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THE CATEGORY OF *HABITUS*:
ACCIDENTS, ARTIFACTS, AND HUMAN NATURE

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IN EXPLAINING Aristotle's division of being into ten categories or predicaments (*praedicamenta*), Thomas Aquinas presents some striking claims about the category *habitus*:¹

There is a special [predicament] in human beings. In other animals, nature sufficiently gave those things that pertain to the conservation of life, for example, horns for defense, a thick and hairy hide for covering, hooves and other things of that sort for walking without injury. And thus when such animals are called 'armed' or 'clothed' or 'shod', they are in a way not thus denominated from something extrinsic, but from some of their parts. Thus, these things are referred to the predicament of substance: as when one says that a human being is 'handed' or 'footed'. But things of this sort cannot be given to human beings by nature, in part because they do not fit with their subtle constitution, in part because of the multiform works that fit with human beings insofar as they have reason, for which determinate instruments could not be applied to them by nature: but in place of all of these there is in the human being reason, by which he prepares externals for himself in place of those things which are intrinsic to animals. Wherefore when a human being is called 'armed' or 'clothed' or 'shod', he is denominated from something extrinsic, which has the notion neither of cause nor of measure; wherefore, it is a special predicament, and is called '*habitus*'. But it should be considered that this predicament is attributed even to some animals, not according to their being considered in their nature, but according to their coming to human

¹ '*Habitus*' is sometimes translated as 'state', 'equipment', 'attire', or 'having'. So as not to favor one interpretation from the outset, I leave it untranslated here. '*Habitus*' is both the nominative singular and plural form of the noun.

use, as when we say that a horse is ‘ornamented with a phalerae’ or ‘saddled’ or ‘armed’.²

Aquinas holds that *habitus* belong primarily to humans, and to other beings only through human rational causal activity. But most Scholastic thinkers, including many Thomists, denied that *habitus* has a special connection to human persons. In this article, I inquire into why Aquinas held this thesis about *habitus*, and I defend the interpretation of John of St. Thomas and many Thomists after him as the view that best makes sense of this thesis in the context of all of Aquinas’s texts. This view, the *realist modal view*, holds that first, *habitus* are real modes and real beings, not mere predications, and second, *habitus* belong primarily to humans, through their application of artifacts to themselves such that their unlimited range of possible ways of rationally engaging with the world is actualized by the artifacts.³ The findings of this paper are important for understanding the Thomistic view of the human person.

The importance of *habitus* and of the realist modal view can only fully be understood in the context of an inquiry into the history of Scholastic views on *habitus*. This inquiry will reveal the complexity of Scholastic views on categories and accidents, not only on *habitus*, but on the members of the other “*sex principia*” (*actio, passio, ubi, quando, situs, and habitus*). The findings of this paper are important for understanding the categories and accidents in general. I first analyze the sources for Scholastic thinking on *habitus*. Second, I consider seven Scholastic theories of what *habitus* is and argue that they are all reducible either to the view that *habitus* are extrinsic denominations or to the realist modal view. Finally, I defend the latter view.

² III *Phys*, lect. 5, n. 15 (*Opera omnia*, [Rome: Leonine ed., 1884], 2:114-15). All translations in this article are mine. See Aristotle, *Categories* 4.2a3. All citations from Aristotle are from Jonathan Barnes, ed., *Complete Works of Aristotle*, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

³ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus philosophicus*, Logica, p. 2, q. 19, a. 1 ([Paris: Vives, 1883], 1:540-43); Logica, p. 2, q. 19, a. 4 (Vives ed., 1:554-55).

I. SOURCES FOR SCHOLASTIC THEORIES OF *HABITUS*

Scholastic theories of *habitus* are based on three passages from Aristotle's *Categories*, two from *Metaphysics*, and one from *Parts of Animals*. In this section, I analyze these texts and the early commentaries on them that influenced Scholastic thinkers.

In *Categories* 4.2a3, Aristotle mentions *habitus* (or *habere*; in Greek, *echein*) in his list of the categories, and gives "being shod" and "being armed" (*hupodedetai*, *hōplistai*) as examples.⁴ This text gave rise to Scholastic controversies over whether the categories are kinds of predicates, predications, real things, or predicates mirroring distinctions among real things. This controversy was transmitted to Scholastic thinkers through Boethius,⁵ who held that a *habitus* is not a being inhering in a subject, but a relative manner of having something extrinsic.⁶

In *Categories* 9.11b13, Aristotle lists six categories (*actio*, *passio*, *ubi*, *quando*, *situs*, *habitus*) that he does not discuss in detail. These *sex principia* were treated at length in the twelfth-century *Liber sex principii* (or *Liber sex principiorum*), which was subsequently included in editions of Aristotle's *Organon* and commented on in that context. The *Liber* holds that what is distinctive about the *sex principia* is that they are forms that

⁴ Sometimes this category is referred to by a noun, '*habitus*' or '*hexis*'; sometimes by an infinitive, '*habere*' or '*echein*'. I shall generally give only Latin, rather than Greek or Arabic, technical terms, since I am focusing on Scholastic theories.

⁵ Boethius, *In categorias Aristotelis commentaria*, s. 4 (*Patrologia Latina* [Paris, 1847], 64:180C). See also III *Phys*, lect. 5, n. 15 (Leonine ed., 2:114-15); V *Metaphys.*, lect. 9 n. 890 (*In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio* [Turin: Marietti, 1964], 238); Albert, *Liber de praedicamentis*, t. 1, c. 7 (*Opera omnia* [Paris: Vives, 1890], 1:164); Paul Symington, *On Determining What There Is* (Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2010), 18-22; William E. McMahon, "Albert the Great on the Semantics of the Categories of Substance, Quantity, and Quality," *Historiographia Linguistica* 7:1-2 (1980): 146; idem, "Reflections on Some 13th- and 14th-Century Views of the Categories," in Michael Gorman and Jonathan J. Sanford, eds., *Categories: Historical and Systematic Essays* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 45-46; Robert Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 221-24.

⁶ Boethius, *In Categ.*, s. 7 (Migne, ed., 64:217A, 219A-C, 221A-B); s. 9 (Migne, ed., 64:264A).

belong to a composite⁷ and are neither subsistent (as are substantial forms) nor intrinsic (as are qualitative and quantitative forms) but extrinsic, referring to something outside the subject.⁸ The *Liber* does not define what is meant by ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’, but Scholastic thinkers generally understood the distinction as follows. A form is intrinsic to a subject if and only if it immediately depends just on the subject; for example, having a certain mass is intrinsic since it depends just on the subject that has the mass. A form is extrinsic to a subject if and only if it immediately depends on both the subject and something other than the subject; for example, being punched is extrinsic, since it depends on the one who is punched and the one who punches. Scholastic thinkers debated whether extrinsic accidents are real forms or mere extrinsic denominations, and whether they involve any intrinsic change to the subject. According to the *Liber*, since *habitus* comes to be through a change in position of artifacts relative to the body of which it is predicated, it is extrinsic.⁹

According to the *Liber*, *habitus* is “of a body and of those things adjacent around a body” but is had by just part of the body, for example, as a shoe is had by the foot. What is proper (*proprium*) to *habitus* is that it exists in multiple subjects, the thing that has and the thing that is had, for example, in both a foot and a shoe. Some accidents in other categories are also dual-subject accidents, such as the relation of similarity, but it is distinctive of *habitus* that every member of the category is a dual-subject accident.¹⁰ While the definition of *habitus* from the *Liber* was adopted by all subsequent Scholastic thinkers, this dual-subject view was adopted only by Albert, but then not mentioned by later Scholastic thinkers, including Aquinas, all of

⁷ *Liber sex principiorum* 1.1, 1.7 (available at <http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/resources.html>). This text was sometimes erroneously attributed to Gilbert of Poitiers.

⁸ *Liber* 1.15.

⁹ *Liber* 7.69.

¹⁰ *Liber* 7.72.

whom rejected the possibility of dual-subject accidents.¹¹ I consider this dual-subject view below.

In *Categories* 15.15b21, Aristotle gives a list of eight ways in which the infinitive ‘to have’ (*habere, echein*) is said; this text raises the question of which kinds of having belong to the category *habitus*. ‘To have’ or ‘having’ is a “post-predicament,” like ‘motion’ and ‘prior and posterior’, that is, it is a predicate said with multiple senses, each of which fits into a different category. Aristotle does not explicitly match each mode of having to a particular category, so there was debate among Scholastic thinkers over which category fits with each mode of having. One can *have* a coat, in the sense of wearing it (Aristotle’s third mode of having); this ‘having’, along with the fourth mode (wearing items like rings that cover a small part of the body), fits into the category of *habitus*. One can also *have* a coat in the sense of owning it (the seventh mode of having), and this, on most Scholastic views, fits into the category of relation.¹² Scholastic thinkers debated whether the fifth mode, by which a substance has its parts, belongs to *habitus*, as Averroës, for example, held. Some also suggested that the seventh mode and eighth mode (by which spouses have each other) belong to *habitus*; they held that *habitus* is constituted whenever a person chooses to have or to use a thing extrinsic to him or herself.¹³

¹¹ Albert, *Liber de sex principiis* (hereafter *In Liber*), t. 7 c. 3 (*Opera omnia* [Aschendorff: Monasterii Westfalorum, 2006], 1.2:65b45-51). Jeffrey Brower, “Albert the Great on the Nature and Ontological Status of Relations,” *Archiv für Geschichte des Philosophie* 83 (2001): 247ff., has argued, without considering this passage, that Albert denies that there are dual-subject accidents.

¹² See, e.g., *STh* I-II, q. 49, a. 1 (*Opera omnia* [Rome: Leonine ed., 1891], 6:309-10).

¹³ J. Valbuena, “De significatione specialis praedicamenti ‘habitus’ apud philosophum et divinum Thomam,” *Angelicum* 22 (1945): 176-77; Joseph Owens, *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1985), 208. cf. John Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 220-21. Peter Abelard, *Die Glossen zu den Kategorien*, in *Die Logica ‘Ingredientibus’*, in Bernhard Geyer, ed., *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, b. 21, h. 2 (Münster: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1919), 259, held that the eighth mode belongs to *habitus*.

In *Metaphysics* 5.20.1022b3-10, Aristotle distinguishes three modes of *habitus*, which do not correspond to the modes of *habere* listed in the previous text. The first mode in this text is a sort of “activity” or “medium” had between one who wears clothes and the clothes; this was often taken by Scholastic thinkers to be a quasi-definition of *habitus*.¹⁴ Aristotle likens wearing clothes to making something: just as there is an activity of making between a maker and a made thing, so there is a medium of having between a wearer and his clothes. This having is not itself had by the subject, since then the having of the having would be had, leading to an infinite series of havings.

As a quasi-activity, that is, as something like an activity, *habitus* is similar to the members of the categories of *actio* and *passio*. *Actio* is the category of predicates that ascribe an act of efficient causality to a subject, and *passio* is the category of predicates that ascribe an instance of being affected by an efficient cause to a subject. But Simplicius of Cilicia argues that it does not follow that *habitus* is reducible to the category *actio*.¹⁵ *Habitus* is not a category just because of the action involved but also because of the way in which one body is accompanied or surrounded (*circumcingi, circumponuntur*) by another, whereby one being is ordered (*habitudine*) to another. Nor should there be a second category, *haberi*, opposed to *habere*, as *passio* is opposed to *actio*, since whenever a *habitus* predicate is used, both the “having” and the “being had” are cosignified.¹⁶ This anticipates the dual-subject view, in that Simplicius holds that *habitus* includes two converse orderings, apparently rooted in two subjects.

