πορθουμένης τῆς χώρας ἐκ θαλάττης μὲν ὑπὸ Καρῶν ἐκ γῆς δὲ ὑπὸ Βοιωτῶν, οὓς ἐκάλουν Ἄονας, Κέκροπα πρῶτον εἰς δώδεκα πόλεις συνοικίσαι τὸ πλῆθος, ὧν ὀνόματα Κεκροπία Τετράπολις Ἐπακρία Δεκέλεια Ἐλευσίς Ἀφιδνα (λέγουσι δὲ καὶ πληθυντικῶς

¹⁷⁹ “But the horsemen are one thousand noble men. A company of one thousand fighting men rearing horses. Philochorus in the fourth (book) has written that at one time their number was established at one thousand. For the Athenians had different numbers of cavalry at different times.”

¹⁸⁰ “While the Peloponnesian forces were still collecting at the Isthmus and while they were on the march [...] as to their resources in money, then, he thus sought to encourage them; and as to heavy-armed infantry, he told them that there were thirteen thousand, not counting the sixteen thousand men who garrisoned the forts and manned the city walls. For this was the number engaged in garrison duty at first, when the enemy were invading Attica, and they were composed of the oldest and the youngest citizens and of such metics as were heavily armed [...] The cavalry, Pericles pointed out, numbered twelve hundred, including mounted archers, the bow-men sixteen hundred, and the triremes that were seaworthy three hundred.”

¹⁸¹ Harding 2008, 121: “Certainly the figure of 1,000 cavalrymen (hippeis) in F39 is consistent with the known strength at that time (Thucydides: 2.13.8 with Gomme, HCT: *ad loc.*; Aristophanes, *Knights*: 225; Spence 1987: 167–75; Bugh 1988: 79–119).”

¹⁸² Cf. F 93 = F 7 Harding = Georgios Synkellos, *Ekloge Chronographias*, p. 289.

Ἀφίδνας) Θόρικος Βραυρὼν Κύθηρος Σφηττὸς Κηφισιά [...] πάλιν δ' ὕστερον εἰς μίαν πόλιν συναγαγεῖν λέγεται τὴν νῦν τὰς δώδεκα Θησεύς.¹⁸³

A parallel account is to be found in the second book of the *History* (II 15, 1–2):

(1) Ἐπὶ γὰρ Κέκροπος καὶ τῶν πρώτων βασιλέων ἡ Ἀττικὴ ἐς Θησέα αἰεὶ κατὰ πόλεις ὤκειτο πρυτανεῖα τε ἐχούσας καὶ ἄρχοντας, καὶ ὁπότε μὴ τι δείσειαν, οὐ ξυνῆσαν βουλευσόμενοι ὥς τὸν βασιλέα, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ ἕκαστοι ἐπολίτευνον καὶ ἐβουλευόντο· καὶ τινες καὶ ἐπολέμησάν ποτε αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐλευσίνιοι μετ' Εὐμόλπου πρὸς Ἐρεχθέα. (2) ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς τὰ τε ἄλλα διεκόσμησε τὴν χώραν καὶ καταλύσας τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τὰ τε βουλευτήρια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐς τὴν νῦν πόλιν οὕσαν, ἐν βουλευτήριον ἀποδείξας καὶ πρυτανεῖον, ξυνώκισε πάντας, καὶ νεμομένους τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάστους ἅπερ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἠνάγκασε μιᾷ πόλει ταύτῃ χρῆσθαι, ἡ ἀπάντων ἤδη ξυντελούντων ἐς αὐτὴν μεγάλη γενομένη παρεδόθη ὑπὸ Θησέως τοῖς ἔπειτα· καὶ ξυνοικία ἐξ ἐκείνου Ἀθηναῖοι ἔτι καὶ νῦν τῇ θεῷ ἑορτὴν δημοτελεῖ ποιοῦσιν κτλ.¹⁸⁴

First, it is crucial to properly isolate Philochorus' material from Strabo; it seems that the delineation that goes down to the last sentence on the uniting act of Theseus is not correct: Strabo seems to introduce a type of common knowledge at that point, with the reporting clause “it is said” (λέγεται τὴν νῦν τὰς δώδεκα Θησεύς...).¹⁸⁵ Apart from this problematic part, the two accounts correspond

¹⁸³ “It suffices, then, to add thus much: According to Philochorus, when the country was being devastated, both from the sea by the Carians, and from the land by the Boeotians, who were called Aonians, Cecrops first settled the multitude in twelve cities, the names of which were Cecropia, Tetrapolis, Epacria, Deceleia, Eleusis, Aphidna (also called Aphidnae, in the plural), Thoricus, Brauron, Cytherus, Sphettus, Cephisia. And at a later time Theseus is said to have united the twelve into one city, that of today” (transl. Jones).

¹⁸⁴ “For in the time of Cecrops and the earliest kings down to Theseus, Attica had been divided into separate towns, each with its town hall and magistrates, and so long as they had nothing to fear they did not come together to consult with the king, but separately administered their own affairs and took counsel for themselves. Sometimes they even made war upon the king, as, for example, the Eleusinians with Eumolpus did upon Erechtheus. But when Theseus became king and proved himself a powerful as well as a prudent ruler, he not only re-organized the country in other respects, but abolished the councils and magistracies of the minor towns and brought all their inhabitants into union with what is now the city, establishing a single council and town hall, and compelled them, while continuing to occupy each his own lands as before, to use Athens as the sole capital. This became a great city, since all were now paying their taxes to it, and was such when Theseus handed it down to his successors. And from his time even to this day the Athenians have celebrated at the public expense a festival called the Synoecia, in honour of the goddess.”

¹⁸⁵ Hence Jacoby is speculative on this, Jacoby, FGrHist IIIb. Suppl. 2, 290 n. 12: “Ph. was obliged to mention the synoikism, and he certainly recorded it as an act of Theseus [...] It must

in that both name Cecrops as the sole king of the twelve demes of Attica, although Thucydides places greater emphasis on the independence of the demes.¹⁸⁶ Jacoby considered whether the sense of the Philochoran fragment is consistent with Thucydides, namely whether both authors ascribe the same acts to Cecrops and Theseus, but there is no inconsistency: Cecrops established and ruled over twelve dispersed demes; Theseus was the reformer and initiated the gathering of the demes into one political body. Thucydides could only differ from Philochorus in the overall interpretation of the process.¹⁸⁷ Philochorus seems to have enumerated the demes, whereas Thucydides does not. Importantly, the tradition that names Cecrops the first king was not the sole one circulating at that time, hence it is worth underlining that Philochorus' version is in the same tradition as Thucydides'.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, in Philochorus Cecrops seems not to have been a figure of myth but rather was rationalized into a human, and his reign could have been adjusted to a view of the evolution of civilization, which corresponds with Thucydides' views as expressed in the entire *Archaeology*. It is not excluded that it may have been influenced by these views.¹⁸⁹ In sum, although the fragment does not unequivocally testify to Philochorus' acquaintance with Thucydides' *History*, it shows an overall consistency in their accounts about the early quasi-mythical history of Attica, and it is fairly probable that Philochorus used Thucydides for that part of his narrative.

Another extract that can be adduced is Philochorus' account of the legal problems of Pheidias, who was charged with fraud by the institution of the statue of Athena.¹⁹⁰ In this fragment, the decree against Megara, preceding the Peloponnesian War, and Pericles' problems with the charges of fraud concerning the foundation of the statue of Athena and trial of Pheidias are reported. The two things are described as interconnected, i.e. the decree was, according to the account extracted from Philochorus, used by Pericles as means of stirring up the war and evading charges. Thucydides in his narrative of the antecedents to the war does not make such a connection, but he also mentions

e.g. have mentioned the *Συνοικία*." Harding's delineation (2008, 21), however, seems to include that last sentence.

¹⁸⁶ Jacoby 1949, 125–126.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Jacoby, FGrHist IIIb. Suppl. 2, 290 n. 15. Cf. Hornblower, CT I, 260–269, on the specificity of Thucydides' account: "Hellanikos and Th. are in general accord on the Thesean synoikism, but Th.'s characterization is different from that of the Attidographers and more realistic (more autocratic and less democratic)" (p. 264).

¹⁸⁸ See Harding 2008, 22.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. F 94–97 = F 8–11 Harding; Cf. Harding 2008, 23: "Primitive towns needed primitive rulers and Cecrops was made to perform that function well [...]".

¹⁹⁰ F 121 = 135 Harding = Scholion RV to Aristophanes, *Pax*, 605–611. The scholion reports Philochorus' narrative of the events from 438.

the Megarian decree as one of the complaints against the Athenians (Thuc. I 67, 4–5). He refers in addition to the decree in the context of the ultimate negotiations immediately preceding the outbreak of the war¹⁹¹ and the statue with the stately reserves of gold that it constituted (Thuc. II 13, 5), but not the accompanying account which Philochorus seems to have provided. On the one hand, there are few points of contact between that account and Thucydides: the latter provides no detailed information on Pericles' alleged involvement, and there is a difference in Philochorus' figure for the value of the gold on the statue: he has 44T, whereas Thucydides has the rounder number of 40T (Thuc. II 13, 5).¹⁹² The version is also in disagreement with that given by Plutarch, deriving most probably from Ephorus. On the other hand, apart from Thucydides' silence on the alleged involvement of Pericles in the affair, the Megarean decree and the complaints of the Megarians in Sparta are related in very similar words;¹⁹³ Jacoby took it for further proof that Philochorus followed Thucydides for the political developments leading to the war.¹⁹⁴ On the whole, therefore, it seems likely that Philochorus took Thucydides' narrative as one of his sources for the events in question, but he must have supplemented it with others, probably quite hostile to Pericles. This is the tradition in which Ephorus is also to be included.

¹⁹¹ Thuc. I 139, 1–3.

¹⁹² See Harding 2008, 117–118, with bibliographical references.

¹⁹³ Cf. (with the corresponding words in bold) F 121: [...] ὅς ἐστιν ἀπὸ τούτου ἑβδομος, περὶ Μεγαρέων εἰπὼν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ 'κατεβόων Ἀθηναίων παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀδίκως λέγοντες **εἵργεσθαι ἀγορᾶς καὶ λιμένων** τῶν παρ' Ἀθηναίοις' with Thuc. I 67 4: καὶ ἄλλοι τε παριόντες ἐγκλήματα ἐποιοῦντο ὡς ἕκαστοι καὶ Μεγαρῆς, δηλοῦντες μὲν καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα διάφορα, μάλιστα δὲ **λιμένων** τε **εἵργεσθαι** τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ καὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς **ἀγορᾶς** παρὰ τὰς σπονδάς and F 121: οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ταῦτα **ἐψηφίσαντο** Περικλέους εἰπόντος, τὴν γῆν αὐτοὺς αἰτιώμενοι τὴν ἱερὰν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπεργάζεσθαι [...] ἐγκαλέσας Μεγαρεῦσιν ὡς **τὴν ἱερὰν ὀργάδα ταῖν θεᾶν ἐργασαμένοις**. ἄλογος δὲ φαίνεται ἡ κατὰ Περικλέους ὑπόνοια, ἐπὶ ἔτεσιν πρότερον τῆς τοῦ πολέμου ἀρχῆς τῶν περὶ Φειδίαν γενομένων with Thuc. I 139, 1–3: καὶ μάλιστα γὰρ πάντων καὶ ἐνδηλότατα προούλεγον τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων **ψηφισμα** καθελοῦσι μὴ ἂν γίνεσθαι πόλεμον, ἐν ᾧ εἴρητο αὐτοὺς μὴ χρῆσθαι **τοῖς λιμέσι** τοῖς ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ μηδὲ τῇ Ἀττικῇ **ἀγορᾷ**. οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι οὔτε **τάλλα** ὑπῆκουον οὔτε τὸ **ψηφισμα** καθήρουν, ἐπικαλοῦντες **ἐπεργασίαν** Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς τῆς **ἱερᾶς** καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου καὶ ἀνδραπόδων ὑποδοχὴν τῶν ἀφισταμένων.

¹⁹⁴ See Jacoby, FGrHist IIIb. Suppl. 2, 392 n. 6: "The complaint of the Megarians in Sparta Philochorus narrated almost in the words of Thucydides (I, 67, 4), and καὶ αὐτοὶ shows that he mentioned the other complainants, too. He (or Androtion) probably followed Thucydides closely for the outline of the political development of the conflict before the outbreak of the war." As we can see, Jacoby was uncertain as to whether Philochorus could have used Thucydides directly in this case, or through Androtion. He does not develop the question in the context of this fragment.

One more fragment relates the armistice at Pylos of 425 and the embassy of the Spartans to Athens (F 128a = 147a Harding = Scholion RV to Aristophanes, *Pax*, 665):

Φιλόχορος φησὶν οὕτως· ‘Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ περὶ διαλύσεων ἔπεμψαν πρέσβεις πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν Πύλῳ καὶ τὰς ναὺς αὐτῶν παραδόντες οὕσας ξ. Κλέωνος δὲ ἀντειπόντος ταῖς διαλύσεσι στασιάσαι λέγεται τὴν ἐκκλησίαν· ἐρωτῆσαι δὲ συνέβη τὸν ἐπιστάτην· ἐνίκησαν δὲ οἱ πολεμεῖν βουλόμενοι’. ἄλλως· μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πύλῳ· ἐπὶ Κλέωνος γὰρ πρεσβευσαμένων Λακεδαιμονίων ἐστασίασαν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ὡς Φιλόχορος φησι. μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πύλῳ καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους, οὓς ἔλαβεν ὁ Κλέων, ἔπεμψαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐπαγγελλόμενοι δώσειν τὰς τριήρεις ἃς εἰλήφεσαν τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, ἅμα δὲ καὶ περὶ εἰρήνης καὶ σπονδῶν. ἀντεῖπεν οὖν τότε Κλέων, καὶ τοῦ ἐπιστάτου τρίτον ἐρωτήσαντος τὴν βουλὴν τί βούλεται, εἰρήνην ἢ πόλεμον, εἵλετο ἡ βουλὴ τὸν πόλεμον συνεστάναι.¹⁹⁵

These developments are described in greater detail by Thucydides in the fourth book of the *History* (IV 15, 1–23):

(15, 1) Ἐς δὲ τὴν Σπάρτην ὡς ἡγγέλθη τὰ γεγενημένα περὶ Πύλον [...] (15, 2) ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοὺς στρατηγοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἣν ἐθέλωσι, σπονδὰς ποιησαμένους τὰ περὶ Πύλον ἀποστεῖλαι ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας πρέσβεις περὶ ζυμβάσεως [...] (16, 3) αἱ μὲν σπονδαὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐγένοντο, καὶ αἱ νῆες παρεδόθησαν οὕσαι περὶ ἑξήκοντα, καὶ οἱ πρέσβεις ἀπεστάλησαν. ἀφικόμενοι δὲ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἔλεξαν τοιαύδε [...] (21, 2) οἱ δὲ τὰς μὲν σπονδὰς, ἔχοντες τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ νήσῳ, ἥδη σφίσιν ἐνόμιζον ἐτοίμους εἶναι, ὅποταν βούλωνται ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς, τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ὥρεγοντο. (21, 3) μάλιστα δ’ αὐτοὺς ἐνήγε Κλέων ὁ Κλειαινέτου ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ’ ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ὃν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, καὶ ἔπεισεν ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς χρὴ ... (22, 1) οἱ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀπόκρισιν οὐδὲν ἀντεῖπον, ξυνέδρους δὲ σφίσιν ἐκέλευον ἐλέσθαι οὔτινες λέγοντες καὶ ἀκούοντες

¹⁹⁵ “Philochorus writes as follows: ‘The Lakedaimonians sent ambassadors to the Athenians regarding a cessation of hostilities, after making a truce with the commanders at Pylos and after handing over their ships, which were sixty in number. But when Cleon spoke out against the peace treaty, it is said that the Assembly was divided in opinion. Eventually, the president put the question and those who wanted to go on fighting won the day.’ Alternatively: After the affair at Pylos. For in the time of Cleon, when the Lakedaimonians sent ambassadors, there was a difference of opinions in the Assembly, as Philochorus says. Following the affair at Pylos and the captured men, whom Cleon took, the Lakedaimonians sent to the Athenians (men) offering that they would give back the triremes of the Athenians that they had captured in the war, and at the same time (making overtures) about a peace treaty. Then, at that time Cleon spoke in opposition, and when the president asked the council (boule) for the third time what it wanted, peace or war, the council chose to continue the war.” Cf. F 128b = F 147b Harding = Scholion to Lucian, *Timon*, 30: ἐπέστη (Cleon) δὲ καὶ τῇ πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους εἰρήνῃ, ὡς Φιλόχορος [καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης] προθεῖς ἄρχοντα Εἰθύνον. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν Πολιτείᾳ (28, 3) καὶ περιζωσάμενον αὐτὸν λέγει δημηγορῆσαι.

περὶ ἐκάστου ξυμβήσονται κατὰ ἡσυχίαν ὅτι ἂν πείθωσιν ἀλλήλους. (22, 2) Κλέων δὲ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλὸς ἐνέκειτο, λέγων γινώσκειν μὲν καὶ πρότερον οὐδὲν ἐν νῶι ἔχοντας δίκαιον αὐτούς, σαφὲς δὲ εἶναι καὶ νῦν, οἵτινες τῷ μὲν πλήθει οὐδὲν ἐθέλουσιν εἰπεῖν, ὀλίγοις δὲ ἀνδράσι ζύνεδροι βούλονται γίνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ εἴ τι ὑγῆς διανοοῦνται, λέγειν ἐκέλευσεν ἅπασιν. (22, 3) ὁρῶντες δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὔτε σφίσιν οἶόν τε ὃν ἐν πλήθει εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς ἐδόκει αὐτοῖς ξυγχωρεῖν, μὴ ἔς τοὺς ξυμμάχους διαβληθῶσιν εἰπόντες καὶ οὐ τυχόντες, οὔτε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ μετρίοις ποιήσοντας ἃ προυκαλοῦντο, ἀνεχώρησαν ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν ἄπρακτοι.¹⁹⁶

A comparison of these two texts shows that the Atthidographer made use of literary (in this case Thucydides) material, as well as documentary. From documentary sources Philochorus supplied the detail lacking in Thucydides, i.e. that a vote was actually taken in the Assembly.¹⁹⁷ On the whole, however, there are no contradictions between the narratives of the two authors, and it is quite probable that the *History* was the main source for the events in question.

The fragment on the revolt of Scione from the Athenians is also worth mentioning (F 129 = F 148 Harding = Scholion V to Aristophanes, *Vespae*, 210):

Φιλόχορος ἐπὶ Ἰσάρχου φησὶ πρὸ ἐνιαυτοῦ Βρασίδαν ἀποστήσαι Σκιωναίους τῶν Ἀθηναίων, Ἀθηναίους δὲ ν⁻ τριῆρεις πρότερον πέμψαντας Μένδην μὲν ἐλεῖν, Σκιώνην <δὲ> περιτειχίσαι.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ “At Sparta, when they received the news of what happened at Pylos [...] they decided, so far as Pylos was concerned, to conclude a truce with the Athenian generals, if they should consent, and to send envoys to Athens to propose an agreement [...] The truce was concluded on these terms, the ships, sixty in number, were delivered up, and the envoys dispatched. When they arrived at Athens they spoke as follows. [...] But the Athenians believed that, since they held the men on the island, peace could be theirs the moment they cared to make it, and meanwhile they were greedy for more. [...] They were urged to this course chiefly by Cleon son of Cleaenetus, a popular leader at that time who had very great influence with the multitude. He persuaded them to reply that the men on the island must [...] To this reply the envoys said nothing, but they requested the appointment of commissioners who should confer with them, and after a full discussion of all the details should at their leisure agree upon such terms as they could mutually approve. Thereupon Cleon attacked them violently, saying that he had known before this that they had no honourable intention, and now it was clear, since they were unwilling to speak out before the people, but wished to meet a few men in conference; he bade them, on the contrary, if their purpose was honest, to declare it before them all. But the Lacedaemonians, seeing that it was impossible to announce in full assembly such concessions as they might think it best to make in view of their misfortune, lest they might be discredited with their allies if they proposed them and were rebuffed, and seeing also that the Athenians would not grant their proposals on tolerable conditions, withdrew from Athens, their mission a failure.”

¹⁹⁷ Harding 2008, 124–125.

¹⁹⁸ “Under the archonship of Isarkhos Philochorus says that the Athenians, in response to Brasidas’ causing the Skionians to revolt from Athens in the previous year, dispatched 50 ships and first captured Mende, then put Skione under siege.” Archonship of Isarchus was 424/3.

The *Wasps* was staged in 423/2, the year following the archonship of Isarchus (424/3). The revolt of Scione took place just after the truce of 424/3 between Athens and Sparta had been negotiated and before Brasidas had been informed. The revolt and the reaction of Athens are described by Thucydides in the final chapters of book four (IV 120–133):

(123, 1) Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Μένδῃ ἀφίσταται αὐτῶν, πόλις ἐν τῇ Παλλήνῃ, Ἐρετριῶν ἀποικία. καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐδέξατο ὁ Βρασίδης, οὐ νομίζων ἀδικεῖν [...] (129, 2) ἐπὶ τὴν Μένδην καὶ τὴν Σκιώνην οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥσπερ παρεσκευάζοντο, ναυσὶ μὲν πεντήκοντα, ὧν ἦσαν δέκα Χῖαι, ὀπλίταις δὲ [...] (130, 6–7) οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι (ἥδη γὰρ καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἐπαναστρέψας πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἦν) ἐσπερόντες ἐς τὴν Μένδην πόλιν, ἅτε οὐκ ἀπὸ ξυμβάσεως ἀνοιχθεῖσαν, ἀπάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ ὡς κατὰ κράτος **ἐλόντες** διήρπασαν, καὶ μόλις οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατέσχον ὥστε μὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διαφθεῖρεσθαι. καὶ τοὺς μὲν Μενδαίους μετὰ ταῦτα πολιτεύειν ἐκέλευον ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, αὐτοὺς κρίναντας ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς εἴ τινας ἡγοῦνται αἰτίους εἶναι τῆς ἀποστάσεως· τοὺς δ' ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει ἀπετείχισαν ἐκατέρωθεν τείχει ἐς θάλασσαν καὶ φυλακὴν ἐπικαθίσταντο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ περὶ τὴν Μένδην κατέσχον, ἐπὶ τὴν Σκιώνην ἐχώρουν (131, 1–2) οἱ δὲ ἀντεπεξεληθόντες αὐτοὶ καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι ἰδρύθησαν ἐπὶ λόφου καρτεροῦ πρὸ τῆς πόλεως, ὃν εἰ μὴ ἔλοιεν οἱ ἐναντίοι, οὐκ ἐγένετο σφῶν **περιτείχισις**. **προσβαλόντες δ' αὐτῷ κατὰ κράτος οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ μάχῃ ἐκκρούσαντες τοὺς ἐπόντας ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντό τε καὶ ἐς τὸν **περιτειχισμὸν** τροπαῖον στήσαντες παρεσκευάζοντο.**¹⁹⁹

As can be grasped from the above text, the wording of this extract from Philochorus is at certain points so close to that of Thucydides (cf. esp. the words in bold) that it seems to bring additional proof of his use of the historian.²⁰⁰ Philochorus does, however, supply the name of the archon, which is avoided

¹⁹⁹ “Meanwhile Mende revolted from them, a city in Pallene, and an Eretrian colony. And Brasidas received them, thinking they were not doing wrong [...] against Mende and Scione, as they had been preparing to do, with fifty ships, of which ten were Chian, and with one thousand hoplites [...] But the Athenians – for Nicias had already turned back and was near the city – burst into the city with their whole force, and, as the gates had been opened without an agreement, plundered the city as though they had taken it by storm; and the generals with difficulty kept them from destroying the inhabitants also. They then directed the Mendaeans henceforth to retain their former constitution, and bring to trial among themselves any whom they thought guilty of the revolt; but the men on the acropolis they fenced off with a wall extending on either side down to the sea, and set a guard over them. And when they had thus secured Mende, they proceeded against Scione. The Scionaeans and the Peloponnesians had come out against them and taken position on a strong hill before the city, which had to be taken by the enemy before the city could be invested with a wall. So the Athenians made a furious assault upon the hill and dislodged those that were upon it; they then encamped and, after raising a trophy, prepared for the circumvallation.”

²⁰⁰ Cf. Harding 2008, 125.

by Thucydides; this is consistent with both authors' individual differences in method.

There are also excerpts from Philochorus concerning the so-called Peace of Nicias, that can be paralleled with the passages from the fourth book of the *History*, e.g. F 131 = F 152 Harding = Scholion RV to Aristophanes, *Pax*, 466:

Ἐπὶ γὰρ [τοῦ] Ἀλκαίου σπονδάς φησι γεγονέναι Φιλόχορος πεντηκονταετείς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις πλὴν Βοιωτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων καὶ Ἡλείων.²⁰¹

This is supplemented with F 132 = F 153 Harding = Scholion RV to Aristophanes, *Pax*, 475–477:

Καὶ ὁ Φιλόχορος φησι πολεμοποιούντας πάλιν τοὺς Κορινθίους προσλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ τοὺς Ἀργεῖους.²⁰²

These references seem to be correctly associated with Thucydides' account of the Peace (Thuc. V 17, 2):

τότε δὴ παρακαλέσαντες τοὺς ἐαυτῶν ζυμμάχους οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ ψηφισαμένων πλὴν Βοιωτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων καὶ Ἡλείων καὶ Μεγαρέων τῶν ἄλλων ὥστε καταλύεσθαι (τούτοις δὲ οὐκ ἤρεσκε τὰ πρᾶσσόμενα), ποιοῦνται τὴν ξύμβασιν κτλ.²⁰³

Cf. Thuc. V 27, 1:

Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ αἱ πεντηκοντούτεις σπονδαὶ ἐγένοντο καὶ ὕστερον ἢ ζυμμαχία, καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Πελοποννήσου πρεσβεῖαι [...] ἀνεχώρουν ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος· καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐπ' οἴκου ἀπῆλθον, Κορίνθιοι δὲ ἐς Ἄργος τραπόμενοι πρῶτον λόγους ποιοῦνται πρὸς τινὰς τῶν ἐν τέλει ὄντων Ἀργείων κτλ.²⁰⁴

There are only slight differences between the piece of Philochorus and Thucydides in this case, e.g. Philochorus does not mention the Megareans; and as to the Corinthians,

²⁰¹ "For Philochorus says that in the archonship of Alkaios a fifty-year peace treaty was concluded between the Athenians and the Lakedaimonians and their allies, with the exception of the Boeotians, the Corinthians and the Eleians."

²⁰² "And Philochorus says that the Corinthians, stirring up war again, tried to get even the Argives on their side."

²⁰³ "At this time the Lacedaemonians summoned their own allies, and when all the rest had voted to stop hostilities, except the Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleians and Megarians – to whom the negotiations were displeasing – they made the agreement [...]"

²⁰⁴ "After the conclusion of the fifty years' treaty and the subsequent alliance, the embassies from the Peloponnesus [...] withdrew from Lacedaemon. The rest went home; but the Corinthians proceeded first to Argos and entered into communication with certain of the Argive magistrates [...]"

the wording is not the same.²⁰⁵ However, this can be a result of the scholiast's inaccuracy in his quotations of Philochorus, not of the latter's text.

Lastly, the piece on the action of the Athenians facing lack of resources for continuing war (F 138 = F 164 Harding = Scholion to Aristophanes, *Lysistrata*, 173–174):

οὐκ ἂν ἄγοιεν εἰρήνην οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἕως ἂν θαλασσοκρατῶσιν καὶ τὸ ἀργύριον τὸ ἄβυσσον ἢ παρὰ τῇ θεῷ ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει· καὶ γὰρ ἀληθῶς ἀπέκειτο χίλια τάλαντα. ἥρξαντο οὖν κινεῖν αὐτὰ ἐπὶ Καλλίου ἄρχοντος, ἐφ' οὗ εἰσέχθη τὸ δρᾶμα, ὥς φησι Φιλόχορος ἐν Ἀτθίδι.²⁰⁶

Thucydides recorded this desperate action by the Athenians, of using the reserve fund that Pericles had set on the Acropolis (Thuc. II 13, 4–5). The difference is that Thucydides does not give the archon's name, as the Attidographer does, but some of the wording seems to be similar (Thuc. VIII 15, 1):²⁰⁷

Καὶ νομίσαντες μέγαν ἤδη καὶ σαφῇ τὸν κίνδυνον σφᾶς περιεστάναι, καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ζυμμάχους οὐκ ἐθέλῃσιν τῆς μεγίστης πόλεως μεθεστηκυίας ἡσυχάζειν, τὰ τε χίλια τάλαντα, ὧν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου ἐγλίχοντο μὴ ἄψασθαι, εὐθὺς ἔλυσαν τὰς ἐπικειμένας ζημίας τῷ εἰπόντι ἢ ἐπιψηφίσαντι ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἐκπλήξεως, καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο κινεῖν καὶ ναὺς πληροῦν.²⁰⁸

In sum, from that survey of the select fragments of Philochorus we conclude the following:

1. Numerous fragments correspond with Thucydides in terms of content.
2. Several fragments correspond with Thucydides' narrative in content and vocabulary (similar wording in account of the same historical events).
3. There is, in several cases, additional information in the Phylarchan account in comparison to the Thucydidean account.
4. The range of the books of the *History* with which some of Philochorus' fragments overlap in content and, in some instances, in vocabulary, is from the first to the last; we can surmise that Philochorus used the books: I, II, IV, V,

²⁰⁵ Cf. Harding 2008, 126.

²⁰⁶ "The Athenians would not make peace so long as they control the sea and have the bottomless (supply of) money in the goddess' temple on the Acropolis. For the truth is that one thousand talents were laid up there. Indeed, they began to remove it in the archonship of Kallias, in whose time the play (sc. the *Lysistrata*) was produced, as Philochorus tells in Atthis."

²⁰⁷ Cf. Harding 2008, 132–133.

²⁰⁸ "And they felt that the danger which encompassed them was by now great and manifest, and that the rest of their allies would not be inclined to keep quiet when the greatest state of all had seceded. And so they took up the question of the fund of a thousand talents, which during the whole war they had jealously refrained from touching, and under the influence of their consternation immediately rescinded the penalties which had been imposed upon any speaker who should propose to touch this money, or any presiding officer who should put such a proposal to a vote, and then voted to use this fund and man a considerable number of ships."

VIII. Thus, it is probable that he had the entire work at his disposal. It is worth remembering here that the above points apply to the Phylarchan extracts as reported by the intermediate authors, which are often quite problematic, especially the scholiasts. It is difficult to assess their accuracy in quoting Phylarchus; most cases are, however, not verbatim quotations but indirect speech (φησὶ + AcI).

On the whole, the evidence examined above seems to make probable that Philochorus knew and used Thucydides' *History* when writing his own historical work. Thucydides' narrative was supplemented by Philochorus by other sources, but Thucydides could have been the basic source at least for the period preceding the Peloponnesian War and the War itself. If this is correct, the fact that a well-trained and informed scholar-historian such as Philochorus followed Thucydides at least in parts of his account, testifies that the latter was held in high esteem in some circles of intellectuals, to which Philochorus belonged, and that the *History* was available to them at the time when he was active.

4. Conclusions

In the early fourth century BC, Thucydides' *History* was read by authors of historical works: Cratippus and the author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (if he is a different person from Cratippus). For these two an acquaintance with Thucydides is explicitly attested. Cratippus probably read the entire *History*, speculated about the reason of its "incompleteness", and criticized the shape or abundance of Thucydides' speeches. Since Cratippus is himself a "shadowy" figure, we can only speculate where he found Thucydides' work, but the most plausible conjecture is in a library in Athens. The same applies to the *Hellenica*. The papyrological evidence from the Hellenistic period is scanty, but not insignificant. The approximate date of 250 BC marks the time when Thucydides was circulating in Egypt (probably Alexandria, but we do not know the provenance of the papyri for certain). Their external features suggest professional purposes. They can be examples of editions of single books (first and eighth) of the *History*. Thucydides was well-known in Peripatetic circles. This is attested, firstly, by the indirect testimonies about Theophrastus and Praxiphanes — the former expressed his views about Thucydides' style, which implies a thorough reading of the *History*. Both considered Thucydides a crucial figure and innovator in the field of historiography. Secondly, we have the anonymous Περὶ ἐμπνεύσεως, written under the strong influence of Peripatetic literary theories. The unknown author, probably writing in Alexandria, not only cites passages from five of the eight books of the *History* for explanatory purposes, but also clearly shows that he is acquainted with, and understands the sense of, whole sections of the work. Agatharchides, also

associated with the Peripatos, seems to have read the whole *History*, or at least he was aware of its content. His patron in Alexandria, Heraclides, himself writing historical works, could be among those who, according to the testimony, “praised” Thucydides for his truthfulness. The well-attested knowledge and study of the *History* in the Peripatetic school also makes it plausible that this work was to be found in the Aristotelian library. Polybius’ explicit mention of Thucydides is disappointing, given modern scholars’ convictions about the affinities between them. Nevertheless, it firmly attests that the former was aware of the latter’s work, its subject matter, and of Thucydides’ continuators (in this case, Theopompus). Another testimony is the anonymous chronographic source in Diodorus. In it, the historian is considered the primary source for the events of the Peloponnesian War; he is set within a chain of συγγραφεῖς, writers of contemporary history. The author of this probably “tabular” work would have been acquainted with Thucydides, knew the content of his work, but was also aware of a controversy over its division into eight (which he seems to accept) or nine (which he says is preferred by “some”) books. Lastly, Thucydides was probably extensively used by the most recognized Attidographer of antiquity — Philochorus of Athens — for the composition of his own historical work.

CHAPTER THREE

THUCYDIDES' METHODOLOGICAL CHAPTER AND ITS RECEPTION

1. The methodology and scope of this chapter

In the previous chapter it has been shown that in number of instances where acquaintance with Thucydides' *History* is attested there are reasons to think that his entire work was read. Nonetheless, the introductory chapters of the *History* were probably better recognized, and the most likely to be imitated by further generations of historians.¹ The papyrological evidence, specifically the ratio of extant passages from the first book to the remainders of other books, seems to support the supposition. At the very least, books I–III were probably better known in their entirety than the later ones.² The present chapter focuses on the potential responses of the Hellenistic historians to Thucydides' so-called “methodological chapter” from the first book. This passage is exceptional — Thucydides openly defines his approach to certain historiographical-theoretical issues.³ This has important implications. First, he consciously reflected on the historiographical questions involved in this chapter. Second, those questions could be reconsidered by further generations of historians.⁴ We can venture to think that the attitude towards the ideas included in the chapter on method is

¹ Sacks 1986, 394: “Thucydides’ methodological statements, then, were likely the best-known in the Greek literary world. The reason for their popularity was not only their power of expression, but as well their ambiguity, which allowed them to be interpreted and applied according to current fashion.” Cf. Hornblower 1994, 60–61, and idem 1995, 59, in reference to Polybius, who “may have had better recall of the methodological chapters of Thucydides, especially those early in Book One, than of routine Thucydidean narrative and particular speeches.”

² See above, p. 41 n. 32. Of all the preserved papyri of the *History* ca. 25 percent (23 papyri) are pieces of the first book; second in order is the second book: ca. 18 percent (17 papyri). Other books are much less represented. Of the two extant Hellenistic papyri, one contains fragments of the first book. To be sure, we have to apply caution to “papyrological statistics”. Cf. Kennedy 2018, 38–41, arguing that the books I–III were more likely to be read than the rest of the *History*.

³ Thucydides’ critical self-consciousness, or “meta-knowledge” about his own principles, concerning e.g. the assessment of his sources, is remarkable. In fact, no historian after Thucydides, as far as we can judge from the extant texts, has included this type of reflection so explicitly and emphatically in his work. The exceptional character of this awareness was properly stressed e.g. by Schadewaldt 1982, 276 (“Methodenbewusstsein”), and Hornblower, CT I, 59: “There is nothing like it in Herodotus. More remarkably, it is hard to parallel in any writer *later* than Thucydides.”

⁴ Or, at the very least, be the first to be reflected upon, after the reading of Thucydides’ first book; unlike numerous ideas that have to be read from the *History* as a whole, and are often modern constructs, such as e.g. “Athenian imperialism”, the “idea of the law of the stronger”, etc.

representative for the reception of Thucydides in general.⁵ Another crucial feature of the methodological chapter, as regards the question of reception, is that the points made by Thucydides in that section are sufficiently “graspable” to look for their parallels in fragmentary Hellenistic historians. Conversely, relationships between great ideas that are too inclusive or wide-ranging, such as a “political-military idea of history” as compared with e.g. “pragmatic history” in the case of Polybius, are extremely hard to assess.⁶ It would require thorough and full knowledge of the entire works, which is impossible in the case of the Hellenistic historians.⁷ Even if we had the complete works of the Hellenistic historians at our disposal, we still would have, on both sides, constructs too great to be compared. However, even with the focused methodological chapter the thematic range of this section goes far beyond the modern concepts of methodology. There is thus also one case where the enquiry involves notions not expressed in the *Methodenkapitel*.⁸

As emphasized in the introduction, any attempt to assess the relationship between Thucydides’ methodological concepts, and those expressed by particular Hellenistic historians, is, of necessity, preceded by an *a priori* understanding of Thucydides himself. The studies on the reception of Thucydides published until now have not posed the question: what is actually the proper method of comparison of his historiographical concepts with the Hellenistic authors? They did not take as their point of departure an independent interpretation of the “received” text, mostly relying on presumptions of what is, and what is not, “Thucydidean”. Hence, in the present work, an arguably more appropriate approach is taken, which endeavours to provide a reading of Thucydides, focused on the key concepts of the methodological chapter, which precedes the assessment of the possible affinities of these concepts with the Hellenistic historians’ ideas.

This procedure, however, is not free from difficulties. When interpreting Thucydides, the scholar constantly risks the danger of using later (i.e. post-Thucydidean) authors to elucidate his concepts, explain his vocabulary, understand his ideas etc. Interpreted in this manner, Thucydides is then to be

⁵ Cf. Nicolai 1995, 5: “L’interpretazione del controverso passo programmatico che chiude l’archeologia tucididea (1, 22) può essere considerata come una cartina di tornasole che consente di comprendere in che modo l’opera di Tuciddide sia stata valutata e classificata.”

⁶ We would have to define, in such instance, firstly, Thucydides’ “idea of political-military history” in a comprehensive manner, and try to parallel it with Polybius’ *πραγματική ιστορία*. It would require a thorough interpretation of both historians. Such constructs are also particularly subject to modern distortions and imputations.

⁷ It is sometimes forgotten that it also applies to Polybius, so commonly associated with Thucydides in modern scholarship.

⁸ I.e. the concept of causation, see below, pp. 110–118.

compared with the later (in our case: Hellenistic) authors, including those who served in the reading of his *History*. In other words, we can fall into the trap of assessing the affinities between Thucydides' methodology and the methodologies of the very authors who help us to understand him, which results in hermeneutic aporia. Therefore, in this chapter I aim first of all to read Thucydides' text in its own right, keeping to a simple three-stage interpretative scheme. Each element of the text is to be read: a) within the immediate context (here: the chapter on method), b) in relation to other parts of the work (intratextual connection, e.g. with the chapters preceding or following the one being interpreted), c) in the context of the entire work. To this text-oriented method, we can further add (only as complementary) references to Thucydides' background, his "reality".⁹ In most cases, to establish the most probable sense of the given word/idea I proceed from a) a simple translation of the relevant text, to b) its immediate context, through c) occurrences of the key notions in other passages of the work to (not always) d) occurrences of these notions in other works. Of the studies on the particular interpretative problems are adduced those that are in keeping with the methodological rules outlined above. In the classic hermeneutical approach, it is legitimate to state that an idea/concept from a given text is analogous to another under two conditions: a) if these texts belong to the same intellectual/cultural "space" (Schleiermacher: *Sprachgebiet*), and b) when it is demonstrable that these texts embrace a similar pattern of thought (Schleiermacher's *Gedankencomplexus*). Simple word-echo is not enough to assert their affinity. Individual notions, in a given context, combine to form a specific *system* in which they gain their proper sense. In other words, it is the interrelation of two or more notions that constitutes the sense of each particular component, and creates the third element — a theory,

⁹ See the classical hermeneutical approach as conceptualized by Schleiermacher 1838, 36–39. Of modern Classical scholars, who rarely put forward their methodological foundations, I find close affinity with the approach of Morrison 1999, 98 with n. 16. He conceptualizes "three types of analysis: local, distant and extratextual" – the first two converge with Schleiermacher's first two punctuated above, while the last one (extratextual), according to Morrison, refers to "other contexts, including the reader's own world". On this last point I disagree, as it would mean interaction with the ancient text resulting in imputation of modern ideas, concepts, etc. I prefer to replace it with "author's own world". That is because I endeavour to inquire into ancient authors' way of thinking about historiography, rather than placing it in a modern context. Morrison does not indicate his theoretical model. On modern hermeneutics see Ricoeur's essays (esp. on the relations between history and hermeneutics): Ricoeur 2000, 731–747; idem 2003, 15–25; idem 1976, 683–695. Cf. Bollnow 1976, 167–189, on Ricoeur and hermeneutics in general. Ricoeur's methodology was recently applied, with interesting results, in the field of Classical literature by Wiater 2011, 21–23.

idea etc.¹⁰ In sum, according to the hermeneutical methodology of interpretation, it would be incorrect to “pull out” single elements from their context in order to compare them with other extracted components from a different text. To be sure, the intention of the survey below is not to provide a complete reinterpretation of the chapter on method. The aim is to make an outline of the crucial points made by Thucydides in the passage, to reject the most inadequate readings found in the literature on the subject, and to propose the most probable interpretation. I am aware that interpretation of a given passage, chapter etc. always has to be treated as *the most probable* when taking all arguments into account. There is no reading that could be considered “ultimate”; there is only the most likely reading, which can be questioned at any point. It applies to Thucydides, as well as to the other authors compared with him throughout this book.

2. Thucydides’ chapter on method

The interpretations of I 22 were, especially in the XIXth century, focused on its alleged “scientific” overtones.¹¹ Thucydides was believed to have proclaimed here his strict scientific rules for writing history.¹² In later scholarship, the relationship between historiography and rhetoric was conceptualized in a different way, which also opened up new perspectives on the chapter.¹³ Let us first quote the chapter on method *in extenso* (Thuc. I 22):

(1) Καὶ ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον ἕκαστοι ἢ μέλλοντες πολεμήσειν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ἦδη ὄντες, χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμνημονεύσαι ἦν ἐμοὶ τε ὧν αὐτὸς ἦκουσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοθεν ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν· ὥς δ’ ἂν ἐδόκουν μοι ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ’ εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένων ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται. (2) τὰ δ’ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος ἠξίωσα γράφειν, οὐδ’ ὥς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ’ οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρήν καὶ παρὰ τῶν

¹⁰ Schleiermacher 1838, 94, (cf. p. 99). Schleiermacher builds on the word “text”, as deriving from Latin *texere*, “to weave”. Hence, text is a structure “weaved from senses” (Verwebung von Sinneinheiten). See Frank 1977, 31. On interpretation in hermeneutics in general see Gadamer 1974, 1062–1073; Bohman 1999, 377–378. For detailed account of Schleiermacher’s theory see Birus 1982, 15–58; Margolis 1987, 361–368; Bowie 1998, VII–XXXI.

¹¹ On the methodological chapter of Thucydides in general see the comprehensive studies of: Schmid 1954/55, 220–233; Erbse 1970, 43–69; Beyer 1971; Egermann 1972, 575–602; Schepens 1980, 113–119; Marincola 1989, 216–223; Meister 1990, 50–53 and 59–62; Nicolai 1995, 5–26; Tsakmakis 1998, 239–255; Murari Pires 1998, 106–111; Plant 1999, 62–73; Greenwood 2006, 63–68; Pothou 2009, 141–151; Tosi 2018, 165–182 (on I 22, 1). Cf. Forsdyke 2017, 22–30.

¹² See a good overview of the modern reception in Harloe, Morley 2012b, 1–24; cf. Morley 2012, 115–139.

¹³ Lateiner 1977, 42–51; Grant 1974, 81–94; Wiater 2011, 121–124.

ἄλλων ὅσον δυνατόν ἀκριβεῖα περὶ ἐκάστου ἐπεξελθόν. (3) ἐπιπόνως δὲ ἠύρισκετο, διότι οἱ παρόντες τοῖς ἔργοις ἐκάστοις οὐ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔλεγον, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐκατέρων τις εὐνοίας ἢ μνήμης ἔχοι. (4) καὶ ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φανέται· ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὐθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἔξει. κτήμᾳ τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν ζύγεται.¹⁴

This section falls into three main thematic parts:

1. Statement on how the speeches that occur in the *History* were construed.
2. Declaration of the avoidance of τὸ μυθῶδες in the *History*.
3. The resulting usefulness and everlasting value of the work.

2.1 The statement about speeches

Thucydides explains his approach to the composition of speeches in the first sentence of the chapter (I 22, 1).¹⁵ The interpretation of this passage has been an object of considerable scholarly debate. The central question is: what does Thucydides actually declare here as to the character of the speeches that he

¹⁴ The purpose of this section is to provide a probable interpretation of these words, and any rendering into English implies a certain ready understanding of them. Thus, especially at this stage, the translation should be treated with exceptional caution: "As to the speeches that were made by different men, either when they were about to begin the war or when they were already engaged therein, it has been difficult to recall with strict accuracy the words actually spoken, both for me as regards that which I myself heard, and for those who from various other sources have brought me reports. Therefore the speeches are given in the language in which, as it seemed to me, the several speakers would express, on the subjects under consideration, the sentiments most befitting the occasion, though at the same time I have adhered as closely as possible to the general sense of what was actually said. But as to the facts of the occurrences of the war, I have thought it my duty to give them, not as ascertained from any chance informant nor as seemed to me probable, but only after investigating with the greatest possible accuracy each detail, in the case both of the events in which I myself participated and of those regarding which I got my information from others. And the endeavour to ascertain these facts was a laborious task, because those who were eye-witnesses of the several events did not give the same reports about the same things, but reports varying according to their championship of one side or the other, or according to their recollection. And it may well be that the absence of the fabulous from my narrative will seem less pleasing to the ear; but whoever shall wish to have a clear view both of the events which have happened and of those which will some day, in all human probability, happen again in the same or a similar way—for these to adjudge my history profitable will be enough for me. And, indeed, it has been composed, not as a prize-essay to be heard for the moment, but as a possession for all time" (all translations of Thucydides' *History* are of Smith).

¹⁵ On speeches in Greek historiography in general a good outline is found in Walbank 1985, 242–261. Walbank aptly stresses the epic roots of the model of introducing speeches of the acting characters into the narrative: "To let historical characters speak for themselves is, however, a more dramatic method and recalls the long association of historiography from its earliest beginnings with epic and drama" (p. 243).

interweaves with the narrative parts of the *History*? There are several possible answers:

1. Thucydides says he endeavoured to reproduce literally the words of the speakers.
2. Thucydides declares that the speeches are entirely his own invention.
3. Thucydides admits to some degree of free invention, but based on the words that had really been spoken.
4. Thucydides says that the speeches are his invention, but adheres to several principles that make them probable in the given circumstances.

Before we consider our understanding of Thucydides, it is necessary to stress that the proper object of our inquiry here is what he actually declares he is/was doing, not what he in fact did.¹⁶ In other words, we examine Thucydides' assertions, not his practices. The first possibility — Thucydides implies that he reproduces the speeches literally — has gained relatively little acceptance in scholarship.¹⁷ It is hardly possible that Thucydides could have believed that he could obtain precise knowledge about every speech included in the *History*; for some of them there was hardly any reliable informant.¹⁸ Moreover, in the passage cited above, Thucydides admits that either for him “it was hard to remember with precision what was said” (χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμνημονεῦσαι ἦν), as well as for his informants (τοῖς ἄλλοθεν ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν). Furthermore, ἀκρίβεια, which in this context probably means “exactness”, when applied to λόγοι should probably be read as “precise wording”¹⁹ — which Thucydides admits he was unable to provide. Thucydides' explicit statements in the immediate context of the chapter rule out the possibility that the speeches in the *History* are a literal reproduction of the historical speeches.

¹⁶ This provision does not entirely exclude references to Thucydides' practice, but limits them to the relationship between theory and practice, and it is this which will at some points be examined.

¹⁷ See Fornara 1983, 144, who supports such a view with the understanding of τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων as “the actual words” (not “actually delivered speeches”). On the fallacy of this reading see below. Garrity 1998, 361–384, argues that Thucydides to some degree reproduces both form (style) and content. The pivot of his argument is the occurrence of ὥς and οὕτως in the statement about speeches (ὥς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ... εἰπεῖν ... οὕτως εἴρηται). Garrity stresses the adverbial and modal aspects of the two words, which, according to him, imply that Thucydides claims that he is writing “in the way” that the speeches were delivered. Garrity's moderate position as to Thucydides' partial faithfulness to the style of the speakers is not entirely unfounded, but still doubtful.

¹⁸ See Pelling 2009, 180.

¹⁹ Eggermann 1972, 577: ἡ ἀκρίβεια = “Genauigkeit”; Porciani 1999, 130: “ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων: si ricorda [...] qualcosa di preciso”. See also the helpful discussion of the term in Scanlon 2002, 146–147, who supports such a translation.

The second option — Thucydides composed the speeches fully according to his own judgement — was particularly defended e.g. by Franz Egermann. He tried to prove this by a specific reading of the elements mentioned in the passage in question: the given circumstances (τὰ αἰεὶ παρόντα), the requirements imposed by them on the speakers (τὰ δέοντα), and the political line taken by them (ἡ ξύμπασα γνώμη).²⁰ According to Egermann, the speeches in Thucydides are historical only in terms of the probability of the use of given words in a given context. However, the crucial point in his reasoning — the understanding of the ἡ ξύμπασα γνώμη as “die politische Gesamthaltung” — is controversial, and has found little scholarly approval.²¹ Nevertheless, Thucydides does not entirely exclude the possibility that to some extent the speeches are a reflection of those actually delivered. This seems to be implied in the second part of the passage cited above. Thucydides describes his endeavour to gain full knowledge about the original speeches, on the one hand by hearing them himself (διαμνημονεῦσαι ... ὧν αὐτὸς ἤκουσα), on the other — by interrogating those that had heard them (τοῖς ἄλλοθεν ποθεν ἐμοὶ ἀπαγγέλλουσιν). Arnold W. Gomme argued that Thucydides' method was to inquire into the sense of the historical speeches, and to rewrite them in his own language.²² An argument for this is the admittedly high degree of similarity in the style of the speeches. Walter Schmid, in a meticulous structural analysis of the chapter on method, has shown that the λόγοι are declared to be “as close as possible” to the actual ones, but with the provision that to some degree they also rely on “Ergänzung”, “Rekonstruktion”. This is specifically implied by the qualifier ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης.²³ Further, the fundamental phrase: ἡ ξύμπασα γνώμη.

²⁰ Egermann 1972, 580–581: “Die Reden sind Schöpfungen des Thukydides und insofern frei komponiert, als sie weder formal-stilistisch noch inhaltlich-gedanklich ein bestimmtes reales Original kopieren. Dennoch ist die thukydideische Rede in tieferem Sinn historisch getreu dadurch, daß sie drei ausschlaggebende Faktoren berücksichtigt: die jeweilige geschichtliche Situation (τὰ αἰεὶ παρόντα), die Forderung, die diese an den Redner und Staatsmann stellt (τὰ δέοντα) und drittens die politische Gesamthaltung und Gesamtintention (ἡ ξύμπασα γνώμη) des Staatsmannes, der mit der betreffenden geschichtlichen Situation konfrontiert ist und zu ihr Stellung zu nehmen hat (τὰ δέοντα εἰπεῖν). Und das ist in der Tat das Entscheidende und historisch Bedeutsame.”

²¹ Erbse 1989, 133, follows Egermann, but also adds his own proposals as to the rendering of the term. Forsdyke 2017, 26, seems also to go in this direction.

²² Gomme 1937, 156–189. This study also summarizes (and criticizes) the opinions of earlier scholars on Thucydides' method in composing the speeches. A drawback of this otherwise excellent paper is that it combines and confuses the question of what Thucydides *declares*, and what he actually *does* as to the speeches in his work.

²³ Schmid 1954/55, 220–233. The author provides a useful scrutiny of the *Methodenkapitel* in terms of its key notions (“Hauptbegriffe”). Canfora 2011, 365–388, added a simple yet

Scholars have tried to render it in various ways: as the “main thesis”, “general sense”²⁴ or “intention”²⁵ of the delivered speeches. The charge against these readings is their incompatibility with the fact that most speeches have more than one layer and involve many different points. It is therefore very difficult, if not impossible, to say what is the “main thesis” or “general sense” of a speech. The problem with the reading “intention” is similar.²⁶ John Wilson rightly refuted those readings, and convincingly argued that Thucydides attempted to comprise the complete “thesis” of each speech (all the vital points of the speech actually delivered). According to Wilson, Thucydides tried to gain knowledge about the speeches, and to adhere to all their chief points (the proper sense of *ξύμπασα* here), at the same time making additions, relying on τὰ δέοντα — what would be required to be said on each occasion.²⁷ Frank W. Walbank also assumed that Thucydides claims some historicity for his speeches, with necessary additions of his own, due to gaps in his and his informants’ memory.²⁸ These additions are, according to Walbank, expressed in the phrase τὰ δέοντα — which are words imputed by the historian, according to his own idea of what should be said in particular circumstances.²⁹ Leone Porciani inquired into the semantics of γνώμη in other Thucydidean passages and in other authors, and on that basis he concluded that the most appropriate way to understand γνώμη in Thuc. I 22 is “line of reasoning” or “argumentation”.³⁰ Still, we shall add that, as Antonis Tsakmakis accentuates, γνώμη is not a “property” of a speech, but of a speaker. Therefore, Emily Greenwood’s proposal: “the ideas behind what speakers actually said”, seems most adequate: words convey speaker’s whole γνώμη, as closely as was possible.³¹ At the same time, Thucydidean speeches are more

substantial observation that Thucydides introduces his speeches by ἔλεξαν τοιαύδε (“such as this”), not τάδε (“these”).

²⁴ Plant 1988, 201–202.

²⁵ Bicknell 1990, 172–178; Erbse 1989, 133: “Gesamthaltung” and “Grundintention”. Still, Erbse believes that Thucydides tried to get as close as possible to the actual speeches and to the “main intention” of the speakers. Badian 1992, 187–190, understands the intention as “what the speaker wanted to persuade his audience to do”.

²⁶ For instance, is there a correct answer to the question, what is the main “intention” of the Funeral Speech?

²⁷ Wilson 1982, 97–99. Tosi 2018, 175–176, makes a good point for the reading of *ξύμπασα* as implying completeness, rather than generality.

²⁸ Hence Walbank’s rendering of *ξύμπασα γνώμη* as “general purport”.

²⁹ Walbank 1985, 244–245.

³⁰ Porciani 1999, 103–135, esp. 124–127. “Ritengo che il significato di γνώμη in I 22, 1 sia quello di ‘pensiero, ragionamento, sequenza di argomenti’, sostenuto da I 54, 2, da II 20, 1 e da VII 8, 2.” (p. 128)

³¹ Tsakmakis 2017, 274. Cf. Greenwood 2006, 64; Zagorin 2005, 152: “true gist or purport of what each speaker said”.

sophisticated and “philosophically” elaborated to an extent rather unexpected in their historical counterparts.³²

The next problem central for the interpretation of Thucydides' statement on method in composing the speeches, but also pertaining to his approach to ἔργα, is the relationship between the verb δοκεῖν as it occurs in the part about speeches on the one hand, and δοκεῖν appearing in the sentence on ἔργα on the other.³³ On a general level, the use of δοκεῖν in these two sections seems to indicate a contrast between Thucydides' treatment of λόγοι on the one hand, and ἔργα on the other. The former were written “as it seemed to me” (ὥς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ), whereas the ἔργα “were not written down as it seemed to me” (οὐδ' ὥς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει), but they were rather “inquired into with the highest possible adequacy” (ὅσον δυνατόν ἀκριβείᾳ ... ἐπεξελθόν). Some scholars understood this as a dichotomy between subjectivity in the treatment of speeches, which are (allegedly) affected by Thucydides' imagination, and objectivity in the analysis of the deeds of war, which are subjected to a stricter “scientific” inquiry. The apparently “negative” use of δοκεῖν in the case of ἔργα could be used as a confirmation that in the case of λόγοι Thucydides allows himself to take considerable liberties with the speeches (as compared with the historical ones).³⁴ The reason for this misconception is the application of incorrect semantics of δοκεῖν, allegedly implying “fanciful” or “imaginative” dealing with the historical material (λόγοι or ἔργα). Here we need to go beyond the immediate context. John Marincola analyzed Thucydides' use of δοκεῖν and has shown that its sense is far from clear. The meanings of δοκεῖν found in the *History* tend to encompass thinking, reconstructing and reasoning, but always in such a way that it relies on some firm basis.³⁵ The phrase οὐδ' ὥς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει would mean, according to this reading, “not as I thought”, and implies that the

³² This has been illuminatingly described by Tsakmakis 2017, 267–281, esp. p. 273: “As deeds, Thucydides' speeches are historical (they were truly delivered), but at the same time they are free from each speaker's weaknesses and limitations: they are – Thucydides assures us – expert speeches of exemplary quality.”

³³ Thuc. I 22, 1–2: ὥς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ἕκαστοι περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπεῖν, ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων, οὕτως εἴρηται. τὰ δ' ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος ἡξίωσα γράφειν, οὐδ' ὥς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ' οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον δυνατόν ἀκριβείᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου ἐπεξελθόν.

³⁴ Schmid 1954/55, 233, does not put it so radically, but nevertheless admits a contrast; Bicknell 1990, 174; Hornblower, CT I, 59–60, translates ὥς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει as “according to ideas of my own”.

³⁵ Marincola 1989, 216–223. Marincola says that whenever Thucydides uses the verb δοκεῖν for what he does, “it means that he employs certain amount of imaginative historical reconstruction and at times uses his own reasoned conjectures (a better term than “opinions”).” (p. 221)

ἔργα are less subject to Thucydides' reconstructive reasoning, but not, as could erroneously be presumed, entirely deprived of his opinions, perspectives, etc. Taking this semantic improvement into account, δοκεῖν applied to the handling of λόγοι would imply that Thucydides was aware that he had enough source material to work on, but fewer possibilities to verify it in comparison with ἔργα. This difference stems from the character of the material itself; Thucydides writes mostly contemporary history ("Zeitgeschichte"), which gave him the opportunity to be the witness of the events described, or at least to interrogate the eyewitnesses thereof.³⁶

Further, what is the sense of τὰ δέοντα? Are τὰ δέοντα words/ideas etc. appropriate to the circumstances from the perspective of Thucydides, or of each particular speaker?³⁷ Wilson argued that the answer lies in the relation between τὰ δέοντα and ξύμπασα γνώμη. The τὰ δέοντα are a necessary supplement of Thucydides' source material concerning what was actually said, a type of "expansion" of the chief points of each speech to which he had some access. In other words, τὰ δέοντα are Thucydides' own conjectures about what each speaker should say in terms of content, taking this speaker's γνώμη into account.³⁸ In sum, while the ξύμπασα γνώμη are probably "the ideas behind what speakers actually said", the τὰ δέοντα denote rearrangement, supplementation and revision of the content, but also Thucydides' own input in terms of style.³⁹ Walbank saw a tension between what was really said (γνώμη) and

³⁶ As highlighted in the context of the semantics of δοκεῖν by Marincola 1989, 222.

³⁷ The difference is subtle, but not insignificant. Either τὰ δέοντα are meant as words imputed to the speakers by Thucydides (because he believed them to be appropriate), or τὰ δέοντα are words that Thucydides thought that the given speaker would consider appropriate to the situation. The latter option would rely more on Thucydides' knowledge about each speaker's preferences and line of reasoning, the former on his own rhetorical training and devices. See Greenwood 2006, 67–68.

³⁸ The γνώμη aspect rightly stressed by Wilson 1982, 101–103. See Tosi 2018, 167–171, for the emphasis on content, rather than form, and on Thucydides' awareness of the probability, rather than exactness, of his "reconstructions".

³⁹ I agree on this point with Tsakmakis 1998, 249: "Thukydides hat versucht, jede Rede so zu formulieren, wie er glaubte, daß man die jeweiligen Thesen in der jeweiligen Situation am besten hätte unterstützen können." Cf. "Thukydides bestätigt in 22,1, daß die in den Reden vertretenen Positionen die historische Wahrheit wiedergeben, stellt aber zugleich klar, daß alles über diesen inhaltlichen Kern Hinausgehende (d.h. die Form) seiner eigenen rhetorisch-schriftstellerischen Kunstfertigkeit zu verdanken ist." (p. 251). See also Winton 1999, 527–533: γνώμη as the historical core of the speeches, τὰ δέοντα as Thucydides' supplementation of it, according to his judgement. Cf. Nicolai 1999, 280–281; Porciani 1999, 133; Pelling 2009, 184–185, highlights the fact that prior to every speech Thucydides provides a short summary of its content, which sometimes contains information that is not to be found in the speech itself. This suggests that Thucydides omits certain parts of the speech, and changes the internal balance of particular

Thucydides' conjectures about what should be said in the given circumstances (τὰ δέοντα). In fact, he seems to aptly remark that “the criterion of the one is simply the truth, the criterion of the other is suitability, τὸ πρέπον, πιθανότης [...]”.⁴⁰ Walbank's suggestion that Thucydides is the first author known to us who articulates the concept of πρέπον is one of the important points of reference in the further argument on the reception of the methodological chapter in the Hellenistic period.⁴¹ Yet this perspective requires modification at one point — is τὸ πρέπον, or appropriateness, in any way meant to be at variance with the truth? The answer has to be negative. There is no proof that “suitability” or “appropriateness” does involve free invention on the part of the historian. Quite the contrary — the historian in putting τὰ δέοντα into his speakers' mouths is bound to take all circumstances into account: the personality of the speaker, his audience, their mutual relationships, their historical setting, etc. The τὰ δέοντα is actually something that restricts, not facilitates, the historian's subjectivity and potential bias.⁴² To recapitulate, in the part of the methodological chapter which pertains to speeches in the historical work, Thucydides declares that he has tried to be as faithful as possible to the content of speeches actually delivered, that it was difficult to reproduce them with utmost precision, thus he composed them with the overall circumstances in which they were delivered in mind. In other words, the principle of Thucydides' composition of speeches in his *History* is rationally assessed probability based on the historian's knowledge and experience. Certain particularities in terms of the arguments used, as well as their stylistic form, depend on Thucydides' substantiated judgement of his source material concerning the historical speeches.

2.2 Declaration of the avoidance of τὸ μυθῶδες

The second part of the chapter refers to the absence of τὸ μυθῶδες in the *History*, and the everlasting usefulness of the work (I 22, 4). It is worth underlining that this form, obviously connected with the word μῦθος, does not occur in surviving Greek literature before Thucydides.⁴³ There have been various proposals for translation, which lay emphasis either on the sense that it refers to a) subject matter: “storytelling element”; “merveilleux”, b) stylistic traits: “literary considerations”; or c) both: “künstlerischen Schmuck”; “inventive

points in comparison to its “original”; Schütrumpf 2011, 253: “Such a process of summarizing implicit in ξύμπασα γνώμη involves reduction, abstraction, generalization.”

⁴⁰ Walbank 1985, 245.

⁴¹ See below on Callisthenes (pp. 121–122) and Posidonius (pp. 176–177).

⁴² See Schütrumpf 2011, 249–251; Marincola 2007, 121.

⁴³ As noted by Flory 1989, 193 n. 2. A TLG computerized search seems to confirm this.

embellishment”.⁴⁴ All these renderings are to a large extent arbitrary, and seem to be founded on the “traditional” association with the word *μῦθος*. Of course, the word derives from (or is connected to) *μυθέω* (“relate fabulously”) and *μῦθος* (“story”),⁴⁵ but its exceptional grammatical form, and first of all the specific context of the methodological chapter, call for a deeper inquiry of its sense as used by Thucydides.⁴⁶

Flory has questioned this simple definition of *μυθῶδες* as “stories” (i.e. any kind of story), and argued that in our context Thucydides means not only to avoid “fanciful” stories as irrelevant to history, but specifically stories that exaggerate and celebrate the glories of war.⁴⁷ Thucydides indeed says that the lack of *μυθῶδες* will prove *ἀτερπέστερον* — “less pleasant” for the audience.⁴⁸ In other passages in the *History*, rhetorical pleasure, flattering the crowd, etc. are regularly opposed to truth, proper interest (= what is good for the listeners), and are connected to “patriotic” praise and self-praise, which ultimately, as the speakers warn, lead to danger.⁴⁹ Thucydides also mentions *τὸ μυθῶδες* in the chapter immediately preceding the methodological one (I 21, 1).⁵⁰

ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων τεκμηρίων ὅμως τοιαῦτα ἂν τις νομίζων μάλιστα ἃ διήλθον οὐχ ἁμαρτάνοι, καὶ οὔτε ὥς ποιηταὶ ὑμνήκασι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ μείζον κοσμοῦντες μᾶλλον πιστεύων, οὔτε ὥς λογογράφοι ξυνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον, ὅντα ἀνεξέλεγκτα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνευκικότα, ἠύρησθαι δὲ ἡγησάμενος ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων σημείων ὥς παλαιὰ εἶναι ἀποχρώντως.⁵¹

⁴⁴ Cf. Hornblower, CT I, 61: “τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες: ‘the unromantic [lit. ‘unstory-like’] character of my narrative”. See the bibliographical references in Flory 1989, 195 n. 5.

⁴⁵ Frisk, GEW, 265, s.v. *μῦθος*: “sagenhaft, fabelhaft”.

⁴⁶ On the relation between myth and historiography in general see Saïd 2007, 76–88, who emphasizes the pioneering role of Thucydides: “In fact it is in Thucydides (1.21) that we first find a word coined – maybe by Thucydides himself – on the root *μυθ-* with a distinctly negative content: in his programmatic remarks, *μυθῶδες* designates what is to be excluded from the history of the Peloponnesian War: the miraculous aspects of traditional tales that have nothing to do with “truth” – they do not admit testing – but are attractive and entertaining.” (p. 78). On the Greek concept of *μῦθος* in general see Fowler 2011, 45–66.

⁴⁷ Flory 1989, 194–202.

⁴⁸ Grant 1974, 81 – “rather dull”, p. 82: “less attractive”; cf. Gomme 1954b, 117.

⁴⁹ Thuc. I 84, 2; II 41, 4; II 65, 8; VI 83, 2–3; VII 8, 2; VII 14, 4.

⁵⁰ Hornblower, CT I, 59 notes that the sentence about *τὸ μυθῶδες* at I 21 “anticipates” I 22, 4.

⁵¹ “Still, from the evidence that has been given, any one would not err who should hold the view that the state of affairs in antiquity was pretty nearly such as I have described it, not giving greater credence to the accounts, on the one hand, which the poets have put into song, adorning and amplifying their theme, and, on the other, which the chroniclers have composed with a view rather of pleasing the ear than of telling the truth, since their stories cannot be tested and most of them have from lapse of time won their way into the region of the fabulous so as to be incredible.

This passage occurs in a section that is a transition to the proper *Methodenkapitel*, as well as a conclusion to the so-called Archaeology, the reconstruction of the most ancient times of Greek history (Thuc. I 2–19).⁵² Thucydides draws a clear distinction between his account of these times, as based on thorough research, and the accounts of the “poets and logographers”, who have embellished on the events, especially the Trojan war. The sense and final conclusion of the Archaeology is that Greece was not as populous at that time, as one could infer from Homer (Thuc. I 10, 3–4), and that the war itself required fewer resources than the poets imply (Thuc. I 11, 2). In general — many of Thucydides' contemporaries' convictions about the past are incorrect, usually due to indiscriminate acceptance of the oral tradition.⁵³ Scholars have supposed this statement about the relegation of τὸ μυθῶδες to be an implicit criticism of the type of historiography represented by Herodotus.⁵⁴ Things that are hardly verifiable (ἀνεξέλεγκτα) “make their way into” (ἐκνευικηκότα),⁵⁵ or become, τὸ μυθῶδες. The μυθῶδες is something that “rather pleases the listeners, than shows the truth” (προσαγωγώτερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον). It is suggested that τὸ μυθῶδες is such an account that remains untested, inaccurate, unclear, based on false

He should regard the facts as having been made out with sufficient accuracy, on the basis of the clearest indications, considering that they have to do with early times.”

⁵² On Thucydides' method and aims in this section see: Hornblower, CT I, 7–59; Tsakmakis 1995, 34–50 (see *ibidem*, 3–8 for earlier scholarship on the subject); Crane 1996, 32–34; Pothou 2009, 126–141.

⁵³ As with the story of the tyrannicides (I 20, 2): οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὰς ἀκοὰς τῶν προγεγενημένων, καὶ ἢ ἐπιχώρια σφίσιν ἢ, ὁμοίως ἀβασανίστως παρ' ἀλλήλων δέχονται. Ἀθηναίων γοῦν τὸ πλῆθος Ἱππαρχον οἶονται ὑφ' Ἀρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος τύραννον ὄντα ἀποθανεῖν κτλ. (“For men accept from one another hearsay reports of former events, neglecting to test them just the same, even though these events belong to the history of their own country. Take the Athenians, for example; most of them think that Hipparchus was tyrant when he was slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton”).

⁵⁴ As articulated e.g. by Gomme 1954b, 117: “By τὸ μυθῶδες Thucydides means those stories which Herodotos loved to tell both about the past (e.g. Kandaules and Gyges, or the birth of Cyrus or of Kypselos, Rhampsinitos and the clever thief) and about his own contemporaries (Zerxes and his dreams, or Xerxes and the storm at sea when he was returning to Asia), some of which he does not himself believe to be true and gives his reasons why. Such things Thucydides rejects in the interests of truth, and we say that Herodotus was after all an artist, while Thucydides was the first scientific historian.” Of course, the last part of this opinion of Gomme — the opposition of Herodotus “the artist” and Thucydides “the scientist” is, in the light of the methodology and perspective of the present book, treated with distance. Cf. Flory 1989, 201; Said 2010, 168, adduces *Schol. ad Thuc.* I 22, 4: αἰνίττεται δὲ τὰ μυθικὰ Ἡροδότου.

⁵⁵ On ἀνεξέλεγκτα and ἐκνευικηκότα see Hornblower, CT I, 59, which renders them respectively as “cannot be tested” and “passed into the region of”.

assumptions, and not useful.⁵⁶ Thucydides, instead of reproducing unverified τὸ μυθῶδες, decided to inquire the past with support of the “clearest proofs” (ηὐρησθαι δὲ ... ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων σημείων).

Hence, scholars who tend to subsume the sense of τὸ μυθῶδες in this section under “sentimental and chauvinistic accounts” (Stewart Flory) or “patriotic stories” (Simon Hornblower)⁵⁷ seem to be wrong. Throughout the Archaeology, Thucydides lays emphasis on inquiry, proper reasoning, the search for truth, and not only on the “patriotic” aspect of μυθῶδες. In the conclusion to the Archaeology (I 20, 2), he says that “people accept the oral tradition even if (not especially when — M.K.) it refers to their own country”.⁵⁸ The emphasis seems to be on the lack of criticism as such, not exclusively on that grounded in patriotic sentiment.⁵⁹ This contextual reading of τὸ μυθῶδες, taking into account the section preceding the methodological chapter, allows us to say that the notion designates, in Thucydides’ idiosyncratic use, common, unsubstantiated and/or⁶⁰ exaggerated accounts of the past, which are — consequently — false. Hence, when in the methodological chapter immediately following the section analyzed above, Thucydides says that ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται, we can allow ourselves to believe that he declares the avoidance of information which is untested, based on false premises or exaggerated, even if it results in a less pleasurable aural effect.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Pothou 2009, 88: “Il n’a pas fait référence à l’élément mythique (μυθῶδες) dans son œuvre, parce que le mythe ne contient aucune des qualités recherchées par Thucydide: l’exactitude [...], la vérité [...], la clarté [...] et, enfin, l’utilité pour l’avenir [...]”.

⁵⁷ Flory 1989, 201. Hornblower, CT I, p. 61: “[...] the stories Thucydides has in mind are patriotic ones”.

⁵⁸ If Thucydides conceived of τὸ μυθῶδες as laying emphasis on the distortion of historical/poetical accounts, caused by patriotic sentiments, he would have stressed that precisely at this point. Instead, he formulates this with concessive words: οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὰς ἀκοὰς τῶν προγεγενημένων, καὶ ἢν ἐπιχώρια σφίσιν ἦ.

⁵⁹ Chapter I 20 corroborates this. The example of uncritical acceptance given there (the widespread belief that Hipparchus was killed when already a tyrant) is “patriotically” irrelevant; cf. the introductory words stressing the critical enquiry as such: πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὄντα καὶ οὐ χρόνῳ ἀμνηστούμενα καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνας οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἰοῦνται κτλ. (“There are many other matters, too, belonging to the present and not forgotten through lapse of time, regarding which the other Hellenes as well hold mistaken opinions [...]”), and the concluding: οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐτοῖμα μᾶλλον τρέπονται. (“So averse to taking pains are most men in the search for the truth, and so prone are they to turn to what lies ready at hand”).

⁶⁰ The examples in I 20 seem to be assessed by Thucydides as false, common and unverified, but have little to do with exaggeration. On the contrary, the convictions rebutted in the Archaeology proper are both unsubstantiated and exaggerated.

⁶¹ Again, Flory 1989, 202, is too narrow when he restates that “[...] τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες means the absence of patriotic anecdotes in the narrative portion of the *History* [...]”.

Here one additional remark has to be made. It could be mistakenly expected that by this declaration Thucydides excludes *tout court* the mythical or quasi-mythical accounts of the past. This would mean a serious disjunction with some narrative parts of the *History*, where such stories actually do occur.⁶² What is therefore decisive is probably the aim and character of these insertions. Firstly, Thucydides uses typical distancing words when introducing such elements.⁶³ Secondly, when he does so, it is either because he is trying to clarify a point (e.g. a common confusion between two personal names⁶⁴), or he regards the story as “probable”.⁶⁵ In one instance he shows that myth throws some light on the geographical issue,⁶⁶ in another the story somehow illuminates a specific name.⁶⁷ There seems to be some historical usefulness gained thanks to each of these digressions.⁶⁸ As a result, we may assume that for Thucydides any kind of information about the past is *potentially* acceptable, but only such that is subjected to criticism, verification, or is to some extent probable, can find itself in the historical narrative. It is exactly what Thucydides does in the Archaeology — he takes the Homeric account of the Trojan War, and “strips away” all the elements that make it μυθῶδες, a story which is far from the truth about this battle.

To be sure, the above considerations were not intended to “test” Thucydides’ theory against his practice; their aim was to clarify the sense of τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες as it appears in the methodological chapter. The conclusion is that Thucydides by his declaration does not mean to eliminate or reject any mythical element *ex definitione*, but to include it only with the principles of verification, criticism, and for the sake of usefulness. As for the relation of this statement to the speeches, on the basis of the above considerations it is reasonable to assume that the notion of μυθῶδες does in a sense apply to them, since they are supposed to be written with the utmost possible accuracy and faithfulness to the real ones, which meets the demand that past should be examined, verified, etc. Still, the composition

⁶² Thuc. II 29, 3: Tereus, Itys and Procne (including the information about the murder of Itys); II 102, 5–6: the story about Alcmaeon; III 88, 1–3: the legend of Hephaestus’ abode on Hiera; III 96, 1 the tradition about Hesiod’s death; IV 24, 5: Odysseus’ sail through Charybdis; VI 2, 4: the settlement of Sicels in Sicily.

⁶³ Introducing them with: λέγεται (II 102, 5; III 96, 1; IV 24, 5); νομίζουσι δὲ (III 88, 2); ὥς μὲν εἰκὸς καὶ λέγεται (VI 2, 4). Cf. Saïd 2010, 169.

⁶⁴ As in the case of II 29, 3.

⁶⁵ As in VI 2, 4, where Thucydides stipulates that it is a common view (λέγεται), but still probable (εἰκὸς).

⁶⁶ Thuc. II 102, 5–6.

⁶⁷ Thuc. III 96, 1.

⁶⁸ Pothou 2009, 89–91.

of speeches is not without reason discussed by Thucydides separately; the exclusion from them of τὸ μυθῶδες is not the task of the historian.⁶⁹

2.2.1 The sense of τὸ σαφές

In the immediately following sentence Thucydides asserts the utility of his *History* (I 22, 4, lines 31–35). This statement contains several crucial concepts commonly associated with this historian. The first phrase requiring explanation is τὸ σαφές σκοπεῖν.⁷⁰ The τὸ σαφές is an abstract noun deriving from the adjective σαφής, meaning basically: “clear”, “manifest”, but also “certain”.⁷¹ Are we allowed to ascribe the latter sense, which is deduced from texts earlier than Thucydides, to the occurrence of τὸ σαφές in the passage in question?

Andrew J. Woodman argued that the term alludes to the dramatic vividness or realism of Thucydides’ narrative.⁷² Woodman remarks that ἐνάργεια and

⁶⁹ Flory 1989, 202, poses the question whether Thucydides means that the speeches are also devoid of “patriotic anecdotes” (Flory’s definition of τὸ μυθῶδες). Flory strives to resolve the problem of the praise of Athens, particularly visible in the Epitaphios, which could suggest that the absence of μυθῶδες does not concern the speeches. However successful this attempt may be, it is completely unnecessary when we understand that the content of the speeches is not entirely Thucydides’ creation (as the proper part of the methodological chapter implies, see above, pp. 93–99), and thus he could not expunge the words that could be classified as μυθῶδες from the given speech, if he believed (or simply knew), that they occurred in that which was actually delivered. By contrast, he could avoid, or erase, each incorrect belief about the Peloponnesian War from his narrative.

