The Cardinal Role of Respect and Self-Respect for Rawls ’ s and Walzer ’ s Theories of Justice ¹

: The cardinal role that notions of respect and self-respect play in Rawls ’ s A Theory of Justice has already been abundantly examined in the literature. On the other hand, however, it has hardly been noticed that these notions are also central to Michael Walzer ’ s Spheres of Justice. Respect and self-respect are not only central topics of his chapter “ Recognition ” , but constitute a central aim of a “ complex egalitarian society ” and of Walzer ’ s theory of justice. This paper substantiates this thesis and elucidates Walzer ’ s criticism of Rawls according to which ” we need to distinguish between “ self-respect ” and “ self-esteem ” . ,

It is evident that notions of respect and self respect playacardinal role in John Rawls's AT heoryo fJ ustice. Forh im, "self-respect( or self-esteem)" is, as he repeatedlys tates, "perhaps the most important primary good" (Rawls 1971, pp. 440,544;§6 7, §82). Rawls claims that the fact that his conception of justice as fairness "givesm ore support to self-esteem than other principles is as trong reason" that it would be adopted in the "original position" and chosen over competing conceptions (Rawls 1971,p .440, §67;c f. pp. 178 -79, §29).⁴ Similarly,i n Political Liberalism Rawls talks about "the fundamental importance of self-respect" and asserts "that self-respectismost effectively encouraged and supported by the two principles of justice" (Rawls 2005,p .3 18, VIII, §6 ). Rawls'sc onception of self-respecta nd its role in his theory of justicea sf airness seem to undergo no significant modifications or developments after ATheoryo fJ ustice. However,R awls'ss tatements on self-respect and in particular the "bases of self-respect" and theirstatus as primary goods in ATheoryofJustice and Political Liberalism are sometimes unclear and confusing.
After as horta nd partlycritical second section on Rawls'su nderstanding of respect and self-respect,t his essays ubstantiates the thesis that notions of respect and self-respect playacardinal role in Walzer's Spheres of Justice. Self-respect and self-esteem are not onlyc entral topics in his chapter "Recognition", but constituteacentral aim of his whole theory of justice. Section three provides av ery shorti ntroduction to Walzer'st heory of distributive justicea nd to his chapter "Recognition".T he fourth section examines his conceptso fp ublic honor and individual desert and shows that,i nt his context,W alzer advances as trong argument against Rawls'st heory of justice. Section five substantiates the thesis thatself-respect and self-esteem constitute acentral aim of a "complex egalitarian society" and of Walzer'st heory of justice.
These two aspectsd escribet he desirable mental state of aperson who has selfrespect.Aperson'ssense of her own value cannot be achievedbyanisolated individual because it essentiallyd epends on an intersubjective or social dimension. ForR awls, "our self-respectn ormallyd epends upon the respect of others. Unless we feel that our endeavors are honored by them, it is difficult if not impossiblef or us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing" (Rawls 1971,p .1 78, §29). Self-respect depends on "finding our person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by others" (Rawls 1971,p .440, §6 7).
ForR awls,aperson'ss ense of her own value is not primarilyl inked to her job, income or wealth, but to her conception of the good or her plan of life. According to his theory,h uman beingsa re equal as moralp ersons. Moral persons are defined by boththeir capabilities of having asense of justiceand of having a "conception of theirg ood (as expressed by arational plan of life)" (Rawls 1971, pp. 19,505;§4, §77).⁵ In the modern world, individuals "have different plans of life" and "there exists ad iversity of philosophical and religious belief" (Rawls 1971,p .1 27, §22). Accordingt oR awls's "thin theory" of the good, "ap erson's good is determined by what is for him the most rational plan of life givenr easonable favorable circumstances" (Rawls 1971,pp. 395 -396, §60). If ap erson's rational plano fl ife is recognizedo ra pproved by the other members of society, the person develops the conviction that her plan is worth carrying out and, as a consequence, develops as ense of her own value.⁶  Cf. Rawls 2005,pp. 310 -324, VIII, § § 5 -6. ForRawls, "the capacity for moral personality is a sufficient condition for beinge ntitled to equal justice" (Rawls 1971,p .5 05, §77).  Rawlsd eclares about the opposites cenario, in which ap erson'sr ational plan of life is not sociallyrecognized or approved: "When we feel that our plans areoflittle value, we cannot pursue them with pleasureo rt ake delight in their execution" (Rawls1 971, p. 440, §6 7).