In *Metaphysics* 5.23.1023a7-23, Aristotle distinguishes four modes of ‘to have’ (*habere, echein*), which do not match the lists in the last two texts. The first mode is having a thing through a

¹⁴ Categories cannot have real definitions, because they are the most general genera and definitions are composed of a higher genus and a specific difference, but they can be precisely described or have “quasi-definitions.”

¹⁵ Simplicius calls *actio* ‘*facere*’ and *habitus* ‘*habere*’ in Moerbeke’s translation.

¹⁶ Simplicius, *Commentaire sur les Catégories d’Aristotle traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke*, ed. A. Pattin and W. Stuyven (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1971), 1:85, 91.

natural tendency or impulse, as a fever has a person, a tyrant has a city, and people have the clothes they are wearing.¹⁷ These examples suggest that this mode includes members of the category *habitus*, but perhaps also members of other categories. In this mode, the subject has something not just through spatial adjacency but also through a natural tendency to acquire this sort of extrinsic thing. The twentieth-century Thomist J. Valbuena takes this mode to constitute the category of *habitus* and so includes the first two examples in *habitus*.¹⁸

Aristotle's text on this mode of having seems to be a remote basis for Aquinas's thesis that *habitus* properly belong only to humans (no source for his thesis is in fact stated). The account of this mode of having is developed by Simplicius, following the Neo-Platonist Iamblichus, and by the Muslim philosopher Algazel, both of whom were known to Aquinas.¹⁹

Simplicius holds that *habitus* belongs only to living beings. The case of one body being surrounded by another, as when a statue is clothed, just involves an accident in the category of *passio*. But *habitus* is constituted by a living creature working to support (*insinuat tensionem*) a body that is adjacent to itself, that is not natural to it, and that it uses and acquires.²⁰ Though he does not fully explain why this constitutes a new category, it seems to be because the living creature and the accompanying body, in virtue of the former's use and support of the latter, are oriented toward a new purpose. This orientation is explained by a new kind of accident.

This view is developed by Albert, who holds that *habitus* fulfills a purpose, such as clothing for warmth, or weapons for attack or defense.²¹ While Albert, unlike Aquinas, does not

¹⁷ No Scholastic thinker held that the other modes listed in this text belong to *habitus*.

¹⁸ Valbuena, "De significatione," 177.

¹⁹ Jan Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 47; Michael Chase, "The Medieval Posterity of Simplicius' Commentary on the *Categories*: Thomas Aquinas and Al-Fārābī," in Lloyd Newton, ed., *Medieval Commentaries on Aristotle's Categories* (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 9-10.

²⁰ Simplicius, *In Categ.* (Pattin and Stuyven, eds., 2:502, 505-6).

²¹ Albert, *In Categ.*, t. 6, c. 2 (Vives ed., 1:272); *In Liber*, t. 7, c. 2, ad 1 (Aschendorff ed., 1.2:361).

explicitly restrict *habitus* to being the result of rational use, rather than of natural impulse, his examples tend in this direction. *Habitus* arises, in all his examples, when a person acquires an extrinsic thing that fulfills some need, and applies it to his body such that it conforms to the shape and position of the body.²² The acquired body, an artifact or a domesticated animal, is the material cause of *habitus*, and the human body is its final cause.²³ The form of *habitus* inheres in both, though it is said only of the subject that has the extrinsic thing. *Habitus* actualizes a potency in a subject, allowing a new action or making an action easier, such as fighting or ornamenting oneself,²⁴ though Albert, like Aquinas after him, does not explain how this comes about. *Habitus*, like the other *sex principia*, has a relation of surrounding or accompanying (*circumdationem*) as its foundation, that is, as a necessary condition to which it adds the differences mentioned here.²⁵ On this dual-subject view, what makes it true that “a man is clothed” is the man, the clothes, the relation of the clothes to the man, and a *habitus* inhering in both. On all the Scholastic views, the category *habitus* differs in some way from the category “relation” (or *ad aliquid*). As Albert puts it, with most Scholastic thinkers in agreement, relations are comparisons (*comparibilitas*) of the subject to some extrinsic thing in some respect.²⁶ *Habitus* (and the other *sex principia*) adds something, such as a causal connection, to this comparison.

This dual-subject view, however, is problematic. First, the causal structure of *habitus* on this view is confused. *Habitus* inheres in both subjects, but chiefly in the man, not the clothes, since it is said of and affects the man, not the clothes. Yet its

²² Albert, *In Categ.*, t. 1, c. 7 (Vives ed., 1:165); t. 6, c. 2 (Vives ed., 1:272); t. 7, c. 16 (Vives ed., 1:303); *In Liber*, t. 7, c. 1 (Aschendorff ed., 1.2:62); t. 7, c. 3 (Aschendorff ed., 1.2:66).

²³ Albert, *In Liber*, t. 7, c. 1 (Aschendorff ed., 1.2:62a10-15).

²⁴ Albert, *In Liber*, t. 7, c. 2 (Aschendorff ed., 1.2:65a20-b32).

²⁵ Albert, *In Categ.*, t. 6, c. 1 (Vives ed., 1:270); *In Liber*, t. 7, c. 1 (Aschendorff ed., 1.2:62a10-15).

²⁶ Albert, *In Categ.*, t. 4, c. 6 (Vives ed., 1:223). Cf. Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 47, s. 2, n. 10 (*Opera omnia* [Paris: Vives, 1861], 26:788).

material cause is said to be the clothes, not the potency it actualizes in the man. But the material cause of a being is its principle of potentiality, and so, on this account, it ought to actualize something in the clothes, not in the man, but this is not the case. Second, *habitus* cannot be individuated by its subject, as accidents are on some Scholastic views such as that of Aquinas,²⁷ so *habitus* is not clearly an individual form, at least from some Scholastic perspectives. Third, it is not clear how *habitus* has *per se* unity on this view, which every categorical being must have, since it is intrinsically dependent on multiple subjects. Fourth, it does not clearly match the structure of *habitus* predications, which ascribe a property just to the thing that has, not to the thing that is had; this will be concerning to those who hold that the correct ontology must match the structure of ordinary language. None of these concerns absolutely defeat this view, but they raise problems that other views overcome.

On the basis of some of Simplicius's and Albert's claims, Aquinas's restriction of *habitus* to humans makes sense, though Aquinas rejects the dual-subject view. The new kind of being of *habitus* arises, on Aquinas's view, not just through active using, which could be explained through actions and relations, but through the intentionality and purpose exerted in the using, by which the artifact actualizes one of the open-ended range of potentialities for engaging with the world engendered by human reason. This account is perhaps rooted, as the seventeenth-century Jesuit Antonio Rubio contends, in another text of Aristotle, *Parts of Animals* 4.10. This Aristotelian text explains how nonhuman animals have been given only one means of defense and covering each, but humans have intelligence, and organs adapted to intelligence such as hands, whereby we can invent any covering or instrument we like; thus, it is necessary that by nature we be naked and without tools, that we might be

²⁷ See, for example, *STh* III, q. 77, a. 2 (*Opera omnia* [Rome: Leonine ed., 1906], 12:196-97).

able to develop any sort of tool for our purposes.²⁸ This defense of the realist modal view will be expanded in the final section of the paper, but here we can see its roots in Aristotle's texts and the subsequent tradition.

Aristotle's first mode of having in this last text from the *Metaphysics* is also developed by Algazel. Algazel argues that in order to constitute a new category, *habitus* must not only involve one body being surrounded (*comprehendendi*) by or adjacent to another, but also the surrounding body must be moved with the motion of the surrounded body, as when the clothes one is wearing move along with one. If something that can constitute a member of the category of *habitus*, such as a tunic, is moving but not surrounding a body, as when one is putting the tunic on, then no *habitus* is constituted; if an artifact surrounds a body, but does not move with that body, as when a house surrounds a person, then no *habitus* is constituted.²⁹

To sum up, the Aristotelian texts transmitted to the Scholastic tradition the notion of a category that is typified by examples like wearing clothes and holding weapons but that could involve other sorts of havings. To be an accident in the category *habitus* is to be a medium between a subject that has and something that is had.

II. SCHOLASTIC THEORIES OF *HABITUS*

Among Scholastic thinkers after Aquinas, and on the basis of the earlier texts considered in the last section, there were at least six views on what a *habitus* is (and what either all the *sex principia* are, or what the members of the last four categories, *ubi*, *quando*, *situs*, *habitus*, are): the *intentional modal view*, the *extrinsic denomination view*, the *absolute entity with respectus view*, the *pure respectus view*, the *respectus extrinsecus*

²⁸ Antonio Rubio, *Logica mexicana*, c. 10, q. un. (Lyon: Ioannes Pillehotte, 1625), 449. This comparison between humans and other animals is perhaps rooted in the speech of Protagoras in Plato's *Protagoras* 320c-328d.

²⁹ Algazel, *Metaphysics* I.1.4 (J. T. Muckle, ed., *Algazel's Metaphysics: A Medieval Translation* [Toronto: St. Michael's, 1933], 19).

adveniens view, and the *realist modal view*.³⁰ Various Thomists held each of these views and ascribed each to Aquinas. I maintain that his view is best expressed by the realist modal view, which holds that *habitus* are real modes, that is, beings really distinct from their subjects that cannot exist apart from their subjects. Moreover, I maintain that each of these views reduces to being a form of either the extrinsic denomination view or the realist modal view. I present the views in the order that I do, because this order best shows the full historical context for the realist modal view and the history of Scholastic views not only on *habitus*, but also on the *sex principia* in general.

A) *The Intentional Modal View*

The thirteenth-century thinker Henry of Ghent held that *habitus* and the other *sex principia* are “modes” that do not exist in themselves, but are “intentionally” distinct from their subjects. This view has precedents in Boethius and Aristotle,³¹ especially in the first text cited from the *Metaphysics*, which held that *habitus* is a ‘medium’, a term often equated by Scholastic thinkers with the term ‘mode’. A version of this view was held by some in the twelfth century, including Gilbert of Poitiers.³² On this view, what makes it true that “a man is clothed” are the man, his clothes, and a mode of having whereby the man has his clothes, which is intentionally distinct

³⁰ For lists of views see: John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 19, a. 1 (Vives ed., 1:539-40); Bartholomaeus Mastrius and Bonaventura Belluto, *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, p. 2, t. 3, d. 8, q. 12, a. 1, n. 191 ([Venice: Pezzana, 1727], 271); Paul Soncinas, *Quaestiones metaphysicales actuissimae*, bk. V, q. 39 (Lyon: Apud Carolum Pesnot, 1579), 92.

³¹ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, q. 32, a. 5 (Raymond Macken, ed., [available at philosophy.unca.edu/henry-ghent-series], 86). See Mark Henninger, *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250-1325* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 50-51; McMahon, “Reflections,” 51.

³² Gilbert of Poitiers, *Commentarius in Boethii opuscula sacra*, ed. N. M. Häring, Studies and Texts 13 (Toronto, 1966); and idem, *Breves dies hominis*, fol. 54va, cited in Lauge Olaf Nielsen, *Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1982), 56-57, 83, 129, 137, 142, 294-95.

from, but really identical to, the man. This view posits “modes” that are neither really nor rationally distinct from their subjects but are only intentionally distinct—that is, distinct ways in which a thing can be conceptualized, founded in the way reality actually is, without involving a real distinction of beings or things. The distinction between a subject and its mode is not a distinction of reason but an intentional distinction founded in reality, midway between a real and a rational distinction. Claims regarding this sort of distinction tell us something about the way reality actually is, not just about how it appears to us, but in making such claims we do not posit a separate entity to account for those features of reality. The mode of *habitus* is really identical to, but intentionally distinct from, its foundation in the man.

