https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6748-8512
Figures
Abstract
Background
Identifying groups at increased risk for political violence can support prevention efforts. We determine whether “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) Republicans, as defined, are potentially such a group.
Methods
Nationwide survey conducted May 13-June 2, 2022 of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. MAGA Republicans are defined as Republicans who voted for Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential election and deny the results of that election. Principal outcomes are weighted proportions of respondents who endorse political violence, are willing to engage in it, and consider it likely to occur.
Findings
The analytic sample (n = 7,255) included 1,128 (15.0%) MAGA Republicans, 640 (8.3%) strong Republicans, 1,571 (21.3%) other Republicans, and 3,916 (55.3%) non-Republicans. MAGA Republicans were substantially more likely than others to agree strongly/very strongly that “in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States” (MAGA Republicans, 30.3%, 95% CI 27.2%, 33.4%; strong Republicans, 7.5%, 95% CI 5.1%, 9.9%; other Republicans, 10.8%, 95% CI 9.0%, 12.6%; non-Republicans, 11.2%, 95% CI 10.0%, 12.3%; p < 0.001) and to consider violence usually/always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives (MAGA Republicans, 58.2%, 95% CI 55.0%, 61.4%; strong Republicans, 38.3%, 95% CI 34.2%, 42.4%; other Republicans, 31.5%, 95% CI 28.9%, 34.0%; non-Republicans, 25.1%, 95% CI 23.6%, 26.7%; p < 0.001). They were not more willing to engage personally in political violence.
Citation: Wintemute GJ, Robinson SL, Tomsich EA, Tancredi DJ (2024) MAGA Republicans’ views of American democracy and society and support for political violence in the United States: Findings from a nationwide population-representative survey. PLoS ONE 19(1): e0295747. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0295747
Editor: Ali B. Mahmoud, St John’s University, UNITED STATES
Received: February 3, 2023; Accepted: November 27, 2023; Published: January 3, 2024
Copyright: © 2024 Wintemute et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Data Availability: Data used in this study have been provided as Supporting information files.
Funding: GW SG-22-45737 The Joyce Foundation GW 2019-1728 The Heising-Simons Foundation GW 20-25584 The California Wellness Foundation GW NA Violence Prevention Research Program GW NA California Firearm Violence Research Center The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
Introduction
A growing body of research [1–6], assessments by experts in domestic violent extremism [7], and events such as the insurrection of January 6, 2021 have raised concern about the prospect of widespread political violence in the United States (US). Political violence, like other forms of violence, kills and injures people; even the credible possibility of political violence has negative health and social consequences at the individual and population levels. Political violence should be studied and addressed as a public health problem.
In late spring 2022 we conducted the Life in America Survey to develop a better understanding of political violence based on data from a large nationally representative US sample. The survey’s first report found concerning levels of support for political violence—including personal willingness to engage in that violence [6]. Because understanding the distribution of risk for adverse health events is fundamental to the public health approach, additional reports have focused on variation in support for political violence associated with political party affiliation and political ideology [8] and with firearm ownership [9].
This report focuses on one specific group that may be at increased risk for political violence: so-called MAGA (Make America Great Again) Republicans. In speeches on August 25, 2022, in Bethesda and Rockville, Maryland [10, 11], and September 1, 2022, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania [12], US President Biden used that term in reference to Republicans who supported Donald Trump and denied the results of the 2020 election. He asserted that MAGA Republicans endorsed political violence, implying that they did so more than others or that others did not. He emphasized his belief that his characterization applied to only a minority of Republicans [13–16]. Critics nonetheless accused him of maligning half the country, apparently referring to persons who had voted for Donald Trump [13, 17–20]. These critics were asserting, in essence, that MAGA Republicans were indistinguishable from other Republicans.
These events generated the two research questions that we explore in this analysis. To begin, and in accordance with the history described above, we define MAGA Republicans as Republicans who voted for Donald Trump in 2020 and agreed strongly or very strongly with the statement that “the 2020 election was stolen from Donald Trump, and Joe Biden is an illegitimate president.” We establish three comparison groups: self-identified strong Republicans, other Republicans, and non-Republicans.