The social recognition or approval of the different plans of life in aj ust society is in particulare xpressed by Rawls'sf irst principle of justicet hat calls for "an equal right to the most extensive totalsystem of equalbasicliberties" (Rawls 1971,p .3 02;§46). The first principle, which includes the equal liberty of conscience and the right to vote and to be eligible for public office, ensures equal citizenship and thus as imilar and secure status for all members of society.O n this basis, "av ariety of communities and associations" or "free communities of interest" can be established that allow all citizens to carry out theirp lans of life (Rawls 1971,pp. 441, 544;§67, §82).Inajust society,the equal distribution of the fundamental rights and liberties guaranteed by the first principle constitutes the basis for self-respect (Rawls 1971,p .5 44, §8 2).
Rawls emphasizes that among his two principles it is in particulart he equal liberty principle that is supposed to promotea nd sustain self-respect: "The basis for self-esteem in aj ust society is not then one'si ncome share but the publiclya ffirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties" (Rawls 1971,p .5 44;§8 2;cf. Rawls 2005,p .3 18, VIII, §6 ). Rawls'sa rgument from selfrespect is not onlya ni mportant argument for his conception of justicea sfairness in general, but in particularf or the priority of liberty among the two principles (Rawls 1971,pp. 541-548, 544-546, §82;cf. Shue 1975,Taylor 2003. Critics have rightlyo bjected that individual self-respect depends to ac onsiderable amount also on one'si ncome share and that the importance Rawls givest o self-respect among the primaryg oods calls for less socioeconomic inequality than Rawls'sd ifference principle allows (Barry 1973,p .3 2 ⁷ ;E yal 2005;K eat and Miller1 974;Miler1 978, p. 18;N ielsen 1979;Z aino 1998). In modernw ork and market societies, the social status and self-respect of ap erson depends to ahighdegree on her job and on being able to buy acertain set of commodities.⁸  Barry criticizes Rawls: "That equality of self-respect maybeasmuch or morehindered by inequalitieso fw ealtho rp owert hemselvesa pparentlydoes not occur to him" (Barry 1973,p.3 2). This criticism is exaggerated because Rawls clearlystates about his idea that the "precedenceof liberty entails equality in the social bases of self-respect": "Now it is quitepossible that this idea cannot be carried through completely. To some extend men'ssense of their own worth mayhinge upon their institutionalp osition and their income share" (Rawls1 971, p. 546, §8 2; cf. p. 534, §8 0; cf. Zaino 1998).  Cf. Walzer'sanalysis of sociologist Lee Rainwater'sstudies on the "social meaningofincome", according to which in industrial societies money buysmembership (Walzer 1983, pp. 105 -106). Walzer also quotes another sociologist and refers to the differencebetween the society of feudal Europe and modern bourgeois society: "Status,F rank Parfin argues,isafunctionofplace, profession, and office, not of particular recognitions of particular achievements.The abolition of titles is not the abolition of classes.C onceptions of honor arem orec ontroversial than they Accordingt ot he second aspect, "self-respect implies ac onfidencei no ne's ability,sofar as it is within one'spower,tofulfill one'sintentions".Thissecond aspect is related to the first one in terms of being its prerequisite.Aperson must have the confidencethatshe has the ability to fulfill her particular plan of life in order to follow it through and to have "the will to strive for" it.Ifweare "plagued by failurea nd self-doubt" we cannot "continue in our endeavors" (Rawls 1971, p. 440, §6 7).
Both aspectso fs elf-respect,a nd in particulart he first,a re associated with what Rawls calls the "Aristotelian Principle".T his principle "is ap rinciple of motivation" and "runs as follows: other thingse qual, human beingse njoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity" (Rawls 1971,p p. 426 -427, §6 5). Rawls illustrates this principle referringt o people who are able to playboth checkers and chess. As chess is am ore ingenious and complicated game thanc heckers,i tl eads to more enjoyment. Therefore, such kinds of people are morem otivated to playt he formert han the latter (Rawls 1971,p.426-427, §65). Analogously, people enjoy their plans of life much more if these plans succeed as a call upon their natural capacities in an interesting fashion. When activities fail to satisfy the Aristotelian Principle, they arelikelytoseem dull and flat,and to give us no feelingofcompetenceo rasense that they arew orth doing.Aperson tends to be morec onfident of his value when his abilities areboth fullyrealizedand organized in ways of suitable complexity and refinement (Rawls 1971,p .440, §67).
The more aperson'splan of life allows her to develop and exercise her capacities and abilities and the more this plan of life is recognized or approved by the other members of society,t he more she will be able to develop as ense of her own value or self-respect.