Henry argues that the ten categories are ten *rationes, modi essendi*, or ways of thinking about a being. They do not all correspond to really distinct kinds of beings; not every categorical mode or *ratio* corresponds to a separate *res* or real thing. (This is unlike the realist modal view, as we shall see.) The *sex principia* reduce in reality to relations, and relations to their foundations in the three categories whose members are *res*: substance, quality, and quantity.³³ But all of the categories are intentionally distinct. Whereas relations are directly founded on substance, quality, or quantity, the *sex principia* are also founded on motion or dispositions to motion, since motions bring two things together, such as a thing and a place.³⁴ Relation and the *sex principia* are ways in which a *res* is with respect to another, or ways that refer their subject to another.³⁵

³³ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VII, q. 1/2 (Gordon Wilson, ed., [available at philosophy.unca.edu/henry-ghent-series], 29-32). See Giorgio Pini, “Scotus’ Realist Conception of the Categories,” *Vivarium* 43 (2005): 73-75 on how Simon of Faversham and Peter John Olivi held Henry’s view; and Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 245 on how Nicolas of Strasbourg, Alexander of Alexandria, James of Viterbo, Dietrich of Freiburg, Franciscus de Prato, and Durandus of St. Pourçain held that the *sex principia* are modes, but also real beings.

³⁴ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, a. 32, q. 5 (Macken, ed., 95). See McMahon, “Reflections,” 50.

³⁵ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, a. 32, q. 5 (Macken, ed., 84). See McMahon, “Reflections,” 46-50; Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 232-33.

They are their foundation plus a “mode,” a *ratio* of the thing in reference to another, which does not exist separately in itself.³⁶ One might object that this formulation does not entail that modes do not really exist but only that they cannot exist separated from their subjects. But Henry makes it clear that modes do not really add anything to their subjects; for example, he holds that God has modes added to him without threat to his simplicity because they are not really distinct from him. *Habitus*, on this view, is a contained thing, such as a person, considered with respect to what contains it, such as clothes, resulting from the motion of receiving that container.³⁷

Some Thomists, such as John of St. Thomas, call *habitus* a mode but mean that it is a kind of real being, while other Thomists, such as John Capreolus, deny that *habitus* is a mode but draw on Henry’s account of *habitus* as a “*respectus*.”³⁸ Terms like ‘mode’ and ‘*respectus*’ shifted in meaning among Scholastic thinkers, which in part led to the proliferation of views on the *sex principia*. In contemporary literature, Robert Pasnau takes Aquinas’s view to be similar to Henry’s. Aquinas calls the categories “modes of being” (*modi essendi*) and he seems to hold that some of the categories are really identical to one another, only distinct inasmuch as we distinguish them in order to understand reality, and insofar as our terms for these modes denominate different “structures” of reality, to use Pasnau’s term.³⁹ This notion of “structure” helps make sense of the idea that these modes could be founded in reality without introducing real differences: reality has aspects that involve differences without involving the introduction of entirely new, irreducible beings. For example, *actio* and *passio* are really both

³⁶ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, a. 32, q. 5 (Macken, ed., 87); *Quodlibet* VII, q. 1/2 (Wilson, ed., 6).

³⁷ Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, a. 32, q. 5 (Macken, ed., 103-5).

³⁸ See Pini, “Scotus’ Realist Conception of the Categories,” 71-72.

³⁹ III *Phys.*, lect. 5, n. 15 (Leonine ed., 2:114-15); V *Metaphys.*, lect. 9, n. 890 (Marietti ed., 238); *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1 (*Opera omnia* [Rome: Leonine ed., 1975], 22.1:3-8); Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 232-33. Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 39, s. 2, n. 22-23 (Vives ed., 26:516-17) understands Aquinas to have Henry’s view. Cf. Pini, “Scotus’ Realist Conception of the Categories,” 71.

the motion brought about by an efficient cause in a patient, but they are distinguished conceptually and denominatively insofar as that effect can be referred in different ways to the agent and to the patient, in a way similar to Henry's intentional distinction.⁴⁰ Even more explicitly, Aquinas states that

that from which something is denominated is not necessarily always a form according to the nature of the thing, but it suffices that it be signified through the mode of a form, grammatically speaking. Indeed, a human being is denominated from action, clothing, and other things of that sort, which really are not forms.⁴¹

This suggests that, on Aquinas's view, *habitus*, *actio*, and probably the other *sex principia* are not really distinct from their subjects, but just involve talking about subjects as if they had forms of these kinds. For example, clothes act like a form for the human body, which is picked out by *habitus* predications, but they are not really forms. Indeed, Aquinas says elsewhere that *habitus* (and *ubi*, *quando*, and *situs*) are effects of relations of the subject having to the thing had.⁴² On some interpretations, the members of these categories are even reducible to members of the category 'relation'.⁴³

Ultimately, however, Henry's view reduces to other views. On the one hand, this view could be interpreted in such a way that it reduces to the extrinsic denomination view, as it was interpreted by the sixteenth-century Jesuit Pedro da Fonseca, and by the seventeenth-century Jesuit Richard Lynch. On this interpretation, intentionally distinct modes are really identical to their subjects and so are mere ways of denominating those subjects based on extrinsic things, though these extrinsic things can be thought of as affecting their subjects.⁴⁴ This inter-

⁴⁰ III *Phys.*, lect. 5, nn. 16-17 (Leonine ed., 2:115); *STh*, I, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1 (*Opera omnia* [Rome: Leonine ed., 1888], 4:324).

⁴¹ *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 10, ad 8 (*Quaestiones disputatae* [Turin: Marietti, 1965], 2:211).

⁴² V *Metaphys.*, lect. 17, n. 1005 (Marietti ed., 266).

⁴³ See Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 231; Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 226-27.

⁴⁴ Pedro Da Fonseca, *In libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae*, bk. 5, c. 7, q. 2 ([Frankfurt: Impensis Ioannis Theobaldi Schanuuertteri, 1599], 2:429-44); bk. 7, c. 8,

pretation is suggested by Aquinas's statement that the *sex principia* are extrinsic denominations⁴⁵ of some subject with reference to an extrinsic thing that can be considered grammatically as a form of the subject.⁴⁶ Henry too seems to think of them as ways of talking about a subject with respect to things extrinsic to it. The intentional modal view would then have the same problems that we shall see that the extrinsic denomination view has. On the other hand, one could interpret "mode" in a more robust manner, holding that if modes are distinct aspects of reality, then they are real beings; on this interpretation, the intentional modal view would reduce to the realist modal view, which I shall defend below.

B) The Extrinsic Denomination View

This view was first clearly held by William of Occam and John Buridan. More importantly for my project of considering the Thomistic view of *habitus*, this view was held by many, though not all, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Jesuit philosophers, such as da Fonseca, Suárez, Lynch, Rodrigo Arriaga, Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, Martinus Smiglicus, and the commentators on Aristotle of the Jesuit college at Coimbra, the Conimbricenses. Suárez, Lynch, and the Conimbricenses held that they were following Aquinas in holding this view; since my interest in this paper is to understand Aquinas's view, I focus on these last here.⁴⁷

q. 4 (Frankfurt ed., 3:357-78); Richard Lynch, *Universa philosophia scholastica*, t. 7, c. 6, ad 3 and 4 ([Lyon: Borde, Arnaud, and Rigaud, 1654], 3:212).

⁴⁵ III *Phys.*, lect. 5, n. 15 (Leonine ed., 2:114-15).

⁴⁶ *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 10, ad 8 (Marietti ed., 2:211).

⁴⁷ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 39, s. 2, nn. 22-23 (Vives ed., 26:516-17); Lynch, *Universa philosophia scholastica*, t. 7, c. 6 (Lyon ed., 3:211-13); Conimbricenses, *Commentarii collegii Conimbricensis e societate Iesu in universam dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae* (hereafter *In Dial.*), *In Categorias*, c. 9, q. 3, a. 2 (Coloniae Agippinae: Apud Bernardum Gualterium, 1630), 531. Mastrius and Belluto, *Philosophiae*, p. 2, t. 3, d. 8, q. 12, a. 1, n. 191 (Venice ed., 271) also take this to be the view of Aquinas, and, following Aquinas, of Hervaeus Natalis, Chrysostem Javellus, Domingo Soto, and Paul Soncinas. Some twentieth-century interpreters of Aquinas also have this view, e.g., A. Krempel, *La doctrine de la relation chez saint Thomas* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952), 429-50;

On this view, *habitus* is a predication of a participle of some subject, where the participle denominates the subject as connoting an extrinsic adjacent body. When I say “a man is clothed,” a passive participle is predicated of ‘man’, whereby a man is considered as connoting, or having to do with, clothes. The things that make the claim true are an individual man and his individual clothes, in a certain situation with respect to one another. There is no need to posit any other being; the “situation,” the “respect,” and the “connoting” are not real beings or forms but are only considered linguistically as if they were.⁴⁸

Suárez holds that there are three kinds of categorical accidents, all of which are oriented towards substances as their subjects: intrinsic accidents, modes, and extrinsic denominations.⁴⁹ An accident is an intrinsic accident if and only if it (1) has its own proper entity separate from its subject⁵⁰ and (2) is intrinsically apt to exist in another,⁵¹ but (3) can, by divine power, exist actually on its own,⁵² (4) has its own nature,⁵³ and

and Peter Hoenen, *Cosmologia*, 5th ed. (Rome: Apud aedes Pont. Universitatis Gregorianae, 1956), 74-94 (cited at Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 225).

⁴⁸ William of Occam, *Summa logicae*, I, 41, 49 (Philotheus Boehner, et. al., eds., *Opera philosophica et theologica* [St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1974], 1:114-17, 153-59); and John Buridan, *Quaestiones in praedicamenta*, q. 3 (Johannes Schneider, ed. [Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen der Wissenschaften, 1983], 14-29), cited in Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought*, 521-22; McMahon, “Reflections,” 53-57. Among the Jesuits, Occam and Buridan’s version of this view is followed most of all by Martinus Smiglecius, *Logica*, d. 7, q. 4 (Ingolstadt: Ex typographeo Ederiano, 1618), 530-31.

⁴⁹ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 16, s. 1, nn. 3, 5, 18 (Vives ed., 25:567-68, 572); disp. 37, s. 2, nn. 8, 11 (Vives ed., 26:494-96). Cf. Da Fonseca, *In V Metaphys.*, c. 7, q. 2, s. 3 (Frankfurt ed., 2:434); Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 254.

⁵⁰ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 7, s. 1, n. 17 (Vives ed., 25:255-56); disp. 16, s. 1, nn. 2, 14, 21 (Vives ed., 25:566, 570, 573); disp. 37, s. 2, nn. 9, 17 (Vives ed., 26:495, 497-98).

⁵¹ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 16, s. 1, n. 5 (Vives ed., 25:567-68); disp. 37, s. 2, n. 9 (Vives ed., 26:495).

⁵² Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 37, s. 2, n. 14 (Vives ed., 26:496-97).

⁵³ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 16, s. 1, n. 3 (Vives ed., 25:567); disp. 37, s. 2, n. 1 (Vives ed., 26:493).

(5) really changes that in which it inheres if it inheres.⁵⁴ For example, quantities like intelligible mathematical surfaces and qualities like heat are intrinsic accidents.⁵⁵ No Scholastic thinker held that *habitus* is an intrinsic accident, because there is no way that “being dressed” could be preserved apart from its subject, so it does not meet (3).

