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THE SHORT ANSWER: IMPLICATIONS FOR DIRECT COMPOSITIONALITY
(AND VICE VERSA): ONLINE APPENDICES

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These appendices address two additional arguments that have been given for the SILENT LINGUISTIC MATERIAL hypothesis (SLM; see in particular Merchant 2004). These arguments purport to show that a movement analysis of the fragment answer is necessary, and this in turn supports SLM. For if there is movement of the fragment, there must be surrounding material out of which the fragment moved. The first argument (Appendix A) concerns preposition stranding and has played a key role in much literature (especially on SLUICING, but many of the same points are relevant to fragment answers). The second concerns islands (Appendix B). I show that both cases are unconvincing, for two reasons. First, the actual facts are unclear. Second, even if the purported generalizations were correct, SLM does not actually account for the full range of facts. As to the account of the facts under Qu-Ans, here too there remain open questions, so I am not putting these domains forward as arguments for Qu-Ans either. The point is simply that both domains need to be better understood before any conclusion can be drawn from them. At this point, however, they certainly do not provide evidence for SLM.

APPENDIX A: THE P-STRANDING GENERALIZATION

One of the most frequently cited arguments for an SLM analysis of sluicing—and which has also been used to argue for SLM in fragment answers—is the so-called PREPOSITION STRANDING (hereafter, P-stranding) generalization (Merchant 2001, 2004). The argument is intended to support not just SLM *PER SE*, but also the movement-plus-deletion/silencing account of SLM. I elucidate the argument in the context of fragment answers by first considering the situation in English, a language that allows P-stranding in WH-questions and other fronting constructions. Thus both 1a and 1b are possible questions.

- (1) a. To whom did Carly reveal her secret?
- b. Who did Carly reveal her secret to?

Focusing just on 1a for the moment, either of the answers in 2 is also possible.

- (2) a. To Mick.
- b. Mick.

(Notice that both versions of 2 are also possible answers to 1b, a fact that I put aside for now but return to below.) The crux of the P-stranding argument is that languages that do not allow P-stranding (and hence do not allow questions analogous to the version in 1b) allow only answers with a preposition, analogous to the English case in 2a; fragment answers parallel to the English answer 2b are not allowed. The claim is that this follows if fragment answers require movement followed by deletion/silencing; 2b could not be derived since the movement required to front just a single NP (as opposed to a full PP) would be blocked. In other words, using English words for the sake of illustration, the non-P-stranding language would not allow the fragment answer in 2b because this would covertly have to be a structure like 3, which would be disallowed in that language (the notation $\otimes$ is used to mean that sentences corresponding to 3 are bad in the class of languages that do not allow P-stranding).

(3) $\otimes$ Mick, [_{FP} Shh [~~Carly revealed her secret to t~~]].

Merchant 2004 illustrates this generalization by citing English, Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish all as languages of the English variety (P-stranding allowed, and fragment answers like 2b allowed as answers to questions like 1a). By contrast, Greek, German, Yiddish, Czech, Russian, Bulgarian, and Hebrew all do not allow P-stranding in questions, and similarly do not allow fragments like 2b as answers to questions such as 1a. (Additional data regarding the corresponding argument for sluicing is provided in Merchant 2001.)

However, it is not at all clear what conclusion to draw from this domain, since the issues are murky for at least three reasons. First, assume that the generalization is correct. Then it is once again hasty to jump to the conclusion that 2b must COME FROM a full fuller sentence of the form in 3. Once again, the two could be bad for the same reason. After all, we in any case need an account of what determines whether a language allows P-stranding in the first place. One view on that—putting this in traditional movement terms—is that in a language like English, a feature such as a WH-feature (or any other feature that allows for something to move) is possible both on the NP with the WH-morphology (and semantics) and on the PP containing it (see, for example, the sort of feature-passing convention approach to pied-piping developed in Gazdar et al. 1985),¹ while in the noN-P-stranding languages, the relevant feature can only be on the PP (obviously, then, this is not the same as the feature relevant to WH-morphology). We have already seen that under Qu-Ans, the category of the WH-expression must match that of the answer, and that this can be ensured by encoding the information about that category onto the root node. Then, in a P-stranding language like English where the relevant feature can be on either the NP or the PP, one can imagine feature-passing conventions such that the root node in the question in 1a can be encoded with the information that the ‘WH-category’ is NP or the information that it is PP (since both can be marked as such in English). In a language with obligatory pied-piping (thus where only PPs can be marked with the appropriate feature that sanctions extraction), this would then of course be the only category that can be appropriately marked on the root node. I leave open the question of how to extend this to sluicing as we have not dealt here with the matching effects in sluicing, but see Ginzburg & Sag 2000 for relevant discussion of a similar ‘direct matching’ account in sluicing. Nonetheless, I propose this sketchily and tentatively (and in movement terms), not because the full details cannot be worked out, but because before taking the space needed to do so, I need to be sure that the generalization is actually correct.