Rawls discusses the objection that the highdemands of the Aristotelian Principle make it difficult for less gifted individuals to gain recognition for theirpersonal life plans from others. However,h ec ounters this objectionb yc laiming that it "normallys uffices thatf or each person therei ss ome association (one or more) to which he belongsa nd within which the activities that are rational for him are publiclya ffirmedb yo thers. In this wayw ea cquire as ense that what we do in everydayl ife is worthwhile" (Rawls 1971,p .4 41, §67). Rawls does not give concrete examples of the kind of associations and communities wereu nder the old regime, but distributionsa re still patterned, now dominated by occupation rather than blood or rank" (Walzer 1983, p. 256).
The Cardinal Roleo fR espect and Self-Respect for Rawls he has in mind. In all likelihood he thinks of avariety of clubs,societies, unions, corporations and such like. Being am ember of such kindso fa ssociations also has abeneficial effect on self-respect: Associative "ties strengthen the second aspect of self-esteem, since they tend to reduce the likelihood of failurea nd provide support against the sense of self-doubt when mishaps occur" (Rawls 1971, p. 441, §6 7).
As aK antian, Rawls not onlyt alks about "principles of justicef or institutions",b ut also about "principles of natural duty and obligations that applyt o individuals" (Rawls 1971,p.3 33,chap. VI). His theory claims that in an "original position of equality",f ree and rational persons would also choose principles of natural duty.One important natural duty is the "duty of mutual respect": "This is the duty to show ap erson the respect which is due to him as am oral being" (Rawls 1971,p.337, §51). As alreadymentioned, moralbeingsare defined as persons with as ense of justice and with ac onception of their good. In correspondence to the twoa spects of moral personality,m utual respect is shown "in our willingness to see the situation of others from their point of view,f rom the perspective of their conception of their good; and in our being prepared to give reasons for our actions whenever the interests of others are materially affected" (Rawls 1971,p .3 37, §51).⁹ Rawls convincingly claims thate veryone benefits "from living in as ociety wheret he duty of mutual respect is honored" and that such ad uty supportse veryone'ss ense of her ownv alue and thus self-respect.
This shortc larification and critique of Rawls'sv iew of respect and self-respect allows for af inal criticism of his central term "baseso fs elf-respect". Rawls introducest his term togetherw ith his "general conception of justice", from which he derives his two principles of justice. This "general conception" reads: "All social values -liberty and opportunity,i ncome and wealth, and the bases of self-respect -are to be distributed equallyunless an unequaldistribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone'sa dvantage" (Rawls 1971, p. 62, §1 1; cf.p .3 03, §4 6). In this important section of Rawls'sb ook the term "bases of self-respect" remains opaque. Afteri ntroducing his "general conception",R awls tells his readers that "liberty and opportunity, income and wealth"  Rawlsf urther explainsh is statement: "When called for,r easons aretobeaddressed to those concerned; they aret obeo ffered in good faith, in the belief that they aresound reasons as defined by am utuallya cceptable conception of justicew hich takest he good of everyone into account.Thus to respect another as am oral person is to try to understand his aims and interests from his standpoint and to present him with considerations that enable him to accept the constraints on his conduct" (Rawls 1971,pp. 337-338, §5 1).I nt his context, in af ootnotet hat says "On the notion of respect" Rawlsr efers to BernardW illiams 1962, pp. 118 -119. are "primary goods, thatis, thingsthatevery rational man is presumed to want" and thatthese primary goods are distributed by "the basic structure of society"¹⁰ (Rawls 1971,p.62, §11). At this point,hementionsfor the first time thatalso selfrespect is an important primary good. However,h ed oes not onlys tays ilent about what exactlyt he social bases of this primary good are, but also does not indicate whether these basess hould also be considered as ap rimary good.¹¹ On the one hand,t hese basesa re listed among the primary goods that are to be distributed equally;¹² on the other,h eo nlym entions self-respect and not its bases in his enumeration of the chief primary goods on this page.