An accident is a mode on Suárez’s view if and only if it (1) does not have its own proper entity distinct from others,⁵⁶ (2) is intrinsically apt to exist in another and (3) can only actually exist in another,⁵⁷ and so (4) cannot exist actually on its own even by divine power, (5) only has its nature in its inhering,⁵⁸ and (6) really changes that in which it inheres.⁵⁹ For example, the sensible shape of some portion of extended space is a mode in the category of quality, which cannot exist apart from its subject.⁶⁰ A mode, on Suárez’s view, is not a full “thing” (*res*) capable of existing or being understood apart from its subject, but it is also not merely rationally or intentionally distinct from its subject. It genuinely affects its subject, adding to it a completion or perfection beyond those provided by its essence.⁶¹ Suárez’s modes have more being than Henry’s, because of (1) and (5); at least, this is how they were understood by, for example, John of St. Thomas. But John denies that modes fulfill conditions (1) and (5): on John’s view, modes are really and fully beings.⁶² On Suárez’s view, essence

⁵⁴ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 16, s. 1, nn. 4, 10 (Vives ed., 25:567, 569); disp. 16, s. 2, n. 14 (Vives 25:578-79); disp. 37, s. 2, n. 8 (Vives ed., 26:494-95); disp. 39, s. 2, n. 3 (Vives ed., 26:511).

⁵⁵ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 39, s. 3, n. 14 (Vives ed., 26:527); disp. 40, s. 5, n. 40 (Vives ed., 26:562).

⁵⁶ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 16, s. 1, n. 21 (Vives ed., 25:573); disp. 37, s. 2, n. 10 (Vives ed., 26:495).

⁵⁷ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 37, s. 2, n. 10 (Vives ed., 26:495).

⁵⁸ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 16, s. 1, n. 22 (Vives ed., 25:573).

⁵⁹ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 16, s. 2, n. 16 (Vives ed., 25:579).

⁶⁰ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 39, s. 3, n. 14 (Vives ed., 26:527); disp. 42, s. 3, n. 15 (Vives ed., 26:615).

⁶¹ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.* disp. 7, s. 1, n. 16-19 (Vives ed., 25:255-56); disp. 16, s. 1, n. 21 (Vives ed., 25:573).

⁶² John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 14, a. 1 (Vives ed., 1:424-26); q. 14, a. 5 (Vives ed., 1:443); q. 19, a. 1 (Vives ed., 1:540-42).

and existence are really identical and there can be beings without proper entity, if such beings have their existence only in another and so do not have independent essence.⁶³ On John's view, essence and existence are really distinct, and existence gives ultimate completion to a being, such that there cannot be beings without proper entity: everything that has existence is properly a being, with its own real essence.⁶⁴

An accident is a categorical extrinsic denomination if and only if it is (1) a predicate that denominates some subject by reference to something extrinsic to that subject, where (2) that extrinsic thing acts as a sort of form toward the subject such that the subject seems to be modified by the extrinsic thing's formal activity,⁶⁵ but (3) the extrinsic thing does not inhere in the denominated subject,⁶⁶ though the subject is (4) spoken of in the extrinsic denomination as if modified and as if resulting in a concrete accidental unity with the extrinsic thing,⁶⁷ and (5) has a certain ordering to the extrinsic thing but (6) is not really changed beyond having a real relation of ordering to the extrinsic thing.⁶⁸ But there are two kinds of extrinsic denominations, those that are categorical, and those that are beings of reason (an example of which is "being seen"). The former involve the extrinsic thing acting as a sort of form of the subject and causing a real categorical relation toward itself in the subject, but the latter do not involve any such affecting or

⁶³ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 31, s. 11, n. 15, 32, 35 (Vives ed., 26:276, 281-3).

⁶⁴ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 14, a. 1 (Vives ed., 1:426-7); *Philosophia Naturalis*, pt. 1, q. 7, a. 5 (Vives ed., 2:125-128); *Cursus theologicus in summa theologiae* (hereafter *In STh*), I, q. 3, d. 4, a. 4, nn. 19 and 25-27 ([Paris: Vives, 1883], 1:603, 606-7).

⁶⁵ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 16, s. 1, n. 24 (Vives ed., 25:574); disp. 37, s. 2, n. 8 (Vives ed., 26:494-95); disp. 39, s. 2, n. 36 (Vives ed., 26:520-21).

⁶⁶ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 37, s. 2, n. 8 (Vives ed., 26:494-95).

⁶⁷ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 32, s. 1, n. 23 (Vives ed., 26:319); disp. 37, s. 2, n. 8 (Vives ed., 26:494-95).

⁶⁸ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 16, s. 1, nn. 3, 24 (Vives ed., 25:567, 574); disp. 16, s. 2, n. 1 (Vives ed., 25:574).

real relations.⁶⁹ A categorical extrinsic denomination on Suárez's account functions just like an intentional mode on Henry's, which is further evidence that the intentional modal view reduces to the extrinsic denomination view.

On Suárez's view, *habitus* is a categorical extrinsic denomination.⁷⁰ For example, clothes, by being near a body, act as a sort of form of the body whereby the body is ornamented.⁷¹ In accord with Aristotle's *Metaphysics* 5.20.1022b3-10, the subject *has* its clothes, and this having, though not a real being, is a sort of medium from the man to the clothes, though not vice versa.⁷² But there is nothing really existing here besides the body, the clothes, the real relations of nearness or contact of the man to the clothes and vice versa, the place or boundary surface (*ubi*) of both that founds those relations, and the internal arrangement of parts (*situs*) of both; no new kind of *per se* unity and being is introduced.⁷³ Suárez holds that the view that *habitus* is a real mode is unthinkable.⁷⁴

The Conimbricenses similarly contend that there is no intrinsic difference between being dressed and being naked, and so no real mode of *habitus* needs to be posited.⁷⁵ Arriaga argues that it is as improbable to think that getting dressed brings about a real change in the dressed body as it is to think that the coming into being of a new white thing in India brings about a new real relation of similarity to that white thing in every white

⁶⁹ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 2, s. 1, n. 1 (Vives ed., 25:70); disp. 6, s. 6, n. 10 (Vives ed., 25:223); disp. 39, s. 3, n. 12 (Vives ed., 26:526-27). Cf. John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 19, a. 1 (Vives ed., 1:540).

⁷⁰ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 53, s. 1, n. 3 (Vives ed., 26:1012).

⁷¹ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 53, s. 1, nn. 1, 3 (Vives ed., 26:1011-12).

⁷² Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 53, s. 1, nn. 1, 4 (Vives ed., 26:1011-12). Cf. Pedro Da Fonseca, *In V Metaphys.*, c. 7, q. 2, s. 3 (Frankfurt ed., 2:434); s. 4, ad 9 (Frankfurt ed., 2:439); c. 20 (Frankfurt ed., 2:913).

⁷³ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 35, s. 1, n. 5 (Vives ed., 26:426-27); disp. 39, s. 3, n. 12 (Vives ed., 26:526-27); disp. 53, s. 1, n. 3 (Vives ed., 26:1012).

⁷⁴ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 53, s. 1, nn. 1, 3 (Vives ed., 26:1011-12). Unlike Aquinas, Suárez thinks that any case of one body being adjacent to another is an instance of *habitus*; cf. *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 53, s. 2, nn. 1-3 (Vives ed., 26:1013-14). Cf. Conimbricenses, *In Dial.*, In Categorias, c. 9, q. 3, a. 2 (Gualterium ed., 532); c. 10 (Gualterium ed., 566).

⁷⁵ Conimbricenses, *In Dial.*, In Categorias, c. 9, q. 3, a. 2 (Gualterium ed., 530).

thing in the world. However, he admits this is somewhat unconvincing, as getting dressed seems to produce a greater change in me than does the production of something new in India.⁷⁶ Suárez argues for the lack of real change by contending that God could annihilate the body or the clothes and preserve the other exactly as it was, and so no mode needs to be posited to explain being dressed.⁷⁷ But this begs the question as to whether getting dressed brings about a real change in either, since it assumes that were God to annihilate one of these subjects, the other would remain exactly the way it was.

In my view, the most problematic aspect of this view is that it denies or fails to account for a unique connection between human persons and artifacts; the reasons why such an account must be given will be presented below. This is contrary to the tendency to pay close attention to experience and “save the appearances” in a nonreductionistic manner that is a hallmark of much Aristotelian thought. Wearing clothes and using tools make a difference to the way in which we engage with the world, over and above the spatial relations we have to those artifacts, but the view we are investigating here explains this experience reductionistically. Just as Aristotelianism gives a nonreductionist metaphysics of intentionality, by positing entities such as intentional species, so the unique features of the experience of engaging with the world through artifacts likewise suggests the need for positing a new entity. Likewise, this theory severs some of the isomorphism between language and reality typical of Aristotelianism, an isomorphism that grounds much of the realism of that philosophy: *habitus* predications in ordinary language seem to posit a unique sort of property had by a subject; if this is the case, then the metaphysics should match. A philosopher with antireductionist and realist intuitions has good reasons to reject the extrinsic denomination view.

⁷⁶ Rodrigo de Arriaga, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, disp. 5, c. 3 (*Cursus philosophicus* [Paris: Apud Iacobum Quesnel, 1689], 782). For a response to this argument in favor of the realist modal view see Rubio, *Logica mexicana*, c. 10, ad 2 (Pillehotte ed., 451).

⁷⁷ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 53, s. 1, n. 5 (Vives ed., 26:1012-13).

C) *The Absolute Entity with "Respectus" View*

John of St. Thomas and the Scotists Bartholomaeus Mastrius and Bonaventura Belluto mention that some held that the predicates in these categories signify something absolute (that is, intrinsic and nonrelational) with a *respectus* or ordering to the denominated subject. John does not mention any names of those who held this view; Mastrius and Belluto wrongly attribute it to Rubio, who actually holds the realist modal view.⁷⁸ By contrast with the last two views, according to which the predicate signifies the denominated subject with an ordering to the extrinsic thing, on this view, the predicate signifies the extrinsic thing with an ordering to the denominated subject. The predicate 'clothed' in "a man is clothed" would refer to the clothes insofar as they are ordered to the man wearing them. What makes the sentence true are the man, his clothes, and perhaps a relation from the clothes to the man or an intentionally distinct mode in the clothes. There is little difference between this view and the former two views: on none of these views is *habitus* a kind of real being. Indeed, Suárez sometimes speaks as if he held this view: he says that the realities abstractly referred to by *habitus* predicates are the clothes.⁷⁹ Arriaga and Hurtado say that *habitus* predicates refer to the clothes as placed around (*ubicationibus*) the man.⁸⁰

A member of the Thomistic tradition who may have held this view is the sixteenth-century Jesuit Francisco Toletus, who held that *habitus* predication is taken from a form or thing, which by some mode is around a body and which ornaments or

⁷⁸ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 19, a. 1 (Vives ed., 1:539); Mastrius and Belluto, *Philosophiae*, p. 2, t. 3, d. 8, q. 12, a. 1, n. 191 (Venice ed., 271). Rubio, *Logica mexicana*, c. 10, q. un. (Pillehotte ed., 447); *Q. generalis pro omnibus sex ultimis praedicamentis* (Pillehotte ed., 453, 455). John of St. Thomas wrongly attributes this view to Hervaeus Natalis, Chrysostem Iavellus, Domingo Soto, and Pedro da Fonseca, who held the extrinsic denomination view.

⁷⁹ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 39, s. 2, n. 2 (Vives ed., 26:511).

