Human Interaction in the State of Nature: Hobbes on Respect for Persons and Self-Respect

: In this chapter I shall attempt to identity different forms of respect in Hobbes ’ state of nature, by way of an identification and critical engagement with some of the key notions which, as I believe, inform his views of the mechanism of human interaction: power, recognition, honor, esteem and fear. My general contention is that the philosophical issues of respect for persons and self-respect offer a lens through which Hobbes can: (1) describe some features of the state of nature and the aspects which elicit a transition from such a state to the creation of a commonwealth; (b) some prescriptive indications on how human beings ought to behave towards each other with a view to a condition of peace and security. I will identify four kinds of respect: esteem, honor, an equal respect based on fear and one grounded in recognition of each other ’ s legitimate needs and interests.


1I ntroduction
Hobbes'sreflection on human nature and the mechanisms of the constitution of political government exhibits ar ich array of interrelated themesa nd philosophicallyproblematic issues.Amongthem, the nature of the epistemic and the agential powers that human beingspossess by nature or acquire over their lifetimes, the individual psychological motivesi nspiring their pursuits, and the strategies of reciprocal interaction thatt hey usuallye nact to prevent conflict.H obbes examinest hese issues and situates them in an elaborate philosophicale difice, set up with the following aim: as ystematic discussion and ar econstruction of the conceptual mechanics that,i nh is view,e nervatet he transition from as upposedlypre-political condition of human coexistence (which Hobbes notoriously calls the "state of nature")t oacivil society bereft of inner strife.
Within this framework of investigation, the philosophical issues of respect for persons and self-respect do not stand out (at least prima facie)a ss ubjects which Hobbes is keen to discuss in as ystematic way.On the one hand,t his might explain as ubstantial absence of scholarlys tudies on the topic of respect in his philosophy; on the other,his concern for the ideal of respect is evident in his remarks on esteem, honor and the equal regard that persons owe to each other qua human beings.In this essayIwill brieflyr eview various expressions of respect for oneself and respect for others in the Hobbesian state of nature, stressingi np articulart he role that the idea of "recognition of power" plays in conceptuallys hapinge ach form of respect.
With aview to this, Ishallfocus on two of Hobbes'sworks:¹ the Elements of Law Natural and Politic,aphilosophicaltract writtenb efore the outbreak of the Civil War(1640) which represents asortof"trial run for Hobbes'ssystem" (Bobbio 1993, p. 26), and Leviathan,published in English in 1651,² whereheprovides awide-rangingtreatment of the theory of formation of civil society.AsIbelieve, these works provide not onlyc ompatible, but also reciprocallye nriching accounts of the ideal of respect.³ In the first section of this essayIgive ashort description of the main agential powers that guarantee human knowledge and agency,a nd show how these are at work in the state of nature.Inthe subsequent sections Iaddress the following forms of respect in the state of nature: 1) respect as esteem and reputation; 2) respect as honor; 3) well-grounded and ill-groundedrespect for oneself; 4) respect as reliance on oneself as an authoritative judge;5)two kinds of equal respect for persons: (5a) one grounded on recognition of the human power to hurt other individuals;( 5b) respect for one'sa gential powers (one prescribed by Hobbes's laws of nature).
 All the passagesfromHobbes'sworks quoted in this essayare taken from TheComplete Works of Thomas Hobbes,e dited by Sir William Molesworth (1839 -1845). As Bobbio (1993, p. 27)s uggests,the Latin edition of Leviathan was probablyw ritten in part beforet he English version, but published onlyi n1 670w ith minor corrections. The Elements,byv irtue of the systematicd escription of human powers provided by Hobbes, maycontributetoamoreaccurate understandingofissues related to the ideal of respect.Ifollow Carlo Galli'sview that Leviathan offers al ess rigid and rigorous account of human naturet han the Elements of Law and De Cive (Galli 2013,p .v).
