A Grand Strategy or a Military Operation?: A Reconsideration of the Lingzhou Campaign of 1081
- A Grand Strategy or a Military Operation?A Reconsideration of the Lingzhou Campaign of 1081
In the summer of 1081, Dowager Empress Liang 梁太后 (?–1085) of Xi Xia 西夏 staged a coup, temporarily imprisoning her son Xia Huizong 夏 惠宗 (1060–1086), for his having discarded Xi Xia court ritual in favour of Chinese ceremonies.1 The coup was reported to the reigning Song emperor Shenzong 宋神宗 (1048–1085) by Vice Supreme Director of Operations of Fuyan Circuit 鄜延路 Chong E 種諤 (1017–1083), urging a quick response to the precious opportunity to launch a punitive expedition against Xi Xia. To restore the Song emperor as the rightful ruler of the Tangut people and recover the old borders of Han (202 bce–ce 220) and Tang (618–907) times, Chong E appealed to lead armies that would sweep over the Sino-Tangut frontier and extinguish the Xi Xia dynasty. If the court found it difficult to mobilize troops for a large expedition, Chong pleaded with Shenzong to "just authorize me to lead the nine legions of Fuyan Circuit and overrun them."2 He even boasted he could conquer the leaderless Xia state and bring the child emperor Huizong back to Kaifeng.3
For the next several months, the Song kept a close eye on the Xi Xia internal crisis. Wang Anshi 王安石 (1021–1086), as Jingguo gong (荊國公), had insisted [End Page 371] on domestic improvement before entering armed confrontation with Xi Xia. However, once Wang was out of office and the emperor was surrounded by ineffective men like Wang Gui 王珪 (1019–1085) and opportunists like Cai Que 蔡確 (1037–1093), Shenzong felt no longer restrained.4
Ambitious to revitalize the empire and conquer the fragile and unstable Xi Xia, Shenzong ordered a five-pronged punitive attack. The campaign was mainly led by the men who had served in the Xihe Campaign (Xihe kai bian 熙河開邊) of Wang Shao 王韶 (1030–1081): In addition to Chong E, the commanders included Gao Zunyu 高遵裕 (1027–1086), Liu Changzuo 劉 昌祚 (1022–1089), the eunuch Wang Zhongzheng 王中正 (1028–1099) and Li Xian 李憲 (1035–1086).5 The primary objective of this expedition was to recover Lingzhou 靈州, previously the western gate to Song territory which was captured by Xi Xia in 1002, if not a complete elimination of Xi Xia. The five commanders led nearly 400,000 warriors, supported by about the same number of transport troops, converging on Lingzhou and Xingzhou 興州, the capital of Xi Xia.6
However, the campaign turned out to be a debacle. Song was violently defeated, hundreds of thousands of lives were lost. Four out of the five generals [End Page 372] were relegated (all except Li Xian, who captured Lanzhou 蘭州). In particular, Gao Zunyu was severely blamed as "Zunyu [who] lost the campaign, causing millions to be killed" (Zunyu lingwu zhiyi, tutan baiwan 遵裕靈武之役, 塗 炭百萬).7 He was then demoted to be the Yingzhou tuanlian fushi 郢州團 練副使 (Yingzhou military training vice commissioner).
Yet, this disastrous defeat of the Song armies raises many questions. In fact, how much responsibility should Gao justly bear for Song's defeat? What happened among the five commanders during the campaign? Was the Lingzhou Campaign a simple military action or a grand political strategy that involved more complexity than is thought for launching the expedition? This essay attempts to arrive at a more objective and judicious account through an investigation and reconstruction of the Lingzhou Campaign of 1081.
Process of the Lingzhou Campaign
Gao Zunyu, styled Gongchuo 公綽, enjoyed a dual identity as both a military general and royal relative. He was maternal uncle to Shenzong; his grandfather Gao Qiong 高瓊 (935–1006) having been a senior military commander in early Song. His father Gao Jixuan 高繼宣 occupied prominent positions such as Meizhou fang yushi 眉州防禦使 (Meizhou defense commissioner) in Sichuan.8 Gao Zunyu was not assigned to senior position until 1067, the year that Song Yingzong 宋英宗 (1032–1067) died, when Gao was in his early forties. Gao was designated as an ambassador to Xi Xia. Against Xi Xia's provocations, Gao defended Song's royal esteem. Later, the successful military operations Gao undertook, such as conquering Hezhou 河州 (1073) and defending Minzhou 岷州 (1074), won him Shenzong's recognition.9 After decades of waiting, it seemed his career had moved into a rising track; nonetheless...