This brings us to the second murkiness of this domain: it not clear that the generalization is correct. Indeed, there has been substantial discussion about this, in particular as it relates to the corresponding argument in the case of sluicing. Because the generalization (or lack thereof) has received the most attention in the context of sluicing (rather than fragment answers), we turn our attention here to that body of literature. So first let us briefly consider the P-stranding argument in the sluicing domain (where the argument originally was made in Merchant 2001). The relevant facts in English are that both sluices are possible in 4.

(4) Carly revealed her secret to someone, but I don’t know who/to whom.

But in a language that does not permit P-stranding in questions, Merchant’s claim was that only the remnant with the preposition is allowed. Since then, however, several at least seeming counterexamples have come to light, including—among others—Brazilian Portuguese (Almeida & Yoshida 2007), Spanish (Rodrigues et al. 2009), and Polish (Sag & Nykiel 2011). These languages do not permit P-stranding, but allow prepositionless sluice remnants. (Presumably the same facts carry over to the fragment answer case,

¹ This account, of course, does not actually use movement, but is an explicit account of what can occur in the dislocated position in terms of the feature-passing conventions.

although this remains to be verified for the full range of relevant languages; it is verified for Polish in Nykiel 2016).

This is hardly the end of the story, for there is also a substantial body of literature (Rodrigues et al. 2009, van Craenenbroeck 2010) designed to save the P-stranding generalization by hypothesizing that the apparent counterexamples derive from ordinary clefts or ‘short clefts’ rather than from the full WH-source (we consider here only the proposal based on ‘short clefts’, which is common in the relevant literature). English words are again used to illustrate, as this can serve as a stand-in for the class of languages at issue. Thus imagine a language with obligatory pied-piping in questions, but that allow sluices like 4 in which the ‘remnant’ can simply be *who* (without the preposition). Then the claim is that the hidden material here is only *it was t*. The postcopular position (occupied here by the trace) is not one requiring a preposition; hence the lack of pied-piping in the remnant is unsurprising. In other words, the structure for 4 is as shown in 5.

(5) Carly revealed her secret to someone, but I don’t know who [Shh [~~it was t~~]].

Notice that while the *it was t* portion is often called a ‘short cleft’, it is unclear whether this really has anything to do with ordinary clefts. More likely, it is simply an equative copular construction, where *it* (and its analogue in the languages in question) is a general anaphor picking up—in 5—the contextually salient concept of the individual to whom Carly revealed her secret. (Of course, it is also possible that ordinary clefts should be analyzed as containing some of these ingredients too.) But either way, under this analysis the identity condition on the sister of Shh must be semantic (in some loose sense); there is no remote formal identity between *it was t* and any portion of previous linguistic material. The analysis would easily extend to the case of fragment answers. Thus an obligatory pied-piping language that allows for prepositionless fragments (such as Polish) could allow the question-answer pair as shown in 6.

(6) Q: To whom did Carly reveal her secret?

A: Mick, [Shh [~~it was t~~]].

Here, *it* can again be thought of as picking up the contextually salient concept of the individual to whom Carly revealed her secret, where the answer in 6 just equates that individual with [Mick]. Again, of course, the conditions on the sister of Shh (allowing *it was t* to be silenced) have to be semantic.

Although there are arguments in favor of this analysis (see for example Rodrigues et al. 2009), it obviously opens up a whole new set of questions. For one thing, one has to wonder why the P-stranding correlation should ever hold. Any language that has short clefts or an all-purpose anaphor like *it* (including a null pronoun) and some way to express identity (i.e. something like the copula *be*) should allow pairs like 6. Nor would there be an explanation for CASE MATCHING (even leaving aside the difficulty discussed in the main article for SLM’s account of case matching). For example, as was pointed out in Merchant 2001 and van Craenenbroeck 2010, Greek shows the usual case-matching facts in sluicing, which would be a surprise if short clefts were a possible source since the relevant portion in a short cleft is nominative. The sluicing pattern is seen in 7.

(7) I astinomia anedrine enan apo tous Kiprious prota, ala dhen ksero
 the police interrogated one.ACC from the Cypriots first but not I.know
 *pjos /pjon.
 who.NOM /who.ACC
 ‘The police interrogated one of the Cypriots first, but I don’t know who.’