2T he State of Nature: Its "Scientific" andA nthropologicalP remises Both in the "Prefacetothe reader" of De Cive (EW II, xvii) and in the first chapter of Leviathan (I, XIV;EW117), Hobbes notoriouslydeclares that the state of nature is acondition of war of all against all (bellum omnium contraomnes).His urge to make such af orceful, apodictic statement in the opening sections of his work supposedlys uggests that anya ttempt to understand the aims and strategies for the successful preservation of civilsociety must cope with the risk of returning to ap re-political state.On the one hand, as several scholars have pointed out,t he state of nature represents at heoretical device by which Hobbes,i n line with his methodofexploration and presentation of reality to his readers,attempts to analyze the conceptual premises for the legitimacy of sovereign power (Kavka 1986,p p. 83 -92).⁴On the other hand,t he state of naturec an alsob e viewed as one to which "politicized" human beingsrisk returningifthe civil society in which they live suffersfrom inner strife and lack of regulation.⁵As Helen Thornton for instance maintains (Thornton 2005,p.17),"the state of nature was also ac onstantlyt hreateningp ossibility − ac ondition into which aw eakened commonwealth had the potential to dissolve.I no ther words, it was ac ondition in which human beingsliving in civil society had the potential to fall, if they arrogated to themselvesthe judgment of good and evil, and in doing so disobeyed their rightful sovereign".⁶Whether conceivedasthe logical premise of the origins of society or as the nefarious outcome of civil disobedience, the state of nature represents ap rivileged space of observation from which Hobbes is able to draw consequences about human behavior (Thornton 2005,p .1 7)⁷ and, nonetheless, find reasons to justify the need for human beingstosubmit to the sovereign authority of civils ociety (Lloyd2 009,p .212).In order to understand how the state of nature generates (and is identified with) ac ondition of mutual conflict,i tm ustb ea cknowledgedt hat, in this  FormanyofHobbes'scontemporaries,however,the stateofnaturerepresented adescription of the pre-historic origin of society.F or this interpretation see Ewin 1991,p .94a nd 96.  See for instanceBobbio 1993, pp. 41-42,who claims that Hobbes,rather than consideringthe stateo fn atureapre-political condition, characterizes it as an anti-political situation, such as civil war in existings tates. Thornton follows Sheldon Wolin (1960,p.2 64) in regarding Hobbes' stateo fn aturea sapolitical version of the Biblical story of the Fall. On Hobbes'sdescription of the stateofnature as atheory of human behavior see Kavka1986, p. 19;c f. Boonin-Vail pp. 21-50.state, people appear to commit to the pursuit of what they believemakes up their personal good and the avoidance of whatever obstructst hat pursuit.H obbes does not seem to come to this conclusion from sheer experience.⁸On the contrary,hesituates the human tendencytoseek one'sown good within the framework of natural necessity.⁹As he explains for instance in the Elements of Law,this necessity: [M]aketh men to will and desire bonum sibi,that which is good for themselves, and to avoid that which is hurtful; but most of all, the terrible enemyo fn ature, death, from whomw e expect both the loss of all power,and also the greatest of bodilypains in the losing.(EL XIV, 6; EW IV,8 3) Here, the word "power" seems to evoke the generic idea of am an's "present means; to obtain some future apparent good",a sH obbes explains in Leviathan X, 41.1 (EW III, 74).In that chapter,H obbes divides human powers into two classes: natural powers,which he describes as "eminence[s] of the faculties of bodyorm ind: as extraordinary strength,form, prudence, arts, eloquence, liberality,n obility" and instrumental powers,that is, "means and instrumentst oa cquire more [power]: as riches, reputation, friends" (EW III, 74).¹⁰It should be noted, however,that in TheElements of Law Hobbes introduces amore "basic" sense of power,one on which the possibility of both natural and instrumental powers seems to rest.H erei st he notion of "power" Hobbes employs while offering ad efinitiono f" human nature": [M]an's nature is the sum of his natural faculties and powers,a st he faculties of nutrition, motion, generation, sense, reason, etc.These powers we do unanimouslyc all natural,a nd arec ontained in the definitiono fm an, under these words, animal and rational.(EL I, 4; EW IV,2 ) Unlike "eminent" or "instrumental" powers,the powers aboveare possessed by each and every human being,and so is the natural tendencytouse them bothin  It is worth noting, however,that several scholars have stressed the relevanceofempirical observation (and even of "self-inspection" in Hobbes' method of knowledge.S ee for instance Strauss 1936,p .2 9;Oakeshott 1975,i xa nd Skinner 2002,p .6 5;Kavka 1986,p .7 . Hobbes'si nsistence on the "causal" natureo fs cientific knowledge coexists with the belief that science in general (and, mores pecifically, the science of nature) is knowledge of mechanical causes (see Jesseph 1996,p.86).In Hobbes'sview,the notion of "motion" can be adopted as the unifyingcriterion for different brancheso ft heoretical science, such as optics,physics, and geometry. Ad efinition of "instrumentalp owers" is also giveni nE LVIII, 4; EW IV,3 7 -38.
cognitive and in practical endeavors with aview to the achievement of one'sown good.In this light,p eople can not onlyr ecognize each othera se qual, but also claim equal treatment by virtue of the act of recognition.
In the attempt to identify the sources of human interaction and its manifold expressions (conflictual or respectful), Hobbes sets aside the powers of the body and narrows the focus on the powers of the mind.As show in this essay, the various typeso fr espect that human beingsc an displayi nt he state of nature( as well as in the civil state) can be viewed as specific forms of rational recognition of these powers accompanied by the relevant passions (passion itself being a power that represents the outcomeo fr ecognition).Notably,H obbes identifies two kinds of natural power of the mind: cognitive and motive (L I, VII; EW IV,2).By putting his account of the connections between the human mind and external reality into as trictlyd eterministic framework, he maintains thatb oth are to be understood as matter in motion.¹¹Cognitive capacities as sense-perception, imagination, memorya nd rational understanding set off desires and processes like deliberation and choice.One cognitive power in particular,i magination,¹² is able to determine various kinds of "interior beginningsofvoluntary motions": the so-called "endeavours" (L I, 6; EW III, 39).These are the motions thatc onstitute the inherent mechanics of passions.¹³Hobbes employs the notion of "endeavour" to define two basict endencies entrenched in each and every human being:appetiteand aversion.Appetite is treated as interchangeable" with the notions of "desire",and "love" (L I, 6; EW III 39;cf.EL VII, 2; EW IV,31-32),¹⁴ and is defined as an endeavor towards omething that delights (EL VII, 2; EW IV,3 1).An expression of appetitei spleasure (or contentment or delight),¹⁵ which in The Elements is described as ap rinciple that helps the vital motion (EL VII, 1; EW IV,3).By contrast,when the endeavor is fromward something,itisgenerally  In this respect,H obbes' view of the human mind is as tark departure from Descartes, who considers the mind incorporeal.Forthe Hobbesian view of the mind as amode of organization of matter see Pettit 208, p. 12.S ee also Boonin-Vail 1994,p p. 34-38, whoa rgues that both the minds and its inner workings can be viewed as natural bodies themselves. As Boonin-Vail (1994,p .39) claims,t he salient differenceb etween vital and voluntarym otion is that voluntarym otions arec aused by the imagination. From am echanistic perspective,p assionsa ppear to derive from the action of external objects on the brain, goingo nt ot he heart (EL X, 1; EW IV,5 4).They arise fromt hat motion and agitation of the brain which Hobbes calls "conception" (EL VIII, 1; EW IV,3 5). In LI ,6(EW III, 40), however,H obbes points out that by "desire" we always mean the absenceo ft he desired object, whereas by "love" we most commonlys ignify the presenceo ft he object. See LI,6;EWIII, 42: "But the appearence, or sense of that motion [i.e. the motion in which appetitec onsists is that we either call delight or trouble of mind".called aversion or hate.This tendencyisaccompanied by pain, i.eaprinciple that hinders and weakens the vital motion (EL VII, 1; EW IV,3 ).
