SAIS Review of International Affairs

Ronald Reagan is one of America's most perplexing presidents. Some see him as a detached and distracted former actor who charmed his way into the world's most powerful office. Others say he was uniquely gifted with an ability to cut through complexities to the essence of issues and, using extraordinary communication skills, able to mobilize public support for noble causes. Some see him as a president who stoked the Cold War; others see him as the president wise enough to know how to end it.

The great value of James Mann's remarkable book is that he successfully threads through these conflicting interpretations to present a balanced portrait of this enigmatic figure, whose "rebellion" was against most of the conventional views embodied in the advice coming from his foreign policy advisors. With some exceptions, notably Reagan's Secretary of State George Shultz, Reagan's advisors underlined the dangers and potential for deception as then-Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev moved onstage in the mid to late 1980s. In Mann's account, Reagan was clearly not naïve about the dangers and uncertainties, but he was also more alert than many of his advisors to the opportunities Gorbachev presented.

Mann makes clear that Reagan's conviction was not based primarily on deep study of the Soviet Union, on intelligence reports, or on State Department assessments. It flowed mainly from confidence in his own ability to judge people, to understand what motivated them, and to develop relationships of trust and confidence.

One side of Reagan that Mann documents is his tendency to ignore the formal positions prepared by the bureaucracy for his meetings with foreign leaders, including Gorbachev, and instead to engage them in seemingly trivial personal conversation, swap jokes, and generally behave in ways that some of his top aides considered embarrassing.

Mann also covers the various ways in which Reagan was influenced by people outside official circles. He mentions, for example, that Reagan chose to sign an important arms control treaty with Moscow at a date and time set by his wife's astrologer. Mann also covers, in detail not available elsewhere, the relationship of trust that Reagan developed with American cultural historian [End Page 149] Suzanne Massie, who placed more emphasis than any of Reagan's official advisors on sociological and cultural factors as key drivers of Soviet policy. Reagan appeared to think that Massie had a deeper understanding than others of what motivated Russians. He met with her at least 20 times and used her as a secret personal emissary to Gorbachev—something that perplexed and annoyed his foreign policy team.

But Mann also documents another side of Reagan—the president as shrewd operator and wise visionary. His bottom line is that Reagan's judgments about the Soviet Union and the Cold War were fundamentally correct. When others with more Soviet experience, such as Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, suspected and warned that Gorbachev was probably just another in a long line of hide bound Soviet leaders, Reagan somehow sensed that Gorbachev was different. He understood, moreover, that the Soviet economy had inherent weaknesses that would not permit it to compete with the West for much longer. He was correct in defying his advisors, who incorrectly warned that his Berlin speech in 1988 ("Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!") would alienate the Russians. And he seemed to understand that the Cold War could be brought to an end through a combination of pressure, persuasion, and strengthened bilateral dealings.

Mann's analysis rings true to me in part because I personally saw all these facets of Ronald Reagan on the one occasion when, as an intelligence officer, I had the opportunity to brief him. This was in 1991, prior to a trip that the retired president was about to take to Russia, Poland, and Germany. All of his trademarks were on display. He listened attentively but interrupted occasionally with an apt joke. He seemed particularly interested in the personal qualities of those he would meet but...