The first research question is, Are MAGA Republicans a distinct subset of Republican party affiliates, other than on the characteristics incorporated in their definition? We compare MAGA Republicans with the other groups on demographic characteristics and an array of beliefs about American democracy and society. The second question is the primary focus of this analysis: Are MAGA Republicans more likely than others to see political violence as justified and to be willing to engage personally in political violence? We compare them with others on the beliefs that political violence is justified generally and to advance 17 specific political objectives. We also assess their relative willingness to engage in political violence at varying levels of lethality and against nine specific classes of people, defined by occupational or social characteristics. Finally, we compare MAGA Republicans with others on their willingness to possess and use firearms in situations where they consider political violence to be justified.
Methods
The 2022 Life in America Survey was designed by the authors and administered online in English and Spanish from May 13 to June 2, 2022, by the survey research firm Ipsos [21]. The survey’s methods have been described in detail elsewhere [6, 8] and are summarized here. The study is reported following American Association for Public Opinion Research guidelines [22].
Ethics statement
This study protocol was reviewed by the University of California Davis Institutional Review Board (UC Davis IRB ID 187125–1) and determined to be exempt (category 2: survey research) from full committee review. The University of California, Davis, in accordance with its Federalwide Assurance (FWA) for the Protection of Human Subjects agreement with the Department of Health & Human Services (FWA 00004557), adheres to all federal and state regulations related to the protection of human research subjects, including 45 CFR 46 (“The Common Rule”), 21 CFR 50 and 21 CFR 56 for FDA regulated products, and the principles of The Belmont Report and Institutional policies and procedures. In addition, the International Conference on Harmonization, Good Clinical Practice (ICH GCP) principles are adhered to insofar as they parallel the previously mentioned regulations and policies.
Consent to participate
The UC Davis IRB waived a requirement for written or verbal consent. Instead, introductory text to the questionnaire as seen by participants included this statement:
As with all KnowledgePanel surveys, your participation is entirely voluntary, and your responses will be kept confidential and anonymous. You will not be individually identified, and your de-identified responses will only be used for qualified research purposes. You may skip any question at any time.
If you have any questions about this survey, you may contact the research team by calling (916) 734–3539. This study has been approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of California, Davis. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact the University of California, Davis, Institutional Review Board at (916) 703–9151. If you have questions about your rights as a research subject or are dissatisfied at any time with any aspect of the survey, you may also contact KnowledgePanel panel member support at (800) 782–6899.
By continuing, you are agreeing to participate in this study.
Participants
Respondents were drawn from the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, an online research panel that has been widely used in population-based research, including studies of violence and firearm ownership [23–25].
To establish a nationally representative panel, members are recruited on an ongoing basis through address-based probability sampling using data from the US Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File, a method that facilitates adequate representation from hard-to-reach populations [26, 27]. Recruitment into KnowledgePanel involves repeated contact attempts, if necessary, by mail and telephone. Recruited adults in households without internet access are provided a web-enabled device and free internet service, and a modest, primarily points-based incentive program seeks to encourage participation and promote participants’ retention in KnowledgePanel over time.
A probability-proportional-to-size procedure was used to select a study-specific representative sample of KnowledgePanel members. All panel members who were aged 18 years and older were eligible for selection. Invitations were sent by e-mail; automatic reminders were delivered to non-respondents by e-mail and telephone beginning 3 days later.
A final survey weight variable provided by Ipsos adjusted for the initial probability of selection into KnowledgePanel and for survey-specific nonresponse and over- or under-coverage using design weights with post-stratification raking ratio adjustments. With weighting, the sample is designed to be statistically representative of the noninstitutionalized adult population of the US as reflected in the 2021 March supplement of the Current Population Survey [26, 27].
Measures
Sociodemographic data, political party affiliation, and voting behavior were collected by Ipsos from profiles created and maintained by KnowledgePanel members. Party affiliation is derived following a procedure used since the 1950s by the American National Election Studies (ANES) [28]. As described in the report of a previous KnowledgePanel survey on another topic,
Respondents were first asked, “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as” (response choices: “Republican,” “Democrat,” “Independent,” “Another party,” “No preference”). Republicans/Democrats were then asked, “Would you call yourself a” (response choices: “Strong Republican/Democrat,” “Not very strong Republican/Democrat”). All others were asked the follow-up question: “Do you think of yourself as closer to the” (response choices: “Republican Party,” “Democratic Party”)
[29].
Respondents who answered this last question were coded by Ipsos as “Leans Republican” or “Leans Democrat.” Respondents who refused to answer (n = 165, 2.7% of the sample) were coded as “Undecided/Independent/Other.” The Democrat, Leans Democrat, and Undecided/Independent/Other groups were combined for analysis as non-Republicans.