From the notions of "desire", "pleasure", "aversion"?and "pain" Hobbes deriveshis conception of good and evil in the state of nature.As he believes, good and evil do not exist as concrete realities in nature (L I, 6;EW III, 41;cf. Thornton 2005,p .1 8).They are simplyn ames, which individuals applyt ot heir own and other people'sactionsonthe basisofwhat theylikeordislike(LI,XV;EWIII,146; cf.EL VII, 3; EW IV,3 2; DC I, 2; EW II, 5).If considered in conjunction with the idea thatevery mandiffers from others in constitution and experiences, this implies the lack of an objective,a bsolutea nd unanimouslya ccepted view of good and evil in the state of nature.Although Hobbes views appetites and aversions as the subjective measure of good and evil, that does not meant hat he endorses ar elativistic theory of morality (Kavka 1986,pp. 349 -357;Boonin-Vail 1994,pp.58 -123¹⁶).On the contrary, there is some evidence that he held morality to be conventional (Gauthier 1979, p. 547¹⁷).In LI ,13( EW III, 115), for instance, he claims that [T]o this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; that nothingcan be unjust.T he notions of right and wrong,j ustice and injustice have theren op lace.Where therei sn oc ommon power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice.¹⁸As Icomment in the last section, thereisanobjective standard of conductinthe principles Hobbes calls "laws of nature",i.e., the laws awell-governed commonwealth ought to adopt.¹⁹It is primarilyi nt he light of this moral standard that  Foradifferent view see Tuck (1989,p .6 4), whoc laims that Hobbes'se thical vision is the "grimmest version of sceptical relativism".S ee also Reik (1977,p .90), whoc laims that there areb yn om eans objective,a bsolute ethical norms in Hobbes' system. Gauthier maintainst hat Hobbes establishes "ap lacef or morality as ac onventional constraint on our natural behavior". Cf.LI ,6 ,( EW III,41), where Hobbes says that in the civil state therea re commonr ules of good and evil as established by the person whor epresents it,o rb ya na rbitrator (or judge) whom men agree to set up.  See for instanceL, II,26 (EW III,253), where Hobbes claims that civil and natural law "contain each other".human beingsmay respect each other as equals.However,Hobbes also provides evidence that certain forms of respect for oneself and for persons (equal respect included) are at work even in ac ondition of war of all against all, wheref ellow humans refuse to abide by shared rationalp rescriptions.Iwill explore this by showing that some of the conceptual models of respect for oneself and for persons discussed by Hobbes (such as esteem, honor,g lory and even embryonic forms of equal respect) not onlyp refigure practicable possibilitieso fh uman agency in the state of war,b ut also help Hobbes to conceptualize this state and to identify its causes.
3F romP otentialt oA ctualC onflict.Formso f Respect forO neself and Respect forO thers in the Stateo fN ature Before identifying the kinds of respect that applyi nt he state of nature, it is interesting to note that Hobbes does not describet his state as ap urelyp otential state of war,thatis, characterized by the disposition to fight unless there are assurances to the contrary (Kavka 1986,p .90) to answer these questions by stating that,a sH obbes himself declaresi nLI, XIII (EW III, 112): … in the natureo fm an, we find three principal causes of quarrel.First,c ompetition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.The first,maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety;a nd the third, for reputation.
Here, competition is mentioned as ar elational condition which Hobbes considers with reference to the human tendencyt op ursue gain.This tendency might be qualified as desire for either material goods, in which case Hobbes speakso f" covetousness",o ro ffice or precedence, which he calls "ambition" (L I, 6; EW III, 44).Both names are always used to indicate "blame";w hat is blameworthyi sn ot desire for certain goods in themselves, but the fact that the men contending for gain are displeased with one another.
In TheE lements of Law,ont he other hand, human beingsa re portrayedb y Hobbes as naturallyc ompetitive even with regard to the passion for glory.I n EL IX, 21 (EW IV,5 2-53), for instance, Hobbes compares human life to ar ace which has "no other goal,n or other garland,but being foremost",a nd one'si rreducible desire for superiority involves the search for glory,r eputation and honor (Zagorin 2009,p.32).These values, as we shall see, are viewed by Hobbes as goods thath elp people preservea nd enhance ap ositive view of themselves.Moreover,like richesinacondition of limited resources,these are "inflationary" goods, i. e., if one person has them, another person is deprivedofthem.Competition over glory,r eputation and honor can thereforeb ev iewed as a "zero-sum game",i nw hich one person'sg ain (or loss) of utilityi se xactlyb alanced by the losses (or gains) of the utility of others.²¹ForH obbes the nature of the characteristic conflict between human beings in the state of naturei sn ot determined by the lack of an absolute, objective good (a lack which, paradoxically, might compel people to look for different goods and therefore reduce competition), but by adesire to be and appear superior to others.This tendencyisplaced by Hobbes within the framework of amore basic inclination shared by human beings: the pursuit of one'so wn happiness, which he presents as "aperpetual and restless desire of power after power,that ceaseth onlyi nd eath" (L I, 11;E WI II, 85 -86).