But if the remnant after ‘who’ here could be a short cleft (or equative construction), this would not follow, since the full version contains nominative case.

- (8) ... ala dhen dsero pjos /*pjon tan.
 but not I.know who.NOM /*who.ACC it.was
 ‘... but I don’t know who it was.’

(It should be pointed out again that the discussion here is incomplete in that case matching in sluicing has not been treated, but again I refer the reader to Ginzburg & Sag 2000 for one possible direct-matching theory. A direct-matching analysis would of course have no problem with 7.)

The short-cleft analysis of the apparent violations of the P-stranding generalization would thus appear to undermine much of the rationale for SLM in general. Yet once again the story is not over: van Craenenbroeck (2010) attempts to resolve this dilemma by proposing a principle of ‘last resort’, formulated as follows: ‘An underlying cleft is only used in sluicing when the corresponding wh-question is independently unavailable’ (p. 1720). But this is a mere informal statement. Just whether and how it can be formalized is unclear, and until it is formalized there is no way to evaluate its complexity, nor can we evaluate whether it follows from independent principles or is just a stipulation regarding a narrow set of data. In fact, there are very good reasons to be suspicious of such a principle. For example, I assume that just about no theory would expect the grammar to have available to it a category ‘sluicing’ (even though as linguists we (roughly) understand the range of sentences that fall under this descriptive notion). But without such a notion, how can the grammar ‘know’ to correspond the putative short-cleft source of 8 with the different version that uses accusative case and contains as its hidden linguistic material the fuller structure (i.e. the material *pjon anerine i astinomia*, which translates as ‘who.ACC the police interrogated’)? As far as the GRAMMAR is concerned, these two have little in common. They ‘mean’ the same thing to speakers, but this is only after the referent of *it* is supplied (which is unlikely to happen via a grammatical process). And the two competing versions do not have the same surface form. So by what algorithm can the grammar compute that sluicing (or Shh) is unavailable for 8? Until such a question is answered, the proposal is incomplete.

Related to this is the fact that the notion of the ‘corresponding WH-question’ is undefined. Note that the analysis assumes that the availability of the full WH-question ‘source’ for sluicing (which uses accusative case on the WH-word) counts as a competitor for 8 (with a different case marking) and hence blocks the short-cleft source (this is crucial for explaining why case matching must hold). But the analysis also assumes that a full WH-question ‘source’ for sluicing in which pied-piping has occurred does not count as a competitor for the short-cleft source; this lack of competition is necessary for explaining the very fact that the sluice without a preposition is good. I assume that van Craenenbroeck’s idea here is that the prepositionless sluice fragment could NOT have been derived from the corresponding WH-question and so the short-cleft source is allowed. But by the very same token, the nominative version of 7 ALSO could not have been derived from the full WH-question source (because the fronted WH would have to be accusative). So why could one not reason that here too the corresponding WH-source of 7 (with nominative) is unavailable, and hence the short-cleft source (shown in 8) should be good? Again, the analysis is incomplete without an answer to this. Hence, until the last-resort principle is formalized—and until it can be shown that it is more than just a construction-specific stipulation—there is little reason to believe that the short-cleft analysis is viable, and thus it is unclear as to whether the P-stranding generalization is correct.²

Finally, there are interesting open questions about how the full set of relevant facts even in English should be accounted for. The problems are different for the two different theories, but neither theory seamlessly accounts for everything. To best illustrate, we need to shift from examples like 1 and 2, where the

² The remarks above assume that the intent of this principle is to be a principle of grammar, not a principle of processing or production. While the latter types of ‘transderivational’ principles are somewhat less objectionable in that we know that competition-driven effects do play a major role in processing and in production, I see no way to recast this in terms of either processing or production.

preposition at issue is arguably a meaningless case-marking preposition similar to cases where the preposition is surely meaningful. Consider, then, the question in 9, which allows either 10a or 10b as an answer.

(9) Q: Into which hole did Alice fall?

(10) a. A: Into the one belonging to the Mad Hatter.

b. A: The one belonging to the Mad Hatter.

Under SLM, 10a is unproblematic. The relevant portion of the question is *Alice fall* [_{PP} *t*], and the representation of the answer (ignoring tense) would be *Into the one belonging to the Mad Hatter* [_{FP} *Shh* [*Alice fall* [_{PP} *t*]]]. The identity condition for the sister to *Shh* is met whether that condition is syntactic or semantic. However, 10b is problematic. Here the representation of the sister to *Shh* is [*Alice fall* [_{PP} *into* [_{NP} *t*]]]. Obviously this is not formally identical to the relevant portion of the question. Nor is it semantically identical to the meaning of that portion (the reader can now see why we switched from a case-marking preposition like *to* to the case of a contentful preposition). One might entertain the hypothesis that in 10b it is really the entire PP that is fronted, with the *into* deleted by another process, but if this is possible in general, then this of course undermines the explanation for the P-stranding generalization. Finally, one might also try to salvage the mismatch by a copy theory of movement; the interested reader can verify that a copy theory approach wreaks havoc with any identity condition, for in all of the fragment answers, the fronted material would leave a copy that could not be identical (semantically or formally) to the corresponding trace in the question.