⁷⁰ Hornblower, CT I, 61: “have a clear picture”; Bicknell 1990, p. 178, proposes rendering: “essence”, “what really goes on in what takes place.” The significance of the term has been adequately highlighted by Scanlon 2002, 147: “[...] the “clear truth” is a key term in Thucydidean thought, not just by its prominent position in I.22.4, but by its selective use elsewhere in his text.”

⁷¹ The basic meanings of the adjective σαφής recorded in the LSJ are: “clear”, “plain”, “distinct”, “manifest”; of persons, oracles – “sure”, “unerring”. According to LSJ, the abstract noun τὸ σαφές in the passage in question means “the clear truth”. LSJ also cites Eur. *Or.* 397: σοφόν τοι τὸ σαφές, οὐ τὸ μὴ σαφές, as used in the sense “clear truth”. The poetic adverb of σαφές is σάφα, which, as Frisk, GEW, 684, s.v. σάφα, notes, is very often combined with words for knowing, being sure, especially associated with knowledge that comes from being eyewitness: “σάφα Adv. ‘bestimmt, sicher, zuverlässig’, bes. mit οἶδα, auch m. anderen Verba des Wissens und des Sagens [...].” Frisk detects such meanings as peculiar to epic, from the *Iliad* onwards (a caveat on the interpretation of Thucydides’ text, which, as assumed at the beginning of the present chapter, cannot rely on texts later than himself). Similarly Beekes, EDG, s.v. σάφα: “surely, certainly, definitely”. Beekes states that the etymology of σάφα remains “unexplained”.

⁷² Woodman 1988, 62: “Although it is true that σαφήνεια is not one of the terms which later became common to describe the quality of vivid imitation which Thucydides’ readers detected in his work, it is linked with ἐνάργεια by two late rhetoricians as if the two terms were synonymous; and since appealing to the sense of sight is the characteristic feature of ἐνάργεια it will be observed that the verb which Thucydides uses in his sentence is σκοπεῖν (‘see’ or ‘view’), its almost literal sense being activated by the express contrast with ἐξ μὲν ἀκρόασιν (‘for audience purposes’). His readers are thus guaranteed the superior experience of ‘sight over sound’ (see p.

σαφήνεια are used by some rhetoricians nearly as synonyms; further, that Thucydides links σαφές with the verb for “seeing” (σαφές σκοπεῖν), and that ἐνάργεια is inherently connected to vision. That seems appealing, but not compelling when it comes to the interpretation of I 22 or I 1, 3. Woodman’s reading relies too much on material later than Thucydides to be safely applied to him, a danger in interpretation of Thucydides pointed out above.⁷³ The fact that later critics defined σαφήνεια in close association with ἐνάργεια is different from Thucydides’ own use and understanding of τὸ σαφές.⁷⁴ John Marincola accentuated the semantic connection of σαφές with “precision” and thought that τὸ σαφές σκοπεῖν should be understood as “know precisely”. It would then denote exactness resulting from Thucydides’ focus on contemporary, not ancient, history.⁷⁵ Thomas F. Scanlon criticized both readings, and in a comprehensive study of the term in Thucydides, with a great deal of additional evidence from contemporary literature and drama, makes a compelling case that τὸ σαφές is an expression for “a broad kind of knowledge which is the product of a complex and positive process of correct analysis of information”.⁷⁶ The scholar convincingly argues that (and why) Thucydides prefers τὸ σαφές in this context, rather than ἀλήθεια — it is because he refers there not only to past events, but also to the future (τὸ σαφές σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ... ἔσεσθαι). The statement evidently concerns knowledge about more generalized truths, whereas ἀλήθεια pertains to knowledge about past and present reality.⁷⁷ Scanlon has analyzed the occurrences of τὸ σαφές and its cognates in other passages of the *History*, and in those instances it seems reasonable to assume that σαφές means “certain”, “sure”.⁷⁸ Moreover, Hornblower aptly refers us back to what is probably the most instructive parallel, where Thucydides points to his pursuit of “clarity” (I 1, 2):

15 and n. 83), an imitation of the experiences on which the narrative is based, but enhanced through its having been structured and shaped by the author himself.”

⁷³ Abiding by the methodology of the present chapter, as outlined above.

⁷⁴ On the connection between σαφήνεια and derivatives with ἐνάργεια and the possible implications for the reception of Thucydides, see chap. 5.

⁷⁵ Marincola 1997, 96 n. 166.

⁷⁶ Scanlon 2002, 131–148; the quotation is from the conclusion, p. 148. Another phrasing of his definition is the following: “[...] τὸ σαφές is an expression of a reliably clear certainty about human actions based on a careful analysis of particular events but offering general paradigms for the future.”

⁷⁷ Scanlon 2002, 131–132.

⁷⁸ Apart from Thuc. I 1, 3 Scanlon adduces I 9, 2; VI 32, 3; VI 33, 1; VII 14, 4; VII 67, 4; V 105, 2. Particular support for the meaning “certain knowledge” is provided by V 113 (the present as “more σαφές” than the future). See Scanlon 2002, 141–143.

κίνησις γὰρ αὕτη μεγίστη δὴ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐγένετο καὶ μέρει τινὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, ὥς δὲ εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ πλείστον ἀνθρώπων. τὰ γὰρ πρὸ αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔτι παλαιότερα σαφῶς μὲν εὖρεῖν διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος ἀδύνατα ἦν, ἐκ δὲ τεκμηρίων ὧν ἐπὶ μακρότατον σκοποῦντί μοι πιστεῦσαι ξυμβαίνει οὐ μεγάλα νομίζω γενέσθαι οὔτε κατὰ τοὺς πολέμους οὔτε ἐς τὰ ἄλλα.⁷⁹

Here Thucydides seems to underline how difficult (actually, impossible: ἀδύνατα ἦν) it was to inquire into the events that took place before the Peloponnesian War, due to the time that has passed since their occurrence (διὰ χρόνου πλῆθος). It is remarkable that here the verb qualified by σαφῶς is not σκοπεῖν but εὖρεῖν. We may observe that the quality of “clearness” (keeping the working character of such a translation in mind) applies to inquiry (εὖρεῖν) as well as to the cognizance of its effects (σκοπεῖν). Moreover, the connection between τὸ σαφές in I 22, 4 and I 1, 3 is marked in the second part of the sentence — ἐκ δὲ τεκμηρίων ... σκοποῦντί μοι πιστεῦσαι etc. Thucydides had first to “look into” the distant past of Greek cities, relying on evidence (τεκμήρια); as for the Peloponnesian War, he provides τὸ σαφές, after inquiry, as an already “finished product”. The Archaeology can be seen as an exposition of the method of obtaining the σαφές. The parallel from I 1, 3 shows that for Thucydides, in order to “establish” τὸ σαφές, it is necessary to test reality by autopsy, inquiry, gathering of evidence, judgement of probability, then to organize the information and present it. If it is possible, an account that is supposed to be σαφές should rely on personal experience of others or on being an eyewitness of the events.⁸⁰

To sum up, Thucydides’ understanding of τὸ σαφές corresponds to the earliest semantics in epic and presocratic philosophers,⁸¹ denoting “certain knowledge” about the past, but also providing insight into the general laws governing the human reality.

⁷⁹ “For this was the greatest movement that had ever stirred the Hellenes, extending also to some of the Barbarians, one might say even to a very large part of mankind. Indeed, as to the events of the period just preceding this, and those of a still earlier date, it was impossible to get clear information on account of lapse of time; but from evidence which, on pushing my inquiries to the furthest point, I find that I can trust, I think that they were not really great either as regards the wars then waged or in other particulars.”

⁸⁰ Cf. Cuscutà 2005, 59–77, esp. conclusion from p. 65: “Dall’analisi di questi passi pertanto si evince che per Tuciddide ‘tecnicamente’ una notizia o la narrazione di un evento è σαφές solo nel momento in cui essa viene riportata o viene reperita sul posto da una persona ben informata, come può essere un testimone oculare o comunque molto vicino ai fatti.” See also Parmeggiani 2003, 235–283.

⁸¹ As in the etymology of σάφα, see n. 71 above.

2.3 The idea of usefulness

Finally, the part that concludes the methodological chapter, concerning the usefulness of the *History* (I 22, 4). The idea of the usefulness and everlasting value of the *History* is commonly regarded as one of the most “Thucydidean” contributions to historiography,⁸² and is traditionally referred to in reception studies. How should we understand this concept, firstly, in the immediate context of the introduction?

Some readings of Thucydides' conception of utility seem to fall wide of the mark, e.g. when they state that utility implies rejection of spectacular or dramatic elements in the narrative.⁸³ Neither the distance from the μυθῶδες, nor the notion of utility as knowledge of universal principles entail the absence of ἐνάργεια or πάθος in the work. In general, scholars have agreed that the above words of Thucydides are an assertion that the *History* as a whole is meant to be useful at whatever time it is read.⁸⁴ The words κτῆμά ἐς αἰεὶ are strictly related to ὠφέλιμα: the “everlasting possession” (i.e. the *History*) should probably be read as “having permanent value”, *because* it is useful. The words κτῆμά ἐς αἰεὶ should not be read literally (e.g. “for ever and ever”); the accent seems to be on the potentiality that lies in the work, which can be at any moment taken and read, for the benefit of the reader.⁸⁵ This “everlasting value” is contrasted with ἀγώνισμα, literally “contest”, further — “declamation” (as it often had the form of a competition). The worth of ἀγώνισμα is differentiated by Thucydides from the value of the *History*, in that it aims at “being heard for the moment” (ἐς τὸ παραχρῆμα ἀκούειν). So far, the antithesis seems understandable; the problem arises when we ask about the specific character of the “usefulness” (ὠφέλιμα) mentioned here. Some scholars, e.g. Geoffrey E. M. de Ste Croix, conceived of it as knowledge that will enable Thucydides' readers to anticipate or even predict the future.⁸⁶ This reading has been contested, since in the passages where the

⁸² On the poetic roots of the idea of the utility of knowledge of the past see Malitz 1990, 330–332.

⁸³ Gabba 1981, 50–62.

⁸⁴ See generally: Gomme, HCT I, 149–150; Schadewaldt 1982, 287; de Romilly 1956, 41–66; Malitz 1982, 278–288; Darbo-Peschanski 1989, 667–668; Meister 1990, 52; Price 2001, 18–19.

⁸⁵ Cf. Schadewaldt 1982, 287; Hornblower, CT I, 61.

⁸⁶ Ste Croix 1972, 30–33. This scholar argued on the basis of certain passages, in which Thucydides praises Themistocles and Pericles for their ability to anticipate the future events. Cf. the similar, much earlier, interpretation of J.H. Jr. Finley 1942, 98, which is restated by Darbo-Peschanski 1989, 660: “Tout comme les acteurs des événements politiques et militaires qu'il relat, Thucydide, avant tout préoccupé du présent, demande aussi que celui-ci, transmué en passé par la postérité de ses lecteurs, devienne une source d'analogies qui permette de déchiffrer l'avenir et d'y assurer le triomphe de l'utilité.”

historian praises Themistocles and Pericles for their talent for anticipation, there is no suggestion that it relies on knowledge about the past.⁸⁷ Jacqueline de Romilly has also argued against this and a similar understanding of Thucydides' words, especially against the idea that the *History* was meant to be a type of practical "manual" (e.g. for politicians).⁸⁸ The *History* was rather not projected as a collection of political or military *exempla*.⁸⁹ It is probably right to see such interpretations as detached from the actual text of the chapter on method. Still, in the passage in question Thucydides implies that the advantages of reading his work are more than merely an antiquarian acquaintance with past reality.⁹⁰ De Romilly in her insightful analysis postulates a reading of the concept of *ὀφέλημα* that emphasizes the element of universality and general laws that govern human reality.⁹¹ The "hidden universal principles", which Thucydides — in de Romilly's view — reveals throughout the work, are for the most part not stated explicitly; they are implied in the narrative, and need to be discovered by the reader.⁹² What is the key universal principle which

⁸⁷ See Thuc. I 138, 3: Ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἐτέρου ἄξιος θαυμάσαι· οἰκεία γὰρ ξυνέσει καὶ οὔτε προμαθὼν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἐπιμαθὼν, τῶν τε παραχρῆμα δι' ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνώμων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλείστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής. ("For indeed Themistocles was a man who had most convincingly demonstrated the strength of his natural sagacity, and was in the very highest degree worthy of admiration in that respect. For by native insight, not reinforced by earlier or later study, he was beyond other men, with the briefest deliberation, both a shrewd judge of the immediate present and wise in forecasting what would happen in the most distant future"). These words testify against Ste Croix' interpretation, particularly οὔτε προμαθὼν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἐπιμαθὼν, i.e. "he needed no learning beforehand, or afterwards". Cf. Pericles' statements at Thuc. II 65, 13, which can be read only as a description of proper/improper reasoning about the probability of future developments, made on the grounds of actual conditions. See Flory 1989, 203–204: "Ste Croix rightly stresses Thucydides' admiration for those who can anticipate the future but fails to show in his examples of Themistocles and Pericles how reading history will give similar powers to others."

⁸⁸ De Romilly 1956, 45–46; 59; 62.

⁸⁹ Von Fritz 1967, 530–531: the *History* is no "Rezeptbuch", but rather an "Anschauungsmaterial", on which one can build his understanding of historical processes.

⁹⁰ See the polemic of Flory 1989, 204, n. 40. However, the subsequent argument of Flory (pp. 205–208) that Thucydides "[...] still offers a possibility for changing the future, if only slightly" is unconvincing and unclear.

⁹¹ De Romilly 1956, 50–55, 60. The author endeavours to show that Thucydides shaped his work with the aim of showing the universal principles of human conduct, by finding numerous leading themes in various points in the work. Moreover, the facts are, according to de Romilly, selected and structured in order to disclose hidden connections between them: "Les faits sont organisés en séries, autour de quelques motifs très nets et très simples, qui se confirment les uns les autres" (p. 52).

⁹² De Romilly 1956, 60–63. Hence, those universal laws are not a formula imposed on the past, but the other way round – they are an inference from the past, and of course shaped by the

Thucydides may have had in mind when writing the *Methodenkapitel*? De Romilly's answer is: human nature.⁹³ Even if de Romilly goes far beyond the sole *Methodenkapitel* in her reading, this also seems to be a step in the right direction for a proper explanation of the ideas expressed in the passage I 22, 4. It is because the concepts of utility, certain knowledge about the past, and the reference to the future are inextricably connected with something that we can indeed translate as "human nature" (τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὐθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον). Hornblower points out that "κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον is broader than 'according to human nature'; it means something closer to the human condition' or 'situation'".⁹⁴ This notion points to something constant, a factor which lies behind (or is the ultimate cause of) all the processes that a historian can undertake in his work, and all of what is about to happen (καὶ τῶν μελλόντων). This matches perfectly our interpretation of τὸ σαφές as "certain knowledge" that is not restricted to the past or present, but extends to the future, exactly because its object is something that transcends the particularity of each single event. To be sure, this *constans* cannot be understood as simple set of rules, an account of the necessary consequences of a given situation; the regularities are probably to be conceived of as those of the relationships between particular elements in a situation.⁹⁵ The *constans* of certain regularities can be dependent on τὸ ἀνθρώπινον, since Thucydides, as he reveals elsewhere in his work, believes that human nature is in a way a stable entity.

Let us look beyond the immediate context of the methodological chapter to grasp the proper meaning of the factor of τὸ ἀνθρώπινον. This paragraph is very important for a proper understanding of Thucydides' methodology (III 82, 2):

καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾗ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαιτέρα καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὥς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ζυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται.⁹⁶

historian. In that lies, as de Romilly puts it, the greatest bias against "objectivity" on the part of Thucydides.

⁹³ De Romilly 1956, 55. Similarly Malitz 1982, 278–288; Forsdyke 2017, 28–29.

⁹⁴ Hornblower, CT I, 61; Stahl 1966, 33.

⁹⁵ Cogan 1981, 234–239: "That τὸ ἀνθρώπινον which is, for Thucydides, both the cause, in the most general sense, of all events, and also what is to be learned by the study of his history, is this complex rhetorical structure through which – as Thucydides conceives it – men organize their individual existences into social actions. This explanation of τὸ ἀνθρώπινον strikes, I believe, the proper balance between generality and particularity." (p. 238) Cogan's reading has its limitations, since it focuses nearly exclusively on the speeches, on the deliberative contexts of the interactions between the actors of the *History*. Yet his definition of τὸ ἀνθρώπινον remains balanced and well-argued.

⁹⁶ "And so there fell upon the cities on account of revolutions many grievous calamities, such as happen and always will happen in while human nature is the same, but which are severer

This passage sheds some light on the ideas expressed in the chapter on method. Especially striking is the correspondence between the two paragraphs, in that they both refer to constant features of “humanity” in the context of its decisive role in the course of history. Moreover, the passage at III 82, 2 reinforces the reading of the last sentence of the *Methodenkapitel* proposed above: Thucydides states that there is one basic constancy, which influences both the past and the future (γινόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα), but with manifold manifestations thereof (τοῖς εἵδεσι διηλλαγμένα), according to the given circumstances (ὥς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται).⁹⁷ It will therefore not be wrong to accede to Zagorin’s recent expression that Thucydides “was to an exceptional degree a generalizing historian”, and his perspective was, in that respect, philosophical.⁹⁸ In sum, usefulness seems to be connected with knowledge about general and universal principles of human conduct, and the utility of the *History* lies in providing the reader with such a structuring of the narrative that grants him insight into these principles.

3. Thucydides’ conception of causation

Since the approach in this chapter is based on the hypothesis that the first book of Thucydides’ *History* (with particular stress on the *Methodenkapitel*) was the most likely to be read and recalled by the Hellenistic historians, we shall take into account the theses of modern scholars concerning Thucydides’ and the Hellenistic historians’ theories of historical causation. In this case, we need to go beyond the methodological chapter *sensu stricto*. Unlike the ideas from the chapter on method, the theory of causation is not described explicitly, and needs to be interpreted from other Thucydidean statements as well as his narrative. To be sure, I do not aim here at establishing the only “correct” Thucydidean understanding of causation, which can be taken as a benchmark for evaluating later discussions. It is perfectly possible that ancient readers interpreted the passage and the whole Thucydidean concept of causality differently, and some of the implicit observations within it will go undetected by us. However, it would be unsound not to enter at all into the interpretation of the central notions

or milder, and different in their manifestations, according as the variations in circumstances present themselves in each case.”

⁹⁷ Hornblower, CT I, 481, underlines that Thucydides was a trailblazer in that respect: “The principle seems simple but had to be stated for the first time: it was Th. who did so.” Cf. Schadewaldt 1982, 288–289: this conception is “absolut Neuartige des Thukydides”. See the meticulous analyses of this passage by Price 2001, 22–72 and Ostwald 1988, 53–61. Cf. Pearson 1957, 228–244, who emphasizes the gap between “wartime morality” and “peacetime morality” in Thucydides. See also: Connor 1984b, 96–105.

⁹⁸ Zagorin 2005, 139; cf. Sanborn 1954, 65–68.

in the context of the *History*, since scholars writing about Thucydides' reception seem to refer to them in an intuitive and sometimes stereotypical way. What the following discussion intends to do is to discard those readings that find no support in Thucydides' text and are improbable, and propose an interpretation mostly validated by arguments from the immediate context of the methodological chapter, combined with Thucydides' approach to causality throughout his narrative. Then the relevant passages on causation in the Hellenistic historians can be read in their individual contexts, and only after that are any hypotheses about their affinity to those of Thucydides formulated.

The theme of causation occurs in the section immediately subsequent to the methodological chapter proper. Thucydides' understanding of causation is embedded in the "celebrated statement of the true cause of the Peloponnesian War".⁹⁹ The historian writes (I 23, 4–6):

(4) ἤρξαντο δὲ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι λύσαντες τὰς τριακοντούτεις σπονδὰς αἱ αὐτοῖς ἐγένοντο μετὰ Εὐβοίας ἄλωσιν. δι' ὃ τι δ' ἔλυσαν, τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα πρῶτον καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, τοῦ μή τινα ζητῆσαί ποτε ἐξ ὅτου τοσοῦτος πόλεμος τοῖς Ἑλλήσι κατέστη. (6) τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν· αἱ δ' ἐς τὸ φανερόν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἴδ' ἦσαν ἐκατέρων, ἀφ' ὧν λύσαντες τὰς σπονδὰς ἐς τὸν πόλεμον κατέστησαν.¹⁰⁰

In the passage adduced above, Thucydides articulates his ideas about the causes of the war, by distinguishing the (in working translation) "truest cause" from "the grievances spelled out". The sense of particular words in that assertion has been an object of intense scholarly discussion. For our purposes we shall focus first on the meaning of ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις and its relation to the αἰτίαι. There have been various approaches to Thucydides' theory of historical causation.¹⁰¹ Two extreme positions on this problem were expressed, and argued for, in the books of Francis M. Cornford and Charles N. Cochrane. Cornford tried to prove

⁹⁹ As Hornblower, CT I, 64, put it.

¹⁰⁰ "And the war began when the Athenians and Peloponnesians broke the thirty years truce, concluded between them after the capture of Euboea. The reasons why they broke it and the grounds of their quarrel I have first set forth, that no one may ever have to inquire for what cause the Hellenes became involved in so great a war. The truest explanation, although it has been the least often advanced, I believe to have been the growth of the Athenians to greatness, which brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and forced them to war. But the reasons publicly alleged on either side which led them to break the truce and involved them in the war were as follows."

¹⁰¹ See positions quoted above, n. 11. The recent attempt by Parmeggiani 2018, 229–246, to search for links between Thucydides' aetiology and the philosophy of Heraclitus is, although limited in scope and not relevant here, particularly stimulating.

that Thucydides had no idea of cause in the modern sense — as an objective, e.g. an economic or sociological factor. This scholar emphasized that much of the first book is not about causes, but about grievances, the αἰτίαι, so the historian fails to have any idea of causation in the modern “scientific” sense.¹⁰² Cornford believed that Thucydides was different in this respect from the much more “developed” (but still prescientific) explanatory system of Polybius.¹⁰³ At the other extreme was the interpretation of Cochrane (a fierce polemic against Cornford), according to which Thucydides was strictly scientific and objective, including in his theory of historical causation.¹⁰⁴ Both approaches found their adherents, and both tended to overemphasize some aspects of Thucydidean methodology and underrate others. On the one hand, Cornford aptly observed that employing modern categories to describe the ancient historians’ conceptual frameworks caused misinterpretations and inadequate understanding of their works. The scholar was probably the first to draw attention to the fact that ancient historians in general — and Thucydides in particular — conceived of as causes primarily the internal mental states of individuals (but also groups). Yet having stated this, Cornford placed all his effort into displaying how Thucydides’ language and conceptual framework derives from tragedy, and how it separates him from modern historians. Cochrane, on the other hand, went far in associating Thucydides’ method with the “science” of medicine as represented in the Hippocratic corpus, which was supposed to have a coherent theory of underlying vs. superficial causes.¹⁰⁵ Yet the allegedly technical usage of πρόφασις in the medical writings has been shown to be virtually non-existent, and thus the reading of Thucydides in the light of the conceptual connections in this respect has proved erroneous.¹⁰⁶ In fact, Cornford and

¹⁰² Cornford 1907, 64–65. Inverted commas mean that I do not accept Cornford’s division between the “scientific” and “unscientific” or “prescientific” theory of causation.

¹⁰³ Cornford 1907, 58–65.

¹⁰⁴ Cochrane 1929, *passim*. Kirkwood 1952, 58–59, argues quite convincingly that in Thucydides the role of a notion for an “objective” cause (i.e. not pertaining to internal states of humans) is αἴτιον; it occurs e.g. in the context of earthquakes. As regards the field of politics, military action etc., however, the words are solely πρόφασις and αἰτία. On αἴτιον see also Pearson 1952, 206.

¹⁰⁵ Cochrane 1929, 17; cf. Schwartz 1919, 250; Pédech 1964, 56–59 (“la distinction entre cause vraie et cause apparente”). Lehmann 1974, 167 with n. 2 (“der medizinischen Fachsprache nahestehende Terminologie des Thukydides”).

¹⁰⁶ See Kirkwood 1952, 41–45, with a concise *status quaestionis*, which demonstrates that in the medical writings πρόφασις and αἰτία are both used in the sense “cause” and πρόφασις is definitely not meant as a type of “deeper” or “basic cause”; thus interpretations that associate Thucydides’ πρόφασις from I 23 with the medical uses prove only that in both instances the word has no fixed special meaning of the kind. See Pearson 1952, 210 n. 22; cf. idem 1972, 389: “It has commonly (though mistakenly) been supposed that the word should necessarily have

Cochrane, although they seemingly represented antithetical positions, shared the same basic XIXth-century presupposition: that the proper and final aim of history is the employment of methods and concepts which will make objectivity and accuracy as possible as in natural sciences. They only disagreed as to whether Thucydides did, or did not, achieve this ultimate aim.¹⁰⁷ It is therefore inevitable that we reject both views, and read Thucydides' statements about causation without preconceptions related to our own, modern ideas of causality in historical processes.

If we are to better understand Thucydidean concepts, we should first dismiss the modern notion of "cause". Translations can be misleading here, and only in some instances does the rendering of αἰτία or πρόφασις as "cause" prove adequate.¹⁰⁸ We shall begin by looking into the initial part of I 23, 5, where Thucydides says that the war began with the break of the peace treaty: ἤρξαντο δὲ αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Πελοποννήσιοι λύσαντες τὰς τριακοντούτεις σπονδὰς. The question of the αἰτίαι of this breach follows: διότι δ' ἔλυσαν, τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα. It seems clear that the historian has a simple timeline in mind: first there are the αἰτίαι, διαφοραί (and πρόφασις), which lead then to the breach of the treaty, from where the two sides begin to fight: ἤρξαντο. The grammar of the sentence — both verbs in the aorist, the second one a participle suggests the sense: "having broken the Treaty, they began to fight". This sequence αἰτία-ἀρχή will be important in considering the relation to Polybius' and the other Hellenistic historians' schemes.

It seems that αἰτία is a clearer notion, its commonest meaning being "blame" or "charge". In Thucydides it has been identified as most often denoting "grounds", "grounds for blaming someone", or things responsible for an action.¹⁰⁹ Pearson distinguished between two main usages, i. active: "accusation", "complaint", "grievance", and ii. passive: "guilt", "blame", "responsibility".¹¹⁰ It is often difficult to decide between these connotations of the word, but we can propose

something to do with 'cause', and since Thucydides and Polybius used the word in contexts where 'immediate cause' or 'exciting cause' seemed an appropriate translation, the attempt was made to force this meaning on passages in the medical writers." See the discussion *ibidem*, 391–393, on the false reading of πρόφασις as "pre-appearance" in the medical writers and its unjustified transposition into Thucydides' *History*.

¹⁰⁷ As Ferguson 1930, 585, said about Cochrane's book: "The service of this well-written, closely-reasoned book will be greatest to those who do not read German. The author's judgement of Thucydides and his conception of history as a science correspond closely with those of Eduard Meyer." See also Hartog 2005, 106–108, on the clash of the two historians' positions.

¹⁰⁸ Pearson 1972, 383.

¹⁰⁹ Kirkwood 1952, 55–57.

¹¹⁰ Pearson 1952, 205–206, adds that "[...] by logical development it also means 'that which is responsible' – the 'cause', as in the opening sentence of Herodotus [...]."

that in the above passage I 23, αἰτία denotes “grievance”, oscillating between blame, accusation and complaint.¹¹¹ In I 23, Thucydides mentions, next to αἰτίαι, the διαφοραί — “differences”, as the element that also contributed to the outbreak of war. These obviously refer to certain “facts” i.e. actions taken by either Corcyra, Potidaea, Corinth and other agents. The αἰτίαι and διαφοραί could not exist without basis in the actual military and political activities of the *poleis* involved in the conflict. They (διαφοραί) also refer to the different interpretations of the same facts by the historical actors. Thucydides stresses that they were “declared” — λεγόμεναι. This, and the content of the speeches, which Thucydides indicates as expressing these αἰτίαι, seems to imply that the agents themselves to a degree “define” causes of the breach of the treaty, by elaborating on the past and present political developments.

The interpretation of πρόφασις in the passage brings more difficulties. The word derives from προφαίνω or προφήμι, in the most general terms “something that you show or say, an explanation that you offer for behaviour, giving the reason or the purpose”.¹¹² The connection to φαίνω — “appear” — had been underlined in earlier studies of the word’s occurrences in Thucydides, but was later reconsidered and partly discarded.¹¹³ The preposition προ- could be mistakenly read as implying temporal relation: “something that precedes” (e.g. immediate events before war), but it has been shown that it has also the non-temporal sense of “forth”, “away”.¹¹⁴ In Thucydides, it carries a range of connotations, often meaning a “pretext”,¹¹⁵ an expressed intention, as opposed to the real intention,¹¹⁶

¹¹¹ Cf. Rhodes 1987, 159; Sealey 1987, 91: “[...] in speaking of αἰτίαι Thucydides has in mind things which people said when they imputed responsibility.”

¹¹² Pearson 1952, 206. See *ibidem*, 209–215, for a survey of the senses of πρόφασις in Greek authors other than Thucydides. Schäublin 1971, 137–138, enumerates the occurrences and possible senses of πρόφασις from Homer to Thucydides. See also *ibidem*, 141, for the usage in the Attic orators, especially the example from Demosthenes, *De cor.* 156, where the phrase ἀληθὲς πρόφασις refers to Philip’s real motives, as contrasted with the declared ones. I do not share his conviction that Demosthenes is “von Thukydides geradezu beeinflusst” in this phrase.

¹¹³ Pearson 1972, 391. Schäublin 1971, 133–134, is probably right to say that even precise knowledge of the etymology of the word would help little in the case of its functioning in Thucydides’ *History*.

¹¹⁴ προφαίνω itself, which is the most likely source of πρόφασις, means “to show forth”, rather than “to show in advance”. Cf. Pearson 1972, 393. Schäublin 1971, 140–141, also convincingly refutes the temporal interpretation of πρόφασις.

¹¹⁵ Schäublin 1971, 142–143 (“Anlass”).

¹¹⁶ See Thuc. VI 33, 2; VI 8, 4, but especially VI 76, 2: ἤκουσι γὰρ ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν προφάσει μὲν ἢ πυνθάνεσθε, διανοία δὲ ἦν πάντες ὑπονοοῦμεν. Cf. other places quoted in Kirkwood 1952, 50. Pearson 1952, 206, refers to the etymological connotation of πρόφασις with φαίνω (“to show, exhibit”) to explain why it is proper to use the rendering “excuse” or “pretext”: “[...] we most commonly offer explanations for our behaviour if it appears reprehensible or if we wish to conceal our true intentions or motives.”

sometimes “reason”.¹¹⁷ These are qualified by Pearson as “offensive” senses. At times, the word has an intermediate sense of a “reason used as a pretext for action”, grounded in reality, not made up, thus not the chief, but in the given situation a sufficient, motive for action. As such, *πρόφασις* can be understood as “excuse”.¹¹⁸ These senses Pearson labels as “defensive”, i.e. used to exculpate oneself in the face of a negative response to one’s action. In some instances, it has the more neutral sense of “explanation”, and this meaning seems to be the common denominator in most of the connotations wherever the word appears.¹¹⁹ It would thus be the most adequate rendering of the word in most of its occurrences.¹²⁰ An exceptional instance of the use of *πρόφασις* is the description of the plague in Athens, where it can be read in a medical sense, comparable to the Hippocratic corpus.¹²¹ Why in the passage in question is *πρόφασις* qualified as “the truest” (*ἀληθεστάτην*), but also “the most concealed” (*ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ*)?¹²² Interestingly, such a compound, i.e. *ἀληθεστάτη* + *πρόφασις* is found only here and in one more place in Thucydides. It does not occur in extant Greek literature apart from these two instances.¹²³ We could conceive of it as a cause that, in Thucydides’ perspective, was absent from the public sphere, political deliberations, negotiations, etc. However, this would be incorrect, since this truest cause, as Thucydides defines it, namely the

¹¹⁷ Thuc. I 133, 1; see also Kirkwood 1952, 49.

¹¹⁸ Thuc. V 31, 3, and Kirkwood 1952, 50.

¹¹⁹ Pearson 1952, 215; Pearson 1972, 387–389.

¹²⁰ Schaublin 1971, 139, for instances in Thucydides.

¹²¹ Thuc. II 49, 1; see Kirkwood 1952, 45; Schaublin 1971, 144 with n. 65.

¹²² The *λόγῳ* is particularly confusing here. Traditional translations of *λόγος* seem inadequate: “word”, “argument”, etc., do not fit into the Thucydidean context. Perhaps the most appropriate will be a more atypical reading, not recorded in the dictionaries: “political deliberation” or “public discourse”.

¹²³ In the preliminaries to the Sicilian expedition Thucydides, after expounding the character of the island, explains why the Athenians decided to invade it (VI 6, 1): *Τοσαῦτα ἔθνη Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων Σικελίαν ὥκει, καὶ ἐπὶ τοσὴνδε οὖσαν αὐτὴν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι στρατεύειν ὥρμητο, ἐφίεμενοι μὲν τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ προφάσει τῆς πάσης ἄρξαι, βοηθεῖν δὲ ἅμα εὐπρεπῶς βουλόμενοι τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἐγγενέσι καὶ τοῖς προσγεγενημένοις συμμαχοῖς, μάλιστα δ’ αὐτοὺς ἐξώρμησαν Ἑγεστίων [τε] πρέσβεις παρόντες καὶ προθυμότερον ἐπικαλούμενοι.* (“Such were the nations, Hellenic and barbarian, that inhabited Sicily; and such was the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were bent upon invading. To give the truest explanation, they were eager to attain to empire of the whole of it, but they wished at the same time to have the fair pretext of succouring their own kinsmen and their old allies”). In this instance, Thucydides contrasts the true motive for the expedition with the “fine” declarations of their will to support their “kinsmen”, whereas in I 23 the “truest cause” is contrasted with the “publicly alleged” reasons. See the discussion of the passage in Hornblower, CT III, 300–301.

Athenians' rise to power and the Peloponnesians' fear of it,¹²⁴ is actually present in numerous places throughout the first book of the *History*.¹²⁵ For instance, at I 88 Thucydides explicitly and emphatically bears out the reason why the Lacedaemonians, after a long debate with their allies, decided to declare war on Athens.¹²⁶ Here Thucydides makes clear that whatever motives for war had been suggested to the Lacedaemonians in the speeches of their allies, they were not what ultimately persuaded them. The decisive factor was their fear of further Athenian expansion. Therefore, both categories of factors (αἰτίαι and the truest πρόφασις) are presented by Thucydides as functioning and occurring in political deliberations prior to the war.¹²⁷ It has to be emphasized that Thucydides explicitly states that the αἰτίαι (and διαφοραί) were also the factor that (at least partly) caused the break of the thirty-years' peace (διότι δ' ἔλυσαν, τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα πρῶτον). The phrase διότι δ' ἔλυσαν implies that the "grievances" and "disagreements" between the agents belonging to the two sides were considered by Thucydides to have an influence on the ultimate decision of the Spartans to break the treaty. After stating that, he proceeds to what he found to be the decisive, most influential element — ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις. The distinction is therefore between the key and the contributing factors, not the underlying and apparent (i.e. really non-existent) cause. The interpretation that makes Thucydides distinguish between the "underlying" and "superficial" cause is in all probability inappropriate and ahistorical. The reasons included in the speeches are not presented as entirely irrelevant, but their *relative* importance was, as Thucydides implies, much smaller than the fear of the

¹²⁴ Here we cannot enter into discussion of the historical adequacy of Thucydides' ideas about the reasons for the Peloponnesian War. On the historical correctness of the "truest explanation" the arguments of Sealey 1987, 97–109 and Cawkwell 1997, 20–39 are fundamental.

¹²⁵ Thuc. I 24–55; 55–56, is an account of the grievances (= αἰτίαι), specifically the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea (67–88), the congress of Peloponnesian allies, where the Corinthian speech mentions the cases of Corcyra and Potidaea (= αἰτίαι), but stresses Athenian expansion and Spartan reluctance (= πρόφασις); I 119–125, the meeting of the Peloponnesian League, which involves a Corinthian speech, where the case of Potidaea is mentioned (= αἰτία), but much more strongly emphasized is Athenian expansion (= πρόφασις). In his first speech (I 140–144), Pericles argues that the αἰτίαι are merely excuses, and thus attempts at appeasement will not work. See the useful summary of Rhodes 1987, 154–157; on the arguments of both sides see Kurpios 2015, 233–235. Morrison 1999, 94 and 97 with n. 14, also noticed the prominence of the "truest cause" in the decision-making process of Athenian assembly.

¹²⁶ ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν ξυμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις ὅσον φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐπὶ μείζον δυνηθῶσιν, ὀρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑποχείρια ἤδη ὄντα. ("And the vote of the Lacedaemonians that the treaty had been broken and that they must go to war was determined, not so much by the influence of the speeches of their allies, as by fear of the Athenians, lest they become too powerful, seeing that the greater part of Hellas was already subject to them.")

¹²⁷ Cf. Rhodes 1987, 163.

Spartans.¹²⁸ This seems to be the most likely explanation for the occurrence of ἀφανεστάτην in the passage. The wide range of potential denotations of πρόφασις, as outlined above, also explains why at I 23 Thucydides found it necessary to add the qualifier ἀληθεστάτη; it seems crucial for distinguishing the πρόφασις in question — the fear of the Spartans — from the others.¹²⁹ The ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις — the Spartans' fear¹³⁰ — is of subjective character; we could label it “psychological”, as it refers to the internal state of the historical actors.¹³¹ Its particularity resides in the quality of being “most true”, that is — the decisive and real motive for taking up the action.¹³² All in all, it is most accurate to read πρόφασις in I 23 as explanation (similar to German “Begründung”),¹³³ rather than cause. The qualifier ἀληθεστάτη stresses that to Thucydides it is the fundamental force behind the war's outbreak.¹³⁴

What then about the difference between πρόφασις and αἰτία? On the one hand, it seems evident that these words are not synonyms.¹³⁵ However, Thucydides sometimes seems to interchange the two, and he evidently does not use them in a strict, “technical” manner.¹³⁶ On the other, it would be incautious to read the

¹²⁸ Cf. Hornblower, CT I, 132–133.

¹²⁹ Hornblower, CT I, 194: “[...] it was this, rather than the word πρόφασις, which expressed the idea of underlying cause.” At the very end of the first book, at I 146, Thucydides seems to use πρόφασις (without any additional qualifier) in reference to the Athenian expansion: σπονδῶν γὰρ ξύγχρισις τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν καὶ πρόφασις τοῦ πολεμεῖν (“The events which were taking place constituted an actual annulment of the treaty and furnished an occasion for war”). This passage is not unproblematic; Thucydides does not clarify what exactly he means by τὰ γιγνόμενα which are at the same time a rupture of peace and the reason for war. The γὰρ in the final sentence means that it somehow explains the preceding account of how suspicious the two sides became towards each other — it was exactly because (everything?) which happened until that time (τὰ γιγνόμενα) was already a rupture of peace and thus — a cause for war.

¹³⁰ Sealey 1987, 91–93, shows by analysis of the grammatical features (and their rhetorical effect) of Thucydides' statement about the “truest reason”, that it also blames the Athenians. The fear of the Spartans was a consequence of the Athenians' actions, and it forced them (the Spartans) to begin the war.

¹³¹ As Kirkwood 1952, 55, put it: “These meanings form a comprehensible pattern; all are subjective, having to do with the mental attitudes of the persons who are engaged in the events being described; all can be derived from the basic idea of a “showing forth”. Schaublin 1971, 140: “psychologischer Zwang”.

¹³² Cf. Schaublin 1971, 139–140.

¹³³ *Ibidem*, 138.

¹³⁴ See Pearson 1972, 387. Cf. Parmeggiani 2018, 232: The adjective ἀληθεστάτη had to be added as means of disambiguation, since πρόφασις alone would imply mere “pretext”.

¹³⁵ At III 13, 1, προφάσεις καὶ αἰτίας are the grounds given by the Mytileneans for their mutiny against Athens. If the words were entirely synonymous, the passage would be tautological.

¹³⁶ For instance, I 118, where Thucydides seems to use πρόφασις for some grounds for complaint called αἰτίαι at I 23, 5–6, is problematic. Kirkwood 1952, 52–53, argues that here and at I 146 Thucydides uses πρόφασις in the meaning similar to I 23 and VI 6: the πρόφασις would

two notions as antithetical, or to assume that Thucydides intended to make a contrast based directly on their meanings.¹³⁷ According to the discussion of their senses above, the main difference seems to be that αἰτία is a type of positive “accusation” or “grievance”, whereas πρόφασις is more “defensive”, as e.g. “explanation” or “justification” of one’s action.¹³⁸ The fact that Thucydides accompanies the two words by qualifiers proves decisive for this problem. Firstly, he indicates that there were some αἰτίαι and διαφοραί that lead to the breach of the treaty, and these are referred to by him in the speeches, as they were articulated publicly (λεγόμεναι). Then he defines the πρόφασις that was least present in public debate, yet critical. Hence, the main difference between αἰτίαι and πρόφασις in this context is the fact that the first were more present in political discourse than the latter. We should add that both words (πρόφασις and αἰτία) are subjective, in that they denote the agent’s reason for acting or taking decisions, rather than objective as words used to explain why something happens.¹³⁹ Moreover, Thucydides seems to write about the πρόφασις of the Spartans as a collective body; the motive is attributed not to an individual, but to a whole group.

To sum up, according to the above survey, in I 23, when considering the ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις of the Peloponnesian War, and the λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι on both sides, Thucydides makes a distinction between the grievances and charges voiced e.g. at assemblies, by embassies etc. and the decisive factor, the thing that best explains the actions taken by the Spartans, which is of psychological character.¹⁴⁰ This does not imply that the grievances were entirely false; it means rather that they were all concomitant, as well as contributing to the final decisions and actions.

mean the state of mind engendered by the various αἰτίαι. At I 126, 1, μεγίστη πρόφασις εἶναι τοῦ πολεμεῖν, means nothing more than “a serious pretext for war”, similarly at III 82. According to Pearson 1952, 209, the relation between πρόφασις and αἰτία is also sometimes unclear in Herodotus. Pearson 1972, 383–386, shows the interchangeability of the two notions in other authors, particularly in the Hippocratic corpus.

¹³⁷ Gomme, HCT I, 153–154.

¹³⁸ Pearson 1952, 222: “Thus we may say that when Thucydides directly contrasts πρόφασις with αἰτία he contrasts “defence” or “justification” with “accusation” or “grievance”.

¹³⁹ Rhodes 1987, 161.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Parmeggiani 2018, 230–233, which reads the difference between ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις and αἰτία as mark of how Thucydides “distinguished between ‘historical causes’ on the one hand and a ‘philosophical cause’ on the other”. The adjective ἀληθεστάτη had, in Parmeggiani’s view, to be added as means of disambiguation, since πρόφασις alone would imply mere “pretext”.

4. Possible reactions to Thucydides' methodological chapter

4.1 Callisthenes of Olynthus

The first historian who can be analyzed as potentially reacting to Thucydides' chapter on method is Callisthenes of Olynthus (c. 370–327 BC). He lived in the age of transition, and belongs to the Hellenistic “new world”, marked with the deeds of Alexander the Great.¹⁴¹ The affinities between one of his fragments and Thucydides have significant meaning for the overall assessment of the reception of Thucydides in the Peripatetic circles. Callisthenes was Aristotle's close relative and disciple,¹⁴² and “court historian”¹⁴³ of Alexander the Great.¹⁴⁴ In our context, Callisthenes' acquaintance and cooperation with Aristotle¹⁴⁵ as

¹⁴¹ Hence, e.g., G. Wirth's entry on Callisthenes in the *Lexikon des Hellenismus*, 2005, 512–513.

¹⁴² FGHist 124 T 2 *ap.* Plut. *Alex.* 55: ἀνεψιῶς Ἀριστοτέλους. According to Suda, s.v. Καλλισθένης Δημοτίμου, he was the “second cousin” of Aristotle.

¹⁴³ Fragments of Callisthenes are gathered in FGHist 124 F 1–59; T 1–36 and BNJ 124. On his life and writings in general see: Jacoby 1919, 1674–1707; Pearson 1960, 22–49; Pédech 1984, 15–69; Prandi 1985, 11–33; Golan 1988, 99–120; Meister 1990, 104–107; Dillery 2011, 180–181. The proper *magnum opus* of Callisthenes was the Ἑλληνικά (*Greek History*) in ten books. It covered the span of time from 387/6 (the King's Peace, which ended the Corinthian War) up to the beginning of the Sacred War in 357/6. The leading themes of the work were the end of the Spartan predominance, the ascendancy of Thebes, and the developments in Macedon under Philip II. See: Schwartz 1900, 106–130; Prandi 1985, 35–74. The numerous excursuses, and ethnographic and geographic details have prompted some scholars to see it as a typical example of “Peripatetic historiography” (e.g. Meister 1990, 105). Other – poorly attested – works of Callisthenes are: *Encomium of Hermeias* (F 2); *On the Sacred War* (F 1); *Periplus* (F 6–7); *Maxims* (F 4–5). From the Renaissance, Callisthenes was also (incorrectly) credited as the author of the so-called *Alexander Romance*, which was probably written around the third/second century BC.

¹⁴⁴ According to Diog. Laert. V 4–5 (T 6), Aristotle “recommended” (συστήσας) him for the post of Alexander's private teacher. We should note that Callisthenes was an accomplished historiographer prior to his participation in the expedition of Alexander: the Ἑλληνικά was written between c. 343–335. Only then did he take part in the campaign and undertook to write Ἀλεξάνδρου πράξεις (which commenced with Alexander's invasion of Asia, and broke off around the events of the year 331: F 35–37). It seems inadequate to consider the latter work the most important in Callisthenes' career (as Meister 1990, 105, has it: “Das Hauptwerk des Kallisthenes war seine bereits erwähnte Alexandergeschichte [...]”). The work was criticized for its panegyrical character and propaganda; Alexander is given heroic and even divine attributes (T 8; F 14a). On the relationship between Callisthenes and Alexander see Brown 1949, 225–248; Simons 2011, 61–82. In 327 Callisthenes was charged with treason and involvement in the so called “conspiracy of the pages” (T 7; T 8).

¹⁴⁵ Callisthenes composed in collaboration with Aristotle the Πυθιονικάι (a list of the victors of the Pythian games), and probably stayed with him in Pella, when the philosopher was Alexander's teacher (T 6). Callisthenes' and Aristotle's teamwork comprised antiquarian research, rhetoric, botany, perhaps also zoology, biology, medicine, and astronomy, for which they shared similar interest. Bosworth 1970, 407–413, showed that the relationship between Aristotle and Callisthenes is far from clear. The historiographical ideas of Callisthenes should

well as with Theophrastus,¹⁴⁶ may be of certain significance in evaluating the possible historiographical influence of Thucydides. Undoubtedly, Callisthenes' intellectual affinities with the Peripatos were strong, and to a certain degree his historiographical ideas can be viewed in this light.¹⁴⁷ Theophrastus' and other Peripatetic figures' recognition of Thucydides is crucial, as we have no direct evidence that Callisthenes read the *History*.

4.1.1 Interpretation of FGrHist 124 F 44

One particular fragment of Callisthenes can be analyzed in possible connection to Thucydides' chapter on method, specifically to the statement about speeches (F 44 ap. Athen. mechan. *De machinis*, 7.3 p. 10 Schneider):

Καλλισθένης φησί· 'δεῖ τὸν γράφειν τι πειρώμενον μὴ ἀστοχεῖν τοῦ προσώπου, ἀλλ' οἰκείως αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τοὺς λόγους θεῖναι.'¹⁴⁸

Felix Jacoby interpreted these words as a "continuation" of Thucydides' declaration from the *Methodenkapitel* (Thuc. I 22, 1).¹⁴⁹ Heinrich G. Strebel, on the

not be seen as entirely determined by Aristotle, as has been assumed by some scholars (cf. von Fritz 1956, 130). Cf. Chroust 1973, 83–91; Prandi 1985, 11–18; Mangia 2009, 313–341.

¹⁴⁶ Diogenes Laertius, V 44 = T 19a, notes a completely lost work entitled *Callisthenes or on Sorrow* (Καλλισθένης ἡ Περὶ πένθους). The πένθος in the title can be read as "sorrow", "mourning" (esp. after someone's death), "misfortune", "misery". It is also mentioned at Diog. Laert. IV 27, as work that was "mostly admired" (θαυμάζεται δὲ αὐτοῦ μάλιστα βιβλίον τὸ Περὶ πένθους). We know practically nothing about the content and form of the work. We can only conjecture that the theme touched upon Callisthenes' death, and somehow treated the role of fortune in human life. According to a reference in Cicero, Theophrastus in his work commented on the fate of Callisthenes, and the luck of Alexander, of which the king did not know how to make proper use. See Bosworth 1970, 407. Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* III 21 = T 19b: *Theophrastus interitum deplorans Callisthenis sodalis sui* etc. It is worth noting that Cicero calls Callisthenes Theophrastus' *sodalis*, which can mean a "mate", "comrade", but also a fellow or member of a corporation, society, e.g. of a *ἐταιρεία*, or college of priests (see OLD, s.v. *sodalis*). Cicero's expression suggests that he believed in a close relationship between the two intellectuals. Most probably it was a relationship between peers (they were of approximately the same age) educated by one teacher – Aristotle (as Diog. Laert. V 39 implies, see Chroust 1973, 84). After the educational stage of their acquaintance, they could have worked together, e.g. in the field of botany (Mangia 2009, 328 with n. 76; 329).

¹⁴⁷ Pearson 1960, 25, points also to Callisthenes' links with the "rhetorical historiography" of the Isocratic "school"; this, however, relies on the conceptual miscomprehension discussed in the introduction to the present work.

¹⁴⁸ "Callisthenes says: It is necessary for the writer not to miss the mark where the person [of the speaker – M.K.] is concerned, but rather to set the words in accordance with it, as well as with the circumstances." transl. mine.

¹⁴⁹ Jacoby comments: "Aus einem proöimion daß die eingelegten reden den tatsachen und dem charakter des redenden angepaßt sein müssen, ist fortbildung der thukydideischen forderung (I 22, 1 *περὶ τῶν αἰεὶ παρόντων ... τὰ δέοντα ... ἐχομένῳ ὡς ἐγγύτατα τῆς ζυμπάσης γνώμης*

contrary, saw them as a “distortion” of the Thucydidean norm — Thucydides meant, according to Strebel, to include in the speeches only the actual or probable words, whereas Callisthenes focused solely on τὸ πρέπον,¹⁵⁰ as if (as Strebel seems to imply) the latter category were somehow contradictory to the methodological principles of Thucydides. Simon Hornblower seems to misreport Strebel’s assessment, as he writes that “this fragment was plausibly regarded by Jacoby as a development of Thucydides’ methodological demand (I 22), and others (Strebel, Lionel Pearson, Otto Lendle) agree.”¹⁵¹ Strebel called Callisthenes’ statement an “Umbiegung”, not “Weiterentwicklung” or “Entfaltung”. He evidently means that Callisthenes alters or deforms Thucydides’ principles in the case of composing speeches. As for Pearson, he observed that “this comment recalls the famous remarks of Thucydides (1.22.1) about the speeches in his history.” “Recalls” clearly does not mean “is a direct and/or conscious reference to”. Pearson, however, believes that it is. On that basis he supposes that Thucydides’ *History* was an object of literary or philosophical discussion between Callisthenes and Aristotle.¹⁵² Hornblower also — cautiously — allows for such a possibility.¹⁵³ Recently, Klaus Meister unequivocally asserted that the fragment of Callisthenes “evidently depends on Thucydides”, but he provides no argument for this claim.¹⁵⁴ Overall, none of the scholars have substantiated their statements through analysis of either Thucydides or Callisthenes, not to mention by a coherent interpretation of both in one work. All these opinions go back to, and ultimately rely on, the short comments of Jacoby and Strebel.¹⁵⁵

τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων) in richtung auf das stärkere hervortreten der persönlichkeit in der geschichtsschreibung.”

¹⁵⁰ Strebel 1935, 22: “Denn während diesen bei der Komposition der Reden immer die Rücksicht auf den tatsächlichen oder den Umständen nach möglichem Inhalt leitete, ist es dem Schüler des Aristoteles nur um die Wahrung des πρέπον zu tun.”

¹⁵¹ Hornblower 1995, 54.

¹⁵² As Pearson 1960, 31, continues: “But since Aristotle also held definite views about appropriate characterization, we may suspect not only that Callisthenes admired the work of Thucydides, but that he discussed with Aristotle some of the literary and moral issues which it raised.” Cf. Lendle 1992, 159–160.

¹⁵³ Hornblower 1995, 54: “But it is surely reasonable to postulate engagement with Thucydidean speeches, and with Thucydidean principles of speech-writing, among Aristotelians active as both historians and rhetoricians [...]”

¹⁵⁴ Meister 2013, 38: “In der Tat ist die Abhängigkeit dieser Äußerung vom sog. Redensatz des Thukydides (I 22,1) evident.”

¹⁵⁵ Neither Jacoby nor Strebel cite any authority for their thesis. Pearson refers to Will 1914, 19–20, but only in the context of the speculations about Aristotle’s and Callisthenes’ possible discussions about Thucydides. Hornblower relies on these previous authors, Meister refers to Jacoby, Pearson, and Hornblower, without analysis of his own.

Apart from these reception studies, other scholars have also made some observations about the potential connection between Thucydides and Callisthenes. Walbank saw Callisthenes' conception as innovative in comparison with Thucydides, in that the criterion of suitability is not restricted to the situation, but embraces the traits of the speaker as well.¹⁵⁶ Paul Pédech does not offer a detailed discussion, and compares the words from the fragment in question with the conception of Thucydides. The scholar concludes that Callisthenes' principles in composing speeches are completely different. Thucydides, Pédech says, focuses on the requirements of the circumstances in which the speech was delivered, Callisthenes — as the fragment allegedly implies — on the psychological and moral traits of the speaker.¹⁵⁷ Luisa Prandi devotes more attention to the fragment and its relationship to Thucydides. Firstly, she tries to read the words of Callisthenes in their own right. She stresses the notion of *πρόσωπον* that occurs there, and points to its connection with tragedy — she makes Callisthenes oriented to the proper dramatization ("sceneggiatura") of the characters appearing in historical narrative, in the way that tragedy dramatizes its characters. This is, according to Prandi, what differentiates the two historians' methodologies. Prandi reads the second part of the fragment as postulating a strict correspondence between the events described and the style in which they are described ("stretto legame fra λόγοι e πράξεις"). This is where Callisthenes' and Thucydides' principles apparently converge. The rule of dramatization is, Prandi concludes, due to the development of, and Callisthenes' adherence to, the current of "tragic historiography".¹⁵⁸ These approaches are characteristic in that they compare Callisthenes and Thucydides within the well-known paradigm of the general tendencies in Hellenistic historiography. In particular, this paradigm seems to determine Prandi's reading of *πρόσωπον* in Callisthenes' fragment. Indeed, one of its meanings is "a character in a play" (or book).¹⁵⁹ However, its presence in rhetorical theory cannot be underestimated.¹⁶⁰ For instance, the notion occurs in Alexander's rhetorical treatise *De figuris* (second cent. AD) in the context of *διατύπωσις* and *ἐνάργεια* (Alex. *Schem.* 13–15 p. 51 Spengel). Alexander defined *διατύπωσις* as arising from *παρασυναγωγή* — a "production for comparison"¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ Walbank 1985, 246.

¹⁵⁷ Pédech 1984, 35.

¹⁵⁸ Prandi 1985, 132–133. Prandi's conclusion reads: "La vicinanza fra Callistene e Tucide non è in generale molto forte [...]"

¹⁵⁹ LSJ, s.v. *πρόσωπον* records the use in the Callisthenes' fragment as "of an author".

¹⁶⁰ Lausberg 1990, pars. 762, 772, 820, 821, 826, 829.

¹⁶¹ LSJ, s.v. *παρασυναγωγή*.

of *πρόσωπα* and *ἔργα*. The concept that we should turn to here is *προσωποποιία* (lat. *factio personae*), lit. “creating of a person”; in rhetoric it is the figure of introducing impersonal beings as persons, or persons not present.¹⁶² Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses the word clearly in the context of composing speeches, in *On Thucydides*. From the context it seems to be evident that *πρόσωπον* is a name for the character of the speaker; most importantly, he implies that the author can put into his speaker's mouth words that are, or are not, appropriate for him (*προσώποις πρέποντας*; plausible that they were spoken by the figure as we know it). Thucydides achieves the aim of the appropriate creation of *πρόσωπα* in the exchange between Archidamus and Plataeans in book II (71–72).¹⁶³ In the chapter on the Melian Dialogue, Dionysius draws a distinction between the form of relation (a summary of a speech), where the historian speaks himself (*ἐκ τοῦ ἰδίου προσώπου*), and a speech in direct discourse, formed by the historian (*προσωποποιεῖ*).¹⁶⁴ Are we to explain Dionysius' understanding of *πρόσωπον* through the influence of tragedy on historiography or on rhetorical theory? Definitely not. We can only suppose that it entered into his rhetorical or literary theory within his rhetorical training, as a standard term for the character of the speaker deduced from this speaker's words.

The idea of this representation being appropriate or inappropriate seems to match perfectly Callisthenes' formula: *μὴ ἀστοχεῖν τοῦ προσώπου*. The *ἀστοχεῖν* means primarily “to miss the mark”; with the *genetivus* it can be found as denoting lack of proper measure, lack of timing, or lack of appropriateness,¹⁶⁵ etc. Prandi seems to be wrong in dividing this phrase from the subsequent clause: *οἰκείως αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τοὺς λόγους θεῖναι*. The pronoun *αὐτῷ* refers to *πρόσωπον* from the preceding clause; so we cannot, as Prandi does, read the two clauses independently. Literally, Callisthenes says that the words have to be formed in a way that is “proper” for the character of the speaker. The adverb *οἰκείως* is crucial — it implies appropriateness, suitability; in combination with *πρόσωπον* it refers probably to the individual, characteristic traits of the given person who delivers a speech.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, Callisthenes says that the *λόγοι* should conform also to the “things”, or “matters” in question — *πράγμασι*. This should be probably read as the general theme, the subject of the speech, the things it discusses. Perhaps its sense can

¹⁶² Lausberg 1990, par. 826: “[...] die Einführung nichtpersonhafter Dinge als sprechender sowie zu sonstigem personhaftem Verhalten befähigter Personen.”

¹⁶³ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 36, 1: *τοῖς τε προσώποις πρέποντας καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν οἰκείου καὶ μήτ' ἐλλείποντας τοῦ μετρίου μήτε ὑπεραίροντας κτλ.*

¹⁶⁴ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 37, 2: *προσωποποιεῖ τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα διάλογον καὶ δραματίζει.*

¹⁶⁵ See e.g. Polyb. XXVII 20, 2; Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 33, 14; Strab. I 4, 5.

¹⁶⁶ See various places cited in LSJ, s.v. *οἰκείως*.

be extended to the circumstances in which the speech takes place; still, from the immediate context of the fragment we cannot say that with certainty.

To sum up, the most probable interpretation of Callisthenes' words is that he defines a principle of composing speeches, in which the central idea is the appropriateness of the words in the context of the personality and character of the speaker, as well as in relation to the subject matter, which can also be connected to the circumstances in which the speech is delivered. It has to be emphasized that it is not explicitly stated where Callisthenes formulated this theory, or whether it refers to historiography at all. Despite this, Jacoby ascribed the fragment in question to a *prooemium* to the Ἑλληνικά, and other scholars followed.¹⁶⁷ Prandi also takes the Ἀλεξάνδρου πράξεις into account,¹⁶⁸ but the *opinio communis* seems to be better substantiated.

4.1.2 Affinities of F 44 with Thucydides I 22, 1

Having revised the reading of the fragment, we can now ask about its relationship to Thucydides' theory as outlined in the first section of the present chapter. First of all, we have to admit that there is no explicit mention of Thucydides either in the fragment in question, or in any other of Callisthenes' extant (also fragmentary) works. Other sources are also silent as to his acquaintance with Thucydides. There have been attempts to trace his knowledge, or even the influence on him of Thucydides in a passage from the Ἑλληνικά (a speech). However, the parallel is so general, the ideas so common, that the Thucydidean impact remains insubstantial. Callisthenes' words are related by an unknown commentator on Aristotle, so any inquiry into verbal echoes is doubtful.¹⁶⁹ Nevertheless, Theophrastus certainly read (and valued) Thucydides, and Callisthenes was evidently in close contact with him and Aristotle in his intellectual training and further activity. His acquaintance with Thucydides is very likely. Thus, there is at least an elementary basis (or justification) for reading

¹⁶⁷ Pearson 1960, 31. Pédech 1984, 35, also discusses the fragment in the section on the Ἑλληνικά.

¹⁶⁸ Prandi 1985, 132 ("forse").

¹⁶⁹ F 8 *ap.* Anon. i. Aristot. *Eth. Nic.* IV 8: ἱστορεῖ Καλλισθένης ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν κτλ. The text that follows is according to Pearson 1960, 31, parallel with Pericles' words from the Funeral Oration (Thuc. II 40, 4), that the Athenians make friends by giving favours, rather than by receiving them. Meister 2013, 39, is probably right to remark that "handelt es sich doch um einen Gemeinplatz, der auch bei anderen Autoren gestanden haben kann", but such an assertion remains unfounded, until we actually indicate passages in other works, where a similar idea occurs (Meister does not do this). Macleod 1983, 150, quotes only several lines from Euripides' *Supplices*. Blundell 1989, 35, adduces Democritus (DK 68 B 96), rather incomparable to the passage from Thucydides, and Dem. *De cor.* 269 (also a doubtful parallel to the idea found in Thucydides and Callisthenes).

Callisthenes' fragment on composing speeches as a reaction to Thucydides' chapter on method. This does not amount to treating it as an exclusive influence. To sum up, the question of a potential connection between Thucydides and Callisthenes can be answered in the following way:

1. Thucydides says that he endeavours to reproduce the *ξύμπασα γνώμη* of the speakers, plus he takes *τὰ δέοντα* into account: the words that are appropriate for the circumstances, including the identity of the speaker. Callisthenes also postulates appropriateness to the person, as well as to the subject matter. In other words, the idea behind Thucydides' formula *τὰ δέοντα* is quite similar to Callisthenes' concept that the speech has to be in conformity with reality (with emphasis on certain parts of this reality: the speaker and the circumstances). To perceive this, we need to set aside the enduring convictions and presumptions about Callisthenes' affiliation with a school of historiography that preferred rhetorical effect to historical truth. The inclusion of *πρόσωπον* — of the character of the speaker — in the notion of appropriateness is not un-Thucydidean; quite the contrary — there is no reason to think that Thucydides did not take the person of the speaker into account.¹⁷⁰ The *γνώμη*, which Thucydides claims to reconstruct with utmost possible faithfulness, in fact entails the personal, individual factors that shape this *γνώμη*. The interpretation of Callisthenes' *πρόσωπον* in terms of drama, and its differentiation, on these grounds, from Thucydides, is unjustified. The concept of *πρόσωπον* is firmly rooted in rhetorical theory, and the etymological associations with the terminology of tragedy should not deceive us here.

2. The concept of Thucydides is very similar to Callisthenes' in that it emphasizes the general principle of the character of the relationship between words and reality: the former have to correspond to the latter; have to be faithful to, or rely on it. In other words, both Thucydides and Callisthenes underline the need for the author's knowledge of the subject matter on which he is about to speak, and apply it in composing this speech. For both historians, *λόγοι* have to be adequate, to conform to *πράγματα*: the subject, and — by implication — the circumstances in which the speech is delivered.

To conclude, Callisthenes' principles of writing speeches are in conformity with the conception articulated by Thucydides in the chapter on method, even though we cannot determine explicit or verbal connection between the two texts. We lack evidence to state with certainty that Callisthenes, when writing

¹⁷⁰ Cf. Marincola 2007, 122: "[...] we ought not to posit a vast gulf separating this approach from that of Thucydides, nor assume that it reveals a "rhetorical" conception of constructing speeches as opposed to Thucydides' "historical" notion of what was actually said. Notions of appropriateness and probability reside at least partially behind Thucydides' understanding of *τὰ δέοντα* [...]."

about the theory of speeches, had Thucydides “in mind”; but he formulated a theory that is congruent with that of the author of the *History*.

4.2 Hieronymus of Cardia

The next historian, writing at the threshold of the Hellenistic period, who has been associated with Thucydides by modern scholars, is Hieronymus of Cardia (c. 360 – c.260 BC). He was a historian and statesman, beginning his career as a member of the entourage of his fellow Cardian — Eumenes (e.g. acting as his emissary in 319/318, at the siege of Nora).¹⁷¹ Prior to that, his main function was possibly that of a γραμματεὺς of Eumenes. Of his education and acquaintance with earlier historians we know nothing.¹⁷² Thus, whether Hieronymus read Thucydides is not possible to ascertain.¹⁷³ He wrote a historical work entitled *The Histories after Alexander* or *The Histories of the Successors*,¹⁷⁴ which spanned the period from Alexander’s death, to the death of Pyrrhus (323–272), and was written approximately in the first quarter of the third century.¹⁷⁵ He was probably Diodorus’ main and direct authority in the books 18–20 of the Βιβλιοθήκη.¹⁷⁶ There is no explicit methodological statement, not to mention

¹⁷¹ There are reasons to believe that he was Eumenes’ nephew. After Eumenes’ death in 316, he passed to the court of Antigonos the One-eyed. Further, he served with Antigonos in Syria (312/1) and at Ipsus (301); under Demetrius Poliorcetes he governed Thebes, after its revolt in 293. Finally, he worked for Antigonos Gonatas. In a recently discovered papyrus (P.Oxy. LXXI 4808, I 18) he is called an “experienced historiographer” (ἐμπρακτος συγγραφεύς), and “an esteemed man” (ἀνὴρ σπουδαῖος). His work is referred to with an adjective “truthful” (ἀληθοῦς), and the author himself is “an example of soundness” (παράδειγμα σωφροσύνης). On Hieronymus’ life and writing see: Reuss 1876, 1–8; Jacoby 1913, 1540–1548; Brown 1947, 684–696; J. Hornblower 1981, 5–17; Knoepfler 2001, 36–38; Roisman 2010, 135–148.

¹⁷² Cf. J. Hornblower 1981, 10.

¹⁷³ Strasburger 1977, 33, claims that Hieronymus knew Thucydides and Herodotus, but adduces no argument.

¹⁷⁴ FGrHist 154 T 1 *ap.* Sudam, s.v. Ἱερώνυμος Καρδιανός· ὃς τὰ ἐπ’ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πραχθέντα συνέγραψε. Καρδία δὲ ὄνομα πόλεως. Cf. T 3 *ap.* Diod. Sic. XVIII 42, 1: Ἱερώνυμος ὁ τὰς τῶν Διαδόχων Ἱστορίας γεγραφώς. These and other mentions of Hieronymus’ work seem not to give its title, but rather refer to its content. See J. Hornblower 1981, 76 n. 2.

¹⁷⁵ The precise starting point of the narrative is difficult to establish; it was most probably around 322, the account of the Bactrian revolt, preceded with a geographical survey of Asia, to be found in Diodorus, XVIII 5–6. On this work see: Engel 1972, 120–125; J. Hornblower 1981, 76–153; Landucci Gattinoni 1981–1982, 13–26; Lehmann 1988, 130–149. Malitz 1990, 337, argued that because of his strict methodology Hieronymus remained relatively unpopular in his own time.

¹⁷⁶ After nearly a century of scholarly debate, the old view of Jacoby eventually prevailed; he believed that Diodorus reproduces Hieronymus extensively, with slight alterations in terms of style or arrangement on his part (Jacoby 1913, 1551–1557: “eine gemäßigte Zusatztheorie”). J. Hornblower 1981, 18–75, provided a fresh and coherent argument for the thesis that Diodorus reproduces his sources in terms of their main ideas, focus, perspective, while altering their style.

an entire chapter devoted to method, in the extant work of Hieronymus (or that which is supposed to draw on him). Hieronymus' epitomators were interested in the content of his work, not in a preface, that must have also existed.¹⁷⁷ Nevertheless, he was considered Polybius' "only Hellenistic rival in pragmatic history",¹⁷⁸ chiefly because of the qualities of the narrative in Diodorus, which are treated as exemplary for Hieronymus' historical work. He certainly had first-hand knowledge about numerous events which he described (or from his own autopsy), was skilled in assessment and analysis of his source material; his narrative was probably coherent, full of details, and clear.¹⁷⁹

Therefore, scholars have supposed that "Thucydidean influence" on Hieronymus did exist. Jacoby called him "wahrer Nachfolger" of Thucydides,¹⁸⁰ S. Hornblower "Thucydides' real successor", and pointed i.a. to the similar διαίρεσις of the works of Thucydides and Hieronymus: the division of the narrative into campaigning seasons, and to several other features.¹⁸¹ His view is based on Jane Hornblower's study, in which Thucydides was identified as Hieronymus' ultimate model. Both scholars operate within interpretative and conceptual patterns that are not entirely accepted in the present work.¹⁸² Meister

She analyzed all the intermediary sources for Hieronymus' work in comparison to Diodorus' account. Her conclusion is clear: "[...] among those whose works on the Successors survive, only Diodorus used Hieronymus both directly and for an extended piece of writing." Lehmann 1988, 121–129, as the strong arguments for reading Diod. Sic. XVIII–XIX/XX as extracted from Hieronymus, stresses: a) references to the latter by name in the books in question, b) the perspective of Eumenes, Antigonus, and Demetrius Poliorcetes, from which these books are written, c) the use of diplomatic documents produced/received by these figures in these books, d) the tendency to side with Eumenes, betraying the close connection of the author with this figure. These points are very compelling. See also: Simpson 1959, 370–379; Schäfer 2002, 11–14, positive on Hieronymus as Diodorus' main source; Knoepfler 2001, 38–39, is more sceptical; Anson 2004, 11; 28 and 32–33 (esp. on the "Eumenean bias" of Hieronymus). For the overall assessment and comparison of the testimonia of Hieronymus Reuss 1876, 9–77, is still useful; cf. pp. 115–127 (on Hieronymus in Diodorus).

¹⁷⁷ Cf. J. Hornblower 1981, 80.

¹⁷⁸ Bosworth's expression in the article on Hieronymus in the OCD, 2012, 684.

¹⁷⁹ As observed already by Reuss 1876, 78: "Wir werden sehen, dass wir es mit einem aufs beste unterrichteten, geradezu peinlich genauen und gewissenhaften Schriftsteller zu thun haben." Cf. *ibidem*, 100, on Hieronymus' autopsy.

¹⁸⁰ Jacoby 1913, 1557.

¹⁸¹ Hornblower 1995, 51 and pp. 58–59, enumerates the absence of gods as causal factors, the search for deeper causes for e.g. the Lamian War, the obsessive interest in the unity of Alexander's empire (comparable to Thucydides' stress on the Athenian ἀρχή), the preference for the lowest and most believable of competing statistics, lastly, the most subjective element: the high quality of the narrative.

¹⁸² Hornblower relies entirely on J. Hornblower 1981, which he cites at p. 61 n. 61. J. Hornblower 1981, 235, suggested that "the dominant influence on his work ultimately must have been Thucydides: in his account of αἰτίαι and his analysis of the struggle for total power Hieronymus shows his desire to be a political historian." We see here, how J. Hornblower reads Thucydides,

restated S. Hornblower's points and adduced Jacoby for the view that Hieronymus "followed Thucydides' methodological principles".¹⁸³ Recently, most of the points of contact between Hieronymus and Thucydides, indicated by S. Hornblower, were repeated by Dillery, who goes further and postulates direct influence.¹⁸⁴ None of the scholars provides a more detailed inquiry into potential affinities between Thucydides and Hieronymus;¹⁸⁵ nearly all refer to categories too broad to be measured,¹⁸⁶ or too general.¹⁸⁷ Of the points mentioned e.g. by S. Hornblower, the only question that can be addressed according to the scope and methodology of the present chapter, is Hieronymus' approach to historical causation.

4.2.1 Hieronymus' conception of historical causation

The potentially relevant material can be found in Diodorus, XVIII 8–13, in the account of the so-called Lamian War (323–322).¹⁸⁸ The narrative begins with a statement that it is necessary to outline the αἰτίαι of this war (Diod. Sic. XVIII 8, 1):

Κατὰ δὲ τὴν Εὐρώπην Ῥόδιοι μὲν ἐκβαλόντες τὴν Μακεδονικὴν φρουρὰν ἡλευθέρωσαν τὴν πόλιν, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν τὸν ὀνομασθέντα Λαμιακόν. τούτου δὲ τὰς αἰτίας ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι προεκθέσθαι χάριν τοῦ σαφεστεράς γενέσθαι τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ συντελεσθείσας πράξεις.¹⁸⁹

and by which paradigm she compares him to Hieronymus: as a representative of "political historiography". Cf. Hornblower 1994, 43, where Hieronymus is, "like Thucydides", a "pragmatic" historian. Hieronymus and Thucydides are also mentioned as comparable by Bury 1909, 177. On similar διαίρεσις in both historians see Lehmann 1988, 126.

¹⁸³ Meister 2013, 44: "[...] seine Darstellung weitgehend den methodischen Vorgaben des Thukydides folgte."

¹⁸⁴ Dillery 2011, 185, "[...] it is clear that Hieronymus was an historian of the first order, finding inspiration for his historiography in the work of Thucydides."

¹⁸⁵ This applies to all studies in which such comparisons occur. Even J. Hornblower, who writes at length on Hieronymus, adduces Thucydides without reflection on the latter's own methodology, employing a ready interpretation of it.

¹⁸⁶ E.g. Hornblower 1995, 59: "obsessive interest in the unity (τὰ ὅλα) of Alexander's empire" on the part of Hieronymus, as compared to Thucydides' stress on the Athenian ἀρχή. How, on the basis of the poorly recognized testimonies, can we decide how strongly Hieronymus emphasized this unity?

¹⁸⁷ E.g. Meister 2013, 44, when he indicates the "endeavour to provide a truthful account" ("Das Bemühen um eine wahrheitsgemäße Darstellung") as Thucydides' influence on Hieronymus.

¹⁸⁸ The Lamian War was fought between Macedon (under Antipater) and the Greek coalition led by Athens and Aetolia. In Lamia (Thessaly) Antipater was besieged. The war ended with the Greek defeat at Crannon. See Hornblower, *Lamian War*, OCD, 2012, 790.

¹⁸⁹ "In Europe the Rhodians drove out their Macedonian garrison and freed their city, and the Athenians began what is called the Lamian War against Antipater. It is necessary to set forth

Then, an account of Alexander's decree about the restoration of the exiles in the Greek cities follows (XVIII 8, 2–5). Its effect was, for the most part, overall approval, with the exception of the Aetolians and the Athenians. For these, the decision was an offence; for the Aetolians because they had (in their opinion) rightly exiled the Oeniadae from their native city, for the Athenians because they had already colonized Samos and were unwilling to abandon it (XVIII 8, 6–7). Such was their reaction as described by the author:

οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ τὴν κάθοδον τῶν φυγάδων ὡς ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ γινομένην ἀπεδέχοντο, Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι δυσχεραίνοντες τῇ πράξει χαλεπῶς ἔφερον. Αἰτωλοὶ μὲν γὰρ κτλ.¹⁹⁰

In the account that follows, the beginning and the developments of the Athenians' revolt against Macedon, precipitated by the above decision, are described. First, we have to underline the basic fact that the need for expounding the causes of the war is expressed. In the passage in Thucydides immediately following the proper chapter on method, the historian also states that the reasons will be described, “so that no one have to enquire why such a war between the Greeks ever broke out”.¹⁹¹ This is the first correspondence between Thucydides and Hieronymus in terms of historical causation. Closer scrutiny shows that their affinity in the field of causation is much greater than heretofore supposed.

Diodorus, most probably after Hieronymus, explains why it is necessary to describe the causes: *χάριν τοῦ σαφεστέρας γενέσθαι τὰς ἐν αὐτῷ συντελεσθείσας πράξεις*. Geer's simple rendering of this phrase: “in order that the events that took place in it may be clearer” cannot be treated as appropriately conveying the sense of *σαφές* in the context.¹⁹² It is also likely that in our passage *σαφές* has a different sense from the stylistic quality of the speeches, as e.g. in the case of Photius' assessment of Agatharchides. *σαφές* is a quality of the *πράξεις* of the war; due to the exposition of their *αἰτία*, they become “more *σαφές*” (note the implied possibility of gradation). It is then possible to connect this expression with Thucydides' crucial passage from the chapter on method: *ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφές σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν*

the causes of this war in order that the events that took place in it may be clearer” (all translations of Diodorus' books XVIII–XX are of Geer).

¹⁹⁰ “Now people in general welcomed the restoration of the exiles as a good thing, but the Aetolians and the Athenians took offence at the action and were angry.”

¹⁹¹ Thuc. I 23, 5: *τὰς αἰτίας προύγραψα πρῶτον καὶ τὰς διαφοράς, τοῦ μὴ τινα ζητῆσαί ποτε ἐξ ὅτου τοσοῦτος πόλεμος τοῖς Ἕλλησι κατέστη*.

¹⁹² It is evident that Geer did not reflect on the potentially quasi-technical meaning of *σαφές* here. He seems to have taken the very first meaning of the word from the LSJ (see s.v. *σαφές*: clear, plain, distinct).