Hobbes'si dea that each person always actst os atisfy her own desires has prompted scholars to arguet hath ee ndorses egoistic views of human nature.
 Awell-established trend in contemporary Hobbesian scholarship analyzes Hobbes'st heory of the stateofnatureinterms of "game-theory".For adiscussion of the most important views on the matter see for instanceE ggers 2011.
Understood in this light,h owever,e goism appears to be as heer truism (Kavka 1986,p.35),²²and it fails to account for the idea that people might have desires which, although aiming at their own happiness, go well with the pursuits and personal interest of others.²³Non-tautological versions of human egoism are needed to support Hobbes'sa rguments against conflict and anarchy ( Kavka 1986,p .6 4).In other words, to explain Hobbes'ss tateof naturea sacondition of conflict,s elf-interestedi ndividual motivesm ust be assumed to be "predominant" over other-regarding motives(seeKavka 1986,pp.64 -80,who speaks of a "predominant egoism").
Egoism can take the form not onlyo fg reediness for riches, knowledge and honors (that is, adesire to "have more"), but also of adesire to defend the powers and goods that are alreadypossessed, i. e. ad esire that can be fulfilled only by attemptingt oi ncrease one'so wn powers (in which case, achieving more would not be an aim in itself, but simplyameans to further ends) (cf.LI ,1 1; EW III, 86).In the following subsections Is how thatr espect for oneself and respect for others help Hobbes to characterize this sorto fe goism and,a ll the same, the conditions that prompt human conflict in the state of nature.

Reputation
In Hobbes' view,one'ss earch for reputation (as good reputation) is acharacteristic tendencyo fh uman beings, although he suggests that not every man is equallyd rawn to it.²⁴Hobbes places reputation in the category of instrumental goods (L I, X; EW III, 74).People look for reputation not as ag ood in itself, but by virtue of the use they can make of it.Agood reputation is achieved in relation to some kind of power and excellence, which consists in comparison and implies aform of superiority over others (cf.LI,VIII; EW III, 56).UnlikeAristotelianv irtues, whose outstanding nature is rooted in an intermediacyb etween excess and defect in passions and actions (seee speciallyBook II of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics), Hobbesian excellencesare "relational" goods.Given  See also Gert 1972, p. 7, whoh as defined this form of egoism "tautological egoism". See for instancet hose actions arisingo ut of other-regarding passionsl ike charity,b enevolencea nd good will.These passions ared efined by Hobbes as "desireo fg ood to another" (L I, 6; EW III, 43).In EL IX, 17 (EW IV,4 9-50) Hobbes explains that one'sd esiret oa ssist other men in accomplishing their desires can ultimatelyb et raced back to one'sd esire to advance one'so wn good and power. See for instanceLI, XI; EW III, 86,where Hobbes suggests that some desire fame fromnew conquest,o thers sensual pleasure, and others admiration for some excellence of their own.people with similar or an equal degree of excellence, the power of each would lose value and its distinctive excellent nature would dissipate.
In this respect "reputation of power,ispower" (L I, X; EW III, 74).Foragood reputation drawswith it the adherenceofthosethat need protection (Ibid.), and it is plausible to supposet hatt he forceo fp eople'sc onsent enables the person of high reputetoachieve(at least some of)his plans.Moreover,awell-respected person represents for those who respect her apoint of trust.This is for instance the case of people who excel in prudence: [R]eputation of prudenceinthe conduct of peaceorwar,ispower; because to prudent men, we commit the government of ourselves, morew illinglyt han to others (L I, X; EW III, 74).
To think highlyo fs omeone can be considered af orm of "evaluativer espect", and its basis mayb ea ny sort of identifiede xcellence (whethero ther-regarding or not).²⁵One'sstriving for good reputation is successful onlyifdesire is accompanied by as erious commitment to the achievement of natural powers includingforms of excellence.The pursuit of ag ood reputation might represent avaluable motivational source for actions productive of power,and asense of shame -apassion that Hobbes defines as the "apprehension of some thing dishonourable" (L I, 6; EW III, 47) -might be triggered by the prospect of failuret oa chieve the esteem of others.As he explains, in youngm en, [shame] is as igno ft he loveo fg ood reputation, and commendable: in old men it is as igno ft he same; but because it comest oo late, not commendable.(L I, 6; EW III, 47) By commendingshame in young people, Hobbes probablymeanstosay not only that the young are generallym ore inclined to act thant he elderly, duet ot heir energy and strength, but also that, by possiblyh aving al onger life ahead, they can achieveagreat deal through their individual powers.
