The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review

SOME ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON AND COSMOLOGICAL PROOFS "Laws like the principle of sufficient reason . . . are about the net and not about what the net describes." (Ludwig Wittgenstein) "What a pity science cannot resolve to keep people under discipline and to keep itself in check!" (Kierkegaard 's Vigilius Haufniensis) RCENT literature concerning cosmological proofs for the existence of God has stressed their employment of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). Though in the past many critics of theistic arguments have not only not recognized the operation of this principle but also have criticized theists for employing a version of the principle of causality explicitly rejected by many in the theistic tradition/ contemporary criticism has generally acknowledged the functioning of the PSR. This is not to .say, however, that the principle has not been found wanting. In fact, confining ourselves just to discussions of what we might call in a preliminary way its " truth," two types of criticism seem to have been advanced. The first type, developing a characterization used by James F. Ross, might be called "Humean" so as to stress its epistemological character as well as its similarity with standard empiricist procedures against the principleof causality. The other type, which might be called " theological," attempts to reveal the incompatibility of the PSR with the existence of 1 See W. Norris Clarke, S. J., "A Curious Blindspot in the Anglo-American Tradition of Anti-Theistic Argument," The Monist, 54 (1970), pp. 181-~00. ~58 SUFFICIENT REASON AND COSMOLOGICAL PROOFS fl59 a free creator God; the PSR must thus be repudiated by traditional theists themselves. Our first concern, in section I, will be a presentation of various " Humean" arguments as they have been developed by Professor Ross 2 and by Professor William L. Rowe.3 In section II we shall develop and discuss their criticisms of the PSR in an effort to come to a correct understanding of the meaning, status, and function of the principle. Our contention will be that both critics and defenders have not always been clear on these issues, especially on the difference between " Rationalist " and " Aristotelian " understandings of the PSR and cosmological argumentation. We shall argue that there are at least two ways the PSR oan be denied, that there is a different type of absurdity involved in each denial, and that the context and nature of the denials must be stressed by one who would successfully defend the principle. In view of the complex structure of the " theological " ·argumentation of both Ross and Rowe, and since much of what we would say in response would be a reiteration of what was developed earlier, we shall confine ourselves in section III to a presentation of what we consider the basic claims of this type of critique. Our analysis in section IV will stress the essential modesty of the " Aristotelian " PSR; instead of providing the basis for an overbearing rationalism, scientism, and determinism, this PSR seemingly functions to render philosophical theology a discipline which attains its goal in a simultaneous recognition of its essential incompleteness with regard to possible truths about the divine. 2 James F. Ross, Philosophical Theology (Indianapolis and New York: The BobbsMerrill Company, 1969). 3 In "The Cosmological Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason," Man and World, 1 (1968), pp. ~78-9~. In "The Cosmological Argument," No-Us, 5 (1971), pp. 49-61, Rowe presents a "theological" argument, but in the process clarifies his formulations of the PSR. (Our essay was written previously to the publication of Rowe's more detailed analyses in his The Cosmological Argument (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975)). 260 CHARLES J. KELLY I. The following four objections to the PSR havebeen advanced (the first two by James F. Ross, the third and fourth byWilliam L. Rowe): 1. Since the principle that everything has (must have) an explanation or sufficient reason is assumed without proof, how is it known to be true? Any attempt to establish it as true runs into the dilemma: a) If the PSR is known by induction its absolute universality cannot be established. It can only be a synthetic principle of doubtful truth, since a finite body of evidence is available which could...