μελλόντων κτλ. As shown above, the most likely interpretation of τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν in Thucydides is to read it as “certain knowledge”. Thucydides does not make an explicit association of σαφές with the account of the reasons for the Peloponnesian War, but such an interconnection is plausible.¹⁹³ Thucydides’ τὰ γενόμενα seems to be quite similar in sense to πράξεις — all the events of the given war are meant in both instances. We of course cannot read any Thucydidean sense “into” the Diodorean passage, but if we hypothetically read the phrase τοῦ σαφεστέρας γενέσθαι as “becoming more understandable”, we would probably not miss the point. Yet this can be decided with greater degree of certainty after consideration of the content that is referred to in that opening sentence. What is the character of the account that comes after the preliminary declaration? As summarized above, Alexander’s decree made the Athenians and the Aetolians very dissatisfied and even angry: δυσχεραίνοντες τῇ πράξει χαλεπῶς ἔφερον. The participle from δυσχεραίνω and the phrase χαλεπῶς φέρειν point to the mental state of the Athenians and the Aetolians, which lead them to the decision to go to war against Macedon. This “internal process” is clearly depicted as a decisive factor responsible for the outbreak of the Lamian War. Therefore, αἰτία is understood in a psychological way; the schema of the account is clear — firstly, the events that caused the given psychological state or attitude, next, the preliminary developments, and finally, the very beginning of the proper process (i.e. that which is subsumed under the heading of the “such and such” war).

4.3 Polybius of Megalopolis

Polybius of Megalopolis was traditionally regarded as one of the few Hellenistic historians who in an exceptional manner represented methodological principles and historiographical aims similar to those of Thucydides.¹⁹⁴ He belongs to the authors who mention Thucydides by name. What we know about his life, intellectual milieu and literary education, allows us to think that he read Thucydides’ work. He almost certainly knew the latter’s chapter on method.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹³ Cf. above, pp. 104–106.

¹⁹⁴ General remarks on the affinity between the two historians are found in: Mioni 1949, 127–131; Ziegler 1952, 1503, cf. 1522–1523; Ziegler 1955–1956, 162–170; Roveri 1964, 44; Lehmann 1974, 165–166 with n. 1; Hornblower 1994, 60–61; Marincola 1997, 71–72.

¹⁹⁵ On Polybius’ life, education, and literary work see the fundamental discussion of Ziegler 1952, 1444–1471, which underlines Polybius’ (probably superficial) knowledge of Homer, Classical tragedy and lyric poetry. As for philosophical authors, according to Ziegler, Polybius shows only indirect acquaintance with Aristotle or Theophrastus. The most evident is Polybius’ contact with the Stoic school through Panaetius. The so-called Scipionic Circle, involving Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, was Polybius’ setting in Rome (the term “circle” is now

4.3.1 The potential parallel between Thuc. I 22, 4 and Polyb. III 31, 12

In general, scholars have seen the Polybian idea of the usefulness of historiography as similar to, and somehow continuing the ideas of, Thucydides.¹⁹⁶ Strebel was the first to go into detail, and pointed to a passage where Polybius states that history is about the exploration of causes, and that knowing them grants the historical work a long-lasting value (Polyb. III 31, 12). This is supposed to be parallel to the concluding sentence of the *Methodenkapitel* of Thucydides (I 22, 4: usefulness and everlasting value of the *History*).¹⁹⁷ Several scholars have made similar observations on this passage, some assuming that Polybius here consciously refers to Thucydides;¹⁹⁸ some even took it as sufficient proof that Polybius read Thucydides (or at least the chapter on method).¹⁹⁹ Others restricted themselves to conceiving it as a parallel with verbal echoes, and tried to show in the comparison between Thuc. I 22, 4 and Polyb. III 31, 12 that the two historians are not entirely in agreement in their concepts.²⁰⁰

regarded with suspicion, see Erskine, *Scipionic Circle*, OCD, 2012, 1330). In Polybius' motherland, Megalopolis, during the historian's lifetime, the Academy was most prominent. See: Cuntz 1902, 75–84; Roveri 1964, 44–142; Walbank 1972, 32–40; Pédech 1974, 41–64; Marincola 2001, 113–116; Clarke 2003, 69–87; Gowing 2010, 384–394; Guelfucci 2010, 329–357; Kloft 2013, 13–24; Mehl 2013, 23–48.

¹⁹⁶ Schadewaldt 1982, 227: “harte Sachlichkeit” of Polybius as a factor of usefulness and continuation of Thucydides' methodology. Cf. Gentili, Cerri 1988, 26–27; Hose 2009, 189–191; Kloft 2013, 19.

¹⁹⁷ Strebel 1935, 23: “Ich stehe nicht an, diese Worte als Kompliment gegen seinen großen Vorgänger zu deuten, mit dessen Programm er sich im Wesentlichen eins weiß.” The word “Kompliment” is vague, but it seems that Strebel thought of conscious, affirmative allusion to Thucydides on the part of Polybius.

¹⁹⁸ Nicolai 1995, 17: “Polibio [...] allude chiaramente alle sue dichiarazioni programmatiche quando, in vari luoghi della sua opera, esalta l'utilità della storia per la formazione dell'uomo politico. [...] Le parole di Tucidide sembrano risuonare anche in 3, 31, 12 sg.”; cf. p. 295: “L'uso del termine ἀγώνισμα [...] è un chiaro segnale che rinvia al programma di Tucidide.” Cf. Walbank 1972, 41: “These and other examples confirm that Polybius was conscious of his relationship to a predecessor like himself [...]”; cf. idem 1990, 256; Foulon 2013, 143: “Il ne fait guère de doute que l'on trouve un écho délibéré à ce texte chez Polybe, dans une digression relative à l'histoire [...]”

¹⁹⁹ Luschnat 1970, 1295, seems to draw such a conclusion from the parallel in question: “Das Kapitel I 22 hat Polybios aber wohl doch gekannt.” Hornblower 1994, 60–61: “The reference to ἀγώνισμα seems decisive evidence that Polybius knew Thucydides.” Foulon 2013, 146, after analysis of this and all other potential parallels goes as far as to state that: “l'examen de ces quatre passages polybiens montre donc que leur auteur a nécessairement en tête le texte de Thucydide, qu'il a non seulement lu et relu, mais retenu par cœur.” Similarly Porciani 2020, 94–96.

²⁰⁰ Meister 2013, 49: “[...] mit wörtlichen Anklängen an das *Methodenkapitel* des Thukydides”. Cf. Ziegler 1952, 1503; Eisen 1966, 80; Saïd 2010, 173.

Recently, Scardino argued that in the Polybian passage there is no purposeful allusion to Thucydides at all, but this shall prove unlikely below.²⁰¹

i. Polyb. III 31, 12: interpretation

Let us begin with a quotation of the relevant passage — a methodological digression by Polybius (III 31, 12):

ἱστορίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις τὸ διὰ τί καὶ πῶς καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπράχθη τὸ πραχθὲν καὶ πότερον εὐλογον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀγώνισμα μὲν μάθημα δ' οὐ γίνεται, καὶ παραντίκα μὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὸ παράπαν.²⁰²

This passage occurs at the end of section III 1–33, 4, where the causes and preliminaries of the Hannibalic War and the Second Illyrian War are described. The third book begins as an introduction to the *Histories* proper, after two books of narrative concerning the time before the Hannibalic War, which served, Polybius says, as “introduction and preparation to the entire *History*”. The aim of this introduction, the historian clarifies, was to explain the processes and circumstances (“when, how, and why”) of Rome’s expansion and first clash with Carthage, of the Achaeans’ and other Greek poleis’ growth, as well as of the state of affairs in the kingdom of Macedon. Without this, it would be impossible for the reader to really understand the present developments in Italy (especially the domination of Rome) and beyond, which are the main theme of the work.²⁰³ Remarkably, the methodological digression occurs in Polybius in a similar place to Thucydides’ *Methodenkapitel*: after “prehistory” and before the explication of the causes of the war proper. The structure — in that respect — of the works of the two historians, is similar.²⁰⁴ This may be accidental, but

²⁰¹ Scardino 2018, 310–312, stresses the lack of explicit reference to Thucydides in the passage, which, as the scholar himself admits, is but an argument *ex silentio*.

²⁰² “For if we take from history the discussion of why, how, and wherefore each thing was done, and whether the result was what we should have reasonably expected, what is left is a clever essay but not a lesson, and while pleasing for the moment of no possible benefit for the future” (all translations of Polybius are of Paton).

²⁰³ Polyb. II 71: ἡμεῖς δ’ ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἐπίστασιν καὶ προκατασκευὴν τῆς ὅλης ἱστορίας διεληλύθαμεν, δι’ ἧς ὑποδέδεικται πότε καὶ πῶς καὶ δι’ ἧς αἰτίας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν κρατήσαντες Ῥωμαῖοι πρῶτον ἐγχειρεῖν ἤρξαντο τοῖς ἔξω πράγμασι καὶ πρῶτον ἐτόλμησαν ἀμφισβητεῖν Καρχηδονίοις τῆς θαλάττης κτλ. (“I have thus completed this Introduction or preliminary part of my *History*. In it I have shown in the first place when, how, and why the Romans, having mastered Italy, first entered on enterprises outside that land and disputed the command of the sea with the Carthaginians [...]). See also in this context: I 3; I 12; II 37; II 42; III 1.

²⁰⁴ Thucydides proceeds as follows: I 1: general introduction; I 2–19: Archaeology (the development of the two sides – Sparta and Athens); I 20–22: digression on method; I 23: the causes of the Peloponnesian War. Cf. Polybius: I 1–5: general introduction; I 6–II 71: the

could also be interpreted as Polybius' deliberate shaping of his work with the Thucydidean model in mind.²⁰⁵

Polybius' view on historiography conveyed at III 31, 12 does not belong to the methodological chapter *sensu stricto* (as I tend to interpret III 1–7/8). Here Polybius seems to clarify once again why he inquires into the causes of the Hannibalic War, instead of focusing only on the war itself, and on that occasion he reiterates the idea expressed in the “chapter on method” at III 4, 7–10 which reads:

(7) δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ἐκ τούτων φανερόν ἔσται τοῖς μὲν νῦν οὖσιν πότερα φευκτὴν ἢ τούναντίον αἰρετὴν εἶναι συμβαίνει τὴν Ῥωμαίων δυναστείαν, τοῖς δ' ἐπιγενομένοις πότερον ἐπαινετὴν καὶ ζηλωτὴν ἢ ψεκτὴν γεγονέναι νομιστέον τὴν ἀρχὴν αὐτῶν. (8) τὸ γὰρ ὠφέλιμον τῆς ἡμετέρας ἱστορίας πρὸς τε τὸ παρὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐν τούτῳ πλείστον κείσεται τῷ μέρει. (9) οὐ γὰρ δήπου τινὰς τέλος ὑποληπτέον ἐν πράγμασιν οὔτε τοῖς ἡγουμένοις οὔτε τοῖς ἀποφαινομένοις ὑπὲρ τούτων, τὸ νικῆσαι καὶ ποιήσασθαι πάντας ὑφ' ἑαυτούς.²⁰⁶

Arguably, only reading the two passages (III 4 and III 31, 12) in parallel proves valuable for a proper understanding of the Polybian idea of the usefulness of historiography, and its relation to the conception of Thucydides. In III 4 Polybius emphasizes the usefulness of his *Histories* as founded on a comprehensive knowledge of Roman rule, the ruled nations' reactions to it, and the attitudes to the new order in all countries of the inhabited world. This knowledge is supposed to provide grounds for the moral assessment of the Romans for Polybius' contemporaries, and serve as a signpost in the latter's contact with them. The political action rests upon prior moral judgement.²⁰⁷

προκατασκευή; III 1–7: digression on method and introduction to the *Histories* proper; III 8–33, 4: the causes and preliminaries of the Hannibalic War etc. The main difference between Thucydides' *Methodenkapitel* and Polybius' methodological reflection in III 1–7 is that the latter is more verbose and also involves summaries and explanations of the content of the *History*; Thucydides is more dense and narrowed down to several meaningful sentences. See Lehmann 1974, 166, n. 1.

²⁰⁵ It is not without significance that we are again talking here about potential imitation of Thucydides' book I, the most likely to be thoroughly read by the historians after him.

²⁰⁶ “For it is evident that contemporaries will thus be able to see clearly whether Roman rule is acceptable or the reverse, and future generations, whether their government should be considered to have been worthy of praise and admiration or rather of blame. And indeed it is just in this that the chief usefulness of this work for the present and the future will lie. For neither rulers themselves nor their critics should regard the end of action as being merely conquest and the subjection of all to their rule.”

²⁰⁷ According to Walbank 1990, 264–266, Polybius is exceptional in Hellenistic historiography in that his concept of utility is not restricted to moral instruction, but also has practical, psychological and moral aspects.

Providing a basis for that judgement, namely the history of the development of the Roman rule, means usefulness.²⁰⁸ This is ideally consistent with the thought expressed at III 31, 12, the τὸ διὰ τί καὶ πῶς καὶ τίνος χάριν, which refers to the intentions, means and aims of the historical actors in the historical process.²⁰⁹ The answers to these questions, specifically posed as regards (the way to and ways of) Roman domination, and other nations' engagements, will be the knowledge Polybius writes of at III 4. Judgement relies not on the knowledge of the deeds themselves, but on acquaintance with the circumstances and intentions of the actors. Only then is history not ἀγώνισμα but μάθημα. The usefulness of historiography is established when the historical work helps one to take proper, (often but not solely) political decisions in the historian's present day. The decisions which Polybius has in mind are taken with reference to the intentions and natures of those in question, and these have to be studied from a diachronic perspective (Polyb. III 31, 8–12). Such is the probable explanation of the concept of the utility of historiography in Polybius.

It is necessary to stress here that usefulness, which Polybius defined in the above passages from book III, is not essentially connected with the notion of πραγματική ιστορία and restricted to the field of political-military activity.²¹⁰ The concept of pragmatic history refers chiefly to subject matter, namely to the history of the deeds of nations, states and kings, and is restricted to contemporary history. It is not organically integrated with the function of utility, as was commonly believed by scholars. In other words, the usefulness of historiography is not a factor dependent on, or stemming from, some greater category of pragmatic history.²¹¹ Polybius' idea of usefulness seems to be

²⁰⁸ Cf. Walbank, HCP I, 301.

²⁰⁹ A thorough analysis of these three main questions as part of Polybius' methodology is found in Pédech 1964, 37–40.

²¹⁰ Polybius introduces the idea that reading history is of practical use for political activity at the very beginning of his *Histories*, I 1: ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ τινὲς οὐδ' ἐπὶ ποσόν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀρχῇ καὶ τέλει κέχρηται τούτῳ, φάσκοντες ἀληθινωτάτην μὲν εἶναι παιδείαν καὶ γυμνασίαν πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς πράξεις τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἱστορίας μάθησιν κτλ. ("But all historians, one may say without exception, and in no half-hearted manner, but making this the beginning and end of their labour, have impressed on us that the soundest education and training for a life of active politics is the study of history [...]").

²¹¹ See e.g. Gelzer 1964, 155–156: historical writing as "Lehrbuch der Politik"; cf. 159–160: history as "Beispielsammlung"; Petzold 1969, 7–8, subsumes the thought articulated in III 31 under the heading of "pragmatic history". The most thorough analysis of the concept is in Mohm 1977, 8–28, with a comprehensive *status quaestionis* up to his time. He shows how earlier scholars have wrongly subsumed numerous features of Polybius' work, including the concept of utility, under the category of pragmatic history. Walbank seems to rightly underline that we should not overemphasize the significance of πραγματική ιστορία; see Walbank, HCP I, 42: "Applied to history πραγματικός in P. connotes a narrative of events (political, military, etc.) as

founded on the more general notion of truth, according to which knowledge about the past is beneficial for present actions and decisions both in private and in public life. In III 31, Polybius plainly states that knowledge about the past as well as the making of proper decisions in one's private life is indispensable for any individual.²¹² The concept of *πραγματική ιστορία* is absent from the discussion of the utility of history. This point is important, since the pragmatic-political-military “calque” has often distorted our understanding of the Polybian concept of utility (similar misinterpretation occurred in numerous studies on Thucydides).²¹³

ii. Affinities and differences between Polyb. III 31, 12 and Thuc. I 22, 4

What does Polybius' conception of history have in common with Thucydides' ideas from I 22, 4? Firstly, the verbal correspondences:

a. The use of the word *ἀγώνισμα*, in Thucydides antithetical to *κτῆμά ἐς αἰεὶ*, in Polybius, to *μάθημα*.

b. The occurrence of derivatives of *ὠφελέω*: *ὠφέλημα* (Thucydides); *ὠφελεῖ* (Polybius), with reference to historical writing.

c. The orientation towards the future: *τῶν μελλόντων* (Thucydides); *τὸ μέλλον* (Polybius).

d. The occurrence of near synonyms denoting “instant”: *τὸ παραχρῆμα* (Thucydides); *παραιντίκα* (Polybius), with reference to the usefulness of historical work “for the present” as opposed to “for ever” (*ἐς αἰεὶ* — Thucydides; *πρὸς τὸ μέλλον* — Polybius). These verbal connections seem also to be connections in sense, at least on a general level: both historians claim their work is more than merely *ἀγώνισμα*; both emphasize usefulness; both say that their work bears some relation to the future, and is not limited to the present.²¹⁴

Karl F. Eisen tried to compare Polybius' and Thucydides' conceptions of history, and he concluded that although both historians endeavour to reveal the universal laws of human conduct, Polybius is different in that he aims ultimately at a prediction of the future on the basis of these laws. This forecast applies to particular instances of political organizations, whereas for Thucydides — Eisen claims — individual cases *per se* are of no interest to the

opposed to any kind of category, e.g. a history of colonization; hence *πραγματική ιστορία* is little more than ‘history’, and bears no overtones of ‘didactic’ or ‘politically useful’.”

²¹² Polyb. III 31, 3; III 31, 5; III 31, 10: *μεγίστας ἐπικουρίας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν* πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον.

²¹³ Scheller 1911, 72–74.

²¹⁴ Cf. Porciani 2020, 95: “Credo che in 3.31.12–13 Polibio stia citando Tucidide con un gusto quasi filologico.”

historian.²¹⁵ The usefulness of Thucydides consists in τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν, which is comparable to the Polybian τὸ διὰ τί καὶ πῶς καὶ τίνος χάριν, so both want to achieve “clarity”; but the final aim is different. The consequence of this comparison is the conclusion that Polybius does not build on Thucydides, but we can speak about some “traces of his thought” (“Spuren thukydeischen Denkens”).²¹⁶ This view is not entirely acceptable, taking the above considerations into account. Eisen’s reading of τὸ σαφές as “Klarheit” is at the core of the misconception. The sense of τὸ σαφές from Thucydides’ chapter on method was established as certain knowledge about long-lasting rules governing the human world (it refers to the present, but to the future as well). This is not different from the Polybian factors highlighted at III 31, 12; in fact, Polybius claims that knowing history provides one with the tools to assess the present, take proper steps, and have adequate expectations.²¹⁷ This has little to do with “prediction”. In fact, both historians focus on the idea of usefulness for the reader’s present time. They possibly diverge in that Thucydides seems to have believed that his work will enable one to discern universal laws in any developments, and thus will be more conscious of what is going on, whereas Polybius stresses the usefulness for the readers of *his* present day, concerning himself and dealing with Roman rule. Polybius wishes to benefit the readers interested in the question, how has Rome risen to dominance? Thucydides would perhaps rather say that his aim is to teach the principles and processes pertaining in *any* way to domination.

Klaus Meister, commenting on III 31, 11–12 concluded that Polybius and Thucydides have the common aim of “transmitting historical insights”, rather than teaching moral lessons, and that they both prefer utility over pleasure. Thucydides is supposed to be stricter as to the latter question.²¹⁸ The first

²¹⁵ Eisen 1966, 30: “Es geht Thukydides aber erstens mehr um das Allgemeine, das mit dem Besonderen stark verflochten ist. Das Besondere dient der Darstellung des Allgemeinen. [...] Das Gesetzmäßige aber, das Thukydides zu erkennen sucht, das ist der zweite Punkt, soll nicht zu einer Prognose dienen wie bei Polybios.”

²¹⁶ *Ibidem*, 29–30.

²¹⁷ Polyb. III 31, 8–10: τὰ δὲ παρεληλυθότα τῶν ἔργων, ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων λαμβάνοντα τὴν δοκιμασίαν, ἀληθινῶς ἐμφαίνει τὰς ἐκάστων αἰρέσεις καὶ διαλήψεις καὶ δηλοῖ παρ’ οἷς μὲν χάριν, εὐεργεσίαν, βοήθειαν ἡμῖν ὑπάρχουσιν, παρ’ οἷς δὲ τὰναντία τούτων. ἐξ ὧν καὶ τὸν ἐλεήσοντα καὶ τὸν συνοργιούμενον, ἔτι δὲ τὸν δικαιοῦντα, πολλὰκις καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῶν εὐρεῖν ἔστιν (“But men’s past actions, bringing to bear the test of actual fact, indicate truly the principles and opinions of each, and show us where we may look for gratitude, kindness, and help, and where for the reverse. It is by these means that we often and under many circumstances find those who will show compassion for our distress, who will share our anger or join us in being avenged on our enemies”).

²¹⁸ Meister 2013, 48–49.

statement of Meister seems too broad; what type of “insights” (Einsichten) does Meister believe both historians intend to “transmit”? The second is not founded on the actual text of Thucydides, quite the contrary — the language of the last sentence of I 22, 4 points clearly towards a difference in emphasis: κτήμᾳ τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα: “possession for ever, more/rather than a prize composition”. There is no indication, neither in the chapter on method, nor in any other place in Thucydides, which would suggest that he excludes the element of pleasure entirely.²¹⁹ Similarly, Polybius defines utility in contrast to pleasure: usefulness lasts, pleasure is temporary (τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ) — but the matter is of the sense of proportion, not of rejection of pleasure *tout court*.²²⁰ Further, a similarity between the two historians is demonstrable when we look more closely at Polybius' idea. Both historians offer a negative assessment of the worth of historiography — historical writing (of the kind described by the author) is certainly not ἀγώνισμα.

To assess the relationship between these two passages (of Thucydides and Polybius), we should also consider the implications of the antithesis historiography — ἀγώνισμα, which occurs in their proclamations: what is the relation between κτήμᾳ ἐς αἰεὶ (Thucydides) and μάθημα (Polybius)? In the case of the former, we have delineated above a reading that ascribes to κτήμᾳ the connotations linked to σαφές: the aspect of being valid as long as human nature/condition remains the same. This is an element of *constans*, which historical writing displays and which makes historiography useful in any circumstances. This *constans* resides in the universal rules discovered and written down by the author (hidden in the narrative and speeches). Has the Polybian antithesis similar implications? In the *prooemium* to the *History* Polybius refers to historiography as μάθησις (I 1, 2–3). Polybius seems to say that μάθησις arising from history is the best “instruction and training” for political action, further — that it is the best teacher of how to bear the vicissitudes of life. Frank W. Walbank comments on this by referring to the common idea of *historia magistra vitae* as appearing in other (esp. Latin)

²¹⁹ Cf. Hornblower, CT I, 61: “This famous announcement does not quite exclude (cp. above on ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν) the possibility that parts at least of Th.’s own work were recited: he wants it to be thought of as a possession for ever rather than a prize recitation piece.”

²²⁰ At IX 2, 6, Polybius underlines utility as preferable over pleasure, but implies that the latter is not entirely irreconcilable with the former: οὐχ οὕτως τῆς τέρψεως στοχαζόμενοι τῶν ἀναγνώσομένων ὥς τῆς ὠφελείας τῶν προσεχόντων (“Aiming not so much at the pleasure of the hearers, as rather at the utility of those concerned,” transl. mine). Cf. similarly in VII 7, 8, where the given disposition of the material in historical writing can be more useful and pleasant at the same time: καὶ ... ἡδίων οὗτος καὶ ... χρησιμώτερος. On this relationship in Polybius see: Miltsios 2013, 120–124.

authors, and sees a connection with Thucydides.²²¹ However, that offers scant explanation of the Polybian concept, not to mention its relation to Thucydides. The idea of learning recurs throughout Polybius' work,²²² and also in the designation of the desired addressees (I 2, 8):

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοῦ πόσα καὶ πηλίκᾳ συμβάλλεσθαι πέφυκε τοῖς φιλομαθοῦσιν
ὁ τῆς πραγματικῆς ἱστορίας τρόπος.²²³

The “instruction for serious students” as the aim of the *Histories* recurs in several more places.²²⁴ Yet the most relevant in our context is the passage where Polybius differentiates historiography from tragedy (II 56, 11):

[...] ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ διὰ τῶν πιθανωτάτων λόγων ἐκπλήξαι καὶ ψυχαγωγῆσαι
κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἐνθάδε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἔργων καὶ λόγων εἰς
τὸν πάντα χρόνον διδάξαι καὶ πείσαι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας κτλ.²²⁵

Here Polybius makes an explicit connection between the “lovers of learning”, and the aspect of everlasting worth of this learning (εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον).²²⁶ It would therefore be correct to assume that μάθημα as the antithesis to ἀγώνισμα means “understanding” or “learning” which proves useful not only in the given moment of reading/listening to the historical work, but also at any point in the future. The usefulness of the μάθημα is also (if not primarily) of practical character, namely, it serves as a guide for taking action.²²⁷ The last phrase is

²²¹ Walbank, HCP I, 39: “The didactic view of history which appears here is common to the earlier Greek historians [...]”. He adduces i.a. Thuc. I 22; II 48, 3. Apart from that Walbank quotes Diod. Sic. I 1; Sall. *Iug.* IV 5–6; Cic. *De or.* II 9, 36; Plin. *Ep.* 5.8.2 quotes Thucydides’ antithesis of κτῆμά and ἀγώνισμα, remarking that the one is history, the other, a speech (*alterum oratio, alterum historia est*). It is, however, doubtful whether all these instances express the same thought, and we should not read Polybius’ conception from the perspective of such a wide range of alleged parallels from such a variety of contexts.

²²² Apart from the references quoted above, μάθησις occurs at II 40, 5.

²²³ “In the course of this work it will become more clearly intelligible [by what steps this power was acquired], and it will also be seen how many and how great advantages accrue to the student from the systematic treatment of history.”

²²⁴ Polyb. III 21, 9; XI 19a, 2.

²²⁵ “The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters’ mouths, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates [...]”

²²⁶ See Vegetti 1989, 26–27.

²²⁷ Cf. Polyb. II 56, 14, where μάθησις has the connotation of “teaching a lesson”; cf. IX 14, 5.

therefore perfectly comparable to (if not synonymous with) Thucydides' κτῆμά ἐς αἰεὶ.²²⁸

4.3.2 Polybius' approach to speeches and Thucydidean influence

i. Interpretation of Polyb. XII 25a–25b

Another crucial part of Thucydides' *Methodenkapitel* concerns the approach to speeches in his historical work. The potentially relevant part in Polybius is XII 25a, 4–25b, 4.²²⁹ Polybius censures Timaeus for how he (according to Polybius) treated speeches in his work (XII 25a, 4–5).²³⁰

(4) διότι γὰρ ταῦτα παρ' ἀλήθειαν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι κατατέταχε Τίμαιος, καὶ τοῦτο πεποίηκε κατὰ πρόθεσιν, τίς οὐ παρακολουθεῖ τῶν ἀνεγνωκότων; (5) οὐ γὰρ τὰ ῥηθέντα γέγραφεν, οὐδ' ὥς ἐρρήθη κατ' ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ προθέμενος ὥς δεῖ ῥηθῆναι, πάντας ἐξαριθμεῖται τοὺς ῥηθέντας λόγους καὶ τὰ παρεπόμενα τοῖς πράγμασιν οὕτως ὥς ἂν εἴ τις ἐν διατριβῇ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν ἐπιχειροίη, ὥσπερ ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως ποιούμενος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξήγησιν τῶν κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἰρημένων.²³¹

Then Polybius outlines his own principles (XII 25b, 1–4):

(1) [Ὅτι] τῆς ἱστορίας ἰδίωμα τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὺς τοὺς κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἰρημένους οἰοί ποτ' ἂν ὦσι γινῶναι λόγους, δεύτερον τὴν αἰτίαν πυθάνεσθαι, παρ' ἣν ἢ διέπεσεν ἢ κατωρθώθη τὸ πραχθὲν ἢ ῥηθέν· (2) ἐπεὶ ψιλῶς λεγόμενον αὐτὸ τὸ γεγονὸς ψυχαγωγεῖ μὲν, ὠφελεῖ δ' οὐδέν, προστεθείσης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας ἔγκαρπος ἢ τῆς ἱστορίας γίνεται χρήσις. (3) Εἰ γὰρ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐπὶ τοὺς οἰκείους μεταφερομέναις καιροῦς ἀφορμαὶ γίνονται καὶ προλήψεις εἰς τὸ προϊδέσθαι τὸ μέλλον, καὶ ποτὲ μὲν εὐλαβηθῆναι, ποτὲ δὲ μιμούμενον τὰ προγεγονότα θαρραλεώτερον ἐγχειρεῖν τοῖς ἐπιφερομένοις· (4) ὁ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ῥηθέντας λόγους καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν παρασιωπῶν, ψευδῇ δ' ἀντὶ τούτων ἐπιχειρήματα

²²⁸ Walbank, HCP I, 262, again recalls Thucydides: "Further the charm of tragedy is only κατὰ τὸ παρὸν, the profit of history εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον, a distinction which, in its rhetorical formulation, recalls Thucydides' famous claim [...]" Cf. Walbank 1985, 250.

²²⁹ On speeches in Polybius in general see: Pédech 1964, 254–302; Mohm 1977, 51–67 (with a discussion of the interpretations up to his time); Sacks 1981, 79–95; Vercruysse 1990, 17–38; Wiedemann 1990, 289–300; Marincola 2007, 123–126; Wiater 2010, 67–107 (focused on the role of speeches in Polybius' narrative).

²³⁰ On the speeches in Timaeus see Pearson 1986, 350–368.

²³¹ "Timaeus had untruthfully reported them in his work, and has done so of set purpose? For he has not set down the words spoken nor the sense of what was really said, but having made up his mind as to what ought to have been said, he recounts all these speeches and all else that follows upon events like a man in a school of rhetoric attempting to speak on a given subject, and shows off his oratorical power, but gives no report of which was actually spoken."

καὶ διεξοδικοὺς λέγων λόγους, ἀναιρεῖ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ἴδιον· ὃ μάλιστα ποιεῖ
Τίμαιος.²³²

Polybius' approach to speeches has been considered by scholars to be connected to Thucydidean methodology in various ways. According to Paul Pédech, Polybius' assertion as expressed in XII 25a (that historians should adhere to what was really said) is not only a polemic with Timaeus, but also with Thucydides and his contemporary emulators (in the approach to speeches in historiography). Polybius indeed criticizes Timaeus by using the expression: *προθέμενος ὥς δεῖ ῥηθῆναι*, which can be read as an allusion to Thucydides': *ὥς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἔμοι ... τὰ δέοντα μάλιστα εἰπεῖν*. Thucydides' concept of finding suitable words would be, in this reading, inconsistent with Polybius' aim of establishing what was really said.²³³ However, Pédech's view relies on a narrow reading of the Polybian phrase.²³⁴ The sole etymological link between *τὰ δέοντα* in Thucydides and *δεῖ* in Polybius is not enough to assume that the latter has the former's entire theory in mind. What Polybius actually says in the passage where the phrase occurs is that Timaeus had at his disposal *nothing except* (= solely) his own conjectures about what would be said by a given speaker in a situation. Moreover, as established above, Thucydides underlines that he reasoned out the most appropriate words and used his critical apparatus to form them (the correct sense of *ὥς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἔμοι*). On the contrary, according to Polybius, Timaeus merely *assumed* what should be said (*προθέμενος*), having no idea of (as he applied no reasoning to) what was actually said (*οὐ γὰρ τὰ ῥηθέντα γέγραπεν*). Walbank is sceptical as to whether Polybius attacks Thucydides or some "Thucydideans" in the passage in question, but he follows Pédech with his general view that Polybius was clearer in claiming that it is up to the statesmen, not the historian, to choose appropriate arguments for a speech; Thucydides was allegedly "less certain" about this (i.e.

²³² "The peculiar function of history is to discover, in the first place, the words actually spoken, whatever they were, and next to ascertain the reason why what was done or spoken led to failure or success. For the mere statement of a fact may interest us but is of no benefit to us: but when we add the cause of it, study of history becomes fruitful. For it is the mental transference of similar circumstances to our own times that gives us the means of forming presentiments of what is about to happen, and enables us at certain times to take precautions and at others by reproducing former conditions to face with more confidence the difficulties that menace us. But a writer who passes over in silence the speeches made and the causes of events and in their place introduces false rhetorical exercises and discursive speeches, destroys the peculiar virtue of history. And of this Timaeus especially is guilty, and we all know that his work is full of blemishes of the kind."

²³³ Pédech 1961, 124.

²³⁴ This view is also refuted by Nicolai 1999, 284–286. Cf. Porciani 2020, 99–101.

he allowed more room for the invention of a historian in composing speeches). This view has been recently repeated by Meister, who on the one hand assumes some type of “dependence” of Polybius on Thucydides (in XII 25 a), on the other, he thinks that the former rejected the concept of τὰ δέοντα. However, Meister’s reading is methodologically obscure and inconsistent.²³⁵ Walbank notes that Polybius’ requirement for the historian to record and recount τὰ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ῥηθέντα is very close in its sense to Thucydides’ ἡ ξύμπασα γνώμη τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων.²³⁶ Yet he does not elaborate on the parallel; nor does he specify his view as to whether the potential analogies in both historians’ approaches are due to a conscious imitation of Thucydides on the part of Polybius. As established above, by saying that he “kept as close as possible to ἡ ξύμπασα γνώμη”, Thucydides means that in composing the speeches inserted in the *History* he aims at offering the most faithful reconstruction possible of their main points. As for Polybius, we concluded that he also postulated inquiry into the content of speeches actually delivered. Thus, in this respect the historians are in complete agreement. It needs to be stressed that they also both admit that this can be achieved only to some degree, “as far as it is possible”: Thucydides (I 22, 1–2): ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων cf. with Polybius (XXXVI 1,7): κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ῥηθέντα καθ’ ὅσον οἶόν τε.²³⁷ Walbank’s position was based on an assumption about the “unresolved antithesis between ‘the general purport of what was actually said and what the situation seemed to me to require each party to say.’”²³⁸ As demonstrated, both historians stress the necessity of the inquiry into what was

²³⁵ Meister 2013, 49: “Die Abhängigkeit des Polybios vom Redensatz des Thukydides (I 22, 1) ist unübersehbar. [...] so lehnt er damit implicite die erste Maxime des Thukydides ab und legt damit strengere Maßstäbe an als dieser, indem er allein eine wortgetreue bzw. sinngemäße Wiedergabe der Reden gelten läßt.” Meister’s standpoint is vague in several aspects. Firstly, the term “Abhängigkeit”: what precisely is meant by this? Conscious imitation, indirect influence through the historiographical tradition? Secondly, Meister says that Polybius argues for a more exact reproduction of either the words or the sense of what was said in a given speech, as if it were only a slight difference. Yet the difference is fundamental; the reproduction of speeches verbatim was *definitely not* a component of the methodology of either Thucydides or Polybius. It is most likely that they both postulated the reconstruction, through inquiry, of the main points of the real speeches. Meister’s comparison of Thucydides and Polybius is thus completely erroneous in this respect.

²³⁶ Walbank 1985, 249; Porciani 2020, 96–97.

²³⁷ Adverbial form ὅσον and ὅσα means “so far as”, “so much as”; οἶός τε in *neutrum singularis*, e.g. οἶόν τε ἐστὶ means “it is possible”. Hence, the two elements together give “as far as it is possible”. This middle way has been recently suggested as an important point in the connection between the historians by Porciani 2020, 97–98.

²³⁸ Walbank 1985, 252. Nicolai 1999, 298, calls this problem “un’aporia di fondo”, which is not resolved but simply avoided by Polybius.

really said — the sense of the speech must remain faithful to reality. At the same time, they both employ the category of appropriateness relating to the contribution of the historian; both knew that it was impossible to recount the speeches verbatim, and that sometimes it was difficult to ascertain the content of the real speech. In sum, the thesis that Polybius' statements about speeches, embedded in the critique of Timaeus, are a polemic with (Pédech), or correction of (Walbank), Thucydides himself, or some "Thucydidean historians" of Polybius' time, lacks confirmation in the close reading of their texts.

On the other hand, we have Roberto Nicolai's reverse thesis, that Polybius' criticism of Timaeus' approach to speeches is a charge against those historians who had incorrectly understood Thucydides' methodology.²³⁹ This could be corroborated by Polybius' attack on Timaeus' speech as put in the mouth of Hermocrates (on the occasion of the conference in Gela), which was one of the most renowned of Thucydides' speeches.²⁴⁰ That Timeaus was thought to be an imitator of Thucydides' speeches is suggested by Plutarch (on this testimony see chap. 5, p. 250). The thesis is not unfounded, but requires more caution — we have no explicit proof that Polybius compares Timaeus to Thucydides in the passage in question. Still, as shown (see the Appendix, pp. 284–285) in the present book, the speech was probably very well known indeed, particularly in the Peripatetic circles. It is not unlikely that, having read Thucydides' version of the speech (which is plausible), and then the one in Timaeus', Polybius preferred the former's creation to the latter's, and the criticism in book XII is in part a result of this assessment.

ii. Polybius' function of speeches: an innovation in comparison with Thucydides

Prior to the criticism of Timaeus' speeches and the exposition of his own theory of how they should be composed, Polybius stresses their important role in historical writing. He says that they are a type of summary of events, the "chief points" (κεφάλαια τῶν πράξεων), and that they conjoin (συνέχει) the entire story.²⁴¹ The very treatment of speeches as κεφάλαια of deeds already implies an inextricable connection between the two elements. In other words, Polybius

²³⁹ Nicolai 1999, 283, 296.

²⁴⁰ Foulon 2013, 147: "[...] or Polybe, par sa critique explicite du discours forgé par Timée, montre implicitement combien le Sicilien est inférieur à Thucydide."

²⁴¹ Polyb. XII 25a, 4: κεφάλαια τῶν πράξεων ἐστὶ καὶ συνέχει τὴν ὅλην ἱστορίαν. The κεφάλαια with gen. τῶν πράξεων seems to be Polybian modification of a rhetorical compound phrase κεφάλαια + λόγων/λόγου ("sum", "gist of the matter"). See the passages adduced in LSJ, s.v. κεφάλαιος; cf. Lausberg 1990, pars. 623, 675, and par. 590, for the adverbial form κεφαλαιωδῶς as "summarily", "concisely".

seems to state that the speeches have to recapitulate the narrative, and to bring its various parts together in a clear and concise form.

In addition to this, in the first part of the text adduced by Polybius defines his position by stating what Timaeus fails to do:

a. Timaeus does not record all the speeches delivered, and when he does, he distorts their true features. There is a slight problem with the interpretation of this part of the sentence: οὐ γὰρ τὰ ῥηθέντα γέγραφεν, οὐδ' ὥς ἐρρήθη κατ' ἀλήθειαν. Does ὥς ἐρρήθη refer to the form or the content of the speeches? It recalls the formulation of Thucydides: ὥς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοὶ ... εἰπεῖν, which, as concluded above, definitely does not concern the form of the speeches, but rather the line of argument and the manner in which the content could be understood. In this statement of Polybius, the occurrence of κατ' ἀλήθειαν seems decisive: it most probably implies the arrangement of content and argument appropriately to the speaker, rather than features of style.²⁴²

b. Instead of ascertaining the form of the actual speeches, Timaeus makes assumptions about how the speeches *should* have sounded: προθέμενος ὥς δεῖ ῥηθῆναι, and merely “reports” or “enumerates” all the delivered ones: πάντας ἐξαριθμεῖται τοὺς ῥηθέντας λόγους.

c. Timaeus provides no inquiry into what was really said: οὐκ ἐξήγησιν τῶν κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἰρημένων; instead he merely displays his own rhetorical talent: ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως. This is a logical effect of the fact that he does not try to establish the form of the speeches as actually delivered.

Polybius supplements these objections in the subsequent chapter, by stating what the task of the historian as regards the speeches actually is:

a. The historian ought to take the actually delivered speeches into account, to be well acquainted with them: αὐτοὺς τοὺς κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἰρημένους ... γνῶναι λόγους. In another part of book XII we find confirmation that Polybius considered it the historian's task to establish the content of the speeches as delivered in reality.²⁴³ Importantly, the personality of the speaker needs to be properly rendered; his words have to be in conformity with his deeds.²⁴⁴

²⁴² Cf. Walbank, HCP II, 385–386. That the material is cast into a Polybian form can be read in particular from XXIX 12, 10, on which see Walbank 1972, 45 n. 71.

²⁴³ See Polyb. XXXVI 1, 7: τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ῥηθέντα καθ' ὅσον οἶόν τε πολυπραγμονήσαντας διασαφεῖν. Walbank 1985, 249, argues that κατ' ἀλήθειαν ῥηθέντα should be read as “the sense of what was said”, not “the precise words spoken”. In fact, no other passage in Polybius suggests that he considers the reconstruction of the exact words the historian's task.

²⁴⁴ Polyb. XII 25k, where Timaeus' speech placed in the mouth of Hermocrates is criticized for its technical deficiencies and the inappropriateness of the argument. The chapter as a whole implies that the speeches should be rooted in political reality, including the personality of the speaker; note the concluding words οἷς τὸν μὲν Ἑρμοκράτην τίς ἂν κεκρῆσθαι πιστεύσειε (“who

b. The historian should offer not only the actual speeches in a proper form, but also accompany them with an indication of the causes of their success or failure.

Several chapters later, Polybius clarifies his method — it is not the task of a historian to write down each and every speech in its entirety, but to select and abridge the material, focusing on what is most fitting (from the words actually spoken) in the given circumstances.²⁴⁵ In the same chapter he illuminates the manner in which he conceives of the necessary involvement of the causes as accompanying the speeches (XII 25i, 8):

εἰ γὰρ οἱ συγγραφεῖς ὑποδείξαντες τοὺς καιροὺς καὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν βουλευομένων, κἄπειτα τοὺς κατ' ἀλήθειαν ῥηθέντας λόγους ἐκθέντες διασαφήσαιεν ἡμῖν τὰς αἰτίας, δι' ἃς ἢ κατευστοχήσῃαι συνέβη τοὺς εἰπόντας ἢ διαπεσεῖν κτλ.²⁴⁶

Here Polybius explains why a mere recording of speeches is insufficient; it should be preceded by a description of the circumstances (καιροὺς), the impulses (ὁρμὰς) and the dispositions (διαθέσεις) of the speakers; only then should the speeches actually delivered follow. By these means, the causes of the speaker's success or failure (κατευστοχήσῃαι ... ἢ διαπεσεῖν) are noticeable to the reader.²⁴⁷ The passage also includes the commonplace opposition of pleasure and utility — Timaeus' methodology leads only to the former, whereas Polybius' stresses the primacy of the latter.²⁴⁸ Another element to be found throughout the ideas expressed in the statements about speeches is Timaeus' lack of political experience, which is the main cause of his complete failure (in Polybius' eyes) to reconstruct or recompose the speeches properly.²⁴⁹

To sum up, from book XII and remarks at other points in the *History*, the following principles for composing speeches in historiography emerges:

would believe that Hermocrates spoke in this way?"). Cf. Walbank 1985, 247–248. Marincola 2007, 125, notes that here appropriateness depends on probability.

²⁴⁵ Polyb. XII 25i, 5–6: τὸ δὲ τοὺς ἀρμόζοντας καὶ καιρίους ἀεὶ λαμβάνειν, τοῦτ' ἀναγκαῖον. Walbank, HCP II, 397, convincingly refutes the interpretation of this passage, which implies that Polybius believes historians ought to choose arguments suitable to the speaker and the occasion. This is the duty of statesmen; historians can only reconstruct their positions and rhetorical choices. Cf. Walbank 1972, 45, n. 70.

²⁴⁶ "If writers, after indicating to us the situation and the motives and inclinations of the people who are discussing it report in the next place what was actually said and then make clear to us the reasons why the speakers either succeeded or failed [...]."

²⁴⁷ Speeches themselves are not causes, according to Foulon 2010, 146 ("des discours comme causes"). Wiater 2010, 71–75, convincingly refutes the identification of speeches as causes in their Polybian terms.

²⁴⁸ Walbank, HCP II, 386.

²⁴⁹ Walbank, HCP II, 399.

1. Speeches are as important as the narrative parts (τὸ πραχθὲν ἢ ῥηθὲν); they serve as a type of summary and elucidation of the narrative.

2. The historian needs to establish, as far as it is possible, how the speeches actually delivered sounded.

3. The content of the recounted speeches has to correspond to the content of the historical speeches.

4. The historian can select and modify (esp. abridge) the speeches, so that they contain what was, in the source speeches, most appropriate to the circumstances. In this respect, the concept of appropriateness is applied.²⁵⁰

5. The personality of the historical figure who delivered the speech is not without significance, and should be adequately reflected in the words put in his mouth. Here appropriateness is also necessary.

6. The speeches are to be formulated in the historian's style; a reconstruction of their stylistic traits is not the task of the historian.

7. Speeches need to be complemented with an account of the circumstances, including the intentions and motivations of the speakers, so that the reader can understand the reasons for the success or failure of the speech or connected action.

8. The frequency and extensiveness of speeches in a historical work should be properly considered. Polybius assumes that at times it is enough to refer the main points of the speech in *oratio obliqua* (Polyb. XXXVI 1).

iii. Affinities and differences between Thucydides' and Polybius' conceptions of speeches in historiography

The similarity of the chief principles of the two historians in the composition and role of speeches in historical writing is, in view of our interpretation of the relevant passages, unquestionable:

1. Both assume that speeches and narrative are complementary and equivalent elements of historiographical work.

2. Both historians postulate inquiry into the historical speeches, and at the same time allow for the historian's supplementation, selection, and rearrangement of the content, according to the criterion of appropriateness.

Nevertheless, Polybius' approach is not a mere "copy" of Thucydides. We should not follow scholars who go to the opposite extreme, and overemphasize

²⁵⁰ Marincola 2007, 125, underlines how Polybius uses the vocabulary of appropriateness with reference to speeches, at III 108, 2: καὶ παρεκάλουν τὰ πρέποντα τοῖς παρεστώσι καιροῖς; and in XV 10, 1: Ταῦτα δ' ἐτομασάμενος ἐπεπορεύετο παρακαλὼν τὰς δυνάμεις βραχέως μὲν, οἰκείως δὲ τῆς ὑποκειμένης περιστάσεως.

the impact of Thucydides on the Polybian theory of speeches.²⁵¹ First and foremost, we need to point to what seems the greatest innovation of Polybius: the strict connection he establishes between words and deeds, through the explanatory character of the speeches. It has indeed been indicated that Thucydides' and Polybius' speeches are conceived of as having the same function within their works: the elucidation of historical causes and processes.²⁵² However, for Thucydides this explanatory role was assumed, rather than evidenced from his actual declarations in the chapter on method, or any other place in his work. In fact, Thucydides leaves the question of the function of speeches untouched, and where scholars have claimed that Polybius is influenced by him in that respect, they did so presumably because of the "obvious" conviction that he follows Thucydides' methodology in general. In other words, we should be wary of simply extrapolating Polybius' historical conceptions from those of Thucydides. The relationship between λόγοι and utility (speeches expound the causes — knowledge of causes means utility) seems uniquely Polybian, as far as we can judge from the extant works of Greek historiography.²⁵³

4.3.3 Polybius' concept of causation and its affinity with Thucydides

From Strebel's study onwards, scholars have considered Polybius' stress on causation in recording historical processes as a sign of Thucydides' impact on the later author.²⁵⁴ Some read Polybius' theory as an implicit but intentional and deliberate criticism of Thucydides, and an attempt to develop or refine his ideas.²⁵⁵ Let us test this view.

²⁵¹ Nicolai 1999, 283: "Polibio – è questa l'ipotesi su cui intendo lavorare – si fa dunque esegeta e continuatore del metodo di Tucidide." Similarly Marincola 2007, 123: "It is clear that Thucydides' approach stands behind Polybius' later remarks on speeches in histories [...]." Foulon 2010, 146–147, says that Polybius merely changes the wording, so as not to be considered a plagiarist: "Une fois de plus, Polybe a varié juste ce qu'il faut pour ne pas être taxé de plagiat."

²⁵² Hose 2009, 189–191.

²⁵³ Cf. Marincola 2007, 123.

²⁵⁴ Strebel 1935, 23; Sacks 1986, 394, n. 65: "Polybius clearly draws on Thucydides for his understanding of αἰτίαι [...]" ; Meister 2013, 48: "Hierbei steht die dreifache Unterscheidung des Polybios [...] in der Nachfolge des Thukydides [...]" Further, Meister remarked that Thucydides "goes deeper" than Polybius into historical causes, but this again sounds unclear (Thuc. I 23, 6 is cited, yet no analysis follows).

²⁵⁵ Walbank, HCP I, 305–306: "Though he makes no reference to Thucydides' system, his silence spells criticism of it, for in 31. 12 f. he shows by reminiscence his familiarity with his predecessor." Cf. Hornblower 1994, 60, refers also to Ziegler 1952, 1503, as one of the scholars that took Polybius' views about causation as an attempt at a refinement on Thucydides' "cause and pretext" model, but in the place cited there is no mention of the theory of causation, nor of the relationship between Polybius and Thucydides in that context. In *The Fourth-century and*

i. Interpretation of Polyb. III 6, 6–8 and attempts at finding an affinity with Thuc. I 23

Polybius expresses his theory of causation in a much more explicit way than Thucydides, in Polyb. III 6, 6–7,²⁵⁶ where the historian undertakes to describe the causes and preliminaries of the Hannibalic War:

(6) ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ διεληφότες ἀρχὴ τί διαφέρει καὶ πόσον διέστηκεν αἰτίας καὶ προφάσεως, καὶ διότι τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ πρῶτα τῶν ἀπάντων, ἡ δ' ἀρχὴ τελευταῖον τῶν εἰρημένων. (7) ἐγὼ δὲ παντὸς ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶναι φημι τὰς πρῶτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις τῶν ἤδη κεκριμένων, αἰτίας δὲ τὰς προκαθηγουμένας τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεων· λέγω δ' ἐπινοίας καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα συλλογισμοὺς καὶ δι' ὧν ἐπὶ τὸ κρίναι τι καὶ προθέσθαι παραγινόμεθα.²⁵⁷

This statement appears in the context of the polemic with the historians who wanted to explain the causes of the war between Carthage and Rome (τὰς κατ' Ἀννίβαν πράξεις βουλόμενοι τὰς αἰτίας ἡμῖν ὑποδεικνύναι). Polybius rejects their interpretation, in which the siege of Saguntum by the Carthaginians and their crossing of Iber constitute the αἰτίαι of the war. According to Polybius, these were the ἀρχαί of the war, not the αἰτίαι.²⁵⁸ Studies focused on the reception of Thucydides have either merely suggested that Polybius drew on the former in the theory of historical causation, or that the later historian intended to refine his predecessor's conception. Both views are equally unsatisfactory.²⁵⁹ More detailed assessments occur in studies on Polybius alone. In his *Commentary*, Walbank claims that Polybius criticized Thucydides' concept of causality. Yet this scholar seems to misinterpret the Polybian understanding of αἰτία as “such events as lead the individual to conceive a will

Hellenistic Reception (1995), Hornblower says that Polybius' analysis of causation “looks like an attempt to refine Thucydides' two-tier version”, but here the comparison ends.

²⁵⁶ Quoted by the scholars mentioned above, except for Strebel 1935, 23, which adduces Polyb. III 31, 12, but in very general terms (he does not draw any comparison between the historians' concepts; Meister 2013, 48, adduces also IX 19a; XII 25b; XXXII 18, but with no interpretation or connection between the passages).

²⁵⁷ “These are pronouncements of men who are unable to see the great and essential distinction between a beginning and a cause or purpose, these being the first origin of all, and the beginning coming last. By the beginning of anything I mean the first attempt to execute and put in action plans on which we have decided, by its causes what is most initiatory in our judgements and opinions, that is to say our notions of things, our state of mind, our reasoning about these, and everything through which we reach decisions and projects.”

²⁵⁸ Polyb. III 6, 3: ἀρχὰς μὲν εἶναι τοῦ πολέμου φήσαιμ' ἂν, αἰτίας γε μὴν οὐδαμῶς.

²⁵⁹ None of these scholars made a detailed comparison of these concepts; no interpretation of the relevant passages is attempted.

to war”.²⁶⁰ It has been shown above that Polybian αἰτία comprises primarily the mental processes of key individuals (kings, political bodies etc.). This, according to Walbank, is supposed to be a more “mechanical” concept than that of Thucydides. In Thucydides, “a war breaks out because of grievances, which are simply the form in which a deeper antagonism (the real cause or πρόφασις) finds expression.”²⁶¹ Polybius is particularly distinct from Thucydides, as he coins a term that covers the actual decision to go to war, which is something “between αἰτία and πρόφασις”.²⁶² But Walbank’s reading of Thucydides seems not quite correct here; it has been argued above that αἰτία means, especially in the *Methodenkapitel*, “grievance” or “charge”, but its relationship to πρόφασις is not such as Walbank believed. Walbank interprets Thucydides in the paradigm of a “superficial and deeper cause”, which has been refuted.²⁶³ We have thus to discard Walbank’s comparison between Polybius’ and Thucydides’ ideas of causation, as it is based on interpretations of both that in the present study are considered questionable. Pédech’s comparison of Thucydides’ and Polybius’ conceptions of causation was probably the most exhaustive to date.²⁶⁴ According to Pédech, Polybius — “like Thucydides” — is supposed to surpass the “individual appearances” (“apparences particulières”), in order to place causality in the structure of the events. Yet this placement, according to Pédech, is only apparently similar; Thucydides’ idea of the “truest explanation” is synthetic (it subsumes numerous elements under one notion),²⁶⁵ whereas Polybius’ conception of cause refers directly to “objective reality” (“réalité objective”) pertaining to human activity, which is to be discovered by the historian.²⁶⁶ Is the “truest explanation” actually a synthesis of various components? It has been said above that the most appropriate reading of πρόφασις

²⁶⁰ Walbank, HCP I, 305. The Polybian πρόφασις seems correctly interpreted by Walbank as “the pretext”, which may or may not be genuine, ἀρχή – as “the first action”.

²⁶¹ Walbank, HCP I, 305.

²⁶² Walbank, HCP I, 305–306.

²⁶³ See above, pp. 112–113, on the false paradigm of the “influence of the language of medicine”.

²⁶⁴ Pédech 1964, 95, considers Polybius’ knowledge of Thucydides as probable, but not certain. However, it shares the flaw of all Thucydidean reception studies in that it does not treat Thucydides separately, prior to the inquiry into the affinities between him and Polybius. Thucydides’ conception of causation is referred to as an established fact, instead of being an object of interpretation. Moreover, Pédech’s reading of Thucydides seems close to the paradigm of his close affinity with the medical writers, especially where the concept of cause is concerned. This general conviction determined Pédech’s comparison between him and Polybius. Lastly, Pédech is also not systematic, i.e. the considerations about Polybius’ possible affinities with Thucydides are dispersed throughout the work.

²⁶⁵ Pédech 1964, 88.

²⁶⁶ *Ibidem*.

is “explanation”; Thucydides adds “truest”, which means that this explanation was based on reality. However, he nowhere implies that this is some sort of general inference from various elements. It is doubtful that Thucydides’ *πρόφασις* does not refer to “objective reality” — the fear of the Spartans was hardly (in the historian’s mind) abstract — quite the contrary; it was the reality that Thucydides believed he had detected as chiefly responsible for the actions taken by them. Furthermore, Polybius sometimes defines as *αἰτία* internal states nearly identical to the *ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις* of I 23.²⁶⁷ Pédech’s differentiation between Thucydides’ synthetic and Polybius’ analytic notion of cause is stimulating, but misses the mark. Further, Pédech says that Polybius agrees with Thucydides in “separating appearances from reality” in distinguishing *αἰτία* from *πρόφασις*; but this distinction is only secondary for Polybius — the fundamental one is between *αἰτία* and *ἀρχή*.²⁶⁸ In Pédech’s view, in Thucydides the “true cause” and the “causes declared openly” are two sides of one reality, whereas the Polybian three notions of *αἰτία*, *πρόφασις* and *ἀρχή* follow one another; they appear in different time.²⁶⁹ The second point is incorrect — Thucydides seems to have a similar temporal sequence in mind,²⁷⁰ even though he focuses more on the order of priority (in terms of the influential factors), rather than on the order of time.

As for the appearance-reality distinction, it requires consideration of whether both historians actually make one, and whether their concepts are comparable in this respect. We have outlined above the probable sense of *αἰτία* and of *πρόφασις* in passage I 23 of Thucydides. The main difference between them lies in the way they are expressed — *αἰτίαι* are the charges articulated by the historical actors, thus these are grievances uttered openly in public, their character is usually offensive; *πρόφασις* is a positive “explanation” of an action, and where Thucydides adds the adjective “true/truest” he implies that in his judgement this given explanation conforms to reality. However, even by saying that the *πρόφασις* was *ἀφανεστάτη λόγῳ*, Thucydides does not suggest that it was entirely hidden; on the other hand — the *αἰτίαι* are not “apparent” in the sense of being completely unreal (as Pédech indicates); these are also realities, however less fundamental and significant than the fear of the Spartans (the “truest *πρόφασις*” of the War). Thucydides only underlines that there was little place in public debate for what he considered to be the true explanation of the

²⁶⁷ In Thuc. I 23, the *ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις* is Spartans’ fear; Polybius points to *ὀργή* and to *θυμός*.

²⁶⁸ Pédech 1964, 90, notes that *πρόφασις* is not an object of methodological discussion in Polybius.

²⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, 93.

²⁷⁰ See above, pp. 111–113.

war, and that the αἰτίαι received more attention in political deliberation. Further, Polybius' distinction of αἰτία and πρόφασις is not explicitly stated, which, given the ample room devoted by him to methodological considerations, suggests that it does not constitute any significant part of his thinking about causality. The basic meaning of πρόφασις is like Thucydides': "explanation", most often appearing as the declared motive for action — when it is fictitious it has the connotation of "pretext". We may assume that, given the meaning of αἰτία in Polybius, it can sometimes be coherent with the declared πρόφασις; there is no general rule that πρόφασις is *ex definitione* false. Therefore, Pédech's conclusion that Polybius' theory of causes is "radicalement différent" from that of Thucydides²⁷¹ has to be considered an exaggeration. It should also be noted that Pédech consequently uses the word "cause" both for Thucydides' (ἀληθεστάτη) πρόφασις and αἰτία, as well as for Polybian αἰτία. This rather blurs the proper senses and distinctions between the Greek words, and infuses them with modern conceptions of cause.²⁷² The adequate interpretation of Greek terms in the usage of both historians, and their rendering into English, are the crucial points in the assessment of Polybius' potential relationship to Thucydides in the case of historical causality. The above survey of modern scholarship on this question demonstrates that scholars commit several errors when approaching the problem, listed as follows:

- a. They do not go beyond a superficial association between the two historians, attributing the idea of the antithesis between apparent and real causes to their theories,
- b. they misinterpret the meaning of αἰτία in Thucydides as well as in Polybius,
- c. they read one historian in the light of the other, especially Polybius' theory is interpreted through the (alleged) sense of Thucydides' contrast between αἰτίαι and πρόφασις.

If any of the above elements play a part in the attempt to address the question of reception, the result will definitely give a false idea of the relationship between Polybius and Thucydides.

ii. Towards interpretation of the Polybian idea of historical causality

First of all, it is clear for Polybius that there is a temporal gap between actions crucial for the commencement of a given development, and everything that

²⁷¹ Pédech 1964, 95.

²⁷² To be sure, it is impossible to point to a single modern definition of historical cause; but it would be commonly acknowledged that e.g. "grievance" (the usual sense of αἰτία) does not belong to its semantic scope.

precedes these actions. The formers are already the “beginning”, the latter is everything that is necessary for these actions to transpire. Thus far, the meaning of ἀρχή seems simple. The definition of αἰτία seems more complex: what are the προκαθηγουμένας τῶν κρίσεων καὶ διαλήψεων? The προκαθηγέομαι alone means “to precede”, “go before and guide”,²⁷³ with κρίσεις (“choices” or “something decided”),²⁷⁴ the “turning points” and διαλήψεις (“judgements”)²⁷⁵ it would give us “things that influence in advance the choices and judgements”.²⁷⁶ Polybius implies by that the processes taking place in the minds of the individual agents: their “designs” (ἐπίνουαι),²⁷⁷ dispositions (διαθέσεις),²⁷⁸ and all the reasonings (συλλογισμοὶ)²⁷⁹ referring to them, all the processes that influence decisions and plans. To make the case easier for his readers, Polybius elucidates his conception with the example of Alexander’s war with the Persians.²⁸⁰ Its αἰτίαι were, firstly, the march of Xenophon through Asia and Agesilaus’ entry into Asia, both of which took place undisturbed by the Persians.²⁸¹ Here we have the αἰτίαι understood as things that influenced Philip’s thinking, since, in consequence of those events, Philip inferred that the Persians are cowardly and

²⁷³ See LSJ, s.v. προκαθηγέομαι.

²⁷⁴ Pédech 1964, 81, thinks that Polybius here means purely intellectual activity, “l’acte mental par lequel on pose le contenu d’une opinion”. Even if this definition is sound, Pédech goes rather too far in drawing parallels between Polybius and Theophrastus (and other philosophers, esp. Aristotle) in this instance, as well as in his reading of the rest of the categories in question. Still, he at least makes the effort of defining the Polybian notions, whereas most scholars are content with arbitrary translation.

²⁷⁵ Pédech 1964, 81–82, defines this category as the intellectual process of analysis, as opposed to the synthesizing character of κρίσις, and discusses passages where slightly different connotations are potentially to be found. Petzold 1969, 11, questioned the purely intellectual reading of διαλήψεις, and stresses the aspect of will as inherent in the word. He adduces III 7, 7, where διαλήψις can indeed be read as a disposition towards performing action already decided upon (“auf die Verwirklichung der Entscheidung hin gerichtet”); it is somewhat “closer” to action than κρίσις.

²⁷⁶ As Petzold 1969, 10, conceives it, κρίσεις are the link (“Gelenk”) between αἰτίαι and ἀρχή.

²⁷⁷ Pédech 1964, 82–83: “l’idée directrice, l’invention créatrice”. It is always interwoven with action, often accompanied with preparations or undertakings.

²⁷⁸ Pédech 1964, 83, renders the word “sentiments”; he transposes the sense from the medical writings, where διάθεσις is state of the body in the given moment, as contrasted with its long-term condition. However, the adduced instances from Polybius suggest rather the translation “disposition towards (doing) something”, i.e. the tendency to behave in a particular way, in reference to a given thing.

²⁷⁹ Cf. Pédech 1964, 84: “un raisonnement, un calcul”. See the examples cited, and use of other derivatives of λογισμός, *ibidem*.

²⁸⁰ See Walbank, HCP I, 305–308, for details of this exposition.

²⁸¹ Polyb. III 6, 10–11.

lazy (κατανοήσας καὶ συλλογισάμενος τὴν Περσῶν ἀνανδρίαν);²⁸² he also realized how skilled his soldiers were, and what potential booty was waiting for him in Asia. Thus, he decided to go to war against them, as soon as he could gain the goodwill of the Greeks. His observations, reasoning, and the ensuing decision, as well as the associated plans and preparations, are also the αἰτίαι proper of the war.²⁸³ The πρόφασις for the war was, in turn, the punishment for the harm done to the Greeks by the Persians.²⁸⁴ This is what the Macedonians declared when going to war. Thus, the Polybian πρόφασις is the reason that one announces and/or uses in propaganda when going to war — a “pretext”.²⁸⁵ This notion — unlike αἰτία and ἀρχή — does not find explicit methodological discussion in Polybius; we may assume that he uses the word in a non-technical (which does not mean entirely unconscious) way.²⁸⁶ Finally, the ἀρχή of the war was Alexander’s invasion of Asia (III 6, 14). In general, ἀρχή is the execution of decisions already taken, the “first actions and deeds according to decisions already made” (ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις τῶν ἤδη κεκριμένων).²⁸⁷ In the subsequent chapter, Polybius provides one more example, which will be useful in further comparisons with Thucydides: the wars between Antiochus and the Romans. Their αἰτία was the Aetolians’ anger (ὀργή) at the Romans; its πρόφασις the intention declared by them to liberate the Greeks, and the ἀρχή, Antiochus’ arrival at Demetrias.²⁸⁸ Similarly, in III 9, 6, Polybius makes a comment about the reasons for the war between the Romans and the Carthaginians, and points to the “first αἰτία” of that conflict:

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ γε Ῥωμαίων καὶ Καρχηδονίων πολέμου — τὴν γὰρ παρέκβασιν ἐντέθην ἐποιησάμεθα — νομιστέον πρώτον μὲν αἴτιον γεγονέναι τὸν Ἀμύλκου θυμὸν τοῦ Βάρκα μὲν ἐπικαλουμένου, πατρὸς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν Ἀννίβου γεγονότος.²⁸⁹

²⁸² See the discussion in Petzold 1969, 11 n. 1. Petzold reads δι’ ὧν as a repetition or summary of the previous categories: ἐπίνοιαι, διαθέσεις, συλλογισμοὶ. However, Polybius is admittedly not entirely explicit here, and various readings of καὶ δι’ ὧν are possible.

²⁸³ Polyb. III 6, 13–14.

²⁸⁴ Polyb. III 6, 13: εὐθέως προφάσει χρώμενος ὅτι σπεύδει μετελθεῖν τὴν Περσῶν παρανομίαν εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

²⁸⁵ Pédech 1964, 89–90, with instances cited confirming such a meaning.

²⁸⁶ As observed by Pédech 1964, 90.

²⁸⁷ Pédech 1964, 86 and pp. 92–93, describes the terms. Sometimes Polybius uses the word καταρχή, see *ibidem*, n. 172, for examples.

²⁸⁸ Polyb. III 7, 2–3.

²⁸⁹ “To return to the war between Rome and Carthage, from which this digression has carried us away, we must regard its first cause as being the indignation of Hamilcar surnamed Barcas, the actual father of Hannibal.”

Here the psychological state of an individual (not, as in the previous example, of the whole group) is the crucial factor in the outbreak of the war. In other places Polybius seems to be consistent in this understanding of αἰτίαι;²⁹⁰ one passage makes clear that he considered many αἰτίαι potentially responsible for the developments described, and one αἰτία can be “more responsible” or more “effectual” than another.²⁹¹ In the most general terms, Polybius' conception of αἰτία is founded on the assumption that historical events themselves are always rooted in earlier processes. These developments affect political figures' minds, so that they begin to think in a particular way, make decisions and commence action. αἰτία thus comprises the entirety of mental processes, which are the antecedents and determinants of the action that ensues. It is therefore the task of the historian to inquire into the decisive figures' judgements, reasonings, and motives, as well as into the external circumstances which determined them.²⁹² Hence Pédech coined the term *intellectualisme historique* for Polybius' approach.²⁹³ By this he (probably too easily) excludes the emotional aspect of the internal states of humans; he reads the Aetolians' ὀργή, as well as Hamilcar's θυμός, as consisting of “constatations, judgements et raisonnements”, and as such as pertaining to a different family, but not being of a different nature.²⁹⁴ The emotional character of anger is indisputable; the question is the reasons for that anger. We know how Polybius emphasizes the central role in historical writing of inquiry into αἰτίαι. The historian needs to detect the αἰτίαι of the events, just as a physician needs to establish the reasons for the given state of the human organism. This knowledge is indispensable if adequate steps are to be taken in the given circumstances, that result from the given αἰτία.²⁹⁵ So, knowledge of αἰτία is the condition of the utility of a historical work.²⁹⁶ There are only extremely exceptional cases, where detection of αἰτίαι is impossible

²⁹⁰ See Polyb. I 12; I 20; II 2–12; II 37–38; II 42; II 46; III 1.

²⁹¹ Polyb. II 53, 3: ὁ δὲ καὶ νομιστέον αἰτιώτατον γεγονέναι πραγμάτων κατορθώσεως.

²⁹² Mohm 1977, 153–154, describes this by making a distinction between “external” and “internal” αἰτίαι (“äußeren und inneren αἰτίαι”).

²⁹³ In contrast to “matérialisme historique”, Pédech 1964, 87.

²⁹⁴ *Ibidem*.

²⁹⁵ Polyb. III 7, 4–7. The analogy goes so far that Polybius, at the end of outlining it, uses a verb that is a typical word for “curing” (ἰᾶσθαι), having in mind the action of a politician, that – having established the αἰτίαι of the given situation – undertakes to prevent or “repair” the plans and aims of the decisive figures: ἰᾶσθαι ... τὰς πρώτας ἐπιβολὰς καὶ διαλήψεις. Cf. II 32, 6; VI 2, 8; XI 19a, 1; XII 25b, 2; XXII 18, 6. See Mohm 1977, 196 (“allein die αἰτίαι die Vorausberechnung ermöglichen”).

²⁹⁶ Ziegler 1952, 1532–1543; Petzold 1969, 11–12; Mohm 1977, 151–154.

for the historian, and then the events are due to τύχη.²⁹⁷ Hence, remarks about αἰτίαι of the events described recur in Polybius regularly.²⁹⁸

iii. Affinities and differences between Polybius' and Thucydides' concepts of causality

On the basis of the analyses made until now, we can conclude that:

1. Polybius and Thucydides make a similar distinction between the beginning (in Thucydides — a verbal form of ἄρχειν, in Polybius — the noun ἀρχή) and the facts prior to this, which lead to this decisive event.

2. Polybius defines αἰτία as an internal process in an individual, or a whole group, that leads to a final resolution, decision, etc. It can have a rational (“reasoning”) or emotional (“outrage”) character. In Thucydides, it is πρόφασις that is defined in such terms — esp. the “fear” of the Spartans. However, since for Thucydides there is no *fundamental* semantic difference between αἰτία and πρόφασις (in I 23 πρόφασις is only more decisive and less publicly articulated than the other αἰτίαι and διαφοραί), there is a close correspondence between the two usages in a general sense: both historians endeavour to define the factor principally responsible for the decisions taken. For both this factor is “psychological” in character. It is reasonable to assume that the phenomena implied in the word αἰτία as used by Thucydides at I 23 would count for Polybius as αἰτίαι as well — “grievances” or “differences” involve reasoning, interpreting, etc., thus leading or contributing to the decisive act, the ἀρχή.

3. When not accompanied by an adjective, πρόφασις has a similar sense in both historians: “explanation”, which can bear negative (“pretext” — when it is false) or positive (“reason”) connotations.

4. The reading of both historians' conceptions of causation that sees it as an antithesis of the “underlying” and “superficial” cause can hardly be considered correct on the basis of the relevant passages from their works. Such interpretations were rooted in a reading of Thucydides' statements through the lens of the medical writings (themselves also stereotypically treated);²⁹⁹ this reading was then further applied to the terminology of Polybius, and false conclusions about his dependence on Thucydides in that field were drawn. Instead, both historians conceive of *one sphere of causality* — internal human processes, which can be disclosed (articulated explicitly) or not. The task of the historian is to detect the actual process that was decisive for the given action.

²⁹⁷ Polyb. XXXI 30, 3; cf. Pédech 1964, 76. On τύχη see e.g. Walbank 1972, 60–65.

²⁹⁸ See Pédech 1964, 77, for a list of relevant passages from Polybius' *Histories*.

²⁹⁹ See above, pp. 112–113.

5. Polybius is more self-conscious and explicit in his theory of causation. Thucydides' conception must be read from the concise statements in I 23. Hence, it is difficult to speculate as to whether Polybius takes him as a model in that respect. This makes it doubtful if he intends to polemize with Thucydides' theory.

4.3.4 Erroneously defined affinities between Polybius and Thucydides

Apart from the two main methodological parallels discussed above, scholars have indicated other similarities between the two historians. Firstly, the attachment of importance to practical (political, military) experience.³⁰⁰ This aspect is stressed by Polybius numerous times and there is no doubt that it is a crucial part of his vision of the figure of a historian. The interchangeability of the historian with a politically active statesman is a well-known Polybian idea; experience is a necessary requisite which decides whether the historian will be able to write a useful account.³⁰¹ Of course, this is not to be understood as an *exclusively* Polybian trait; it should probably be seen as characteristic of Greek historiography in general. Still, Polybius was the first known author who emphasized this and articulated it with such emphasis, as well as who realized it in practice. Thucydides' experience as a general is also known. Yet what about the connection of that experience with historiographical methods? In the *Methodenkapitel* the personal experience of the historian occurs in two brief remarks:

- a. Thucydides says he heard some of the speeches himself: ὃν αὐτὸς ἤκουσα.
- b. He witnessed (lit. "was present at") some of the events: οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν.

The above expressions can hardly be read as relating to the political or military expertise of the historian, not to mention a conscious and elaborate conception of the interchangeability of the roles: politician-historiographer. It can even be questioned whether Thucydides means *practical experience* here at all. We would search in vain for any explicit or implicit statements referring to anything like this in the rest of his work. The statements in the chapter on method are rather an example of the commonplace topos of autopsy, deeply

³⁰⁰ Strebel 1935, 23–24: "Wie dieser begründet er seinen Beruf zur Geschichtsschreibung auf seine praktische Erfahrung und seine militärische und politische Sachkunde"; Walbank 1972, 41: "Both were politicians and generals [...]"; Meister 2013, 50. See Luschkat 1970, 1294–1295, for earlier works.

³⁰¹ The vital passage in this respect comes, again, from the critique of Timaeus: XII 25g (adduced by Meister). On Polybius' "mingling together" of historian and politician see Gelzer 1964, 155–156; Petzold 1969, 7–16; Walbank 1972, 32–65; Boncquet 1982–1983, 290–291; Clarke 2003, 70–72; Schepens 2010, 11–34. Schepens aptly comments on Polybius' statements in book XII, and shows how the two roles are in some instances blended to a degree that makes it difficult to decide which is attributed to which.

rooted in the Greek culture of the time. Its appearance in historiography (in Thucydides in particular) is explainable by the affinity between historiography and epic (see chapter five, pp. 229–231).³⁰² Certainly, Thucydides' political and military practice was not without significance for the questions he posed, the subjects he decided to describe and to exclude, etc., in one word — the shape of the *History*.³⁰³ Yet this is still something other than self-awareness in that respect, and something other than a part of historiographical methodology.

According to Giuseppe Nenci, Polybius is exceptional in Hellenistic historiography, which allegedly became “silent” about this idea.³⁰⁴ In this respect, he could be considered to be Thucydides' continuator. Nevertheless, even if the idea of the “experienced historian” is to a degree linked with the demand for autopsy, the two concepts should be distinguished from one another. The fact of being an eyewitness does not imply professional knowledge and experience of the matter observed. It seems that Polybius developed the traditional model of autopsy by adding the element of expertise, which he believed was necessary for personal observation to be efficient and effective: an experienced historian is able to assess and choose what and how to explore.³⁰⁵ Polybius states that what the historian needs is αὐτοπάθεια. This word has significant implications for our understanding of Polybius' conception. It has not been sufficiently emphasized by scholars that he postulates not so much personal *observation* of the facts described (that would be αὐτοψία *sensu stricto*), but something slightly different — *experience* of them. Unfortunately, αὐτοπάθεια is not defined more strictly by Polybius; from the immediate context we can understand it as personal — perhaps also emotional — experience of, or contact with, matters included in the narrative. It is a type of amalgam of “seeing” and “practising”, as suggested by the introductory sentence of this chapter: ἄπειρος ... πολεμικῆς χρείας ... καὶ τῆς

³⁰² On autopsy in Thucydides' chapter on method see the standard work of Schepens 1980, 94–123; cf. pp. 27–31, where he discusses various modern interpretations of the role of eyewitness accounts in Greek culture. It is clear that the idea of ὄψις and αὐτόπτης is not a historiographical invention, it occurs i.a. in Aeschylus, Sophocles, Aristophanes, and others. Schepens argues convincingly that the concept was exploited in historiography because it was familiar to a popular audience. In historiography the importance of autopsy was determined by the primary focus (of the current of Zeitgeschichte) on contemporary events (such that could be attended personally or recounted by eyewitnesses). On the *topos* of autopsy in historical *prooemia* see Lachenaud 2004, 68–69.

³⁰³ Malitz 1982, 264. Thompson 1969, 170–171, points out that Thucydides' conjectures about the aims and intentions of historical actors are possible due to his experience.

³⁰⁴ Nenci 1955, 35–38. Darbo-Peschanski 1998, 173.

³⁰⁵ Schepens 2011, 116–117; cf. Marincola 1997, 73–74.

τῶν τόπων θεάς.³⁰⁶ Therefore, interpretations which view Polybius as Thucydides' continuator in stressing political and military experience as requisites of the historiographer are flawed. It is Polybius who consciously articulates the idea and conceptualizes the amalgam of politician-historian. In Thucydides we find no such belief, even *implicite*.

Other elements which scholars have indicated as demonstrating Thucydides' influence on Polybius were:

- i. a rationalistic point of view,
- ii. the minor role of the gods in historical writing.

These elements require an exhaustive interpretation of both historians' entire works, and as such cannot be appropriately compared here (see above on the methodology of the present chapter). Strebel underlines the almost complete absence of Thucydides' narrative presence as the greatest difference between the two writers, as opposed to the numerous interventions (especially his open polemics with other authors) of Polybius.³⁰⁷ These statements are of too general a character to assess their adequacy. The very terminology employed in them is unclear and would require profound review, which cannot be undertaken in the present work. The aim of this chapter has been to focus on the explicit and self-reflective methodological declarations of the historians, not on modern assessments (which require total interpretation) of their entire works. Thus, we shall dismiss those suggestions from our study.