Hence, being held in highesteem is not agood desirable in itself in Hobbes' view,but is instrumental in achieving one'saims.Agood reputation is astarting point for the pursuit of greater power,and this pursuit (as well as the search for limited goods, riches and social position) exacerbates human competition.As Hobbes claims in LX I, 85 (EW III, 86),  This version of "evaluative respect" was conceptualized by Hudson (1980,pp. 71-73).Adifferent version is provided by Stephen Darwall (1977,pp. 41-45), whose notion of "appraisal respect" applies not onlyt oc ases of respect for excellence of am oral nature,but also to respect for non-moral excellences employed in an other-regarding way.
The following lines go on to show how the tendency to competei nt he state of nature causes people to cultivatei ll-grounded views of their own powers and those of others.Aglaringe xample is the widespread inclination to show reverential respect for the ancients, rather than for one'sc ompetitors: [P]articularly, competition of praise, inclineth to areverenceofantiquity.F or men contend with the living, not with the dead; to these ascribingmorethan due, that they mayobscure the gloryo ft he other.(LX I, 85; EW III, 86) Areasonable implication is the idea that,when aperson'sview of herself (wellgrounded or not) does not match the opiniono fo thers, her expectations might be thwarted and her search for power be hindered by others.Mutual impediments, in their turn, generate conflict.

Honour
ForH obbes honour is ar elational concept.O ne might recognize one'so wn powers by certain signs,t hat is, by the actions thatp roceed from thosep owers (EL VIII, 5; EW IV,3 8); "honour",h owever,c omes into playo nlyw hen those signs are recognizedb yo thers.Honor is defined as "the acknowledgment of power" (or "opinion of power";LI, X; EW III, 80) and,m oret ot he point,o f one'ss uperiority regardingt hat power: to honour aman inwardly, is to conceive or acknowledge that man hath the odds or excess of that power abovehim withwhom he contendeth or compareth himself.(L I, X; EW III, 80) All the thingst hate xpress the power from which they proceed are honorable, such as all actionsa nd speeches that proceed or seem to proceed from experience, science, discretion or wit,b ecause the sources from which they proceed are powers (L I, X; EW III, 79 -80).By contrast,actions or speeches that proceed from error,i gnorance or follya re dishonourable.
Apower which, acknowledged, prompts aform of respect − honour − is not of absolute value; on the contrary, it is amenable to comparisons,asisthe worth of ap erson.²⁶As Hobbes pointso ut in Leviathan, the value,orw orth of am an, is as of all other things,h is price; that is to say, so much as would be givenfor the use of his power: and therefore is not absolute; but athingdependant on the need and judgment of another […]t ov alue am an at ah ighr ate, is to honour him; at alow rate,istodishonour him.But high, and low,inthis case, is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himself.(L I, X; EW III, 76) One'sc riteria of assessment of others, being based on the evaluation of one's own powers,a ppear unstable, especiallyi fw ec onsider that people tend to assess their own powers as superior to thosea ctually possessed.Onlyi nacommonwealth is value assigned accordingt op ublic, shared criteria.Respect as honour,i nt his case, is recognition of the public worth of am an, his dignity (L I, X; EW III, 76).Thiscan be expressed through the concession and establishment of professional and social positions, and is used by the sovereign to guarantee as table, well-ordered political community.
In the civil state, each person is responsible and accountable for the lack of recognition of the worth of other persons (and the role assigned to each in the political community).The conceptual model of honour at work in this case seems to match Darwall'sd escription of honour as a "second-personal" form of respect,o ne which, featuring as ubstantial asymmetry of power between those who respect and those who are respected, obliges the former to take the latter and to conduct themselvesa ccordingly ( Darwall 2008, pp. 5 -7).By contrast,inthe state of nature, the recognition of another'spower is not normatively binding,n or does it contributet op reventing open conflict.I ndeed, the addressees of honour in that state do not possess the authority to be treated with respect; hence the respectings ubjects are not accountable for failingt oh onour them.
That the idea of respect for persons taking shape against the backdrop of a condition of mutualstruggle and competition is all the more evident in Hobbes's definitiono f" reverence" in TheE lements of Law (EL VIII, 7; EW IV,40): Reverence is the conception we have concerning another,that he hath the power to do unto us both good and hurt,b ut not the will to do us hurt.
 In De Cive,h owever,H obbes addresses the issue of value fromaprescriptive point of view, suggesting that people should try to gaina" non-comparative" view of their own worth.In DC II, 2(EW II, 5) he says that "every man must account himself, such as he can make himself without the help of others".
In Hobbes'sa ccount,aperson is worthyo fr everencen ot onlyt hrough possession of agiven power,but also the capacity and attitude which causes thatp erson to refrain from using the power in ways thatm ight damageo thers (for instance, by jeopardizingt he pursuits undertaken by others).Ap ure conception, however,d oes not necessarilyi nvolve trust and confidence, and reverencef or aperson due to her attitude of restraint in specific situations does not dissipate distrust towards the person showingr estraint.

Well-Grounded and Ill-Grounded Self-Respect
In Hobbes' view,acquiringagood reputation certainlyhelps aperson to shape a positive view of herself and,asaconsequence, develop the self-confidenceneeded to embark on certain pursuits.In this respect,H obbes seems to foreshadow the idea of self-respectf ound in John Rawls's AT heoryo fJ ustice.Here, Rawls claims that [I]t is clearlyrational for men to securetheir self-respect.Asense of their own worth is necessary if they aretopursue their conception of the good with zest and to delight in its fulfillment.( Rawls1 971,p. 178) In par.67hetreatsself-respect as avalue endowed with two distinctive aspects: on the one hand, it includes ap erson'ss ense of his own value, his securec onviction that his conception of his good, his plan of life, is worth carryingo ut (Rawls1 971: p. 440); on the other, self-respect implies aconfidenceinone'sability,sofar as it is within one'spower, to fulfill one'si ntentions.When we feel that our plans areo fl ittle value, we cannot pursue them with pleasureo rt aked elight in their execution.(Rawls 1971:p .440)By endorsinga"proto-Rawlsian" view,Hobbes believes thatself-respectdoes not rise simply from the opinions of external observers.Life-plans cannot be cultivated without recognition of one'so wn powers,that is, withouta na ttempt to achieveawell-grounded self-knowledge.