Onlymuch laterinthe book,when Rawls introduces the grounds for the priority of the equal liberty principle, he makes clear what he means with his term "bases of self respect".Hementions that "the precedence of liberty entails equality in the social basesofself-respect" and -as alreadymentioned -states: "The basis for self-esteem in ajust society is not then one'sincome share but the publiclya ffirmedd istribution of fundamental rights and liberties" (Rawls 1971, pp. 546,544;§8 2). Therefore, the social bases of self-respecta re primarily identical with the rights and liberties secured by the first principle of justice. This late clarification demonstrates that Rawls was not careful when he phrased his "general conception of justice" because his enumeration of those social values that "are to be distributedequally" lists "liberty and opportunity,income and wealth,  The basic structureo ft he society is composed out of its most important institutions: "By major institutionsIunderstand the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements.Thus the legal protection of freedomo ft houghta nd liberty of conscience, competitive markets, privateproperty in the means of production, and the monogamous family […]. Takent ogether as one scheme,the major institutionsd efine men'sr ights and duties and influencetheir life-prospects,what they can expect to be and how wellthey can hope to do" (Rawls 1971,p .7 , §2 ).  NirE yal claims that Rawls mentions onlyf ives ocial primary goods including the social bases of self-respect (Eyal 2005,p .1 95).H owever,i nt he context of his "general conception of justice" Rawlsd esignates onlys elf-respect as ap rimary good. Eyal seems to be unaware of this problem regarding the differenceb etween self-respect and its social bases.  It seems that Nir Eyal,who has been mention in the preceding footnote, is also not awareof Rawls's "general conception of justice" because he asserts that Rawls nowheres tates how the bases of self-respect should be distributed (the first referencet os elf-respect in the contexto f the "general conception" has been overlooked in creating the index of AT heoryo fJ ustice). Eyal claims in his papert hat the distributive principle of the social bases of self-respect is Rawls's "covert" principle of justice and undertakes to reconstruct it.The result of this reconstruction is that "justice mandates that each social basis for self-respect be equalized" (Eyal 2005,p.195 -196). However,alreadyinhis "general conception of justice" Rawls'sstates clearly that the bases of self-respect should be "distributed equallyu nless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone'sa dvantage" (Rawls 1971,p.62, §1 1;cf. p. 546, §82).
The Cardinal Role of Respect and Self-Respect forR awls and the baseso fs elf-respect" (M.K.'si talics). The word "and" before "the bases of self-respect" suggests or implies that these basesare something different from all of the afore-mentioned primary goods, which is not the case. Liberty is aprimary good that is also the main social basis for self-respect.Therefore, both selfrespect and its bases are primary goods. In Political Liberalism,R awls pronounces that also "fair equality of opportunity" counts as as ocial basisf or self-respect (Rawls 2005,p .2 03,V , §7 ;f or severalo therb asess ee Eyal 2005, pp. 196,2 12). In Political Liberalism,R awls alsos tates clearlyt hat the social bases of self-respectcount as one out of five primary goods. However,confusingly enough,n ow he doesn'tl ist self-respecta nymore as ap rimary good (Rawls 2005,p p. 308 -309,3 19,V III, §4 , §6 ). In Justice as Fairness. AR estatement, Rawls declares "that it is not self-respect as an attitude toward oneself but the social bases of self-respect that count as ap rimary good" (Rawls 2001, p. 60 -cannotbereducedto"ashortlist of basic goods",and neither are twoprinciples of justicesufficient to regulate the just distribution of all these social goods (Walzer 1983, p. 5;Walzer 1992, p. 12). Rather,Walzer calls for adiverse setofrules, standardsand principles for the distributionofall different social goods. While "from Platoo nward" the majorityofp hilosophers who have written about justicea ssume that "there is one, and onlyo ne, distributive system",Walzer argues for ap luralist approach that encompasses av ariety of distributions and distributive principles. He claims "that the principles of justice are themselvesp luralist in form;t hat different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons,i na ccordancew ith different procedures, by different agents" (Walzer 1983, pp. 5 -6). Forh im, there is onlyo ne universalp rocedural  In the correspondingf ootnoteh es tates: "Theory is ambiguous on this point.I tf ails to distinguish between self-respect as an attitude, the preservingofw hich is af undamental interest, and the social bases that help to support that attitude" (Rawls 2001,p .60). rule: each social good should be distributed accordingtothe criteria valid for its own sphere (Walzer 1992, p. 12). Walzer'sm ain suggestion for the multiplicity of social goods and the complexity of distributives ystems is his idea of "complex equality".This remarkable idea reconciles the common egalitarian demand for social equalitywith the recognition of al arge number of social inequalities. According to Walzer'srepublican theory of distributive justice, ajust distribution of all social goods leadstoa"complex egalitarian society" in which every citizenis equallyf reef rom domination and tyranny ( Walzer 1983, p. 17;c f. Knoll 2014). AccordingtoWalzer'srelativist approach, social goods tend to have different meaningsindifferent societies. The claim of his interpretative method is that the proper distributive criteria of social goods are intrinsic to each particulars ocial good. It is the meaningo fe ach social good that determines the criterion of its just distribution.¹⁴ Walzer argues, for example, that the appropriate understanding of the meaning of medicalc are and welfare reveals to us that these goods should not be sold but allocated accordingt on eed (Walzer 1983, pp. 64-90). The consequence of Walzer'sc laim that the meaning of each social good determines its criterion of just distribution is that each social good and its distinct meaning constitutes -as he puts it metaphorically -as eparate and relatively autonomous sphere of justice: "When meanings are distinct,d istributions must be autonomous. Every social good or set of goods constitutes, as it were, adistributive sphere within which onlycertain criteria and arrangements are appropriate" (Walzer 1983, p. 10). In the case of medical care and welfarei ng eneral, these constituteasphere in which the proper criterion for ajust distribution is need.Office, on the other hand,constitutes asphere in which the suitable criterion is qualification (Walzer1983, pp. 135 -139,143 -147). If all social goods are distributed autonomouslyand according to their meanings, a "complex egalitarian society" has been reached.