4.4 Agatharchides of Cnidus

Agatharchides of Cnidus has often been omitted in reception studies due to certain misconceptions about his profession: he was chiefly a historian and geographer, but was often treated as "only" a geographer.³⁰⁸ Ancient authors,

³⁰⁶ These words can be erroneously taken as a quotation of Timaeus' words. However, the introductory word in the fragment (φησίν) implies a paraphrasing or Polybius' own deduction from Timaeus' text, rather than a precise citation. In the older edition of Jacoby, the entire sentence was printed as a fragment (FGrHist 566 F 34), but Jacoby in the commentary notes that the second part of the sentence is doubtful in that respect: "Polybios zieht seinen schluss auf T.s unkenntnis aus einer äusserung des schriftstellers über seine lange entfernung von der heimat, die T. selbst vermutlich sehr anders verwendet hat." In a new edition it is either a fragment (BNJ 566 F 34) or part of a *testimonium* (T 19, where the entire polemic in book XII is printed); T 4b prints only the statement about Timaeus' stay in Athens. Therefore, the words that concern "seeing and experiencing" are most probably Polybius' own.

³⁰⁷ Strebel 1935, 23–24; Walbank 1972, 41–42.

³⁰⁸ Agatharchides, historian and geographer, lived most of his adult life in Alexandria; after 145 he left for Athens. He was in the service of Heraclides of Lembus. His major works, of which there are only fragmentary remains, are: *Asian Affairs* (Περὶ Ἀσίας/τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν: probably a universal history in ten books, which extended to the Diadochi), *European Affairs* (Περὶ τῶν

and modern scholars following them, have drawn attention to the Peripatetic background of Agatharchides' writings.³⁰⁹ Since, as argued above, it is very likely that he read the entire work of Thucydides,³¹⁰ it is necessary to consider potential affinities between the historiographical concepts of both authors.³¹¹

4.4.1 Agatharchides' imitation of Thucydides speeches?

The testimony of Photius

i. Phot. *Bibl.* 213, p. 171b (BNJ 86 T 2): context, attribution and interpretation

Reception studies have mentioned Thucydides' alleged influence on Agatharchides' composition of speeches. The source is Photius, who calls Agatharchides an "imitator" of Thucydides (BNJ 86 T 2 *ap.* Phot. *Bibl.* 213, p. 171b):

καὶ ζηλωτὴς μὲν ἐστὶ Θουκυδίδου ἔν τε τῇ τῶν δημηγοριῶν δατυλείᾳ τε καὶ διασκευῇ, τῷ μεγαλείῳ δὲ μὴ δευτερεύων τοῦ λόγου τῷ σαφεὶ παρελαύνει τὸν ἄνδρα.³¹²

Some scholars have claimed, on the basis of the above text, that Agatharchides "took over" from Thucydides the idea of making speeches an important element of the historical work.³¹³ Strebel mentioned this testimony, but refrained from any comments through lack of sufficient "Stilproben" of Agatharchides to cast any judgement on the adequacy of Photius' words.³¹⁴ Indeed, we have only

κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην: forty-nine books, perhaps from the latest to his own time), and *On the Red Sea* (Περὶ τῆς Ἐρυθρᾶς θαλάσσης, five books; some preserved by Diodorus and Photius). On Agatharchides' life, background and works in general see: Meister 1990, 150–153; Sacks, *Agatharchides*, OCD, 2012, 35; Marcotte 2001, 385–435; Malinowski 2007, 17–61; Ameling 2008, 13–59.

³⁰⁹ BNJ 86 T 1 *ap.* Strab. XIV 2, 15: Ἀγαθαρχίδης, ὁ ἐκ τῶν Περιπάτων. In BNJ, Burstein suggests, on the one hand, that the influence of the Peripatetic current on Agatharchides is easy to read from his "hostility to the Asianic style" (thus, Burstein suggests, an Aristotelian trait), as well as from his affinities with Dicaearchus' ethnography. On the other hand, Burstein states that "[...] his emphasis on ἐνάργεια as a criterion for reliability suggests the influence of Epicureanism." (with refs. to Fraser 1972, 547; Burstein, 1989, 27–28 and Schwartz 1894, 739–740). It is hard to agree with the latter conclusion, in particular in light of the analysis below of Ps.-Demetrius' and Dionysius of Halicarnassus' conceptions of ἐνάργεια (pp. 224–229).

³¹⁰ See chap. 2, p. 66.

³¹¹ On Agatharchides' concepts of πάθος and ἐνάργεια and their relation to Thucydides see chap. 5, pp. 256–260.

³¹² "He is an emulator of Thucydides in the richness and arrangement of his speeches, and not inferior in the elevation of his language, and he is superior to him in clarity" (all translations of Agatharchides' fragments in Photius are of Burstein).

³¹³ E.g. Strasburger 1966, 88–89.

³¹⁴ Strebel 1935, 24.

scanty fragments of the speech of a praeceptor to a king, a cluster of isolated excerpts, which can in no way offer an indication of Agatharchides' method in composing speeches. It certainly does not belong to the category of *δημηγορίαι*, of which Photius speaks in our comparison to Thucydides.³¹⁵ Simon Hornblower called this testimony "isolated and ambiguous", and posed the question (which he does not attempt to answer): whether it reflects something actually said by Agatharchides, or is it Photius' way of making a literary point?³¹⁶ Klaus Meister's solution is that the statement in question obviously reflects Photius' reaction to Agatharchides' writing (in this case — the speeches), and he tries to support this by indicating Photius' knowledge of Agatharchides, especially of his maxims.³¹⁷ Meister seems to have chosen the appropriate method for evaluating our testimony, but also appears to have misapprehended the passage he quotes, which is necessary to adduce here *in extenso* (Phot. *Bibl.* 213, p. 171a–b):

ἔστι δέ, ἐξ ὧν τὸν ἄνδρα τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ διελθόντες ἐπέγνωνεν, μεγαλοπρεπής τε καὶ γνωμολογικός, καὶ τῷ μὲν τοῦ λόγου μεγέθει καὶ ἀξιώματι τῶν ἄλλων μᾶλλον χαίρων, λέξεσι μέντοι λογάσιν οὐ πάνυ προστεθειμένος, οὐδὲ διὰ τῶν ἐθίμων δὲ διὰ παντὸς πορευόμενος, γεννῶν δὲ αὐτὸς οὐ λέξεις, ἀλλ' εἴ τις ἄλλος δημιουργὸς τῆς περὶ τὰς λέξεις χρήσεως, καινὴν τινα μὴ καιναῖς κεκρημένος λέξεσι φαντασίαν ἐμπόυσαν ἀποτελεῖ τὴν φράσιν· οὕτω δὲ προσφυῶς ὑποβάλλεται τὴν πρᾶξιν, ὥς τὴν τε καινοτομίαν μὴ δοκεῖν εἶναι καινοτομίαν, καὶ τὸ σαφὲς οὐκ ἔλαττον τῶν ἐξ ἔθους λέξεων παρέχειν. κέχρηται δὲ καὶ γνώμαις τὸ νουνεχὲς καὶ δραστήριον ἐπιδηλοῦσαι. τροπὰς δὲ ὑπελθεῖν, εἴ τις ἄλλος, ἄριστα παρεσκευασμένος τὸ μὲν ἡδὺ καὶ κηλοῦν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διαχέον λεληθότως δι' ὅλου διασπείρει τοῦ γράμματος, εἰς τροπὴν δὲ ὅ τι παρενήκεται, οὐδεμίαν λύπην δηλοῦσαν ἀφίησι. ποιεῖ δὲ αὐτῷ τοῦτο μάλιστα οὐχὶ ἢ τῶν λέξεων αὐτὴ καθ' ἑαυτὴν μεταβολή, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀπὸ πραγμάτων ἐτέρων εἰς ἕτερα μετά τινος σοφῆς καὶ ἡρεμαίας μεταχειρήσεως μετάβασίς τε καὶ μετατροπή. ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀντιλαβεῖν μὲν ὄνομα ῥήματος, ἀμείψαι δὲ τὸ ῥῆμα εἰς ὄνομα, καὶ λῦσαι μὲν λέξεις εἰς λόγους, συναγαγεῖν δὲ λόγον εἰς τύπον ὀνόματος, οὐδενὸς ἀνεπιτηδειότερος ὧν ἴσμεν.³¹⁸

³¹⁵ See Malinowski 2007, 399–411, for the *status quaestionis* of the character of this fragment and the identification of the king. Verdin 1983, 412–417, probably overemphasizes the question of characterization in this speech, calling it a "discours de caractere", and associating it with "Peripatetic psychology" as well as with the precepts found in Callisthenes' F 44.

³¹⁶ Hornblower 1995, 58 and n. 60.

³¹⁷ Meister 2013, 51. Meister draws a parallel between Thucydides and Agatharchides in the idea of the "law of the stronger", which is irrelevant in our context. This theme was touched upon also by Strasburger 1966, 92.

³¹⁸ "It is the case that this man, judging by what we have learned by going through his work, is distinguished and sententious, delighting more than other writers in the grandeur and dignity

These two paragraphs immediately precede Photius' comparison of Agatharchides with Thucydides. Jacques Schamp argued that the passage implies that Photius' analysis of Agatharchides' style is based on his own reading of *On the Erythraean Sea* (not of the author of the immediate source for the codex).³¹⁹ By writing τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ διελθόντες, Photius suggests that he read more than just one speech of Agatharchides, and that this was not a cursory glance, but a careful and detailed analysis.³²⁰ This seems to be confirmed by the reference to the public speeches of Agatharchides in the plural: ἔν τε τῇ τῶν δημηγοριῶν.³²¹ However, we can question here how Photius could claim to have evaluated numerous speeches, "having studied them throughout", and comment on their abundance, comparable to Thucydides, while he knew only two books of the *On the Erythraean Sea*.³²² We would either have to assume, against the established view, that Photius read the greater part of this, and also of other historical works by Agatharchides, or that the stylistic assessment in which the comparison to Thucydides occurs belonged to a *Vita* found in the manuscript of the *On the Erythraean Sea* which Photius perused. Furthermore, none of the plausible reconstructions of the latter work, even if we assume that it was *strictly* historical in character, leave much room for the insertion of public speeches

of his style, but not at all employing unknown words, and not employing common words throughout the whole of his narrative. But, a craftsman in the use of words, if ever there was one, by creating a kind of novel appearance but not with novel words, he perfects his style. He so ably creates his work that his innovation does not seem to be an innovation and he furnishes clarity not less than that provided by usual words. He forms sentences that show sensibility and vigor. He employs figures, arranging them better than any other writer and scattering throughout his whole work sweetness and charm and relaxation for the soul without it being noticed. And whatever tends toward figured speech, he allows without causing any displeasure. He achieves this not merely by the variation of words by itself, but by varying and changing from one subject to another which he does with skill and deftness. For he uses a noun in place of a verb and changes a verb into a noun. In addition he expands words into sentences and contracts a sentence into a nominal phrase, more skillfully than any writer we know."

³¹⁹ Cf. Schamp 1987, 369: "Il n'y a pas à douter que le jugement de Photios repose bien sur un contact personnel avec l'œuvre." See pp. 363–374, where Schamp argues that the read work in question is *On the Erythraean Sea*.

³²⁰ The διέρχομαι as compound with λόγος means usually "to go through in detail"; see places cited in LSJ, s.v. διέρχομαι. The ἐπέγνωνεν in this context could mean "adjudicate". The διὰ παντός in this sentence bolsters the impression that Photius evaluates a considerable number of Agatharchides' speeches.

³²¹ Cf. Burstein, BNJ, *ad loc.* (electr. vers.).

³²² There is near unanimity in opinion among scholars that Photius had only the first and the fifth book of *On the Erythraean Sea* at his disposal. Of these, only a single speech from the first one is attested. See the balanced discussion of the *status quaestionis* in Malinowski 2007, 57–59, which concludes that to resolve this problem we would need to compare the chapters in question with all other literary assessments in Photius.

(the only speech, fragmentarily extant, is not a δημηγορία),³²³ not to mention in great quantity.³²⁴ The first possibility also requires a thorough acquaintance with most speeches from Thucydides' *History*, deep enough to draw parallels with those of Agatharchides.

Gościwit Malinowski pointed to Marcellinus' *Vita* of Thucydides as a potential parallel — it too involves an assessment of the historian's style combined with information about his life. There Thucydides himself is described as Ζηλωτῆς Ὀμήρου.³²⁵ Schamp admits that this literary assessment is exceptionally passionate, and not to be found anywhere in Photius.³²⁶ Having considered the above, we would incline to the view that the whole stylistic evaluation in pars. 4–6, including the comparison to Thucydides, was taken over by Photius from the introduction in the manuscript, which was written earlier.³²⁷ What does it mean that a historian was a ζηλωτής of Thucydides? This word can mean either “emulator”, “zealous admirer” or “follower”,³²⁸ but it is uncertain whether Photius uses it here in an ordinary, non-technical sense. The entry concerning Agatharchides is the only one in the *Library*, where ζηλωτής suggests imitation of literary qualities.³²⁹ The identification of Agatharchides

³²³ The speech has an evidently paraenetic character.

³²⁴ See Malinowski 2007, 116–128, for a sound and thoroughly argued reconstruction of the character of *On the Erythrean Sea*. Malinowski concludes that it was a historical narrative in its own right, with Ptolemaeus Philadelphos' plan to find and gain elephants as the point of departure and the leitmotif of the expedition to Ethiopia.

³²⁵ Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 35, 1: Ζηλωτῆς δὲ γέγονεν ὁ Θουκυδίδης ... Ὀμήρου; cf. 36, 1: ἐζήλωσε δὲ ἐπ' ὀλίγον, ὥς φησιν Ἀντυλλος, καὶ τὰς Γοργίου τοῦ Λεοντίνου παρισώσεις; 37, 1: μάλιστα δὲ πάντων, ὅπερ εἶπομεν, ἐζήλωσεν Ὀμηρον. Ritter 1845, 340–341, shows that this association of Thucydides with Homer comes from a certain Antyllos the orator; at least some part of pars. 35–45 is written by him.

³²⁶ Schamp 1987, 370: “On chercherait en vain ailleurs dans la *Bibliothèque* d'autres exemples de réflexions analogues inspirées par des sentiments identiques.”

³²⁷ Strebel 1935, 24, relates the thesis of Büdinger 1895, 106, that the above opinion in Photius is rooted in an assessment of an Imperial Age grammarian, who found Thucydides hard to understand — unlike Agatharchides.

³²⁸ See LSJ, s.v. ζηλωτής.

³²⁹ This word occurs twice more in Photius, both times in fragments of works copied from other authors: Ptolemaeus Chennus and Mnemon of Heraclea. The contexts indisputably indicate that the sense is far from the meaning found in “Classicist” literary criticism. First is a fragment from an Alexandrian grammarian active during the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian: Ptolemaeus Chennus, *New History* (Phot. *Bibl.* 190, p. 151a): Ὁ δὲ Πομπήιος ὁ Μάγνος οὐδ' εἰς πόλεμον προίει, πρὶν ἂν τὸ λ' τῆς Ἰλιάδος ἀναγνώσειε, ζηλωτῆς ὦν Ἀγαμέμνονος (“And Pompey the Great never went to war without reading book XI of the *Iliad* because he was an admirer of Agamemnon.” All translations of Photius are of Pearse). Second is a fragment of a first-century AD local historian: Memnon, *History of Heraclea* (BNJ 434 F1 *ap.* Phot. *Bibl.* 224, p. 236): Συνελαμβάνετο δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ Ἡρακλεώτης ἀνὴρ, ζηλωτῆς τῆς Λαμάχου προαιρέσεως, Δαμοφέλῃς ὄνομα, φρούραρχος καὶ αὐτὸς τῇ πόλει μετὰ τὴν Λαμάχου φθορὰν καταστάς. (“He was joined in this undertaking by a Heracleian called Demopheles, an adherent of Lamachus' party

as a ζηλωτής of Thucydides, and of Cassius Dio as a μιμητής Θουκυδίδου, refers us to first-century BC Augustan literary criticism, in particular to the ideas of imitation (μίμησις) and emulation (ζήλωσις), central categories in the terminology of literary criticism in the Classicist circles from the first century BC onwards. Its most universal definition was given by Casper C. de Jonge, who referred to the most prominent Classicist, Dionysius of Halicarnassus: “In Dionysius’ case, we may summarize this theory by the terms μίμησις and ζήλωσις: the eclectic imitation of the best qualities of various models from the past, with the intention of surpassing them.”³³⁰ It is striking that an identical opinion — that an author modelled his speeches on Thucydides, but managed to improve their clarity — is expressed by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in *On Thucydides*. Dionysius says that Demosthenes was a Θουκυδίδου ζηλωτής as to the qualities of the grand style, but that at the same time he avoids the historian’s greatest weakness — a lack of clarity.³³¹ Here the focus is also on the δημηγορίαι, public speeches, compared in terms of style with the δημηγορίαι of Thucydides.³³²

In the *Library* we find three other assertions relating to the stylistic influence of Thucydides on later writers. Cassius Dio (c. 164–229 AD) is described as a μιμητής Θουκυδίδου, and it is said that Thucydides was his κανών,³³³ Dexippus (third cent. AD) is called “another Thucydides”,³³⁴ the orator Isaeus (c. 420–

who had been chosen to be a leader of the city guards after the death of Lamachus”). In both above fragments ζηλωτής occurs in the most common sense of “admirer” or “adherent”.

³³⁰ De Jonge 2008, 11. Cf. Kennedy 1972, 347; Flashar 1978, 87–88; Russell 1979, 1–16.

³³¹ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 53–54.

³³² Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 54, 5 (demonstrates how Demosthenes’ speech is intricate yet clear): Ἐν δὲ τῇ μεγίστῃ τῶν κατὰ Φιλίππου δημηγοριῶν.

³³³ Phot. *Bibl.* 71, p. 35b, introduction to fragments of Cassius Dio, *Roman History*: Ἐν δέ γε ταῖς δημηγορίαις, ἄριστος καὶ μιμητής Θουκυδίδου, πλὴν εἴ τι πρὸς τὸ σαφέστερον ἀφορᾷ. Σχεδὸν δὲ κἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις Θουκυδίδης ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ὁ κανὼν (“The speeches, after the style of those in Thucydides, but clearer, are excellent. In almost everything else also Thucydides is his model”).

³³⁴ Phot. *Bibl.* 82, p. 64a, introduction to fragments of Dexippus, *History* (=FGrHist 100 T 5): Ἔστι δὲ τὴν φράσιν ἀπερίττος τε καὶ ὄγκῳ καὶ ἀξιώματι χαίρων, καὶ (ὥς ἂν τις εἴποι) ἄλλος μετὰ τινος σαφηνείας Θουκυδίδης, μάλιστα γὰρ ἐν ταῖς σκυθικαῖς ἱστορίαις (“His style is free from redundancies, massive, and dignified; he might be called a second Thucydides, although he writes more clearly. His characteristics are chiefly shown in his last-mentioned work”). Stein 1955, *passim*, tried to substantiate the thesis that Dexippos had ideas of causation similar to those of Thucydides. This was received by scholars without enthusiasm; see e.g. Dover’s review, 1961, 292. Recently new fragments of Dexippus have been discovered and published; see Grusková, Martin 2017, 40–64.

340) also allegedly “competed with” Thucydides.³³⁵ There are compelling similarities between these entries and the assessment of Agatharchides:

a. Photius also points to public speeches as the object of the imitation of Thucydides (in the case of Cassius: Ἐν δέ γε ταῖς δημηγορίαις, on Agatharchides: ἔν τε τῇ τῶν δημηγοριῶν).

b. In both cases the qualities belonging to the grand style, as the object of imitation, are mentioned.

c. In both instances Thucydides is indicated as a model, except for clarity, in which the authors surpass him (Agatharchides: τῷ σαφεῖ παρελαύνει τὸν ἄνδρα, Cassius: πλὴν εἴ τι πρὸς τὸ σαφέστερον ἀφορᾷ, Dexippus: ἄλλος μετὰ τινος σαφηνείας Θουκυδίδης).

d. Both authors were historians.

Thus, we have three entries, including Agatharchides, in the *Library*, from three different codices (71, 82, 213) where historiographers are considered to be imitators of Thucydides in terms of their grand style, but clearer than him. The focus is on the speeches, not the narrative parts. Of these, Dexippus is chronologically the latest (*floruit* in the second half of the third cent. AD).³³⁶ This can be treated as an argument for the attribution of the passage about Agatharchides to Photius — he seems to have found several emulators of Thucydides among Greek historians, from the Hellenistic period up to the high empire. Photius states that Thucydides was the best representative of the Attic dialect,³³⁷ and this explains why he at times refers to him as the object of comparison, especially where the historians are concerned. However, this is only one possible inference. All things considered, we have three possibilities:

1. Photius made use of the Hellenistic and Augustan critical treatises, accepted the idea of μίμησις/ζήλωσις, and applied it to his own opinion about Agatharchides and two other historians.³³⁸ Stanley M. Burstein, seeking to substantiate the independence of Photius in the case of Agatharchides, observed that emphasis on simplicity and clarity is characteristic of Photius' assessments of the literary qualities of other writers.³³⁹ Carlo M. Mazzucchi rightly

³³⁵ Phot. *Bibl.* 265, p. 492b, introduction to Demosthenes, *Discourses*: Θουκυδίδην ζηλῶν καὶ Πλάτωνα τὸν φιλόσοφον.

³³⁶ Spawforth, McDonald, *Dexippus, Publius Herennius*, OCD, 2012, 443. His *History* covered the time up to 269/270 AD, thus the *terminus post* for his death is 269. Cassius was born c. 164 AD, so he certainly wrote at an earlier time than Dexippus.

³³⁷ Phot. *Bibl.* 60, p. 19b: Ἰωνικῆς δὲ διαλέκτου κανὼν ἂν οὗτος εἴη, ὡς ἀττικῆς Θουκυδίδης (“He may be considered the best representative of the Ionic, as Thucydides of the Attic dialect”).

³³⁸ An alternative is outlined, although not substantiated, by Malinowski 2007, 58.

³³⁹ Burstein, BNJ, *ad loc.* (electr. vers.), quotes here Hartmann 1929, 18–31 and Wilson 1983, 102–107, as his authorities.

underlines how Photius' assessment of Agatharchides shares terminology and other elements with Ps.-Longinus' *On the Sublime*.³⁴⁰

2. Photius copied the assessment of Agatharchides' style and the comparison with Thucydides from a *vita* found in the manuscript of the *On the Erythrean Sea*, whereas the statements about Cassius and Dexippus are his own.

3. None of the comparisons with Thucydides are Photius' own, and they come from one common source, which took Thucydides as the Classical model, and which would require further investigation.

The correspondences between the assessments of Agatharchides, Cassius and Dexippus are too close to allow for option 2. By choosing option 1, the problem signalled above — Photius' actual acquaintance with the speeches of Agatharchides — remains unresolved; unless we should simply assume that the comparison with Thucydides was based merely on the reading of the two books of *On the Erythrean Sea*. Through elimination of the first two possibilities we arrive at the third. The degree of consistency in the framework of evaluation, concepts and terminology with Dionysius' comparison of Demosthenes to Thucydides can be a part of the argument for such a hypothesis: the comparisons could draw on a source belonging to the classicist tradition, from the late third cent. AD.

ii. Implications of the testimony for the reception of Thucydides' conception of speeches

Whatever attribution we decide upon, there are no firm grounds to think that Agatharchides had stated explicitly that he intentionally modelled his speeches on those of Thucydides. Dionysius said that Demosthenes was Θουκυδίδου ζηλωτής, while the orator nowhere points to the historian as his stylistic model.³⁴¹ It is nearly certain that the claim of imitation is an effect of Dionysius' comparison of Demosthenes to Thucydides, with emphasis on the similarities between them. We probably have a similar situation in the case of our fragment — Photius/his source seems to have read and analyzed both authors, and arrived at the conclusion that Agatharchides took Thucydides as his historiographical exemplar.

³⁴⁰ In particular, mastery in the use of metaphor and avoiding neologisms, as emphasized by Photius, are to be found in Ps.-Longinus; see Mazzucchi's view summarized by Malinowski 2007, 58.

³⁴¹ We have to take into account that not everything by Demosthenes is extant, but the size of the corpus available to us is still considerable, and the lack of any mention of Thucydides in such a large quantity of Demosthenic texts is remarkable.

The terminology used in our testimony is not complex. Beginning with τῶν δημηγοριῶν δαψιλεία, it clearly means “abundance”, hence “a large number of public speeches inserted into the historical work”.³⁴² Admittedly, in Thucydides the speeches play a prominent part, so the claim seems adequate and confirms an acquaintance with the historian. The sense of διασκευῇ is clear: it underlines that the speeches of Thucydides and Agatharchides were rhetorically elaborated;³⁴³ probably that statement also underlines the fact that they are not simply “written down”, but the raw content was an object of rhetorical-technical transformation. Agatharchides' speeches are also described by the phrase τῷ μεγαλείῳ ... τοῦ λόγου. This is a term used to characterize the grand style,³⁴⁴ by which Thucydides was classified, esp. in the Hellenistic handbook of Ps.-Demetrius.³⁴⁵ The author thus asserts that Agatharchides' speeches had qualities that made them impressive, emotional, passionate. How Agatharchides achieved this is explained in the two preceding paragraphs (4–5). Finally, the expression τῷ σαφεῖ παρελαύνει: Agatharchides “overtakes” i.e. surpasses Thucydides in clarity. This has already been elucidated above; here we can only recapitulate — a lack of clarity (ἀσαφής) in Thucydides was the main subject of Dionysius' *De Thucyde*. The σαφήνεια was one of the “virtues of style” (ἀρεταὶ λέξεως) as conceptualized by Theophrastus. Earlier, clarity alone was the main virtue of style as defined by Aristotle.³⁴⁶ Therefore, the claim that the speeches in Agatharchides are clearer than those of Thucydides refers to the oldest stylistic system of Peripatetic provenance, as well as to the tradition present at least from the first cent. BC, which considered Thucydides the exemplar of the grand style, but lacking one of the chief qualities of this system. Agatharchides (as well as Cassius Dio and Dexippus) is like Dionysius' Demosthenes — he keeps Thucydides' strong points, but improves on his greatest weakness. That Peripatetic overtone of the perspective from which Agatharchides is assessed is worth noting.

To conclude, it is appropriate that we should treat the testimony in Photius as a literary point, made by an author adhering to the Peripatetic tradition of literary criticism. It is unlikely that it was Photius' assessment. We should emphasize that the focus is not on style in general, but precisely on the style of public speeches composed for a historiographical work, as the comparisons of Cassius Dio and Dexippus with Thucydides prove. The adequacy of the crucial statement cannot be evaluated, but it is probably safe to assume that Photius'

³⁴² LSJ, s.v. δαψιλεία: “abundance”, “plenty”.

³⁴³ LSJ, s.v. διασκευή: “construction”, “equipment”, “rhetorical elaboration of a topic”.

³⁴⁴ LSJ, s.v. μεγαλείος: “magnificent”, “splendid”, “of style, elevated”.

³⁴⁵ See the Appendix.

³⁴⁶ Innes 1985, 252; Grube 1952, 180.

source was competent enough to find resemblances between Agatharchides and Thucydides. Moreover, the very fact that it is Thucydides that is used as the “litmus paper” for this historian’s language can be understood as sign that Agatharchides was perceived as stylistically closest to the former.

4.4.2 Agatharchides’ approach to myth and Thucydides’ criticism of τὸ μυθῶδες

A potential affinity between Agatharchides and Thucydides can be detected in their approach to myth in historiography. This is an element absent from nearly all reception studies. Herman Verdin pointed to the fragments of *On the Erythrean Sea*, which treats the tradition about Perseus, as parallel with Thucydides’ rejection of τὸ μυθῶδες in the methodological chapter.³⁴⁷

i. Interpretation of Phot. *Bibl.* 250, p. 442b

The fragment in question is preserved in Photius, *Bibl.* 250, p. 442b; the greater part of it pours scorn on the implausible and fantastic stories present in traditional Greek mythology, and underlines their unreal and unbelievable character. The point Agatharchides makes by this exposition is clear; he intends to discredit Deinias’ claim that Erythras was Perseus’ son.³⁴⁸ The crucial part for our purpose is the final point made by Agatharchides:

Ὅτι αὐτὸς, φησίν, ἑαυτῷ αἴτιος καθίστατο ἐλέγχων ὁ τὴν τῶν μυθοποιῶν ἐξουσίαν εἰς πραγματικὴν μετὰ γων ἐνάργειαν· ἥς ἂν τις ἀφέλῃ τὸν ἔλεγχον, οὐθὲν εὐτελέστερον καταλείψει γένος τῆς πίστεως ἡρμένης. Ἐπεὶ διὰ τίνα αἰτίαν Ὅμηρον οὐκ εὐθύνω, Διὸς καὶ Ποσειδῶνος φράζοντα διαφορὰν, ἀδύνατον ἀνθρώπῳ πίστιν παραδοῦναι· οὐδ’ Ἡσιόδῳ μέφομαι δηλοῦν τολμῶντι θεῶν γένεσιν· οὐδ’ Αἰσχύλον ἐπιπλήττω πολλοῖς διεψευσμένον καὶ πολλὰ συγγράφοντα τῶν ἀσυγχωρήτων· οὐδ’ Εὐριπίδου κατηγορῶ τῷ μὲν Ἀρχελάῳ περιτεθεικότος τὰς Τημένου πράξεις, τὸν δὲ Τειρεσίαν βεβιωκότα παρεισάγοντος πέντε γενεῶν πλέον· οὐδὲ τοὺς ἄλλους εἰς ἐπιτίμησιν ἄγω, διασκευαῖς ἐν τοῖς δράμασι χρωμένους ἀδυνάτοις; ὅτι πᾶς ποιητὴς ψυχαγωγίας [μᾶλλον] ἢ ἀληθείας ἐστὶ στοχαστής.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁷ Verdin 1983, 411.

³⁴⁸ Malinowski 2007, 379.

³⁴⁹ “He says that one makes himself responsible for the occurrence of arguments against him by transposing mythological liberty onto a factual account. When someone takes away from this type of description the possibility to refute arguments, there is no literary genre more miserable, as all credibility would be lost. For what reasons shall I not correct Homer when he, on the occasion of the account of the quarrel between Zeus and Poseidon, made assurances impossible for a human being to make? Shall I not rebuke Hesiod for daring to describe the birth of the gods? Shall I not attack Aeschylus, who lied in numerous instances, and wrote many inappropriate

In the quoted fragment, Agatharchides underlines in particular the aspect of impossibility (ἀδύνατον ... διασκευαῖς ... ἀδυνάτοις) and the incredible nature (τῆς πίστεως ἡρμένης) of the poetic/mythical stories. The implication is clear: they produce falsity (διεψευσμένον). Historiographers should therefore be cautious in introducing μυθοποιῶν ἔξουσίαν into historical narrative (πραγματικὴν ἐνάργειαν).³⁵⁰ Yet most significant is the final sentence: πᾶς ποιητὴς ψυχαγωγίας μᾶλλον ἢ ἀληθείας ἐστὶ στοχαστής. It shows that the proper theme of Agatharchides' argument is the antithesis of poetry and historiography: the poet is "one who aims at" driving the soul; the historian, by implication, aims at ἀλήθεια. This refers us to the theory of ψυχαγωγία, of which an important spokesman was Eratosthenes.³⁵¹ But there is no need to look outside historiography to interpret Agatharchides' words. The antithesis of truth and falsity, and the concept of ψυχαγωγία as pertinent to tragedy, occurs in Polybius' critique of Phylarchus (Polyb. II 56, 10–12):³⁵²

(10) δεῖ τοιγαροῦν οὐκ ἐπιπλήττειν τὸν συγγραφέα τερατευόμενον διὰ τῆς ἱστορίας τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας [...] (11) τὸ γὰρ τέλος ἱστορίας καὶ τραγωδίας οὐ ταῦτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον. ἐκεῖ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ διὰ τῶν πιθανωτάτων λόγων ἐκπληῆσαι καὶ ψυχαγωγῆσαι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, ἐνθάδε δὲ διὰ τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἔργων καὶ λόγων εἰς τὸν πάντα χρόνον διδάξαι καὶ πείσαι τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας, (12) ἐπειδὴ περ ἐν ἐκείνοις μὲν ἡγείται τὸ πιθανόν, κἂν ᾗ ψεῦδος, διὰ τὴν ἀπάτην τῶν θεωμένων, ἐν δὲ τούτοις τάληθές διὰ τὴν ὠφέλειαν τῶν φιλομαθούντων.³⁵³

Although in Polybius the notion of myth does not appear, the above passage sheds light on the essential opposition found in the fragment of Agatharchides — the domain of historiography is truth and credibility, whereas poetry contains such elements as are incredible. Agatharchides charges Deinias with

things? Shall I not charge Euripides, who ascribed the deeds of Temenos to Archelaus, and brought on the scene Teiresias, who is supposed to have lived more than five generations? Shall I not criticize others, making use in their dramas of absurd compositional ideas? Every poet strives to seize humans' souls, rather than for truth" (transl. mine).

³⁵⁰ For more on this terminology see chap. 5, pp. 258–260 of the present work.

³⁵¹ He uses the same words, fr. IA4 Berger *ap.* Strab. I 2, 3: Ποιητὴν γὰρ ἔφη πάντα στοχάζεσθαι ψυχαγωγίας, οὐ διδασκαλίας. Verdin 1990, 10, is certain that Agatharchides "reproduit très probablement les idées d'Eratosthène". Cf. Malinowski 2007, 382–383.

³⁵² See Walbank, HCP I, 260. The passage is discussed in detail by Venini 1951, 54–61.

³⁵³ "A historical author should not try to thrill his readers by such exaggerated pictures [...] For the object of tragedy is not the same as that of history but quite the opposite. The tragic poet should thrill and charm his audience for the moment by the verisimilitude of the words he puts into his characters' mouths, but it is the task of the historian to instruct and convince for all time serious students by the truth of the facts and the speeches he narrates, since in the one case it is the probable that takes precedence, even if it be untrue, the purpose being to create illusion in spectators, in the other it is the truth, the purpose being to confer benefit on learners."

the same thing for which Polybius blames Phylarchus: he does not take the proper aim of historiography as his signpost. In Polybius the emphasis is laid on Phylarchus' improper balance between horrible descriptions and the account of causes; in Agatharchides, on a more general approach to mythology as a potential source for historical work.³⁵⁴ The reason for the scepticism towards myth was most probably epistemological — it could not be examined by autopsy or by the interrogation of eyewitnesses.³⁵⁵ Deinias' explanation, drawing on myth, of the name Erythreanis posited against the true one offered by Agatharchides, discovered by the latter through personal inquiry (αὐτὸς μεμάθηκε), namely from the interrogation of a certain Persian.³⁵⁶ Agatharchides seems to bear this out by saying εἰς πραγματικὴν μετὰ γων ἐνάργειαν, thus referring to the idea of a "living" historical account, which has to be based on personal experience, thus gaining credibility (πίστις).³⁵⁷ The emphasis on autopsy in this context suits the antithesis (myth-historiography) perfectly.

ii. Similarities between Agatharchides and Thucydides in the treatment of myth in historiography

Verdin remarked that Agatharchides' rejection of myth is stricter than in Thucydides or Herodotus, and should be understood in the context of the ongoing separation of literary genres in the Hellenistic period.³⁵⁸ More recently, Suzanne Saïd put the question inversely, and suggested that whereas Thucydides charges poetry with including the fabulous element, Agatharchides levels his criticism at historians that used the *licentia poetica* to represent facts in an expressive manner.³⁵⁹ Yet this seems to be an erroneous reading of both Thucydides' and Agatharchides' approaches. As I hope to have shown above, Thucydides by his declaration of avoiding μυθῶδες does not exclude any mythical element *ex definitione*, but postulates to submit it to verification and criticism, for the sake of usefulness. Moreover, his target was probably a specific historian: Herodotus, who, as we may understand from Thucydides' words, indiscriminately used mythological material when composing his work. As for

³⁵⁴ Verdin 1983, 411, connects Agatharchides' opposition of poetry and historiography with Polybius' differentiation between history and encomium; cf. Pédech 1964, 393–394; 583.

³⁵⁵ Gabba 1981, 50–53; Flory 1989, 193–208; Marincola 1997, 117–118.

³⁵⁶ *ME* 5 *ap. Phot. Bibl.* 250, p. 442a: Τέταρτος δὲ καὶ ἀληθὴς ἐστίν, ὃν αὐτὸς μεμάθηκε παρὰ Πέρσου. Verdin 1990, 14.

³⁵⁷ Cf. Verdin 1990, 1–15. On the concept of ἐνάργεια in the historiographical method of Agatharchides see chap. 5, pp. 256–261.

³⁵⁸ Verdin 1990, 11: "Confrontant Agatharchide et ses prédécesseurs, on pourrait dire que ce qui, pour Hérodote et Thucydide, était une frontière est devenue une barrière."

³⁵⁹ Saïd 2010, 171.

Agatharchides, in the passages analyzed above, he most probably underlines the same fault on the part of Deinias — the latter took mythological material about Perseus and Eythras, and used his invention to connect the latter with the name of the sea. In the most general terms, instead of critical inquiry into the mythical components of the explanation of the sea's name, he took them at face value (or even imaginatively rearranged).³⁶⁰ This explains why Agatharchides mentions “refutation” as a tool that should be applied to “this genre” (i.e. poetry): τὸν ἔλεγχον. This implies the process of scrutiny, investigation, and refutation of what in the mythical tradition proves to be contrary to fact or known to be inconsistent with information gathered from other sources (with preference for autopsy and the interrogation of witnesses).³⁶¹ Such a refutation reminds us of Thucydides' treatment of the oral tradition about the Trojan War in the Archaeology.

In sum, as far as we can deduce from the extant fragments, Agatharchides' approach to poetry and historiography, particularly to the treatment and potential use made of mythology in historical work, is similar to that expressed by Thucydides in the chapter on method. Is that similarity due to the conscious inspiration of Agatharchides as drawn from Thucydides? It has been argued in the previous chapter that Agatharchides read Thucydides' *History* as a whole; his acquaintance with the *Methodenkapitel* is very likely, as is his knowledge of the Archaeology, where Thucydides presents an ἔλεγχος of the poets' version of the Trojan War. Although his historical works are different in scope from Thucydides' account of a single war, the core idea of the proper task of the historiographer seems to be the same. Thus, although ultimate proof of this cannot be provided, the claim that certain Thucydidean historiographical concepts had a direct impact on the Cnidian is substantiated by the evidence.

4.5 Posidonius of Apamea

4.5.1 The Posidonian fragments

The next author is Posidonius of Apamea.³⁶² Apart from other fields, Posidonius' literary output included a voluminous historical work, of which only brief

³⁶⁰ Malinowski 2007, 366–368.

³⁶¹ LSJ, s.v. ἔλεγχος: “argument of disproof or refutation”, “cross-examining”, “testing”, “scrutiny”.

³⁶² Posidonius (c. 135–c. 51) was born in Apamea on the Orontes. He was a Stoic philosopher, scientist, and historian; educated at Athens under Panaetius, he settled in Rhodes, of which he was granted citizenship. His school in Rhodes became the leading centre of Stoicism. He wrote on astronomy, meteorology, mathematics, geography, hydrology, seismology, zoology, botany, anthropology, and history. On Posidonius' life and works in general see: Reinhardt 1953,

fragments remain.³⁶³ In the case of Posidonius, the question of the attribution and proper edition of the fragments is exceptionally complex.³⁶⁴ Their representativeness is extremely hard to assess,³⁶⁵ but it seems certain that he

563–570; Nock 1959, 1–4; Sandbach 1975, 129–139; Steinmetz 1994, 670–705; Clarke 1999, 129–192; Kidd, *Posidonius* (2), OCD, 2012, 1195–1196; Vimercati 2004, 2–16. See also von Fritz 1977, 163–175, for a comprehensive *status quaestionis* of Posidonian studies up to his time. Classic works are Reinhardt 1921, and 1926. This scholar emphasized Posidonius’ original contribution to historiography, especially the amount of circumstantial detail provided in descriptions of non-Greek peoples, as well as the endeavour to set this detail within a wider philosophical perspective. For an overview of the philosophy of Posidonius see Edelstein 1936, 286–325.

³⁶³ The *History* was a major work consisting of 52 books, covering the period from 146 probably to the mid-180s (Hackl 1980, 151–166; Ruschenbusch 1993, 70–76), probably left unfinished. Its scope was the entirety of the known world, from developments in Asia Minor, Spain, Egypt and Africa, Gaul and the northern peoples, to Rome and Greece. It was full of details about social and environmental phenomena, and ethnology (Italian, Roman, Gallic, Germanic). There was a tendency in earlier scholarship to overemphasize the “psychological” factors in Posidonius’ historiographical conception (e.g. von Fritz 1977, 175. described as “Verbindung von Voelkerpsychologie, Massenpsychologie und Individualpsychologie.” Cf. Bringmann 1986, 29–66). For Kidd 1989, 46–49, in the *History*, ethnology leads to psychology, which is the proper field of aetiology in Posidonius. The philosophical study of psychology (esp. emotions) should lead to the identification of the real causes of historical events. According to Kidd, the unifying factor of the *History* was a “moralist’s view of historical explanation, where events are caused by mind and character in the relationship between ruler and ruled, and by tribal or racial character in social movement and motives.” (Kidd 2012, 1195–1196. On Posidonius’ historical work in particular see: Rudenberg 1918, 9–17; Strasburger 1965, 40–53; Gigon 1972, 245–249; von Fritz 1977, 175–189; Malitz 1983, 34–74; Thümmel 1984, 558–561 (an attempt to summarily point out the general characteristics of the *History*, with special regard of the influence of Stoicism).

³⁶⁴ The standard edition of the Posidonian fragments and *testimonia* is Edelstein-Kidd 1972, 1989 (with commentary by Kidd 1988). Only texts indisputably referring to Posidonius are included in the edition (see Kidd 1972, pp. XV–XIX, on his methodology). The edition of Theiler 1982 relies on the older methodology of Rheinhardt and diverges considerably in the delineations of the fragments, including many more (470 fragments from nearly 70 authors). For a detailed (and overall positive) review of Theiler see Janáček 1986, 77–97. Both editions include not only fragments *sensu stricto* (i.e. precise quotations) but also and mostly paraphrases, allusions, and summaries. It seems appropriate to treat them as complementary (cf. Winiarczyk 1996, 259–264). The most recent edition of Vimercati 2004 is an attempt to avoid the excessive strictness of Edelstein-Kidd on the one hand, and the inclusiveness of Theiler on the other. Vimercati intends to maintain a good balance between the two extreme methodologies (*ibidem*, 14: “[...] ‘via di mezzo’, una sorta di ‘terza via’ che speriamo equilibrata tra la larga generosità del Theiler e il severo rigore del Kidd”). Vimercati distinguishes between “frammenti certi” (where the name of Posidonius occurs) and “frammenti attribuibili” (where the name of Posidonius is absent, but arguments for the attribution are strong). The historical fragments presented in Jacoby, FGrHist 87, are still useful, and in the present section I refer to this edition. For the validity of Jacoby’s selection of Posidonius’ historical fragments see Lens 1992, 739–740.

³⁶⁵ Already Laffranque 1964, 112–113, indicated that the character of the extant fragments of Posidonius’ *History* needs to be explained by the scope and literary aims of Athenaeus, who is the intermediate author for a large number of them. According to Laffranque, Strabo is more reliable as to the actual focus of the historical work of Posidonius, as he presented a higher level

consciously continued Polybius, knew his work, and shared certain historiographical patterns with him, particularly the approach to historical causation.³⁶⁶ He probably relied on autopsy for some of his material, and made critical use of selected sources he considered trustworthy.³⁶⁷

We lack any explicit methodological statements by Posidonius, except for the fragment with a very controversial attribution, a part of the *prooemium* in Diodorus' *Library* (I 1, 3). It was counted as a fragment by Willy Theiler, whereas Ian Kidd, abiding to his methodological principles, omitted it from his edition.³⁶⁸ The ascription to Posidonius is based on the allegedly "Stoic" categories involved in the passage, which, some scholars have argued, point to Posidonius as their ultimate source. However, the arguments are not satisfying enough to consider this attribution as substantiated and to seek Thucydidean parallels there.

4.5.2 Attempts at defining general affinities between Posidonius and Thucydides

This lack of explicit methodological statements notwithstanding, there have been various attempts to assess Posidonius' relationship to Thucydides. Some scholars have made general comments that Posidonius is closer to the

of scholarship and scientific training, which is supposed to guarantee his greater "objectivity" (this should be treated with caution). Cf. Limmermann 1888, 103–130; Munz 1929, *passim*. Athenaeus' transmission of Posidonius has recently been investigated anew by Clarke 2007, 291–302. Schmidt 1980, 10–13, discusses this problem, with apt arguments for the view that the ethnological elements belonged to excursions, rather than formed the essential theme of the work. There was, Schmidt tries to show, a balance and coherence between them and the military-political narrative. Schmidt also makes an interesting case of the role of Posidonius' "Klimatheorie" in the *History*.

³⁶⁶ FGrHist 87 T 1 *ap.* Sudam, s.v. Ποσειδώνιος, points out Posidonius' continuation of Polybius: Ποσειδώνιος Ἀλεξανδρεὺς· φιλόσοφος Στωικός, μαθητὴς Ζήνωνος τοῦ Κιτιέως. ἔγραψεν Ἱστορίαν τὴν μετὰ Πολύβιον. See Laffranque 1964, 113–134, indicating i.a. a similar leading theme of Posidonius' and Polybius' *Histories* – the Roman role and expansion in the Mediterranean. It is not without significance that Strabo corrects Polybius with the aid of Posidonius several times: FGrHist 87 F 89 *ap.* Strab. V 1, 8 (Πολύβιος δ' εἶρηκε [...]) Ποσειδώνιος δέ φησι κτλ.), cf. F 51 *ap.* Strab. III 4, 13, which implies that Posidonius could have criticized his predecessor. See Nock 1959, 4. On affinities between the two historians see the comprehensive discussion of Schulten 1911, 568–607, who, following a detailed and well-argued inquiry, concludes that Posidonius "wie für die geographische Einleitung, so auch für den historischen Teil den Polybius benutzt; aber vielfach desavouiert hat." See also Momigliano 1980, 89–101.

³⁶⁷ Laffranque 1964, 145. Verbrugghe 1975, 189–193, argues convincingly that he depended on oral sources e.g. for the account of the Slave Wars.

³⁶⁸ Diod. Sic. I 1, 3 = F 80 Theiler. Kidd argues against that (Kidd 1989, 39–40). See Bees 2002, 207–209 with n. 2–7 for an overview of various standpoints. Bees himself reads the *prooemium* as Posidonian.

Thucydidean than the Herodotean “type” of historiography.³⁶⁹ Heinrich G. Strebel on the one hand pointed to the scarcity of the source material for such an analysis,³⁷⁰ on the other — he rewrites the thesis of Eduard Norden, that Posidonius’ method is built on certain categories similar to those of Thucydides, esp. probability (εἰκός, εἰκάζειν, εἰκασμός).³⁷¹ This was only a short remark, in which Norden tried to associate both historians on the grounds of the “scientific” character (“die echte Wissenschaftlichkeit”) of their method. It is evidently based on a modernistic interpretation of Thucydides;³⁷² Posidonius’ use of εἰκός is an aspect completely insufficient to advance a thesis of Thucydidean influence; the concept was common in Greek rhetoric and historiography, and thus cannot be identified as a specific trait of Thucydides, taken over by Posidonius. Strebel seems also to see in another passage an analogy to Thucydides’ claim from the *Archaeology*, that in archaic times Greece lacked significant political organization.³⁷³ This is also only an indirect parallel, and the question does not pertain to methodology. Finally, Strebel suggests that Posidonius could have been well acquainted with Thucydides through his teacher Panaetius.³⁷⁴ If Panaetius made use of Thucydides, and possibly shared his library with his students, it is very probable that Posidonius read Thucydides as well. To be sure, this is far from proof of Posidonius’ contact with the *History* of Thucydides, but is at least one argument for the plausibility of such an acquaintance. Simon Hornblower indicates Posidonius’ introduction to the Sicilian Slave War as showing “specific Thucydidean influence”, and the more general “interest in detailed recording as well as explaining”, which “might, if we had more of him, recall Thucydides”. Hornblower seems to rely only on secondary literature and his treatment is inconclusive as to his own view. The references are to the brief suggestions of

³⁶⁹ See e.g. Gigon 1972, 250. For this scholar, the main link between the two historians is the essential approach to history: they prefer the “tragic” way of writing about the past, to stress the pathetic element and the role of fortune.

³⁷⁰ Strebel 1935, 25: “Poseidonios’ Verhältnis zu dem großen Historiker würde uns sehr interessieren, aber leider fehlen uns hierfür alle Anhaltspunkte.”

³⁷¹ Strebel 1935, 25–26.

³⁷² Norden 1923, 68 n. 1: “Dieser ersichtlich oft von ihm gebrauchte Ausdruck muß für die echte Wissenschaftlichkeit seines Forschens sehr einnehmen. Es ist thukydideische Art (I 9, 5 u. ö.).” The same belief, bearing similar modernistic overtones, was expressed by Laffranque 1964, 145; 149: on Posidonius’ “objectivity” and “rationalism” in dealing with historical matters. Posidonius represents, in this author’s view, “une conception scientifique de l’Histoire” (p. 151) identical to Thucydides’. For the distortions of this paradigm in reading Thucydides, and in assessing the reception of his *History* see the introduction to the present work.

³⁷³ Strebel 1935, 26.

³⁷⁴ *Ibidem*, adduces Eustathius’ remark on *Od.* XXIII 220, where Panaetius cites Thucydides for grammatical purposes.

Karl Reinhardt and Kidd, which cannot serve as satisfactory evidence for and answer to the question posed at the beginning of this chapter.³⁷⁵ Klaus Meister also relied on Reinhardt's observation on the sentence about κίνησις, which led him to agree with Hermann Strasburger, who believed that both had "kinetische Geschichtsauffassung". This seems so vague that it requires further explanation, which does not occur either in Strasburger or in Meister. Meister also followed Hornblower in connecting both historians' alleged emphasis on historical causation, again without any argument or analysis.³⁷⁶ Recently, Marianne Pade pointed out two fields of the influence of Thucydides on Posidonius: the opening of the *History* and the speeches.³⁷⁷ Unfortunately, this note is so concise that we lack any further argumentation on this point; it is not even certain which fragment Pade means by the "opening" of Posidonius' work; most likely she means F 80 Theiler (*ap.* Diod. Sic. I 1, 3), a very disputable attribution (see above, n. 368). Recently, Meister again suggested Thucydidean influence or inspiration in Posidonius' treatment of speeches. The form of his statements makes them difficult to assess.³⁷⁸ Since speeches were counted an important part of Thucydides' chapter on methodology, this potential point of contact between these authors requires further analysis, even though we do not have any explicit statements from Posidonius regarding the role and method of composition of speeches in historical writing.

4.5.3 The speeches in Posidonius' *History* and Thucydides' method

i. Interpretation of Ath. V 211d–215b (FGrHist F 36)

The relevant text of Posidonius is a speech appearing in the so-called Athenian episode, preserved by Athenaeus (FGrHist 87 F 36 = F 247 Theiler = 253 Edelstein-Kidd = A 323 Vimercati, *ap.* Ath. V 211d–215b). It is a relatively long passage (for a fragment),³⁷⁹ which occurs in Athenaeus, in the context of a satirical account of the misdeeds of professional philosophers in public life,

³⁷⁵ Posidonius takes up four lines and one note in Hornblower's article. Posidonius FGrHist 87 F 108 is adduced for the influence in the case of the Slave War. Hornblower relies on Reinhardt 1953, 633. See the different interpretation of Verbrugge 1975, 189–204. For the "detailed recording as well as explaining" Kidd 1989, 50, is quoted.

³⁷⁶ Meister 2013, 51, expressed this view with even greater conviction: "Höchst thukydeisch waren ferner die Schärfe und Stringenz der Ursachenanalyse (vgl. etwa F 108 über die Gründe des Ersten sizilischen Sklavenkrieges)."

³⁷⁷ Pade 2013, online ref. on September 28th, 2020: "In the Hellenistic period, Poseidonius (c. 125–c. 50 BC) and Polybius (c. 200–after 118 BC) were both influenced by T. In the former, this is seen in the opening of his history and in his use of speeches [...]."

³⁷⁸ Meister 2013, 51, nearly rewrites Reinhardt 1953, 638.

³⁷⁹ It comprises 179 lines in Edelstein-Kidd (ca. 6 pages of the CCTC edition).

especially as leaders or generals.³⁸⁰ This is an episode from the *History*, in which Posidonius describes how in the year 88 BC, during the war of Rome with Mithridates VI Eupator, a certain Athenion, son of an Egyptian slave-girl and Peripatetic Athenion,³⁸¹ became an ambassador to Cappadocia. These events are otherwise unknown. Athenion convinced the Athenian people that he induced Mithridates to liberate them from the Romans, was designated general, then made himself a tyrant. After that, he began to terrorize the citizens, and finally sent a military expedition to Delos, which was a disaster. The speech in question occurs after Athenion's ostentatious arrival at Athens from Cappadocia, in which he persuades the Athenian crowd to join Mithridates against Rome, by emphasizing how powerful he is, and how weak the Romans are.

How can we assess this speech in relation to Thucydides' historiographical principles? Reinhardt remarked that this fragment shows that Posidonius is like Thucydides in that they both convey essential developments through speeches. The difference is in the focus: Thucydides highlights the political, Posidonius the moral aspect through the speeches.³⁸² However, it seems that it is the context in Athenaeus, not in Posidonius, that carries moral overtones. The leading theme in the context where the fragment is quoted by Athenaeus is the faults of the philosophers who were involved in politics; but in the fragment itself the most highlighted fact is that Athenion was actually a non-legitimate citizen, a mere poor sophist,³⁸³ who, after the visit to Mithridates' court, entered the city in a pompous manner and is explicitly said to have committed wrongs, having forgotten his philosophical principles, and showing himself a tyrant.³⁸⁴ Posidonius, as far as we accept the delineation of the fragment in Kidd (which

³⁸⁰ The case of the tyranny of Athenion comes after the account of the deeds of the Epicurean Diogenes (at the court of Alexander Balas of Syria), of the Epicurean Lysias (as tyrant of Tarsus), and a critique of Plato's stories about Socrates. The proper theme of these chapters is stressed by Athenaeus at their very end: τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν οἱ ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας στρατηγοί (Ath. V 215c). On the Athenaeus context see Kidd 1988, 863–864, and the commentary on the entire fragment *ibidem*, 864–887. The role of this short episode in Posidonius' *History* was probably marginal, but still it is hard to agree with von Fritz 1977, 177–179, who completely disregards it as entirely unrepresentative of the historiography of the Apamean. Cf. Clarke 2007, 291–298, on the relationship between the two authors, particularly on Athenaeus' aims in deriving ideas from Posidonius. On the figure of Athenion and the historical context see Theiler 1982, 126.

³⁸¹ Hence the proper Athenion, which is the subject of the fragment, is called by Posidonius an οἰκοτριψ: "a slave born and bred in the house".

³⁸² Reinhardt 1954, 88.

³⁸³ Ath. V 211f: παρέγγραφος Ἀθηναίων πολίτης ἐγένετο; 212c: ὁ παρέγγραφος Ἀθηναίων; Ἀθηναίων ὁ πένης; 212d: ὁ δὲ πρότερον ἐκ μισθωτῆς οἰκίας; 213e: λεχθέντων ὑπὸ τοῦ οἰκοτρίβος.

³⁸⁴ Ath. V 213f: τύραννον αὐτὸν ἀποδείξας ὁ φιλόσοφος; 214a: παρὰ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου δόγματα; 214f: Ἀθηναίων δ' ἐπιλαθόμενος τῶν δογμάτων τῶν τοῦ περιπάτου.

is not obvious),³⁸⁵ stresses not the factor of Athenion's philosophical education, but rather his meagre provenance in general. The speech occurs after a long and lively narrative on the Athenion's reception at Athens, which contains a great deal of circumstantial detail.³⁸⁶ This refers us to the idea of ἐνάργεια, as a feature of the historical narrative.³⁸⁷ Yet most of all, it suggests that Posidonius witnessed, or had interrogated direct witnesses to, these events.³⁸⁸ It is likely that Posidonius had ear-witness accounts of Athenion's speech.

ii. Affinities between F 36 and Thuc. I 22, 1

Thucydides placed emphasis on the balance between the actual content, on which he strove to acquire reliable data, and his own invention, the things that were likely to be said given the particular circumstances. In the passage concerning Athenion, Posidonius seems partly to relate his words in *oratio recta* (with the intervention of Posidonius' words in imperfectum: ἔφη or aorist: εἶπη),³⁸⁹ and partly to summarize them.³⁹⁰

The phrase πολλῶν οὖν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων λεχθέντων refers us to Thucydides in two respects:

1. τοιούτων is similar to the introductory words used by Thucydides at the beginning of his speeches. This and similar formulae have been shown to imply that the historian does not claim the absolute literal accuracy of the delivered

³⁸⁵ The editor takes the entire section Ath. V 211d–215b as a verbatim citation of Posidonius, with the exception of 213f., where he detects contamination (Kidd 1988, 879 *ad loc.*, cf. Vimercati 2004, 695 and Theiler 1982, 127, defend this part as it stands.) Nevertheless, this simple delineation is not as unproblematic as it seems; we can find some indication that Athenaeus intervenes in some of the sections. For example, the phrase πολλῶν οὖν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων λεχθέντων – numerous similar formulae occur in Athenaeus, in places where he undoubtedly uses his own voice (e.g. III 96d: τοσούτων λεχθέντων καὶ περὶ τούτων; VI 228c; VII 307f; VIII 331c; X 421a; XIII 562a; XIII 648c; XIV 644f; XV 696a). This cannot be explored in depth here, but should alert us as to the possibility of Athenaeus' distortions of Posidonius' texts, which has been ignored by all editors (most recently, Vimercati 2004, 692, calls the fragment "citazione posidoniana vera e propria").

³⁸⁶ E.g. the garments and jewellery of Athenion, the feelings of the crowd that wondered at Athenion's paradoxical luck (from a son of a slave to a celebrated ambassador), the spontaneous rush of the masses to the assembly etc.

³⁸⁷ See chap. 5, pp. 229–231.

³⁸⁸ Cf. Kidd 1989, 870: "Posidonius must have had personal accounts of these scenes: we have no reason to disbelieve them because of the underlying tone or rhetorical style."

³⁸⁹ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔφη ... λέγω τοῖνον, ἔφη ... τί οὖν, εἶπε κτλ.

³⁹⁰ Athen. V 213c: πολλῶν οὖν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτω λεχθέντων ὑπὸ τοῦ οἰκότριβος, συλλαλήσαντες αὐτοῖς οἱ ὄχλοι καὶ συνδραμόντες εἰς τὸ θέατρον εἵλοντο τὸν Ἀθηνίωνα στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ὀπλῶν ("There was much more in the same fashion from this erstwhile houseboy, then the mob, full of excited chatter, rushed in a mass to the theatre where they chose Athenion Hoplite General" transl. Kidd).

speeches, but rather admits partial — but still based on reasoning, not pure fancy — creation on his own part.

2. It echoes some crucial Thucydidean expressions, concerning the speeches, from the *Methodenkapitel*: χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαμνημονεῦσαι ἦν (I 22, 1), and the most important ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς ξυμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων. This can be considered a mere verbal coincidence; in Thucydides the λεχθέντα functions as a noun, whereas in the Posidonian fragment we are dealing with here it has the function of a *participium aoristi passivi* in the sentence.³⁹¹ Yet we may also speak of an echo (not necessarily intentional), which would be consistent with the general impression made by the Athenion episode — Posidonius seems to relate the words as Athenion would really have spoken them. Therefore, Kidd is probably right to say that Posidonius could have “applied no less severe canons than Thuc. I 22, 1”. However, Kidd immediately makes a distinction between the two historians’ approaches.³⁹² He seems thus to allow for the possibility of a similar methodology in composing speeches to that of Thucydides, but at the same time he claims that the aim of Posidonius was different — to reveal the psychological factor (the Athenian people’s emotions), as the cause of the events which followed. But in Thucydides’ methodological chapter, there is no reflection as to what the aim of the speeches in historical writing is. This seems to be self-evident, and to require no explicit comment. We also have no idea whether or where Posidonius discussed the role of speeches. Hence, it is very problematic to argue for a concrete *purpose* of the speeches, either in Thucydides or in Posidonius, particularly in the face of such a scarcity of material as in the case of the latter.

We would need more Posidonian speeches to assess their relationship to those of Thucydides, and this could still not be enough to differentiate between their goals. Moreover, since it is fairly possible that Athenaeus compressed and cut the original text of Posidonius, the proper interpretation of Athenion’s speech within the narrative is inevitably determined by Athenaeus’ selection of material, and as such cannot be compared with Thucydides. If we were to reply to Kidd’s suggestion, we could argue that a conception of speeches as

³⁹¹ πολλῶν οὖν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων λεχθέντων ὑπὸ τοῦ οἰκότριβος, συλλαλήσαντες αὐτοῖς οἱ ὄχλοι καὶ συνδραμόντες εἰς τὸ θέατρον εἶλοντο τὸν Ἀθηνίωνα στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ὅπλων. For transl. see above, n. 390.

³⁹² Kidd 1988, 873–874: “Yet in the context the purpose of the speech is clear, to demonstrate just how Athenion played on the πάθη of the mob. To present this effectively, no doubt he selected and because of ancient conditions phrased as best he could what was reported to him, but this was for him historical evidence of the psychological cause of what happened at Athens in 88.”

displaying the psychological cause(s) of the events could in fact also be argued for Thucydides. It would be enough to adduce here the speeches and politics of Pericles, his relationship with the Athenian demos, Alcibiades and his manipulations, and — perhaps the most appropriate example of all — the emotional decisions in the case of the Mytileneans, and the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus.³⁹³ The speech of Athenion in the Posidonian fragment involves no more psychological analysis of the *πάθη* of the Athenian mob than numerous passages in Thucydides. Therefore, this aspect cannot serve as a means of distinguishing between the two historians' methodologies, as Kidd suggested.

4.5.4 Posidonius' conception of causation and Thucydides

i. The problem of the delineation and attribution of FGrHist 87 F 108

The second potential affinity with Thucydides is Posidonius' understanding of historical causation.³⁹⁴ Hornblower and Meister cited FGrHist 87 F 108 as a relevant fragment of Posidonius in this context. The subject matter of the piece is the so-called Sicilian Slave War (?136–131), a mutiny of slaves which embraced a large part of Sicily, and several Greek cities. Both Hornblower and Meister ignored the fact that the attribution and delineation of this fragment is far from certain, and editors approach it in different ways. Jacoby takes as the beginning (itemized as FGrHist 87 F 108a a) the passage in Phot. *Bibl.* 244, p. 384a, which is identified as Diodorus' XXXIV/XXXV 2, 1. In the Diodorean context, Posidonius is not mentioned by name. Hence, Kidd omits the passage completely in his edition; he prints only the fragment from Athenaeus pertaining to the part of Posidonius' *History* which described the war. However, he admits that it serves as a secure link to the narrative in Diodorus, and that it constitutes a strong argument for ascribing the entire section in Diodorus to Posidonius³⁹⁵. Thus, other editors of the Posidonian fragments include Diod.

³⁹³ See particularly Thuc. I 140–144; II 60–64, and Thucydides' remarks on how Pericles steered the people (II 65); VI 16–18 (Alcibiades' speech to the Athenians) and the enthusiastic reactions of the people (e.g. VI 19: οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκούσαντες ἐκείνου ... ὥρμητο στρατεύειν; cf. VI 48 and esp. VIII 81, 2 on Alcibiades' emotional appeal, given in indirect discourse); cf. the measures taken in Athens to punish the mutinous Mytileneans, as determined by emotions: III 36: καὶ ὑπὸ ὀργῆς ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς; cf. the subsequent comments of Thucydides about Cleon's influence on demos; further – his and Diodotus' speeches (III 37–40 and III 42–48). On the psychological element in Thucydides Huart 1968 is fundamental.

³⁹⁴ As suggested by Hornblower and Meister, see above, p. 173.

³⁹⁵ FGrHist 87 F 7 = F 59 Edelstein-Kidd = 136a Theiler = A 287 Vimercati, *ap.* Ath. XII 542 b. The theme in the context of Athenaeus is the luxury (τρυφή) of notable individuals, one example of which is Damophilus' appearance in Posidonius' *History*. Damophilus appears in the account of Diod. Sic. XXXIV/XXXV 10, and in the Constantinian *Excerpta* at XXXIV 2, 34,

Sic. XXXIV/XXXV 2, 1–18, as drawing on the former’s *History*; the arguments for this seem to be solid.³⁹⁶ To be sure, it needs to be stressed that we are dealing here with a two-stage “sifting” of the (probably) Posidonian underlying original, the eight books of the *History*: the text comes via Diodorus via Photius.³⁹⁷ For the sake of clarity, I refer below to the text in question according to the chapters in Diodorus.

ii. Posidonius’ scheme of historical causation: the account of the Slave War in Diodorus

The author (Posidonius, to some extent altered by Diodorus) begins with an announcement, that he is going to describe the αἰτία of the Slave War (Diod. Sic. XXXIV/XXXV 2, 1):

Ὅτι μετὰ τὴν Καρχηδονίων κατάλυσιν ἐπὶ ἐξήκοντα ἔτεσι τῶν Σικελῶν εὐρουούντων ἐν πᾶσιν, ὁ δουλικὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπανεῖστη πόλεμος ἐξ αἰτίας τοιαύτης.³⁹⁸

The narrative that follows gives an account of the origins of mass slavery in Sicily — how the slaves were mistreated by their masters from the very beginning (XXXIV/XXXV 2, 1–3). This caused the slaves great distress and led to their decision to revolt (XXXIV/XXXV 2, 4). After some time, a certain Eunus, an Apamean slave belonging to Antigenes of Enna, began to pretend to be a magician and diviner, and was in favour with most of the slaves (XXXIV/XXXV 2, 5–9). The revolt begins when the slaves of another citizen of Enna — Damophilus — resolve to kill him and his wife, with Eunus’ blessing; together with other slaves they ravage Enna, making Eunus the head of the revolt (XXXIV/XXXV 2, 10–16). A man named Cleon begins a revolt among

where the above fragment is rewritten, with only slight alterations on the part of Diodorus. See: Kidd 1988, 293–294: “This sentence forms the only secure link between Diodorus Bk 34 and Posidonius. Nevertheless, the strong likelihood remains that Diodorus used Posidonius for his whole account of the first Sicilian slave war [...]” See arguments in Vimercati 2004, 712 and Theiler 1982, 100, who is nearly certain: “[...] erste Teil ist ein hervorragendes Beispiel poseidonischer Kunst.”

³⁹⁶ They still differ in precise delineation: F 136b Theiler (Diod. Sic. XXXIV/XXXV 2, 1–18), Vimercati B 22a (Diod. Sic. XXXIV/XXXV 2, 1–24). Jacoby prints Photius and *Excerpta* in separate columns (FGHist 87 F 108).

³⁹⁷ Provided that Diodorus used Posidonius directly. Even if he did, we have to assume that he intervened in the text he used; the extent of Diodorus’ alterations is not easy to assess, and would require a separate study of the Diodorus-Posidonius relationship, which is still a desideratum. Cf. Kidd 1999, 129: “[...] Diodorus 34.2.34, which is unquestionably a diluted version of Posidonius.”

³⁹⁸ “When Sicily, after the Cathaginian collapse, had enjoyed sixty years of good fortune in all respects, the Servile War broke out for the following reason” (all translations of Diod. Sic. XXXIV/XXXV are of Walton)

yet other slaves, and joins Eunus' forces (XXXIV/XXXV 2, 17). The slave troops have some success in defeating the Roman militaries, as they reach a total of two hundred thousand; new slave uprisings occur in Attica and other places (XXXIV/XXXV 2, 19). The revolt comes to a climax in Sicily, but is eventually suppressed (XXXIV/XXXV 2, 18–24). The structure of this account is clear: first, after the preliminary announcement, comes the description of the αἰτία: the conditions of the life of the Sicilian slaves, which lead to their distress and resolution to mutiny. Chapter 4 is crucial here:

Πιεζόμενοι δὲ οἱ δοῦλοι ταῖς τλαιπωρίαις καὶ πληγαῖς τὰ πολλὰ παραλόγως ὕβριζόμενοι, οὐχ ὑπέμενον. συνιόντες οὖν ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τὰς εὐκαιρίας συνελάλουν περὶ ἀποστάσεως, ἕως εἰς ἔργον τὴν βουλὴν ἤγαγον.³⁹⁹

The participle *πιεζόμενοι* is explanatory; it means: “as the slaves were distressed” or “since they were distressed”, because of the extreme hardships they had to endure.⁴⁰⁰ This state of distress should be identified as the proper αἰτία of the war according to Posidonius.⁴⁰¹ When the grounds for the revolt were ready, the next stage followed, labelled “the beginning”: ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ὅλης ἀποστάσεως ἐγένετο τοιαύτη (XXXIV/XXXV 2, 9). This ἀρχή was the riot that took place in the house of Damophilus - the impulse that prompted the whole war came from there (the first killing of the masters, organization of slaves into group etc.). The rest are the developments of the revolt, and its fall.

Therefore, in the narrative as we find it in Diodorus there is a clear scheme of the interpretation of the events in terms of αἰτία and ἀρχή. Interestingly, the author points out that he expounds “the” reason, i.e. a single one — and from the whole account (esp. ch. 4) we can infer that it was the mental state of the slaves — their “distress” or “oppression” (implied by *πιεζόμενοι*), itself an effect of the harsh behaviour of their masters. It is sharply and explicitly distinguished from the first actions of Damophilus' slaves — these were already only a consequence of the state of affairs prior to them.

³⁹⁹ “The slaves, distressed by their hardships, and frequently outraged and beaten beyond all reason, could not endure their treatment. Getting together as opportunity offered, they discussed the possibility of revolt, until at last they put their plans into action.”

⁴⁰⁰ This is *participium coniunctum*, habitually used by the Greek historians to indicate the internal processes of the historical actors. It can be also called described as motivation, as the ideas of what the given person/group thought/felt/intended etc. are almost always a historian's inference from the facts.

⁴⁰¹ We could, of course, suspect that it is Diodorus' original contribution to the text in Posidonius. Yet this is hardly possible when we consider the relative faithfulness to Posidonius' account in the case of Damophilus.

iii. Affinities between Posidonius' and Thucydides' conceptions of causation

If the ascription of the scheme αἰτία-ἀρχή to Posidonius is correct,⁴⁰² we can conclude that his conceptualization of historical causation is similar to the theory explicitly defined by Polybius. And since we have concluded above that Polybius' theory is essentially the same as Thucydides', we can also assume an affinity between Posidonius and Thucydides, in particular in the following elements:

1. Posidonius makes the same distinction between the reason (αἰτία) and the beginning (ἀρχή).

2. The concept of αἰτία is comparable: it is the mental state of the crucial figure(s), caused by some external event or process (here: the treatment of the slaves and their distress). In the extant fragments or testimonia of Posidonius, we find no other notions that belong to Thucydides' and Polybius' conceptions of historical causation: πρόφασις, ἀφορμή, etc. However, this does not mean that Posidonius would not use them in the appropriate context. In the case of the slave war, there was no place for πρόφασις meaning "pretext", since this concept refers primarily to state politics. What "pretext" could the Sicilian slaves employ when staging the revolt?

4.6 Dionysius of Halicarnassus

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (c. 60 BC – post 7 AD) is not always described by modern scholars as a Hellenistic historian.⁴⁰³ Yet when taking into account the strict chronological dates of the Hellenistic period and Dionysius' life,⁴⁰⁴ plus, most importantly, the Hellenistic background of his rhetorical and literary education, he arguably should be included in the analysis.⁴⁰⁵ What is especially significant is that he is the only author to write a separate treatise about Thucydides in the period in question. His direct and explicit references to Thucydides' methodological chapter are revealing, and contribute significantly to our understanding of the reception of his ideas towards the end of the period in question. Dionysius was born and grew up in Halicarnassus in Caria, but

⁴⁰² As J. Hornblower 1981, 27–31, has shown, Diodorus tends also to reproduce the rare or technical vocabulary of his sources.

⁴⁰³ For example, Meister 1990, treats Diodorus of Agyrium as the last Greek historian of the Hellenistic age. Dillery 2011, 171–217, also ends with Diodorus. But e.g. Scardino 2014, 673–675, includes Dionysius in his survey of Hellenistic historiography.

⁴⁰⁴ Dionysius came to Rome in 30/29 BC (see Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* I 7, 2), and was already around thirty years old at that time; thus his education and the beginnings of his career fall into the late Hellenistic period.

⁴⁰⁵ See also the arguments in chap. 1, pp. 27–28.

moved to Rome in around 30/29, where he stayed at least twenty-two years.⁴⁰⁶ His intellectual activity was particularly intensive and covered historiography, literary criticism, rhetoric and grammar.⁴⁰⁷ Nevertheless, his proper *magnum opus* was the *Roman Antiquities* (Ῥωμαϊκὴ ἀρχαιολογία). Its subject matter is the early history of the Roman state,⁴⁰⁸ the point of departure a controversial thesis on the Romans' Greek roots.⁴⁰⁹ He was well-read in Greek as well as in Roman literature,⁴¹⁰ and was versed in the most noteworthy literary circles of the time.⁴¹¹ In particular, there is some convincing evidence of Dionysius' relationship with the Peripatetics, specifically with Andronicus of Rhodes, the famous initiator of the new edition of the works of Aristotle and Theophrastus in Rome.⁴¹² Dionysius shows profound knowledge of their rhetorical treatises, and his principal critical categories derive from their writings.⁴¹³ Dionysius' literary concepts do not need to be discussed here in detail; for our purpose it is only worth stressing that the Peripatetic background of Dionysius' literary output is well attested.

⁴⁰⁶ He himself claims that it was "when Augustus put the civil war to an end", see Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* I 7, 2; cf. Quint. *Inst.* III 1, 16. On Dionysius' life see: Egger 1902, 1–4; Aujac 1978, 9; Hidber 1996, 2; Kennedy 1972, 342–343; Bowersock 1965, 130–132. In Rome, Dionysius not only wrote, but also taught rhetoric to Roman aristocrats. Cf. Egger 1902, 7; Pavano 1958, XI; de Jonge 2008, 1.

⁴⁰⁷ On the character of Dionysius' literary treatises see: Kiessling 1868, 248–254; Maykowska 1950, 394–408; Atkins 1952, 108–120; Grube 1965, 207–230; Hurst 1982, 839–865; Schultze 1986, 121–124; Ronnet 1994, 219–222; de Jonge 2008, 23.

⁴⁰⁸ For example Strabo, contemporary with Dionysius, mentions him as a historian, not a literary critic (Strab. XIV 2, 16: καθ' ἡμᾶς Διονύσιος ὁ συγγραφεύς). See how at Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* I 7, 2, Dionysius describes his historiographical enterprise; cf. VII 70, 2 and Rhys Roberts 1901, p. 4; Bonner 1939, 1; Hidber 1996, 1. On the relationship between the two main fields of Dionysius' interest (history-rhetoric) see Cizek 1989, 288–289; Fox 2001, 76–93; idem 1993, 31–47.

⁴⁰⁹ Liers 1886, 2–4; Hartog 1991, 149–167; de Jonge 2008, 18–19.

⁴¹⁰ At Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* I 7, 2–3, he mentions his acquaintance with the Latin language.

⁴¹¹ Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* I 7: τὰ μὲν παρὰ τῶν λογιωτάτων ἀνδρῶν, οἷς εἰς ὀμλίαν ἦλθον. On the intellectual *milieu* of Dionysius see: Rhys Roberts 1900, 439–442; Atkins 1952, 105–108; Wisse 1995, 78–80; Hidber 1996, 1–8; Delcourt 2005, 30–35; Weaire 2005, 246–266; Wiater 2011, 25–26. De Jonge 2008, 25–34, emphasizes the variety of these contacts.

⁴¹² See esp. the allusion in the first *Letter to Ammaeus*, 1, 1, a discussion of some rhetorical-theoretical problem. Wooten 1994, 121–123, makes a compelling case that Andronicus of Rhodes is meant there.

⁴¹³ Dionysius quotes numerous times Theophrastus' *On Style* (Περὶ λέξεως), which contained the main ideas of the system of the "virtues of style", ἀρεταὶ λέξεως, used by Dionysius in his critical writings. See Russell 1981, 129–137, which traces the roots of Dionysius' categories of literary criticism. Pavano 1958, XII–XIII, discusses the influences on Dionysius' concepts, and, apart from a few Stoic elements he identifies them as "di derivazione e di spirito prettamente aristotelici". Cf. Wooten 1994, 129, who stresses the more general Aristotelian influence.

4.6.1 Dionysius' interpretation of Thuc. I 22, 4 in the *On Thucydides*: the criticism of τὸ μυθῶδες

The treatise *On Thucydides* (Περὶ Θουκυδίδου) belongs to the latest of Dionysius' critical writings. It is one of the most important, as it shows his ideas in a developed, mature form.⁴¹⁴ Furthermore, it conveys Dionysius' ideas about historiography, to be found only *implicite* in the *Antiquities*. Lastly, it is a specific testimony of the reception of Thucydides, which can be analyzed not only from the perspective of Dionysius' critical comments, but also as an example of how some methodological principles could be understood at that time, and in the circles that Dionysius belonged to. To be sure, it would be pointless to analyze the entire treatise, as it focuses to a large degree on stylistic problems *sensu stricto*. In the following, I will concentrate on several crucial passages, which clearly refer to Thucydides' *Methodenkapitel*. *On Thucydides* is a part of a wider discussion of the historian's stylistic qualities, taking place between Dionysius and other prominent Roman intellectuals. It was composed at the request of Dionysius' opponent in this argument — Quintus Aelius Tubero — in order to substantiate the theses merely outlined in an earlier treatise.⁴¹⁵ It is written from the perspective of the idea of μίμησις — potential elements in Thucydides' *History* which are suitable for imitation.⁴¹⁶ In general, Dionysius praises Thucydides for his impartiality; some narrative parts and speeches also deserve admiration.⁴¹⁷ Of the elements connected with Thucydides' chapter on method, Dionysius first refers to the part concerning the question of τὸ μυθῶδες. He quotes Thuc. I 22, 4 at the end of chap. 7, but proceeds somewhat

⁴¹⁴ Krüger 1823, XVIII–XLVI; Blass 1887, 208–219; Bonner 1939, 81–97; Grube 1950, 96; Pavano 1958, IX.