⁸⁰ Arriaga, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 5, c. 3 (Quesnel ed., 781). Cf. Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, *Universa philosophia, Metaphysica*, d. 18 (Lyon: Ludovici Prost Haeredis Rovite, 1624), 942.

clothes the body.⁸¹ Since he held that the *sex principia* are extrinsic denominations, “mode” here is understood in something like Henry’s sense of the term. Toletus’s version of this view is a version of the extrinsic denomination view. But, in addition to the problems with the latter, this view has the added disadvantage of not conforming to the semantic structure of *habitus* predications: *habitus* predications, such as “a man is clothed” attribute a form to the subject, the man, not to the extrinsic thing, the clothes, and this is not reflected on this view.⁸²

D) The Pure “Respectus” View

John of St. Thomas lists two views that hold that the *sex principia* are *respectus*, a term from Henry that was also used in the last three views. One view holds that the *sex principia* are pure *respectus*, that is, orderings (*habitudines*) or comparisons (*comparationes*) of one thing to another that are free of anything absolute and do not include anything inhering in the subject but are just an ordering. When we say that “a man is clothed,” we mean that the man has an ordering towards the clothes. This ordering, which, as on the intentional modal view, is not really distinct from the man, corresponds to the predicate ‘clothed’, and, together with the man and the clothes, and perhaps with members of the categories relation and *ubi*, makes this sentence true. The other *respectus* view, which will be considered next, is the view that the *sex principia* are *respectus extrinsecus adveniens*. The two views are similar in some ways, and some Scholastic thinkers, such as Mastrius and Belluto, held that they were the same.⁸³ However, some defenders of the

⁸¹ Francisco Toletus, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in universam Aristotelis logicam, In librum categoriarum*, c. 10 (Venice: Apud Iuntas, 1580), 89.

⁸² Valbuena, “De significatione,” 172 wrongly says that the seventeenth-century Dominican Antonius Goudin held a version of this view. But Goudin held the realist modal view: see *Philosophia thomistica*, Logica majoris prima pars, d. 2, q. 6, a. 4 ([Madrid: Apud Petrum Marin, 1789], 1:245).

⁸³ Mastrius and Belluto, *Philosophiae*, p. 2, t. 3, d. 8, q. 12, a. 1, n. 191 (Venice ed., 271).

pure *respectus* view, such as the sixteenth-century Dominican Soncinias, argue against Scotus's *respectus extrinsecus adveniens* view; in this, he follows the Thomist John Capreolus.⁸⁴

Capreolus holds that *habitus* is neither something absolute, that is, nonrelational, as on the realist modal view, nor something absolute together with an ordering (*respectus*) to another, as on the absolute entity with *respectus* view.⁸⁵ John of St. Thomas, perhaps noting the similarities between this view and Henry's, presents the pure *respectus* view as holding that the *habitus* is a mode in the subject that orders the subject toward an extrinsic thing.⁸⁶ But on Capreolus and Soncinias's version of this view, *habitus* is just a *respectus*, not a mode with a *respectus*. A *respectus* is just a way of predicating with a foundation in reality, not a kind of real being; thus this view resembles the intentional modal view.⁸⁷ The difference is that here the predicate denotes the pure ordering, not an intentionally distinct mode.

A *prima facie* objection to this view is that it seems to reduce *habitus* to the category of relation, which its proponents do not want to claim; my reply to this objection will introduce an important distinction. Categorical relations, Soncinias argues, immediately result from the existence of absolute things. For example, a relation of similarity immediately results from the existence of one white form (the foundation) and another white form (the term), both of which are absolute. But *habitus* (and the other *sex principia*) results immediately from the existence of its foundation and its term when these are in a relation of adjacency or containment, and so it is not reducible to relation, since it is founded, as Aquinas said, on a relation. *Habitus* is

⁸⁴ Soncinias, *In V Metaphys.*, q. 39 (Pesnot ed., 92).

⁸⁵ John Capreolus, *Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis* (hereafter *In Sent.*), II, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, s. 2, ad 1 argumenta Aureoli ([Turin: Alfred Cattier, 1900], 3:139).

⁸⁶ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 19, a. 1 (Vives ed., 1:539-40).

⁸⁷ Capreolus, *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 2, a. 2B, s. 1, ad 6 argumenta Scoti, ad 18-19 (Cattier ed., 1:353-54); ad 9 argumenta Scoti (Cattier ed., 1:355); Soncinias, *In V Metaphys.*, q. 13, concl. 2 (Pesnot ed., 61). Cf. Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 39, s. 2, n. 22 (Vives ed., 26:516).

said to be left (*derelinquitur*)⁸⁸ in the contained subject, not as anything absolute or really distinct from the subject, but as a pure ordering of the subject towards something adjacent. Only a pure *respectus* can, Soncinas claims, be a medium between two things, as Aristotle says *habitus* is, since nothing absolute can exist between two things, contrary to the dual subject view.⁸⁹

Soncinas holds that any instance of being contained belongs to *habitus*.⁹⁰ Capreolus at one point claims, following Aquinas, that only humans have *habitus*,⁹¹ and then he goes on, in what seems to be a self-contradiction, to cite approvingly a claim of Averroës that holds that an animal having skin is in this category.⁹²

Ultimately, despite its proponents' claims to the contrary, this view reduces to the extrinsic denomination view: a *respectus* is just an ordering of a subject to something extrinsic, said in virtue of or as resulting from that extrinsic thing, distinct from the subject only conceptually with a foundation in reality.

E) The "*Respectus Extrinsecus Adveniens*" View

The second view that holds that *habitus* is a kind of *respectus* holds that *habitus* (along with the other *sex principia*) are *respectus* that come to a thing from something extrinsic (*respectus extrinsecus adveniens*). This view was first formulated by John Duns Scotus, who held that members of these categories are real beings. On this view, what makes it true that "a man is clothed" are the man, the clothes, and a *respectus* that orders the man toward the clothes. At least one Thomist, the

⁸⁸ '*Derelinquere*' and '*relinquere*' denote that these accidents are "in" their subjects, and are not mere extrinsic denominations, but are not "intrinsic" in their subjects.

⁸⁹ Capreolus, *In II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, s. 2, ad 1 argumenta Aureoli (Cattier ed., 3:139-40); *In II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, s. 2, ad 1 argumenta Aureoli, ad 5 principale (Cattier ed., 3:142-43); Soncinas, *In V Metaphys.*, q. 39 (Pesnot ed., 92); q. 41 (Pesnot ed., 94).

⁹⁰ Soncinas, *In V Metaphys.*, q. 41 (Pesnot ed., 94).

⁹¹ Capreolus, *In II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, s. 2, ad 1 argumenta Aureoli (Cattier ed., 3:140).

⁹² Averroës, *In V Metaphys.*, c. 23, cited at Capreolus, *In II Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, s. 2, ad 1 argumenta Aureoli, ad 5 principale (Cattier ed., 3:143).

Dominican Thomas de Vio Cajetan, also held this view. But on his version of the view, the members of the *sex principia* are not really distinct forms but are merely ways of conceiving a being as if they were forms that follow upon the relation of adjacency.⁹³ While this is a realist view for Scotus, it is a version of the extrinsic denomination view for Cajetan. Later thinkers, such as da Fonseca, likewise took this to be a version of the extrinsic denomination view.⁹⁴

The proponents of this view distinguish two kinds of *respectus*: *respectus intrinsecus adveniens* and *respectus extrinsecus adveniens*; this distinction distinguishes this view from the pure *respectus* view. A *respectus* is a *respectus intrinsecus adveniens* (and therefore in the category of relation) if and only if it arises immediately and necessarily in the subject of the foundation given the existence of the foundation and the term. For example, given any two white things, a *respectus intrinsecus adveniens* of similarity will arise in each thing. These *respectus* are intrinsic because they depend only on intrinsic substantial, qualitative, or quantitative forms. A *respectus* is a *respectus extrinsecus adveniens* (and therefore in one of the *sex principia*) if and only if it arises from its foundation and term just when these are in some proper relation; different kinds of these *respectus* are founded in different kinds of foundations, terms, and relations. For example, given the *respectus intrinsecus adveniens* of adjacency between a man and his clothes, a *respectus extrinsecus adveniens* of *habitus* arises ordering the man towards the clothes. In order to arise, some cause must put the man and the clothes into the right relation, as when he gets dressed. For a *respectus intrinsecus*, no causal activity beyond

⁹³ Thomas de Vio Cajetan, *Commentaria in praedicamenta Aristotelis* (Marie Hyacinthe Laurent, ed. [Rome: Angelicum, 1939], 4-5, 192); *Expositio super summam theologiam* (hereafter *In STh*) I, q. 6, a. 4, n. 3 (*Opera omnia Thomae Aquinatis* [Rome: Leonine ed., 1881], 4:70); *In de ente et essentia divinae Thomae Aquinatis commentaria*, s. 8 (Marie Hyacinthe Laurent, ed. [Turin: Marietti, 1934]). See Joshua Hochschild, *The Semantics of Analogy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010), 187, 212.

⁹⁴ Da Fonseca, *In V Metaphys.*, c. 7, q. 2 (Frankfurt ed., 2:434); *In VII Metaphys.*, c. 8, q. 4 (Frankfurt ed., 3:357-58).

that which brings about the foundation and term is required.⁹⁵ On the pure *respectus* view, by contrast, *respectus* like *habitus* do arise immediately given their relata: given the existence of a container and the contained, *habitus* arises.⁹⁶

But this apparent difference between the views really is just a matter of different descriptions under which the relata are taken. The *respectus* of *habitus* does not arise immediately from the existence of the man *qua* man and the clothes *qua* clothes. But it does immediately arise from the existence of the man *qua* contained and the clothes *qua* containing. The pure *respectus* view uses the latter description, while the *respectus extrinsecus adveniens* view uses the former. They agree that *habitus* arise from a foundation and a term in a relation of containment or adjacency. Yet it is not clear on either view why this relation would constitute a new category of being.

Scotus distinguishes between intrinsic forms, such as qualities and quantities, and *respectus extrinsecus adveniens*. This is a distinction much like that between intrinsic forms and modes on Suárez's view. Scotus calls *respectus* "modes," but he thinks that they really add to their subjects, are really distinct from their subjects, and have their own essence.⁹⁷ Intrinsic forms are capable of existing apart from their subjects, at least by divine power; *respectus* cannot, but must inhere immediately in their subjects.⁹⁸ Scotus does not discuss the *sex principia* in detail,⁹⁹

⁹⁵ John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio*, bk. IV, d. 6, p. 4, a. 2, q. 2, nn. 293-99 (*Opera omnia*, [Vatican City: Typis Vaticanis, 2010], 11:385-87); d. 12, p. 1, q. 1, ss. 36-38 (Vatican ed., 12:309-10); d. 12, p. 2, q. un., ad 1, ss. 277-82 (Vatican ed., 12:380-82); d. 13, q. 1 (Vatican ed., 12:451.233-45).

⁹⁶ Rubio, *Logica mexicana*, Q. generalis pro omnibus sex ultimis praedicamentis (Pillehotte ed., 453), takes all of this to show the falsehood of the *respectus extrinsecus adveniens* view.

⁹⁷ Scotus, *In librum praedicamentorum quaestiones*, q. 11, n. 4 (*Opera omnia* [Paris: Vives, 1894], 1:468); *Ordinatio* IV, q. 13, a. 1, ss. 41-55 (Vatican ed., 12:450-53); *Quaestiones quodlibetales*, q. 3 (Vives ed., 25:129-30), cited in Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 243. Cf. Henninger, *Relations*, 73-74.