In Spheres of Justice,Walzer examines questions of self-esteem and self-respect mainlyinthe chapter "Recognition".Walzerisaware that the modern philosophyofrecognitiongoes backtoHegel who he quotes twice: "they recognize themselvesa sm utuallyr ecognizingeach other" (Walzer 1983, pp. 259, 278). For Hegel, self-consciousness and personal identity depend on recognition by others, which is usually the resultofsome kind of struggle. In line with this, Walzer calls his first subchapter,inwhich he approaches his topic from ahistoricalperspective, "The Struggle for Recognition".¹⁵ Like Hegel in the famous chapter on  Forthe difficulties of Walzer'sclaim that the meaningofeach social good determines its criterion of just distributions ee Miller 1995, pp. 5 -10.  Likewise, the title of Axel Honneth'sHabilitationsschrift,which also drawso nH egel'se arly Jena writings,i sKampf um Anerkennung (Honneth 1992).
The Cardinal Role of Respect and Self-Respect forR awls master and servant,Walzer is interested in the changes that go along with the progress from hierarchical society of feudal Europe to modern bourgeois society. In the formers ociety,s ocial ranks and hereditary titles go along with ac ertain degree of honor: "Titles are instant recognitions" (Walzer 1983, p. 250). In the latter societies, titles basedonblood lose their central importance. The hierarchyof titles among men is substituted by the single title "Master" or "Mister": In as ociety of misters, careers areo pen to talents,r ecognitions to whoever can win them. To paraphrase Hobbes,the equality of titles breeds an equality of hope and then ageneral competition. The struggle for honor that ragedamong aristocrats […]isnow entered by everyman. It is not,h owever,a ristocratic honor that everyman is after.A st he struggle is broadened, so the social good at issue is infinitelyd iversified, and its name is multiplied. Honor,r espect,e steem, praise, prestige,status,r eputation, dignity,r ank, regard, admiration, worth, distinction, deference, homage, appreciation, glory, fame, celebrity […] ( Walzer 1983, p. 252).
In modern bourgeois society,p eople have no fixed places and ranks, and there exists ap lurality of methodsb yw hich av ariety of forms of recognition can be gained from others. People usually are preoccupied with their own claims to recognition and thus are reluctant to recognize others. However,W alzer is right in observing that people also have the need to give recognition: "we need heroes,m en and women whom we can admire without negotiation and without constraint" (Walzer 1983, p. 254). Nevertheless, as recognitionisascarce good and as everyone can competetoobtain it,inmodern society life becomesas probablyHobbes noticed for the first time -aracefor better places and more recognition. ForWalzer,this is an ambivalent development: "Asociety of misters is aworld of hope, effort,and endless anxiety" (Walzer 1983, p. 254). Recognition is asocial good that is mostlydistributed unequally. People have different skills and talents and will thus obtain different degrees of recognition. Modern bourgeois society does not promise "equalityofoutcomes" but "equality of opportunity" (Walzer 1983, p. 256).
Walzeri sa ware that moderns ocieties do not make good on this promise. He criticizes the social reality that there are still classes and thats ocial status does not depend mainlyoni ndividual qualities and "particulara chievements", but on the achievement of professional statusoran"office"¹⁶.Walzercondemns  Walzer defines office "as anypositioninwhich the political community as awhole takes an interest,choosingthe person whoh olds it or regulating the procedures by which he is chosen" (Walzer 1983, p. 129). Accordingt ot his definition, most jobs in the modernw orld have turned into offices because "the statecontrols licensing procedures and participates in the enforcement that "office holderscommand respect in the same waythatthey command high salaries, without having to provet heir worth to their fellow workers or to their clients" (Walzer 1983, p. 256). As he shows in the chapter "Office",the distribution of this social good is so important because "so much elsei sd istributed along with office (or some offices): honor and status, power and prerogative, wealth and comfort" (Walzer 1983, p. 155). As aconsequence, in modern societies the struggle for recognition becomes as truggle for office or for jobs and income (Walzer 1983, p. 256).