Survey questions that supplied data for this analysis covered three broad domains: beliefs regarding democracy and the potential for violence in the US; beliefs regarding American society and institutions; and support for and personal willingness to engage in violence, including political violence. Prior surveys on these topics were reviewed, and selected questions were included or adapted in this questionnaire to track trends in opinion and provide context for responses to questions that had not been asked previously.
Support for the QAnon delusion complex was determined through respondents’ agreement with statements of core elements of that complex: that US institutions “are controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles who run a global child sex trafficking operation” and that “a storm coming soon” will “sweep away the elites in power and restore the rightful leaders.” Support for great replacement thinking was determined through respondents’ agreement with the statement that “in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants.”
Our primary outcome measures concerned political and non-political violence. Violence was represented by the phrase “force or violence,” defined as “physical force strong enough that it could cause pain or injury to a person.” “Force or violence to advance an important political objective that you support” was used in questions about respondents’ support for and willingness to engage in political violence.
Respondents were asked about the extent to which they considered political violence to be justified “in general” and then about justification for its use to advance specified political objectives, such as “to return Donald Trump to the presidency this year,” “to preserve an American way of life based on Western European traditions,” and “to stop police violence.” There were 17 specified objectives. Nine were presented to all respondents, and 8 were paired, with each respondent seeing only 1 item from each pair; each respondent was presented with 13 of 17 objectives.
Respondents who considered political violence to be at least sometimes justified for at least 1 of these specified objectives were asked about their personal willingness to engage in political violence: by type of violence (to “damage property,” “threaten or intimidate a person,” “injure a person,” “kill a person”) and by target population (examples: “an elected federal or state government official,” “a police officer,” “a person who does not share your religion”).
All respondents were asked about the likelihood of their future use of firearms in a situation where they consider political violence to be justified (e.g., “I will be armed with a gun”; “I will shoot someone with a gun”).
The full text of all survey questions reported on here is in the Supplement.
Implementation
Forty KnowledgePanel members participated in a pretest of the English language version that was administered April 27 to May 2, 2022.
Respondents were randomized 1:1 to receive response options in order from negative to positive valence (e.g., from ‘do not agree’ to ‘strongly agree’) or the reverse throughout the questionnaire. Where a question presented multiple statements for respondents to consider, the order in which those statements were presented was randomized unless ordering was necessary. The questionnaire included several design elements intended to minimize inattentive responses and biased estimation of support for political violence [6].
We employed unipolar response arrays without a neutral midpoint (e.g., do not agree, somewhat agree, strongly agree, very strongly agree). The literature is not in agreement on whether such midpoints should be included [5, 30]. We were persuaded by the studies reviewed by Chyung et al. [30], which suggest that such midpoints facilitate selection of “a minimally acceptable response as soon as it is found,” known as satisficing. According to those authors, satisficing is particularly common when respondents are uncomfortable with the topics of the survey or under social desirability pressures, and both conditions apply here. In the analysis, we focus on responses above the “somewhat” or “sometimes” level to minimize the impact of potential satisficing on the results.
The questionnaire included a check for inattentiveness among respondents: two fictitious entries were included in lists of news and information outlets for which respondents provided information on their extent of use.
Statistical analysis
In forming the analytic sample for this study, we excluded the 1,365 of 8,620 respondents for whom party affiliation, 2020 voting behavior, or opinion on the legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election was not available. To generate prevalence estimates, we calculated weighted percentages and 95% confidence intervals (CI) using PROC SURVEYFREQ and weighted averages with standard errors in PROC SURVEYMEANS in SAS version 9.4 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC). Outcomes were defined dichotomously to produce prevalence differences. Unadjusted and adjusted prevalence differences and their 95% confidence intervals (CI) were determined by PROC SURVEYREG, with robust standard errors to correct for design effects and heteroskedasticity in binary outcomes. Two multivariable models were used to adjust for covariates: Model 1 included age, gender, and race and ethnicity; Model 2 retained those variables and added income, education, and census division. P-values were corrected for multiple comparisons by controlling the false discovery rate using the Benjamini-Hochberg method [31]. The article text presents the absolute percentages and design-adjusted F-test p-values from Model 2. Tables with prevalence differences for the unadjusted models, Model 1, and Model 2 are presented in the Supplement.