⁹⁸ Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV, d. 10, p. 1, q. 1, ss. 67-70 (Vatican ed., 12:74-75); d. 12, p. 1, q. 1, nn. 25-38, 77-80 (Vatican ed., 12:306-10, 323-34); d. 12, p. 2, q. un., nn. 278-82 (Vatican ed., 12:381-82); q. 13, a. 1, ss. 41-55 (Vatican ed., 12:450-53). See Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 209-11.

⁹⁹ See, e.g., Scotus, *Ordinatio*, IV, q. 13, a. 1, s. 41-55 (Vatican ed., 12:450-3).

but if this account were applied to *habitus*, it would have, on my interpretation, the following analysis: when a person is dressed, a *respectus extrinsecus adveniens* of *habitus* comes to be, immediately inhering in the person, and ordering him or her toward the clothes. But, I contend, given this inherence in the subject, the *habitus* would not just be an ordering of the subject to another, as on the pure *respectus* view, but would be an absolute mode in the subject.

Scotus's view anticipates the realist modal view, but later Scotists rejected that view, which holds that the *sex principia* are both absolute modes and transcendental relations.¹⁰⁰ I shall consider transcendental relations in the next section; briefly, they are relations that are identical to their subjects or foundations. Mastrius and Belluto argue that since *respectus extrinsecus* are orderings toward another thing, they are not absolute modes. Since they are essentially added to their subject, they are not transcendental relations. Since each *respectus* is one unified thing, they are not absolute modes plus a *respectus* or transcendental relation. They are not extrinsic denominations, because predications involving the *sex principia* attribute something real to the subject. Rather, they are just *respectus*, real orderings of a subject toward something extrinsic.¹⁰¹

One problem with the *respectus extrinsecus adveniens* view is that it holds that *habitus*, though resulting from extrinsic things, are ways in which subjects are ordered toward extrinsic things. But this is not what *habitus* primarily are; rather, as can be seen from the structure of a predication like "a man is clothed," and as will be further argued below, they are ways in which a subject is affected by an extrinsic thing. Indeed, Mastrius and Belluto allow that in the case of *habitus* there is a "mode of informing

¹⁰⁰ See, e.g., Antonius Hiquaeus Hibernus, *Commentarium in quaestiones in libros sententiarum*, in Duns Scotus, *Opera omnia*, d. 13. q. 1 (Vives ed., 17:671); John Punch, *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, d. 17, qq. 1-2 (Lyon: Arnaud & Borde, 1672), 241-44; Mastrius and Belluto, *Philosophiae*, p. 2, t. 3, d. 8, q. 12, a. 1 (Venice ed., 271-72), who follow Nicholas Bonet. See the texts from Walter Burley, Paul of Venice, and Petrus Thomae cited in Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 240-41.

¹⁰¹ Mastrius and Belluto, *Philosophiae*, p. 2, t. 3, d. 8, q. 12, a. 1, nn. 192-95 (Venice ed., 271-72). See Henninger, *Relations*, 79, 83; Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 254.

and sustaining” (*modum informationis et sustentationis*) from the clothes, from which a special union between the subject and the clothes results, irreducible to the members of any other category. However, they ridicule any attempt to derive this category from the human aptitude to use clothes, as Rubio and other proponents of the realist modal view do.¹⁰² On their view, *habitus* is a unique sort of union between two things, without a clear reason why this results in a new category of being. This view thus seems, despite their denial, to be a version of the realist modal view. Ultimately, the realist modal and extrinsic denomination views are the only plausible views of *habitus* and the other *sex principia*.

F) *The Realist Modal View*

The view that I defend as both true and the view that best makes sense of Aquinas’s thesis on *habitus* is the view that *habitus* is a real mode, that is, a real being that cannot exist except by inhering in its subject and that really changes its subject when it inheres in its subject. Although this view is terminologically similar to the intentional modal view, on the realist modal view, modes are really, not just intentionally, distinct from their subjects. Although this account of modes is similar to that of Suárez, it differs in that, on this view, modes are complete beings with complete essences and acts of existence, rather than, on Suárez’s view, partial essences and existences. According to the realist modal view, what makes it true that “a man is clothed” are a man, his clothes, and a mode of *habitus* inhering in the man; the predicate ‘clothed’ denotes the mode.

This view is explicitly held by several seventeenth-century philosophers: Antonio Rubio; the Irish philosopher Bernardus Morisanus; the Complutenses, that is, the Carmelite commentators on Aristotle at the University of Alcalá; and the

¹⁰² Mastrius and Belluto, *Philosophiae*, p. 2, t. 3, d. 8, q. 12, a. 2, nn. 222-25 (Venice ed., 279). See the similar account at Hibernus, *Commentarium*, d. 13, q. 1 (Vives ed., 17:670).

Dominican Thomists John of St. Thomas and Antonius Goudin; and it is also held by most subsequent Thomists. It has precursors in the work of Peter Abelard and the fourteenth-century modist Radulphus Brito.¹⁰³ On Abelard's view, terms in the logical category of *habitus* refer to a kind of accidental thing (*res*) which comes to a subject from extrinsic things like weapons that one has, which is more long lasting than a *passio*, and which is a property of the thing that has, not of the thing had; Abelard excludes the dual-subject and absolute-entity-with-respectus views.¹⁰⁴ On Brito's view, a *habitus* accident (and each of the *sex principia*) is an absolute mode caused and left (*derelinquitur*) in a subject by something extrinsic, whereby the subject is compared to that extrinsic thing as contained to containing thing, and which, unlike on other versions of this view, is not founded on a relation.¹⁰⁵

John of St. Thomas, who best develops what subsequently became the standard Thomistic view, acknowledges that predicates in the logical category *habitus*, like those in all the *sex principia*, are expressed by extrinsic denomination, as Aquinas says. But, like Suárez, he distinguishes two kinds of extrinsic denominations. First, some are relations of reason like 'being seen'; in these, nothing changes in the denominated

¹⁰³ Rubio, *Logica mexicana*, c. 10, q. un. (Pillehotte ed., 448-51); Morisanus, *In Aristotelis logicam, physicam, ethicam, apotelesma*, Logica, d. 9, q. un. (Frankfurt: Typis Iohannes Friedrici Weisii, 1625), 138-39; Complutenses, *Cursus sive disputationes in Aristotelis dialecticam et philosophiam naturalem*, d. 16, q. 1 (Alcala de Henares: Apud Ioannem de Orduña, 1624), 644-48; q. 6 (Compluti ed, 659-60); John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 14, aa. 1, 5 (Vives ed., 1:425-28, 442-43); q. 19, aa. 1, 4 (Vives ed., 1:539-43, 552-55); Goudin, *Philosophia*, Logica maioris prima pars, d. 2, q. 6, a. 4 (Madrid ed., 1:245); Eduardo Hugon, *Cursus philosophiae thomisticae*, Logica ([Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1927], 1:74-75, 83); Owens, *Metaphysics*, 208-9; Charles de Koninck, "Prolégomènes à la dixième catégorie," *Philosophia perennis* 3 (1996): 5-23. See Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 245, on how Nicolas of Strasbourg, Alexander of Alexandria, James of Viterbo, Dietrich of Freiburg, Franciscus de Prato, and Durandus of St. Pourçain held that the *sex principia* are real modes in the Suárezian sense of mode, and so are perhaps forerunners of the realist modal view.

¹⁰⁴ Abelard, *Logica 'Ingredientibus'*, 256-59. Cf. Nielsen, *Twelfth Century*, 236-38.

¹⁰⁵ Brito, *Quaestiones super librum praedicamentorum*, q. 8, in William E. McMahon, "Radulphus Brito on the Sufficiency of the Categories," *Cahiers de l'institut du moyen-age grec et latin* 39 (1981): 90-92.

subject. Second, some are categorical; in these, the presence of the extrinsic thing from which the subject is denominated brings about a change in the subject. He explains this change by positing a mode or “*respectus*” in the subject. For example, wearing involves either a sort of action (and so change) of the subject, as in the display of ornamentation in wearing make-up, or a sort of passion (and so change) of the subject, as in being covered by clothes, that results from the extrinsic thing, and it involves a link between the person who has and the artifact that is had in a way different from other actions and passions.¹⁰⁶

On John’s view, there are two kinds of modes: those that are reductively in some nonmodal category and those that are in categories that just contain modes.¹⁰⁷ First, a mode is reductively in a nonmodal category if and only if it pertains to the constitution of a member of a category that is not itself a mode. For example, to be a complete substance, a substance must be incommunicable, unable to be part of or assumed by another substance; this is explained by a mode of subsistence, which is not a being with its own act of existence but a constitutive principle of complete substances. Second, a mode is in a category that just contains modes if and only if it is a mode that does not constitute a member of another category but is a being *per se*, with a complete nature and its own act of existence. These modes are not really separable from the extrinsic things from which they result but are “principles of fittingness” (*principia convenientes*) between a subject and an extrinsic thing.¹⁰⁸ When I wear clothes, I am affected by and fitted to them and dependent on them as clothed by them. The mode depends on the clothes as to its origin, and so is not separable from them; if I take off the clothes, the mode ceases to be. Furthermore, in *habitus*, unlike in *ubi*, *quando*, and *situs*, the extrinsic thing does not measure—that is, provide a standard or

¹⁰⁶ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 14, a. 5 (Vives ed., 1:443); q. 19, a. 1 (Vives ed., 1:540-41); q. 19, a. 4 (Vives ed., 1:554); *In I-II STh*, *De habitibus*, d. 13, a. 1, nn. 87, 90 ([Quebec: Laval, 1949], 21-22).

¹⁰⁷ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 14, a. 1 (Vives ed., 1:427). Cf. Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 7, s. 1, nn. 18-19 (Vives ed., 25:256-57).

¹⁰⁸ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 14, a. 1 (Vives ed., 1:425-27).

rule for judging—the denominated substance, but rather is just simply and “nakedly” applied to the substance.¹⁰⁹

The relation between the clothes and the mode reflects the unique sort of causality involved in the causing of modes. Modes do not require a direct and *per se* cause;¹¹⁰ they can come to be indirectly through another event, such as the act of getting dressed. The conditions that occasion the emergence of the mode are said to be the “origin” of the mode. Clothes do not efficiently or formally act on a person to bring about a mode. Rather, the clothes are applied to the person; this application makes a difference of fittingness (*convenientia*) to the person, and it “leaves behind” (*derelinquitur*) a mode of fittingness and dependence in the person. For most Scholastic thinkers, a thing fits with itself or with another when the latter is either in accord with the nature of the former, fulfills some potency of the former, or displays the nature of the former in a better manner than if the latter had not come together with the former.¹¹¹ Many artifacts fit with human nature when they are physically applied to the human body, not because they directly follow upon human nature, but because they reveal that nature well and because they fulfill a human potency for engaging with the world. When I hold and use an artifact, I am rendered able or better able to do certain things, and my rational nature, with its open-ended range of possible ways of engaging with the world, is revealed and expressed. This relation of fittingness brings about an intrinsic change in the person because it actualizes that range of possibility in a definite way. When I wear clothes or hold a tool, I do not merely take on a new relation of spatial adjacency to that artifact; in addition to these relations, an intrinsic mode of *habitus* must be posited to explain my relation to artifacts adjacent to me. This is consistent with the fact that many artifacts have an element of conventionality to them: the structure or style of my clothes may be conventional, but the effect they have on me and the potencies

¹⁰⁹ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 14, a. 5 (Vives ed., 1:443).

¹¹⁰ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 19, a. 1 (Vives ed., 1:543).

¹¹¹ See, e.g., *STh* III, q. 1, aa. 1-2 (Leonine ed., 11:6-7, 9-11); Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 10, s. 1, n. 6 (Vives ed., 25:330).

they actualize in me are not conventional, but follow upon rational nature.

