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Abstract

In the writings of the Chinese Madhyamaka master Jizang (549–623CE), we often read arguments that deduce universal affirmation from universal negation. In previous scholarship, this seemingly paradoxical reasoning was often explained by ascribing to Jizang a type of transcendental realism—the view that reality transcends our ordinary language, logic, and reason—and reading it as his unique way of capturing such transcendental nature of reality. More recently, an attempt at formalizing this transcendental realist interpretation of Jizang was made by Yasuo Deguchi, who suggests that Jizang could have been tinkering with a type of dialethism. This paper challenges the transcendental realist interpretation of Jizang by studying strong anti-realist tendencies found across his writings, and proposes a way to understand his deduction of universal affirmation from universal negation within the boundaries of ordinary reasoning and coherently with his anti-realist philosophy by introducing the modalities of “categorical truth” and “conditional truth.”

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