Bribe and Punishment: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Analysis of Bribery
Fig 4
Equilibrium population structure for the five-strategy model as a function of punishment p, and bribe amount b in ‘with refund’ (A, D) and ‘without-refund’ (B, E) asymmetric liability and symmetric liability scenario (C, F).
Shades of white and black colors denote the equilibrium abundance of O1 and O2 type of officers. Shade of green and blue and red colors denote the stationary frequencies of C1, C2 and C3 categories of citizens. The values of other parameters are: c = 1, v = 1, k = 0.4, t = 0.1. The initial condition corresponds to xC1 = 1/3, xC2 = 1/3, xC3 = 1/3, xO1 = 1/2, xO2 = 1/2.