At this point, a Suárezian might object by distinguishing two kinds of modes. On the one hand, some modes have a *per se* cause, a cause by which they are drawn out (*educere*) from the potencies of their subject. For example, the sensible shape of a thing is a mode that is caused to complete the quantitative figure or magnitude of the thing. These modes exert formal causality over their subjects, actualizing and perfecting them. On the other hand, some modes merely “result” from certain conditions, without a direct *per se* cause; these are not drawn out from the potencies of their subject but merely exist in the subject given certain conditions, and they do not formally cause their subject, or actualize or perfect it.¹¹² *Habitus* would seem to be in the latter category—but if that is correct, then *habitus* cannot actualize a potency in the subject, as it is supposed to do. John’s response is to deny an aspect of the distinction. Every mode is drawn out from the potencies of matter, even if it does not have *per se* causes, as in the case of *habitus*, and every mode completes, actualizes, and perfects its subject, and so is a formal cause.¹¹³

John bases his realist modal view in part on Aquinas’s claim that acts and, through the mediation of acts, subjects are proportioned to their circumstances, such as their place and time, but these extrinsic circumstances leave a property in the act and the subject. Likewise, John reasons that a subject’s circumstances, like his clothes, leave a mode in a person through the mediation of his relation to them. Aquinas says that the categories *quando* and *ubi*, which result from the circumstances place and time, are both human “conceptions” and “properties of the acts,” while the circumstances themselves are both modes of what is done in the acts and outside the acts. But he goes on to say that acts, strictly speaking, do not have accidents, but rather the circumstances are “conditions” of the

¹¹² Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 7, s. 1, nn. 17-19 (Vives ed., 25:255-57); disp. 16, s. 2, nn. 3-4, 16 (Vives ed., 25:575, 579). See also Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 253-58, 272.

¹¹³ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Phil. Nat., pt. 1, q. 4, a. 2 (Vives ed., 2:83).

person acting, through the mediation of acts. This suggests that circumstances can belong to a subject as its modes.¹¹⁴ In the case of *habitus*, clothes are not merely external to a subject but also belong to it through a mode.

John's view offers a plausible interpretation of all the relevant texts from Aquinas. Aquinas claimed, in the text from *De potentia* quoted above, that clothes are not a form but are just spoken of in *habitus* as if they were a form.¹¹⁵ John concurs: extrinsic things constituting *habitus* are not forms inhering in a person. Rather, because of these extrinsic things, modes come to be in the person which ground the extrinsic denominations by which these accidents are named.¹¹⁶ Even though these accidents are signified as purely extrinsic, not as inhering modes, Aquinas claims that "nothing prevents something from being inhering, which nevertheless is not signified as inhering."¹¹⁷ In like manner, Bernardus Morisanus argues that, since categorical extrinsic denominations are said intrinsically of their subjects, there must be something intrinsically and absolutely in the subject that accounts for this denomination.¹¹⁸ So, on the realist modal view, while it is true that Aquinas holds that *habitus* and the other *sex principia* are named by extrinsic denominations, nothing in the texts that make those claims contradicts the claim that there is a real mode that underlies those denominations, and indeed other texts indicate that Aquinas also holds that there are such real modes. The extrinsic denomination view and intentional modal view do not take into account all that Aquinas says on this issue.

Furthermore, the realist modal view makes sense of Aquinas's texts on the categories as "modes of being." Aquinas seems to suggest that some modes of being, such as *actio* and

¹¹⁴ IV *Sent.*, d. 16, q. 3, a. 1, qq. 1 (*Opera omnia* [Parma: Fiacadori, 1858], 7.2:759-60); John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 19, a. 1 (Vives ed., 1:540).

¹¹⁵ *De Pot.*, q. 7, a. 10, ad 8 (Marietti ed., 2:211).

¹¹⁶ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 14, a. 5 (Vives ed., 1:442). Cf. III *Phys.*, lect. 5 (Leonine ed., 2:111-15); V *Metaphys.*, lect. 9 (Marietti ed., 237-40).

¹¹⁷ *De Pot.*, q. 8, a. 2 (Marietti ed., 216-19).

¹¹⁸ Morisanus, *In Aristotelis logicam*, Logica, d. 9, q. un. (Frankfurt ed., 138-39).

passio, are really reducible to others.¹¹⁹ But he also seems to say that each categorical mode of being is a real grade of being, having an act of existence and essence.¹²⁰ He furthermore says that *habitus* is a medium and quasi-action between two things, with no indication that he means this in a merely linguistic sense.¹²¹ While some modes of being, like *actio* and *passio*, are reducible to some other mode, in the sense that they are referred to one effect external to an agent, each mode of being, including *actio* and *passio*, is a distinct real mode in a subject, which grounds distinct modes of predication. For example, the *actio* of heating and the *passio* of being heated are both referred to one effect, the heat in the thing being heated, but while the *actio* refers the agent to this patient, it also involves a real change in the agent, explained by a real mode. Likewise, *habitus* refers the wearer to the things worn, but still really affects the wearer, which is explained by a real mode; in both cases, the reality of the mode is indicated by the way in which the subject—the agent in the case of *actio* and the wearer in the case of *habitus*—is denominated.¹²² In this way, Aquinas can be plausibly read as a realist about all the categories.

On the realist modal view, the dependence of the mode on the extrinsic thing explains the relational aspects of *habitus* without making *habitus* a categorical relation, a pure *respectus*, or a *respectus extrinsecus adveniens*. Explaining this involves another key distinction of John's, the distinction between real relations, or relations according to being (*relationes secundum esse*), and transcendental relations, or relations according to what is said (*relationes secundum dici*). A real relation is entirely dependent for its existence on the real existence of its foundation and its term. On John's view, it is a form really

¹¹⁹ III *Phys.*, lect. 4 (Leonine ed., 2:109-10); IX *Metaphys.*, lect. 8 (Marietti ed., 446-48); *De Pot.*, q. 10, a. 1 (Marietti ed., 2:253-56).

¹²⁰ *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 22.1:3-8); *De ente et essentia*, c. 1 (*Opera omnia* [Rome: Leonine ed., 1976], 43:369-70).

¹²¹ V *Metaphys.*, lect. 20, n. 1062 (Marietti ed., 277).

¹²² John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Phil. Nat., pt. 1, q. 14, a. 4 (Vives ed., 2:275-76), citing *De Pot.*, q. 8, a. 2. Cf. ScG II, c. 9 (*Opera Omnia* [Rome: Leonine ed., 1918], 13:284); Wippel, *Metaphysical Thought*, 227.

different from its foundation and its term, and inheres in the subject of the foundation, and orients it towards another (*ad aliud*) as toward a pure term. The relation of similarity is a relation in this sense. A transcendental relation is dependent on another (*ab alio*) as its cause, effect, measure, or as an extrinsically affecting thing, but it does not orient its subject towards another as toward a term, and it is really identical to its subject. For example, prime matter is transcendentially related to the substantial form that actualizes it: it is dependent on that form as formally causing it, but it is not oriented by a real relation over and above its own entity toward that form; rather, to be transcendentially related to or dependent on substantial form is just what it is to be prime matter.¹²³

A mode of *habitus* is transcendentially related to an extrinsic thing, and so is dependent on that thing but is not a real relation or orientation to it. This transcendental relation is identical to the mode, which is the medium whereby a subject has something outside itself, such as clothes, because the clothes, having been applied to the body, engender this mode of dependence.¹²⁴ Some who hold this view, such as Rubio, Goudin, and the Complutenses, call *habitus* a mode and a *respectus*, but by *respectus* they mean a dependence on an extrinsic entity, not an orientation towards that entity, as on the pure *respectus* view.¹²⁵ This view does not deny that we have an

¹²³ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 17, a. 2 (Vives ed., 1:498-503). Mastrius and Belluto, *Philosophiae*, p. 2, t. 3, d. 8, q. 1, n. 7 (Venice ed., 235), object to the Thomistic view that identifies a transcendental relation with its foundation; they allow (n. 12) that they are really identical, but contend that they are formally distinct, that is, they have distinct but inseparable quiddities. So an accident that is both an absolute mode and a transcendental *respectus* is not *per se* one. Cf. Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 47, s. 1, nn. 7, 10 (Vives ed., 26:783-84). Antonio Rubio, *Logica, Q. generalis pro omnibus sex ultimis praedicamentis* (Pillehotte ed., 455), responds that some absolute forms essentially include a transcendental relation, without compromising *per se* unity, since what is essentially in something is in its *per se* unity.

¹²⁴ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Logica, pt. 2, q. 19, a. 1 (Vives ed., 1:541-43). See John Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 76-77.

¹²⁵ Rubio, *Logica mexicana*, c. 10 (Pillehotte ed., 446); Complutenses, *Cursus sive disputationes in Aristotelis dialecticam et philosophiam naturalem*, d. 16, q. 1, concl. 1-2

orientation towards our clothes, but that this orientation is explained by a real relation, not by a mode of *habitus*. We must posit that mode to explain the unique sort of dependence and fittingness we have with our clothes, and how wearing clothes causes new completion and actualization in us.

Another Suárezian objection might be raised at this point: *habitus* can be explained as a unity of order. Sometimes things that are extrinsic to one another have the unity of order: they have relations to one another whereby they are, for example, oriented to the same goal, or jointly are in a place, or have a common shape, as with the parts of a house.¹²⁶ This is a genuine unity, less than the unity of a being, or the unity of a subject with its accidents, but greater than the unity of an aggregate, like a pile of rocks.¹²⁷ The Suárezian could argue that my clothes and I have unity of order: we are different things, but located in the same place, with the same shape and position, and my clothes are ordered to the goal of warming and ornamenting me, while I am ordered to a goal of expressing myself through them. No further being needs to be posited.

A proponent of the realist modal view can respond that wearing clothes causes more in me than that. I “fit” with my clothes, and they actualize my potencies for engaging with the world; this is best explained by a mode that is also a transcendental relation. In this manner, Rubio argues that by nature we are naked and without tools, but, because of our reason, we have a natural aptitude for an accommodation with and joining to clothes and tools; once we are dressed or hold tools, this aptitude is actualized, and this actualization of a natural aptitude or potency must be explained in terms of a new real accident, which is a mode inhering in the person, not an action performed by the person, though it is directed towards facilitating action.¹²⁸

(Compluti ed., 644-48); Goudin, *Philosophia*, Logica majoris prima pars, d. 2, q. 6, a. 1, concl 2 (Madrid ed., 1:242).

¹²⁶ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 51, s. 2, n. 10 (Vives ed., 26:982).

¹²⁷ Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 36, s. 3, n. 13 (Vives ed., 26:490); disp. 51, s. 5, nn. 11-12 (Vives ed., 26:1002).

¹²⁸ Rubio, *Logica mexicana*, c. 10, q. un. (Pillehotte ed., 450).

Another objection is that if *habitus* were a mode that some subject can have, then this would contradict Aristotle's claim that, in categorical *habitus*, the having is not itself had, since that would lead to an infinite regress of havings. Admittedly, this would not necessarily defeat the view, since Aristotle might have been wrong. But the modal realist can respond that although we "have" the mode, we do not have it in a way that would require positing another having between the subject and the mode, because modes immediately inhere in their subjects. "Having" a mode does not match any kind of having listed by Aristotle in any of his texts.