Estimated counts of adults in the US were generated by simple extrapolation, multiplying weighted percentages and their confidence intervals from our sample by the estimated adult population of the US as of July 1, 2021 (258.33 million persons) [32].
A sensitivity analysis excluded the 447 respondents who reported use of one or both fictitious news sources.
Results
Of 15,449 panel members invited to participate, 8,620 completed the survey, yielding a 55.8% completion rate. Information on the demographics of respondents and nonrespondents is provided elsewhere [6].
The 7,255 respondents who made up the analytic sample for this study comprised 1,128 MAGA Republicans (15.0%, 95% CI 14.1%, 15.9%), 640 strong Republicans (8.3%, 95% CI 7.6%, 9.0%), 1,571 other Republicans (21.3%, 95% CI 20.3%, 22.4%), and 3,916 non-Republicans (55.3%, 95% CI 54.1%, 56.6%). We estimate that MAGA Republicans, as defined, account for 33.6% (95% CI 31.9%, 35.4%) of all Republicans and15.0% (95% CI 14.1%, 15.9%) of the adult population of the US, or approximately 38.8 million (95% CI 36.5 million, 41.1 million) people.
Demographic characteristics
Among the three groups of Republicans, age and race and ethnicity distributions were similar; MAGA Republicans were more likely to be female (Table 1). MAGA Republicans were less likely than all other groups to have a bachelor’s or postgraduate degree or a household income of $150,000 or greater.
Democracy, the potential need for violence, and civil war
MAGA Republicans were more likely than others to think that “there is a serious threat to our democracy” (MAGA Republicans, 90.0%, 95% CI 87.9%, 92.0%; strong Republicans, 74.4%, 95% CI 70.6%, 78.1%; other Republicans, 61.7%, 95% CI 59.0%, 64.4%; non-Republicans, 70.1%, 95% CI 68.4%, 71.8%; p< 0.001) (Table 2, S1 Table in S1 File). They were more likely to agree strongly or very strongly that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy” (MAGA Republicans, 31.0%, 95% CI 28.0%, 34.1%; strong Republicans, 17.8%, 95% CI 14.5%, 21.2%; other Republicans, 17.0%, 95% CI 14.8%, 19.2%; non-Republicans, 15.2%, 95% CI 13.9%, 16.6%; p< 0.001) and that “armed citizens should patrol polling places at election time” (MAGA Republicans, 19.2%, 95% CI 16.6%, 21.9%; strong Republicans, 5.0%, 95% CI 2.8%, 7.1%; other Republicans, 4.1%, 95% CI 2.9%, 5.4%; non-Republicans, 3.6%, 95% CI 2.9%, 4.3%; p< 0.001).
By wide margins, MAGA Republicans were more likely than others to agree strongly or very strongly that force or violence might be justified under three sets of circumstances: 1) to “protect American democracy…if elected leaders will not,” 2) to save “our American way of life” that is “disappearing so fast,” and 3) to “save our country” because “things have gotten so far off track” (Table 3, S2 Table in S1 File; p < 0.001 for all three comparisons). Among MAGA Republicans, strong or very strong support for these positions ranged from 26.3% to 46.0%. They were also much more likely to agree strongly or very strongly that “in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States” (MAGA Republicans, 30.3%, 95% CI 27.2%, 33.4%; strong Republicans, 7.5%, 95% CI 5.1%, 9.9%; other Republicans, 10.8%, 95% CI 9.0%, 12.6%; non-Republicans, 11.2%, 95% CI 10.0%, 12.3%; p < 0.001) (Table 3, S2 Table in S1 File).
