A Common Mechanism Underlying Food Choice and Social Decisions
Fig 3
Choices and reaction times from Task 2 (Dictator game).
A) The probability of the dictator choosing the selfish option as a function of his own payoff gain from the selfish option, relative to the fairer option, and B) as a function of the receiver’s loss from the selfish option. C) The dictator’s RT as a function of his own payoff gain from the selfish option, and D) as a function of the receiver’s loss from the selfish option. Black circles indicate the aggregate subject data with bars representing s.e.m. Red dashed lines indicate the DDM predictions with 95% confidence intervals. The overlap of these confidence intervals with the data’s standard error bars indicates excellent model predictions. Blue dotted lines indicate the alternative DDM with θ = 0.15, which would be the prediction from the widely-used Fehr-Schmidt model of social preferences.