From his examples, it is clear that John follows Aquinas in thinking that this mode arises only as a result of human rational activity, though he thinks that animals can have *habitus* when they are clothed, and he also includes walls having coverings, such as paintings, in *habitus*.¹²⁹ He does not explain why this category only results from human activity; but, as we have seen, Rubio and Albert do, as do two twentieth-century Thomists, Charles de Koninck and Joseph Owens. De Koninck argues that *habitus* result from the potentially infinitely open-ended scope of human reason. We need to express and reveal ourselves, and we do so in part through our clothing, which can reveal our feelings, self-understanding, subjectivity, and social roles.¹³⁰ Furthermore, much of our experience of the world and of ourselves is mediated through our clothes: I am aware of myself in feeling my clothes around me, and thereby also aware of the world and of my shared materiality with the world.¹³¹ By wearing different sorts of clothes we are completed in different ways: we are by nature incomplete in our external coverings, so

¹²⁹ John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, v. 1, Logic pt. 2, q. 19, a. 4, p. 555, following, probably, Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 39, s. 2, n. 37 (Vives ed., 26:521); disp. 53, s. 2, n. 3 (Vives ed., 26:1010-11).

¹³⁰ DeKoninck, "Prolégomènes," 6-9, 18-19. This account resembles some of the claims of Karol Wojtyła that actions of the person reveal the person. cf. John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, v. 1, Logic pt. 2, q. 21, a. 6, pp. 596-99, following *De Verit.*, q. 7, a. 5 (Leonine ed., 22.1:205-6); ScG III, c. 49. Cf. Aquinas, *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 1, ad 3 (*Opera omnia* [Rome: Leonine ed., 1899], 10:350); Cajetan, *In II-II STh*, q. 168, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 10:350).

¹³¹ DeKoninck, "Prolégomènes," 20-23; Aristotle, *De anima* 2.11.423b15-17, 25-26.

that by reason we can adapt ourselves to an open-ended variety of environmental and social conditions.¹³² De Koninck does not mention modes, but he seems to have something like them in mind when explaining how *habitus* completes us. Owens is more explicit in endorsing the modal theory: he says that *habitus* is in the subject through its dependence on an extrinsic thing. He suggests that this sort of dependence is found even when artifacts are not immediately adjacent to the body and also in relation to other persons in institutions like marriage.¹³³ These extrinsic things affect a person in a way that limits and actualizes in a determinate way the person's potentially infinitely open-ended range of ways of relating to the world.

Furthermore, the realist modal view is well supported by and makes good sense of Aquinas's account of human reason's relation to material natures. Aquinas discusses this in texts that are similar to the text cited at the beginning of this article. These texts provide further evidential motivation for the realist modal view. When Aquinas discusses human reason's relation to material natures, he compares the infinite effects of human reason to the particular effects of animal nature.¹³⁴ Lower animals have instruments and coverings as body parts by nature. Even those extrinsic instruments that animals produce, such as the nests of birds or the insect-gathering sticks of apes, are the result not of reason, but of natural impulse based on cognition of particulars.¹³⁵ But the human body is adapted by the rational soul for the expression of the potentially infinite effects of reason, and so the human body shares in reason's open-ended cognitive, appetitive, and productive scope. This is seen in the ability of the hands to fashion any sort of artifact and the ability of the vocal organs to express anything known by reason; reason can use both the human body and artifacts, as its

¹³² DeKoninck, "Prolégomènes," 12-18. Cf. Cajetan, *In II-II STh*, q. 6, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 9:84-85).

¹³³ Owens, *Metaphysics*, 208-9.

¹³⁴ See, e.g., *STh* I, q. 76, a. 5, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 5:228).

¹³⁵ See Cajetan, *In II-II STh*, q. 66, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 9:84-85).

instruments.¹³⁶ Furthermore, because of reason, humans affect themselves in ways different from the ways in which lower animals affect themselves. By reason, we can invent artifacts which have as their end the modification of the human body, for the sake of changing how we relate to the world, as when we build houses to protect ourselves.¹³⁷ When we invent and use such artifacts, we do not only take on a new spatial relation to them and new actions towards them. Rather, the open-ended range of ways that we could engage with the world is actualized in a definite way. An artifact confers new “powers” or “habits” on me for efficaciously engaging with the world. Such a self-affecting is unprecedented among lower material things, and it is plausible to explain it through a new kind of being, a *habitus*.

The category *habitus* can be compared to *habitus* in the category of quality, such as virtues and vices. Just as they cannot produce genuine artifacts, so nonhuman animals cannot have virtue and vices, because reason is required to have these. But lower animals can naturally have bodily dispositions, such as beauty and strength, which are similar to qualitative *habitus* in that they are tendencies to act in a certain way. Because we have reason, we not only can have these dispositions naturally, but we can form them in ourselves, just as we make artifacts. Our bodies can be formed to obey reason, as when we train our hands to play a musical instrument. And we can train non-human animals to have incomplete qualitative *habitus*, like our virtues or vices. Similarly, we can give them accidents in the category of *habitus* by putting artifacts, like clothes, on them, for our own purposes. Lower animals, like all material things, can be modified by human reason in ways of which they are not

¹³⁶ I *Peryermeneias*, lect. 2, n. 2 (*Opera omnia* [Rome: Leonine ed., 1882], 1:11); lect. 6, n. 8 (Leonine ed., 1:32); *STh* I, q. 91, a. 3, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 5:394). This account of human rationality as directly involving and requiring artifacts is similar to that of the “extended mind” theorists Andy Clark and David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” in Richard Meany, *The Extended Mind* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010), 27-39; and of the phenomenologists Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 70-71, 95-101; and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 2002), 164-67.

¹³⁷ I *Sent.*, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1 (*Opera omnia* [Parma: Fiacadori, 1856], 6.1:522-23).

capable by nature.¹³⁸ Humans can produce modes of *habitus* in lower animals (and in inanimate things, as when we put paintings on a wall), for material things have an open-ended range of possibilities for obeying human reason. Reason's activity expands outward into the material world, in order to act more effectively and actualize our possibility for engaging with the world, so that we reach perfection. When we apply one material thing to another for the sake of completing these possibilities, it is plausible to hold that a mode of *habitus* results in the material thing, just as it is plausible to posit such a mode in myself when I bring an artifact into adjacency with myself. Artifacts complete us and other things in various ways, and this completion is, metaphysically, a mode.

That artifacts intrinsically and really affect us, and so real modes of *habitus* should be posited, is further seen from Aquinas's claim that the use of artifacts affects our ethical state, as in his discussion of the virtue of modesty, which moderates our use of external things. One can be immoderate in this use either through excessive or deficient use of externals relative to the customs of a place or through inordinate attachment to externals, as when one seeks excessive pleasure through ornamentation in clothing.¹³⁹ Much of the virtue of modesty can be explained as part of the virtue of honesty: clothing and other externals signify one's role or state in life and should truthfully

¹³⁸ See *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 8, ad 5 (Marietti ed., 2:62); *Compendium theologiae* I, c. 104 (*Opera omnia* [Rome: Leonine ed., 1979], 42:120); *STh* I-II, q. 50, a. 3, ad 2 (Leonine ed., 6:319); Cajetan, *De potentia neutra et de natura potentiae receptivae*, q. 1, n. 1 (*Opuscula omnia* [Lyon: Apud haeredos Iacobi Iuntae, 1562], 3:206); q. 2, n. 3, p. 207; *In I STh*, q. 106, a. 1 nn. 5-6 (Leonine ed., 5:483); q. 111, a. 3 (Leonine ed., 5:518); da Fonseca, *In IX Metaphys.*, c. 1, q. 4, s. D (Frankfurt ed., 607); Suárez, *Disp. Metaphys.*, disp. 16, s. 2, nn. 17-18 (Vives ed., 25:579-80); disp. 43, s. 4, n. 17 (Vives ed., 26:650); John of St. Thomas, *Cursus phil.*, Nat. Phil. pt. 1, q. 4, a. 2 (Vives ed., 81-84); Lawrence Feingold, *The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas and His Interpreters* (Naples: Sapientia Press, 2010), 107. On these other sorts of *habitus*, and on the ways in which lower natures are obedient to human rationality, see my "Habits, Potencies, and Obedience: Experiential Evidence for Thomistic Hylomorphism," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (2014): forthcoming.

¹³⁹ *STh* II-II, q. 169, a. 1 (Leonine ed., 10:356-57).

represent these things.¹⁴⁰ But this does not explain everything about modesty, which also requires that the externals be fitting (*convenientes*) to the wearer, since externals can add to the beauty of the human body.¹⁴¹ Bodily beauty is a disposition (*habilitatio*) of the body, a proportion among its parts with a perfection of color.¹⁴² We can, through treating the body as an artifact, increase this beauty through applying artifacts to the body, as when one uses jewelry to augment one's beauty; these artifacts supplement and follow upon our natural inclinations.¹⁴³ Although artifacts have much about them that is conventional, our inclination to produce them is not, nor is their effect. If the application of artifacts to the body can supplement and affect bodily dispositions, then this application is not something purely extrinsic to the body but something that intrinsically affects the body. We can immodestly desire the increase in beauty that comes from their use; what we immoderately desire is not just the artifacts themselves, but the artifacts as applied to and intrinsically affecting us and our way of comporting ourselves toward the world. This moral difference in modesty is founded on a real metaphysical difference, which is well explained through a mode.

CONCLUSION

Based on all the foregoing, I can now offer a quasi-definition of *habitus* and an account of its extension. Something is a *habitus* if and only if it is a really existing mode left in its subject by something extrinsic to the subject, where the extrinsic thing fits with the subject, the subject is dependent on the extrinsic thing, one of the subject's unlimitedly open-ended potencies for rationally engaging with the world is actualized by the extrinsic thing, and the extrinsic thing has been applied to the subject for some humanly rationally guided purpose or use.

¹⁴⁰ *STh* II-II, q. 168, a. 1, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 10:350); q. 169, a. 1, ad 3 (Leonine ed., 10:357).

¹⁴¹ Cajetan, *In II-II STh*, q. 169, a. 2, nn. 2-3 (Leonine ed., 10:169-72).

¹⁴² *STh* II-II, q. 145, a. 2 (Leonine ed., 10:147).

¹⁴³ *In I Cor.*, c. 11, v. 5, lect. 2, n. 598 (Lander, Wy.: Aquinas Institute, 2012), 224.

Owens is correct, I think, that the range of extrinsic things that constitute such a mode is broader than the clothing and weapons generally mentioned. Any tool that is actively being used actualizes one's potencies for engaging with the world in a definite way and the user is thereby dependent on the tool, and so any tool that is actively being used brings about a mode of *habitus*. This includes entering a building, using any vehicle or animal for transportation, and using lexical artifacts like written texts. Likewise, John of St. Thomas seems to me correct in saying that any time a human person puts one artifact on another for the sake of ornamenting or otherwise fitting with the latter, a mode of *habitus* results in the latter. Furthermore, Owens seems right to me in including engagements with other people who are adjacent to one in some way, as when one comes together with another to perform a political action or a sexual act, as constituting a mode of *habitus*.

A realist understanding of *habitus* is important for fully understanding human persons and their relation to the world, as well as for understanding the nature of accidents and of categories; merely understanding *habitus* as a kind of extrinsic denomination is insufficient for understanding these things, and all other view of *habitus* reduce to these two views. While this category was underexplored by Aristotle, its importance is highlighted by the debates over it in the Scholastic literature. Attentiveness to this topic may give one a deeper taste of the complexities of Scholastic metaphysics, a greater openness to the rich realism of accidents, and an appreciation for the grandeur of the human person expressed in the realist modal view.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ I am grateful to John Boyle, Gloria Frost, Marie George, Matthews Grant, Robert Pasnau, Faith Pawl, Tim Pawl, Sydney Penner, Mike Rota, Christopher Schabel, and some anonymous referees for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.