⁴¹⁵ Quintus was a Roman attorney and historian, who, as we can infer from Dionysius' words, took Thucydides as a model for his own historical work, of which only scarce pieces have survived (Bowersock 1965, pp. 129–130). As we are told, Quintus was discontented with Dionysius' unequivocally negative assessment of Thucydides in the treatise *On Imitation*. *On Thucydides* is thus a development or specification of the content from the other work (nearly entirely lost). The *On Thucydides*, in turn, raised objections from Dionysius' other friend, Ammaeus, which inspired him to write the second *Letter to Ammaeus*, complementary to *On Thucydides*. Cf. Aujac 1991, 7–9; Pavano 1958, XXIX.

⁴¹⁶ De Jonge 2008, 11, defines the concept of μίμησις in Dionysius: "In Dionysius' case, we may summarize this theory by the terms μίμησις and ζήλωσις: the eclectic imitation of the best qualities of various models from the past, with the intention of surpassing them." Cf. Bonner 1939, 6–7; Kennedy 1972, 347; Flashar 1978, 87–88; Russell 1979, 1–16; Cichocka 2004, 149–160; Lévy 2010, 52–54.

⁴¹⁷ Impartiality see *Thuc.* 8; on the narrative parts see chap. 5 of the present work (esp. the account of the sea battle in the Harbour of Syracuse).

inversely, as he first provides his understanding of this passage, beginning with general comments at *Thuc.* 6, 4–5:

(4) πρῶτον μὲν δὴ κατὰ τοῦτο διήλλαξε τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ συγγραφέων, λέγω δὲ κατὰ τὸ λαβεῖν ὑπόθεσιν μήτε μονόκωλον παντάπασιν μήτ' εἰς πολλὰ μεμερισμένην καὶ ἀσυνάρτητα κεφάλαια· (5) ἔπειτα κατὰ τὸ μὴδὲν αὐτῇ μυθῶδες προσάναμι, μηδ' εἰς ἀπάτην καὶ γοητείαν τῶν πολλῶν ἐκτρέψαι τὴν γραφὴν, ὥς οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ πάντες ἐποίησαν, Λαμίας τινὰς ἱστοροῦντες ἐν ὕλαις καὶ νάπαις ἐκ γῆς ἀνιεμένας, καὶ Ναΐδας ἀμφίβιους ἐκ Ταρτάρων ἐξιούσας καὶ διὰ πελάγους νηχομένας καὶ μιζόθηρας, καὶ ταύτας εἰς ὁμιλίαν ἀνθρώποις συνερχομένας, καὶ ἐκ θνητῶν καὶ θεῶν συνουσιῶν γονὰς ἡμιθέους, καὶ ἄλλας τινὰς ἀπίστους τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς βίῳ καὶ πολὺ τὸ ἀνόητον ἔχειν δοκούσας ἱστορίας.⁴¹⁸

Dionysius makes several important points here. Firstly, Thucydides is for him an absolute pioneer in rejecting the element of τὸ μυθῶδες; for Dionysius it is a *differentia specifica* of our historian. He emphasized this by saying that Thucydides avoided what everyone before him did (οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ πάντες ἐποίησαν), namely he does not make his narrative deceitful and comparable to witchcraft (ἀπάτην καὶ γοητείαν), for the sake of seducing “the many” (τῶν πολλῶν). Secondly, Dionysius specifies what he understands by τὸ μυθῶδες: the fantastic stories about non-existent creatures, about their relationships with humans, and their half-god offspring. Thirdly, Dionysius goes on to “justify” the earlier authors, admitting that in works oriented towards local history, such as fables, which in being a part of the local tradition and transmitted from the most ancient times could (or even had to be: ἀναγκαῖον ἦν) have been included. Nevertheless, he explicitly calls them “fable-like fiction”,⁴¹⁹ and “theatrical trickery”.⁴²⁰ This assessment is thus quite ambivalent.⁴²¹ The following comment precedes immediately the quotation of Thucydides' words from the chapter on method (I 22, 4), thus is potentially the most telling as to Dionysius' interpretation of them (*Thuc.* 7, 3):

⁴¹⁸ “In this way, then, he differed from the historians before him, and I say this since he chose a subject which neither consists entirely of one member nor is divided into many irreconcilable parts. Moreover, he did not insert anything of the mythical into his history, and he refused to divert his history to practice deception and magic upon the masses, as all the historians before him had done, telling of Lamias issuing from the earth in woods and glens, and of amphibious nymphs arising from Tartarus and swimming through the seas, partly shaped like beasts, and having intercourse with human beings; telling also about demi-gods, the offspring of mortals and gods, and many other stories that seem incredible and very foolish to our times” (all translations of Dionysius' *On Thucydides* are of Pritchett).

⁴¹⁹ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 7, 1: εἰ καὶ τῶν μυθικῶν ἤψαντο πλασμάτων.

⁴²⁰ *Ibidem*, 7, 3: οὐχ ἥρμοσεν ἐγκαταμίσγειν τῇ διηγῆσει τὰς θεατρικὰς γοητείας κτλ.

⁴²¹ Saïd 2010, 181.

Θουκυδίδη δὲ τῷ προελομένῳ μίαν ὑπόθεσιν, ἥ παρεγίνετο αὐτός, οὐχ ἥρμοττεν ἐγκαταμίσγειν τῇ διηγήσει τὰς θεατρικὰς γοητείας οὐδὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀπάτην ἀρμόττεσθαι τῶν ἀναγνωσομένων, ἣν ἐκεῖναι πεφύκασι φέρειν αἱ συντάξεις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν ὠφέλειαν, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ προοιμίῳ τῆς ἱστορίας δεδήλωκε κατὰ λέξιν οὕτως γράφων·⁴²² ‘καὶ ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες’ κτλ.

Dionysius seems to operate within an antithesis: the fantastic element aims at ἀπάτη: “trickery”, “beguiling, deceit”. It is a term that occurs with reference to oratory. It is opposed to ὠφέλεια: “utility”, “benefit”⁴²³ (cf. our interpretation of this part of the *Methodenkapitel* above, pp. 99–104).⁴²⁴ Dionysius also explains that the omission of fantastic content was determined by Thucydides’ choice of the subject matter of his work: a single war, things that he himself had lived through (μίαν ὑπόθεσιν, ἥ παρεγίνετο αὐτός). This, in Dionysius’ view, was a primary reason for the necessity of rejecting τὸ μυθῶδες. Having quoted the words from Thuc. I 22, 4, Dionysius continues by saying that Thucydides was considered to be devoted to the truth, by “nearly all learned man and orators”; he evidently sees a connection between the rejection of τὸ μυθῶδες and the truth. Such is Dionysius’ reading of this part of the chapter on method in *On Thucydides*. In his own historical work, Dionysius again refers to μῦθοι (*Ant. Rom.* I 8, 1–2):

(1) Ἀρχομαι μὲν οὖν τῆς ἱστορίας ἀπὸ τῶν παλαιοτάτων μύθων, οὓς παρέλιπον οἱ πρὸ ἐμοῦ γεγόμενοι συγγραφεῖς χαλεποὺς ὄντας ἄνευ πραγματείας μεγάλης

⁴²² “On the other hand, it was not suitable for Thucydides, who chose just one subject in which he participated, to mix theatrical enticements with the narrative, or to practice the deceit against readers which those compilations customarily exhibited, but to be useful, as he himself explained in the introduction to his history, writing thus [...]”. Dionysius has a version slightly different from the standard text of Thuc. I 22, 4. First, Dionysius’ citation: καὶ ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φαίνεται· ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γεγονότων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα κρίνουν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἔξει· κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρήμα ἀκούειν ζύγκεται. Cf. the text as it stands in the edition of Alberti: καὶ ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες αὐτῶν ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται· ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενομένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὐθὺς κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιμα κρίνουν αὐτὰ ἀρκούντως ἔξει. κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρήμα ἀκούειν ζύγκεται. On such divergencies in the Dionysian quotations of the *History* see Bravo 2012b, 202–230, which demonstrates that the text Dionysius used is likely to belong to the less interpolated branch of transmission, i.e. conveying the text closer to the initial version of Thucydides.

⁴²³ A comparable idea is expressed in Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 6, 4–5, where the opposite of ὠφέλεια is ψυχαγωγία.

⁴²⁴ The antithetical relation of these two elements is clearly reflected in the construction of the sentence: οὐχ ἥρμοττεν ἐγκαταμίσγειν τῇ διηγήσει τὰς θεατρικὰς γοητείας οὐδὲ πρὸς τὴν ἀπάτην ἀρμόττεσθαι τῶν ἀναγνωσομένων, ἣν ἐκεῖναι πεφύκασι φέρειν αἱ συντάξεις, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν ὠφέλειαν κτλ.

ἐξευρεθῆναι· (2) καταβιβάζω δὲ τὴν διήγησιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ πρώτου Φοινικικοῦ πολέμου τὴν γενομένην ἐνιαυτῷ τρίτῳ τῆς ὀγδόης καὶ εἰκοστῆς ἐπὶ ταῖς ἑκατὸν ὀλυμπιάσιν.⁴²⁵

Dionysius seems to say that the most ancient times were the hardest to investigate, and to establish the truth as opposed to falsehood. This was, he claims, the reason why historians had left them untouched (*παρέλιπον*). Here by *μῦθοι* Dionysius clearly means the oldest historical tradition concerning the origins of Rome (and the provenance of the Romans), which he diligently examines in the chapters I 9–44.⁴²⁶ These can be “inquired into” (the crucial word is *ἐξευρεθῆναι*, of which the object is the *μῦθοι*),⁴²⁷ and substantiated, which Dionysius believes that he succeeds in doing. Thus, *μῦθοι* are not fanciful stories to be rejected *tout court*, but rather material that can potentially contain historical truth.⁴²⁸ Still, if they are not subjected to proper examination, they are indeed to be contrasted with truth.⁴²⁹

In sum, Dionysius' comments about τὸ μυθῶδες/μῦθος in *On Thucydides* and in his own historical work show that he took over its “initial” sense and adapted it to his historiographical methodology. In particular, in *On Thucydides* he tends not to see the omission of τὸ μυθῶδες as a matter of historical truth, but as a simple consequence of Thucydides' choice of subject. In the *Antiquities* he is closer to the understanding of μυθῶδες/μῦθος as stories requiring verification, which is the sense, as discussed above, of the original idea of Thucydides.

4.6.2 Dionysius' interpretation of Thuc. I 22, 4: the methodology of composing speeches

In *On Thucydides*, Dionysius also explicitly refers to Thucydides' statements from the chapter on method concerning speeches. He does it on the occasion of

⁴²⁵ “I begin my history, then, with the most ancient legends, which the historians before me have omitted as a subject difficult to be cleared up without diligent study; and I bring the narrative down to the beginning of the First Punic War, which fell in the third year of the one hundred and twenty-eighth Olympiad” (all translations of Dionysius' *Antiquities* are of Cary).

⁴²⁶ See e.g. how Dionysius refers to Cato's and Sempronius' accounts of how the first inhabitants of Italy were Greeks, at I 11, 1: Ἑλληνικῷ τε μύθῳ χρησάμενοι οὐδένα τῶν τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ γραψάντων βεβαιωτὴν παρέσχοντο. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθὲς ὅπως ποτ' ἔχει, ἄδηλον (“And although they are following a Greek legend, they have cited no Greek historian as their authority. It is uncertain, therefore, what the truth of the matter is.”)

⁴²⁷ LSJ, s.v. ἐξευρίσκω: “to find out”, “to discover”, “to seek out” etc.

⁴²⁸ Cf. Dionysius attempts to explain the old story at *Ant. Rom.* I 36, 1–2. See Saïd 2010, 180–185.

⁴²⁹ See the myth vs. ἀλήθεια at *Ant. Rom.* I 39, 1; I 40, 6–41, 1; I 79, 1. In those instances we can see that the quality of being “mythical” and “truthful” is gradable.

the critique of the Melian Dialogue (*Thuc.* 37–41). The central point of the criticism is the inappropriateness of the enunciations of the Athenians in this famous part of the *History*. Importantly, in some instances Dionysius openly contrasts the words put into the mouths of the Athenian speakers with historical truth, in order to show how unsuitable they are. The “appropriateness” seems to be a synonym for “in conformity with reality”.⁴³⁰ After several chapters of argument, supported with quotations from the Dialogue, Dionysius remarks that Thucydides certainly could not have attended the discussion between the Athenians and the Melians in person (οὔτε αὐτὸς μετέσχεν), since in the fourth book Thucydides implies that after his unsuccessful generalship at Amphipolis he remained in Thrace until the end of the war (*Thuc.* 41). He therefore could not know the precise words spoken by both sides. Hence, Dionysius poses the final question as to whether Thucydides at least composed the speeches according to the precepts outlined in the chapter on method (*Thuc.* 41, 4):

λείπεται δὴ σκοπεῖν, εἰ τοῖς τε πράγμασι προσήκοντα καὶ τοῖς συνεληλυθόσιν εἰς τὸν σύλλογον προσώποις ἀρμόττοντα πέπλακε διάλογον ἔχόμενος ὡς ἔγγιστα τῆς συμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων,⁴³¹ ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ προοιμίῳ τῆς ἱστορίας προεῖρηκεν.⁴³²

After this, Dionysius concludes that as for Thucydides’ Melians, their words in the Dialogue are appropriate, but as for the Athenians — they absolutely are not. Dionysius’ words immediately preceding the quotation of (a part of) I 22 are: τοῖς τε πράγμασι προσήκοντα καὶ τοῖς συνεληλυθόσιν εἰς τὸν σύλλογον προσώποις ἀρμόττοντα. This can (and should) be read as Dionysius’ understanding, or interpretation of, Thucydides’ statement ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς συμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων. In this interpretation, as in comments on the appropriateness throughout the entire section on the Dialogue,

⁴³⁰ See part. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 38, 2: πράγμασιν ἀρμόττον λέγεσθαι; 39, 1: βασιλεῦσι γὰρ βαρβάρους τὰντα πρὸς Ἑλλήνας ἤρμοττε λέγειν Ἀθηναίοις δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἑλλήνας ... οὐκ ἦν προσήκοντα εἰρήσθαι. Confrontation with the knowledge about historical reality is at 40, 3: ταῦτ’ οὐκ οἶδα πῶς ἂν τις ἐπαινέσειεν ὡς προσήκοντα εἰρήσθαι στρατηγοῖς Ἀθηναίων. The Athenians’ words about the gods are incompatible with what Dionysius regarded as common knowledge about them — that they looked to the gods before taking any decision.

⁴³¹ Dionysius’ quotation slightly differs from our text of I 22, which reads: ἐχομένῳ ὅτι ἐγγύτατα τῆς συμπάσης γνώμης τῶν ἀληθῶς λεχθέντων. The difference is virtually irrelevant for the sense of the sentence.

⁴³² “So it remains to be examined whether he has made the dialogue appropriate to the circumstances and befitting the persons who came together at the conference, ‘adhering as closely as possible to the overall purport of what was actually said’, as he himself has stated in the proem of his history.” Pritchett’s rendering of the part of the chapter on method is, of course, his own interpretation, which slightly differs from ours.

the key words are προσήκω, joined with τὰ πράγματα and ἀρμόζω (+ πρόσωπα). Both verbs were popular in the impersonal form (ἀρμόζει, προσήκον) meaning “it is fitting”. Viewing the compound phrases in context, Dionysius probably means by the first the suitability of the words for the situation in question.⁴³³ The second one means basically the same thing, but with reference to the persons of the speakers.⁴³⁴ Such a reading is in conformity with what we considered to be the most probable sense of Thucydides' statements about speeches in the chapter on method. The crucial thing is that Dionysius says that Thucydides meant to provide speeches as close as possible to the historical ones, and whenever he could not know the exact words of the speeches, he would compose them according to the highest standards of rational inquiry, based on knowledge about the historical context and the historical actors in question.

4.6.3 Dionysius' idea of usefulness and the implicit polemic with Thuc. I 22, 4

Dionysius, in the *prooemium* to the *Roman Antiquities*, mentions usefulness in the context of his work (*Ant. Rom.* I 1, 2):

ἐπέισθην γὰρ ὅτι δεῖ τοὺς προαιρουμένους μνημεῖα τῆς ἑαυτῶν ψυχῆς τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις καταλιπεῖν, ἃ μὴ συναφανισθῆσεται τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ πάντων μάλιστα τοὺς ἀναγράφοντας ἱστορίας, ἐν αἷς καθιδρῦσθαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν [πάντες] ὑπολαμβάνομεν ἀρχὴν φρονήσεώς τε καὶ σοφίας οὖσαν, πρῶτον μὲν ὑποθέσεις προαιρεῖσθαι καλὰς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς καὶ πολλὴν ὠφέλειαν τοῖς ἀναγνοσσομένοις φερούσας κτλ.⁴³⁵

In this passage, Dionysius makes a direct connection between ὠφέλεια and the ὑπόθεσις of the historical work, i.e. a historian should choose such a ὑπόθεσις that will prove useful for the reader.⁴³⁶ By ὑπόθεσις Dionysius means the scope of the work: chronological and thematic (see above, quotations from *Thuc.* 6–7). In the *Antiquities* utility seems to be an effect of two qualities of the ὑπόθεσις:

⁴³³ Such a definition seems not to be the basic one; see LSJ, s.v. προσήκω: “belong to”, “pertain”, “concern”, then: “befitting”, “proper”, “meet”.

⁴³⁴ LSJ, s.v. ἀρμόζω: “fit together”, “join”, “adapt”, “accommodate”, then “fit well”, “correspond”, “suit”, “be adapted for”.

⁴³⁵ “I am convinced that all who propose to leave such monuments of their minds to posterity as time shall not involve in one common ruin with their bodies, and particularly those who write History, in which we have the right to assume that Truth, the source of both prudence and wisdom, is enshrined, ought, first of all, to make choice of noble and lofty subjects and such as will be of great utility to their readers [...]”

⁴³⁶ Verdin 1974, 295–296, emphasized the fact that in the *Antiquities* Dionysius emphasizes only usefulness, and never pleasure, which is compatible with the principles of Thucydides. Cf. Homeyer 1965, 270.

it should be “noble” and “magnificent”. If the subject matter lacks these features, the work is of no use (*Ant. Rom.* I 1, 3):

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ ἀδόξων πραγμάτων ἢ πονηρῶν ἢ μηδεμιᾶς σπουδῆς ἀξίων ἱστορικὰς καταβαλλόμενοι πραγματείας, εἴτε τοῦ προελθεῖν εἰς γνώσιν ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ τυχεῖν ὅποιουδήποτε ὀνόματος, εἴτε περισυσίαν ἀποδείξασθαι τῆς περὶ λόγους δυνάμεως βουλόμενοι, οὔτε τῆς γνώσεως ζηλοῦνται παρὰ τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις οὔτε τῆς δυνάμεως ἐπαινοῦνται, δόξαν ἐγκαταλιπόντες τοῖς ἀναλαμβάνουσιν αὐτῶν τὰς ἱστορίας, ὅτι τοιούτους ἐζήλωσαν αὐτοὶ βίους, οἷας ἐξέδωκαν τὰς γραφάς.⁴³⁷

Dionysius’ vocabulary recalls the criticism of Thucydides found in the *Letter to Pompeius*. There, Thucydides’ ὑπόθεσις is explicitly criticized as “inglorious”, “poor” (e.g. *Pomp.* 3, 4: πονηρὰν εἴληφεν ὑπόθεσιν), because it is focused on the shameful war between the Greeks.⁴³⁸ It seems that the above remarks from the *prooemium* to the *Antiquities* can be read as implicit criticism of Thucydides as well. The idea of usefulness is defined in a different way from that found in Thucydides: it is oriented towards the “patriotic” formation of the minds of the readers.⁴³⁹ There is nothing similar in the methodological declarations of Thucydides; usefulness is strictly connected to knowledge about the universal principles of human behaviour, and its primary aim is cognizance. Dionysius thus at the same alludes to and polemizes with Thucydides,⁴⁴⁰ reinterpreting the latter’s historical ideas.

⁴³⁷ “For those who base historical works upon deeds inglorious or evil or unworthy of serious study, either because they crave to come to the knowledge of men and to get a name of some sort or other, or because they desire to display the wealth of their rhetoric, are neither admired by posterity for their fame nor praised for their eloquence; rather, they leave this opinion in the minds of all who take up their histories, that they themselves admired lives which were of a piece with the writings they published.”

⁴³⁸ This criticism of Thucydides’ ὑπόθεσις is analyzed in chapter four of the present work, pp. 213–214.

⁴³⁹ It is evident in the manner in which Dionysius characterizes his own ὑπόθεσις (*Ant. Rom.* I 2, 1: Τὴν μὲν οὖν ὑπόθεσιν ὅτι καλὴν εἴληφα καὶ μεγαλοπρεπὴ καὶ πολλοῖς ὠφέλιμον οὐ μακρῶν οἶμαι δεῆσειν λόγων κτλ. (“That I have indeed made choice of a subject noble, lofty and useful to many will not, I think, require any lengthy argument [...]”).

⁴⁴⁰ See Saïd 2010, 181.

CHAPTER FOUR

THUCYDIDES IN THE TREATISES ON THE THEORY OF HISTORIOGRAPHY

In the present chapter I focus on Thucydides' place in treatises on the theory of historiography. Since there is no agreement on the content of the works entitled (or quoted as) *Περὶ ἱστορίας*, I begin with an assessment of the arguments of scholars who deny that *Περὶ ἱστορίας* treated historical theory at all. My aim is to show that this scepticism is unfounded. Next, I make a detailed investigation into the attribution of the fragment of Theophrastus where Thucydides appears (Cic. *Or.* 39). I adduce manifold arguments for the attribution of the testimony to *Περὶ ἱστορίας*. I then analyze the testimony of Praxiphanes' *Περὶ ἱστορίας*, which also mentions Thucydides. Finally, I try to interpret Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *Letter to Pompeius* as a type of *Περὶ ἱστορίας*, and to illustrate how Thucydides is understood in this work.

1. The content of works entitled *Περὶ ἱστορίας*

1.1 Arguments for and against theoretical content

It has been suggested that to translate the title *Περὶ ἱστορίας* as “*On History*” is only one of various possibilities. Since our knowledge of such works is extremely scarce, this would be the first element to raise doubts about their subject. As is known, the basic, or primary meaning of *ἱστορία* was “inquiry” or “research”. However, this basic meaning had, as early as Herodotus' time, changed into “events written down as an effect of inquiry”, and simply “historical work”; and this continued throughout the Hellenistic period.¹ There is no substantial evidence that would deny this sense on the level of general linguistic usage, and the examples below will show that, on a general level, the title *Περὶ ἱστορίας* can be understood as referring to historical writing. That *Περὶ ἱστορίας* treated the theory of historiography was questioned by Gert Avenarius.² One of the central arguments adduced by Avenarius against the theoretical content of *Περὶ ἱστορίας* treatises has to be discussed in detail. It is based on Cicero's statement

¹ Keuck 1934, 6–8; Seifert 1977, 226–284; Hose 1998, 634: “Ausgehend von der Bedeutung ‘Nachforschung’ (Hdt. 2, 118), über ‘Resultat der Nachforschung’ = ‘Kenntnis’ (Hdt. 1, pr.) hin zu schriftliche Darlegung der Nachforschung, d. h. im Falle Herodots (7, 96) ‘Geschichtliches Werk’. Diese Bedeutung (Bezeichnung für Geschichtliche Werke) bleibt in der griechischen Literatur konstant (vgl. Pol. 1, 57,5).”

² Avenarius 1956, 170–171, cf. Brunt 1979, 320. Free 2015, 267–276, is less sceptical.

about the separate treatment of the precepts of historiography (Cic. *De or.* II 61–62):³

(61) [...] *Cum eis me, ut dixi, oblecto, qui res gestas aut orationes scripserunt suas aut qui ita loquuntur, ut videantur voluisse esse nobis, qui non sumus eruditissimi, familiares.* (62) *Sed illuc redeo: videtisne, quantum munus sit oratoris historia? Haud scio an flumine orationis et varietate maximum; neque eam reperio usquam separatim instructam rhetorum praeceptis; sita sunt enim ante oculos.*⁴

Scholars have tended to see this passage as an argument against the theoretical content of treatises entitled Περὶ ἱστορίας, particularly that by Theophrastus, or a lack of specialized works on the theory of historiography in the Hellenistic age in general. Avenarius says it would have been odd if Cicero had not known any such work if it existed.⁵ However, after closer examination of this passage in Cicero we have to state that this passage does not mean exactly what Avenarius thought. Firstly, it implies that Cicero found the following precepts of writing history unarticulated:

-*ne quid falsi dicere audeat*: the requirement of not falsifying the truth,
 -*ne qua suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo*: the requirement of impartiality, of favour,

-*ne qua simultatis*: the requirement of showing no malice.

These three are called by Cicero “well-known” basics (*De or.* II 63): *fundamenta nota omnibus*, on which further elements are built: *exaedificatio in rebus et verbis*. These *fundamenta* refer us back to *De or.* II 51, where Cicero says: *Si, ut Graeci scripserunt, summi, inquit Catulus; si, ut nostri, nihil opus*

³ On the passage and its context see: Leeman, *ad loc.*, 249–252; Woodman 1988, 70–116; Fleckl 1993, 21–24 (although I have objections to his interpretation); Fox 2007, 134–141; Woodman 2008, 23–31; Northwood 2008, 228–244. On *De oratore* in general, see Wilkins 1892, 1–25; May, Wisse 2001, 3–48; Mankin 2011, 1–9; 35–41; for in-depth analyses of particular passages the commentary begun by Leeman and Pinkster 1981–2003 is invaluable.

⁴ “I divert myself (as I said) in the company of those who have written the story of events, or speeches delivered by themselves, or whose style suggests their wish to be accessible to us men of no very profound learning. But I return to my argument. Do you see how great a responsibility the orator has in historical writing? I rather think that for fluency and diversity of diction it comes first. Yet nowhere do I find this art supplied with any independent directions from the rhetoricians; indeed its rules lie open to the view” (all translations of *De oratore* are of Sutton).

⁵ Avenarius 1956, 172: “Diesen Worten zufolge scheint es also in der hellenistischen Zeit noch keine Spezialschriften zur Geschichtsschreibung gegeben zu haben. Cicero jedenfalls war nichts dergleichen bekannt. [...] Diese Feststellung aber läßt auch die Existenz einer methodologischen Schrift des Theophrast als sehr fraglich erscheinen. Denn es wäre verwunderlich, wenn Cicero von einem Werk, dem Wehrli eine so maßgebende Bedeutung für die antike Geschichtstheorie zuschreibt, nichts gewußt sollte.” Cf. Rambaud 1953, 15.

*est oratore; satis est non esse mendacem.*⁶ From the connection between these two passages, and from the context, it is clear that “not to be a *mendax*” means to keep to the *fundamenta*, to write history as the ancient (first) historians did, but without rhetorical embellishment. This embellishment is identical to the idea of *ornatum*, and the *exaedificatio* comprises *res* and *verba*.⁷ This *exaedificatio* is nothing other than the πραγματικός and λεκτικός τόπος known from Dionysius of Halicarnassus,⁸ a scheme of dividing and assessing all rhetorical production, not only history, but also the regular speeches of the Attic orators. *Res* is treatment of the content, *verba* — the language employed by the historian.⁹ So, Cicero’s statements mean that he does not find in the rhetorical handbooks the first element — *fundamenta* — the “obvious” rules of historical writing discussed *expressis verbis*. He seems to suggest that it is because they are conceived intuitively (*sita sunt ante oculos*). This does not imply that Cicero did not read anything about the second element — *exaedificatio*. Karl Petzold’s analysis rightly points to the wider context of the argument in this part of the *De oratore*. To properly assess the meaning of Cicero’s words, we have to begin with II 29.¹⁰ The subsequent discussion has the rhetorical *praecepta* as its theme; the recurring question is: are specific precepts necessary for particular branches of rhetoric? The answer is, for most of them, negative; these are inherent in the general rules, and are naturally at hand for a “ready speaker” (*homini diserto*, II 49).¹¹ The sense of *De or.* II 62 is that even though the writing of history is a great responsibility (*munus*) for any orator, it still does not have (or need) a distinct treatment in the rhetorical handbooks,¹² just as with the preceding and the following “types” of rhetorical activity. This should in fact be seen in the light of the hypothesis put forward at the very beginning of *De oratore* — that a real orator’s abilities have to rely on profound *scientia*,

⁶ “If he is to write as the Greeks have written, answered Catulus, a man of supreme ability is required: if the standard is to be that of our own fellow-country-men, no orator at all is needed; it is enough that the man should not be a liar.”

⁷ Cf. the discussion by Northwood 2008, 239–241 of the relation between *fundamenta*, *exaedificatio* and *leges historiae* (polemic Woodman 1988); on the metaphor of the building n. 30. The metaphor recurs in the discussion of *ornatum* in *De or.* III 151–152.

⁸ See below, p. 211.

⁹ See the discussion that follows.

¹⁰ Petzold 1999, 260–261.

¹¹ *De or.* II 44–49: It is in fact commenced as soon as in I 107–203, where Crassus emphasizes natural ability, excluding the need for precepts.

¹² It is implied in the language of the sentence *neque eam reperio usquam separatim instructam*, that it introduces an opposing thought to what precedes, as has been remarked by Leeman, *ad loc.*, 266: “Der mit *neque* eingeführte Satz hat eine adversative Bedeutung ‘und doch nicht’” (my emphasis); cf. *ibidem*, 249–252.

rather than on specific instructions.¹³ The passage on historiography is a part of the argument that there are some branches of oratory that have their peculiarities, but nevertheless do not require any separate treatment. Therefore, given the main theme within which the statement about the precepts for historiography occurs, these remarks cannot be treated as a “discussion of how history should be written”.¹⁴ This is just an enumeration of certain tasks the orator has to deal with, a brief summary, and not an exposition of the rules of history, aiming at comprehensiveness. Cicero’s interlocutors see everything mentioned in II 62–63 — the *fundamenta* as well as *exaedificatio* — as left undefined, but only in the rhetorical handbooks or treatises, concerning rhetorical theory (*in artibus rhetorum*, II 64). This seems indisputable: we find such rules (these mentioned in II 62–63) neither in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, nor in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, etc. Moreover, a crucial aspect of the passage discussed is that it is a dialogue that takes place in 91 BC. When Cicero makes one of the interlocutors say that there are no particular precepts for historiography in the available rhetorical treatises, this should rather be understood as pertaining to that dramatic date, not to the times during which Cicero was writing *De oratore*.¹⁵ Consequently, we cannot infer that in Cicero’s time treatises named Περὶ ἱστορίας, discussing the precepts of historiography, did not exist. All we can say precisely is that Cicero’s *dramatis persona* from the dialogue *De oratore* had not seen the main principles of historiography included in rhetorical handbooks.

1.2 Non-Peripatetic Περὶ ἱστορίας

Avenarius, reflecting on the possible content of Theophrastus’ and Praxiphanes’ Περὶ ἱστορίας, mentions other works with this title. According to his reading of the passage from Cicero discussed above, his answer as to their theoretical content is rather negative.¹⁶ Still, his survey is very brief, and we have to verify our view about these works. There is one extant fragment of Περὶ ἱστορίας ascribed to Metrodorus of Skepsis (turn of the 2nd/1st cent. BC), who

¹³ *De or.* I 14; 19–20. See Kennedy 1972, 209–226 (a discussion of this subject) and Wisse 2002, 375–400.

¹⁴ Woodman 2008, 23. His controversy with Northwood is, in my view, exaggerated, because he treats the passage in Cicero as a systematic account of the theory of history.

¹⁵ Fox 2007, 140: “Most importantly, the discussion of rhetoric in historical writing needs to be read as an expression of the wider ambiguity concerning the position of rhetoric at Rome: either an essential part or a desirable enhancement. In the case of historiography, Cicero adopts an analysis carefully grounded in its historical context. Historiography was, at this point, both theoretically and practically, divorced from rhetoric.”

¹⁶ Avenarius 1956, 170–173.

was a friend of Mithridates VI, and later joined Tigranes II.¹⁷ A man of this name is mentioned by Cicero several times, as celebrated especially for his memory and high learning.¹⁸ He wrote a treatise expounding his system.¹⁹ He is also reported as author of a book on Tigranes, on gymnastics training, on custom, and what is taken by scholars to be a geographical treatise. The supposed fragment of *Περὶ ἱστορίας* comes from the scholia (*Schol. Apoll. Rhod.* IV 834 = FGrHist 184 F 2):

περὶ τὸν πορθμὸν ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ πυρὸς ἀναφυσήματα γίνεται, ὥστε καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν θερμαίνεσθαι, ὥς φησι καὶ Μητροδόωρος ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ ἱστορίας.²⁰

This testimony contains two features pointing to the content of the work:

- a. It seems to have comprised several books.
- b. The testimony does not refer to historiography *sensu stricto*.

However, it has been noted that the very title mentioned is not certain.²¹ It is possible that the scholiast refers to the title imprecisely, and that he means Metrodorus' work on Tigranes. Moreover, the general field of interest of the author, as far as we know, was far from rhetorical and literary theory. Thus, we cannot say whether the work cited by the scholiast was not a treatise on the theory of historiography.

For Theodorus of Gadara's (ἄκμῃ: 33 BC) *Περὶ ἱστορίας* we have a title in the *Suda*, and an indication that it comprised one book.²² This author should probably be counted among the most important and influential intellectuals of the first century BC;²³ he was the teacher of Caesar Tiberius,²⁴ and wrote, according to ancient sources, many works²⁵ on rhetoric, grammar and geography or

¹⁷ On this figure see Alonso-Núñez 1984, 253–258; Pédech 1991, 65–78; Alonso-Núñez 2001, 604–613.

¹⁸ FGrHist 184 T 4a–T 5aa = Cic. *De or.* I 45; II 365; III 75; II 360.

¹⁹ See Plin. *HN*, VII 88–89 (FGrHist 184 T 5c c).

²⁰ “And around the straits in the sea there are eruptions of fire such that the sea itself becomes hot, as Metrodorus reports in book one of Concerning History.” (transl. Habinek).

²¹ Wendel 1935, 296 in the *apparatus criticus* notes the doubts of Müller in his edition (FGH 204) and proposes emendation. Cf. Avenarius 1956, 171 n. 7.

²² *Suda*, s.v. Θεόδωρος Γαδαρεύς = FGrHist 850 T 1. There is new edition of his remains by Rossella 1991.

²³ On his life and works see Stegemann 1934, 1847–1859. Grube 1959, 337–365. Euseb. (Hieron) *Chron. ol.* 186, 4 (=T 3b) calls him *nobilissimus artis rhetoricae preceptor*. Cf. Strab. XVI 2, 29 (=T 3a). Quintilian testifies to the existence of a separate school, or even a “sect” of “Theodoreans”: *Inst.* III 1, 18; II 11, 2; III 3, 8; IV 2, 32; cf. Strab. XIII 4, 3. On this aspect see Forte 1973, 77–93.

²⁴ Suet. *Tib.* 57; *Suda*, s.v. Θεόδωρος Γαδαρεύς: διδάσκαλος γεγωνὸς Τιβερίου Καίσαρος; Quint. *Inst.* III 1, 17.

²⁵ Quint. *Inst.* III 1, 18: remarks: *plura scripsit Theodorus*.

history.²⁶ He was also probably a pupil of Apollodorus of Pergamum, and followed Peripatetics in his rhetorical theory.²⁷ As for his *Περὶ ἱστορίας*, Friedrich Blass assumed that it contained some type of theory of history,²⁸ whereas Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff took it to be an attempt to write regular history.²⁹ Both interpretations arose without argumentation. Other scholars have left the question without any hypothesis.³⁰ However, Theodorus' rhetorical and literary studies would be perfectly consistent with inquiry into the theory of historical writing. The information that the treatise was in one book indicates that it hardly could have been a historical narrative. Such one-volume work is a likely candidate for a theoretical treatise.

The last work (apart from Theophrastus and Praxiphanes) with such a title is attested to Caecilius of Caleacte, a Greek rhetor and grammarian who was roughly contemporary with Dionysius of Halicarnassus. He was considered a student of Apollodorus of Pergamum, and wrote several works on rhetoric and style.³¹ The fragment from his *Περὶ ἱστορίας* is transmitted by Athenaeus (XI, p. 466a = BNJ 183 F 2, fr. 2 Ofenloch):

Καικίλιος δὲ ὁ ῥήτωρ ὁ ἀπὸ Καλῆς Ἀκτῆς ἐν τῷ *Περὶ ἱστορίας* Ἀγαθοκλέα φησὶ τὸν τύραννον ἐκπώματα χρυσᾷ ἐπιδεικνύντα τοῖς ἐταίροις φάσκειν, ἐξ ὧν ἐκεράμειυσε κατεσκευακέναι ταῦτα.³²

William Rhys Roberts suggested that this work may be identical with the *Περὶ τῶν καθ' ἱστορίαν ἢ παρ' ἱστορίαν εἰρημένων τοῖς ῥήτορσι* (*On Things Said by Orators in Accordance with or Contrary to History*), appearing under Caecilius' name in the Suda.³³ The passage quoted points to a historical account, in which

²⁶ Suda reports: βιβλία δὲ ἔγραψε *Περὶ τῶν ἐν φωναῖς ζητουμένων γ' · Περὶ ἱστορίας α' · Περὶ θέσεως ἐν · Περὶ διαλέκτων ὁμοιότητος καὶ ἀποδείξεως β' · Περὶ πολιτείας β' · Περὶ Κοίτης Συρίας α' · Περὶ ῥήτορος δυνάμεως α' · καὶ ἄλλα.*

²⁷ Stegemann 1934, 1849–1856.

²⁸ Blass 1887, 175.

²⁹ Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1900, 51, n.1. Stegemann 1934, 1849, discusses Theodorus' *Περὶ ἱστορίας* under point C: “geographisch-historische Schriften”.

³⁰ See Avenarius 1956, 171–172.

³¹ Suda, s.v. Καικίλιος = BNJ 183 T 1. Cf. Quint. *Inst.* IX 1, 12. On the author and his works see: von Morawski 1879, 370–376; Brzoska 1897, 1174–1188; Rhys Roberts 1897, 302–312; Kennedy 1972, 364–369; Weissenberger 2003, 885.

³² “Kaikilios the orator from Kale Akte in his *On History* says that Agathokles the tyrant when showing his golden drinking cups to his companions claimed that he made them during the time that he worked as a potter.” (transl. Jenkins). On Agathocles (361/0–289/8 BC), the tyrant and later king of Syracuse, as a potter, see Polyb. XV 35, 2 (= Timaeus in BNJ 566 F 124c).

³³ Rhys Roberts 1897, 303–304. Kaibel 1899, 132 argued that a part of Strab. I 1, 23 is also a fragment of this work, assuming that Pseudo-Longinus, *De sublimitate* 36.3 is a criticism of an underlying text by Caecilius (Ofenloch 1907 prints the Strabo as Fragment 3). However, this has rightly been considered improbable by Jenkins 2011 (BNJ, online ref. on May 17th, 2015).

King Agathocles appeared, and this seems to exclude any historiographical-theoretical content.³⁴ In other sources we find parallel accounts on Agathocles, but they do not contribute to our understanding of Caecilius' treatise.³⁵ On the basis of our scanty evidence it would seem probable that the work treated the history of Caecilius' homeland — Sicily. We should be wary of drawing definite conclusions from Athenaeus' quotation, as he may well have selected this sole statement and placed it in his own context; the primary sense could have been completely different. The quotation is introduced with φησί, and such a formula in Athenaeus usually means that he paraphrases, reformulates, or even supplements his original with additional information.³⁶ But what probably is of significance is that Athenaeus does not specify the book number for that reference, which can imply that it was a single-volume treatise.³⁷

To sum up, little can be said about non-Peripatetic works entitled Περὶ ἱστορίας. As for Metrodorus, the title probably comes from the scholiast; at least, we do not find it on any list of works that would attest it. This, and the content suggested by the extant allusion to that work, the field of interest of the author, rather exclude the possibility that it treated the theory of historiography. In the case of Theodorus and Caecilius, in contrast, we have the title in the *Suda*. Further, Theodorus' general field of interest — rhetoric, language, style etc., corresponds to his intellectual companion Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who treated historiography in the *Letter to Pompeius* and partly in *On Thucydides*. They both belonged to the same circle of intellectuals, and since Dionysius had systematic and established views on historiography, it is probable that Theodorus' Περὶ ἱστορίας treated historical theory. The same applies to Caecilius. It is plausible that the works entitled Περὶ ἱστορίας treated historiography from a theoretical perspective i.e. its rules or precepts as a distinct literary genre. The evidence of the non-Peripatetic works with that title at least does not exclude such a possibility; in particular Theodorus' and Caecilius' works are likely to have had such character.

³⁴ Avenarius 1956, 172: "jene Hypothese keineswegs erhärtet wird".

³⁵ Diod. Sic. XX 63, 4; XIX 2, 7; Polyb. XII 15, 6; XV 35, 2.

³⁶ Giovannelli-Jouanna 2007, 215–237, esp. 223–224. The author shows that in Athenaeus only such words as γράφει and γράφει οὕτως indicate a precise quotation. Adequate citations with φησί are very rare for this author.

³⁷ Athenaeus prefers to point to a specific book in most of his quotations of historians.

2. Thucydides in Theophrastus

2.1 Theophrastus on Thucydides: Περὶ ἱστορίας or Περὶ λέξεως?

Now I shall get back to the fragments of Theophrastus and Praxiphanes, discussed above in the context of the question of what knowledge Hellenistic readers had of Thucydides, and look at them from a different viewpoint, namely their occurrence in that specific type of treatise named Περὶ ἱστορίας. Unluckily, while for Praxiphanes (Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 29 = F 18 Wehrli = F 21 Matelli) it is stated explicitly that he brought up Thucydides in a treatise thus entitled, the attribution of the piece of Theophrastus (Cic. *Or.* 39 = fr. 697 FHS&G) is unsettled and needs to be addressed here.³⁸ For Theophrastus' Περὶ ἱστορίας we have only a title in Diogenes Laertius' list of his works, in the *vita* of the Peripatetic (V 47).³⁹ It is stated that it comprised one book. Nothing more can be inferred from Diogenes. Some scholars have suggested the theory of history as the theme of the work,⁴⁰ and a number of these have assumed that the reference to Theophrastus in Cicero's *Orator* comes from Περὶ ἱστορίας.⁴¹ This was, however, concluded without any attempt at analysis of Cicero's testimony. William Fortenbaugh, in his commentary to the edition of the fragment, followed other scholars, and preferred the ascription to Περὶ λέξεως.⁴² Still, he admits

³⁸ See the discussion of both fragments in the context of the readership of the *History* in chap. 2, pp. 44–58.

³⁹ For this *vita* see: Mejer 1998, 1–28.

⁴⁰ Wehrli, Wöhrle, Zhmud 2004, 539, translate the title of Theophrastus as “über Geschichtsforschung”, whereas Praxiphanes' work is translated as “über Geschichtsschreibung” (p. 602).

⁴¹ Regenbogen 1940, 1526; cf. Brunt 1979, 319–320. Recently Meißner 2010, 181–182, remarked on Cic. *Or.* 39 that Theophrastus treated history as a developing phenomenon, which in Theophrastus' view had been “upgraded” by Thucydides and Herodotus: “Theophrasts Περὶ ἱστορίας betrachtete die Geschichtsschreibung also innerhalb einer Entwicklung, ähnlich wie Aristoteles die tragische Dichtung.”

⁴² Fortenbaugh 2005a, 320. Similarly Avenarius 1956, 172; Petzold 1999, 263 (“vielleicht”). The only explicit references to Theophrastus' Περὶ λέξεως are two, both by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Comp.* 16 = 688 FHS&G and *Lys.* 14 = 692 FHS&G. It appears in the second of Diogenes' lists: Diog. Laert. V 47. Wehrli, Wöhrle, Zhmud 2004, 536–538 translated Περὶ λέξεως as “Der Sprachstil”; Fortenbaugh 2005a, 120 has “expression or style”. From the list we know that it was one book in length. On this work see Stroux 1912, 1–9; Kennedy 1963, 274–278; Fortenbaugh 2005a, 120–124; Fortenbaugh 2005b, 51. Fortenbaugh 2002, 93–102 argues that its content would treat poetry, oratory, and history. It would comprise the technicalities of Greek writing, encompassing all genres of literature. However, Stroux e.g. was ambiguous in his references to the work – he quotes it without a capital “p” (περὶ λέξεως), which points to the fact that he probably considers his fragments as pertaining more generally to Theophrastus' theory on λέξις, not to the specific work listed by Diogenes. Schenkeveld, 1998, 79–80 stresses the fact that the only authors to mention this title as a work by Theophrastus are Diogenes and Dionysius, and without Dionysius' quotation we could even attribute logical content to this work, as we would have to draw an analogy with Eudemus. The latter used the same title for a work on logic

that attribution to *Περὶ ἱστορίας* cannot be excluded.⁴³

2.1.1 Implications of the use of the word *κινεῖν* for the attribution

As demonstrated above, Theophrastus, when describing Thucydides' and Herodotus' contribution to the development of historiography, most probably used the words: *ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ πρώτων ἱστορία κινήθη* or alternatively *οὗτοι δὲ πρῶτοι τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐκίνησαν*. I endeavour to show now that this finding can be of help for the attribution of the fragment. Fortenbaugh in his commentary connects the probable use of *κινεῖν* in the passage about Herodotus and Thucydides, with Theophrastus' interest in "firsts", reflected e.g. in the fact that he composed a work *Περὶ εὐρημάτων* (*On Discoveries*).⁴⁴ Is it justified? Since neither Sandys, nor Fortenbaugh analyzed the usage of this verb, I find it necessary to examine all parallels and discuss their implications for our fragment. Apart from three places adduced by Sandys and Fortenbaugh, I have managed to find five more instances where *κινεῖν* appears in a context that suggests a similar sense to that found in *Or.* 39. The first passage adduced by Sandys and Fortenbaugh is Arist. *Rhet.* III 1404 a20–28:

ἤρξαντο μὲν οὖν κινῆσαι τὸ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ πέφυκεν, οἱ ποιηταί· τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα μιμήματα ἐστίν, ὑπῆρξεν δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικώτατον τῶν μορίων ἡμῖν· διὸ καὶ αἱ τέχναι συνέστησαν ἢ τε ῥαψωδία καὶ ἡ ὑποκριτικὴ καὶ ἄλλαι γε. ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ ποιηταί, λέγοντες εὐήθη, διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τὴν δόξαν, διὰ τοῦτο ποιητικὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο λέξις, οἷον ἡ Γοργίου.⁴⁵

Here the object is *λέξις*, which, as Aristotle claims, was first "moved" by the poets.⁴⁶ The context is the development of the stylistic treatment of language. Sandys also cites a passage (Fortenbaugh omits it) from Plutarch, *Sol.* 29.6:

(cf. Fortenbaugh 2005a, 122–123). On the possible origins of *Περὶ λέξεως* works see Kennedy 1963, 64–65. On Polus, pupil of Gorgias, as the first known author of a work entitled *Περὶ λέξεως* see B. XIV 1 Rad. *ap.* Sudam, s.v. Πῶλος.

⁴³ Fortenbaugh 2005a, 320: "I see no way to rule out this alternative [...]."

⁴⁴ See Diog. Laert. V 47; cf. his naming of Corax as the inventor of words, 736 A-C FHS&G. On the idea of *πρῶτος εὐρετής* see the classic work of Kleingünther 1933, 17–39.

⁴⁵ "The poets, as was natural, were the first to give an impulse to style; for words are imitations, and the voice also, which of all our parts is best adapted for imitation, was ready to hand; thus the arts of the rhapsodists, actors, and others, were fashioned. And as the poets, although their utterances were devoid of sense, appeared to have gained their reputation through their style, it was a poetical style that first came into being, as that of Gorgias" (all translations of the *Rhetoric* are of Freese).

⁴⁶ See Laurenti 1987, 500–501.

Ἀρχομένων δὲ τῶν περὶ Θέσπιν ἤδη τὴν τραγωδίαν κινεῖν, καὶ διὰ τὴν καινότητα τοὺς πολλοὺς ἄγοντος τοῦ πράγματος, οὕτω δ' εἰς ἄμιλλαν ἐναγώνιον ἐξηγμένου.⁴⁷

The object of the verb is tragedy, the context is Solon's attitude towards novelties in tragedy that he, as Plutarch reports, found inappropriate. There is no indication that the Thespian group was the "first" to innovate; κινεῖν is not meant as an act/process in the *development* of tragedy.

Sandys and Fortenbaugh overlooked an analogy drawn by Aristotle between the act of altering the existing laws and changes made in sciences and arts. Both acts are conveyed with the word κινεῖν. The context is Aristotle's discussion of the question of whether the change of ancestral laws is beneficial, Arist. *Pol.* 1268 b25–38:

ἐμπίπτει δ' εἰς ἄλλο πρόβλημα καὶ σκέψιν ἑτέραν· ἀποροῦσι γάρ τινες πότερον βλαβερὸν ἢ συμφέρον ταῖς πόλεσι τὸ κινεῖν τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, ἂν ἢ τις ἄλλος βελτίων. [...] ἐπὶ γοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν τοῦτο συνενήνοχεν, οἷον ιατρικὴ κινήθεισα παρὰ τὰ πάτρια καὶ γυμναστικὴ καὶ ὅλως αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις, ὥστ' ἐπεὶ μίαν τούτων θετέον καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ ταύτην ἀναγκαῖον ὁμοίως ἔχειν.⁴⁸

Thus, Aristotle uses κινεῖν for wide range of fields: laws, (all) arts and sciences, particularly medicine and sport. Medicine, gymnastics, and "all other sciences and arts" appear as examples of positive effect of the activity indicated by the word κινεῖν.⁴⁹ The word is used regularly throughout the passage and it clearly has the sense of the "reform" or "revision" of state laws, and also appears many

⁴⁷ "Thespiis was now beginning to develop tragedy, and the attempt attracted most people because of its novelty, although it was not yet made a matter of competitive contest." (transl. Perrin)

⁴⁸ "And the matter leads to another problem and a different inquiry: some persons raise the question whether to alter the ancestral laws, supposing another law is better, is harmful or advantageous to states. Hence it is not easy to give a speedy agreement to the above proposal to honor reformers, if really it is disadvantageous to alter the laws; yet it is possible that persons may bring forward the repeal of laws or of the constitution as a benefit to the community. And since we have made mention of this question, it will be better if we set out a few further observations about it, for, as we said, it involves difficulty. And it might be thought that it would be better for alteration to take place; at all events in the other fields of knowledge this has proved beneficial – for example, medicine has been improved by being altered from the ancestral system, and gymnastic training, and in general all the arts and faculties so that since statesmanship also is to be counted as one of these, it is clear that the same thing necessarily holds good in regard to it as well." (transl. Rackham)

⁴⁹ See Phillips Simpson 1998, 109–110; Barker 1946, 71–72. Pezzoli, Curniz 2012, 298, emphasizes Aristotle's treatment of medicine from a diachronic perspective; cf. the introduction to book II: pp. 7–19 and Brunschwig 1980, 512–540.

paragraphs later.⁵⁰ It has to be noted that Aristotle admits the limits of the analogy between arts and laws: the latter are dependent solely on custom.⁵¹ Therefore, to “move” them is more hazardous and should be done only with extreme caution.⁵²

The example of Hippodamus, and the whole argument where the analogy appears, indicate that κινεῖν is the second step after εὕρίσκειν: Aristotle begins with provisions “discovered” by him, points out their weaknesses, and poses the question of whether it would be advantageous for the polis to alter (κινεῖν) them.⁵³ It is crucial that in Aristotle the two ideas, of the first inventor and of the reformer, of εὔρεσις and κίνησις, are plainly distinguishable. This can be traced in Aristotle’s use of κινεῖν also for τέχναι, in *De sophisticis elenchis* (183 a40–183 b35). It is stated that discovery has much greater significance than further contribution, but it usually leaves the thing discovered in a very primitive state.⁵⁴ This is an argument against Fortenbaugh’s connection of the testimony with Theophrastus’ *On Discoveries*.

In the passage from the *Politics* Aristotle is talking about αἱ τέχναι πᾶσαι, and we have one more testimony where κινεῖν appears in the context of the art of rhetoric, in Sex. Emp. *Adv. math.* VII 6 = DK 31 A 19:

Ἐμπεδοκλέα μὲν γὰρ ὁ <Ἀριστοτέλης> φησὶ πρῶτον ῥητορικὴν κεκινήκεναι.⁵⁵

The object of the verb is, of course, rhetoric. Diogenes Laertius suggests that Aristotle said this in the dialogue named *The Sophist*, perhaps in the account of the development of rhetoric.⁵⁶ But Diogenes reports Aristotle’s account with the word εὔρεῖν: Ἀριστοτέλης δ’ ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ φησι πρῶτον Ἐμπεδοκλέα

⁵⁰ Arist. *Pol.* 1286 a13.

⁵¹ Arist. *Pol.* 1269 a19–20. There was a scholarly debate on what he actually “discovered”, on which see Burns 1976, 414–428, who convincingly argued that it was “a new theoretical approach expressed in his writings which consisted in a total planning concept comprising political, social and economic considerations and land-allocation based on these premises.” (cit. p. 428)

⁵² It is consistent with other sources: in Herodotus κινεῖν is used in a very negative sense of “tampering with” the ancestral laws by Cambyzes (Hdt. III 80). Interesting is the account of the prescriptions of Zaleucus (Stob. 4. 2.19, 71–75), where to “move” the laws of the state should imply grievous consequences for the individual, if his reform will be considered unbeneficial for the state. See also Plat. *Leg.* VII 797b.

⁵³ Arist. *Pol.* 1267 b22–1269 a28.

⁵⁴ Arist. *Soph. el.* 183 b.

⁵⁵ “Aristotle says that Empedocles was the first to move the rhetoric” (the verb κινεῖν intentionally translated literally to avoid misconception at this stage).

⁵⁶ Diog. Laert. VIII 56–57 = fr. 65 Rose. On Aristotle’s dialogues see Laurenti 1987, 74–88; on the *Sophist* in particular *ibidem*, 495–500. Laurenti aptly underlines the difficulties with determining the subject matter of the work. Flashar 1983, 283 thinks the content is about famous sophists.

ῥητορικὴν εὗρεῖν, Ζήνωνα δὲ διαλεκτικὴν (“Aristotle says in the Sophist that Empedocles discovered rhetoric, and Zeno, dialectic”). However, the testimony of Quintilian would make us consider Sextus’ account to be more faithful to the words of Aristotle, since he there, referring most probably directly to the Stagirite, uses *movere*.⁵⁷ Laurenti presented an apt interpretation of this fragment of Aristotle in the context of his other statements on the history of rhetoric, and indicated that Empedocles is meant to have made some contributions to what already existed.⁵⁸

There are three more instances where κινεῖν appears with similar connotations, one in Sextus Empiricus⁵⁹ and two in Diogenes Laertius — concerning Arcesilaus⁶⁰ and Protagoras.⁶¹

⁵⁷ *Inst.* III 1, 8: *Nam primus post eos quos poetae tradiderunt mouisse aliqua circa rhetoricen Empedocles dicitur* (“The first writer after those recorded by the poets who is said to have taken any steps in the direction of rhetoric is Empedocles.” This translation of Butler, as regards the rendering of *movisse*, seems inadequate). Laurenti 1987, 500; 518 notes that *movere* in such a sense appears only on this one occasion, in Quintilian, which suggests a *verbum e verbo* translation.

⁵⁸ Laurenti 1987, 501–503. Cf. fragments 136 Rose (Tisias as the inventor) and 137 Rose (Corax and Tisias: precepts).

⁵⁹ *Sex. Emp. Adv. math.* XI 2 = Socrates I C464 Giannantoni. The object of the verb is ethics, which was, we are told, first directed by Socrates towards the inquiry into right and wrong. This is a reflection of the opinion that Socrates turned philosophy from the mere study of nature to the problems of ethics. Sextus’ text implies that philosophy proper is about ethics, and ethics is about right and wrong. See the comm. of Bett 1997, 48 and his introduction to the treatise: IX–XIX. Spinelli 1995, 133–134; 143 with n. 48 sees a “Timonian” implication here, which is beyond the scope of our present argument. Similar views of Socrates’ role are frequently expressed, e.g.: *Cic. Tusc.* V 10–11; *De fin.* V 88; it had been articulated earlier by Xen. *Mem.* I 1, 11–16. If this reading is correct, κινεῖν means, in this context, that Socrates has revolutionized philosophy and begun the process of making it what it was meant to be (see Spinelli 1995, 133–134).

⁶⁰ The first one (Diog. Laert. IV 28 = Arcesilaus T 1a Mette) is on Arcesilaus: πρῶτος τὸν λόγον ἐκίνησε. On this *vita* see: Dorandi 1992, 3777–3784; Long 1986, 429–449: Both tend to see Philodemus as the main source. The object of the verb is λόγος, “handed down by Plato”, thus the testimony belongs to the field of language and philosophy (the way of conducting the argument or discourse), and since we have an indication that Arcesilaus took “Plato’s λόγος” and made it “more eristic”, it is plain that κινεῖν means “to improve” or “to innovate by alteration” something handed down by the predecessor. Diogenes does not give his source here. Shalev 2006, 320 assumes that where Diogenes remains tacit as to the source, in the given place he is to be considered the author of the given statement. This is, however, a question beyond the scope of this discussion. On Diogenes’ sources see Mejer 1978, 7–16; Moraux 1986, 245–294.

⁶¹ Diog. Laert. IX 53, 1 = DK 80 A1, 53: τὸ Σωκρατικὸν εἶδος τῶν λόγων πρῶτος ἐκίνησε. The object is the “Socratic form of argumentation”, as we probably should render the Greek here, and the field is philosophy. It is not clear whether Protagoras is meant to have initiated, or invented, the subject in question. On Protagoras-*vita* in Diogenes see the recent article of Shalev 2006, 309–337; cf. Decleva Caizzi 1992, 4236–4240. Both underline the extreme density of subjects for which Protagoras is credited. See also Untersteiner 1967, 15–25. Untersteiner has seen a Peripatetic source here. Decleva Caizzi 1992, 4239 with n. 94–95, argues for Favorinus, due to the character of the entire *vita*. Cf. Mejer 1978, 30–32.

In that set of parallels, five of the examples stress the word *πρῶτος*, and for our purposes we shall concentrate on these, since there is little doubt that *πρῶτος* was also the word used by Theophrastus in the fragment about Thucydides (*ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ πρῶτων ἱστορία κινήθεισα* or *οὗτοι δὲ πρῶτοι τὴν ἱστορίαν ἐκίνησαν*, cf. chap. 2, pp. 52–53). Two of the instances concern *λόγος* (Arcesilaus, Protagoras), one: *λέξις* (the poets), one: rhetoric (Empedocles), one: ethics/philosophy (Socrates). Setting aside Diogenes Laertius (whose sources are not specified and rather impossible to detect here) and Aristotle's observations on innovations on *πάσαι τέχναι* (which appear in a digression), we are left with three instances where *πρῶτος/οι* + *κινεῖν* occur: Aristotle's statement about the poets from the *Rhetoric* (innovators of *λέξις*), about Empedocles in the *Sophist* (innovator of rhetoric), and Sextus' Empiricus about Socrates (innovator of philosophy).

Where did all these remarks come from, namely from which sections of these works? To begin with the easiest case, Sextus voices this remark on Socrates at the very beginning of his work, in the second paragraph, the first being a general outline of the subject matter. The independent character of *Contra ethicis* is indisputable, so it was natural to include a proper *prooemium* there. The statement about Empedocles is difficult to assess in that respect; it is extremely limited. Still, we quoted Quintilian as deriving from this passage of Aristotle, and this comes in an introduction to book III, a history of rhetoric. Empedocles is named at the very beginning of this account, with the verb that echoes Aristotle's words: *movisse*. Thus it is not unreasonable to surmise that this remark also comes from an opening part of the dialogue. As for Aristotle's statement about the poets, it is clear that it comes from the introductory part of the third book of the *Rhetoric*. Aristotle provides an overview of what he will discuss in the treatise: the *λέξις*, then he says who was the first to make any innovation in that field. The parallel from the *Rhetoric* is substantial: the "first innovators" of *λέξις* are indicated in the introduction to book three. This book, as we know from e.g. the Alexandrian list, was treated as (and was probably intended to be) a separate treatise, with *λέξις* as its theme.⁶² So we arrive at at least two cases where *πρῶτος κινήτης* is named in what we will call the *prooemium* proper, immediately after a summary, an overview, of the subject matter of the work.

⁶² Flashar 1983, 254, adds that it was given nr. 87 in the record. Moreover, Fortenbaugh 2002, 93–102 showed probable convergences between the *Περὶ λέξεως* of Theophrastus and the content of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* III.

To be sure, three examples, although compelling, do not constitute a common rule. However, they are substantial enough to allow us to consider the possibility that Theophrastus' statement about Herodotus and Thucydides belonged to the *prooemium* as well.⁶³ There is also no evidence to the contrary, either for all the parallels analysed above, or for this testimony itself. The question remains, this is the *prooemium* to what work? Taking into account our conclusions about the character of statements with κινεῖν + πρῶτος in the attested systematic treatises, each on a specific subject, the probable location and sense of κινεῖν in these works (the innovator of a specific sphere is mentioned in the *prooemium*, because this sphere is the main subject of the work), our case with ἱστορίαν κινεῖν seems not to fit the provenance from Περὶ λέξεως. Put simply, to state that Thucydides and Herodotus were the first innovators of history would be much more apposite to a *prooemium* to a work on *history*, which could include a history of the genre, similar to those of Dionysius and Cicero adduced here, than in a general work on λέξις.

2.1.2 The context of Cicero's quotation from Theophrastus

As I mentioned above, Fortenbaugh, given the context of Cicero's account, ascribed this testimony to Περὶ λέξεως. Cicero gives some indications that he drew on Aristotle and Theophrastus for the treatment of prose rhythm in the *Orator*,⁶⁴ which is very detailed.⁶⁵ This is one argument for regarding Cicero's knowledge of Theophrastus' theory of rhythm as profound, perhaps indeed based on a direct reading of his treatise Περὶ λέξεως. It has been argued that Cicero particularly adequately renders Theophrastus' four virtues of style, probably discussed in Περὶ λέξεως.⁶⁶ However, even if in some parts of the *Orator* Cicero makes extensive use of Περὶ λέξεως, it does not allow us to automatically assume that the mention of Theophrastus in our testimony,

⁶³ We should bear in mind that Ciceronian quotations with the UAF refer usually (albeit not explicitly) to a specific place in a particular work.

⁶⁴ In the *Orator* he mentions Aristotle with Theophrastus in connection with prose rhythm four times (172, 194, 218, 228). Thus, Kennedy 1972, 225 assumed the "direct use" of Theophrastus. Cf. Kennedy 1963, 273–274: Cicero's "repeated use" of Περὶ λέξεως in the *Orator*. Similarly Sandys 1885, LXIX–LXX.

⁶⁵ Kennedy 1972, 256: "The basis of what Cicero says is derived from Isocrates, Aristotle, and Theophrastus, but he has applied the Greek theories to Latin and he has much more to say about rhythm than any earlier author (174)." Kennedy emphasized that the discussion of rhythm is the most detailed part of the work (esp. 168–236). Theophrastus has also been detected as the plausible intermediate source for the report of Aristotle's opinions on prose rhythm in *De oratore* III 182–183: Wisse 1989, 180–183.

⁶⁶ Stroux 1912, 9–28; Kennedy 1963, 273–278; Fortenbaugh 2005b, 59; Kennedy 1972, 225.

Orator 39, comes from that work. An important thing Fortenbaugh does not take into account here is Cicero's method of composition in his treatise. We shall not presuppose that he drew on a single source.⁶⁷ It was most probably work on excerpts, which was often the cause of similar mistakes — and of our confusion.⁶⁸ The reference to the historians actually does not fit well into Cicero's own exposition in *Or.* 38–39. First the “inventors” are mentioned, then some orators, and next, Thucydides and Herodotus, only for Cicero to state how different they were from their contemporaries, but then to underline, with Theophrastus' wording, how innovative they were in the field of *history*. In one sentence Cicero does not make a distinction between them, then the difference is admitted in the next one.⁶⁹ Then, for the section 37–40 Cicero would have most likely written down on a single roll all that was available and relevant for the chief theme of the section: the diachronic description of the beginnings of stylistic prose. He evidently wrote down passages from Plato's *Phaedrus*, one from Isocrates, *something* from Theophrastus; he also refers to unspecified sources (*ferunt, traduntur*). This *something* of Theophrastus could be selected from a work that was not necessarily used further in the *Orator*, but matched the subject and chronology in sections 37–40 (inventors and innovators in prose-writing).

To gain a fuller picture, we can also look to two accounts of the history of historiography, one Cicero's own,⁷⁰ and one by Dionysius.⁷¹ In both, Herodotus and Thucydides are the innovators set within a chain of the development of historiography. The terminology of these descriptions is strikingly consistent with what is reflected in Cicero's account of Theophrastus' words in *Or.* 39 (*ornatius + uberius*). Dionysius is more elaborate on the question of the κατασκευή of the two historians and their predecessors; Cicero also begins with

⁶⁷ To assume that the mention of Herodotus and Thucydides comes from *Περὶ λέξεως* presupposes that the whole account in *Orator*, 37–40 is from that work.

⁶⁸ Cicero, in the *De inventione* II 4, discloses his own *modus operandi*, saying he procured excerpts from the most important authors on the subject (*omnibus unum in locum coactis scriptoribus ... excerpsumus*). In *De fin.* I 6, he adds explicitly that on which he remained silent in the *De inv.* — that he supplements what he collected with judgements or opinions of his own, and arranges the structure of his text according to his purpose. Dorandi 1991, 11–33 reconstructs the process of creating a literary work by ancient authors, and identifies several stages of it, one of them being preparing and using excerpts, if several works were to be perused in the process. Cf. Plinius' method analyzed by Münzer, 1897, e.g. 22–24. Mejer 1978, 16–29, gives an excellent illustration of how working on excerpts affected the work of Diogenes Laertius. See also Blanck 1992, 120–122.

⁶⁹ This was also a riddle for Fortenbaugh 2005a, 319; his answer is that “the failure seems to be entirely his [Cicero's – M.K.] own”. But what is the reason for the failure?

⁷⁰ *De or.* II 55–58.

⁷¹ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 23–24.

words echoing *ornatius* et *uberius*. These accounts fit the idea of κινεῖν flawlessly: the two historians are conceived of as the first contributors to an art of history that is handed down by their predecessors, and it is reflected in the language and structure of the accounts. What I want to underline is the fact that the overall scheme of these accounts is compatible with the testimony of Theophrastus in the *Orator*. In other words, Cicero and Dionysius seem to have had at their disposal some sort of account of the development of the historical genre, in which Thucydides and Herodotus were milestones for its linguistic apparatus. It is not excluded, that they used Theophrastus' *Περὶ ἱστορίας* as source, since the similarity of their accounts is evident, and must be explained somehow.⁷²

In sum, the conclusion of this section is that the testimony in Cicero's *Orator*, 39 comes from Theophrastus' *Περὶ ἱστορίας*. This attribution has consequences for our view on Theophrastus' reception of the *History*.

2.2 Thucydides in Theophrastus: conclusions

Theophrastus' treatment of historiography as a distinct literary genre in the *Περὶ ἱστορίας* seems, on the basis of the above enquiries, highly probable. Since Thucydides and Herodotus were most probably mentioned in the *prooemium* to that treatise, we can surmise that they were the fundamental figures in it. Their contribution was regarded as essential. What exactly was — in Theophrastus' view — Thucydides' impact on historiography? The reconstruction of Theophrastus' terminology is crucial for our answer to that question. As concluded above (chap. 2, pp. 54–55), it is likely that the second part of the fragment is Cicero's translation of Theophrastus' phrase λέγειν *περιττότερον... καὶ μείζονι κατασκευῇ*, (to express... with greater copiousness and embellishment).⁷³ In general, the term *κατασκευή* covers: the use of tropes and figures, both of speech and of thought, the choice of words, and the use of words in composition. Composition also includes periodic structure and rhythm.⁷⁴ The term *περιττόν* is attested for Theophrastus by Dionysius, as a citation from Theophrastus' *On Style*, where it is reported that τὸ μέγα, σεμνόν and περιττόν come from the given choice of words, their composition, and the use of figures. The definition of *κατασκευή* appears thus in connection with the concept of *περιττόν*: *περιττόν* is an effect of a particular *κατασκευή*.⁷⁵ We shall ask then, what grounds Theo-

⁷² Nassal 1910, 6–7 does not even take into account the possibility that Dionysius can in a way “depend” on Cicero; de Jonge 2008, 215–216 adduces several arguments for Dionysius' dialogue with Cicero (on *Thuc.* 55), considering it at least probable.

⁷³ See above pp. 53–54 on the alternative term *κεκοσμημένον*. The senses of the two words in the context of style are similar.

⁷⁴ Kennedy 1963, 11–12.

⁷⁵ Dion. Hal. *Isoc.* 3, 1 = fr. 691 FHS&G. Leeman, *ad loc.*, 292–295; Stroux 1912, 19.

phrastus had for such description of Herodotus' and Thucydides' language? The only reasonable inference is that Theophrastus assessed both historians' language in the context of their predecessors'. This in turn implies that they had to be thoroughly analysed by the philosopher; specifically, Thucydides' choice of words, composition, and use of figures were scrutinized. Theophrastus not only knew and read the *History*, but *studied* its text, from the perspective of its stylistic innovations in historiography.

We shall also emphasize that both Herodotus' and Thucydides' style was equally assessed as innovative. It seems that, apart from patent differences between the historians, they were thought of as major advance for the genre. This is an argument that contradicts some modern ideas about the reasons why Thucydides was allegedly not read in the Hellenistic age — as more difficult than Herodotus.⁷⁶ Analysis of style does not exclude treatment of other elements, particularly of the subject matter of the *History*, by Theophrastus. As we see in Dionysius' *On Thucydides*, historical work can (or even should) be studied from both perspectives. Unfortunately, we lack any testimony of Theophrastus' observations about the *History* in this regard. But it is not excluded, given the impact of Theophrastus on Dionysian literary studies in general, that certain observations of the latter in the treatises where Thucydides is discussed reflect the former's ideas and views about our historian.

3. Thucydides in the Περὶ ἱστορίας of Praxiphanes

3.1 The theme of Praxiphanes' treatise and the figure of Thucydides

In the chapter on the circulation of the *History* in the Hellenistic period, Praxiphanes of Mytilene's mention of Thucydides in the Περὶ ἱστορίας was introduced (pp. 56–58). Here I shall draw further conclusions and consider the fragment's implications for our views of Thucydides' reception. We shall try to specify the overall context in which Thucydides appeared in the treatise, and establishing its subject is crucial here. This question has been more intensely debated than the Περὶ ἱστορίας of Theophrastus. Heretofore, the following have been proposed as the main theme of Praxiphanes' Περὶ ἱστορίας:

⁷⁶ See e.g. Hornblower 1995, 47.

- a. Poetry and its relation to historiography.⁷⁷
- b. The theory of historiography.⁷⁸
- c. Critical-literary and grammatical inquiry.⁷⁹
- d. Other.⁸⁰

Options c) and d) have never been seriously taken into account in studies which have analysed the testimony in detail, and were made in passing, without any substantial argumentation. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff was the first to thoroughly examine this fragment on Thucydides, and he focused on his alleged stay at Archelaus' court in Pella, together with the poets. He interprets the fragment as part of a tradition that Thucydides lived and died at Archelaus' court. This information would, in Wilamowitz's judgment, be part of a biography of the historian.⁸¹ Rudolf Hirzel accepted Wilamowitz's hypothesis about the stay in Pella, but posed the question of the relationship of the title to such an understanding of its content.⁸² Hirzel also advanced the first and the most influential hypothesis that Praxiphanes' *Περὶ ἱστορίας* was a dialogue on the relationship between historiography and other literary genres, represented by Agathon (tragedy), Plato Comicus (comedy), Choerilus and Niceratus (epic), and Melanippides (dithyrambic poetry). The background to the dialogue would be Aristotle's ninth chapter of the *Poetics* (the difference between the universal and the particular). Building on this assumption, Hirzel believed that, in connection with Aristotle's alleged disregard for history, in Praxiphanes' work historiography was represented in a negative light, as inferior to poetry. The dialogue would end with a discouragement of Thucydides by the poets named, and in a generally poor assessment of the historian.⁸³ Other scholars followed, commonly repeating this theory as established knowledge, without any verification of Hirzel's argument.⁸⁴ When we check Hirzel's reasoning, we find that he supported the thesis of the dialogue-form of the work only by a very limited testimony that Praxiphanes wrote dialogues, one of which was entitled

⁷⁷ Preller 1842, 21; Hirzel 1878, *passim*; Wehrli 1969, 112. Tuplin 1993–1994, 183–184, does also not exclude such a possibility; cf. Corradi 2012, 495–523.

⁷⁸ Schwartz 1938, 67–87; Wehrli 1947, 54–71; idem 1983, 567–568; Tuplin 1993–1994, 196.

⁷⁹ Crönert 1906, 176; Gigante 1999, 60 n. 22.

⁸⁰ Ritschl 1866, 413, thought that Praxiphanes' work was a monograph on King Archelaus.

⁸¹ Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1877, 353–359.

⁸² Hirzel 1878, 46.

⁸³ Hirzel 1878, 48; cf. von Fritz 1956, 137; 142.

⁸⁴ Hirzel 1878, 46–49: “So weist das Bisherige auf einen Dialog des Praxiphanes *Περὶ ἱστορίας*, in dem von den Beziehungen der Geschichte zur Poesie die Rede war und wohl über den Vorzug der einen vor der andern gestritten wurde.” (p. 47) Cf. Brink 1946, 24; Aly 1954, 1777; Piccirilli 1985, 113: “molto probabilmente il dialogo”; Hornblower 1995, 54; Fuhrer 1996, 118–120.

Περὶ ποιητῶν.⁸⁵ The further part of Hirzel's reconstruction relies solely on his understanding of the Peripatetic attitude towards historiography. This, in turn, is dependent on a specific reading of Aristotle's *Poetics*, and is hard to accept.⁸⁶ Corradi thoroughly revised Hirzel's hypothesis.⁸⁷ She makes a compelling case that Περὶ ἱστορίας could be modelled on the symposium of Seven Sages, and that dialogue was a suitable, popular and well-attested form in the Peripatetic circle of historical-literary research.⁸⁸ Corradi tried to show that a more positive value has been ascribed to Thucydides and to historiography by Praxiphanes, that he integrated Aristotle's *Poetics*, 9 with certain teachings from the *Rhetoric*. However, her suppositions as to the details of the theme of the work are not convincing: she argues that the direction of the dialogue could be the relation of each genre to the καθόλου from the *Poetics*.⁸⁹ There exists no substantial evidence to support this speculation. Recently, Burkhard Meißner revived the theory of historiography as the theme and content of Praxiphanes' work, in particular its development as a literary genre.⁹⁰ This concept has much on its side, particularly because Thucydides was, as far as we can conclude from Marcellinus' testimony, placed in chronological relation with representatives of other literary genres. The central position of historiography is suggested by the very title of the work. It has to be underlined that this part of the testimony is closer to the quotation of Praxiphanes' words (introduced with φησί), but still has to be taken with caution. In addition, Christopher Tuplin argued that in the work in question Praxiphanes made a theme of Thucydides' fame: its scarcity during his lifetime and shortly after, and its great increase in the following generations.⁹¹ As another possible topic, Tuplin proposed the concept of usefulness and pleasure in historical writing, as Theophrastus seems to have reflected on these.⁹² The first part of Tuplin's interpretation is strictly based on what we read in the fragment, and can thus be accepted. Still, we need to keep in mind that, as I pointed out above, the part of the sentence about the posthumous fame of Thucydides is most likely Marcellinus' own inference from Praxiphanes' words.

⁸⁵ Hirzel adduced only Diog. Laert. III 8 as proof.

⁸⁶ Cf. Tuplin 1993–1994, 190–191.

⁸⁷ Corradi 2012, 495–523.

⁸⁸ *Ibidem*, 503–504.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, 506–514.

⁹⁰ He followed Wehrli 1947, 70–71, see Meißner 2010, 181.

⁹¹ Tuplin 1993–1994, 194–196.

⁹² *Ibidem*, 196.

3.2 Thucydides in Praxiphanes: conclusions

To sum up, on the basis of the Praxiphanes fragment in question we can justifiably conclude that:

1. *On History* contained some type of historical-biographical mention of Thucydides, within a framework of dating based on synchronism with other famous authors.

2. Praxiphanes probably showed an interest in the fact that the historian had been successful only later in life.

3. The theme of late-gained respect was one of the *topoi* present in Peripatetic biography, and this topos could be applied to Thucydides the historian.

Hirzel's, Corradi's, and Meißner's readings seem rightly to stress that history was conceived of by Praxiphanes as a strictly separate literary genre. Accordingly, one of the most important conclusions that can be drawn from the testimony is that Thucydides was chosen, or was conceived of as the chief representative of historical genre.⁹³ This is consistent with Theophrastus' piece transmitted by Cicero, and both Peripatetics' assessment of the historian seems to be based on thorough study of the *History*, and reflect the fact that Thucydides was considered the milestone in historiography as distinct literary genre.