Race and ethnicity and American society
Five items explored beliefs on race and “great replacement” thinking (Table 4, S3 Table in S1 File). MAGA Republicans were less likely than other Republicans and non-Republicans (but not strong Republicans) to agree strongly or very strongly with the statements that “white people benefit from advantages in society that Black people do not have” (MAGA Republicans, 6.5%, 95% CI 4.7%, 8.2%; strong Republicans, 7.0%, 95% CI 4.6%, 9.4%; other Republicans, 18.2%, 95% CI 16.0%, 20.4%; non-Republicans, 62.6%, 95% CI 60.9%, 64.3%; p < 0.001) and that “having more Black Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans is good for the country” (MAGA Republicans, 20.1%, 95% CI 17.3%, 23.0%; strong Republicans, 21.6%, 95% CI 17.9%, 25.3%; other Republicans, 33.1%, 95% CI 30.4%, 35.7%; non-Republicans, 62.7%, 95% CI 61.0%, 64.4%; p < 0.001). They were far more likely than others to agree strongly or very strongly that “discrimination against whites is as big a problem as discrimination against Blacks and other minorities” (MAGA Republicans, 71.6%, 95% CI 68.7%, 74.5%; strong Republicans, 44.1%, 95% CI 39.9%, 48.3%; other Republicans, 33.3%, 95% CI 30.7%, 35.9%; non-Republicans, 10.6%, 95% CI 9.5%, 11.8%; p < 0.001) and that “in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants” (MAGA Republicans, 51.0%, 95% CI 47.8%, 54.3%; strong Republicans, 23.1%, 95% CI 19.6%, 26.7%; other Republicans, 14.4%, 95% CI 12.5%, 16.3%; non-Republicans, 7.0%, 95% CI 6.0%, 8.0%; p < 0.001).
Three items addressed the central elements of the QAnon mythology and a separate religious belief (Table 5, S4 Table in S1 File). MAGA Republicans were much more likely than others to agree strongly or very strongly that US institutions “are controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles who run a global child sex trafficking operation” (MAGA Republicans, 26.7%, 95% CI 23.7%, 29.7%; strong Republicans, 5.4%, 95% CI 3.3%, 7.5%; other Republicans, 6.5%, 95% CI 4.9%, 8.0%; non-Republicans, 5.6%, 95% CI 4.6%, 6.6%; p < 0.001) and that “a storm coming soon” will “sweep away the elites in power and restore the rightful leaders” (MAGA Republicans, 29.6%, 95% CI 26.5%, 32.6%; strong Republicans, 7.0%, 95% CI 4.6%, 9.4%; other Republicans, 5.7%, 95% CI 4.3%, 5.1%; non-Republicans, 6.3%, 95% CI 5.4%, 7.3%; p < 0.001). They were also more likely than others to agree strongly or very strongly that “the chaos in America today is evidence that we are living in what the Bible calls ‘the end times’” (MAGA Republicans, 37.8%, 95% CI 34.6%, 41.0%; strong Republicans, 21.0%, 95% CI 17.4%, 24.6%; other Republicans, 15.1%, 95% CI 13.0%, 17.2%; non-Republicans, 13.9%, 95% CI 12.6%, 15.2%; p < 0.001).
Non-political violence
More than 90% of respondents in all groups saw violence as at least sometimes justified in self-defense or to prevent assaultive or self-inflicted injury to others. In adjusted models, MAGA Republicans were more likely than other Republicans and non-Republicans (but not strong Republicans) to view violence under those circumstances as usually or always justified (Table 6, S5 Table in S1 File; p < 0.001). They were more likely than all other groups to consider violence to prevent harm or damage to property as usually or always justified (MAGA Republicans, 54.5%, 95% CI 51.3%, 57.7%; strong Republicans, 43.6%, 95% CI 39.5%, 47.8%; other Republicans, 37.4%, 95% CI 34.7%, 40.1%; non-Republicans, 25.7%, 95% CI 24.2%, 27.3%; p < 0.001).
Conversely, more than 80% of respondents across all groups reported that violence to win an argument, respond to an insult, or get respect was never justified, and fewer than 5% of respondents in any group saw viewed such violence as usually or always justified. In fully adjusted models, there were no significant differences between groups (Table 6, S5 Table in S1 File).
Political violence
In general and to advance specific objectives.
Support for political violence as usually or always justified “in general” was uncommon in all groups, but slightly less uncommon among MAGA Republicans than among other Republicans and non-Republicans (MAGA Republicans, 3.3%, 95% CI 2.0%, 4.6%; strong Republicans, 2.5%, 95% CI 0.6%, 4.3%; other Republicans, 1.1%, 95% CI 0.5%, 1.8%; non-Republicans, 2.5%, 95% CI 1.9%, 3.2%) (Table 7, S6 Table in S1 File; p = 0.006).
Regardless of their response on the justification for political violence in general, respondents were asked about the justification for political violence to advance specific political objectives (Tables 7 and 8, S6 and S7 Tables in S1 File). Nearly a third of respondents (32.6%, 95% CI 31.3%, 33.8%) considered violence to be usually or always justified for at least one of these 17 specific political objectives, and MAGA Republicans were more likely than others to do so (MAGA Republicans, 58.2%, 95% CI 55.0%, 61.4%; strong Republicans, 38.3%, 95% CI 34.2%, 42.4%; other Republicans, 31.5%, 95% CI 28.9%, 34.0%; non-Republicans, 25.1%, 95% CI 23.6%, 26.7%; p < 0.001).