Consider now the situation for Qu-Ans with regard to 10b. At first blush this appears to be problematic here, too, for this is a mismatch in the category of the answer (NP) and the category of the fronted material (PP). As noted above, however, it seems reasonable to hope that once the full set of feature-passing conventions is spelled out, the category of the WH-word encoded on the root could either be PP or NP. (Granted, this is a promissory note, but it seems quite reasonable, especially in view of the intuition that the optionality of pied-piping in English is due to the fact that both the WH-NP and the PP that contains it can have the WH-feature.) The semantics is also unproblematic given the sort of variable-free treatment of pied-piping semantics developed in Jacobson 1998. In order to extend that treatment to the case at hand, some way to refer to the semantic type of a PP like *into that hole* is needed. Ultimately, it does not matter what this is; for convenience let us call it a ‘location’ (which may well be some special kind of individual). Space precludes detailing the mechanics, but the interested reader can verify that, using the *g* rule discussed in §5.1 of the main article, the semantics for the question will be put together to yield the semantics in 11a, where *f* is a function from individuals to locations. The representation in 11a is equivalent to 11b.

(11) a. $\lambda f(e, loc)[\lambda x[Alice\ fell\ f(x)]]\ (\lambda y[into-y]) =$

b. $\lambda x[Alice\ fell\ into\ x]$

Given this, an ordinary NP like *the hole* is an appropriate answer.

Unfortunately, the situation for Qu-Ans is less clear with respect to the question-answer pair 9–10a (recall that this was the unproblematic case for SLM). Here the syntax is straightforward (we assume that the root can be encoded with the information that the WH-constituent is a PP, which matches the category of the answer), but just how the semantics works depends on how this featural difference (NP vs. PP as the WH-word) interacts with the compositional semantics. Once again, space precludes detailed discussion of this here, but the bottom line is that the compositional semantics of the question in 9 would have to be such that, in addition to the question in semantics shown in 11, there is another reading where it asks for a location and thus has a meaning that can be represented as 12.

- (12) λl [Alice fell l], where the information from the WH-constituent *into which hole* restricts l to be a location for which there is some hole such that l is an ‘into that hole’-location.

This may seem somewhat tortured, but at least some of the ingredients for this are actually already in place. It was shown in detail in §4.1 that the information on the WH-word contributes a restriction to the question (recall, for example, the contribution of *mathematics professor* to the interpretation of *Which mathematics professor left the party at midnight?*). The trick, then, is to have the semantics of *into which hole* make the question meaning be a function of type $\langle 1, t \rangle$ (for l a location), where l is restricted in the way shown above. We leave it open as to whether the semantics can be put together in such a way as to give this result.

But in any case, it is not clear how either theory can account for the fact that the answer can contain a preposition even when the question does not have pied-piping. While the facts are a bit murky, the following question-answer pair seems surprisingly good.

- (13) Q: Which hole did the Alice fall into?
A: ?Into the one belonging to the Mad Hatter.

Under Qu-Ans this is surprising since, without pied-piping, there is no obvious reason that the WH-word should have a PP feature (and so there is no matching). Moreover, there is no obvious reason to think that the question in 13 would have the semantics given in 12. The problem for SLM is similar. Whether the conditions on matching are semantic or formal, neither are met here.

In conclusion, then, the domain of preposition stranding brings up a number of unresolved issues. It is not clear just what can be concluded from this domain, but at this point it is premature to think that SLM has any advantage over Qu-Ans.

APPENDIX B: ISLANDS

Merchant 2004 also invokes island effects to argue for SLM. The relevant data is not about short answers to explicit questions, but rather sentence fragments that are used as answers to implicit questions, as in the following dialogue.

- (14) a. Q: Did Suzy order LOBSTER?
b. A: No, steak.