4. Thucydides in Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius*

4.1 *Letter to Pompeius*: a type of Περὶ ἱστορίας?

Theodorus of Gadara and Caecilius of Calacte wrote Περὶ ἱστορίας. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Theodorus, and Caecilius shared intellectual interests (rhetoric, language, style), and were a part of a specific circle of scholars. The importance of these contacts for Dionysius' literary activity have recently been firmly established.⁹⁴ Dionysius of Halicarnassus certainly knew Theodorus; his relation with Caecilius is explicitly confirmed by Dionysius' reference to him in one of his literary treatises, even though the nature of their contact is disputable. It is therefore very plausible that Dionysius knew Theodorus' and/or Caecilius' Περὶ ἱστορίας.⁹⁵ Since in Dionysius' time Peripatetism was revived, it is possible

⁹³ Cf. Momigliano 1990, 40.

⁹⁴ Cf. chap. 3, p. 181 n. 411.

⁹⁵ See Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3, *ad fin*: ἐμοὶ μέντοι καὶ τῷ φιλότῳ Καικιλίῳ δοκεῖ κτλ. Comm. see Fornaro 1997, 226, who refers to the question with bibliography. The affinity between Caecilius and Dionysius has been stressed already by Krüger 1823, VIII–X: “Idemque, hic etiam Dionysii geminus, Περὶ ἱστορίας scripsisse perhibetur. Sed optime hanc similitudinem cognoscas ex cognata utriusque critici indole atque ingenio.” (p. IX). Ofenloch 1907, XIII–XIV envisaged a scholarly dispute between them; similarly Tolkiehn 1908, 84–86; Hidber 1996, 5–6.

that he read Theophrastus' *Περὶ ἱστορίας* as well.⁹⁶ Kenneth Sacks has put forward a thesis that part of Dionysius' *Letter to Pompeius* is actually intended to be a type of *Περὶ ἱστορίας*.⁹⁷ He argues that, since two prominent scholars of the time wrote this type of treatise (*Περὶ ἱστορίας*), Dionysius would consider it natural to do the same. We know that Caecilius certainly made use of Thucydides; he assessed some aspects of his language in the treatise *On Figures*, and he compared him with Herodotus.⁹⁸ In the *Letter* Dionysius also makes Thucydides and Herodotus, and their comparison, the main point of reference for other historians. Hence Caecilius' interest in historians was probably comparable to what we know about Dionysius.

The part of the *Letter to Pompeius* concerning historiographers is, as Dionysius indicates, a quotation from the second book of the *Περὶ μιμήσεως*,⁹⁹ and Sacks argued that it is not a mere copy, but a reformulation and an attempt at an articulation of Dionysius' views on historiography. On this reading, the aim and scope of this "new version" of the relevant part of the *Περὶ μιμήσεως* would be autonomous and a considerably different text from the original.¹⁰⁰ The wide chronological gap between the two works would be an additional motivation

Atkins 1952, 106 and Kennedy 1972, 364, take a balanced view, that they were neither necessarily close friends, nor bitter opponents, but both underline the importance of Dionysius' relationship with Caecilius for his own work. Sacks 1983, 77–78 argues convincingly for a close relationship between Caecilius and Dionysius, and assumes that given the position of Theodorus, and Dionysius' literary interests, he must also have known Theodorus' output.

⁹⁶ Sacks 1983, 78 assesses this as very probable.

⁹⁷ On various aspects of the *Letter* see: Krüger 1823, XVIII–XLVI; Smiley 1906, 413–414; Brinkmann 1914, 255–266; Bonner 1939, 59–80; Sacks 1983, 66–74; Fox 1993, 31–47; Fornaro 1997, 1–23.

⁹⁸ Caecilius fr. 75 Ofenloch; Ros 1938, 56 n. 17; Maitland 1996, 553; de Jonge 2008, 217–220 with n. 224.

⁹⁹ *Pomp.* 3, 1: πεποίηκα [καὶ] τοῦτο οἷς <πρὸς> Δημήτριον ὑπεμνημάτισμαι περὶ μιμήσεως. τούτων ὁ μὲν πρῶτος αὐτὴν περιεῖληφε τὴν περὶ τῆς μιμήσεως ζήτησιν, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος περὶ τοῦ τίνας ἄνδρας μιμεῖσθαι δεῖ ποιητάς τε καὶ φιλοσόφους, ἱστοριογράφους <τε> καὶ ῥήτορας, ὁ δὲ τρίτος περὶ τοῦ πῶς δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι μέχρι τοῦδε ἀτελής. ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ Ἡροδότου τε καὶ Θουκυδίδου καὶ Ξενοφάντος καὶ Φιλίστου καὶ Θεοπόμπου (τούτους γὰρ ἔκρινον τοὺς ἄνδρας εἰς μίμησιν ἐπιτηδαιοτάτους) τάδε γράφω ("This I have done in the essays I have addressed to Demetrius on the subject of imitation. The first of these contains an abstract inquiry into the nature of imitation. The second asks what particular poets and philosophers, historians and orators, should be imitated. The third, which treats of the proper manner of imitation, remains unfinished. In the second I write as follows concerning Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Philistus and Theopompus, these being the writers whom I select as most suitable for imitation." All translations of the *Letter to Pompeius* are of Rhys Roberts). On textual problems in this passage see Fornaro 1997, 163. On this work see: Bonner 1939, 39–58; Hidber 1996, 56–75; Battisti 1997, 9–30.

¹⁰⁰ Sacks 1983, 77–78. Fox 1993, 37 n. 29, accepts such an interpretation. Fornaro 1997, 162–163: "E' evidente che se pure l'intero trattato *De imitatione* non era stato ancora pubblicato la parte sugli storici aveva già, nella considerazione dell'autore, una sua autonomia."

for such a revision.¹⁰¹ Another argument for such a thesis is Dionysius' self-identification as a historian, no less (if not more) than a literary critic.¹⁰² Is it possible that this part of the *Letter* in any way reflects the actual content and framework of earlier works entitled *Περὶ ἱστορίας*? If the answer is positive, what bearing does it have on our understanding of Thucydides' reception? Sacks' hypothesis can be supported by the specific terminology used by Dionysius in the *Letter*. He repeatedly and with emphasis refers to the proper tasks (ἔργα) and methods in writing history, clearly defining it as a distinct genre, from the very beginning of his "quotation" from the *Περὶ μιμήσεως*. Each chapter discusses one task necessary in writing history:

3, 2: Εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν, περὶ μὲν Ἡροδότου καὶ Θουκυδίδου ταῦτα φρονῶ. πρῶτον τε καὶ σχεδὸν ἀναγκαιότατον ἔργον ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τοῖς γράφουσιν πᾶσιν ἱστορίας ὑπόθεσιν ἐκλέξασθαι καλὴν καὶ κεχαρισμένην τοῖς ἀναγνωσομένοις.¹⁰³

3, 8: Δεύτερόν ἐστὶ τῆς ἱστορικῆς πραγματείας ἔργον γινῶναι πόθεν τε ἄρξασθαι καὶ μέχρι τοῦ προελθεῖν δεῖ.¹⁰⁴

3, 11: Τρίτον¹⁰⁵ ἐστὶν ἀνδρὸς ἱστορικοῦ <σκοπεῖν>, τίνα τε δεῖ παραλαβεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν γραφὴν πράγματα καὶ τίνα παραλιπεῖν.¹⁰⁶

3, 13: Μετὰ τοῦτο ἔργον ἐστὶν ἱστορικοῦ διελέσθαι τε καὶ τάξει τῶν δηλουμένων ἕκαστον ἐν ᾧ δεῖ τόπω.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ Pavano 1942, 12–142; 145 and idem 1958, X sets the first two books of *De imit.* and the *Ep. ad Pomp.* directly one after another as belonging to a middle period, whereas Bonner 1939, 25–38 sets *De imit.* as one of the first works, the *Ep. ad Pomp.* as one of the later ones. Sacks 1983, 83–87 seems to follow Bonner; de Jonge 2008, 20–25 after examination of the literature on the subject (with n. 100 for further bibliography) admits that the exact relative chronology is impossible to establish, but he also places the *Letter to Pompeius* in the middle period.

¹⁰² Sacks 1983, 78.

¹⁰³ "These are my opinions concerning Herodotus and Thucydides, if I must extend my remarks to them. The first, and one may say the most necessary, task for writers of any kind of history is to choose a noble subject and one pleasing to their readers."

¹⁰⁴ "A second function of historical investigation is to determine where to begin and how far to proceed."

¹⁰⁵ Here again ἔργον is the proper subject; Dionysius omits it, perhaps due to linguistic variation.

¹⁰⁶ "A third task of the historian is to consider which occurrences he should embody in his work and which he should omit."

¹⁰⁷ "Next it is the function of a historian so to arrange his materials that everything shall be found in its proper place."

3, 15: Μιάς δ' ιδέας ἐπιμνησθήσομαι πραγματικῆς, ἣν οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν εἰρημένων ἦττον ἐν ἀπάσαις ἱστορίαις ζητοῦμεν, τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγραφέως διάθεσιν, ἣ κέχρηται πρὸς τὰ πράγματα περὶ ὧν γράφει.¹⁰⁸

The initial formulae opening each subsequent paragraph, as underlined in the above citations, are characteristic of a handbook. The idea of the historian's ἔργα is comparable to ἔργα τοῦ ῥήτορος (lat. *officia oratoris*).¹⁰⁹ Such a structuring of the treatise by Dionysius lends weight to Sack's thesis on the special treatment of historiographical theory in the *Letter*.¹¹⁰ A further aspect is that two of the ἔργα (elements of the πραγματικός τόπος) are applied only to the historians and Isocrates: ὑπόθεσις and the διάθεσις.¹¹¹ Moreover, we can infer from *On the Ancient Orators* 4 that in Dionysius' literary criticism historians are clearly distinguished from orators. In his programmatic declaration Dionysius expounds his overall aims in literary criticism. It is significant that (only) historians are clearly meant as a distinct group; this implies a separate treatment of their works. What Dionysius does is not simply apply rhetorical categories to historiography — he rather treats them as something typical of historiography alone, and chooses particular πραγματικοὶ τόποι to highlight in certain historians' works. In other words, historiography is treated as a separate genre, and as such requires treatment from a theoretical point of view. The primary importance of the πραγματικὸς τόπος for historical writing is confirmed by the fact that, when discussing historiography, Dionysius puts the “pragmatic” part first, while the language (or style) is evaluated second. Therefore, even if Sacks' thesis that the *Letter* is a form of Περὶ ἱστορίας is not entirely correct, it cannot be denied that Dionysius really, as Sotera Fornaro put it, “impatrisca dei veri precetti d'arte storica.”¹¹² This has

¹⁰⁸ “I will mention one other feature of the treatment of subject-matter, a feature which in all histories we look for no less than for any of those already mentioned. I mean the attitude which the historian himself adopts towards the events which he describes.”

¹⁰⁹ Cic. *De or.* I 138: *primum oratoris officium esse*; cf. Fornaro 1997, 167–168 who adduces *prooemium* to Consultus Fortunatianus, *Ars rhetorica* I, 1 p. 81 Halm: *Partes oratoris officii quot sunt? – quinque: inventio dispositio elocutio memoria pronuntiatio. Haec a Graecis quid vocantur?* ἔργα τοῦ ῥήτορος; “How many elements of the task of an orator do we have? – five: invention, arrangement, expression, recollection, delivery. What are these called by the Greeks? The tasks of the orator” (transl. mine).

¹¹⁰ Cf. Fornaro 1997, 166–167: “L'argomentazione di Dionisio inizia subito come in un manuale di *techne* storiografica, con l'elencazione, cioè, del ‘primo’ dei principi che bisogna seguire. E l'esposizione manualistica tipica non solo dell'*ars oratoria*, ma anche dell'*ars poetica*; così Ovidio, all'esordio della sua *Ars amatoria*, costruita parodicamente ad analogia di un'*ars oratoria*: *Principio, quod amare velis, reperire labora ... Proximus huic labor est placitam exorare puellam* (35–37) [...]”. Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 1447 a; Plat. *Phdr.* 266d–e.

¹¹¹ Cf. *Thuc.* 8.

¹¹² Fornaro 1997, 17.

not been properly recognized, and some scholars believed that rhetoric rather “contaminated” Dionysius’ ideas about historiography. Such an approach occurred in early studies on Dionysius’ treatment of history, and prevented us from understanding the theoretical concepts inherent in his system. It was a positivist model that did not allow for other than “objective” concepts of historical truth.¹¹³ This paradigm has been undermined some twenty years ago, and the “harmonization” of Dionysius’ rhetorical theory with history began to develop. What Dionysius does in the *Letter* and in *De Thucydide* can be understood in modern terms as belonging to the methodology of history, as it is a theoretical reflection on method.¹¹⁴ The notion of historical truth is however, in this reflection, considerably different from our own.¹¹⁵

4.2 Assessment of Thucydides in the *Letter*

The part of the *Letter* in question is concentrated on Thucydides’ and Herodotus’ manner of writing history, and the two are considered to be the main models for imitation by other historians. The comparison of Herodotus with Thucydides is based on five categories concerning the choice, organization, and treatment of the content of historical writing, subsumed under one notion of *πραγματικὸς τόπος*.¹¹⁶

¹¹³ Two prominent examples from the XIXth cent., when this paradigm flourished, are worth quoting: Wichmann 1878, 30: “Ac primum quidem non neglegendum est, id quod supra breviter indicavi, illum non fuisse historiarum scriptorem, sed rhetorem; scripsit ille quidem historias, sed non meliorem illis de historiae scribendae legibus opinionem expressit, quam hic profectus est [...]” and Liers 1886, 9: “Der Grundfehler der rhetorischen Geschichtsschreibung liegt darin, dass sie die Thätigkeit des Historikers nicht genau von der des Rhetoren trennt”; p. 12: “Nachdem wir so nachzuweisen versucht haben, welchen unheilvollen Einfluss die rhetorische Bildung wegen ihrer Einseitigkeit auf die Darstellung der Geschichte ausüben musste [...]”. Schwartz in his RE article, 1905c, 934–961 (part. 934), followed a similar line.

¹¹⁴ A more balanced approach began with Gabba 1991, 60–92; 114 with n. 46; cf. Fox 1993, 31–47: “That such harmonization is thought necessary demonstrates how far removed Dionysius’ critical categories are from modern approaches to historical writing [...] The rhetorical element of his history can be viewed in this context, and modern prejudices concerning the inapplicability of rhetorical values to history reassessed” (p. 31). Further discussion is found in: Gabba 1994, 495–496. Fox 2005, 360–371 shows that in Dionysius historiography is inextricably interwoven with rhetoric because the latter is, in Dionysius’ categories, closely knit with the political history of Greece and Rome. Fox’s critique of Schwartz (*ibidem*, 368–369) is also intelligent, as he underlines that in antiquity such a concept as “rhetorische Geschichtsschreibung” was absent.

¹¹⁵ Fornaro 1997, 166–168, observes: “I ‘compiti’ che Dionisio indica per lo storiografo coincidono solo in parte con quelli che la tarda trattistica retorica prescrive all’oratore [...]” (p. 167). Cf. Wiater 2011, 121–124.

¹¹⁶ Cf. the conclusion of the discussion of these five parts, 3, 15: Καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸν πραγματικὸν τόπον ἦττων ἐστὶν Ἡροδότου διὰ ταῦτα Θουκυδίδης.

4.2.1 Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides' *ὑπόθεσις*: choice of subject

The first element discussed is *ὑπόθεσις*: the subject chosen for the work.¹¹⁷ Dionysius emphasizes that a suitable subject has to fulfill two conditions, or have two qualities: it should be noble (*καλή*) and pleasing for the listeners (*κεχαρισμένη*). It is significant that both categories have moral overtones. In Dionysius' opinion, Thucydides' *ὑπόθεσις* is far inferior to Herodotus', which is already evident, in his view, in the *prooemia* to their works:

3, 3–5: τοῦτο Ἡρόδοτος κρείττον μοι δοκεῖ πεποιηκέναι Θουκυδίδου. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ κοινὴν Ἑλληνικῶν τε καὶ βαρβαρικῶν πράξεων ἐξενήνοχεν ἱστορίαν, ὥς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα [...] καὶ ἅπερ αὐτὸς εἶρηκε. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ προοίμιον καὶ ἀρχὴ καὶ τέλος ἐστὶ τῆς ἱστορίας. ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης πόλεμον ἓνα γράφει, καὶ τοῦτον οὔτε καλὸν οὔτε εὐτυχῆ· δὲ μάλιστα μὲν ὤφειλε μὴ γενέσθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, σιωπῇ καὶ λήθῃ παραδοθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπιγιγνομένων ἡγνοῆσθαι. ὅτι δὲ πονηρὰν εἴληφεν ὑπόθεσιν, καὶ αὐτὸς γε τοῦτο ποιεῖ φανερόν ἐν τῷ προοίμιῳ.¹¹⁸

The difference between narrating a single war and a wider range of events is an important aspect which distinguishes Thucydides from other historians.¹¹⁹ Dionysius calls Thucydides' *ὑπόθεσις* “poor, dishonourable” (*πόνηρα*); this is unambiguously moral terminology. Thucydides' subject matter is, in Dionysius' view, disgraceful, because it focuses on a shameful period in Greek history, in contrast to the impressive (*θαυμαστὰ*) deeds narrated by Herodotus:

3, 6: ὅσῳ δὲ κρείττων ἢ τὰ θαυμαστὰ ἔργα δηλοῦσα Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων γραφὴ τῆς τὰ οἰκτρὰ καὶ δεινὰ πάθη τῶν Ἑλλήνων διαγγελούσης, τοσοῦτῳ φρονιμώτερος Ἡρόδοτος Θουκυδίδου κατὰ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῆς ὑποθέσεως.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ On the parallel use of the concept in literary criticism, particularly of poetry, Fornaro 1997, 169–170.

¹¹⁸ “In this Herodotus seems to me to have succeeded better than Thucydides. He has produced a national history of the conflict of Greeks and barbarians, in order that neither should the deeds of men fade into oblivion, nor should achievements, to quote from his opening words. For this same proem forms both the beginning and the end of his *History*. Thucydides, on the other hand, writes of a single war, and that neither glorious nor fortunate; one which, best of all, should not have happened, or (failing that) should have been ignored by posterity and consigned to silence and oblivion. In his Introduction he makes it clear himself that he has chosen a bad subject.”

¹¹⁹ Fornaro 1997, 175, aptly refers to Hermogenes' *Progymnasmata*, IV 14 Rabe: the difference between διήγησις and συγγραφή; see also Hornblower 1994, 13–33.

¹²⁰ “As clearly as the story of the wonderful deeds of Greeks and barbarians is superior to the story of the sad and terrible disasters of the Greeks, so clearly does Herodotus show better judgement than Thucydides in his choice of subject.”

Unlike Herodotus, who narrates Greeks' as well as barbarians' deeds, Thucydides seems to give attention only to the dishonourable ones, and only on the part of the Greeks.¹²¹ To avoid extensive elaboration on subjects that are disagreeable for the recipients, especially such that do not shed positive light on one's *patria*, is a universal rhetorical rule. It undermines the moral instructiveness which ought to be a quality of the work.¹²² Thucydides' diminishing of times past is also mentioned by Dionysius in a pejorative sense, a charge consistent with his attitude to the distant past.¹²³ Dionysius also adduces an argument from Thucydides' *prooemium* to emphasize that this was undertaken deliberately and voluntarily: ταῦτα ἐκὼν ἐλόμενος (3, 7).

4.2.2 Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides' choice for the starting point of his narrative

The second element discussed is the beginning and end of the narrative (ἄρξασθαι καὶ μέχρι τοῦ προελθεῖν δεῖ). Again, Herodotus is superior. While Herodotus begins with the reasons for the barbarians' conflict with the Greeks, and ends with the just retribution, Thucydides commences where Greek affairs begin to decline:

3, 8–9: φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τούτῳ Θουκυδίδου πολλὸν Ἡρόδοτος φρονιμώτερος· ἄρχεται τε ἀφ' ἧς αἰτίας ἤρξαντο πρῶτον κακῶς ποιεῖν τοὺς Ἕλληνας οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ προελθὼν εἰς τὴν <τῶν> βαρβάρων κόλασιν καὶ τιμωρίαν λήγει. ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης ἀρχὴν μὲν ἐποιήσατο ἀφ' ἧς ἤρξατο κακῶς πράττειν τὸ Ἑλληνικόν.¹²⁴

Such a plan is unsuitable for an Athenian, and proves Thucydides' malice:

3, 9: ὅπερ Ἕλληνα ὄντα καὶ Ἀθηναῖον οὐκ ἔδει ποιεῖν (καὶ ταῦτα οὐ τῶν ἀπερριμμένων ὄντα, ἀλλ' ὧν ἐν πρώτοις ἦγον Ἀθηναῖοι στρατηγιῶν τε καὶ [τῶν] ἄλλων τιμῶν ἀξιούντες)· καὶ οὕτω γε φθονερῶς, ὥστε καὶ τῇ πόλει τῇ αὐτοῦ τὰς

¹²¹ It is reinforced by the word διαγγελούσης Dionysius uses for what Thucydides' work actually does: it "denounces" the tragic actions of the Greeks, cf. Thuc. VII 73, 4.

¹²² Fornaro 1997, 177–179.

¹²³ *Ibidem*, 181: "Tucidide è accusato, invece, di aver denigrato volontariamente gli avvenimenti più antichi, argomento – sembra a Dionisio, in linea con la sua scelta isocratea – grandissimo, l'unico ad avere dignità letteraria."

¹²⁴ "In this respect, again, Herodotus displays far better judgement than Thucydides. He begins with the cause of the original injuries done to the Greeks by the barbarians, and goes on his way till he ends with the punishment and retribution which befell them. Thucydides, on the contrary, starts with the incipient decline of the Greek world."

φανερὰς αἰτίας τοῦ πολέμου περιάπτειν, ἑτέραις ἔχοντα πολλαῖς ἀφορμαῖς περιάψαι τὰς αἰτίας.¹²⁵

Again, in managing the content of historical writing, moral/ethical qualities are involved. Dionysius suggests that Thucydides ascribed the reasons for the war to his own city φθονερῶς: due to “malice, envy”. The end of Thucydides’ *History* is even more faulty, lacks impressiveness and is unpleasant for the recipients (3, 10).

4.2.3 Dionysius’ criticism of Thucydides’ selection of information

The third element is the choice of material to be included in and excluded from the historical work (τίνα τε δεῖ παραλαβεῖν ἐπὶ τὴν γραφὴν πράγματα καὶ τίνα παραλιπεῖν). In this respect Thucydides is again considered inferior by Dionysius, since he does not make sufficient interruptions in the narrative, so that the hearer’s mind becomes exhausted (3, 11–12). In this case, the delight that results from hearing or reading historical writing is a criterion (τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἀκροωμένων ἡδέως διατίθῃσιν: 3, 11), which comes about when proper change and variety are employed (3, 12). To bolster his argument against Thucydides, Dionysius again draws attention to the fact that in some parts of the historian’s work such welcome digressions occur (3, 12). This is, most probably, stressed to underline once more the deliberate, not accidental, nature of Thucydides’ errors.

4.2.4 Dionysius’ criticism of Thucydides’ distribution of material

The fourth task of the historian is to distribute his material and give it a proper place in the narrative (διελέσθαι τε καὶ τάξαι τῶν δηλουμένων ἕκαστον ἐν ᾧ δεῖ τόπω).¹²⁶ Thucydides’ chronological *taxis* is, Dionysius says, less clear and harder to follow than Herodotus’, whose narrative is organized on the basis of the events themselves (3, 13). This choice causes interruptions, since events occur at the same time at various places, hence there is a need to leave one process to give an account of another. Herodotus’ account, in comparison, is continuous even though it comprises over two hundred years (οὐ διέσπασε τὴν

¹²⁵ “This should not have been done by a Greek and an Athenian, and (what is more) no unappreciated citizen but one to whom his countrymen assigned a foremost place, entrusting him with commands and offices generally. In his malice, he finds the overt causes of the war in the conduct of his own city, although he might have found many other grounds for the outbreak.”

¹²⁶ Sacks 1983, 69; 81, notes that τάξις is here nearly identical with οἰκονομία, whereas in *Thuc.* the element of the proper beginning and end (*Thuc.* 10–12), the διαίρεσις (*Thuc.* 9), and ἐξεργασία, the “proper balance” or “proper development of the material” (*Thuc.* 13–20) are also a part of this concept.

διήγησιν: 3, 14). The contrast between the two historians is evident, as Thucydides chose a single subject and divided the narrative into parts, whereas Herodotus choose manifold subjects, and made them into an organic whole (3, 14).

4.2.5 Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides' moral attitude

The last crucial element is the historian's attitude towards the material narrated (τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ συγγραφέως διάθεσιν, ἣ κέχρηται πρὸς τὰ πράγματα περὶ ὧν γράφει). Dionysius emphasizes the importance of this aspect as equal to the four already discussed: οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν εἰρημένων ἦττον ἐν ἀπάσαις ἱστορίαις ζητοῦμεν. Again, Thucydides is regarded as inferior:

3, 15: ἡ μὲν Ἡροδότου διάθεσις ἐν ἅπασιν ἐπιεικὴς καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς συνηδομένη, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς συναλγοῦσα· ἡ δὲ Θουκυδίδου [διάθεσις] αὐθέκαστος τις καὶ πικρὰ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι τῆς φυγῆς μνησικακοῦσα.¹²⁷

This part of the assessment is laden with moral terminology: Herodotus' διάθεσις is called more “just” (ἐπιεικής), since he shows distress at the bad, and pleasure at the good. In contrast, Thucydides' attitude is “outspoken” (αὐθέκαστος), “harsh” (πικρὰ) and reveals his grudge against his own city, caused, Dionysius suggests, by his exile (τῇ πατρίδι τῆς φυγῆς μνησικακοῦσα). Because of this, Thucydides enumerates and describes in detail Athens' mistakes, whereas its successes are left unmentioned, “as if under constraint” (3, 15: ὥσπερ ἡναγκασμένος).

4.2.6 Dionysius' criticism of Thucydides in the *Pomp.*: a summary

To sum up, in the πραγματικὸς τόπος, in all five parts, Dionysius' judgement is passed in favour of Herodotus. Here it is not my aim to assess whether the above charges against Thucydides are justified,¹²⁸ but to explain Dionysius' treatment of Thucydides in terms of his historiographical precepts. From this overview we can draw several conclusions:

¹²⁷ “The attitude of Herodotus is fair throughout, showing pleasure in the good and grief at the bad. That of Thucydides, on the contrary, is severe and harsh and proves that he bears a grudge against his country because of his exile.”

¹²⁸ Wichmann 1878, 5–9 systematically argues against the “charges” elaborated by Dionysius in the *Letter*; 10–28: the deficiencies in λεκτικὸς τόπος from both the *Letter* and *De Thucydide* are questioned. In Wichmann's opinion he was a malignant and unbalanced critic. Yet his eagerness in this defence seems to be exaggerated: “Fuit igitur non tantum severus, sed etiam iniquus censor [...]” (p. 31).

1. In the *Letter* Thucydides and Herodotus are at the centre of Greek historiography, and both constitute a point of departure and models for other historians.

2. The *πραγματικὸς τόπος*, the choice and elaboration of the subject matter is couched in terminology relating to ethics.

3. Thucydides is inferior to Herodotus in all five historiographical criteria of the *πραγματικὸς τόπος*.

4. Dionysius expressly highlights the voluntary and deliberate character of Thucydides' errors.

5. The main reason for Thucydides' faults is his mindset, his attitude towards his own city.

The five tasks of historian are mentioned in Dionysius' preface to his own historiographical work: the *Antiquities*.¹²⁹ The consistency and systematic character of the above argument proves that "Dionysius' idea of historical truth rested upon a coherent and well-defined set of values".¹³⁰ In this set of values not only the technical aspect is relevant: three of the five tasks pertaining to the *πραγματικὸς τόπος* are defined in moral terms. Dionysius' theoretic categories touch upon the problem of what type of interpretation is fitting for the historian to make. In the case of Thucydides, the central fault is his attitude towards his own homeland, which "compels him" (cf. 3, 15 above) to concentrate on its failures, and to make wrong choices in the treatment of the events he describes. An important case is Thucydides' account of the causes of the war, which he attributes to the Athenians "out of envy" (*φθονεῶς*).

4.3 Thucydides' *φθόνος* and the moral view of historiography

Thucydides' *φθόνος* recurs in *De Thucydide*, 37–41, on the occasion of Dionysius' critique of the Melian Dialogue. After an analysis and negative evaluation of the language and content of the dialogue, particularly of the "immoral" statements of the Athenians,¹³¹ Dionysius concludes by speculating on the reasons for such a treatment of the episode by Thucydides (*Thuc.* 41, 8):

εἰ μὴ ἄρα *μνησικακῶν ὁ συγγραφεὺς τῇ πόλει* διὰ τὴν καταδίκην ταῦτα τὰ ὀνειδῆ κατεσκέδασεν αὐτῆς, ἐξ ὧν ἅπαντες μισήσιν αὐτὴν ἔμελλον. ἃ γὰρ οἱ προεσ-

¹²⁹ Sacks 1983, 80–81; Fox 1993, 32–35, on the preface.

¹³⁰ Fox 1993, 37; cf. p. 38.

¹³¹ Dionysius seems to completely ignore the symbouleutic setting of the Dialogue, which necessitates "harsh" arguments referring to expediency. On the rhetorical prescriptions that partly determine the content and argumentation of the Athenians in the Dialogue see Kurpios 2015, 240–256.

τηκότες τῶν πόλεων καὶ τηλικαύτας ἐξουσίας πιστευόμενοι φρονεῖν τε καὶ λέγειν
 <εὐοίκασιν> πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ὑπὲρ τῆς αὐτῶν πατρίδος, ταῦτα κοινὰ ὑπολαμ-
 βάνουσιν ἅπαντες εἶναι τῆς ἀποστελλούσης πόλεως αὐτοῦς.¹³²

Dionysius suggests that Thucydides, by making the Athenians' position in the Dialogue so harsh and relentless, intended to denigrate the whole city, since they were its representatives. Such a choice and arrangement of the facts of the Peloponnesian War produce an interpretation that is unacceptable for Dionysius. This analysis shows Dionysius' deep understanding of the complex relationship between facts and interpretation, between the historian's subjective point of view and the way in which he organizes his material. His assessment of Thucydides cannot be properly explained without taking Dionysius' preconceptions into account. In the part of the *Letter* under analysis, the first preconception is certainly that the historian should choose a "good" subject, that is, one pleasing for the recipients. What can be striking for the modern reader is that in this survey of historical methods Dionysius does not refer to the notion of truth. The moral conceptualization substitutes categories of objectivity and consideration of the events themselves. However, an account that is arranged and structured wrongly must be considered to be falsifying reality, and Dionysius' criticism seems to imply such a conclusion.

¹³² "Unless it be that the historian is harboring a grudge against the city on account of his condemnation and is showering upon it these reproaches which were bound to cause it to be hated by all men. For the views and statements which the leaders of the cities and the men entrusted with such great power seem to hold and to express before other cities on behalf of their own city – these views and statements all men look upon as shared by the city which dispatches them" (transl. Pritchett).

CHAPTER FIVE

THUCYDIDES' NARRATIVE QUALITIES AND THE HELLENISTIC HISTORIOGRAPHY

1. Introduction: aims and argument of this chapter

Modern scholars have viewed Thucydides as fundamentally different from such Hellenistic authors as Duris or Phylarchus, because he was “pragmatic”, “rationalistic” and recounted “bare facts”, in contrast to their tendency to be “sensational”.¹ In the grand scheme, currents traditionally distinguished within Hellenistic historiography, so-called “rhetorical” and “tragic history”, were set in antithesis to the (alleged) pragmatic model represented by Thucydides. In the most general terms, that opposition was a contrast between “serious”, “scientific” and “artistic” or “literary” historiography.² According to this view, historical truth and stylistic, emotional or rhetorically embellished narrative are mutually exclusive.³ In this long-lasting paradigm, Thucydides was representative of the first approach, and in the Hellenistic period, the only historians who tried to continue it were Polybius and Hieronymus of Cardia.⁴ Such a perspective excluded Thucydides from the “mainstream” of the Hellenistic historiography, and implied that the reaction to his work in this period was rather weak.

However, some interpreters pointed to the simplistic nature of such a distinction between Thucydides and the rhetorical/tragic models from the Hellenistic period. An appeal to emotions and rhetorical effects were identified as characteristics of historiography from its very origins.⁵ Certain scholars have tried to

¹ Duris and Phylarchus in particular were identified as tragic historians; see e.g. Meister 1990, 95: “Begründer und Hauptvertreter Duris von Samos und Phylarchos”.

² Lachenaud 2004, 75: “La préface de Thucydide jette les fondements d’une éternelle controverse: l’art. littéraire est-il compatible avec la recherche de la vérité et les exigences épistémologiques du genre historique?”

³ Already Strebel 1935, 23: “In scharfem Gegensatz zu diesen rhetorisierenden Geschichtswerken steht die pragmatische Geschichtsschreibung des Polybios”; Hornblower 1994, 43: Hieronymus of Cardia as a “pragmatic”, Thucydidean historian; p. 44: tragic history is a “disgraced concept”, but can still serve as a tool for interpretation.

⁴ Siegfried 1928, 26–231, is entirely based on this antithesis. Bury 1909, 174: Duris as a representative of the current antithetical to Thucydides, which Bury calls a “[...] corruption, as we call it, of history”; Africa 1961, 49–50, identifies Polybius and Thucydides as the “part-time practitioners of tragic history”, but Thucydides is generally seen as avoiding “sensationalism”; Roveri 1964, 26–34: post-Thucydidean historiography as either rhetorical or tragic; cf. Malitz 1990, 335–338; Rebenich 1997, 265–337: tragic and rhetorical historiography as opposite currents; cf. Hose 2009, 213; Dillery 2011, 184.

⁵ Walbank 1960, 216–234; Marincola 2003, 285–287; Rutherford 2007, 504–514. Cf. Baron 2013, 5–7, on the distorting divisions into tragic/rhetorical/pragmatic historiography. See

advance a thesis contrary to the *opinio communis*, namely that Thucydides was in fact the inventor and pioneer of the application of certain artistic and emotional effects to historical writing.⁶ Nearly forty years ago, Donald Lateiner advanced a thesis that Thucydides' use of emotive effects impacted the Hellenistic historians in this aspect of their works.⁷ Lateiner tried to show how important the element of suffering, of the terrible experiences of war, is in Thucydides' *History*. His method was to explore passages in Thucydides where the word *πάθος/παθητικόν* occurs, in order to show how he (Thucydides) highlights and emphasizes the magnitude of the horrors of war. The scholar has thus attempted to falsify the dichotomy between the "scientific" historiography identified with Thucydides on the one hand, and the "artistic" (tragic, rhetorical, etc.) on the other. Nevertheless, Lateiner's reading of Thucydides emerged at a specific time in scholarship on the humanities, when the postmodern approach to historiography was attractive. His interpretation of Thucydides is marked with notions and ideas characteristic of the new current, e.g. he treats the concept of "science" as a "metaphor", operating within terminology coined by Hayden White.⁸ Most importantly, however, Lateiner has neither attempted to inquire into the specific points of connection between Thucydides and the Hellenistic historians in the field of *πάθος*, nor has he tried to define precisely the character of this connection. Klaus Meister speculated on Thucydides' influence on what he calls the "dramatic" or "tragic" current in Hellenistic historiography.⁹ Meister advanced a thesis that Thucydides' work was a stimulus for Duris and Phylarchus, two historians associated with the "dramatic" approach to history.

also Marincola 2001, 111–112, esp. p. 110, which remarks that from the beginning historians have aimed at arousing emotion or at rhetorical embellishment. This approach was adumbrated by Kebric 1977, 15; 32; see also Fromentin 2001, 77–92. New approaches intending to unite historiography and tragedy are summarized by Longley 2013, 6808–6810.

⁶ Classical is Hunter 1971, 14–19 and Hunter 1973.

⁷ Lateiner 1977, 51: "Hellenistic historiography owes a debt to Thucydides in its exploitation of *πάθος*. Once we perceive '*πάθος*' in Thucydides, it will be easier to explain its development in later authors."

⁸ Lateiner 1977, 43: "The 'science' metaphor and model continue to beleaguer the study of history." See the critique of White from a classicist position, justifiable in many respects, by Momigliano 1984a, 49–59.

⁹ Meister 2013, 44: "Zwar läßt sich die Abhängigkeit der tragischen Historiographie von Thukydides *stricto sensu* nicht beweisen, doch ist es sehr wahrscheinlich, daß dieser die Entstehung und Entwicklung sowohl der rhetorischen als auch der dramatischen Geschichtsschreibung, die in der Zeit des Hellenismus ebenfalls zahlreiche Vertreter fand, maßgeblich beeinflusst hat." In the present work the idea of a school of "tragic historiography" is rejected. But Meister seems to operate within this paradigm; to go beyond it in assessing Thucydides' affinity with Hellenistic historians is one of the chief aims of this chapter, as well as of the present work as a whole.

He identifies the artistic or rhetorical effects of ἐνάργεια and πάθος as the field in which Thucydides influenced or inspired these authors.¹⁰ The scholar does not specify how he understands Duris' and Phylarchus' attempts to "surpass" ("übertreffen") Thucydides in "dramatic vividness and emotional impact on the reader" ("dramatischer Anschaulichkeit und emotionaler Beeinflussung des Lesers"). He supports his hypothesis with Plutarch's assesment of Thucydides' narrative in *De gloria Atheniensium*, and associates it with Duris' *prooemium*, as well as with Polybius' critique of the "dramatism" of Phylarchus. Yet due to a lack of deeper inquiry, Meister remains on the level of mere verbal associations, and his thesis, as it stands, is unfounded.¹¹ Despite the weak points in their approaches, both Lateiner and Meister rightly emphasized the primary importance of ancient readers' perception of certain aspects of Thucydidean narrative, which appears to be in contrast with the long-lasting modern perspective on Thucydidean methodology. Particularly relevant here are Dionysius and Plutarch, who commented upon Thucydides' specific features, especially his ability to depict events vividly and to arouse emotion.¹²

In the present chapter, Meister's and Lateiner's thesis is tested and developed with reference to all relevant sources that treat the notions of πάθος and ἐνάργεια in literary theories, in connection with Thucydides. The point of the chapter is to show an affinity between Thucydides and historians who were traditionally seen as his "opposites". I aim to demonstrate: a) how he was read by the ancient critics, b) that his literary qualities were regarded as essential by Polybius, Agatharchides, Duris and Timaeus, c) that specific parts of the *History* were recognized as masterpieces of artistic treatment, d) that Thucydides could have influenced the historiographical theory of the Peripatetic school, at least in the field of πάθος and ἐνάργεια. The last point means to substantiate the thesis that the appreciation of Thucydides, in this case of πάθος and ἐνάργεια in his work, originated and developed in the Peripatetic school. Several scholars have pointed out that certain elements of historiographical theory in Dionysius, Lucian and Plutarch have Hellenistic roots.¹³ I also try to highlight a link between the Hellenistic (mostly Peripatetic) background of these authors'

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, 43. Cf. Fornara 1983, 129–130: Duris could be influenced by Thucydides in the concept of μίμησις.

¹¹ Meister does not take into account various essential aspects of the problem, particularly the epic roots of the concept of ἐνάργεια (see below, pp. 230–231). In his reading of Duris and Phylarchus Meister seems to rely on secondary literature.

¹² Lateiner 1977, 51; Meister 2013, 43.

¹³ Homeyer 1965, 45–60; Brunt 1979, 328; 336–338.

historiographical concepts and their (highly positive) assessment of Thucydides.

2. Definitions of πάθος and ἐνάργεια

2.1 Basic understanding of πάθος

The notion of πάθος played an important role in rhetorical and poetic terminology throughout antiquity.¹⁴ Aristotle provides the basic rhetorical meaning of πάθος; a simple definition — πάθος means “emotion”. Translating πάθος as “passion” is incorrect, as the concept also includes mild affection.¹⁵ The sense of the word is sometimes close to the “state” or “condition” of the soul, which is temporary and liable to change. In the most general terms πάθος is “experience”.¹⁶ This last sense proves particularly relevant and adequate in the context of historiography. πάθος can be aroused by any text that is composed in a certain way. The purely technical aspect of arousing emotions was conceptualized by Aristotle as παθητικὴ λέξις (“emotional style/language”).¹⁷ Such λέξις is aimed at showing the emotions of the speaker on the one hand, and at the emotional response of the audience on the other (*Rhet.* III 1408 a23–24). According to some interpreters, in the *Rhetoric* πάθη are associated more with the desired emotional impact on the audience,¹⁸ rather than with the affectation of the speaker himself. Still, expressions of emotion on the part of the orator are accepted.¹⁹ The meaning of πάθος remains basically the same for other authors throughout the Hellenistic period. Dionysius of Halicarnassus says that emotional effects are connected to such qualities as are characteristic

¹⁴ Cf. a comprehensive overview in Martin 1974, 158–166.

¹⁵ Arist. *Rhet.* II 1378b–1388b, with 15 types of πάθη treated by the Stagirite; for an insightful analysis of the Aristotelian understanding of πάθος, see Wisse 1989, 65–74. Cf. Cope 1867, 113–118; Kennedy 1963, 93–94. Dachselt 2003, 37–72, is informative for the ancient idea of πάθος in all literary genres (for Aristotle: pp. 73–77). For general classifications and definitions Ernesti 1795, 238, is still useful. See also Lausberg 1990, 869: “Gemütserschütterung (Gegensatz: ἡθος) A) vom Redner (Dichter) selbst auf Grund von Phantasiebildern empfunden, b) im Publikum bewirkt, C) als Gegenstand der μίμησις dargestellt – in der *evidentia* [...] in der *sermocinatio*”; cf. par. 257, pp. 141–143: as part of the attempt to move the audience, to arouse emotions.

¹⁶ The whole analysis of πάθη is Arist. *Rhet.* II 1378 a20–28; see the commentary of Grimaldi 1988, 12–18, which rightly underscores Aristotle’s pioneering role in defining and describing the role of emotions in oratory.

See Wisse 1989, 71 with examples cited in n. 301 and p. 71 with n. 303

¹⁷ Arist. *Rhet.* III 1408a.

¹⁸ Gill 1984, 152–153.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, 154.

of the grand style.²⁰ The emphasis is on the aesthetic response of the recipients, and the chief tool to achieve this is specific types of expression.²¹ In sum, Aristotle was the first to articulate the notion of *πάθος*, but he restricted it to the sphere of rhetoric. *πάθος* means “emotion” aroused in a recipient of a text, but also “experience”. It is an effect of specific linguistic tools. This definition is also found in an unchanged form in Dionysius of Halicarnassus.

2.2 The concept of *ἐνάργεια*

2.2.1 *ἐνάργεια*: an outline of the problem

Meister pointed to the fact that Plutarch, in a reference to Thucydides' narrative, connects the emotional element with the notion of *ἐνάργεια* (*παθητικώτατος ἐναργέστατος*).²² Meister seems to rely on a simplified understanding of *ἐνάργεια* as an artistic effect, with no regard to the ancient implications of the term. The concept of *ἐνάργεια* was present in literary criticism at least from the second century BC.²³ Until recently scholars have generally assumed that *ἐνάργεια* was a concept initially used and developed by rhetoricians, and only later applied to historiography.²⁴ They believed that in the field of historiography *ἐνάργεια* and the complementary notion of *πάθος* were ideas pertaining to “sensational” or “tragic” historiography, contrasted with “pragmatic” history. This paradigm would identify *ἐνάργεια* and *πάθος* — in contrast to tragedy and epic — as a secondary result, rather than one of the chief aspects of historical narrative.²⁵ However, the origins of the concept of *ἐνάργεια* have been recently inquired into anew, bringing a revision of that traditional view. Francesco Berardi, in the first monograph on *ἐνάργεια*, argues convincingly that *ἐνάργεια* was a notion that actually *originated* in historiography, before

²⁰ Cf. Ps.-Longinus, *Subl.* 8.1; 16.1, where *πάθος* and *ῥυψος* are produced by certain stylistic features.

²¹ *Comp.* 11. Gill 1984, 158, seems to go too far in reading this passage as a definition of “emotional style”. Dionysius does use the word *παθητικόν* in this connection; this is about the types of styles with their proper nomenclature; cf. *Comp.* 11: *πάθος* is one of the qualities. See *Dem.* 18, 5 on Isocrates' style. Dionysius also complimented Demosthenes' ability to arouse various emotions in his audience, whereas Isocrates is better at representing *ἥθη*: *Dem.* 22.

²² This problem was completely ignored by Lateiner.

²³ Zanker 1981, 305–307; Meijering 1987, 30; Berardi 2012, 11: “Già di questi semplici riferimenti è possibile intuire come l'*ἐνάργεια* sia fenomeno tipicamente ellenistico, nato cioè in quella epoca in cui diversi settori del sapere (scienza, filosofia, arte) mostrano una piena conoscenza dei processi di visione e osservazione.” On the philosophical connotations and the development of the concept of *ἐνάργεια* in Greek philosophy in general see Zangara 2007, 234–238.

²⁴ Zanker 1981, 307. Cf. Roveri 1964, 75–76, on *ἐνάργεια* in historiography in general.

²⁵ Meijering 1987, 47.

entering into rhetorical or literary theories.²⁶ The effects of πάθος and ἐνάργεια can be read as constituent, rather than additional, elements of historical practice. This shift of perspective impacts our answers to the questions posed by Lateiner and Meister. In particular, it necessitates a reinterpretation of statements about Thucydides' ἐνάργεια and πάθος, and thereby, of his place within Hellenistic historiographical theory and practice.

2.2.2 Definitions of ἐνάργεια

i. Definition in the Ps.-Dem. Περὶ ἑρμηνείας

What is the sense of ἐνάργεια and its derivatives? The Greek word is connected with the adjective ἀργός: “shining”, “bright”, but also “swift”, thus “in movement”. The adjective ἐνάργεια can be found frequently in such senses as: “manifest to one’s eyes” and “visible”, “palpable”, e.g. of bodily shape.²⁷ This etymology, but especially the contexts where ἐνάργεια and its derivatives occur, shows that it is strictly associated with the sense of vision. The first explicit definition of ἐνάργεια is found in pseudo-Demetrius’ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας (Ps.-Dem. *De eloc.* 209):²⁸

Πρῶτον δὲ περὶ ἐναργείας· γίνεται δ’ ἡ ἐνάργεια πρῶτα μὲν ἐξ ἀκριβολογίας καὶ τοῦ παραλείπειν μηδὲν μηδ’ ἐκτέμνειν, οἷον ὡς δ’ ὅτ’ ἀνὴρ ὀχετηγὸς καὶ πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ παραβολή· τὸ γὰρ ἐναργὲς ἔχει ἐκ τοῦ πάντα εἰρησθαι τὰ συμβαίνοντα, καὶ μὴ παραλελείφθαι μηδέν.²⁹

This definition is valuable, since it describes the means by which ἐνάργεια can be achieved. Firstly, the account should be precise and include everything (ἐξ ἀκριβολογίας καὶ τοῦ παραλείπειν μηδὲν μηδ’ ἐκτέμνειν).³⁰ Details need to be

²⁶ Berardi 2012, 49. Berardi’s enquiry is the most detailed and comprehensive study of ἐνάργεια to date. Such a view was earlier articulated by Zangara 2007, 74–75, but Berardi was first to present argumentation for it.

²⁷ LSJ, s.v. ἀργός; cf. Frisk, GEW, 510: “klar, sichtbar, erkennbar, lebhaftig”; Beekes, EDG, s.v. ἐναργής: “clear, visible, recognizable, living”. See Berardi 2012, 33.

²⁸ General observations on this paragraph: Schepens 1975, 198; Marini 2007, 261; Meijering 1987, 39. For the dating of the treatise and the figure of its author see chapter two, p. 58 n. 106.

²⁹ “We shall treat first of vividness, which arises from an exact narration overlooking no detail and cutting out nothing, e.g. ‘As when a man draws off water by a runnel’. The comparison owes its vividness to the fact that all the accompanying circumstances are mentioned and nothing is omitted” (all translations of *De elocutione* are of Rhys Roberts). The quotation here is from the *Iliad*, XXI 257.

³⁰ All “circumstantial details” should be included, *De eloc.* 210: τοῦ μηδὲν παραλελείφθαι τῶν τε συμβαινόντων καὶ συμβάντων. Cf. par. 217: Γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ παρεπόμενα τοῖς πράγμασι λέγειν ἐνάργεια.

related with carefully chosen words, so that they bring the relevant images to the recipients' minds.³¹ A thorough visual "reconstruction" of a given scene or action provides the recipient (reader or hearer) with similar sensations to those experienced by the eyewitnesses.³² This is the chief feature of a text that produces the impression that we are observing reality ("l'effet de réel").³³ Ps.-Demetrius also stresses the role of imitation in creating ἐνάργεια: πάσα δὲ μίμησις ἐναργές τι ἔχει (par. 219). Although the notion of μίμησις is only touched upon in the context of discussing onomatopoeia, the overall claim that "every μίμησις effects ἐνάργεια" should be noted.³⁴ In the same chapter the author also hints at the relationship between ἐνάργεια and πάθος (214):³⁵

ἀλλ' εἰ ἀφέλοις θάτερον, συναφαιρήσεις καὶ τὴν ἐνάργειαν καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθος.³⁶

The above passage makes clear the relation between ἐνάργεια and πάθος: πάθος results from ἐνάργεια (ἐκ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθος). This also makes the text more "revealing" or "more powerful": (τὸ γὰρ δὴ γεγονὸς δηλότερον/δεινότερον³⁷ τοῦ μέλλοντος).³⁸ For Ps.-Demetrius, the role of the elements of ἐνάργεια and πάθος is what unites the genres of historiography and (epic) poetry.³⁹ Another

³¹ Cf. par. 218: ἡ δὲ ἐνάργεια γέγονεν ἐκ τῆς φροντίδος τῆς περὶ τὸν λόγον καὶ τοῦ ἀπομνημονεύσαι.

³² Berardi 2012, 38. Completeness is also a requirement for vividness in Quint. *Inst.* VIII 3, 63. See also evidence for a similar understanding of ἐνάργεια, that emphasizes turning the reader into a spectator, in the scholia: Meijering 1987, 39–42. Nünlist 2011, 195–198, shows how the scholia placed heavy emphasis on detail as productive of ἐνάργεια.

³³ Nünlist 2011, 196 derives this phrase from Barthes, and continues: "the wealth of detail makes the reader feel that the account is authentic."

³⁴ It is significant that this correlation, μίμησις-ἐνάργεια, is mentioned in passing, as a fact that does not require any argument or elaboration; it seems that it is evident for the author of the treatise.

³⁵ Marini 2007, 263, refers us to the similar link in Ps.-Long. *Subl.* 15.1.

³⁶ "But if you take away one of the two, you will also take away the vividness and the emotional effect of vividness."

³⁷ Some manuscripts have δεινότερον, but Latin translations read *evidentius* here. Radermacher, taking this into account, corrects the text to δηλότερον. See Marini 2007, 263 *ad loc.*

³⁸ See Marini 2007, 263 *ad loc.* He aptly notes the possible confusion that could be caused by this statement, since ἐνάργεια aims usually at presenting the actions as happening right now, not as being in the past, whereas here Ps.-Demetrius seems to state the opposite. Yet the given example makes it clear that in this particular case to make the events irreversible gives them a more impressive character than to make them "undone".

³⁹ In the section about ἐνάργεια, the author of *Περὶ ἐρμηνείας* goes from its definition, through the example from the *Iliad*, to Ctesias the historian, who is praised for being a good example of an author whose work presents such literary qualities that he may be called "a poet" (215): Καὶ ὅλως δὲ ὁ ποιητὴς οὗτος (ποιητὴν γὰρ <ἂν> αὐτὸν καλοῖη τις εἰκότως) ἐναργείας δημιουργός ἐστιν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ συμπάση ("Altogether this poet (for a poet Ctesias may well be

essential point is that Ps.-Demetrius' definition highlights ἐνάργεια as a feature of narrative parts, not of oratorical ones.⁴⁰

In sum, the definition of ἐνάργεια comprises three elements: a) the content (number and character of included details), b) style (e.g. repetitions), c) imitation — μίμησις.

ii. The definition of ἐνάργεια in Dionysius

Dionysius of Halicarnassus' definition of ἐνάργεια connects it even more explicitly with the idea of πάθος. It occurs in one of the treatises on the Greek orators (*Lys.* 7).⁴¹ In Dionysius' explanation, ἐνάργεια is a characteristic of language (λέξις) that produces an effect of "bringing things before the eyes of the listeners" (ὕπὸ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἄγουσα τὰ λεγόμενα) and making them "see what is narrated" (τὰ δηλούμενα ὁρᾶν). ἐνάργεια is the visual image suggested (produced) by a text. It is achieved primarily by relating not only the plain facts, but also the accompanying circumstances (ἐκ τῆς τῶν παρακολουθούντων λήψεως).⁴² Through ἐνάργεια author builds the illusion of realism, reproduces reality in the recipients' minds, to the effect that they "become present" (ὥσπερ παροῦσιν). The connection of ἐνάργεια with μίμησις is not stated explicitly as it is in *De elocutione*, but seems to be implied.⁴³ The definition appears in a treatise that has been proved most influenced by Peripatetic, specifically Theophrastus', rhetorical/literary theories.⁴⁴ Theophrastus is quoted in a paragraph

called) is an artist in vividness throughout his writings"). Ps.-Dem. illustrates his definition of ἐνάργεια with instances not from poetry in general, but rather from epic, specifically the *Iliad*. Cf. Ps.-Dem. *De eloc.* 113: Thucydides' use of Homeric expressions (with a specific "adaptation" of it). Significantly, Ps.-Dem. gives no examples from oratory, ἐνάργεια and πάθος seem to be connected strictly with history and epic. He only quotes a sentence from Plato's *Protagoras* 312a, which is of a narrative character (a description of outward appearance the person of Hippocrates).

⁴⁰ Berardi 2012, 38–39.

⁴¹ On this definition in Dionysius in particular see: Zanker 1981, 297; Meijering 1987, 30; Walker 1993, 369. Berardi 2012, 20 considers this passage "la più accurata definizione di ἐνάργεια che sia possibile leggere tra le fonti retoriche antiche". Cf. ἐνάργεια in Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3, 17. On ἐνάργεια in Dionysius in general see Berardi 2012, 67–69.

⁴² Meijering 1987, 30, notes that "Dionysius does not specify how the writer is to do this", that is, how to detect the proper παρακολουθούντα of the specific case. Dionysius seems to assume that one should simply have knowledge of them. In this respect Polybius is revealing (see below, pp. 263–264), as he explicitly demands first-hand knowledge of the facts, or personal experience of at least similar ones, if ἐνάργεια is to be achieved. Zangara 2007, 61–62, states that personal experience is not a desideratum for Dionysius, Plutarch, or Lucian, but we probably should allow for the implicit assumptions of these authors on this point (see e.g. below, pp. 236–237 on Plutarch's primacy of αὐτοψία).

⁴³ On this connection see Lausberg 1990, par. 810.

⁴⁴ Aujac 1978, 179, in a comment on the passage that will be analyzed in this section, poses the thesis that the notion of ἐνάργεια has peripatetic roots. Similarly Solmsen 1931, 261.

that immediately precedes the definition of ἐνάργεια, and later on as well.⁴⁵ Dionysius also follows him in sections 2–14.⁴⁶ It is therefore likely that the above definition of ἐνάργεια derives directly from Theophrastus.

It is worth noting that the wide use made of Theophrastus in the *Lysias* comes together with positive judgements about Thucydides expressed in the treatise. That can be treated as an indication that Theophrastus could have expressed his appreciative opinion about our historian in his work *Περὶ λέξεως*, to which Dionysius refers.⁴⁷ It is not unreasonable to infer that, although we lack explicit evidence on this, Theophrastus himself made particular remarks about Thucydides' ἐνάργεια.

iii. Lucian's definition of ἐνάργεια in the context of Thucydides' *History*

A definition of ἐνάργεια also occurs in Lucian's treatise *On the Writing of History*. Thucydides is praised because of his ability to depict the events recounted. The crucial passage is the following (51):⁴⁸

Τοιοῦτο δὴ τι καὶ τὸ τοῦ συγγραφέως ἔργον – εἰς καλὸν διαθέσθαι τὰ πεπραγμένα καὶ εἰς δύναμιν ἐναργέστατα ἐπιδείξαι αὐτά. καὶ ὅταν τις ἀκροώμενος οἴηται μετὰ ταῦτα ὁρᾶν τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπαινῇ, τότε δὴ τότε ἀπηκρίβωται καὶ τὸν οἰκεῖον ἔπαινον ἀπέλιπε τὸ ἔργον τῷ τῆς ἱστορίας Φειδίᾳ.⁴⁹

Lucian expresses the view that “to represent reality with utmost vividness” (ἐναργέστατα ἐπιδείξαι) is one of the main requirements of historical writing (τὸ τοῦ συγγραφέως ἔργον). The goal of vivid description is, as in the above definitions, to make the recipient “see things which are narrated” (ὁρᾶν τὰ

⁴⁵ Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 6: ἡς Θεόφραστος μὲν φησιν; 14: τί δὴ ποτε παθὼν ὁ Θεόφραστος [...] τὴν λέξιν αὐτὴν θεῖναι τὴν Θεοφράστου.

⁴⁶ Wooten 1994, 124–127. According to the findings of this scholar, the mention of Theophrastus in par. 6, strongly suggests that Theophrastus is the source of the “framework that Dionysius was following in this part of his essay”. Dionysius defines one of the necessary virtues, σαφήνεια, as deriving most probably from Theophrastus. He further discusses τὸ πρέπον, and introduces other elements from Theophrastus' theory.

⁴⁷ Cf. Homeyer 1965, 52–53.

⁴⁸ See Avenarius 1956, 130–140; Porod 2013, 567–575, part. p. 573; Free 2015, 33–36. Avenarius gives a rather general overview of the uses of ἐνάργεια in various sources, and points to its connection with such categories as μίμησις, πάθος, etc. Although his account has some historical value, it contributes little to the significance of ἐνάργεια for the theory of historiography. He also seems to overemphasize the influence of Gorgias on historiography in terms of the concept of μίμησις producing ἐνάργεια and ἡδονή (see Porod 2013, 574).

⁴⁹ “The task of the historian is similar: to give a fine arrangement to events and illuminate them as vividly as possible. And when a man who has heard him thinks thereafter that he is actually seeing what is being described and then praises him – then it is that the work of our Phidias of history is perfect and has received its proper praise” (all translations of Lucian's *On the Writing of History* are of Kilburn).

λεγόμενα).⁵⁰ The historian is compared to a sculptor, who makes the shapeless material beautiful.⁵¹ In terms of historiography, material is the reality that is “already there”, and proper shaping is required.⁵² Lucian also defines the work of a historian in respect of treating his information — his mind should be like a mirror (κατόπτρῳ ἐοικυῖαν παρασχέσθω τὴν γνώμην), and its function is merely to “reflect” what it “receives”.⁵³ A historian’s work is therefore concerned with how to represent reality properly, and his task is to provide a vivid and beautiful account. Robert Porod notes that Lucian differs from other authors who treated ἐνάργεια, in that he does not make any explicit connection with πάθος or emotions.⁵⁴ He is probably correct to suggest a close affinity between Lucian’s and Polybius’ understanding of ἐνάργεια, for both seem to give primary importance to vivid representation based on personal experience and observation.⁵⁵ As in Dionysius, ἐνάργεια should thus be seen in this wider context of the requirement for αὐτοψία.⁵⁶ Lucian also involves πάθος as experience together with αὐτοψία as an epistemic requisite for historiography.⁵⁷ Certain of Lucian’s concepts have been identified as deriving from Theophrastus. In particular, it has been argued that his praise of Thucydides is to a large extent dependent on what was found by him in Peripatetic works on historiography.⁵⁸ He would then be the third source where theoretical remarks

⁵⁰ Cf. Porod 2013, 567.

⁵¹ In this metaphor reality is the stone from which the proper shapes — that is historical narrative — have to be carved. There is a certain doubt as to the sense of εἰς καλὸν διαθέσθαι in this part of the sentence. Porod 2013, 567 translates: “eine adequate Gesamtkonzeption entsteht”, pointing to “non aesthetic” meaning of καλὸν. Cf. *ibidem*, 573: “das Passende”, das “Adäquate”. I do not consider it necessary here to decide between these senses; both connotations at the same time are likely to be in Lucian’s mind.

⁵² Porod 2013, 567, rightly underlines the originality of this *simile*, which is unparalleled in any of (extant) ancient texts.

⁵³ On this metaphor see Porod 2013, 568 *ad loc.*, with further literature.

⁵⁴ Cf. Porod 2013, 574. In particular, the difference from the chronologically closest Plutarch is analyzed. However, Walker 1993, 352, tends to see Lucian’s concept of ἐνάργεια as similar to other authors’, as the way to produce a graphic depiction; an image together with emotions that ensure its visualization.

⁵⁵ Porod 2013, 574.

⁵⁶ Luc. *De hist. con.* 39; Nenci 1955, 43–44. I do not agree with Nenci that in Lucian αὐτοψία “sopravviveva decaduta a mero topos”.

⁵⁷ Luc. *Ver. hist.* 1, 4: μήτε εἶδον μήτε ἔπαθον. Cf. Nenci 1955, 44.

⁵⁸ Homeyer 1965, 51–52, was, to my knowledge, the only scholar to put forward a hypothesis as to such correlation. Lucian would, according to the author, “revive” concepts from the first cent. BC, opposed to the Dionysian “school”, which tended to a negative evaluation of Thucydides. Homeyer thought that it was precisely Theophrastus that paved the way for treating Thucydides as a model of the high and, most importantly, *poetic* style of writing history. This thesis seems to find substantiation in the context of the present chapter.

about ἐνάργεια and the appreciation of Thucydides are combined with traces of Theophrastus' works.

2.2.3 ἐνάργεια in historiography: a summary

To sum up, the above exposition provides us with the following understanding of ἐνάργεια⁵⁹ as:

- a. the visual representation of reality produced by the text,
- b. an impression of realism,
- c. the graphic quality of the narrative.

ἐνάργεια is achieved by various stylistic measures and linguistic tools. The final goal is to create an image in the recipient's mind, which, in turn, leads to emotions/reactions appropriate for the given image. The main means to make a text ἐναργής are:

- i. detailed description,
- ii. reference to accompanying circumstances,
- iii. purely technical tools: repetitions, etc.

Still, ἐνάργεια is a concept with a particular place in the sphere of historiography. It touches upon the basic understanding of ἱστορία as the account of "what one has seen", implied in the very word.⁶⁰ To understand ἐνάργεια correctly, we have to take into account its roots in ancient epistemology. As has been proved, ancient Greeks and their Roman continuators regarded visual experience as the most reliable of all possible sources of knowledge (*videre = sapere*).⁶¹ The definition of ἐνάργεια seems to be directly linked with the overarching idea that vision is the most reliable witness to reality.⁶² In historiography, this general tendency was reflected in the concept of αὐτοψία — the demand for first-person witnessing of the events described or, if that is impossible, for getting first-hand knowledge from eyewitnesses.⁶³

⁵⁹ Cf. Berardi 2012, 17.

⁶⁰ Berardi 2012, 6.

⁶¹ Berardi's phrase (*ibidem*, 6–7).

⁶² See Diod. Sic. XXXIV/XXXV 28, 3; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* I 68–69 and esp. Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 6, on Theopompus' direct witnessing of the events described. See also Nenci 1955, 42.

⁶³ Nenci 1955, 14–46, shows how the idea of αὐτοψία is present in Greek epic and historiography from the Homeric poems onwards. He tries to demonstrate (with uneven success) that the concept was important until the end of the fifth century, and later lost its impact, due e.g. to Platonic currents in epistemology. Nenci seems to explain the lesser importance of αὐτοψία in the Hellenistic period by the alleged decadence of Hellenistic historiography *in toto*: "Il silenzio sul problema dell'αὐτοψία va di pari col decadere della storiografia" (p. 42). However, apart from this controversial thesis, Nenci's inquiry into the origins and development of the idea is illuminating (part. pp. 33–35 on Thucydides). Nenci makes intelligent remarks on some restrictions of fidelity to eyewitnesses in Thucydides, his scepticism as to the reliability of all

The importance of αὐτοψία in epic is reflected in the special role of eyewitnesses who provide a first-hand account, which is particularly emphasized in this literary genre. Eyewitnesses have first-hand knowledge, which can be shared in a narrative form, an account — Greek διήγησις. The affinity between epic accounts and historical narrative in this respect is very strong.⁶⁴ There is a great difference between the idea of the representation of reality in epic and history, and in drama. In drama the audience is supposed to literally watch events in the theatre.⁶⁵ There is no need to provide a picture with additional linguistic tools, as the image is “at hand”. The exception is the figure of the ἄγγελος, herald, who is always depicted as an eyewitness, and prologues, which require the form of a story (διήγησις).⁶⁶ This is why dramatic scholia have so little to say about ἐνάργεια, and if they have, they concern only the narrative elements — such as messenger speeches.⁶⁷ Therefore, ἐνάργεια is defined chiefly as *virtus narrationis*. διήγησις was considered by rhetoricians themselves as an element primarily linked with poetics and historiography.⁶⁸ ἐνάργεια would then be a natural constituent of the narrative part of the text within these two genres. This inextricable connection between ἐνάργεια and

informants and the need for scrutiny of their accounts. According to Nenci, Herodotus was more inclined than Thucydides to believe eyewitnesses. On αὐτοψία in Greek historiography see: Schepens 1975, 257–273; Schepens 1980, 94–195 (on the role of autopsy in Thucydides’ methodology); Walker 1993, 353–377; Zangara 2007.

⁶⁴ Nenci 1955, 17–21, aptly points out that it probably should be connected with the fact that historiography was considered by the ancients the heir of epic: “ὁφθαλμοῖσιν ὄραν: è una espressione che cadrà tosto in disuso, ma essa sta all’espressione erodotea ὅσα ἀπιστότερα ὁφθαλμῶν (Her. I 8) come l’epica sta alla primitiva storiografia, per cui non solo formalmente vale quanto osservava Strabone, e cioè che i primi logografi scrissero ἐκείνην μιμούμενοι, λύσαντες τὸ μέτρον, τὰλλα δὲ φυλάξαντες τὰ ποιητικά (Strab. I 2, 6)”. Rengakos 2006, 183–209, emphasizes the similarities in narrative-temporal techniques, esp. between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* and the temporal structures in Herodotus, as well as in Thucydides. Rutherford 2007, focused more on the thematic links, as he concluded on pp. 509–510: “It is in fact difficult to isolate a theme common to tragedy and history which is not to some degree present in Homeric epic” (p. 510). This close affinity between historiography and epic is evident in the activity of the Alexandrian philologists. Their primary field of study was Homer and historiography. Texts belonging to these two genres were commented on with reference to each other, rather than to other genres. See Montanari 2013, 1–32, part. pp. 31–32.

⁶⁵ See Rutherford 2007, 508, touches upon this difference, but does not take into account the emotive function of historical narrative.

⁶⁶ Heralds’ accounts are defined as διηγήσεις based on personal experience or knowledge as early as Aeschylus, see Nenci 1955, 25–29. Meijering 1987, 49–50, is right to draw attention to the fact that dramas were sometimes read outside the theatrical setting. Yet we should remember that the primary purpose of drama was theatrical performance.

⁶⁷ Nünlist 2011, 198 n. 13, adduces several scholia that could be considered an exception to this rule, and shows that in fact they are not.

⁶⁸ Berardi 2012, 45 with n. 142, quoting Theon. *Progymn.* 2, 5–6 Pat.; cf. Luc. *De hist. con.* 55.

διήγησις makes it most probable that it was originally conceptualized in historiographical theory and practice, and only later entered rhetorical systems.⁶⁹ This perspective is expounded in a short phrase of Dionysius, which states that the words in a historical narrative are only a means (διὰ τῶν λόγων ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα) to induce the recipient to “perceive things” (τὰ πραττόμενα ὁρῶσα).⁷⁰

This changes our perspective on the judgements passed by ancient critics on Thucydides' literary qualities of πάθος and ἐνάργεια, since they can be interpreted not as a secondary conceptual *apparatus* (derived from rhetorical theory), but rather in the context of historiographical methodology *sensu stricto*, developed and realized in practice in the Hellenistic period (and beyond).

3. Dionysius' assessment of Thucydides' narrative qualities

3.1 The arousal of πάθος by Thucydides

The first explicit comments on Thucydides' πάθος and ἐνάργεια occur in the works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. They appear in various contexts, but several common denominators can be established. The most important in the present framework is one of the passages where Thucydides' skill in manifesting πάθος in the narrative parts of the *History* is assessed (Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 15, 3):

Πόλεόν τε ἀλώσεις καὶ κατασκαφὰς καὶ ἀνδραποδισμοὺς καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας συμφορὰς πολλὰκις ἀναγκασθεὶς γράφειν ποτὲ μὲν οὕτως ὥμῃ καὶ δεινῇ καὶ οἴκτων ἄξιᾳ φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ τὰ πάθη, ὥστε μηδεμίαν ὑπερβολὴν μήτε ἱστοριογράφοις μήτε ποιηταῖς καταλιπεῖν.⁷¹

This is an important testimony, the only one that describes Thucydides' historical work so openly in terms that were commonly associated with the representatives of “tragic history”. William K. Pritchett⁷² reminds us that Paul Scheller quoted the above passage as the first testimonium on the existence of

⁶⁹ Berardi 2012, 47–49; Quint. *Inst.* II 4, 2: *apud rhetorem initium sit (narratio) historica*. Berardi stresses that historiography played a prominent part in the program of rhetorical education, and this also makes it more probable that the influence – in the case of ἐνάργεια – was of historiography on rhetoric, not the other way round.

⁷⁰ Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* XI 1, 3. λόγοι were considered “for the ears”, whereas ἔργα were “for the eyes”, which means that speeches' primary aim is to please the hearer or provide him with information, and the narrative is written to represent or reproduce reality in the most suitable way. See Nünlist 2011, 198; Fromentin 2010c, 261, n. 1.

⁷¹ “Having often been compelled to write of the capture, overthrow, and enslavement of cities, and other similar disasters, he sometimes makes the sufferings appear so cruel, so terrible, so piteous, as to leave no room for historians or poets to surpass him” (all translations of Dionysius' *On Thucydides* are of Pritchett).

⁷² Pritchett 1975, 65; cf. Pavano 1958, *ad loc.*

“tragic history”.⁷³ Frank W. Walbank tried to explain this passage from an ancient reader’s perspective. He assumed that such comments as this of Dionysius seem to exaggerate the emotional or sensational impact of Thucydides’ text.⁷⁴ As I tried to emphasize above, Greek historiography shared a propensity to vivid and emotional description with epic, rather than with tragedy. In Dionysius we can see a reflection of this affinity (epic-historiography), from the literary critic’s perspective.⁷⁵ Instead of treating Dionysius’ judgement of Thucydides’ narrative as evidence that he was also read as a “tragic historian”, we can read it as an assessment of Thucydides’ historiographical qualities *sensu stricto*.

In the adduced passage on Thucydides, Dionysius uses verbs that point to the idea of vision, or the visualization of the emotions and the experiences of historical actors: φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ; εἰς αἴσθησιν. When we connect this with the above definitions of ἐνάργεια and πάθος, we can conclude that from Dionysius’ perspective Thucydides endeavoured to visualize the experiences of historical actors, and that this was the right thing for him to do.⁷⁶ Thucydides is not treated in that respect as an exception; quite the contrary. According to Dionysius he only surpasses all historians and poets in his graphic depictions (ὕπερβολὴν μῆτε ἱστοριογράφοις μῆτε ποιηταῖς καταλιπεῖν).⁷⁷ Dionysius remarks that Thucydides does not always maintain the correct proportion in such descriptions, adequate to the significance of the given events. His treatment is sometimes “uneven” (*Thuc.* 19: τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐξεργασίας τοῦ συγγραφέως ἀνώμαλον).

Importantly, here the element of vivid description and the arousal of πάθος belongs entirely to the sphere of content (πραγματικὸς τόπος), not style.⁷⁸ Dionysius focuses on Thucydides’ narrative, not the speeches (where πάθος has

⁷³ See Scheller 1911, 57–61.

⁷⁴ Walbank 1960, 230–231: “This suggests one of two conclusions. Either later critics such as Plutarch and Dionysius described the effects of Thucydides and Xenophon on their readers in terms that were obviously exaggerated, and could be seen to be exaggerated by anyone who took the trouble to read the account of Cunaxa or the siege of Plataea for himself. Or alternatively the Greeks – I suppose one must say of Plutarch’s and Dionysius’ age, though it would probably be true of ancient Greeks at all times – reacted more directly and emotionally to both the written and spoken word than we normally do. As between the two explanations a choice is not difficult. The history of Greek literature suggests beyond doubt that the Greeks were especially sensitive to the effects of language.”

⁷⁵ Zangara 2007, 80–81, underlines that this insistence on παθήματα and δεινά in Dionysius’ *Thuc.* 15 is one of the consequences of the epic roots of historiography.

⁷⁶ Cf. Verdin 1974, 306.

⁷⁷ On the character of this Dionysian association of prose with poetry see de Jonge 2008, 355–365.

⁷⁸ See the introduction to this critique in par. 9 and the summary in par. 21: τὸ περὶ τὰς ἐξεργασίας τοῦ συγγραφέως ἀνώμαλον etc.

a slightly different sense).⁷⁹ This combines perfectly with the above definition of ἐνάργεια as *virtus narrationis* as conceptualized by other authors, and for the role of πάθος in narrative parts of historical writing.⁸⁰ This was heretofore completely ignored in reception studies. The association of Thucydides with “the poets” (ποιηταῖς) in the passage was also overlooked.⁸¹ The phrasing of Dionysius is meaningful in this respect — he says that Thucydides “makes things reveal themselves” (φαίνεσθαι ποιεῖ). Taking the above considerations into account, we can safely surmise that Dionysius associates Thucydides with the epic poets, rather than with writers of lyric poetry or playwrights.

3.2 Thucydidean πάθη and μίμησις

An all-encompassing concept in Dionysius' literary theory is μίμησις.⁸² Representation of δεινά and πάθη is a part of historical μίμησις of reality.⁸³ In the *Letter to Pompeius*,⁸⁴ a treatise that is crucial for our understanding of Dionysius' historiographical ideas, historians are assessed from the perspective of their ability to produce μίμησις. Dionysius says that Thucydides surpasses Herodotus in the μίμησις of πάθη (*Pomp.* 3, 18):

μετὰ ταύτην συνίσταται τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ τῶν ἡθῶν τε καὶ παθῶν μίμησις· διήρηνται τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην οἱ συγγραφεῖς· Θουκυδίδης μὲν γὰρ τὰ πάθη δηλῶσαι κρείττων, Ἡρόδοτος δὲ τὰ γε ἥθη παραστήσαι δεινότερος.⁸⁵

According to Dionysius, παθητικόν was uncharacteristic of the historians writing before Thucydides (with some exceptions in the language of Herodotus). Vivienne Gray argued convincingly that μίμησις is used here as a technical term

⁷⁹ The entire section 6–8 is about Thucydides' προαίρεσις in the πραγματικὸς τόπος of his work. That is, it discusses the choice and disposition of the material within the work. Pavano 1958, 56–57 *ad loc.*, seems to confuse this context with others, where Dionysius discusses linguistic πάθος in the speeches. However, the distinction is not always easy to make out from Dionysius' remarks.

⁸⁰ Cf. pp. 229–231 above.

⁸¹ Zangara 2007, 81, is an exception.

⁸² See Kennedy 1972, 347. De Jonge 2008, 11: “In Dionysius' case, we may summarize this theory by the terms μίμησις and ζήλωσις: the eclectic imitation of the best qualities of various models from the past, with the intention of surpassing them.” Cf. Flashar 1978, 87–88; Russell 1979, 1–16.

⁸³ Zangara 2007, 81.

⁸⁴ On this work see above, pp. 208–209.

⁸⁵ “After this excellence the imitation of traits of character, and of emotions, presents itself. Here the historians divide the credit, for Thucydides excels in expressing the emotions, whilst Herodotus has greater skill in representing aspects of character”.

of historical theory.⁸⁶ Significantly, we again find a word that points to vision: δηλώσαι τὰ πάθη.⁸⁷ The Thucydidean imitation of πάθη is conceived by Dionysius as attained through ἐνάργεια, which is consistent with the definition in *De elocutione*. The quality of ἐνάργεια is attributed to both Thucydides and Herodotus, but Thucydides is indicated as the one who surpasses Herodotus in τὸ δὲ ἐναργὲς ... ἐν τοῖς παθητικοῖς.⁸⁸ Dionysius implies that the quality of παθητικόν is a *differentia specifica* of Thucydides' "linguistic tools" (ὄργανα λέξεως).⁸⁹ Πάθη are produced by special means of Thucydides' style or language.⁹⁰ The emotional effect is gained e.g. through alterations in word order. Sometimes, πάθη are characteristic not so much of Thucydidean expressions, but of their underlying thoughts.⁹¹

⁸⁶ Gray 1987, 467–486; 468: "A clear case of μίμησις as a technical term in historical theory. Its meaning is revealed in Dionysius' other technical uses of the term, one of which occurs in his essay on Thucydides mentioned above (45)"; cf. also p. 469.

⁸⁷ δηλώω means: "to make visible", "to manifest", "to reveal", see LSJ, s.v. δηλώω.

⁸⁸ I consider correct the interpretation that reads ἐναργής together with τοῖς παθητικοῖς. This reading is justified because of the μέντοι at the beginning of the sentence, which indicates that it directly and logically continues the thought from the previous one. It makes ἐναργής here a proper means of arousing emotions; see Battisti 1997, 118: "L'ἐνάργεια è dunque un processo di imitazione della realtà tale da suscitare una immedesimazione emozionale da parte dell'auditorio che così vive in prima persona i fatti immaginati [...]".