Walzers peculateso nabetter alternative to the existing social situation, in which recognition is closelyt ied to professional status or to holding an office. If these ties werec ut,t he resultc ould be what he calls "the free appraisal of each person by each other person" (Walzer 1983, p. 257). In such as ocial arrangement,p articularp erformances and achievements would lead to particular recognitions.F or example, respect would not be tied to mere office holding,but to "helpfulness in office" (Walzer1 983, p. 257). The highest honor would only come "to office holders who perform well" (Walzer 1983, p. 272). However,Walzer admits that we don'te xactlyk now how "such world would lookl ike" (Walzer 1983, p. 257).

4W alzero nP ublic Honor andI ndividualD esert. AS trong Argument against Rawls'sT heoryo f Justice
In the subchapter "The Struggle for Recognition",Walzer refers primarilyt o" individual distributions" of respect,honor,and esteem. However,heisa ware that there are also "avariety of collective distributions: rewards, prices,medals, citations, wreaths of laurel" (Walzer 1983, p. 259). Public honor is the reward for outstanding performances,accomplishments or works attributed to an individual or ag roup of individuals.O ne of Walzer'sm ain examples for the distribution of public honor is the Nobel Prize in literature.Accordingtohis theory,every social good should be distributed in regard to its meaning.P ublic honor constitutes a separate sphere in which the appropriate criterion for distributions is individual desert: "The crucial standard for public honor is desert" (Walzer 1983, p. 259). Analogously, "punishment,t he most important example of public dishonor", of standards for professional practice. Indeed, anyemployment for which academic certification is required is ak ind of office" (Walzer 1983, pp. 130 -131).
The Cardinal Roleo fR espect and Self-Respect for Rawls should be allotted to those individuals who deserveit (Walzer 1983, p. 268). Walzer understands desert not as asubjective or relative criterion but as an "objective measure": "Henceitisdistributed by juries,whose members delivernot an opinion but av erdict -a "true speech" about the qualities of the recipients.A nd on juries thoughtisnot free; it is bound by evidence and rules" (Walzer 1983, p. 259, cf. 268). Desert is one of threec riteria that Walzerd istinguishes in his first and pivotal chapter "Complex Equality".¹⁷ An important characteristic of desertisthat it "seems to requirea ne speciallyc lose connection between particularg oods and particularpersons" (Walzer 1983, p. 24). In his chapter "Office",inwhich he distinguishesbetween qualification and desert,Walzeroutlines his concept of desert: Desert implies avery strict sort of entitlement,such that the title precedes and determines the selection, while qualification is am uch looser idea. Ap rize, for example, can be deserved because it alreadybelongs to the person whohas giventhe best performance;itremains onlyt oi dentify that person. Pricec ommitteesa re likej uries in that they look backwardand aim at an objective decision. An office, by contrast,cannot be deserved because it belongs to the people whoa re served by it,and they or their agents arefree(within limits Iw ill specify later)t om akea ny choicet hey please (Walzer 1983, p. 136;W alzer'si talics).
If an author has written an ovel that is generallya greed to be the best novel of this year,h ei se ntitled to or deserves the Nobel Prize in literature for this year (Walzer 1983, p. 137).
In the literature, it has not always been noticed that Walzer'ss ubchapter "Public Honor and Individual Desert" contains as tronga rgument against a coree lement and central morali ntuition of Rawls'st heory of justice. For Rawls,t he "inequalities of birth and natural endowmenta re undeserved": "No one deservesh is greater natural capacity nor merits am ore favorables tarting place in society" (Rawls 1971,p .1 00,1 02,c f. 103 -104; §1 7). Rawls introduces his principle of fair opportunity that provides as much compensation as possible for talented individuals born into less favorable social positions as ac onsequence of this moral judgment. He also introduces his difference principle as ac onsequenceo ft his moral intuition (Rawls 1971,p p. 73 -75,1 00 -108; §12,  Like "free exchange" and "need", "desert" is ac riterion that meets Walzer's "open-ended distributive principle. No social good xs hould be distributed to men and women who possess some other good ymerely because they possess yand without regardtothe meaning of x" (Walzer 1983, pp. 20 -21). §1 7).¹⁸ The difference principle should be understood as the principle of the welfares tate because its social application requires the redistribution of social income towards the lessf avored members of society (cf. Knoll 2013). For Rawls,the less favored members of society are also defined by having less capabilities and talents and thus less resources to generate ah ighi ncome (Rawls 1999,p .8 3). However,s uch an "outcomeo ft he naturall ottery" is "arbitrary from am oral perspective" (Rawls 1971,p .7 4, §1 2).T herefore, it givesr ise to "claims of redress" (Rawls 1971,p .1 01,  §1 7). The undeservedb ad luck of the less fortunate in the distribution of natural talents has to be compensated: "Those who have been favored by nature,w hoever they are, mayg ain from their good fortune onlyo nt erms thati mprovet he situation of those who have lost out" (Rawls 1971,p.101, §1 7). Rawls justifies this with his claim that the favored individuals do not deservet heir superior endowments and talents.