For eight of these 17 political objectives considered individually, MAGA Republicans were more likely than each of the other groups to believe that violence was usually or always justified (Tables 7 and 8, S6 and S7 Tables in S1 File). The prevalence of usually/always justification among MAGA Republicans for these eight objectives ranged from 13.1% (95% CI 10.8%, 15.4%) for “to preserve an American way of life based on Western European traditions” to 43.5% (95% CI 38.9%, 48.2) for “to reinforce the police.”
MAGA Republicans also endorsed violence for a greater number of specific political objectives than others did. The mean number of objectives for which violence was seen as usually or always justified was 2.0 (95% CI 1.8, 2.1) for MAGA Republicans, 1.1 (95% CI 0.9, 1.3) for strong Republicans, 0.7 (95% CI 0.6, 0.8) for other Republicans, and 0.7 (95% CI 0.7, 0.8) for non-Republicans (p < 0.001).
Personal willingness to engage in political violence.
Among all respondents, only small proportions in each group (<4%) reported that they would be very or completely willing to damage property or threaten, injure, or kill a person, and MAGA Republicans were not more likely than others to report such willingness (Table 9, S8 Table in S1 File).
Table 10 and S9 Table in S1 File present findings for violence against others because of occupational or social characteristics. Among all respondents, no more than 3% in any group reported that they were very or completely willing to use force or violence against the specified groups, and MAGA Republicans were not more willing than others (Table 10, S9 Table in S1 File).
Possession and use of firearms.
Finally, all 7,255 respondents were asked, regardless of their position on political violence or firearm ownership status, to predict the likelihood of their future use of a firearm “in a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important political objective” (Table 11, S10 Table in S1 File). MAGA Republicans were more likely than others to report that it was very or extremely likely in such a situation that they would be “armed with a gun” (MAGA Republicans, 18.6%, 95% CI 15.9%, 21.2%; strong Republicans, 9.5%, 95% CI 6.6%, 12.4%; other Republicans, 8.1%, 95% CI 6.5%, 9.7%; non-Republicans, 4.7%, 95% CI 3.9%, 5.5%; p < 0.001) and would “carry a gun openly” (MAGA Republicans, 9.3%, 95% CI 7.1%, 11.5%; strong Republicans, 4.0%, 95% CI 2.1%, 5.9%; other Republicans, 3.2%, 95% CI 2.2%, 4.3%; non-Republicans, 2.6%, 95% CI 1.9%, 3.2%; p < 0.001). Few respondents thought it very or extremely likely that they would “threaten someone with a gun” or “shoot someone with a gun,” and there were no significant differences between groups.
Discussion
This study applies a public health approach to political violence. It uses standard methods to investigate variation in self-reported support for and willingness to engage in political violence, which are plausible proximate markers of risk for committing political violence [33]. It also assesses variation in prevalence of extreme beliefs—including the QAnon delusion and great replacement thinking, that have been linked to political violence in specific cases [34–36] and can be considered as potential indicators of risk for political violence.
MAGA Republicans, the group of primary interest, were defined here as self-identified Republicans who voted for Donald Trump in 2020 and strongly or very strongly denied the results of that election [10–12]. We estimate that, using this definition, MAGA Republicans account for approximately one-third (33.6%) of Republicans and 15.0% of the population. A different definition would produce a different estimate. For example, in a poll conducted in late November 2022 [37], 40% of Republicans answered yes to the question, “Do you identify as a MAGA Republican?”
This study first considered the question, Are MAGA Republicans a distinct subset of Republican party affiliates, other than on the characteristics incorporated in their definition? The question arose from critical reactions to the definition of MAGA Republican used by President Biden and adapted here; those reactions implied that, in essence, MAGA Republicans could not be distinguished from other Republicans [13, 17–20]. The study’s findings suggest that MAGA Republicans, as defined, are a distinct minority—more likely than other Republicans to endorse racist and delusional beliefs, sometimes by very wide margins.