⁸⁹ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 24, 11: τέτταρα μὲν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ὄργανα τῆς Θουκυδίδου λέξεως ... ὑπὲρ ἅπαντα δὲ ταῦτα τὸ παθητικόν ("To sum it up, there are four instruments, as it were, of Thucydidean diction [...] and above all these the power of stirring the emotions"). παθητικόν is here the feature of style subsumed under "power of stirring the emotions". See Roberts 1901, 198–199.

⁹⁰ Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 7, 4–5: ἔστι δὴ τις παρὰ τῷ Θουκυδίδῃ λέξις ἐν τῇ Πλαταιέων δημηγορίᾳ πᾶν χαριέντως συγκειμένη καὶ μεστὴ πάθους ἥδε ... φέρε δὴ τις λύσας τὴν συζυγίαν ταύτην μεθαρμοσάτω τὰ κῶλα οὕτως ... ἄρ' ἔτι μένει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἡρμοσμένων τῶν κῶλων ἢ αὐτὴ χάρις ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος; οὐδεὶς ἂν εἴποι ("There is a well-known passage of Thucydides in the speech of the Plataeans, a delightfully arranged sentence full of deep feeling, which is as follows [...] Now let this order be disturbed and the clauses be rearranged as follows [...] When the clauses are arranged in this way, does the same fine charm remain, or the same deep feeling? Plainly not." All translations of the *On Imitation* are of Rhys Roberts). Here Dionysius describes πάθη as metaphorically "filling" Thucydides' λέξις. There is no doubt that in this case he refers to the speeches, particularly to the speech of the Plataeans in book three.

⁹¹ Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 42, 4: ἐνθυμήματα πάθους ἐστὶ μεστὰ. Here, it is the ἐνθύμημα – the essential thought – that is "full of πάθος", able to arouse emotions. Dionysius has the Plataeans' defence from book III 53–59 in mind. Most probably, the thoughts that Dionysius identifies as "containing" πάθη are those that bring the past services of the Plataeans, and ancient Greek history in general, to the fore. On this debate (*Thuc.* III 53–67) see the analyses of Orwin 1994, 70–74 and Hornblower, CT I, 445–446. We cannot speculate here as to what exactly Dionysius found in the speech that he considered παθητικόν but it is necessary to note that the speech of the Plataeans exploits the "sadly irrelevant appeal to the past" (Hornblower's expression), in a manner exceptional for Thucydides. According to Hornblower, "the power and πάθος of the total effect" of the speeches can be grasped only by reading them together with par. 68, where the initial question of the Spartans recurs, as if the speeches were not delivered at all.

4. Plutarch's remarks on Thucydides' artistic skills

4.1 Thucydides' artistry in the *On the Glory of Athens*

As already indicated, Scheller took the passage from Dionysius' *On Thucydides* 15, analyzed above as the first testimonium on the existence of "tragic historiography".⁹² This scholar adduced the passage in connection with a place from Plutarch's minor treatise Πότερον Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ πόλεμον ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν ἐνδοξότεροι (*De gloria Atheniensium*) III 346f–347c.⁹³ Plutarch's testimony, although chronologically far beyond the Hellenistic period, was also recently adduced by Meister in the context of Thucydides' influence on Duris and Phylarchus as "sensational" historians.⁹⁴ In the present section, Plutarch's evidence will be analyzed from the perspective of the connection between his ideas about Thucydides' narrative qualities (as expressed in *De glor. Ath.*) and the place of ἐνάργεια and πάθος in Hellenistic historiography. The scope of the analysis will be widened by inquiry into remarks about Thucydides in Plutarch's *Nicias*.

4.1.1 The content and context of Plut. *De glor. Ath.* III 346f–347c

Firstly, the key text shall be quoted *in extenso* (Plut. *De glor. Ath.* III 346f–347c):

Πλὴν ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν μὲν ζωγραφίαν ποίησιν σιωπῶσαν προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ ποίησιν ζωγραφίαν λαλοῦσαν.⁹⁵ ἅς γὰρ οἱ ζωγράφοι πράξεις ὡς γινομένας δεικνύουσι, ταύτας οἱ λόγοι γεγενημένας διηγοῦνται καὶ συγγράφουσιν. εἰ δ' οἱ μὲν χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασιν οἱ δ' ὀνόμασι καὶ λέξεσι ταῦτ' ἀποδείκνυνται, ὅλη καὶ τρόποις μιμήσεως διαφέρουσι, τέλος δ' ἀμφοτέροις ἐν ὑπόκειται, καὶ τῶν ἱστορικῶν κράτιστος ὁ τὴν διήγησιν ὥσπερ γραφὴν πάθει καὶ προσώποις εἰδωλοποιήσας. ὁ γοῦν Θουκυδίδης ἀεὶ τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς ταύτην ἀμιλλᾶται τὴν ἐνάργειαν, οἷον θεατὴν ποιῆσαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ γινόμενα περὶ τοὺς ὁρώντας ἐκπληκτικὰ καὶ ταρακτικὰ πάθη τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἐνεργάσασθαι λιχνευόμενος. ὁ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ῥαχίαν αὐτὴν τῆς Πύλου παρατάττων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους Δημοσθένης, καὶ ὁ τὸν κυβερνήτην ἐπισπέρχων Βρασιδᾶς ἐξοκέλλειν καὶ χωρῶν ἐπὶ τὴν <ἀπο>βάθραν καὶ τραυματιζόμενος καὶ λιποψυχῶν καὶ ἀποκλίνων εἰς τὴν παρεξίρεσιν, καὶ οἱ πεζομαχοῦντες μὲν ἐκ θαλάττης Λακεδαιμόνιοι ναυμαχοῦντες δ' ἀπὸ γῆς Ἀθηναῖοι· καὶ πάλιν 'ὁ' ἐν τοῖς

⁹² Scheller 1911, 57–61.

⁹³ The title is traditionally rendered *On the Glory of Athens*. On this work in general see J. L. Johnson 1972; Thiolier 1985, 5–24; Gallo 1992, 7–32.

⁹⁴ See Meister's thesis cited above, p. 220 n. 9.

⁹⁵ Simonides fr. 190b Bergk (42a Campbell).

Σικελικοῖς ἔκ τῆς γῆς πεζὸς ἀμφοτέρων, ἰσορρόπου τῆς ναυμαχίας καθεστηκυίας, † ἄλαστον ἀγῶνα καὶ ξύντασιν τῆς γνώμης ἔχων διὰ τὰς συντάξεις ****ως συνεχὲς τῆς ἀμίλλης καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτοῖς ἴσα τῇ δόξῃ περιδεῶς συναπονεύων τῇ διαθέσει καὶ τῇ διατυπώσει τῶν γινομένων γραφικῆς ἐναργείας ****ως εἰ τοὺς ζωγραφοῦντας οὐκ ἄξιον παραβάλλειν τοῖς στρατηγοῖς, μηδὲ τοὺς ἰστοροῦντας παραβάλλωμεν.⁹⁶

Plutarch's remarks about Thucydides occur in connection with a comment on Simonides' famous saying that "painting is silent poetry, poetry — painting that speaks".⁹⁷ Both activities aim at imitation — μίμησις.⁹⁸ Plutarch suggests that artists and poets seek the same effect of μίμησις,⁹⁹ but with different means or materials (ὕλη καὶ τρόποις μιμήσεως διαφέρουσι, τέλος δ' ἀμφοτέροις ἐν).¹⁰⁰ The painter uses "colours and designs", the poet "words and phrases".¹⁰¹ The spoken word evokes images, "shows" or "reveals" (ὀνόμασι καὶ λέξεσι ταῦτα

⁹⁶ "Simonides, however, calls painting inarticulate poetry and poetry articulate painting: for the actions which painters portray as taking place at the moment literature narrates and records after they have taken place. Even though artists with colour and design, and writers with words and phrases, represent the same subjects, they differ in the material and the manner of their imitation; and yet the underlying end and aim of both is one and the same; the most effective historian is he who, by a vivid representation of emotions and characters, makes his narration like a painting. Assuredly Thucydides is always striving for this vividness in his writing, since it is his desire to make the reader a spectator, as it were, and to produce vividly in the minds of those who peruse his narrative the emotions of amazement and consternation which were experienced by those who beheld them. For he tells how Demosthenes is drawing up the Athenians at the very edge of the breakwater at Pylos, and Brasidas is urging on his pilot to beach the ship, and is hurrying to the landing-plank, and is wounded and falls fainting on the forward-deck; and the Spartans are fighting an infantry engagement from the sea, while the Athenians wage a naval battle from the land. Again, in his account of the Sicilian expedition: 'The armies of both sides on the land, as long as the fighting at sea is evenly balanced, are enduring an unceasing struggle and tension of mind' because of their battling forces; and 'because of the continued indecisiveness of the struggle they accompany it in an extremity of fear, with their very bodies swaying in sympathy with the opinion of the outcome.' Such a description is characterized by pictorial vividness both in its arrangement and in its power of description; so, if it be unworthy to compare painters with generals, let us not compare historians either" (all translations of the *On the Glory of Athens* are of Babbitt).

⁹⁷ On Plutarch's use of this adage of Simonides fundamental is Van der Stockt 1990a, 173–177. He discusses the context of the similarities between painting and poetry, painting and prose, as belonging to mimetic activity. Van der Stockt argues for the Platonic character of Plutarch's concept of visualization and critical literary tools. This reference is also discussed by Scheller 1911, 56–57; Walker 1993, 357; Marincola 2003, 293; Goldhill 2007, 5–6. Berardi 2012, 162, similarly to Van der Stockt, stresses the context of artistic imitation theory in which Plutarch remarks on Thucydides' qualities of visualization. Cf. Meister 2013, 43, with interesting references to Hobbes' and Rousseau's appreciation of this fragment.

⁹⁸ Cf. Van der Stockt 1990a, 173–177.

⁹⁹ Van der Stockt 1990a, 174; Van der Stockt 1990b, 23–31.

¹⁰⁰ On Plutarch's aesthetics in general see Cammarota 1990, 91–108.

¹⁰¹ Here I follow the translation of Goldhill 2007, 5. See Walker 1993, 358.

δηλοῦσιν).¹⁰² The best historian for Plutarch is the one that makes his narrative a γραφή, and affects the same senses as painting, i.e. vision (ὄψις). Plutarch implies that, because Thucydides' text has the quality of ἐνάργεια, its recipient can experience the same emotions as the eyewitnesses to the events.¹⁰³ The ἐνάργεια is thus again closely connected with μίμησις.¹⁰⁴

What did Simonides actually mean by ποιήσις in this statement? From the above analyses, in particular those of Ps.-Demetrius and Dionysius,¹⁰⁵ it is not unreasonable to surmise that Simonides means epic poetry in the first place. Such a hypothesis is supported by the subsequent clarification of Plutarch (ἃς γὰρ ...),¹⁰⁶ which describes the activity of the poets as "narrating and writing down" (διηγούνται καὶ συγγράφουσιν) things "that already happened" (γεγενημένας). Such an expression, pointing to narrative (διήγησις), does not match lyric poetry.¹⁰⁷

4.1.2 Analysis of Plutarch's statements about Thucydides

For our subject it is crucial that Plutarch — in such a context — takes Thucydides as a representative and adequate example for his statements.¹⁰⁸ Plutarch leaves no doubt that he means the quality of Thucydides' narrative (τὴν διήγησιν). As Plutarch says, by Thucydides' account, πάθη are "inflicted on the listeners" (πάθη τοῖς ἀναγινώσκουσιν ἐνεργάσασθαι). The recipient of Thucydides' text experiences similar psychological states to those who actually saw the events. Because Thucydides is extremely successful in creating vivid images in the listener's/reader's mind, the latter undergoes "thrilling and shocking emotions" (ἐκπληκτικὰ καὶ ταρακτικὰ πάθη).¹⁰⁹ In the passage from

¹⁰² The analogy between literary narrative and painting is also present in the scholia, see Nünlist 2011, 195.

¹⁰³ The second part of this interpretation is particularly emphasized by Walker 1993, 357; Cf. Van der Stockt 1990a, 175. As it stands in the present passage, ἐνάργεια is rendered by Frazier as "suggestivité", and defined as "la qualité visuelle du récit, son aptitude à faire voir au lecteur ce qu'il lui expose [...] mise en lumière" (p. 241).

¹⁰⁴ Zangara 2007, 63–65; Van der Stockt 1992, 26–31.

¹⁰⁵ See esp pp. 224–227 on Ps.-Dem and Dionysius.

¹⁰⁶ I follow other scholars in taking only the statement at the beginning as the fragment proper of Simonides.

¹⁰⁷ See LSJ, s.v. διηγέομαι: "set out in detail", "describe", with references to Ar. Av. 198; Antiphon 1.13; Plat. *Prt.* 310a; Dem. *Meid.* 77. In our historiographical context, it is most appropriate to take into account Thucydides' use of the word, e.g. at Thuc. VI 54: ἐγὼ ἐπὶ πλεόν διηγησάμενος ἀποφανῶ κτλ. It is not accidental that Thucydides uses διηγέομαι with ἀποφανῶ – "demonstrating", "revealing". Narrative is conceived of as "showing" things.

¹⁰⁸ The transition from discussing poetry to prose is almost silent (cf. 346f: substitution of ποιήσις with λόγοι): τέλος δ' ἀμφοτέροις ἐν ὑπόκειται κτλ. Cf. Van der Stockt 1990a, 174.

¹⁰⁹ We can also find these two terms in Polybius' critique of Phylarchus' "sensational" writing.

Plutarch, this effect is presented in a positive light. Further, Plutarch says that Thucydides “forms an image with πάθη and characters” (πάθεισι καὶ προσώποις εἰδωλοποιήσας), and strives to “enliven the πάθη” (πάθη... ἐνεργάσασθαι λιχνευόμενος). Simon Goldhill tried to read this passage of Plutarch in the light of Longinus’ conception of the psychological impact of φαντασία.¹¹⁰ I do not see the necessity of seeking such a connection. It is probable that Plutarch follows earlier ideas, as they were inherent in historiography. Jean-Claude Thioliier comments that the word πάθη is used here by Plutarch in the sense derived from Aristotle’s *Poetics*.¹¹¹ It is difficult to agree with the first part of his interpretation; a connection with Aristotle’s *Poetics* is not easy to establish here. The historian’s task is to (re)present the facts through μίμησις, not as γεγενημένας, but as γινομένας (cf. *Artax.* 8.1 on Xenophon). Thioliier seems to be correct in the second part of his interpretation, when he suggests reading the sense of πάθεισι καὶ προσώποις from the examples which Plutarch adduces from Thucydides.¹¹² Since Thioliier does not inquire into these examples, I aim now to follow this line and analyze them below.

4.1.3 Plutarch’s remarks on Thuc. IV 11–12

Plutarch highlights passages from two episodes. Firstly, Thuc. IV 11–12 is an account of the Lacedaemonians’ attempt to recapture Pylos. In particular, Plutarch points to Thucydides’ description of how Demosthenes located his troops on the very shore of Pylos,¹¹³ most of all — how Brasidas urges his captains to land on the ragged and rocky shore, steps onto the landing-ladder, faints, and falls down onto the side of the ship. It seems that Plutarch is especially interested in two aspects of this narrative:

a. The specific vocabulary used by Thucydides in this passage, which could add to the vividness of the picture.¹¹⁴

¹¹⁰ Goldhill 2007, 5–6: “If Plutarch is implying an understanding of the psychological impact of φαντασία similar to that of Longinus, it offers a surprising and fascinating stance on Thucydides. This is not the objective and cold Thucydides, but Thucydides the rhetorician, blinding the reader with his science, leading the reader away from analysis into passion and confusion.”

¹¹¹ Thioliier 1985, 74, πάθη as “événement ou effet pathétique que lui donne Aristote dans sa *Poétique* en 1452 b: πάθος ... πρῶξις φθαρτικῆ.. τοιαῦτα. Les exemples guerriers qui suivent dans le texte de Plutarque correspondent à cette définition.”

¹¹² Cf. Van der Stockt 1990a, 176–177, who also connects this interpretation with 345e.

¹¹³ Thuc. IV 11.

¹¹⁴ Certain expressions in this description of Thucydides may have seemed to Plutarch exceptionally graphic. For example, Thucydides writes that Brasidas was “urging”, “hastening” the captain (ἐπισπέρχω). Moreover, he “urged” him not to “land” but to “run into” the shore: ὁκέλλω – a very suggestive word to use, when we are told in the previous lines that the shore was

b. The particulars that Thucydides supplies, which build the exactness of the description.¹¹⁵

These features are probably the reason why Plutarch repeats Thucydides' expressions quite faithfully.¹¹⁶ Thus, by *πάθη* and *πρόσωπα* Plutarch probably means Brasidas' psychological states and his behaviour, as depicted by Thucydides. Some of the elements of the narrative in question have been detected as characteristic of epic description, e.g. the comment on Brasidas' loss of consciousness.¹¹⁷ The whole picture, of "a hero rushing forward", can be considered Homeric.¹¹⁸

To sum up, the *πάθη* and *πρόσωπα* of the participants of the action in this part of Thucydides' narrative, together with the circumstantial details recorded by the historian, are what Plutarch views as producing *ἐνάργεια*, and as what turns the audience of this part of the *History* into a spectator, enabling him to experience the same emotions as the eyewitnesses.

rocky and dangerous. Other words, specified below, can also be considered to contribute to the vividness of this narrative.

¹¹⁵ Thucydides supplies the closest details as to Brasidas' lost of consciousness and his fall; he uses as many as three words to depict it: *τραυματισθεὶς ... ἐλιπονύχησέ ... πεσόντος*. Thucydides also points exactly to the place where Brasidas stepped when he tried to land – on a "gangway": *ἀποβάθρα*. Lastly, we are told by Thucydides where Brasidas fell – onto the "outrigger": *παρεξαιρεσία*. What Plutarch does not repeat, but belongs to the same sentence in Thucydides' narrative, is what we are told about Brasidas' shield that slips down into the sea: *ἡ ἄσπις περιερρύη ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν*. This is probably also in Plutarch's mind here. See the comment of Hornblower, CT II *ad loc.*: "The description is unusually detailed and lively [...], where Brasidas is concerned, Th. enjoys using the whole paint-box."

¹¹⁶ Cf. Thucydides' account and Plutarch's rephrasing, with the verbal echoes underlined:

Thuc. IV 12, 1–5: καὶ ὁ μὲν τοὺς τε ἄλλους τοιαῦτα ἐπέσπερχε καὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κυβερνήτην ἀναγκάσας ὀκέλαι τὴν ναὺν ἐχώρει ἐπὶ τὴν ἀποβάθραν· καὶ πειρώμενος ἀποβαίνειν ἀνεκόπη ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τραυματισθεὶς πολλὰ ἐλιπονύχησέ τε καὶ πεσόντος αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν παρεξαιρεσίαν ἡ ἄσπις περιερρύη ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν κτλ. ("And he not only urged on the rest in this way, but, compelling his own pilot to beach his ship, he made for the gangway; and in trying to land he was knocked back by the Athenians, and after receiving many wounds fainted away. As he fell into the forward part of the ship his shield slipped off into the sea [...]").

Plut. *De glor. Ath.* III 347b (translation irrelevant to this point): καὶ ὁ τὸν κυβερνήτην ἐπισπέρχων Βρασιδᾶς ἐξοκέλλειν καὶ χωρὼν ἐπὶ τὴν <ἀπο>βάθραν καὶ τραυματιζόμενος καὶ λιποθυγῶν καὶ ἀποκλίνων εἰς τὴν παρεξαιρεσίαν κτλ.

¹¹⁷ Hornblower, CT II, 43–46 and p. 165, notes the epic character of *ἐπισπέρχω* and the phrase *τραυματισθεὶς πολλὰ ἐλιπονύχησέ τε*; see parallels with the *Iliad* and further literature given there. Hornblower concludes: "[...] the most remarkable thing is that he should record such a detail at all" (*ibidem*, p. 46).

¹¹⁸ Hornblower, CT II, 166, points to the description of Hector in the *Iliad*, XI 365.

4.1.4 Plutarch's reception of Thucydides' account of the Sicilian Expedition and its affinity with the assessment of Dionysius

The second example in the passage quoted above comes from the account of the Sicilian expedition (*De glor. Ath.* III 347b–c: καὶ πάλιν ‘ὁ’ ἐν τοῖς Σικελικοῖς). The passage that Plutarch refers to here is Thuc. VII 71, 1–3. It is possible that Plutarch recalls these lines from memory, which would explain certain alterations in several words.¹¹⁹ Plutarch adduces only the beginning and the end of this larger section, leaving out the material in between.¹²⁰ It is fairly certain that Plutarch has in mind the entire section of Thuc. VII 71, 1–3, and its literary qualities.

In the chapter adduced by Plutarch, Thucydides describes the final sea battle in the Harbour of Syracuse, from the perspective of the foot soldiers (πεζός)

¹¹⁹ There are minor divergences in particular words, e.g. Plutarch has ἔχων, instead of the commonly acknowledged εἶχε; συναπονεύων instead of ξυναπονεύοντες in Thucydides. However, the most interesting issue is that Plutarch has ἄλαστον ἀγῶνα, whereas modern editors follow manuscripts where stands πολλὸν τὸν ἀγῶνα. The first version, which occurs only in this quotation of Plutarch, is an epic phrase (“insufferable conflict”), see Hornblower, CT III, 698 *ad loc.*

¹²⁰ Plutarch's quotation of Thuc. VII 71, 1–3, omits a considerable number of lines from the original. Below I adduce the text of Thucydides, with the lines that are quoted by Plutarch underlined:

ὁ τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς πεζὸς ἀμφοτέρων ἰσορρόπου τῆς ναυμαχίας καθεστηκυίας πολλὸν τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ ξύστασιν τῆς γνώμης εἶχε, φιλονικῶν μὲν ὁ αὐτόθεν περὶ τοῦ πλέονος ἤδη καλοῦ, δεδιότες δὲ οἱ ἐπελθόντες μὴ τῶν παρόντων ἔτι χεῖρω πράξωσιν. πάντων γὰρ δὴ ἀνακειμένων τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς τὰς ναῦς ὁ τε φόβος ἦν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος οὐδενὶ ἐοικώς, καὶ διὰ τὸ <ἀνώμαλον> τῆς ναυμαχίας ἀνώμαλον καὶ τὴν ἔποψιν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἠναγκάζοντο ἔχειν. δι’ ολίγου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς θέας καὶ οὐ πάντων ἅμα ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ σκοποῦντων, εἰ μὲν τινες ἰδοῖεν πῃ τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας, ἀνεθάρσυσάν τε ἂν καὶ πρὸς ἀνάκλησιν θεῶν μὴ στερῆσαι σφᾶς τῆς σωτηρίας ἐτρέποντο, οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ ἡσώμενον βλέψαντες ὀλοφυρμῷ τε ἅμα μετὰ βοῆς ἐχρῶντο καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν δρωμένων τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τὴν γνώμην μᾶλλον τῶν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ ἐδουλοῦντο· ἄλλοι δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀντίπαλόν τι τῆς ναυμαχίας ἀπιδόντες, διὰ τὸ ἀκρίτως ξυνεχὲς τῆς ἀμίλλης καὶ τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτοῖς ἴσα τῇ δόξῃ περιδεῶς ξυναπονεύοντες ἐν τοῖς χαλεπώτατα διήγον (‘‘And the armies on the shore on both sides, so long as the fighting at sea was evenly balanced, underwent a mighty conflict and tension of mind, the men of Sicily being ambitious to enhance the glory they had already won, while the invaders were afraid that they might fare even worse than at present. For the Athenians their all was staked upon their fleet, and their fear for the outcome like unto none they had ever felt before; and on account of the different positions which they occupied on the shore they necessarily had different views of the fighting. For since the spectacle they were witnessing was near at hand and not all were looking at the same point at the same time, if one group saw the Athenians prevailing anywhere, they would take heart and fall to invoking the gods not to rob them of their safe return; while those whose eyes fell upon a portion that was being defeated uttered shrieks of lamentation, and by the mere sight of what was going on were more cowed in spirit than the men who were actually fighting. Others, again, whose gaze was fixed on some part of the field where the battle was evenly balanced, on account of the long-drawn uncertainty of the conflict were in a continual state of most distressing suspense, their very bodies swaying, in the extremity of their fear, in accord with their opinion of the battle’’).

from both sides, who were observing the fight from the shore. This account has two main features. First, as Thucydides makes the soldiers witness the struggle between the two fleets, words related to vision, “seeing”, “observing” are repeated with an intensity that seems intentional.¹²¹ The soldiers are depicted as spectators of the combat. Simon Hornblower considered three literary patterns, possibly serving Thucydides as the model for such a picture:¹²²

a. The epic *τειχοσκοπία* (“watching from the walls”),¹²³ observation of a combat from the walls of a besieged city.

b. Theatrical performance.¹²⁴

c. Spectatorship at athletic or equestrian contests.

Hornblower argues, not unconvincingly, for the last option, and, even if we do not accept this perspective on the whole,¹²⁵ the emphasis laid by Thucydides on the spectacle has to be deliberate. Thucydides says: δι’ ὀλίγου γὰρ οὔσης *τῆς θέας* — the context implies that he definitely uses the word in the sense of a “place for seeing from”. The word *θέα* was used for a “seat in the theatre”.¹²⁶ Thucydides describes the soldiers’ (=spectators’) emotional reactions to the reversals of fortune during the fight, by employing a rich vocabulary related to internal psychological states.¹²⁷ Thucydides makes the soldiers lament and

¹²¹ Note the impressive variety of Greek vocabulary denoting watching or observing: ἀνόμαλον καὶ *τὴν ἔποψιν* ἐκ τῆς γῆς ... δι’ ὀλίγου γὰρ οὔσης *τῆς θέας* καὶ οὐ πάντων ἅμα ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ *σκοπούντων*, εἰ μὲν τινες ἰδοῖεν πῃ τοὺς σφετέρους ἐπικρατοῦντας ... οἱ δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ ἡσσώμενον *βλέψαντες* ... καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν δρωμένων *τῆς ὄψεως* ... πρὸς ἀντίπαλόν τι τῆς ναυμαχίας *ἀπιδόντες* (transl. above n. 120). The number of these words is striking for such a short passage. Hornblower, CT III, 697, stresses this perspective: “So the spectators are the primary focus of description, to whom, paradoxically, the actual fighters are then compared.”

¹²² Hornblower 2004, 344–346.

¹²³ Here parallels with the *Iliad* are most relevant, e.g. *Il.* XXII 408–409.

¹²⁴ In this case, Hornblower refers solely to secondary literature and admits that he cannot explore the problem further.

¹²⁵ Hornblower’s thesis is put forward in a book on Thucydides’ affinities with Pindar, and this appears to make the author overemphasize certain potential connections between the two. Still, he makes some insightful remarks about single words that at least suggest some relationship: “Surely agonistic spectatorship, whether literary in inspiration or observed from life, was a very natural model for Thucydides when describing perhaps the greatest single *θέα* in his *History*. His use, then, of the word *θέα* in this climactic battle scene points us to the world of Pindar” (p. 346, see also the examples from Homer prior to this conclusion, and CT III, 699, where Hornblower briefly defends his thesis from the charges of Gerber).

¹²⁶ See LSJ, s.v. *θέα*: the basic meanings: “seeing”, “looking at”, “sight”; further meanings: “spectacle”, “performance, in a theatre or elsewhere” (Theophr. *Char.* 5.7; Plut. *Caes.* 55), “place for seeing from, seat in the theatre” (Aeschin. 2.55, Dem. *De cor.* 28).

¹²⁷ τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ *ξύστασιν τῆς γνώμης* εἶχε, *φιλονικῶν* μὲν ὁ αὐτόθεν περὶ τοῦ πλέονος ἤδη καλοῦ, *δεδιότες* δὲ οἱ ἐπελθόντες ... ὃ τε *φόβος* ἦν ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος ... *ἀνεθάρσησάν* τε ... *τὴν γνώμην* μᾶλλον ... τῶν ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ *ἐδουλοῦντο* ... τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτοῖς ἴσα τῇ δόξῃ *περιδεῶς ξυναπονεύοντες* (transl. above n. 120).

shout, in reaction to the vicissitudes of their armies.¹²⁸ Perhaps the most graphic is the last part, adduced *verbatim* by Plutarch, where the observers were “swerving with their bodies in sympathy with their thought” (τοῖς σώμασιν αὐτοῖς ἴσα τῇ δόξῃ περιδεῶς ξυναπονέοντες). It is clear that with this expression Thucydides depicts the πάθη of the eyewitnesses.¹²⁹

Apart from γραφικῆς ἐναργείας, which is a notion already defined above, two additional categories are used to describe the parts of Thucydides’ representation. Firstly, the διάθεσις; basically “disposition”, “arrangement”, or “composition”. In oratory it occurs in the sense of “delivery”, but the use in Plutarch seems more specific — διάθεσις often denotes “representation”, “depiction through words”.¹³⁰ Plutarch probably means that the effect of πάθος is gained through διάθεσις; perhaps it will be correct to assume for the word the sense that is confirmed in Plutarch’s other writings: “word-painting”. This is probably the best rendering of διάθεσις in the context in question. Secondly, the διατύπωσις — literally “shape”, from τυπώω: “to form”, “to engrave”. The metaphorical sense is to “engrave in mind”, thus “imagine”, “form a picture in mind”.¹³¹ It was defined in this more specific sense in the context of rhetoric by several authors, and it points to such description as makes the listener imagine not only the related facts, but also the emotions, the outward appearances.¹³² Plutarch’s use of διατύπωσις in the chapter in question seems to imply that he thinks of Thucydides’ narrative as evoking images of emotions, reflected in the physical appearances of the figures described (here: of the soldiers eyewitnessing the combat).

4.2 Thucydides’ artistic skills in the *Nicias*

The association of Thucydides with graphic and emotive description, especially in some narrative parts of the Sicilian Expedition, is not incidental in Plutarch. It is rather a well-founded view, which recurs in a completely different treatise

¹²⁸ ὀλοφυρμῷ τε ἅμα μετὰ βοῆς ἐχρῶντο: ὀλοφυρμός is a cry of lamentation because of a defeat, βοή – of joy due to victory, there is also a possible Homeric overtone here; see Hornblower, CT III, 699–700 *ad loc.*, who refers us to a similar phrase at par. 4 of the chapter in question, and to Thuc. VI 30, 2.

¹²⁹ At VII 71, 5 Thucydides remarks that the crews of the ships experienced similar emotions to the soldiers on land: παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τῶν νεῶν αὐτοῖς ἐπασχον (3rd pers. plur. of πάσχω, from which the word πάθος derives).

¹³⁰ See the use in Plut. *Quomodo adul.* 16b; 17b.

¹³¹ See LSJ, s.v. διατύπωσις and s.v. διατυπώω.

¹³² Alex. *Schem.* 13–15 p. 51 Spengel. The Latin counterpart of diatyposis is *demonstratio*. Alexander’s treatise *De figuris* was considered quite authoritative in antiquity, see Russel 1981, 176; Trapp, *Alexander* (12), OCD, 2012, 59. For other places where διατύπωσις is defined see Lausberg 1990, par. 810; Berardi 2012, 123–124 and 215.

and context. In the introduction to the *Nicias*, Plutarch appeals to his readers to forgive him for not attempting to surpass Thucydides in the quality of the description of the facts that Thucydides had related with utmost skill. Plutarch marks Thucydides' account with the qualities of ἐνάργεια and πάθος (Plut. *Nic.* 1.1):

Ἐπεὶ δοκοῦμεν οὐκ ἀτόπως τῷ Νικίᾳ τὸν Κράσσον παραβάλλειν καὶ τὰ Παρθικὰ παθήματα τοῖς Σικελικοῖς, ὥρα παραιτεῖσθαι καὶ παρακαλεῖν ὑπὲρ ἑμοῦ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τοῖς συγγράμμασι τούτοις, ὅπως ἐπὶ ταῖς διηγήσεσιν αἷς Θουκυδίδης, αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ περὶ ταῦτα παθητικώτατος ἐναργέστατος ποικιλώτατος γενόμενος, ἀμιμήτως ἐξενήνοχε, μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ὑπολάβωσι πεπονθέναι Τιμαίῳ πάθος ὅμοιον, ὃς ἐλπίσας τὸν μὲν Θουκυδίδην ὑπερβαλεῖσθαι δεινότητι, τὸν δὲ Φύλιστον ἀποδείξειν παντάπασι φορτικὸν καὶ ἰδιώτην, διὰ μέσων ὠθεῖται τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τῶν μάλιστα κατωρθωμένων ἐκείνοις ἀγώνων καὶ ναυμαχιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν [...].¹³³

There is no doubt that Plutarch assesses Thucydides' narrative (ἐπὶ ... διηγήσεσιν) of the Sicilian expedition (books VI–VII;¹³⁴ but he probably has more specific parts in mind, see below). The historian is again presented as a model of historiography full of emotions (παθητικώτατος), vivid (ἐναργέστατος), and multicoloured (ποικιλώτατος).¹³⁵ Two of these adjectives refer strictly to the sense of vision (ἐναργέστατος and ποικιλώτατος),¹³⁶ which recalls Plutarch's remarks in *De glor. Ath.* III 347 (Thucydides' ability to "make an auditor a spectator": θεατὴν ποιῆσαι τὸν ἀκροατὴν). We can speculate as to what exactly Plutarch means by παθητικώτατος; it should probably be understood as "most

¹³³ "I think that Nicias is a suitable parallel to Crassus, and the Sicilian to the Parthian disaster. I must therefore at once, and in all modesty, entreat my readers not to imagine for an instant that, in my narration of what Thucydides has inimitably set forth, surpassing even himself in πάθος, vividness, and variety, I am so disposed as was Timaeus. He, confidently hoping to excel Thucydides in skill, and to make Philistus seem altogether tedious and clumsy, pushes his history along through the conflicts and sea-fights and harangues which those writers had already handled with the greatest success [...]" (all translations of Plutarch's *Nicias* are of Perrin).

¹³⁴ See in general Pelling 1992, 10–12; Hershbell 1997, 226; Van der Stockt 2005, 288–290; Zangara 2007, 58–59. Meister 2013, 43, compares accounts in these books with Duris and Phylarchus, concluding that the latter historians "surpass" Thucydides in dramatism of representation, which makes them sensational and unpersuasive. But this judgement seems to rely mainly on Polybius' critique, which misrepresents Phylarchus.

¹³⁵ Cf. the translation of Pelling 1992, 10: "most emotional, vivid, and varied". Van der Stockt 2005, 288: "with πάθος, vividness and variety".

¹³⁶ The last adjective, a superlative of ποικίλος, is relatively rare. It is not a rhetorical *terminus technicus* (e.g. it does not occur in the lexicon of Lausberg); its meanings comprise the etymological sense "wrought in many colours", hence, metaphorically: "intricate", "diversified", "complex", "subtle" etc. The primary meaning – of colourfulness – is, however, directly related to visual impressions. See Beekes, EDG, s.v. ποικίλος.

productive of emotion” (in the audience), by depicting acts of suffering or violence.¹³⁷

Plutarch labels Thucydides’ narrative with the quality of δεινότης (ὑπερβαλεῖσθαι δεινότητι), which does not occur in the passage of *De glor. Ath.* III 347. This word is difficult to translate; its primary sense is “terribleness”, “harshness”, “severity”. When used for literary features it can be rendered as “intensity”, “forcefulness”,¹³⁸ and implies the effect that the text exerts on the recipient, i.e. it stupifies, affects and/or thrills him. In rhetoric δεινότης had two meanings: a) passionate force, the intensity of a text (special sense) and b) the rhetorical skill of an orator (general sense).¹³⁹ Which sense of δεινότης is implied by Plutarch in this passage? Since he mentions πάθος twice here, and we know that the two categories were interrelated,¹⁴⁰ we can safely assume that it is the more specific sense: the force and intensity of the account.¹⁴¹

5. Dionysius and Plutarch on Thucydides’ Great Harbour narrative

The quality of δεινότης is considered one of the most characteristic traits of Thucydides’ λέξις in Dionysius’ *On Thucydides*.¹⁴² Until now it has remained unnoticed that both Plutarch and Dionysius refer to exactly the same narrative part of Thucydides’ *History* — the last naval battle between the Athenians and the Syracusans in the Harbour of Syracuse (Thuc. VII 69, 4–72, 1).¹⁴³ The

¹³⁷ Gill 1984, 150. This is the meaning found by the author in the *Poetics*, 1453 b11, but I would be cautious about connecting this passage with Aristotle’s treatise (cf. the interpretation of Duris’ *prooemium*, also unjustifiably read with reference to the *Poetics*, below, p. 253, with intervention into this interpretation).

¹³⁸ See LSJ, s.v. δεινότης.

¹³⁹ See Grube 1961, 136–137; Beekes, EDG, s.v. δεινός. The noun δεινότης is etymologically related to δέος and δεινός. Its Latin counterpart is *vehementia*. According to Pritchett 1975, 198, δεινότης as a quality of style arises from a combination of intensity and clarity.

¹⁴⁰ Ps.-Demetrius tells us that δεινότης is linked with expressions of πάθος, which should be simple and unpolished. See *De eloc.* 28: ἀπλοῦν γὰρ εἶναι βούλεται καὶ ἀποίητον τὸ πάθος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἥθος. Cf. the example of μεγαληγορία at 29. Thucydides is adduced as an example of ἰσόκωλον at par. 25. The entire discussion of δεινότης in Ps.-Dem. *De eloc.* comprises paragraphs 240–301.

¹⁴¹ *Contra* Pelling 1992, 10, who reads δεινότης here as “brilliance”, which makes little sense in the context.

¹⁴² Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 24.

¹⁴³ Hornblower, CT III, 693, states that this part of the *History* “is more of an atmospheric evocation and a report of emotions and morale, well suited to recitation, than a piece of conventional military history.” Meister 2013, 43: “In der Tat bildet die sizilische Expedition ein hervorragendes Beispiel für die dramatische Gestaltungskraft des Thukydides [...]”

Thucydidean account in question, considered in itself, has the following characteristics:

- i. It regularly reports the emotions and psychological states of the participants.
- ii. It involves the rhetoric of spectacle and emphasis on vision.
- iii. It is full of superlatives and expressions adding to the magnitude of the event.
- iv. It supplies many circumstantial details, e.g. of screams, body postures indicating internal feelings, etc.

In fact, most of the account is not a description of the event itself (e.g. of tactics), but of the reactions and feelings of those who were present at the event (esp. of the soldiers on the shore, observing the naval struggle). We have in this passage an example of *ἐνάργεια* that involves vividness of moods and, most of all, of the *πάθη* of the participants. The essential and final effect is the impression of the reader/listener, that he himself is present at the event, and watches it together with the observers, whom Thucydides placed at the side of the battle.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, the historian creates the impression that he was himself present at the battle, or obtained his information from the eyewitnesses.¹⁴⁵

Dionysius at *Thuc.* 26 cites *in extenso* the account of the battle (exactly *Thuc.* VII 69, 4–72, 1), and comments on its virtues in the subsequent chapter (*Thuc.* 27). Dionysius stresses the appealing effect of Thucydides' narrative in this section of the *History* (Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 27, 1):

Ἔμοι μὲν δὴ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια τούτοις ἄξια ζήλου τε καὶ μιμήσεως ἐφάνη, τὴν τε μεγαλουργίαν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὴν καλλιλογίαν καὶ τὴν δεινότητα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπέισθην τελειοτάτας εἶναι, τεκμαιρόμενος, ὅτι πᾶσα ψυχὴ τούτῳ τῷ γένει τῆς λέξεως ἄγεται [...].¹⁴⁶

The *δεινότης* is enumerated along with *μεγαλουργία* ("elevation", "sublimity")¹⁴⁷ and *καλλιλογία* ("elegance"). Such a context indicates that Diony-

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Connor 1985, 15.

¹⁴⁵ As Connor 1985, 13 put it: "We are as far from the historians' study as we can possibly be; we are in the war itself. We see; we hear; we even know the plans and thoughts of the participants." Cf. p. 16: "We feel we have been there."

¹⁴⁶ "Now to me these and similar passages appeared worthy of emulation and imitation, and I am persuaded that the elevation, elegance, forcefulness, and other qualities are exhibited in these works in their highest perfection. My judgement is based upon the fact that every type of mind is affected by this kind of discourse [...]."

¹⁴⁷ Rendered in Latin as *grandiloquus* (Cic. *Or.* 20) which is sometimes connected to *σεμνότης*, cf. Ps.-Dem. *De eloc.* 29.

sus has the specific (i.e. referring to the quality of the text) sense of δεινότης in mind — the “passionate forcefulness”.¹⁴⁸

Plutarch states that he is not going to recount these events from the Sicilian expedition that Thucydides had described with vividness, forcefulness etc.; he wants only to add to the general picture by focusing on the character of Nicias. For that reason, when it comes to the moment of the battle in the Harbour (*Nic.* 25), Plutarch omits the course of events, mentions that the battle took place, gives a short summary, and does all this in a manner that is typical of him. However, on this occasion Plutarch underlines how great, thrilling, and moving the battle was both for the observers and the participants (*Plut. Nic.* 25.2):

ἡ δὲ ναυμαχία πολὺν μεγίστη καὶ καρτερωτάτη γενομένη, καὶ μηδὲν ἐλάττωνα πάθη καὶ θορύβους παρασχούσα τοῖς θεωμένοις ἢ τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις διὰ τὴν παντὸς ἐπίβλεψιν τοῦ ἔργου, ποικίλας μεταβολὰς καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτους ἐν ὀλίγῳ λαμβάνοντος, ἔβλαπτε ταῖς αὐτῶν παρασκευαῖς οὐχ ἦττον τῶν πολεμίων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους.¹⁴⁹

According to Plutarch, the battle had thus three main features:

- a. It was the greatest and the most fierce (μεγίστη καὶ καρτερωτάτη).
- b. It raised emotions and threw the observers into confusion (πάθη καὶ θορύβους παρασχούσα τοῖς θεωμένοις), caused by the very witnessing of the event (διὰ τὴν παντὸς ἐπίβλεψιν τοῦ ἔργου).
- c. It was full of diverse and unexpected reversals of fortune (ποικίλας μεταβολὰς καὶ ἀπροσδοκήτους), on both sides.

What does Plutarch actually refer to in this paragraph? It is obvious that he knew the battle from a written account. Plutarch makes clear in the introduction cited above (*Nic.* 1) that it was Thucydides who treated the subject in the best possible way. Hence, Thucydides was certainly Plutarch's basic source for the description of the battle.¹⁵⁰ This also means that, when he refers to Thucydides'

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Grube 1961, 137.

¹⁴⁹ “This proved the greatest and hottest sea fight they had yet made, and roused as many tumultuous emotions in those who were mere spectators as in those who did the fighting, because the whole action was in plain sight, and took on shifts and turns which were varied, unexpected, and sudden. Their own equipment wrought the Athenians no less harm than did that of their enemy.”

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Siemon 1881, 28–51; Marasco 1976, 8–9. Pelling 1992, 11–13; 15–17, and notes 5; 8, provides further evidence and bibliography for the fact that Plutarch knew Thucydides at first hand, and that he is the main source for the account of the Sicilian Expedition in Nicias' *Vita*. There are many verbal echoes of Thucydides' narrative of the Expedition in the *Nicias* (see Pelling's list *ibidem*, 33 (n. 11)). Pelling states: “Plutarch quotes Thucydides often in the *Moralia*, and in such a way as to suggest intimate knowledge of the text and its style; that is also the implication of *Nic.* 1 [...] as well as of the many verbal echoes.” (n. 5). As for *Nicias*, Pelling

ἐνάργεια and emotional effect at *Nic.* 1, he means precisely the way in which Thucydides narrated the battle at the Syracusan harbour (that is, section VII 69, 4–72, 1 — also quoted and commented on by Dionysius).

Overall, it is most appropriate to read the above “summary” of Plutarch (*Nic.* 25) not as his *description* of the battle itself, but rather as an *impression made by Thucydides' description of this battle*. This reading is bolstered by the fact that Plutarch's summary contains numerous verbal echoes of Thucydides' account.¹⁵¹ He evidently alludes to Thucydides' text, and tries to summon up his readers' recollection of the original.¹⁵² This battle was the greatest of the sea-battles described in the *History*, and the reason why Plutarch decides to give no account of it, apart from the fact that Thucydides did it with “unsurpassed skill”, is the (probably detailed) familiarity of Plutarch's audience with these sections of Thucydides.¹⁵³

concluded that “over half of *Nic.* 12–29 seems to come straightforwardly from Thucydides, but the extraneous, non-Thucydidean material is especially full at the beginning [...]” (p. 12). Of course, Plutarch supplements Thucydides, in *Nicias* chiefly from Philistus and Timaeus (*ibidem*, 11–12, with passages that include information that is not to be found in Thucydides). He also modifies and reinterprets Thucydides according to the requirements and purposes of the given works (Pelling 1992, 23–24 gives excellent examples of such “redoing” of Thucydides on the part of Plutarch. On Plutarch's handling of Thucydides as a source see also de Romilly 1988, 22–34; A. Powell 2010, 93–104). On Plutarch's methods of readaptation of historical sources in his *Lives* see Ziegler 1951, 911–914 (913–914: a list of older literature); Stadter 1965, 125–140; Pelling 1980, 127–140; Wardman 1971, 256–260; Nikolaidis 1997, 329–341. On Plutarch's *Lives* in general see: Russell 1995, 75–94; Duff 1999, 52–71; 15–51 (on the introductions to the *Parallel Lives*). On Plutarch's references and quotations in general see Helmbold, O'Neil 1959. Plutarch's method of work was probably to have only one source open in front of him, supplementing with other sources from notes and memory (on Plutarch's method in composing the *Lives* Pelling 1979 is fundamental). So, while writing about the Sicilian expedition in the *Nicias* he had Thucydides' text as the basis, and occasionally supplemented it either from ὑπομνήματα or from memory.

¹⁵¹ *Contra* Pelling 1992, 34 n. 20. Cf. Plutarch's phrases from the passage in question with the wording of Thucydides: Plut.: ἡ δὲ ναυμαχία πολὺν μεγίστη καὶ καρτερωτάτη γενομένη and Thuc. VII 70, 2: ἡ ναυμαχία, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα ἐγένετο, καὶ ἦν καρτερά καὶ οἷα οὐχ ἑτέρα τῶν προτέρων; Plut.: τοῖς θεωμένοις ἢ τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις and Thuc. VII 70, 3: πολλὴ δὲ ἡ ἀντιτέχνησις τῶν κυβερνητῶν καὶ ἀγωνισμὸς πρὸς ἀλλήλους; Plut.: διὰ τὴν παντὸς ἐπίβλεψιν τοῦ ἔργου and Thuc. VII 71, 3: οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἡσσώμενον βλέψαντες ὀλοφυρμῷ τε ἅμα μετὰ βοῆς ἐχρῶντο; Plut.: καὶ μηδὲν ἐλάττωνα πάθη καὶ θορύβους παρασχόουσα and Thuc. VII 70, 6: πολλὴ γὰρ διὴ ἡ παρακέλευσις καὶ βοή ἀφ' ἑκατέρων τοῖς κελυσταῖς, cf. VII 71, 4: πάντα ὁμοῦ ἀκούσαι, ὀλοφυρμὸς βοή. The last connection can be established, since, even though θόρυβος and βοή are two distinct words, they are semantically very close; sometimes they occur as a compound: θόρυβος βοῆς (see LSJ, s.v. θόρυβος).

¹⁵² Since, as remarked above, Plutarch's audience was closely acquainted with Thucydides, or, at least, Plutarch writes in a way that presumes such an acquaintance. Cf. Pelling 1992, 19: “[...] the point would be lost if his audience did not know its Thucydides well.”

¹⁵³ Pelling 1992, 17–19, shows that Plutarch only alludes to Thucydides in case of references to the most obvious and familiar (to him and his audience) moments in the *History*.

Therefore, we already have two testimonies of the reception of Thucydides' account of the battle in question: Dionysius' analysis in *Thuc.* 27, and Plutarch's allusion in the introduction to *Nicias* (*Nic.* 1), which should be read together with the above "summary" of the battle (*Nic.* 25). As indicated above, this assessment is rather to be treated as a set of Plutarch's *impressions* made by Thucydides' narrative of the battle (VII 69, 4–72, 1).

In sum, Plutarch's and Dionysius' reception of Thucydides' account of the battle stresses that its most marked qualities are the focus on emotions in the detailed and vivid description of the battle itself, and of the reactions of the eyewitnesses. Such a reading seems to be contrary to the paradigm of the "rationalist" and "objective" Thucydides. However, it is evident that ancient readers read e.g. such narrative episodes as the account of the final sea battle in the Harbour as pieces of artistry, and, more importantly, considered this to be natural in the historiographical work of Thucydides. Dionysius, writing at the end of the Hellenistic period, can hardly be considered the "discoverer" of this aspect of the Thucydidean passages specified. Rather, the Peripatetic background of his (Dionysius') literary and historiographical concepts is at work here.

5.1 Implications for the Hellenistic reception of Thucydides

The above discussion was intended to provide the grounds for the question of the relationship between Plutarch's reception of Thucydides and his position on Hellenistic theories of historiography.¹⁵⁴ Although some scholars have suggested Plutarch's "Platonic perspective" on history and literature,¹⁵⁵ Thucydides is assessed within conceptions of, and in terms characteristic for, Peripatetic historiographical and literary theory.¹⁵⁶ Plutarch was primarily a biographer, and his *Lives* present a different approach to past reality than historiography *sensu stricto*. Their emphasis is on the ἥθος of particular individuals, not on πράξεις as such.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, Plutarch's understanding of ἱστορία does not

¹⁵⁴ On Plutarch's historiographical ideas in general see: Buckler 1992, 4788–4830; Frazier 1996, 43–69; Nikolaidis 1997, 329–341; Hershbell 1997, 225–243; Duff 1999, 18–22; Badian 2003, 26–44; Van der Stockt 2005, 272–276.

¹⁵⁵ Hershbell 1997, 243: "Above all, history was meant to be viewed from a moral perspective, and for Plutarch this was ultimately a Platonic perspective."

¹⁵⁶ Gallo 1992, 89, in his comment on the passage from *De glor. Ath.* says that ἐνάργεια is "una delle *virtutes dicendi* illustrate da Teofrasto nel *Περὶ λέξεως* [...]". This scholar suggests the direct connection of Plutarch's judgement of Thucydides' writing with Peripatetic literary theories.

¹⁵⁷ Hershbell 1997, 226–234. Despite many apt remarks, I cannot agree with Hershbell's conclusion that Plutarch excluded πάθη from historiography, and relegated them to biography

diverge from Classical and Hellenistic ideas.¹⁵⁸ His historiographical education is based on Classical and Hellenistic authors.¹⁵⁹ The biographical enterprise required vast and unquestionable knowledge and skills in the field of historiography, and these were based on what he read prior to composing the *Lives*. He had a profound knowledge of all the greatest historians from the Classical age onwards.¹⁶⁰

Therefore, it is significant that, given this literary background, Plutarch mentions Thucydides several times as the best example of emotive and graphic writing. Moreover, it can hardly be accidental that both Dionysius, whose Hellenistic literary background is plain, as well as Plutarch pointed to the same narrative part of Thuc. VII 69, 4–72, 1. This convergence makes it hard to believe that they were the first authors or critics to appreciate the stylistic qualities of this account. Rather, this part of the *History* was well recognized already before Dionysius (the first *extant* source that mentions it), and Plutarch — in the Hellenistic period, when the notions used by both authors to describe the account of the naval battle in the Harbour had been coined.

6. Thucydean emotiveness and the Hellenistic historiographers

6.1 Timaeus imitation of the Great Harbour narrative?

Plutarch seems to bolster the thesis that certain parts of Thucydides were widely appreciated for their emotive vividness already in the Hellenistic age. In the

(*ibidem*, 238–239). Hershbell bases this opinion solely on *Galba* 25, of which he gives an unconvincing interpretation. The underlying cause of this misreading is, it seems, Hershbell's acceptance of the idea of a dichotomy between “pragmatic” and “tragic” history, which is questioned in the present chapter. Cf. also Van der Stockt 2005, 272–273.

¹⁵⁸ History is still research or inquiry after the facts, and framing them in a narrative. As such, it aims at truth and is contrasted with τὸ μυθώδες, the fabulous or mythical.

¹⁵⁹ See Hershbell 1997, 230. Cf. Nikolaidis 1997, 329–330: “Despite his well-known disclaimer in the preface of *Alexander* and the explanatory remarks in that of *Nicias*, Plutarch takes a profound interest in history and has a high regard for it; he appreciates historical truth, realized that, although attainable with difficulty, it is easily liable to distortion (cf. *Per.* 13.16), and he seeks to be impartial and objective in his accounts” (quot. from p. 329). The most reliable source of knowledge about historical facts is still the accounts of eyewitnesses; the primacy of αὐτοψία and personal experience over other ways of acquiring information is emphasized. See the examples given by Nikolaidis 1997, 332–333. Plutarch prefers the version of eyewitnesses, even where such authorities as e.g. Polybius provide a different one. The richest source for Plutarch's historiographical concerns is *De Herodoti malignitate*. See Bowen 1992, 1–13 and an insightful analysis of the treatise by Marincola 1994, 191–203.

¹⁶⁰ Nikolaidis 1997, 341: “[...] Plutarch proves an honest and conscientious student of history. He has probably read more authors than those he actually names and is anything else but a passive or credulous reader.” On Plutarch's great acquaintance with Greek literature in general see Pelling 1979, 75–76.

introduction to the *Nicias*, Plutarch intends to dismiss possible allegations that he aims to surpass Thucydides in the abovementioned qualities of his narrative.¹⁶¹ These qualities are the effect of Thucydides' language, and cannot be, in Plutarch's view, copied (ἀμιμήτως, cf. τὰ ἀμίμητα in the sentence below).¹⁶² Any attempt to do so would be foolish (*Nic.* 1.4):

ἐμοὶ δ' ὅλως μὲν ἡ περὶ λέξιν ἄμιλλα καὶ ζηλοτυπία πρὸς ἑτέρους μικροπρεπὲς φαίνεται καὶ σοφιστικόν, ἂν δὲ πρὸς τὰ ἀμίμητα γίγνηται, καὶ τελέως ἀναίσθητον.¹⁶³

Yet at the same time he states that Timaeus of Tauromenium in fact tried to imitate Thucydides in his historical writing (*Nic.* 1.1 = FGGrHist 566 T 18):

[...] μηδὲν ἡμᾶς ὑπολάβωσι πεπονθέναι Τιμαίῳ πάθος ὅμοιον, ὃς ἐλπίσας τὸν μὲν Θουκυδίδην ὑπερβαλεῖσθαι δεινότητι κτλ.¹⁶⁴

Timaeus (c. 350–260), the most important western Greek historian, wrote *Σικελικά*, and it is this work that Plutarch probably refers to.¹⁶⁵ Recently, Klaus Meister tried to show through one extant speech by Timaeus how he challenged Thucydides in rhetorical technique, but this attempt relies on quite arbitrary modern reading.¹⁶⁶ Moreover, Meister focused on Timaeus' speeches, whereas

¹⁶¹ On this statement in particular see Pelling 1980, 135.

¹⁶² Van der Stockt 2005, 289, underlines that ἀμίμητα is used this once in Plutarch in "its artistic sense".

¹⁶³ "But as for me, I feel that jealous rivalry with other writers in matters of diction is altogether undignified and pedantic, and if it be practised toward what is beyond all imitation, utterly silly."

¹⁶⁴ "[...] not to imagine for an instant that I am so disposed as was Timaeus. He, confidently hoping to excel Thucydides in skill [...]."

¹⁶⁵ Timaeus was the son of Andromachus, the dynast who refounded Tauromenium in 358. He was exiled around 315, probably because of his conflict with Agathocles, after the latter had captured Tauromenium. Timaeus spent at least fifty years of his exile at Athens, where he studied under Philiscus of Miletus (a pupil of Isocrates). He composed a synchronic list of Olympian victors, Spartan kings and ephors, the Athenian archons, and the priestesses of Hera in Argos (*Χρονικά Πραξιδικά*). The *Σικελικά* (*Sicilian History*) comprised 38 books, from mythical times to the death of Agathocles (289/288). Timaeus also wrote a separate account on the Roman Wars against Pyrrhus and the events until the year 264, where Polybius' *History* starts. Timaeus wrote his *Σικελικά* during the exile in Athens, from around 320 to 270 (T 4e ap. Plut. *De exil.* 14). See Brown 1958, 1–3; Baron 2013, 89–112. On Timaeus' life and historical work in general see Brown 1958, 1–20; Pearson 1987, 37–51; Baron 2013, 17–42.

¹⁶⁶ Meister 2013, 46–47: discussion of Hermocrates' speech in Timaeus, which presumes that the latter aims to surpass Thucydides in rhetorical technique. Meister compares the depiction of Gylippus in Timaeus with Philistus, in order to show how Timaeus distorted the truth; for Meister this shows a type of "specific reception of Thucydides" ("eine besondere Art der Thukydidesrezeption", p. 47).

Plutarch evidently means that this author also rivalled Thucydides in the narrative episodes (ἀγώνων καὶ ναυμαχιῶν καὶ δημογοριῶν).

The first question is whether Timaeus explicitly stated that he wished (ἐλπίσας) to surpass Thucydides, or whether this is entirely Plutarch's opinion.¹⁶⁷ Unfortunately, the remainder of Timaeus' narrative concerning the Sicilian expedition is too scarce to compare with Thucydides' account.¹⁶⁸ We know, however, that he differed from Thucydides in relation to certain facts, perhaps in a deliberate polemic with him.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, according to Marcellinus, Timaeus claimed that Thucydides lived in Italy (Sicily?) as an exile,¹⁷⁰ and that he was buried there.¹⁷¹ We do not know whether it was the only place where he referred explicitly to Thucydides; we also lack any indication as to the immediate context in which Timaeus made the above claims about Thucydides' life and burial. Nonetheless, it seems that, staying in Athens for c. fifty years, Timaeus was familiar with Thucydides, was interested in his life, and mentioned him in his *Sikelika*.

Plutarch's testimony implies that Timaeus treated the same historical events as Thucydides, with an ambition to surpass him in δεινότης. From Plutarch it can be inferred that the narrative part most probably imitated (or challenged) by Timaeus was exactly the account of the final battle in the Syracusan Harbour.¹⁷² It is impossible to assess what precisely Timaeus tried to achieve; Plutarch by pointing to δεινότης indicates that these were, as it seems, the

¹⁶⁷ On Plutarch's judgement of Timaeus with its literary and scholarly background see Van der Stockt 2005, 276–298. The former was certainly well acquainted with the latter, and used him as one of the main sources in various *Lives*. Thus, it would be fairly possible that Plutarch, knowing equally well both Thucydides and Timaeus, made a comparison between the two, and concluded that Timaeus tries to imitate the Athenian historian.

¹⁶⁸ FGHist 566 F 98–102, of which more than a half is an extract from Plutarch's *Nicias*.

¹⁶⁹ F 101 *ap.* Plut. *Nic.* 28. Thucydides (and Philistus) had reported that Demosthenes and Nicias were put to death by the Syracusans, whereas Timaeus claimed that they had committed suicide. See Van der Stockt 2005, 284–285.

¹⁷⁰ Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 25 (=FGHist 566 F 135): μὴ γὰρ δὴ πειθόμεθα Τιμαίῳ λέγοντι ὥς φυγὸν ὄκησεν ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ (“We do not believe Timaeus, when he says that [Thucydides], being an exile, lived in Italy”, transl. mine). As we see, Marcellinus (or his source) rejected this claim (μὴ ... πειθόμεθα); but at par. 33 he allows for Timaeus' information that Thucydides was buried in Italy.

¹⁷¹ Marc. *Vit. Thuc.* 33 (=FGHist 566 F 136): τὸ δ' ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ Τίμαιον αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλους λέγειν κείσθαι μὴ καὶ σφόδρα καταγέλαστον ἦι. (“And the claim of Timaeus as of others, that he is buried in Italy, is rather ridiculous” (transl. mine).

¹⁷² Plutarch says that he is going to omit what Thucydides had treated with proper emphasis, whereas Timaeus tried to surpass him in δεινότης. Then Plutarch omits the description of the final battle (he offers only the summary discussed above).

qualities of ἐνάργεια and πάθος as produced by Thucydides' description.¹⁷³ In sum, it is likely that Timaeus, while composing his Σικελικά in Athens, probably found Thucydides the most appropriate point of reference for the Sicilian Expedition, and tried to challenge him in the emotional impact and impression made by the accounts of battles, particularly the battle in the Great Harbour of Syracuse.

6.2 Duris' concept of μίμησις and his affinity with Thucydides

Walker has observed that authors who refer to Thucydides' ἐνάργεια point directly to his ability to properly represent reality.¹⁷⁴ I demonstrated above how Dionysius of Halicarnassus highlighted Thucydides' ability to imitate (= represent) ἔθνη and πάθος; the *terminus technicus* for this representation is μίμησις. Thus, μίμησις is a potential factor for the impact of Thucydides on subsequent generations of historians. This word occurs in a clearly historiographical context within a methodological *prooemium* to Duris' Μακεδονικά. It is chronologically the first historiographical work where the idea of μίμησις occurs.

6.2.1 Duris' methodological statement from the *prooemium* to the Μακεδονικά

The entire *prooemium* to the Μακεδονικά is not extant; we have only a small fragment in a quotation by Photius (FGrHist 76 F 1, *ap. Phot. Bibl.* 176, p. 121a):¹⁷⁵

Δούρις μὲν οὖν ὁ Σάμιος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν αὐτοῦ Ἱστοριῶν οὕτω φησὶν·
 “Ἐφορος δὲ καὶ Θεόπομπος τῶν γενομένων πλείστον ἀπελείφθησαν· οὔτε γὰρ
 μιμήσεως μετέλαβον οὐδεμιᾶς οὔτε ἡδονῆς ἐν τῷ φράσαι, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ γράφειν
 μόνον ἐπεμελήθησαν.”¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ Cf. Van der Stockt 2005, 269: “When Plutarch talks about the relation between Timaeus and Thucydides, and about that between Timaeus and Philistus, he is clearly talking about a relation of artistic rivalry.”

¹⁷⁴ Walker 1993, 353.

¹⁷⁵ This reference to Duris comes presumably from the introduction to his Μακεδονικά. The *prooemium* contained, it seems, some exposition of Duris' methodological and stylistic (?) principles. The sentence quoted above is the sole extant material from the first book. In a subsequent discussion, Photius criticizes Duris on similar grounds to the latter's charges against his predecessors. See Landucci Gattinoni 1997, 51–55.

¹⁷⁶ “Duris of Samos in the first book of his *Histories* says: ‘Ephorus and Theopompus fell short of the events, as they neither produced any imitation nor pleasure of the expression, taking care only about the written page’ (transl. mine).”

Can Duris' concept of μίμησις be considered a possible reaction to, or reception of, Thucydides' writing? Charles W. Fornara expressed the view that Duris could have looked to Thucydides as his model, when he criticized Ephorus and Theopompus for the lack of ἡδονή and μίμησις in their histories.¹⁷⁷ The fragment was also recently placed by Meister in the context of Thucydides' influence on the Hellenistic currents of historiography.¹⁷⁸ In general, Meister propounds the thesis that Thucydides' narrative qualities (chiefly πάθος and ἐνάργεια) were of some influence on Duris, which is supposed to be implied in the above fragment. However, the latter reaches wide-ranging conclusions¹⁷⁹ with no proper examination of the question. In sum, the main weaknesses of Fornara's and Meister's theses lie in the following overall ideas behind them:

a. Fornara based this view on an old and already falsified paradigm, in which Duris' notion of μίμησις derives from the conceptual framework of Aristotle's *Poetics*. Similarly, for Meister μίμησις from Duris' fragment refers to tragic/dramatic conceptions in literary theory.

b. For Meister, Duris belongs to a distinct current of "Sensationshistorie".

c. ἐνάργεια and πάθος are to be read as components of historiographical texts belonging exclusively to this current.

d. Thucydides was moderate in his use of these effects, whereas Duris and his "followers" perverted it.

The problem of the interpretation of this passage has been the subject of lively scholarly debate. One of the most established readings saw Duris' methodology as influenced by Aristotle's theory of μίμησις from the *Poetics*. The idea of the importance of this connection was bolstered by the relationship of Duris with Theophrastus.¹⁸⁰ The pivotal part of Duris' dependence on

¹⁷⁷ Fornara 1983, 129–130: "Since Thucydides has been appraised favourably in terms suitable to the (conjectured) aesthetic of Duris, there is reason to think that Duris claimed Thucydides for a precursor and model. Such an assumption would explain the surprising confinement of Duris' criticism to the techniques of his immediate predecessors, the "rhetorical historians", Ephorus and Theopompus. He did not, in other words, criticize all of his predecessors (as an innovator might well do) for a deficiency of pleasure and μίμησις, and it is credible that he contrasted them unfavorably with the great Athenian and perhaps with some others (Ctesias is a possibility; see Demetrius *On Style* 215)."

¹⁷⁸ Meister 2013, 42–43.

¹⁷⁹ See above, pp. 220–221, Meister's thesis of Thucydides' influence on "dramatic historiography".

¹⁸⁰ It has to be emphasized that this connection rests on a textual conjecture. Duris' alleged apprenticeship in Theophrastus' school is based upon an early-nineteenth-century emendation of the text of Athenaeus by A. Korais, in which the singular μαθητής of the manuscript, referring to the sentence's subject, Hippolochus, was replaced by the plural μαθητάς, referring to Lynceus and Duris. Korais' emendation was kept in the most recent edition of Athenaeus (cf. Olson 2006). There is no other independent testimony that Duris was associated with Theophrastus. The

Aristotle/Theophrastus and his successor was believed to be the former's tragic approach to history writing.¹⁸¹ Apart from the historical work *Μακεδονικά*, from which the *prooemium* most probably derives, Duris was interested in tragedy, painting, engraving, contests, customs, and Homeric problems. This led many scholars to interpret the concept of *μίμησις* from the *prooemium* in the framework of Aristotle's *Poetics*, where it is a crucial notion. This "traditional" interpretation stated that Duris' *μίμησις* in his theory of historiography implies that i. history should be more similar to tragedy in its treatment of reality, and ii. that historiography should be aimed at producing the emotions of pity and fear, as the chief conceptual framework of *μίμησις*, as Aristotle suggests.

This understanding of Duris' historiographical work has been questioned and refuted in numerous studies, and the need for reinterpretation has become evident.¹⁸² The notion that requires redefinition is the crucial word in the above *prooemium* - *μίμησις*. Interpretations of this word underlie most of the readings that associate Duris' methodology with Aristotle's concept of *μίμησις* from the *Poetics*. As demonstrated above, in the field of historiography, the meaning of *μίμησις* is distinct from the set of ideas presented in the *Poetics*. Duris' fragment in Photius contains no allusion to Aristotle, and the only point of connection is the word *μίμησις*. There are reasons to read the word and the passage in another way; and to shift the emphasis of interpretation from Aristotle's theory of tragedy.

tradition of a teacher-student relationship between Theophrastus and Duris should thus be treated with caution (cf. Dalby 1991, 539–541; Landucci Gattinoni 1997, 36–38). Furthermore, this conjecture formed the basis not only for the conviction that Duris was Theophrastus' student, but actually for the conception of the Peripatetic provenance of the "school of tragic historiography" in general (!). If we treat this relationship more sceptically (allowing for other factors as decisive for Duris' approach to history), and read Duris' *prooemium* in the context of concepts of *μίμησις* and *ἐνάργεια* within the historiographical genre (as in the present chapter), we will probably achieve an interpretation that is more in conformity with other sources, as well as with the text of Duris itself.

¹⁸¹ On Duris as a "tragic historian" and on his allegedly Peripatetic approach to writing history see: Schwartz 1905b, 1853–1856; Scheller 1911, 68; von Fritz 1956, 85–128; Brink 1960, 14–19; Ferrero 1963, 68–100; Torraca 1988, 17–23; Meister 1975: detailed *status quaestionis* up until the mid-1970s: pp. 109–111; Meister 1990, 61–62; 101.

¹⁸² Kebiric 1977, 15–18, was the first scholar to explicitly cast doubt on such a reading of Duris' historical writing, and preferred a more balanced view. He underlined the existential, as well as the literary background as factors that shaped Duris' writing.

6.2.2 Duris and Thucydides: a common idea of the exactness of the representation of historical reality?

I have pointed out above that the analogy between poetry/historiography and painting occurs in other sources (esp. Dionysius and Plutarch) in a direct connection with the concept of an adequate representation of reality. We can assume that Duris had a similar conceptual framework in mind. Such a view can be supported by reading the *prooemium* in connection with a passage in Diodorus, which indicates that Duris' μίμησις should be understood strictly as a notion for representation.¹⁸³ We find there a similarity in phrasing: τῶν γενομένων πλεῖστον ἀπελείφθησαν (Duris' *prooemium* in Photius) — μιμῆσθαι μὲν τὰ γεγενημένα, πολὺ δὲ λείπεσθαι τῆς ἀληθοῦς διαθέσεως (Diodorus, deriving on Duris). The sentence in Diodorus makes clear that μιμῆσθαι refers to the reproduction or imitation of events which really took place, of historical reality (τὰ γεγενημένα). And it can also be naturally inferred from the text that μίμησις aims at presenting the truth. This aim is hard to achieve, Diodorus states, when a historian has to interrupt his narrative in his attempts to describe events taking place simultaneously in different places. The sense can be paraphrased thus: "experience of the events contains the whole truth, which can be transmitted through imitation by means of writing; however, this will always fall short of their real course, because of the need at times to interrupt the narrative." Therefore, Duris in his *prooemium* indicates that the proper function of a historical narrative is the reproduction of reality, as well as the creation of a pleasurable effect for the audience. The translation in a recently published edition of Duris' fragments, which renders μίμησις as "exactness of representation"¹⁸⁴ thus seems appropriate. Such an approach

¹⁸³ There is a passage in Diodorus, within a chapter most probably based on Duris, where μίμησις appears in the context of the theory of the disposition of material within a historical work, Diod. Sic. XX 43, 7: ταύτη δ' ἂν τις καὶ τὴν ἱστορίαν καταμέμψαιτο, θεωρῶν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ βίου πολλὰς καὶ διαφόρους πράξεις συντελουμένας κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν, τοῖς δ' ἀναγράφουσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχον τὸ μεσολαβεῖν τὴν διήγησιν καὶ τοῖς ἅμα συντελουμένοις μερίζειν τοὺς χρόνους παρὰ φύσιν, ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τῶν πεπραγμένων τὸ πάθος ἔχειν, τὴν δ' ἀναγραφὴν ἐστερημένην τῆς ὁμοίας ἐξουσίας μιμῆσθαι μὲν τὰ γεγενημένα, πολὺ δὲ λείπεσθαι τῆς ἀληθοῦς διαθέσεως ("At this point one might censure the art of history, when he observes that in life many different actions are consummated at the same time, but that it is necessary for those who record them to interrupt the narrative and to parcel out different times to simultaneous events contrary to nature, with the result that, although the actual experience of the events contains the truth, yet the written record, deprived of such power, while presenting copies of the events, falls far short of arranging them as they really are." (transl. Henderson). Strasburger 1975, 85 and Meister 1990, 179, identify this part of the Βιβλιοθήκη as deriving from Duris.

¹⁸⁴ This is the rendering in the edition of Duris' fragments (BNJ 76 F 1).

places the emphasis on a different aspect,¹⁸⁵ on strictly historiographical theory. The link with Aristotle's *Poetics* is less firm than the passages which draw on Duris in Diodorus.

Duris' link with the Peripatetic school, although formerly overemphasized, should not be completely ignored. We should note that, even if Duris had no direct personal relationship with Theophrastus, he certainly could be considered an intellectual who took lessons in the Peripatetic "school". This current was popular enough at the time he wrote his history to impact on his historiographical ideas to some extent.¹⁸⁶ It is not impossible that Duris' conception of μίμησις as the proper aim of historical writing is to some extent related to Thucydides' "status" in the Peripatetic school (Theophrastus, Praxiphanes, Ps.-Demetrius). Even if we consider Duris' overall historical output (so far as we can judge from the remaining testimonies) as fundamentally different from the work of Thucydides, the aspect of an adequate representation of reality, labelled as ἐνάργεια or μίμησις, could be a common denominator between the two historians. We can speculate that when Duris criticizes two prominent historians — Theopompus and Ephorus — on account of their lack of μίμησις, he indirectly *praises* Thucydides *for* his ability to produce μίμησις.

6.3 Agatharchides' conception of ἐνάργεια and πάθος

As we know, Agatharchides was considered an "imitator" of Thucydides' speeches.¹⁸⁷ Below I focus on the connection that we can establish between Thucydides and Agatharchides in the field of the concept of the representation of reality, and in the conceptualization of the crucial dichotomy between myth and history. In the extant fragments of Agatharchides we can find statements combining ἐνάργεια, πάθος and the effect of visualization, similar to the definitions of ἐνάργεια and their applications in Diodorus or Plutarch in reference to Thucydides.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. Landucci Gattinoni 1997, 54–55, argued for an interpretation in which Duris, in the *prooemium*, criticized Theopompus and Isocrates for their focus on the formal requirements of a written account, with little attention to the arousing of emotions in the listeners. Duris would aim at creating emotional participation on the part of the recipients. Such a reading sets Duris in the same framework as Polybius, Agatharchides, and the literary theorists who elaborated on the importance of ἐνάργεια as a feature of historical narrative, as a tool to arouse πάθος in the listeners, and therewith as a tool of imitation (μίμησις) of historical reality.

¹⁸⁶ Kebrić 1977, 11.

¹⁸⁷ See chap. 3, pp. 158–166.

6.3.1 Interpretation of *ME* 21,68

The most relevant passages belong to a part of *De mari Erythreo*, quoted by Photius (445b–447b), which is devoted to reflections on how men's sufferings ought to be represented in a historical work, from the safe and distant perspective of a historian.¹⁸⁸ The text runs as follows (Phot. *Bibl.* 250, p. 446b = *De mari Erythraeo* 21,68 = GGM I. 120, 45):¹⁸⁹

Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν σκώπτειν ὁ σοφιστὴς δοκεῖ διὰ τούτων, οὐκ ὀλοφύρεσθαι τῶν πόλεων τὴν τύχην, καὶ σκοπεῖν πῶς ἂν τάχιστα συγκόπαιτο τὸν λόγον, οὐ πῶς τὸ πάθος ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν ἀγάγοι διὰ τῆς ἐναργείας.¹⁹⁰

Otto Immisch suggested that the concept behind this sentence is “das künstlerische Darstellen außergewöhnlichen Unglücks”.¹⁹¹ Such a reading would confine ἐνάργεια to the domain of aesthetics, which when taking the above analysis into account is difficult to agree with. Adriana Zangara rightly reads this passage in connection with another, where Agatharchides speculates on how someone who was not involved in an action could describe it ἐμφανής, that is, “in a manifest way”.¹⁹² This statement can easily be interpreted in the light of the above definitions of ἐνάργεια — one of its primary functions is the arousal of πάθος.¹⁹³ In Agatharchides, πάθος means, on the one hand, sufferings or the terrible experience of e.g. the inhabitants of a destroyed city, or, on the other, the emotions felt by the recipients of the description of such events.¹⁹⁴ The whole *prooemium* to book V, which includes considerations about “how to depict others' sufferings”, is a discussion of the question of an adequate representation of reality.¹⁹⁵ Agatharchides poses such a question due to one of

¹⁸⁸ πῶς τὰς ὑπερβαλλούσας ἐνίοις ἀκληρίας τὸν ἐκτὸς τῶν κινδύνων κείμενον πρεπόντως ἐξαγγελεῖται. On the entire section of Phot. *Bibl.* 250, p. 445b–447b see Immisch 1919, 9–12; Malinowski 2007, 417–420. Immisch 1919, 9 n. 2, adduces several passages, esp. from Diodorus (probably deriving from Agatharchides), to show that here also Photius relates his wording quite precisely. See Phot. *Bibl.* 250, p. 457b 14; 459a 3; Diod. Sic. III 12, 4; 13, 2.

¹⁸⁹ Zanker 1981, 300, merely mentions this passage, as one piece of evidence that ἐνάργεια was important in Hellenistic historiography. Similarly Zangara 2007, 60.

¹⁹⁰ “I think that by these words the sophist mocks, rather than bewails, the fate of the cities, and wonders how to chop up the speech, rather than how through vividness to represent the emotional effect in the eyes [of the audience]” (all translations of *On the Red Sea* are my own).

¹⁹¹ Immisch 1919, 6–8, quotation from p. 8.

¹⁹² Zangara 2007 renders ἐμφανής as “d’une manière expressive”, which seems inappropriate due to the etymology of ἐμφανής. It derives from ἐμφαίνω (“to exhibit”, “display”), thus the word is strictly connected with vision; “visible”, “manifest” are the proper primary meanings.

¹⁹³ See above, p. 225, in the definition of Ps.-Demetrius.

¹⁹⁴ Malinowski 2007, 421.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. the second sentence of the introduction (*ME* 21): ὧν ὁ τρόπος οὐ λίαν γένοιτ' ἂν ἐμφανής, εἰ μὴ τις ὑποτάξαιτ' ἂν ἀκόλουθον αἰτίαν τοῖς ἐμφανιζομένοις.

the subjects that he treats in his work — the miserable fate of the mine-workers.¹⁹⁶ Agatharchides seems to understand ἐνάργεια as a quality of διήγησις, and his definition is fully consistent with the senses described above. In the subsequent pages, Photius concludes that Agatharchides realized his concept in describing the conditions and terrible experience of these people.¹⁹⁷ Historians ought to reproduce πάθη in order to make their accounts truthful, with the provision that these descriptions cannot be exaggerated or set outside their causal context.