As we have alreadyseen, in thestate of nature thereare no public andagreed criteria fort he assessment of one'sp owers.Nevertheless, Hobbes makesi tc lear that, even so,itispossibletodevelop awell-grounded opinionofoneself through experience of one'sown actions, andconsequentlyfeelpleasure in relation to that opinion.Theimplicitpremise of Hobbes' view is that theactionsthatenablesome goalst ob er eached arep roof of an authenticallyg oodp ower.I nE LI X, 20 (EWIV, 52), fori nstance, Hobbes definesthe virtue of "magnanimity" andclaims that As Hobbes explains in De Cive (II, 2; EW II, 5), glory is agood opinion of oneself, and all the pleasureso fthe mind are either glory or refer to glory in the end.In the same passage, he statest hat [A]ll society thereforeiseither for gain, or for glory;that is, not so much for loveofour fellows,a sf or the loveo fo urselves.
By "glory" Hobbes alsom eans an "internal gloriation or triumph of the mind", that is, the passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our own powerabove the powero fh im that contendeth with us.(EL IX, 1; EW IV,4 0; cf.LI ,6 ;E WI V,46) This concept retains an aristocratic flavour (Slomp 2000,p .48;cf. Pacchi 1987, p. 115), incorporating as ense of superiority over others; as proof of this, as alreadym entioned in LI ,X III (EW III, 112), Hobbes includes it among the causes of competition.On the other hand, he also seems to understand glory as self-respect,apassion that accompanies aspecific kind of rationalrecognition: the acknowledgment of one'so wn powers.
As Hobbes explains in TheElements,(EL IX, 1; EW IV,40-41), the acknowledgment of one'sw orth can be well-grounded: this passion, of them whom it displeaseth, is called pride; by them whomi tp leaseth, it is termed a just valuation of himself.This imagination of our power or worth, maybefroman assured ac ertain experience of our own actions;a nd then is that glory just,a nd well grounded, and begetteth an opinion of increasing the same by other actions to follows.
Ill-grounded self-respect, in contrast,i so ft wo possible kinds.Firstly, it mayb e false glory,apassion stemmingfrom an improper opinion of oneself, nourished by fame and the trust of others (EL IX, 1; EW IV,41).False gloryisdescribed as a passion promptingt hose who feel it to act on the basis of their conceptions of themselves, causing themt of all short of theira mbitions (Ibid.) The second kind of "fallacious" self-respecti sr epresented by the so-called "vain glory",apassion consistingi nt he mere presumption of power,w ithout action.T his passion consists "in the feigning or supposingo fa bilities in ourselves, which we know are not" (L I, VI; EW III, 45 -46).As Hobbes clarifies in LI ,X I( EW III, 88), [V]ain-glorious men, such as without beingconscious to themselvesofgreat sufficiency, delight in supposingt hemselvesgallantm en, arei nclined onlyt oo stentation; but not to attempt: because when dangero rd ifficulty appears,they look for nothingb ut to have their insufficiency discovered.
We might expect Hobbes to see false-glory as as ourceo fc onflict,g iven its capacity to produce real agency.Nevertheless,assome scholars have suggested, (Cooper 2010;Slomp 2000) Hobbes appears to present vain-glory (more than false-glory) as the primary cause of conflictual interactions.Whys hould vainglory,p erhaps more thanf alse-glory,e xacerbatec onflict?T he answer mayl ie in the idea that vainlyglorious men hope for precedencyand superiority abovetheir fellows,not onlywhen they aree qual in power,b ut also when they arei nferior (EL XIV,4 ;E WI V, 82).
The ill-grounded expectations cultivated by vainlyg lorious men, as Hobbes concludes in this passageo fTheE lements,p roduce an attempt to subdue even those who are equal or superior in power.A lthough vain-glory in relation to one'spowers does not lead to the realization of thosespecific powers,itisapassion that,inthe long run, can fuel anger,which, as Hobbes states in Leviathan,is an excess of pridep romptingt he overwhelmingd esire for revenge( LI ,V III; EW III, 62;D CI I, 4; EW II, 7).

