The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review

BRIEF NOTICES Neuf Lel}ons sur les Notions Premieres de la Philosophie Morale. By JACQUES MARITAIN. Paris: Tequi, 1952. Pp. 195. In this volume M. Maritain studies the basic principles of moral philosophy in nine " lessons," just as he did in the field of metaphysics, in his Sept Lel}ons sur L'Etre. The author realizes the need for the moralist to make a scientific and sympathetic approach to the discoveries of Freud and other modern psychologists. He studies the various great ethical systems, with special emphasis on the general principles of classical ethics, of Kant, and of the sociological school. With this background, Maritain proceeds to a discussion of the good, value, judgments of value, the end and finality, the norm or rule of morality, duty and obligation, and sanction. Throughout it is the author's aim to present these basic questions according to the Thomistic doctrine, with a minimum of technical expression . As the eminent Thomist, Fr. J.-M. Ramirez, 0. P., has noted, Maritain is not always too clear in his expositions, but one can see that he has touched upon all the major problems of moral philosophy. We shall limit ourselves to a brief discussion of some points of particular interest. Of major importance is the author's discussion of the two main aspects of the moral good. The first is that of value, in the perspective of formal causality, signifying the intrinsically good quality of a human act; the second is the consideration of the moral good in the perspective of finality, of that to which man tends as a free agent. In the order of pure values, one is concerned with the specification of the moral act, and with a static order, while in the dynamic order of morality, of efficient causality or exercise, it is the consideration of finality that is supreme. Except for the use of the term "value," this is the classical Thomistic conception of the absolute and relative aspects of the moral act. The absolute deals with the abstract consideration of the human act in its goodness (as compared to the judgment of reason, e. g., the abstract goodness of an act of justice); the relative view concerns the moral agent, the act, and their relation to the ultimate end in the actual order. Maritain lays far greater emphasis, it seems, on the absolute, on '' value," though, on the other hand, St. Thomas would appear to emphasize the aspect of finality as primary and dominant in the moral order. Involved here is the very difficult problem of what, in the last analysis, specifies the moral act. An act is absolutely good, morally speaking, when in conformity with a judgment of suitability, of "value "-thus the author analyses the notion of a "bonum honestum morale" in the order of specification and formal causality: "value" applies to something which of itself has the quality of evoking love for itself, and is a good in itself to which the will naturally tends. In virtue of a judg595 596 BRIEF NOTICES ment bearing on such a " value," a human act is specified as good. The problem here is-what function does finality, the consideration of the ultimate end, play in the order of specification? What function does finality play in determining what is good, and according to right reason? One may say that an act is termed morally good or evil in a relation of conformity or difformity, of adaptation or lack of adaptation to the ultimate end of man. Just how are these two aspects of the morally good act to be conceived in their mutual relations? Space does not allow us to enter into a discussion of this matter at the present time, but it may be remarked that in the Thomistic moral theory, it is necessary to consider the role of finality, not only in the order of exercise, but also in that of specification. M. Maritain has made too great a distinction between the final and the formal aspects of the morally good act, and he should have discussed the relation of the human act to man's ultimate end in his consideration of the specification of the human act...