6.3.2 Agatharchides' concept of ἐνάργεια πραγματική and the Thucydidean πάθος

Agatharchides stresses that historians have to produce ἐνάργεια,¹⁹⁸ which is supposed to “reveal” or “instruct on” the events (διδασκούσης τὸ πρᾶγμα). In an earlier section, the historian enumerates conditions to be met in order to create a graphic description of a city that is under siege.¹⁹⁹ Clarity (τὸ σαφές) and some other ornamentations are described as the main requirements for ἐνάργεια.²⁰⁰ Thus, Agatharchides' definition is similar to Demetrius', and is close to Thucydides' concept of ἀκρίβεια and τὸ σαφές. In light of the suggestions as to Thucydides' influence, the connection of τὸ σαφές with ἐνάργεια in Agatharchides has to be emphasized. The text preserved by Photius seems to imply that Agatharchides also gave examples of πάθη adequately depicted by historians, and that he made some comments on them (only examples from orators are adduced in the extant material).²⁰¹ Thucydides could possibly have appeared as a model of ἐνάργεια in the narrative, and of the proper depiction of πάθη. Another relevant passage from Agatharchides contains a phrase unique in all extant historiographical texts, ἐνάργεια πραγματική:²⁰²

¹⁹⁶ Immisch 1919, 9–10.

¹⁹⁷ Phot. *Bibl.* 250, p. 447b = *ME* 24: τὸ πάθος ... ἐκτραγωδήσας κτλ.

¹⁹⁸ Phot. *Bibl.* 250, p. 447a 34–36. Berardi 2012, 46. It is a comment on a passage from Demosthenes, in which details of the destruction of Thebes are supplied, and ἐνάργεια seems to be understood as an effect of the inclusion of these details.

¹⁹⁹ Phot. *Bibl.* 250, p. 446a 8–12.

²⁰⁰ Agatharchides connects ἐνάργεια with clarity at *ME* 21,30: ὅτι τὸ ρηθὲν ἐν τῷ σαφῶς γινῶναι καὶ τὴν συμπάθειαν ἔστι λαβεῖν· ὁ δ' ὑστερήσας τοῦ σαφοῦς ἀπολέλειπται καὶ τῆς ἐναργείας. See Berardi 2012, 58. Malinowski 2007 notes that one codex of Photius transmits not ἐνάργεια but ἐνέργεια for this passage, but he does not suggest which *lectio* is more likely to be correct.

²⁰¹ Malinowski 2007, 420.

²⁰² In Phot. *Bibl.* 250, p. 444b 20–24.

Ὅτι αὐτός, φησίν, ἑαυτῷ αἴτιος καθίσταται ἐλέγχων ὁ τὴν τῶν μυθοποιῶν ἐξουσίαν εἰς πραγματικὴν μετάγων ἐνάργειαν.²⁰³

This quotation comes from a section of *ME* 7–8 (Phot. *Bibl.* 250, p. 442b–444b), which treats the inclusion of myths in historiography, judging it as wrong.²⁰⁴ It is not immediately clear how πραγματική ἐνάργεια should be understood. Francesco Berardi recently translated it as “evidenza dei fatti”. He seems to interpret this passage as: a) posing ἐνάργεια as a condition for truth, b) stressing the requirement of detailed description, c) the need for clear and plain language to achieve a proper visualization of the events.²⁰⁵ Zangara’s interpretation tends to associate this concept of Agatharchides with Polybius, as an opposition between pure (poetical) invention, and ἐνάργεια based on facts, aimed at the reproduction (imitation) of historical reality.²⁰⁶ In fact, Agatharchides draws a sharp antithesis between mythology, found in poetry, and historiography, in the example of Deinias’ story about Perseus. There is a close connection between this line of thought and Polybius’ discussion of the differences between tragedy and history. It is discernible on the level of vocabulary and notions used (ψυχαγωγία as opposed to truth).²⁰⁷ In this framework, ἐνάργεια πραγματική appears a synonym for “evidence of facts”,

²⁰³ “He says that the one who transposes mythological liberty to the vivid account of facts is himself guilty of the occurrence of counterarguments.”

²⁰⁴ To be precise, it is a theoretical *excursus*, within a polemic with Deinias of Argos, who included a myth about Perseus in his work (the story that Erythras was Perseus’ son). The point of departure is the question of the etymology of the Erythrean sea, for which Deinias’ version assumed that it was from the son of Perseus – Erythras (cf. *ME* 2–6 = Phot. *Bibl.* 250, p. 441b–442b). Prior to the above statement on historical truth, Agatharchides adduces a series of mythological stories, commenting on them with irony and doubt. The aim of this critique is to prove that searching for historical or geographical information in poetry is inadequate, since it conveys a great deal of information that is contrary to basic empirical knowledge. See Malinowski 2007, 379–383. Verdin 1990, 1–15, claims that the copiousness of this *excursus* gives an apt illustration of the literary culture in the Alexandrian milieu, where Agatharchides was trained. One of the specific tendencies in this environment was, as Verdin asserts (*ibidem*, 12–13), the gradual separation of poetry and historiography. However, when taking our above findings into account, such a conclusion is rather doubtful; historiography was constantly close to epic poetry (see above, pp. 230–331). Santoni 2001 devoted a separate work to this part of *ME* (see esp. pp. 10–23, on its structure and content).

²⁰⁵ Berardi 2012, 46.

²⁰⁶ Zangara 2007, 75: “D’une part, l’usage ‘positif’, ‘pragmatique’ qui est indiqué par Polybe lui-même au livre XII et qui a été rapproché de l’usage qu’en fait Agatharchides de Cnide, opposant la liberté d’invention poétique (τῶν μυθοποιῶν ἐξουσία) à la ἐνάργεια πραγματική, dont le but serait de reproduire la vérité objective des faits sans susciter d’effets pathétiques et spectaculaires. De l’autre, un usage ‘pervers’ parce que ‘tragique’ et impropre à l’histoire [...]”

²⁰⁷ On ψυχαγωγία as a theme in the context of geography see Malinowski 2007, 382 (esp. on Strabo’s polemic with Eratosthenes’ treatment of Homer) and Verdin 1990, 10–11.

“things themselves”. *ἐνάργεια πραγματική* seems to be the condition of truth, in contrast to *μυθοποιῶν ἐξουσία*, which causes only *ψυχαγωγία*. The antithesis between myth and truth, expressed in terms of *ἐνάργεια* and *πράξεις*, also appears in passages attributable to Agatharchides, found in Diodorus of Sicily.²⁰⁸

This statement comes from Diodorus’ *Βιβλιοθήκη*, book I, which is devoted to Egypt. The section concerns the wondrous healing skills of Isis. This account, at least in the chapters about customs, most probably draws on Agatharchides.²⁰⁹ After a short introduction to “what the Egyptians say about Isis”, Agatharchides says that the Egyptians base their opinion on *πράξεις ἐναργεῖς*, the “plain facts”, as we should probably translate this phrase here.²¹⁰ It is remarkable that the antithesis between *πράξεις ἐναργεῖς* and *μυθολογία* has exactly the same sense as in the reflections explicitly ascribed to Agatharchides by Photius — *mythology contra πράξεις/πράγματα + ἐναργής*. In the same book, but also in others that probably draw on the Cnidian, *ἐνάργεια* appears several times in connection with “the bare facts”. The idea seems to be simple — the observable reality provides the historian with clear (*ἐναργής*) proof. In some of these passages, *ἐνάργεια* is nearly synonymous with reality/truth.²¹¹ In one instance, where Agatharchides is referred to explicitly, *ἐνάργεια* is directly related to the fact of personal observation/experience (*τῆς ἐναργείας αὐτῆς μαρτυρουμένης*).²¹² *ἐνάργεια* as a *μαρτύριον* — i.e. the “image of reality” as a “witness”. The notion of *μαρτύριον* recalls its use in Thucydides, where *μαρτύριον* is a fact that provides the historian with the proof for what he aims to establish.²¹³

To sum up, the semantics of Agatharchides’ *πάθος* and *ἐνάργεια*, as well as the historiographical context in which these notions appear, are fully consistent with all the texts and examples discussed above, where these qualities are highlighted in Thucydides’ *History*.

²⁰⁸ Diod. Sic. I 25, 4: *οὐ μυθολογίας ὁμοίως τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἀλλὰ πράξεις ἐναργεῖς*.

²⁰⁹ However, cf. Oldfather 1933, XXVI.

²¹⁰ Diodorus relates it as if these were the words of the Egyptians, but it is clearly his (or his source’s) reformulation of the Egyptian story into Greek.

²¹¹ Diod. Sic. I 40, 5: *τὴν ἐναργεῖαν, ἥ γε φύσις τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδαμῶς συγχωρήσει*. Cf. I 40, 6: *τὴν ἐναργεῖαν παρέχεσθαι μαρτυροῦσαν*. Cf. *ἐνάργεια* as “bearing witness” in I 41, 8 quoted above. The context is the explanation of “certain of the wise men of Memphis” of the floods of the Nile, which is considered (by Diodorus or his source – probably Agatharchides) absurd, which is summed up in the quoted words involving *ἐνάργεια*. Cf. Diod. Sic. III 3, 2: *ἐναργεστάτην ἔχειν ἀπόδειξιν*. In all these instances it is very probable that the main source of Diodorus is Agatharchides. On Diodorus’ sources in the books in question see Meister 1990, 175–179. On Diodorus’ methodology in the treatment of his sources see the introduction to the present work.

²¹² Diod. Sic. I 41, 8.

²¹³ Cf. Thuc. I 73, 2.

Dionysius, in the crucial passage analyzed above (*Thuc.* 15), commented on Thucydides' ability to imitate πάθη to produce an account that has a strong visual and emotional impact. In making this observation, Dionysius focused on Thucydides' descriptions of the capture and annihilation of cities, the enslavement of men, and "other such terrible things" (Πόλεων τε ἀλώσεις καὶ κατασκαφὰς καὶ ἀνδραποδισμοὺς καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας συμφορὰς). Agatharchides devoted the entirety of chapter 21 in the fifth book of *De mari Erythraeo* to the question of how to describe the capture and destruction of cities. He makes similar statements to those of Dionysius on Thucydides — the historian's role is to produce such an account as will adequately represent such terrible experiences. Dionysius states that Thucydides is, for the most part, a master of such representation (he surpasses all historians in this respect). In light of Dionysius', Plutarch's, and (probably) Timaeus' appreciation of Thucydides' vividness and emotional appeal, and taking the Peripatetic background of Agatharchides into account, we can assume that he was at least to some degree under Thucydides' influence. Of course, this does not imply that he based his theories about ἐνάργεια and πάθος exclusively on Thucydides, but the connection exists.

Agatharchides was considered an adherent of the Peripatetic "school", similarly to Duris, hence some scholars have indicated that he took the concept of ἐνάργεια directly from the learning of the Peripatos.²¹⁴ An affinity between Duris and Agatharchides in terms of their theory of the representation of historical reality seems unquestionable,²¹⁵ and is one more reason to link Thucydides' appreciation by Theophrastus and Praxiphanes with the historiographical theories of the historians stemming from Peripatos.

6.4 Polybius' concept of ἐνάργεια and his imitation of Thucydides

6.4.1 The role of graphic description in historical narrative

In Polybius, ἐνάργεια is to be found in a rarely analyzed passage in book XII. It stands together with ἔμφασις as an important feature of historical narrative. The historian discusses them within the analogy known from Polybius: painting-historical writing. It occurs in a fragmentarily preserved chapter, where Timaeus' lack of personal experience and the resulting artificiality of his account are condemned (XII 25h, 3).²¹⁶

²¹⁴ Immisch 1919, 7: "Der Anschluß an die peripatetische Lehre ist hier ganz klar."

²¹⁵ Schepens 1975, 194; Zangara 2007, 60; Kebric 1977, 11.

²¹⁶ On ἐνάργεια in this topic/chapter in particular see: Strasburger 1975, 83; Schepens 1975, 185–200; Zangara 2007, 60–66; Sacks 1981, 149–150. On this chapter in general, esp. Timaeus'

καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνων ἢ μὲν ἐκτὸς ἐνίστε γραμμὴ σφύζεται, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἐμφάσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνάργειας²¹⁷ τῶν ἀληθινῶν ζώων ἄπεστιν, ὅπερ ἴδιον ὑπάρχει τῆς ζωγραφικῆς τέχνης.²¹⁸

The whole paragraph is a critique of Timaeus' lack of personal experience of the things he described, e.g. military matters. However, this point is couched in characteristic terms (XII 25h, 4):

ἡ γὰρ ἔμφασις τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτοῖς ἄπεστι διὰ τὸ μόνον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοπαθείας τοῦτο γίνεσθαι τῆς τῶν συγγραφέων ὅθεν οὐκ ἐντίκτουσιν ἀληθινούς ζήλους τοῖς ἀκούουσιν οἱ μὴ δι' αὐτῶν πεπορευμένοι τῶν πραγμάτων.²¹⁹

Polybius seems to state that ἐνάργεια and ἔμφασις are necessary qualities in a historical narrative. According to Polybius, a painter who produces an adequate picture of a living being needs to have personal experience of the objects depicted in order to do it correctly. Similarly, in order to provide a picture that will correctly represent reality, a historian has to have direct contact with the matter in question. The overarching idea behind the comparison with painting is that of μίμησις. It refers us to the context of the reproduction of nature, analogically to historiography — which imitates facts.²²⁰ ἔμφασις, in a rhetorical context, denotes such qualities of a text as make more things come to one's mind, than the words themselves designate.²²¹ The compound phrase

role here see Walbank, HCP II, 395–397 *ad loc.* He seems to treat ἐνάργεια and ἐνέργεια as synonyms. On ἐνάργεια in Polybius see also Marincola 2001, 127–128.

²¹⁷ In the Büttner-Wobst edition of 1893 the reading was ἐνεργείας. However, the manuscript is in poor condition; Boissevain's reexamination of it brought another *lectio*: ἐνάργεια, and was followed by Pédech in the Budé edition, as well as by other scholars referring to this passage, see e.g. Sacks 1981, 149 n. 62.

²¹⁸ "For in their case the outlines are sometimes preserved but we miss that vividness and animation of the real figures which the graphic art is especially capable of rendering" (all translations of Polybius are of Paton).

²¹⁹ "We miss in them the vividness of facts, as this impression can only be produced by the personal experience of the author. Those, therefore, who have not been through the events themselves do not succeed in arousing the interest of their readers."

²²⁰ Cf. Polyb. XII 25e. Zangara 2007, 65, commenting on a similar metaphor in Plutarch, draws attention to the serious difficulties involved in this comparison. In the case of painting the temporal relation between the imitated reality and the reality itself is 1:1, namely the picture represents reality as it stands in one particular moment. In a historical account, the effect is sometimes achieved through a longer description, or a series of descriptions; the image is built by a juxtaposition of subsequent descriptions (*ibidem*, 68). Thus, in the case of historical *narratio* the related account is more comparable to a film, than to a static picture. The ancients, with no idea of film technology, drew on the most adequate analogy known to them.

²²¹ Zangara 2007, 61; Cic. *Or.* 139: *erit maior quam oratio*; Quint. *Inst.* VIII 3, 83: *plus significat quam dicit*.

ἔμφασις καὶ ἐνάργεια also occurs in Philodemus' *De poematibus*. In this treatise, a poetic work should have both qualities, whereas rhetoric has only ἐνάργεια.²²² In the context of Polybius' work, the word ἔμφασις can be read compatibly with Agatharchides' ἐμφανής — both terms stress the context of the visual features of historical narrative. Neither ἔμφασις nor ἐνάργεια were defined by Polybius elsewhere, but there are indications that the semantics of this word developed from “appearance”, through “presentation” to “written account”, that is — narrative.²²³ Polybius uses ἐμφαίνω as a synonym for narrative, and by that he reveals the tendency to conceive a historical account as a graphic representation of reality.²²⁴ We can therefore conclude that for Polybius also the reader of historiographical writing is a type of spectator.²²⁵

Polybius states that ἐνάργεια can be achieved only by αὐτοπάθεια. This word has significant implications for our understanding of Polybius' conception. It has already been indicated that Polybius postulates personal *experience* of the described facts (see pp. 155–156).²²⁶ The stem πάθ- in the word is a direct link of αὐτοπάθεια with the notion of πάθος. Such a perspective allows us to make a connection between this passage in Polybius and the definitions of ἐνάργεια and πάθος from Ps.-Dem. *De eloc.* 209 and 217.²²⁷ Guido Schepens stated that in Polybius' notion of αὐτοπάθεια two allegedly contradictory tendencies of Hellenistic historiography are disclosed: the investigation of facts (“Tatsachenforschung”) and the vivid representation of reality (“lebendiges Abbild der Wirklichkeit”).²²⁸ The historian is supposed to “touch” the events for himself, in order to be able to relate them with appropriate vividness and graphic representation. Polybius allows for some degree of un-personal knowledge of the matters described; general knowledge is sufficient.²²⁹ Polybius continues the argument, in the context of the definitions of ἐνάργεια where epic is placed alongside historiography in respect of the shared primary aim — that of visualization.²³⁰ Thus, Polybius makes an

²²² Philod. *De poem.* V, col. XXX, 6.

²²³ The basic meaning of ἔμφασις in LSJ is “appearance”, “reflection”, then: “presentation”, “narration”.

²²⁴ See ἐμφαίνω as “setting forth”, “exposition” at Polyb. VI 5, 3. See Zangara 2007, 61 n.1, for other places where Polybius uses ἔμφασις; cf. Martin 1974, 288–289.

²²⁵ Walker 1993, 371.

²²⁶ Zangara 2007, 61–62, noted that personal experience is not a desideratum for efficient ἐνάργεια in the cases of Dionysius, Lucian, or Plutarch, at least not in their explicit remarks.

²²⁷ This connection is also suggested by Schepens 1975, 198.

²²⁸ Cf. Schepens 1975, 200.

²²⁹ Zangara 2007, 61, goes rather too far calling this question an *aporia* in Polybius' theory.

²³⁰ Polyb. XII 25i. The ὁ ποιητής in this passage is, undoubtedly, Homer. Walbank, HCP II, p. 397 *ad loc.* On this passage see Marincola 2001, 129–130. On Polybian αὐτοπάθεια see also Pédech 1964, 358.

explicit and direct connection between historical narrative and the Homeric poems, exactly in terms of the quality of ἔμφασις, which is possible thanks to αὐτοπάθεια. This association is not accidental, and is particularly striking in the light of the above definitions and examples from Homer adduced by Ps.-Demetrius.

The fact that Polybius articulated a demand for the personal experience of the historiographer is well known, but the emphasis on the concept of πάθος, and its implications for historical narrative, have been underestimated. The cause of this is probably the “old paradigm” of Polybius, in which he was supposed to be focused on bare facts, and attached little weight to the artistic value of historical texts.

6.4.2 The background of Polybius’ conception

Polybius suggests that such understanding of historiographical goals was propounded by his predecessors (ἢ καὶ τοιαύτας ὥοντο δεῖν ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν ὑπάρχειν ἐμφάσεις οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν κτλ.).²³¹ Polybius explicitly sets himself up as a continuator of the earlier (or at least contemporary) historiographical tradition. He is thus certainly not the inventor of the approach that emphasizes αὐτοπάθεια and the resulting ἐνάργεια and ἔμφασις. Schepens inquired into this passage and his conclusions point to the Peripatetic sources to which Polybius refers.²³² However, Schepens does not pose the question whether Polybius has some specific Peripatetic works in mind, or rather a convention that was universally valid in the field of historiography during his time. In light of the conclusions in chapter two of the present work, i.e. the treatment of Thucydides in Theophrastus’ *Περὶ ἱστορίας*, we can advance a view that Polybius refers to this treatise, or to a comparable one. Either way, Polybius’ remarks about the nature of historical narrative, especially its need to be graphic and to properly represent reality, can be combined with Dionysius’ and Plutarch’s assessments of Thucydides, referring to similar categories — ἐνάργεια, πάθος, and on the same level — historical narrative. Polybius presents analogous concepts to these authors, and states that they were expounded by authors/critics before him — i.e. in Hellenistic theories on historiography. Thus, one central conclusion should be that it is hardly possible that the narrative qualities so highly valued by the Hellenistic historians (Duris, Agatharchides, Polybius, and, as the latter says, “others before him”), and Hellenistic critics (Ps.-Demetrius), were not recognized in Thucydides before Dionysius

²³¹ Polyb. XII 25h: “Hence our predecessors considered that historical memoirs should possess such vividness [...]”.

²³² Schepens 1975, 194.

and Plutarch. We ought rather to infer that all Hellenistic historians regarded Thucydides as the model for *ἐνάργεια* and *πάθος*, and thus that Polybius is also at least indirectly influenced by Thucydides in this respect.

6.4.3 Polybius' imitation of Thucydides' Great Harbour narrative

Simon Hornblower suggested a possible imitation of the Thucydidean account of the battle in the Harbour on the part of Polybius.²³³ This part of the question of Thucydides' impact on the latter is, surprisingly, neglected by Foulon in the most recent study of Thucydides' influence on Polybius.²³⁴ In the context of the present chapter, and particularly in light of Timaeus' possible imitation of Thucydides' Syracusan narrative, as well as Plutarch's and Dionysius' views about this part of the *History*, such a thesis should be considered. There are three passages in Polybius that seem to contain verbal and narrative echoes of Thucydides VII 69, 4–72, 1, i.e. his description of the final battle in the Syracusan Harbour, first Polyb. I 44, 5 (crucial words underlined):²³⁵

τὸ δ' ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πλῆθος ἡθροισμένον ἐπὶ τὰ τείχη πᾶν ἅμα μὲν ἠγωνία τὸ συμβησόμενον, ἅμα δ' ἐπὶ τῷ παραδόξῳ τῆς ἐλπίδος ὑπερχαρὲς ὑπάρχον μετὰ κρότου καὶ κραυγῆς παρεκάλει τοὺς εἰσπλέοντας.²³⁶

Next, Polyb. III 43, 7–8:²³⁷

(7) ταχὺ δὲ τούτου γενομένου, καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πλοίοις ἀμιλλωμένων μὲν πρὸς ἀλλήλους μετὰ κραυγῆς, διαγωνιζομένων δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ποταμοῦ βίαν, (8) τῶν δὲ στρατοπέδων ἀμφοτέρων ἐξ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μέρους παρὰ τὰ χεῖλη τοῦ ποταμοῦ παρεστώτων, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἰδίων συναγωνιώντων καὶ παρακολουθούντων μετὰ

²³³ Hornblower, CT III, 698, does not inquire into the details of this possible influence of Thucydides; he merely reports Walbank's remarks in his commentary on Polybius (see notes below).

²³⁴ Foulon 2010, 141–153, focused on the methodological connections between the two historians.

²³⁵ Cf. Walbank, HCP I, 109 *ad loc.*: “The ultimate forebear may be Thucydides' famous description of the battle in the Great Harbour of Syracuse (Thuc. vii. 71).”

²³⁶ “The whole population had assembled on the walls in an agony of suspense on the one hand as to what would happen, and at the same time so overjoyed at the unexpected prospect of succour that they kept on encouraging the fleet as it sailed in by cheers and clapping of hands.”

²³⁷ See Walbank, HCP I, 379 *ad loc.*: “P. may be influenced by Thucydides' description of the battle in Syracuse harbour. Such passages deviate from the austere standard demanded (e.g. in ix. 1), and make concessions to the more sensational form of composition which P. derides (e.g. ii. 56. 10–13, etc.).”

κραυγῆς, τῶν δὲ κατὰ πρόσωπον βαρβάρων παιανιζόντων καὶ προκαλουμένων τὸν κίνδυνον, ἦν τὸ γινόμενον ἐκπληκτικὸν καὶ παραστατικὸν ἀγωνίας.²³⁸

Lastly, Polyb. XVIII 25, 1:

Γενομένης δὲ τῆς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμπτώσεως μετὰ βίας καὶ κραυγῆς ὑπερβαλλούσης, ὥς ἂν ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοῦ συναλαζόντων, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς τῆς μάχης ἐπιβοώντων τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις, ἦν τὸ γινόμενον ἐκπληκτικὸν καὶ παραστατικὸν ἀγωνίας.²³⁹

The underlined words are verbal echoes of Thucydides' account of the sea battle in the Harbour of Syracuse, appraised by Dionysius and Plutarch. Apart from that, there are structural parallels between Thucydides' account of the final naval battle in the Harbour, and the above Polybian narrative episodes:

a. The idea of describing the emotional reactions of the observers who stay on the shore and watch the action (the battle or the struggle with the wind) that happens in the sea,

b. the consequent description of these events as a "struggle" (ἀγών), the emphasis on the screams (κραυγή; ἐπιβοάω) of the participants and of the observers,²⁴⁰

c. the focus on the emotional impact (ἐκπληκτικὸν καὶ παραστατικὸν) of the events on the direct eyewitnesses.

Overall, the above structural similarities, and the numerous parallels in vocabulary between Thucydides and Polybius are too many, and too close to be explained by coincidence. They rather point to Polybius' conscious modelling of these narrative episodes on Thuc. VII 69, 4–72, 1. This would be the second instance (beside Timaeus of Tauromenium) of direct imitation of the same part of Thucydides' text, and thus one more proof that he influenced Hellenistic historiography in the field of ἐνάργεια and πάθος as regards the historical narrative.

²³⁸ "Now with the men in the boats shouting as they vied with one another in their efforts and struggled to stem the current, with the two armies standing on either bank at the very brink of the river, the Carthaginians following the progress of the boats with loud cheers and sharing in the fearful suspense, and the barbarians yelling their war-cry and challenging to combat, the scene was in the highest degree striking and thrilling."

²³⁹ "As the encounter of the two armies was accompanied by deafening shouts and cries, both of them uttering their war-cry and those outside the battle also cheering the combatants, the spectacle was such as to inspire terror and acute anxiety."

²⁴⁰ For κραυγή we can give additional argument for the thesis that Polybius imitates Thucydides in these passages, namely Ps.-Demetrius' highlighting of this and similar vocabulary as employed by Thucydides. See Appendix, pp. 281–282.

7. The emotive Thucydides: a summary

In sum, πάθος, ἐνάργεια, the rejection of myths, and the concept of a proper representation of reality were a standard set of ideas, in fact pertaining to the essence of historiographical methodology.²⁴¹ Vividness and the arousal of emotions cannot be explained as an effect of the influence of tragedy on historiography — the proper roots of the ideas of ἐνάργεια and πάθος are to be found in epic. Thus, Thucydides cannot be contrasted with the historians from the Hellenistic period on the grounds of his alleged “sober” pragmatism, because his narrative was also perceived as vivid, emotional, and aimed at representing reality by creating images in the readers' minds.²⁴² The role of πάθος and ἐνάργεια in Thucydides' *History*, according to later critics (Dionysius, Plutarch), matches the conceptions of these categories as found in Hellenistic historiography and literary theory. Certain parts of Thucydides' text were considered as early as the Hellenistic period to be particularly vivid, emotional, and aimed at μίμησις — especially the account of the naval battle at the Great Harbour of Syracuse: Thuc. VII 69, 4–72, 1. This narrative episode was adduced as an example of δεινότης by Dionysius, it was quoted and appraised by Plutarch due to its vividness and emotional impact, and finally — it was a model for similar accounts in Timaeus of Tauromenium and in Polybius. The evidence is sufficient for us to assume that it was one of the most valued parts of Thucydides' *History*, and the reason for this was its artistic qualities. Its main achievement is the ability to “make the auditor a spectator” — the final aim of ἐνάργεια. In light of the associations of ἐνάργεια with truth and the representation of reality, we should state that there is no contradiction between graphic description (and emotions produced thereby) and historical truth. On the contrary, it seems that in Thucydides, and in other prominent Hellenistic historians, truth is attained when the description is as close to reality as possible. This condition of conformity was, in turn, parallel with the necessity of knowing the facts first-hand, as the central ideal of αὐτοψία required.

In the above analyses of particular authors, in each instance I have stressed their Peripatetic background. This revealed a regularity — in all the sources (critics/historians) where ἐνάργεια is considered an important feature of historical narrative, there are clear indications of the Peripatetic roots of these concepts. Significantly, in most of these sources this combines with an explicit appreciation of Thucydides' narrative qualities, or with imitation thereof. Thus, an inference can be drawn that Thucydides was studied and positively evaluated

²⁴¹ Cf. Zangara 2007, 76.

²⁴² Cf. Walker 1993, 375.

in the Peripatetic school (its literary field of research), especially from the perspective of his narrative qualities of ἐνάργεια and πάθος. This would explain why authors associated with the Peripatos (esp. Duris, Agatharchides) represent certain similar historiographical opinions as to the need for an artistic imitation of reality, which are identified by critics with Thucydides (Dionysius, Plutarch), and influenced by Peripatetic literary theories. It is not impossible that the notions of ἐνάργεια and πάθος, as necessary features of historical narrative, were also conceptualized in Peripatos due to the influence of Thucydides' *History* (esp. the account of the Sicilian Expedition). This would explain the particular interest in this author on the parts of Theophrastus and Praxiphanes (as attested in the third chapter of the present work), as well as of other authors associated with, or deriving much from the Peripatos (Ps.-Demetrius, Agatharchides, Dionysius of Halicarnassus).

CONCLUSION

The aim of this book was to provide a comprehensive account of the reception of Thucydides' *History* in Hellenistic historiography and literary criticism dealing with theory of historical writing. The main thesis, which constituted the point of departure for my research, was that Thucydides' historiographical method, and his work in general, was not entirely rejected by further generations. Such a view has prevailed in Classical scholarship until now, and my intention was to find out whether it was valid.

At the outset, I gathered and examined all explicit references to Thucydides' *History* from the (approximate) time of his death, up to the end of the Hellenistic age. In addition, the Hellenistic papyri of Thucydides have been taken into account. Such a survey has not been hitherto attempted, and it leads to important new findings about historians' acquaintance with Thucydides during the period in question. The papyrological evidence, although scarce, tells us something about the fate of Thucydides' work. The extant Hellenistic papyri containing the *History* are dated much earlier than the single Hellenistic passage of Herodotus. They were most probably professional editions, for specialized literary purposes. Thucydides' *History* was circulating, in such a form, in Egypt as soon as around 250 BC, and its text was probably not yet then standardized. As for the indirect Hellenistic evidence, Thucydides' narrative was most probably perused by the scholar-historian Philochorus at least in parts of the latter's account, which means that the former was held in high esteem in some circles of intellectuals, and that the *History* was available to them.

In the Hellenistic period Thucydides was studied, well-known and valued by authors either belonging to the Peripatos, or closely associated with the Peripatetics. Theophrastus considered Thucydides a crucial innovator in the field of historiography, along with Herodotus. An analysis of Cicero's testimony, and the parallel uses of the terms used by Theophrastus in the fragment in question, show that remarks on Thucydides come from the *prooemium* to his lost treatise *Περὶ ἱστορίας*. Theophrastus must have known the *History* thoroughly, in order to assess its contribution to historiography. The same applies to Praxiphanes, who posited Thucydides as the representative of the entire historical genre, probably in a treatise concerning its development. The Peripatetic literary critic, author of the *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας*, shows an acquaintance with and understanding of numerous sections of the *History*. Agatharchides, also associated with the Peripatos, would probably have read the entire *History*, and points to other intellectuals, who also knew and "praised Thucydides for his

truthfulness". Perhaps he means Heraclides, his Peripatetic patron in Alexandria, and also a historian. This finding is particularly important, since until now Thucydides was believed to have been entirely ignored by nearly all second-century historians.

Polybius' brief reference to Thucydides confirms that the former knew of the latter's work. The anonymous chronographic source in Diodorus reads Thucydides as the primary source for the Peloponnesian War. The author was acquainted with the content of the *History*, and attests to a controversy over its division into (eight or nine) books.

The exploration of the explicit testimonies of the readership of Thucydides' *History* served as an introduction to an inquiry into the reception of Thucydides' historiographical principles by the Hellenistic historians. It seemed necessary to begin with certain corrections to the reading of Thucydides' chapter on method (I 22, in connection with I 23). In the studies on Thucydides' reception published until now, scholars have ignored this stage of analysis, passing straight-away onto the Hellenistic historians. It was necessary to take a stand on several problems arising from the reading of the chapter. Interpretative interventions into the methodological chapter were focused on its three main themes: the method and role of speeches in historical writing, the rejection of what Thucydides calls τὸ μυθώδες, and the idea of the usefulness of historical writing. In addition, Thucydides' concept of causation, implicit in the subsequent chapter (I 23), has been expounded. As for Thucydides' methodology in composing speeches (I 22, 1), the central categories to be defined were ζύμματα γνώμη and τὰ δέοντα. Our analysis of various potential interpretations of these terms has shown that Thucydides endeavoured to build his speeches on a historical "core" of their content, supplementing that with the arguments that to his best judgement were probably used in the given circumstances. The verb used by Thucydides in the passage — δοκεῖν — should be read not as implying free imagination in the work's composition, but rather a reasoning grounded on experience and probability. In sum, all interpretations that assumed that Thucydides either invented the speeches, indulging in artistic licence, or that he strove to reproduce them literally, proved false. Thucydides' statement that his work avoids τὸ μυθώδες (I 22, 4), required, firstly, a proper understanding of this term. I argue that Thucydides does not mean by this all quasi-mythical accounts of the past, but rather every unsubstantiated, unverified or exaggerated story, found also in his contemporaries' works (here Herodotus may be the "target" of the criticism). Lastly, the claim that the work is of everlasting value and is useful (I 22, 4) — here the readings which suggest that the *History* was designed to be a "Rezeptbuch" for a politician, as well as that Thucydides means to provide tools for predicting the future, were refuted. The most likely

sense of usefulness mentioned in this section of the chapter on method is the focus on certain regularities in historical processes, determined by human nature. Thucydides states that the *History* is a κτήμᾰ ἐς αἰεῖ, since it not only provides information already verified, but also highlights those aspects of historical process that are typical, rather than accidental. In this section of the book I also looked into the following chapter (I 23), where Thucydides writes of the causes of the Peloponnesian War. In this case we also had to deal with numerous misunderstandings of Thucydides' concepts; particularly inaccurate, but often accepted in the reception studies, was the belief that the main idea of the historian is the distinction between the deeper and the superficial causes. However, a re-examination of the terms αἰτία and πρόφασις, and a contextual reading of the compound ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις, reveals a different scheme: both αἰτία and πρόφασις can be true or false, both can contribute to the development of war to some degree; there is no proof that Thucydides considered some factors "real" and other "false". The "truest explanation", as we will translate the central phrase, is decisive, but not the only factor that contributed to the war. In addition, in my review of the reading of I 23, I have underlined the psychological character of Thucydides' notion of causality, a point of importance for the affinities between his work and the Hellenistic historians.

From this inquiry I advanced to the separate reading of the relevant fragments of the Hellenistic historians, and further to the potential affinities between them and Thucydides as regards the three main elements extracted from the chapter on method. Callisthenes' fragment 44, about the principles in composing speeches, is shown to convey similar ideas to Thucydides' declared method. In particular, Callisthenes seems to have a similar understanding of the historian's role — in his own addition to the content of the speech must be adequate, taking all the circumstances into account. This point is a strong connection between the two historians, which becomes more plausible when we take into account Callisthenes' close relationship with Theophrastus, which is emphasized in the same chapter. As shown in chapter two, the latter almost certainly studied the *History* in depth, and held it in high esteem. Thus, it occurs that Callisthenes' historiographical principles, at least in the case of speeches, were formed under the influence of the high position that Thucydides held in the Peripatetic school.

Hieronymus of Cardia was by some scholars mentioned as a potential "Thucydidean" historian of the Hellenistic age, but until now the affinities between the two historians have not been sufficiently analysed. Given the present state of our sources for Hieronymus, it is impossible to prove that he was "equally accurate", or "equally focused on political-military history" to Thucydides. To postulate such correspondences would also require sweeping

generalizations about Thucydides in the first place, which is not the method in this book. Instead, I focused on a short but concrete piece of evidence in Diodorus' book XVIII, the section about the Lamian War (XVIII 8–13), for which Hieronymus was Diodorus' main authority. From that passage I deduced Hieronymus' idea of causation. I have found several heretofore neglected elements in this account which show where Hieronymus can be seen as similar to Thucydides: the very explicit stress on causes; the notion of τὸ σαφές as understood in the same way; and causes defined as the psychological states of the actors involved. This is not much, but at least it is a firm ground for saying that Hieronymus resembles Thucydides in one of the central elements of the latter's methodology.

For Polybius we have a considerable amount of material for analysis. He is the only Hellenistic historian for whom we have statements about all the main elements pointed out by Thucydides in the chapter on method: speeches, the usefulness and value of history, and historical causation. He was traditionally regarded as the only real Hellenistic continuator of Thucydides' historiographical principles. Since in this case numerous interpretative errors have prevailed in scholarship, and most affinities between the two historians were actually poorly recognized, I have attempted a fresh and comprehensive treatment of the question. I began with the methodological digression (Polyb. III 31, 12), and interpreted it in connection with Polyb. III 4. I endeavoured to show that these instances have numerous parallels to Thucydides' announcements from I 22, 4 (the “κτῆμά ἐξ αἰεί statement”) on the level of vocabulary, typical antitheses, etc. My analysis leaves little doubt that Polybius took over the general concepts from Thucydides' chapter on method. I argue that Polybius' concept of μάθημα implies a similar approach to historical knowledge to Thucydides' — it has an everlasting value. However, Polybius' concept of the utility of historical writing seems to emphasize more the practical lessons for his present day, and is intended to serve as a means whereby his readers can understand and learn how to deal with Rome. Thucydides' claim was different: his work was supposed to bear out the universal principles of human conduct, valid for any time, and the practical aim of historiography was not stated at all. An examination of Polybius' approach to speeches shows that both historians agreed as to the need to base them on historical truth about the content of speeches actually delivered, which has to be supplemented with probable arguments that take all circumstances into account. Yet Polybius' methodology seems to be much more elaborate; he connects the speeches with causation in a manner unknown in Thucydides. Whereas the latter in the chapter on method merely relates how he composed the speeches, Polybius formulates an explicit and comprehensive theory of their explanatory role in historical

writing, why they are so important, and makes a detailed outline of the rules for their use by the historian (frequency, extensiveness). Further, I focused on Polybius' understanding of historical causation, in which case I had to refute interpretative stereotypes prevalent in scholarship. Specifically, the view that both historians are similar in that they distinguish between "real" and "apparent" causes, is proven unfounded. As in the case of speeches, Polybius is much more explicit, and apparently more self-conscious in his theory of causation.

In sum, Polybius' approach to the above three problems: speeches, usefulness and causation shows numerous affinities with Thucydides, but at the same time seems to be much more specific, explicit and conscious of the overall place of these elements in his historiographical theory. If Thucydides was the first to be explicit about his historiographical concepts, Polybius was certainly the first to do so with such elaborateness and coherence. The section on Polybius ends with an account and refutation of some affinities between Thucydides and Polybius that have been falsely defined. In particular, I aimed to make clear that the idea that a historian should at the same time be a statesman, and similarly the other way round, cannot be read from any of Thucydides' words. Polybius expresses such a view, and practical experience seems to be a part of historiographical methodology, but a connection with Thucydides' *History* relies only on the fact that Thucydides himself was a general, not on any of his statements, which would imply that this has any bearing on his role as a historian. This also seems to be a theoretical innovation on the part of Polybius.

Next, I examined closely the testimony of Photius, where Agatharchides is said to have "imitated" Thucydides in his speeches. Here attention was paid to the accuracy and proper attribution of this statement; scholars have until now taken for granted that this is Photius' own view, based on his reading of both historians. As such, this testimony was poorly valued in the studies on reception, as having little to do with Agatharchides' relationship to Thucydides. This view was due to the neglect of Photius' actual knowledge of Agatharchides' *On the Erythraean Sea*, which was most probably weak. My analysis of the terminology (the term ζηλωτής, the notion of clarity) from the fragment in other codices of Photius leads to the (still tentative) conclusion that Photius rewrites the opinion of a literary critic much earlier than himself. The idea that Agatharchides is also prolific in his speeches, but clearer than Thucydides, is analogous with Dionysius of Halicarnassus' opinion on Thucydides and Demosthenes. Whatever the attribution of the statement, as shown in chapter two Agatharchides did read Thucydides, and some learned intellectual, who had the former's works at his disposal, must have seen a correspondence between

his speeches and those of Thucydides. Agatharchides' approach to myth is proven to be very similar to that of Thucydides. Agatharchides' Peripatetic background, and his knowledge of the *History* as implied in Diodorus, seems to be not without meaning in the context of his established and probable links with Thucydides. The brief hint, ascribed to Agatharchides, at some unknown intellectuals who "have praised Thucydides" for his truthfulness, suggests that in his literary milieu the latter was the model in several respects.

Posidonius has been rarely brought into contact with Thucydides. As I hope to have shown, this was at least partly wrong. There are arguments for the view that Posidonius' method in speeches is similar to Thucydides': the reproduction of the speeches actually delivered, with his own additions. As a secondary point, I inquired into Posidonius' model of historical causation, as embedded in Diodorus' account of the Slave War (*Bibl.* XXXIV/XXXV 2). An analysis of this passage allows us to conclude that Posidonius shares with Thucydides the scheme and division between αἰτία and ἀρχή, as well as the very understanding of αἰτία as a psychological state of an individual or group. This does not imply that he took these elements from Thucydides, but allows us to think of their methodologies as comparable on more solid grounds.

Finally, Dionysius of Halicarnassus was treated as a part of the Hellenistic reception of Thucydides. The very inclusion of this author within the scope of this study is a novelty; Dionysius was commonly classified, in reception studies, within the category of the Roman revival of "Thucydideanism". In my view, this approach is not entirely correct, given Dionysius' rhetorical-theoretical background, which was built on the writings of Aristotle, but first of all on Theophrastus. As shown in chapter two, Thucydides was an important figure in Peripatetic literary circles, and this is reflected in the extant fragments and testimonies. Dionysius, in studying the writings of Theophrastus, absorbed his categories, concepts, and general approach to literature, including historiography; the views on Thucydides expressed by Theophrastus in these writings necessarily influenced Dionysius' own opinion about the historian. The Hellenistic-Peripatetic reception of Thucydides and Dionysius' reading of the *History* are evidently intertwined. In the treatise *On Thucydides* we can see how Dionysius interpreted Thucydides' statements from the chapter on method, particularly on the method in composing speeches, and the approach to τὸ μῦθος. It is an extraordinarily valuable testimony, the only instance where an ancient author literally quotes a passage from I 22, and explains his understanding of that passage. Interestingly, Dionysius associates the criticism of τὸ μῦθος with Thucydides' choice of subject-matter (ὕπόθεσις): a single war, and with the idea of autopsy (ἢ παρὲνέτο αὐτός). Such a connection is not made by any of the extant texts. In the *Roman Antiquities*, Dionysius adds

that the old μῦθοι about e.g. the origins of Rome are difficult to investigate, because autopsy is in this case impossible. Dionysius also explicitly links the avoidance of τὸ μυθῶδες with the pursuit of truth. As for the statement on speeches, Dionysius' reading is consistent with my interpretation of the relevant passage in Thuc. I 22, 1; Dionysius also believes that Thucydides aimed at presenting speeches that were actually delivered, with additions of his own, but always with regard to the circumstances (including the person of the speaker). The terms he uses on this occasion are close to Callisthenes' F 44, and bolster the thesis that F 44 is really Callisthenes' reaction to Thuc. I 22, 1. In this section, I have also looked into Dionysius' idea of the usefulness of historiography, which in my view can be read as a polemic with Thucydides. For Dionysius, usefulness is a matter of choice of ὑπόθεσις — the subject, which should be “noble” and “magnificent”. This is a clear cross-reference to the critique of Thucydides in another treatise — the *Letter to Pompeius*, analysed in chapter four, and treated as a typical work entitled Περὶ ἱστορίας.

The problem of works entitled Περὶ ἱστορίας required separate treatment. Firstly, since all such works are lost, it was necessary to consider what their actual content could have been. I reviewed the arguments of Avenarius, who contended that the content of these works was not historiographical theory, and hope to have shown that in fact his arguments are weak. I argue that Περὶ ἱστορίας could have contained the theory as well as the history of historiography. From this perspective I have examined the testimonies on Theophrastus' and Praxiphanes' references to Thucydides. I hope to have made a compelling argument for the thesis that Cicero actually translates part of Theophrastus' statement about our historian, and that the testimony should be ascribed to the Περὶ ἱστορίας of the Peripatetic. As for Praxiphanes, it was also necessary to begin with the character of the testimony, an aspect until now ignored in scholarship. I think that Marcellinus makes an inference from Praxiphanes' treatment of Thucydides in the Περὶ ἱστορίας, and that he was posited there as a representative of the genre of historiography. These insights bolster the thesis that Thucydides commanded special attention in the Peripatetic school.

Strikingly, works entitled (or called by the authors citing them) Περὶ ἱστορίας were written by two of Dionysius' close colleagues: Theodorus of Gadara and Caecilius of Calacte. Since Dionysius has to be treated as — at least in part — an echo of the Hellenistic reception of Thucydides, I attached particular importance to the *Letter to Pompeius*, and attempted to substantiate the thesis that it is intended as a type of Περὶ ἱστορίας, a handbook on “how to write history”. In that light, Dionysius' assessment of Thucydides in the *Letter* takes on a special significance. Thucydides is paralleled with Herodotus; these

two are compared to one another in several categories: choice of subject, choice of the starting point of the narrative, selection of information, distribution of the material, and moral attitude. In each of these categories Thucydides is rated as inferior, and the central reason, and a type of common denominator in that criticism, is his moral disposition (διάθεσις). Thucydides' choice of subject matter — a war of Greeks against Greeks — is dishonourable (πονηρά), he decided to begin with a time when the Greeks began to do wrongs (κακῶς πράττειν τὸ Ἑλληνικόν), etc. In Dionysius' view, Thucydides bore a grudge against his own city, which determined the manner in which he represented the Athenians — with malice (φθονερῶς). Dionysius, on the one hand, views Thucydides' *History* from the perspective of his theory on the role and aims of historiography; on the other, this judgement can be a reflection or echo of earlier Hellenistic views on the historian. This stress on Thucydides' subject matter, and on the moral motivation that determined it, can hardly be considered a Dionysian invention. It is probable that he took over that perspective as a part of tradition in the history of historiography, which would blame Thucydides for such treatment of the Greeks in general, and of his fellow-citizens in particular. Peripatetic influence on Dionysius, especially that of Theophrastus, should be taken into account in this regard.

The last part of my study concerns the “artistic” aspect of Thucydides' reception. The word “artistic” is put into inverted commas because, as I hope to have shown in chapter five, the idea that historiography is about proper representation (μίμησις), with the effect of vividness (ἐνάργεια), producing, in the end, the true experience (πάθος) of the facts related, is an element inherent in and inseparable from the ancient theory and practice of historiography. On those grounds, I was able to read anew the testimonies that underlined Thucydides' skills in reference to the categories mentioned above, and show which parts of his work were particularly valued in that respect: the final battle in the Harbour of Syracuse in book VII, and the affairs on Pylos in book IV. Dionysius' and Plutarch's descriptions of the first passage leave no doubt that it was read as the most exciting piece of the *History*. Moreover, as I intended to show, Timaeus and Polybius, probably impressed by that account, tried to produce something similar. Verbal parallels in several analogous narrative episodes in Polybius, combined with his remarks on the importance of ἐνάργεια in historical writing, point to Thucydides as his model in this field. Furthermore, Duris' emphasis on μίμησις, as well as Agatharchides' conception of ἐνάργεια, are evidently connected with the descriptions of Thucydides' skills in representation as found in Dionysius. All in all, this last chapter aimed at establishing a new perspective on Thucydides as a skilled writer and artist, not

only as strict investigator of facts. This perspective arguably prevailed in the Hellenistic age and beyond, up to the times of Dionysius and Plutarch.

To sum up, my findings confirm the initial thesis of my enquiry, that in the Hellenistic age Thucydides was neither abandoned nor ignored. The theory that Thucydides was too difficult to find wider readership finds little support; the more likely explanation as to why he could have been (but not necessarily was) “difficult” is the very subject of the Peloponnesian War, which had to be discomforting for all generations of Greeks. Dionysius’ criticism of some parts of the *History* shows that he could have done justice to the Athenians, but he did not; and still Hellenistic historians and literary critics considered him a milestone in the genre, the “everlasting possession” he himself wished to become.

APPENDIX

Quotations from Thucydides in the *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας*

[...] = words from Thucydides' *History* omitted in the citation in the *De eloc.*

underlining = words from the *History* occurring in *De eloc.* in altered form

cursive = quotations from Thucydides and other authors inside *De eloc.*

The numbers in the brackets refer to the chapters of *De eloc.*, e.g.: (25) = *De eloc.* 25

1. On the period: *παρομοίωσις* in cola, Thucydides as an example of *ἰσόκωλον* (25):

εἶδος δὲ τοῦ παρομοίου τὸ ἰσόκωλον, ἐπὶ ἴσας ἔχη τὰ κῶλα τὰς συλλαβὰς, ὥσπερ Θουκυδίδῃ· ὥς οὔτε ὧν πυνθάνονται ἀπαξιούντων τὸ ἔργον, οἷς τε ἐπιμελὲς εἶη εἰδέναι, οὐκ ὀνειδιζόντων·

“Under the heading of symmetry of members comes equality of members, which occurs when the members contain an equal number of syllables, as in the following sentence of Thucydides: *This implies that neither those who are asked disown, nor those who care to know censure the occupation.*” (All translations are of Rhys Roberts)

Quotation from Thuc. I 5, 2. Complete agreement with the standard text of Thucydides.

2. On the types of style: the elevated: *μεγαλοπρεπής* (39–40).¹ Thucydides as an example of the impressive word-arrangement (39):

Δεῖ δὲ ἐν τοῖς κώλοις τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς λόγου τὸν προκαταρκτικὸν μὲν παῖωνα ἄρχειν τῶν κώλων, τὸν καταληκτικὸν δὲ ἔπεσθαι. παράδειγμα δ' αὐτῶν τὸ Θουκυδίδειον τόδε· ἤρξατο δὲ τὸ κακὸν ἐξ Αἰθιοπίας.

“In the elevated style the members should begin with a procatartic paeon and end with a catalectic paeon, as in this passage of Thucydides: *Now it was from Aethiopia that the malady originally came.*”

Quotation from Thuc. II 48, 1. Considerable divergence from the standard text,² however irrelevant in the context of Ps.Demetrius' argument, which is about the paeons at the beginning and at the end of the clause.

¹ See Marini 2007, 187.

² Thuc. II 48, 1: ἤρξατο δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον, ὡς λέγεται, ἐξ Αἰθιοπίας τῆς ὑπὲρ Αἰγύπτου.

3. Long-syllable rhythms, section on the grand style (39–40):

πάντες γοῦν ἰδίως τῶν τε πρώτων μνημονεύομεν καὶ τῶν ὑστάτων, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων κινούμεθα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν μεταξὺ ἔλαττον ὥσπερ ἐγκρυπτομένων ἢ ἐναφανιζομένων. Δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς Θουκυδίδου· σχεδὸν γὰρ ὅλως τὸ μεγαλοπρεπὲς ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτῷ ποιεῖ ἢ τοῦ ρυθμοῦ μακρότης, καὶ κινδυνεύει τῷ ἀνδρὶ τούτῳ παντοδαποῦ ὄντος τοῦ μεγαλοπρεποῦς αὕτη ἢ σύνθεσις μόνη ἢ μάλιστα περιποιεῖν τὸ μέγιστον.

“Anyhow, all of us remember in a special degree, and are stirred by, the words that come first and the words that come last, whereas those that come between them have less effect upon us, as though they were obscured or hidden among the others. This is clearly seen in Thucydides, whose dignity of style is almost in every instance due to the long syllables used in his rhythms. It may even be said that the pervading stateliness of that writer is attained altogether, or for the most part, by this arrangement of words.”

This is an opinion about the entire text of Thucydides (note the words: ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτῷ ποιεῖ). No quotation from Thucydides is given. Exact places of reference are impossible to establish.

4. On the grand style and lengthy clauses as contributing to the impressiveness (44):

Ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μήκη τῶν κώλων μέγεθος, οἷον Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος συνέγραψε τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων, καὶ Ἡροδότου Ἀλικαρνασσεῶς ἱστορίας ἀπόδειξις ἦδε.

“Long members also contribute to grandeur of style, e.g. *Thucydides the Athenian wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians*, and *Herodotus of Halicarnassus sets forth in this History the result of his inquiries*.”

Quotation of the first sentence of Thucydides’ *History* (I 1, 1). Complete agreement with the standard text.

5. On magnificent circular wording: σύνθεσις (45):

Μεγαλοπρεπὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ περιαγωγῆς τῇ συνθέσει λέγειν, οἷον ὡς ὁ Θουκυδίδης· ὁ γὰρ Ἀχελῷος ποταμὸς ῥέων ἐκ Πίνδου ὄρους διὰ Δολοπίας καὶ Ἀγριανῶν καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων, ἄνωθεν παρὰ Στράτον πόλιν ἐς θάλασσαν διεξιέει παρ’ Οἰνιάδας καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῖς περιλιμνάζων ἄπορον ποιεῖ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν χειμῶνι στρατεύεσθαι. σύμπασα γὰρ ἡ τοιαύτη μεγαλοπρέπεια ἐκ τῆς περιαγωγῆς γέγονεν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μόγις ἀναπαῦσαι αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν ἀκούοντα.

“Elevation is also caused by a rounded form of composition, as in the following passage of Thucydides: *For the river Achelous flowing from Mount Pindus through Dolopia and the land of the Agrianians and Amphilochians, having*

passed the inland city Stratus and discharging itself into the sea near Oeniadae, and surrounding that town with a marsh, makes a winter expedition impossible owing to the floods. All this impressiveness arises from the rounded period and from the fact that the historian hardly allows a pause to himself or to the reader.”

Quotation from Thuc. II 102, 2. Some divergences from the standard text, omission of one phrase from the middle of the sentence.³

6. On the harsh joining of sounds and how Thucydides avoids τὸ λειὸν and ὁμαλὲς in composition (48):

καὶ ὁ Θουκυδίδης δὲ πανταχοῦ σχεδὸν φεύγει τὸ λειὸν καὶ ὁμαλὲς τῆς συνθέσεως, καὶ αἰεὶ μᾶλλον τι προσκρούοντι ἔοικεν, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰς τραχείας ὁδοὺς πορευόμενοι, ἐπὰν λέγῃ· ὅτι τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔτος, ὡς ὁμολόγητο, ἄνοσον ἐς τὰς ἄλλας ἀσθενείας ἐτύγγανεν ὄν.

“Thucydides almost invariably avoids smoothness and evenness of composition. He has rather the constant air of a man who is stumbling, like travellers on rough roads, as when he says that *from other maladies this year, by common consent, was free*. It would have been easier and pleasanter to say that ‘by common consent, this year was free from other maladies’.”

Quotation from Thuc. II 49, 1. Considerable divergences from the standard text.⁴

7. On μέγεθος achieved by the brevity of words (49):

Ὡςπερ γὰρ ὄνομα τραχὺ μέγεθος ἐργάζεται, οὕτω σύνθεσις. ὀνόματα δὲ τραχέα τό τε κεκραγὼς ἀντὶ τοῦ βοῶν, καὶ τὸ ῥηγνύμενον ἀντὶ τοῦ φερόμενον, οἷοις πᾶσιν ὁ Θουκυδίδης χρῆται, ὅμοια λαμβάνων τά τε ὀνόματα τῇ συνθέσει τοῖς τε ὀνόμασι τὴν σύνθεσιν.

“Composition makes style impressive in the same way as a rugged word does. Instances of rugged words are ‘shrieking’ in place of ‘crying’, and ‘bursting’ in place of ‘charging’. Thucydides uses all expressions of this kind, assimilating the words to the composition and the composition to the words.”

³ Thuc. II 102, 2: ὁ γὰρ Ἀχελῷος ποταμὸς ῥέων ἐκ Πίνδου ὄρους διὰ Δολοπίας καὶ Ἀγραίων καὶ Ἀμφιλόχων [καὶ διὰ τοῦ Ἀκαρνανικοῦ πεδίου], ἄνωθεν μὲν παρὰ Στράτον πόλιν, ἐς θάλασσαν δ’ ἐξείει παρ’ Οἰνιάδας καὶ τὴν πόλιν αὐτοῖς περιλιμνάζων, ἄπορον ποιεῖ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν χειμῶνι στρατεύειν.

⁴ Thuc. II 49, 1: Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτος, ὡς ὁμολογεῖτο, [ἐκ πάντων μάλιστα δὴ ἐκεῖνο] ἄνοσον ἐς τὰς ἄλλας ἀσθενείας ἐτύγγανεν ὄν.

It is a general reference to Thucydides' inclination to use harsh words (κεκραγῶς, ῥηγνύμενον). Such a form as κεκραγῶς, adduced by Ps.-Demetrius, is not found in Thucydides. Still, Thucydides uses the noun that derives from κραυγάζω (to shriek, shout): κραυγή, in several places.⁵ The occurrence at VII 71, 5 belongs to a section of the vivid description of the battle in the Harbour of Syracuse, the passage of the *History* indicated as having the greatest recognition in the Greek literary world.⁶ Similarly, the form ῥηγνύμενον is absent from Thucydides' text. Other verbal forms deriving from ῥήγνυμι (break, break asunder, burst) occur throughout the *History*.⁷ It is striking that three occurrences (all of the form with the prefix ἀνα-) come exactly from the beginning, the middle, and the end of a distinct section of the *History* — the account of the naval battles at Naupactus and Syracuse (Thuc. VII 34–41). Other instances are dispersed across different sections, whereas this narrative forms a complete whole in itself. A possible implication of this fact is that Ps.-Demetrius has this larger section in mind when he considers Thucydides' propensity for the use of harsh words. Of course, it is impossible to exclude the possibility that he has other passages in mind. What is quite certain is that he means more than one instance, since he points to Thucydides' tendency, that is a repetitive, not incidental use of the words in question. Indeed, this account can be considered important in terms of the development of the war,⁸ but also as an engaging and impressive description, "bringing the events before the readers' eyes".⁹ The connection between VII 34–41 and VII 69, 4–72, 1 is clear; these are the most important descriptions of the (sea) battles in book VII, and the text between them contains no critical moments.¹⁰ The whole of book VII has a specific tension.¹¹

⁵ Thuc. II 4, 2; VII 44, 4; VII 71, 5.

⁶ See the conclusions to chapter five, pp. 267–268.

⁷ From ἀναρρήγνυμι: VII 40, 5; VII 36, 3; VII 34, 5; from ἀπορρήγνυμι: IV 69, 4; V 10, 8; from ἐκρρήγνυμι: VIII 84, 3; from καταρρήγνυμι: IV 115, 3; from παραρρήγνυμι: IV 96, 6; VI 70, 2; V 73, 1.

⁸ This is stressed by Thucydides at the end of the section, where he says how, from this moment onwards, the Syracusans began to believe in their capacity to fight by sea: καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα ἤδη ἔχουσαν εἶχον ταῖς μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ πολλὰ κρείσσους εἶναι.

⁹ On the language of this description see Hornblower, CT III, 609–617.

¹⁰ In Hornblower's *Commentary*, everything between the battles at Naupactus and Syracuse (Thuc. VII 34–41) and the battle at the Harbour (Thuc. VII 69, 4–72, 1), is marked as a transitional period.

¹¹ Cf. Hornblower, CT III, 614 *ad. loc.* VII 36, 6.

8. On figures of speech, τὸ μεγαλείον achieved through varying the case (65):

[Τὸ] μεγαλείον μέντοι ἐν τοῖς σχήμασιν τὸ μὴδὲ ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς μένειν πτώσεως, ὡς Θουκυδίδης· καὶ πρῶτος ἀποβαίνων ἐπὶ τὴν ἀποβάθραν ἐλειποψύχησέ τε, καὶ πεσόντος αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν παρεξίρεσίαν· πολὺ γὰρ οὕτως μεγαλειότερον ἢ εἴπερ ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς πτώσεως οὕτως ἔφη, ὅτι ἔπεσεν ἐς τὴν παρεξίρεσίαν καὶ ἀπέβαλε τὴν ἀσπίδα.

“In constructing a sentence it is well, in order to attain elevation, not to keep to the same case, but to follow the example of Thucydides, when he writes: *And being the first to step on to the gangway he swooned, and when he had fallen upon the forepart of the ship his shield dropped into the sea*. This is far more striking than if he had retained the same construction, and had said that ‘he fell upon the forepart of the ship and lost his shield’.”

Quotation from Thuc. IV 12, 1. Serious discrepancies from the original — only one phrase is in agreement with our text of Thucydides, thus it is a very loose allusion, possibly from memory.¹²

9. On hiatus, μεγαλοπρεπής as an effect of the juxtaposition of long vowels (72):

Ἐν δὲ τῷ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ χαρακτῆρι σύγκρουσις παραλαμβάνοιτ' ἂν πρέπουσα ἥτοι διὰ μακρῶν, ὡς τὸ λαῶν ἄνω ὄθεσκε· καὶ γὰρ ὁ στίχος μῆκος τι ἔσχεν ἐκ τῆς συγκρούσεως καὶ μεμίμηται τοῦ λίθου τὴν ἀναφορὰν καὶ βίαν. ὥσαύτως καὶ τὸ μὴ ἥπειρος εἶναι τὸ Θουκυδίδειον. συγκρούονται καὶ δίφθογγοι διφθόγγοις· ταύτην κατόκησαν μὲν Κερκυραῖοι, οἰκιστὴς δὲ ἐγένετο.

“It is the concurrence of long vowels which is most appropriately employed in the elevated style, as in the words: *that rock he heaved uphillward*. The line, it may be said, is longer through the hiatus, and has actually reproduced the mighty heaving of the stone. The words of Thucydides that *it may not be attached to the mainland* furnish a similar example. Diphthongs also may clash with diphthongs, e.g. *the place was colonised from Corcyra; of Corinth, however, was its founder*.”

The first adduced line from Thuc. VI 1, 1 agreement with our text of Thucydides. The second line is from Thuc. I 24, 2 discrepancy in the prefix of the verb.¹³ It is necessary to note how Ps.-Demetrius switches from one book to the other, which means either that he looked up the phrases in Thucydides' text while writing this section, or that the quotation is from memory. Given the brevity of both lines, and the disjunction with our standard text in the second one, we should adhere to the second option.

¹² Thuc. IV 12, 1: [καὶ πειρώμενος] ἀποβαίνειν [ἀνεκότη ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων], [καὶ τραυματισθεὶς πολλὰ] ἐλειποψύχησέ τε καὶ πεσόντος αὐτοῦ ἐς τὴν παρεξίρεσίαν.

¹³ ταύτην ἀπώκησαν μὲν Κερκυραῖοι, οἰκιστὴς δ' ἐγένετο.

10. On poetic colour in prose (113):

Θουκυδίδης μέντοι κἂν λάβῃ παρὰ ποιητοῦ τι, ἰδίως αὐτῷ χρώμενος ἴδιον τὸ ληφθὲν ποιεῖ, οἷον ὁ μὲν ποιητὴς ἐπὶ τῆς Κρήτης ἔφη· Κρήτη τις γὰρ ἔστι μέσῳ ἐνὶ οἴνοπι πόντῳ, καλὴ καὶ πείρα, περιρρύτος. ὁ μὲν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγέθους ἐχρήσατο τῷ περιρρύτος, ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης ὁμονοεῖν τοὺς Σικελιώτας καλὸν οἶεται εἶναι, γῆς ὄντας μιᾶς καὶ περιρρύτου, καὶ ταῦτά πάντα εἰπὼν, γῆν τε ἀντὶ νήσου καὶ περιρρύτον ὡσαύτως, ὅμως ἕτερα λέγειν δοκεῖ, διότι οὐχ ὥς πρὸς μέγεθος, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὁμόνοιαν αὐτοῖς ἐχρήσατο.

“Thucydides acts otherwise. Even if he does borrow something from a poet, he uses it in his own way and so makes it his own property. Homer, for instance, says of Crete: *A land there is, even Crete, in the midst of the dark sea-swell, Fair, fertile, wave-encompassed*. Now Homer has used the word ‘wave-encompassed’ to indicate the great size of the island. Thucydides, on his part, holds the view that the Greek settlers in Sicily should be at one, as they belong to the same land and that a wave-encompassed one. Although he employs throughout the same terms as Homer — ‘land’ and ‘wave-encompassed’ in place of ‘island’ — he seems nevertheless to be saying something different. The reason is that he uses the words with reference not to size but to concord.”

It is a reference to the particular word used in Thuc. IV 64, 3,¹⁴ in Hermocrates’ speech to the embassies of the Sicilian *poleis* in Gela (whole speech: Thuc. IV 59–64). A correct reading of the context in Thucydides — Hermocrates argues for the need for common policy in the Sicilian *poleis*, in the face of the Athenian aggression. Ps.-Demetrius states that the aim of Thucydides was to stress the idea of concord (πρὸς ὁμόνοιαν αὐτοῖς ἐχρήσατο). In the speech in question, Hermocrates uses the derivative word ὁμολογεῖν; concord is the Leitmotif of his argument.¹⁵ The inference from the above is that Ps.-Demetrius not only remembered/found the particular word in Thucydides. He also shows knowledge about the main theme or content of the whole speech where the interesting word occurs, which amounts to five chapters in Thucydides’ text. The speech of Hermocrates constituted a main turning-point in the conflict, since under its influence the *poleis* of Sicily signed a truce and began to work together against the Athenians.¹⁶

¹⁴ Thuc. IV 64, 3: οὐδὲν γὰρ αἰσχροὺς οἰκείων οἰκείων ἡσθᾶσθαι, ἢ Δωριᾷ τινὰ Δωριῶς ἢ Χαλκιδῆα τῶν συγγενῶν, τὸ δὲ ζῦμπαν γείτονας ὄντας καὶ ξυνοίκους μιᾶς χώρας καὶ περιρρύτου καὶ ὄνομα ἐν κεκλημένους Σικελιώτας.

¹⁵ With the critical moment in Thuc. IV 62, 1: τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολογουμένην ἄριστον εἶναι εἰρήνην πῶς οὐ χρὴ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ποιήσασθαι.

¹⁶ Cf. Thuc. IV 65, 1-2: Τοιαῦτα τοῦ Ἑρμοκράτους εἰπόντος πειθόμενοι οἱ Σικελιώται αὐτοὶ μὲν κατὰ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ξυνηέχθησαν γνώμη ὥστε ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι τοῦ πολέμου ἔχοντες ἂ ἕκαστοι ἔχουσι, τοῖς δὲ Καμαριναίοις Μοργαντίνην εἶναι ἀργύριον τακτὸν τοῖς Συρακοσίοις ἀποδοῦσιν.

11. On elegant arrangement and a graceful effect achieved through rhythm (181):

Κἂν μετροειδῇ δὲ ἡ, τὴν αὐτὴν ποιήσει χάριν. λανθανόντως δέ τοι παραδύεται ἡ ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς χάρις, καὶ πλείστον μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος ἐστὶ παρὰ τοῖς Περιπατητικοῖς καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι καὶ παρὰ Ξενοφῶντι καὶ Ἡροδότῳ, τάχα δὲ καὶ παρὰ Δημοσθένει πολλαχοῦ, Θουκυδίδης μέντοι πέφευγε τὸ εἶδος.

“Even a general metrical character will produce the same effect. The charm of this pleasing device steals on us before we are aware. The trait is a favourite one with the Peripatetics as well as with Plato, Xenophon and Herodotus; and it is found in many passages of Demosthenes. Thucydides, on the other hand, shuns it.”

General reference to Thucydides’ tendency to avoid particular metrical measures, that result in “graceful effect” (χάρις). No specific passage is mentioned, author seems to assess the rhythmical characteristics of Thucydides’ entire text.

12. On plain word-arrangement, prolonged endings of clauses as belonging to the grand style (206):

Ἐχέτω δὲ καὶ ἔδραν ἀσφαλῆ τῶν κώλων τὰ τέλη καὶ βάσιν, ὥς τὰ εἰρημένα· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ τὰ τελευταῖα ἐκτάσεις μεγαλοπρεπεῖς, ὥς τὰ Θουκυδίδου, Ἀχελῷος ποταμὸς ῥέων ἐκ Πίνδου ὄρους καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς.

“In the plain style the members should end with precision, and rest on a sure foundation, as in the examples just quoted. Prolonged endings belong rather to the elevated style, as in the words of Thucydides: *the river Achelous flowing from Mount Pindus*, etc.”

Quotation of a part of a sentence from Thuc. II 102, 2, already adduced in its entirety in par. 45, and partly at 202, where it also lacks one phrase from the middle of the original text.¹⁷

13. On the epistolary style, excessively dignified language as inappropriate for letters (228):

Τὸ δὲ μέγεθος συνεστάλθω τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ λέξις. αἱ δὲ ἄγαν μακραὶ καὶ προσέτι κατὰ τὴν ἐρμηνείαν ὀγκωδέστεραι οὐ μὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐπιστολαὶ γένοιτο ἂν, ἀλλὰ συγγράμματα τὸ χαίρειν ἔχοντα προσγεγραμμένον, καθάπερ τῶν Πλάτωνος πολλὰ καὶ ἡ Θουκυδίδου.

¹⁷ *De eloc.* 202: ὁ γὰρ Ἀχελῷος ῥέων ἐκ Πίνδου ὄρους ἄνωθεν μὲν παρὰ Στράτον πόλιν ἐπὶ θάλασσαν διέξεισιν. See note 3 above for the whole sentence as it stands in the standard text of Thucydides.

“The length of a letter, no less than its style, must be carefully regulated. Those that are too long, and further are rather stilted in expression, are not in sober truth letters but treatises with the heading ‘My dear So-and-So’. This is true of many of Plato’s, and of that of Thucydides.”

Reference to Thucydides’ language in the letters. The object of ἡ Θουκυδίδου is the ἐπιστολὰι from the preceding clause (that is, one specific letter).¹⁸ Grube notes that “we have no genuine letters of Thucydides”,¹⁹ thus he assumes that Ps.-Demetrius knew of some letter written personally by Thucydides (not belonging to the *History*). However, Marini — following Rhys Roberts — suggests that Ps.-Demetrius means the famous letter of Nicias to the Athenians, sent from Sicily (Thuc. VII 11–15).²⁰ In fact, it has been observed that it resembles a speech in several respects,²¹ and in the narrative it is read out at Athens at an Assembly, in order to persuade the Athenians. Its features would allow us to assume that the statement in Ps.-Demetrius refers to it. If this is correct, Ps.-Demetrius shows knowledge of Thuc. VII 11–15, with a precision that lets him express his view as to the style of this passage. Nevertheless, it is impossible to exclude the possibility that some other letter of Thucydides was extant at the time when Ps.-Demetrius was writing, and is the object of his criticism in the above paragraph.²²

Summary

1. Four exact quotations that are fully consistent with the standard text, from the following passages of the *History*:

I 1, 1 (9 words): The opening sentence.

I 5, 2: The so-called Archaeology, digression on piracy: the longest exact and correct quotation (14 words).

IV 64, 3: Quotation of one word, but clearly showing knowledge of the whole section of Thuc. IV 59–64 (Hermocrates’ speech).

¹⁸ On the problems of various *lectiones* of some parts of this paragraph see Marini 2007, 268–269.

¹⁹ Grube 1961, 112 n. 228.

²⁰ Still, Marini 2007, 269, remarks that it has no χαίρειν ascribed, whereas Ps.-Demetrius points to letter(s) that are accompanied by this formula. Still, we should not read literally Ps.-Demetrius when he writes that “these are treatises with a superscription added”; he seems to mean by this that “these are letters only nominally”.

²¹ See Hornblower, CT III, 557–558 (with further bibliography): “[...] it most obviously resembles a speech in being a sustained first-person singular report and expression of opinion by an agent in the *History* [...] There is also some characterization [...] actually a fascinating generic experiment [...]”

²² Cf. Hornblower, CT III, 558.

VI 1, 2: The beginning of the σικελικά, decision to sail against Sicily (3 exact words quoted).

2. Seven quotations inconsistent with the standard text, from the following passages of the *History*:

I 24, 2 (different prefix of a verb): The Corcyra episode.

II 48, 1 (κακόν instead of πρῶτον, words ὡς λέγεται excised): On the great plague, opening chapter.

II 49, 1 (different verb form, a phrase excised): On the plague.

II 102, 2 (three times, the same phrase excised twice): Athenian expedition to Acarnania.

IV 12, 1 (three phrases excised, different verb form): the episode of Spartans being cut off on Sphacteria.

3. Four allusions to Thucydides' work as a whole:

De eloc. 40.

De eloc. 49 (with arguments for this showing knowledge of VII 34–41 — naval battles at Naupactus and Syracuse).

De eloc. 181.

4. One doubtful reference, either to a particular passage, or to some non-extant letter of Thucydides:

De eloc. 228 (with indication that it refers to VII 11–15).

ABBREVIATIONS

AC	<i>L'Antiquité classique</i>
AClass	<i>Acta classica: verhandelinge van die Klassieke Vereniging van Suid Afrika</i>
AHB	<i>The Ancient History Bulletin</i>
AHR	<i>The American Historical Review</i>
AJPh	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
AncSoc	<i>Ancient Society</i>
ANRW	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung</i> , hrsg. von H. Temporini, W. Haase, Berlin-New York (1972–)
AW	<i>Ancient World</i>
BAGB	<i>Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé</i>
BNJ	<i>Brill's New Jacoby</i> , ed. by I. Worthington (2006–)
BNP	<i>Brill's New Pauly</i>
C&M	<i>Classica et mediaevalia: revue danoise de philologie et d'histoire</i>
CAH	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i> , 2 nd edn. (1961–)
CB	<i>The Classical Bulletin: A Journal of International Scholarship and Special Topics</i>
CCTC	<i>Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries</i>
CEA	<i>Cahiers des études anciennes</i>
ChrEg	<i>Chronique d'Égypte</i>
CJ	<i>The Classical Journal</i>
ClAnt	<i>Classical Antiquity</i>
CPh	<i>Classical Philology: A Journal Devoted to Research in Classical Antiquity</i>
CQ	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
CR	<i>Classical Review</i>
CT	S. Hornblower, <i>A Commentary on Thucydides</i> , 3 vols., Oxford 1991–2008.
DHA	<i>Dialogues d'histoire ancienne</i>
DK	H. Diels, W. Kranz, <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> , 3 vols., 6 th edition (Berlin-Grunewald 1951–1952)
DNP	H. Cancik, H. Schneider (eds.), <i>Der Neue Pauly</i> , 16 vols. in 19 parts, Stuttgart 1996–2004
EAH	<i>The Encyclopedia of Ancient History</i> , 13 vols., ed. by R. S. Bagnall et al., Oxford 2013
FGrHist	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , Berlin-Leiden 1923–1958

FHG	C. and F. Müller, <i>Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum</i> , 5 vols., Paris 1841–1847
FHS&G	W. W. Fortenbaugh et al., <i>Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence</i> , Leiden-Boston 1993
GRBS	<i>Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies</i>
G&R	<i>Greece and Rome</i>
GGM	C. Müller, <i>Geographi Graeci Minores</i> , 2 vols., Paris 1855–1861
HCP	F. W. Walbank, <i>A Historical Commentary on Polybius</i> , 3 vols., Oxford 1957–1979
HCT	A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, K. J. Dover, <i>A Historical Commentary on Thucydides</i> , 5 vols., Oxford 1945–1980
Hermes	<i>Hermes: Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie</i>
Historia	<i>Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte</i>
InvLuc	<i>Invigilata lucernis</i>
JEA	<i>The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology</i>
JHS	<i>The Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
JPh	<i>Journal of Philosophy</i>
JRS	<i>The Journal of Roman Studies</i>
Klio	<i>Klio: Beiträge zur Alten Geschichte</i>
Leeman	A. D. Leeman et al., <i>Cicero, De oratore libri III</i> , 5 vols., Heidelberg 1981–2008
LSJ	Liddell and Scott, <i>Greek-English Lexicon</i> , 9 th ed., rev. by H. Stuart Jones suppl. by E. A. Barber and others, Oxford 1996
MH	<i>Museum Helveticum: schweizerische Zeitschrift für klassische Altertumswissenschaft</i>
OCD	<i>The Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> , ed. by S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth, 4 th edition, Oxford-New York 2012
OLD	<i>Oxford Latin Dictionary</i> , ed. by A. Souter et al., Oxford 1968
PCPhS	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
Philologus	<i>Philologus: Zeitschrift für antike Literatur und ihre Rezeption</i>
Phoenix	<i>Phoenix: Journal of the Classical Association of Canada</i>
QS	<i>Quaderni di storia</i>
QUCC	<i>Quaderni urbinati di cultura classica</i>
RAAN	<i>Rendiconti della Accademia di Archeologia, Lettere e Belle Arti</i>
RCCM	<i>Rivista di cultura classica e medioevale</i>
RE	<i>Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> , hrsg. von A. von Pauly, G. Wissowa, W. Kroll, 84 vols., Stuttgart 1893–1980
REA	<i>Revue des études anciennes</i>
REG	<i>Revue des études grecques</i>
Rev. Phil.	<i>Revue de philologie, de littérature et d'histoire anciennes</i>
RFIC	<i>Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica</i>
RhM	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</i>
RIPh	<i>Revue internationale de philosophie</i>
RSA	<i>Rivista storica dell'Antichità</i>

RUSCH	<i>Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities</i>
SCO	<i>Studi classici e orientali</i>
Sem Rom	<i>Seminari romani di cultura greca</i>
SIFC	<i>Studi italiani di filologia classica</i>
Sileno	<i>Sileno: rivista di studi classici e cristiani</i>
TAPhA	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
WJA	<i>Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft</i>
ZPE	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>
ZphF	<i>Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung</i>

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