4F romt he Right of Naturet ot he Law of Nature
In the Hobbesian state of nature, every man has ar ight to all things, that is to say, to do whatever he wishes and to possess and use whatever he wants (EL XIV,10; EW IV,8 4).Hobbes calls this (Jus) "right of nature",c haracterizing it as "blameless liberty of using our own naturalp ower and ability" (EL XIV,6 ; EW IV,8 3).The right of nature (which we could think of a "permission right"; cf.Kavka1 986,p .296) is not opposed to reason, givent hati ti sn atural and le-gitimate for everyone to preservetheir ownbodyand limbs from death and pain (EL XIV,6;E WI V, 83).On the other hand,the phrase "right of nature" does not indicate as eries of entitlementse nablingp eople to call for equalr espect (such as thosee nshrined for instance in liberally-oriented contemporary Charters of rights).In the state of nature, everyone is the judge of theirp ursuits, of the necessity of the means to their established goals, and also of the degree of the dangerinvolvedinpursuing them (EL XIV,8;EWIV,83).It could be said that we are ourselvest he yardsticks of our owna gency.Wem ight say, then, that one holds oneself as ayardstick for one'so wn agency; we are as ort of "epistemic authority" to be respected.²⁷Hobbes explains this concept by means of a reductio ad absurdum: [F]or if it be against reason, that Ib ej udgeo fm ine own dangerm yself, then it is reason, that another man be judge thereof.But the same reason that maketh another man judgeof those things that concern me, maketh me also judge of that that concerneth him.And there-foreIhave reason to judge of his sentence,whether it be for my benefit,ornot.(ELXIV,8; EW IV,8 3) As we have alreadys een, however,the lack of shared criteria for assessing pursuits and dangers generates ill-groundede xpectations,c laims and conflicts.I n the state of nature, the idea of respect for oneself as "judge" legitimatizes not onlyo ne'sr ight to action, but also to resist action, and this is what sparkso ff open conflict: [S]eeingthen to the offensiveness of man'snatureone to another,thereisadded aright of every man to every thing, whereby one man invadeth with right,a nd another man with right resisteth, and men live thereby in perpetual diffidence, and studyhow to preoccupate each other;t he estateo fm en in this natural liberty,i st he estateo fw ar.( EL XIV,1 1; EW IV,8 4) Having said this, the human capacity to actively experience (or simplym entally represent) ac ondition of conflict graduallyl eads to the universal acknowledgment that what seemed, in itself, to be rational, i. e., the arbitrary pursuit of the good, becomes incompatible with the actualization of peace.Thisi st he onlycondition underwhich life-plans can be pursued without the danger of mutual hindrance.Rationality,u ltimately, recommends cooperation rather than conflict (Hampton 1986,p .7 6).The need to achievep eace calls for an urgent re-definition of the standard criteria of rationalityi nt he state of nature, and  See Darwall 2008, pp. 8 -9, whooutlines the conceptualmodel of respect as "recognition of an epistemic authority".also, as Ia rgue in the lasts ection of this essay, of the criteria for the respect of persons.
The transitionf rom al ife ruled accordingt os ubjective criteria of agencyt o one requiringthe employment of ashared rationality (directed towards the promotion of as table condition of peace and respectful interaction) takes shape through the universal recognitiono ft he substantial equalityo fa ll human beings.What makesh uman beingse qual to one another,i nH obbes' view,i sn ot apresumed dignity possessed by all, but the equal power to hurt others.The capacity to inflict damageo no thers (includingt he strongera nd morev irtuous ones) neutralizes the undeniable differences between people in their natural and instrumental powers (i.e. differences which might cause superior people to demand higher amounts of goods than those they would be willing to assign to others).In TheE lements of Law,H obbes suggests that if we consider how little odds therei so fs trength or knowledge, between men of mature age, and with how great facility he that is the weakeri ns trength or in wit,o ri nb oth, mayutterlydestroy the powerofthe stronger; sincethere needeth but little force to the taking away of am an'sl ife, we mayc onclude,t hat men consideredi nm ere nature oughtt o admit amongst themselvese quality.(EL XIV,2 ;E WI V; 81-82) Im aintain thatt he need to imagine ourselvese qual to others can be understood as an embryonic form of equalr espect,b ased on recognition of the equal power of human beingstohurt one another.Thisform of respect combines ar ational aspect,t he acknowledgment of this power,a nd the passions of fear and distrust,a roused by imaginingt he effectso ft his power.Asimilar form of respect was conceptualizedb yH udson, who spoke of "respect as obstacle" with reference to objects worthyo fc onsideration by virtue of their power to block the plans of others (among whom the same person who respects) (Hudson 1980).
In my view,i na ddition to representing as ort of "prudential recognition" and caution,t his opens up the possibilityo fr espect for oneself and others as equallyd angerous subjects.O fc ourse, the concept of respect as an obstacle is far from expressingt he recognition of equal worth (or "dignity")o fh uman beings qua human.Nevertheless, this kind of equal respect might be the basis for the idea that each and every human being needstoberecognizedasasubject whose existences hould be taken seriously and perhaps even adopted as ac onstraint against the agencyofothers (see Darwall1977).Iwould also suggest that, by virtue of the recognition of the power of subjects to inflict damageonone another,rationality,initiallyemployed to promotestrategies implementing individual life plans, graduallyt ranscends the sphere of the right of nature and comes to be areflection on the most promisingstrategies for successful arbitration and the production of agreementb etween incompatible points of view.
Ar ationally-informed treatment of conflicts in the direction of peace does not represent away out of the state of nature.Indeed, as Hobbes claims, reason is no less "nature" than passion (EL XV,1 ;E WI V, 87), and even in the state of nature can be used for strategies of respectful interaction between people.In my view,i ti sp rimarily by means of the concept of the "lawo fn ature" that Hobbes establishes ab asis for equal respect as mutualr ecognition of an equal entitlement to survivala nd happiness.D eparting from at radition of thought that assimilates the lawa nd right of nature,²⁸ Hobbes drawsastarkd istinction between the two.More pointedly, the lawofnatureand its various expressions, if understood and accepted universallya salegitimate sourceo fh uman conduct, reducest he risk of conflict (the very conflict the right of nature itself, if freely pursued,e nds up producing).