Against this claim, Walzer argues that public honor "cannot exist as ag ood unless therea re deserving men and women" (Walzer 1983, p. 261).¹⁹ In his critique of Rawls,W alzer partlyf ollows Nozick'sc riticism (Nozick 1974,p p. 213-216, 228). Walzera ttacks Rawls: Advocates of equality have often felt compelled to denythe reality of desert.The people we call deserving, they argue, aresimplylucky. […]. How are we to conceive of these men and women oncew ehavecometoview their capacities and achievements as accidental accessories,l ike hats and coats they just happen to be wearing? How,i ndeed, aret hey to conceiveo ft hemselves? The reflective forms of recognition, self-esteem and self-respect,o ur most important possessions […]m ust seem meaningless to individuals all of whose qualities aren othingb ut the luck of the draw ( Walzer 1983, pp. 260 -261).
Rawls abstracts persons from their individual qualities and capabilities. Against this abstraction, Walzer argues firstly thati td oes not leave "us with persons at all" (Walzer1 983, p. 261; Walzer'si talics). Secondly, he claims that we cannot be proud of our achievements if the qualities that led to them are not an integral part of our personality.I fw ed on'td eserve anyr ecognitionf or who we are and for our achievements, and if we cannot be proud of ourselves, we cannot develop self-esteem and self-respect.T he fact thatW alzerc alls self-esteem and self-re- The final statement of the differenceprinciple in ATheoryo fJustice reads: "Social and economic inequalities aret obearranged so that they are[ … ](a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle" (Rawls 1971,p .3 02, §4 6).  Walzer advocates the questionable thesis that the "recognition of deservingm en and women, and of all deserving men and women, is possible onlyi nademocracy" (Walzer 1983, p. 267). The validity of this thesis cannot be discussed in this paper.
The Cardinal Roleo fR espect and Self-Respect forR awls spect "our most important possessions" demonstratesh ow important these notions are for him and his theory of justice.
5T he Importance of Self-Respectf or Walzer's Theoryo fJ ustice As alreadym entioned, Walzer criticizes Rawls for not distinguishing between self-esteem and self-respect.For his owndistinction between these two concepts, Walzeri si ndebted to DavidS achs'sa rticle "How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem" (Sachs 1981). If the jury for the Nobel Prize in literature pronounces its verdict about the best novel of the year,i te xpresses its esteem for the work and the author.T he author internalizes this judgment and develops as its reflective-form "self-esteem",which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as "af avorable appreciation or opinion of oneself".Like esteem, self-esteem "is arelational concept": "men and women value themselves -just as they are valued -in comparison with others" (Walzer 1983, p. 274). Of course, usuallyt here is no official jury thatjudgesour value, and thereforewehavetomake our own judgmentsa bout ourselves: In order to enjoy self-esteem, we probablyh avet oc onvinceo urselves( even if this means deceivingo urselves) that we deservei t, and we can'td ot hat without al ittle help from our friends.B ut we arej udgesi no ur own case; we pack the jury as best we can, and we fake the verdictw henever we can. About this sort of thing,n oo ne feels guilty;s uch trails area ll-too-human (Walzer 1983, p. 278).
Even if we successfullyc onvince ourselveso fo ur ownv alue, self-esteem depends to al arge degreeo nt he opinion of others. It also depends on social value judgmentsthat are connected to different kinds of jobs and salaries. Therefore, like in the hierarchical society of feudal Europe, in the modernb ourgeois society there exists no equality of esteem and self-esteem (cf. Walzer 1983, pp. 255-256, 279).
In line with the Oxford English Dictionary,Walzer defines "self-respect" as "ap roper regard for the dignity of one'sp erson or one'sp osition" (Walzer 1983, p. 274). Ap erson regards the dignity of her position -e. g. as at eacher or ad octor -and thus herself, if she measures up to the professional code or the general norm thati sv alid for this position in her society: "What is at stake is the dignity of the position and the integrity of the person who holds it.H eo ught not lower himself for some personal advantage;h eo ught not sell himself short; he oughtn ot to endures uch-and-such an affront" (Walzer 1983, pp. 274-275). Contrary to self-esteem, self-respect is not ar elational concept or the outcome of ac ompetitive practice. It is enough that Ik now the norm and measure myself against it.Whether Is ucceed in measuring up to the norm or not is independent from others succeedingo rf ailing to do so. Self-respecti s " an ormative concept,d ependentu pon our moral understanding of persons and positions" (Walzer1 983, p. 274).