The second question this study considered was, Are MAGA Republicans more likely than others to see political violence as justified and to be willing to engage personally in political violence? The analysis reveals that MAGA Republicans are substantially more likely than others to believe that general social and cultural conditions may create a need for violence and to expect civil war in the US in the next few years. They are more likely to consider violence as usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives and to endorse violence to advance 8 of those 17 objectives considered individually. They are not, however, more likely than members of other groups to report that they are very or completely willing to engage in political violence. And while MAGA Republicans are at least twice as likely as members of other groups to consider it very or extremely likely that they will be armed and carry firearms openly in a future setting in which they consider political violence to be justified, they are not more likely than others to predict that they will use a firearm to threaten or shoot someone in such a situation.
The findings of this analysis are consistent with those of prior academic studies, not focused on a specified political group, that have found associations between support for Donald Trump and racist beliefs [38, 39] and, in 1 instance [39], political violence.
Based on this study’s findings, assessments by law enforcement experts in violent domestic extremism [7, 33, 34], and prior research [1–5, 39], concern about the potential for political violence among MAGA Republicans, as defined here, appears to be justified. A poll conducted in early September 2022 indicates that other Republicans and the general public may share this concern [40]. According to media reports, 58% of respondents, and approximately 25% of Republicans, “said Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’ movement is threatening America’s democratic foundations.” Most Republicans (60%) did not think that “Trump’s MAGA movement represents the majority of the party.” Analyses of the 2022 US midterm elections suggest that these concerns among Republicans contributed to the defeat of candidates who had denied Trump’s loss in the 2020 presidential elections [41, 42].
Our findings provide grounds for guarded optimism and a specific point of focus for potential interventions to reduce the risk of violence. In this analysis, despite their increased endorsement of political violence, MAGA Republicans were not more willing than others to engage in violence themselves. This is concordant with findings in prior reports from our survey, in which the vast majority of those who saw political violence as usually or always justified were unwilling to participate in such violence [6, 8, 9]. Optimism here should be tempered by the knowledge that widespread support for political violence, even when most supporters are not personally willing to engage in violence, can still incite violence by those who are willing.
Fortunately, new research is identifying potentially efficacious interventions for adaptation to specific high-risk groups or implementation at the population level [1, 2, 43, 44]. Given our findings, intervention experts should consider how best to prevent a transition among MAGA Republicans from support for political violence to willingness to engage in it. More research is needed on the factors that lead to support for political violence; addressing those factors is a principal strategy for lessening such support in the future [1, 2].
Limitations
Several technical limitations exist and were reported previously [6, 8, 9]; they are restated here. The findings are cross-sectional and subject to sampling error and bias due to nonresponse and other factors. Crosstabulations frequently produce response counts <100, and weighted prevalences for some important outcomes are below 5%. The large study sample results in relatively narrow confidence intervals in these cases, and sensitivity analysis indicated results were robust to the exclusion of respondents who failed attentiveness checks. Widely publicized mass shootings occurred in Buffalo, NY and Uvalde, TX while the survey was in the field. The Buffalo shooting is understood to have been a race-related hate crime motivated by “great replacement” thinking and may have affected respondents’ views on race, violence, and that particular belief. Russia’s war against Ukraine may have influenced responses on violence and democracy.
Other limitations are specific to this analysis. Our violence outcomes are all markers for potential risk. Acts of political violence would be a stronger outcome measure, and data on acts of violence would also be necessary to validate the measures used here. Such data are not available. To the extent that respondents viewed personal willingness to engage in violence as stigmatized behavior, our results may reflect under-reporting. We note, however, that these questions were asked only of respondents who considered political violence to be justified.
Conclusion
Findings from this large, nationally representative survey demonstrate that, as defined, MAGA Republicans are more likely than others to endorse political violence and differ significantly from other Republicans on many measures. Concern about the potential for political violence among MAGA Republicans appears to be justified, but it is noteworthy that they were not more willing than others to engage in violence themselves. Further research on factors associated with willingness to commit political violence is urgently needed to support effective prevention measures.
Supporting information
S1 File. The supplement contains questions that supplied data for this analysis, references for those questions, and the following 10 supplementary tables.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0295747.s001
(DOCX)
S1 Data. Data zip files included tables S1-S11.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0295747.s002
(ZIP)
Acknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Amy Barnhorst, MD; Vicka Chaplin, MPH, MA, Andrew Crawford, PhD; Julia J. Lund, MPH; Rocco Pallin, MPH; and Veronica A. Pear, PhD, MPH, MA. All those named have provided written permission to be included.
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