The nature of the laws of nature has been the object of intense debate among scholars, especiallyw ith regardt oi ts supposedf oundations.Some hold that these laws ought to be primarilyu nderstood as theorems of reason (see for instance Gauthier2 001), whereas others regard them as prescriptions ultimately issued by divine command (seef or instance Martinich 1992).Adetailedt reatment of the laws of nature is beyond the scope of this paper.S uffice it to say that these are precepts or general rules found by rational argument (L I, XIV; EW III, 116 -117) of an ormative nature.B ya bstracting from subjective plans, opinion and sensitivities, they provide the seeds for well-regulated human coexistence.The prescriptions do not oblige in foro externo,b ut only in foro interno, i. e. in one'sconscience(LI,XV; EW III, 145), implying that the failuretocomply with the laws of nature would not be punishable underthe laws established by a certain commonwealth.
The laws of nature can be thoughto fa s" hypothetical imperatives" (Pacchi 1965, p. 118, note 1), rules that ought to be observed as an indispensable step towards the achievement of acondition of peace.From the founding lawofnature, which prescribes that human beingsact to preservepeace (L I, XIV;EWIII, 117-118), Hobbes derivesasecond law, accordingt ow hich every man who desires peace and the defenseo fh imself thinks that it is necessary  Foradetailed discussion of this issue, see Zagorin 2009,pp. 20 -29.Zagorin mentions in particular Suárez(16 th century), whopoints out that the word lex can be used interchangeably with ius (p.2 4).

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ElenaI rrera Unauthenticated Download Date | 6/14/17 11:07 AM to layd own this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.(L I, XIV;E WI II, 117-118;c f.DC II, 3; EW II, 17;E LX V, 2; EW IV,8 7) The readiness to relinquisht he right can be seen as af orm of regard for other persons and their existence.This is all the more evident since depriving oneself of absolute liberty maybenot onlygeneral in nature, but atransferofrights.Unlike the act of renouncing,i nw hich it does not mattert ow hom the benefit adheres,t he act of transferring involves concern for the benefitt oc ertain persons (L I,XIV;EWIII,(118)(119).This idea emergesfor instance in EL XV,3(EW IV,88): [T]o transfer right to another,isbysufficient signs to declare to that other acceptingthereof, that it is his will not to resist,orhinder him, according to that right he had thereto beforehe transferred it.
In order to achieve peace, no one should do to others what they would not want done to themselves(Cf.LI,XIV;EWIII, 118), anotion,asHobbes states,that can be found in Gospels: whatsoever yourequire that others should do to you, that do ye to them.And that lawofall men, quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.(L I, XIV;E WI II,118) Respectingp ersons, in this sense,w ould amount to calibrating one'se xpectations to fit in with the equale xpectations that other subjects, in their turn, ought to hold in order to attain peace.The idea of equal respect suggested here appears to be premised on af orm of reciprocity which is not simply built against the backdrop of mutual fear,b ut on the capacity to open oneself up to the needs and expectations of others (Lloyd2009).It is ar eciprocity of respectful attitudes making of respect ag enuinely "moral" value in Hobbes'st heory.This emergesi np articular in the following excerpt from TheE lements of Law (XVII, 2; EW IV,104), whereH obbes states that … reason and the lawofn ature dictateth, Whatsoever right any man requireth to retain, he allow every other man to retain the same […]for there is no acknowledgment of worth, without attribution of the equality of benefit and respect.
Hobbes points out in the following lines that the lawo fn ature presupposes a principle of distributive justicew hich consists in allowing "proportionalia proportionalibus",aprinciple that,i nh is view,d emonstratest hate qual respect is an attribution of aequalia aequalibus (XVII, 2; EW IV,104).The distributive principle at stake is premised on ah uman inclination mentioned by Hobbes in

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M]agnanimity is no morethan glory […]but glorywellgrounded upon certain experienceof ap owers ufficient to attain his end in open manner.
Even one'sown view is open to changeovertime, depending on what one desires and praises or opposes and disparages (L I, XV; EW III, 146).Hobbes concludes, from whence[i.e. this fact]arisedisputes,controversies,and at lastwar.(LI,XV;EW III, 146) What assumptions, then,d oes Hobbes make to identify the state of naturea s as tate of open conflict?Also, how does the issue of respect help to clarify the transition from the idea of potential conflict to an actual war?W em ight begin . It is certainlyt rue that,unlike the state of nature in John Locke,²⁰ Hobbes does not necessarilye nvisagea ctive signs of hostility.I ndeed, for Hobbes,t he state of nature is primarilyo ne in which people experience mutual distrust and, most crucially, fear (a passion of aversion generated from fear of receiving hurt,i.e.prompted by an anticipated displeasure; EL VII, 2; EW IV,31-32; cf.LI,6;EWIII, 43).On the other hand, as in the Lockean state of war,H obbes describes as tate of paralysis hindering human cooperation based on common rules of conduct(Kavka 1986,p .91).As Hobbes declares in LI ,X III (EW III, 113):[I]n such condition, therei sn op lacef or industry;b ecause the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequentlyn oc ulture of the earth; no navigation […]n oa rts;n ol etters;n os ociety […]; and which is worst of all, continual fear,a nd dangero fv iolent death …  See the secondo fthe TwoTreatises ofGovernment (chap.3,sec.16,319),where the stateo f war is described as one "declar[ed] by Word or Action, not apassionateand hasty,but asedate settled Design, upon another Mans Life".