While the valid norms and standards for the diverse professional positions and social ranksd iffer,i nd emocraciesg eneral and equal norms also exist for the proper regardo fa ll persons as citizens. In order to achieve self-respecta s citizens, persons have to be publiclyr ecognized as such by the political community.T he community has to show equal respect to its members by giving them "the same legal and political rights",l ike equal voting rights (Walzer 1983, p. 277). As ar esulto ft he equal respect among members of the political community,persons can have proper regardf or their dignity as citizens. Self-respect in "anys ubstantives ense" is "af unction of membership" (Walzer 1983, p. 278;cf. Walzer'schapter "Membership",1983, pp. 31-63). Self-respect also presupposest hat persons are considered to be owners of their qualities and their character and thus responsible for theira ctions (Walzer1 983, p. 279).
Self-respectr equires "some substantial connection" to the groups one belongst oa samember,l ikeo ne'sp rofessional group, one'sp olitical community, or ap olitical movement: That'swhy expulsion fromthe movement or exile fromthe community can be so serious a punishment. It attacks both the external and the reflective forms of honor.P rolonged unemploymenta nd poverty are similarlyt hreatening:t hey represent ak ind of economic exile, ap unishmentt hat we are loathe to sayt hat anyone deserves. The welfare statei s an effort to avoid this punishment,tog ather in the economic exiles,tog uaranteee ffective membership. But even when it does this in the best possible way, meetingn eeds without degrading persons,i td oesn'tg uarantees elf-respect; it onlyh elps to makei tp ossible. This is, perhaps, the deepest purpose of distributive justice. When all social goods,f rom membership to political power,a re distributed for the right reasons, then the conditions for self-respect will have been established as best as they can be. But there will still be men and women whos uffer from al ack of self-respect (Walzer 1983, p. 278).
In Spheres of Justice,Walzerc onceiveso fajusts ociety as ad emocratic welfare state. In the book, he argues for "an expanded American welfares tate",i n which each citizen receiveswelfarebenefits "accordingtohis sociallyrecognized needs" (Walzer 1983, pp. 90 -91). The quote aboved emonstrates thatademocratic welfare state is in particularnecessary in order to allow citizens to develop self-respect.Toe nable self-respecti s, for Walzer, "perhaps,the deepest purpose of distributivej ustice".I na" complex egalitarian society",i nw hich all social goods are distributed accordingt ot heir social meanings, "the conditions for self-respect will have been established as best as they can be".The "experience of complex equality will breed, though it can never guarantee, self-respect" (Walzer 1983, p. 280). These important statements elucidatet hatt he notions of respect and self-respect playacentral role in Walzer's Spheres of Justice.
That the development of citizen'ss elf-respecti safundamental aim of Walzer'st heory of justicei sa lsod emonstratedb yt he fact that he comes back to this topic in the concluding paragraph of his book.I nt he passage, Walzer states that the unequal distributiono fg oods in a "complex egalitarian society" is "no affront to our dignity,nodenial of our moralorpolitical capacity" (Walzer 1983, p. 321). As citizens have the possibility to succeed and experience recognition in manydifferent spheres,failings in some spheres do not constitutea na ffront to their dignity.T he "deep strengths of complex equality" are, as Walzer declares in the concluding sentenceo fh is work, "mutual respect and as hared self-respect",which together are "the sourceo fi ts possiblee ndurance" (Walzer 1983, p. 321).

6C onclusion
This essayhas demonstrated that notions of respect and self-respect playacentral role in Rawls'sa nd Walzer'st heories of justice. As these two theories are amongst the most important works in contemporary political theory and philosophy, the paper has also shown that respect and self-respect are amongst the most important topics in this field. Rawls'sa nd Walzer'st heories of justicea re the result of different approaches to political philosophy. While Rawls speculates on the ideal of awell-ordered society,Walzerinterprets the world we live in and the moralnorms it contains.Intheir approachestorespect and self-respect,both mainlyfocus on the equal respect that is due to citizens of ademocracy.However,a lsoi nt his context,Walzer rightfullyc riticizes Rawls for not distinguishing between self-esteem and self-respect ( Walzer 1983, pp. 272, 277, 335, fn. 42). As ac onsequenceo ft his flaw, Rawls'st heory does not catch sight of the manydifferent forms of recognition distributed in modernsocieties and its corresponding effects on the self or on individual persons. This blind spot might alsobethe result of Rawls'sf ocus on the basics tructure of society as the onlya gent distributing social goods.
Although both political philosophers arguef or aw elfares tate, onlyW alzer succeeds in showing that such asocial arrangement is essential for safeguarding