Because *LOBSTER* is focused there is an implicit question about what Suzy ordered. *No* answers the explicit question (see the discussion of *yes/no* questions in §3.2) and *steak* the implicit one. I have no analysis to offer here of how the implicit question and the fragment are put together, and leave it open as to whether the Qu-Ans analysis can extend to answers to implicit questions. I do, however, show at the end of this appendix that it is not clear how to extend the SLM analysis to this case either since it is not obvious what would be the ‘antecedent’ for the silenced material in the answer [_{FP} *steak* [*Shh* [*Suzy ordered t*]]].

Merchant’s argument regarding these fragments is that they are subject to exactly the kind of island constraints one would expect to find if movement were involved. Thus he cites contrasts like the following.

- (15) a. Q: Did you hear that they might hire TINA?
b. A: No, Sally.
(16) a. Q: Did you hear the rumor that they might hire TINA?
b. A: *No, Sally.

Leaving aside the fact that island violations are arguably poorly understood, assume, for the sake of argument, that they are facts about syntax. (Of course I am not assuming a theory with movement, but even

without movement there are accounts of island violations in terms of the syntax. These usually require reference to a full S, and so Merchant's basic argument would be relevant, with or without literal movement.) But Merchant's generalization concerning islands simply does not seem correct. (For relevant discussion, see Culicover & Jackendoff 2005.) In fact, there is a wealth of literature on the question of whether ellipsis 'amnesties' island violations (most of this literature is played out in the sluicing domain), and hence a thorough review of these issues is beyond the current scope, but a few remarks are in order.³ First, there are many good cases that (under the full-source theory) would involve an island violation, such as 17.

- (17) a. Q: Are they looking for someone who has expertise in SYNTAX?
 b. A: No, in semantics.
 c. A: *In semantics, they are looking for someone who has expertise.

The full distribution of these fragment answers to implicit questions with focus seems to have as much to do with information structure and appropriate context as with syntax: the fragment answer to the implicit question is much better if it is assumed that there is one and only one correct alternative to the focused item in the question. The fragment *No, steak* in 14b, for example, makes sense because the default context that one imagines here is one in which what is at issue is what single entree Sally ordered. The discourse in 15 makes sense because it is easy to interpret the main proposition conveyed as being about who they would

³ A quite thorough and interesting discussion of this issue can be found in Barrow et al. 2015. The authors argue that the island effects are actually real and that apparent violations always can be explained in other ways. However, their explanations for the amnestying of the island violations rests on two kinds of mechanisms. First, they require a movement rule that is licensed only when followed by ellipsis. This is not formalized nor given independent motivation. Second, (following Merchant 2001) they claim that some of the apparent island violations are not real since there are paraphrases of the intended long answer that do not involve islands. Hence if the 'identity condition' were semantic (in a fairly liberal sense), these could be the source. For example, a good case like the fragment in 17 could have (i) as its 'source' (note that *the person they want to hire* must be read de dicto here).

- (i) In SEMANTICS, ~~the person they want to hire will have expertise.~~

Of course, just what the identity condition means here is unclear because we do not know exactly how the original question supplies a representation that gives the antecedent (see discussion below). But leaving that aside, the problem with explaining away selective island violations via 'semantic identity' means that there should never be island violations; see the discussion below concerning resumptive pronouns. Aside from resumptive pronouns, a liberal enough definition of semantic identity means that there can always be a source for a fragment answer in the form of a copular sentence (or a so-called short cleft; see Appendix A for relevant discussion as well). Thus a question such as (iia) can be answered by (iib), so there is no reason why this cannot also be preposed in the way usually allowed for fragment answers in the movement-plus-SLM theory.

- (ii) a. Q: Does he want to buy a RED car?
 b. A: No, it is BLUE.
 c. A: *No, BLUE, ~~it is~~.

The inability of *BLUE* to be a fragment here is sometimes attributed to a LEFT BRANCH CONDITION violation under the assumption that the source has to be **BLUE, he wants to buy a t car*), but with a liberal enough 'identity condition', there is no reason that the source should not be the preposed case in (iic). Note that the interpretation of *it* as an anaphor in (iic) can pick up the car, but of greater interest (since it would generalize to all fragment-answer cases) is the fact that *it* here can be an anaphor picking up something like 'the color which is such that he wants to buy a car of that color'. (In other words, *it* is anaphoric to the implicit question, and the structure in (iib) is a specificational copular sentence, and these supply *BLUE* as the identity of the answer to the implicit question.) Incidentally, under Qu-Ans, the ungrammaticality of (iic) would follow not from a condition on movement, but instead from a condition on what sorts of grammatical categories can stand alone.

hire (i.e. the main question under discussion is about who they hired), whereas implicit insertion of *the rumor that* makes it more difficult to make the basic information of the discourse being about who they might hire. Example 17a is good for similar reasons; it easily lends itself to the assumption that there is just one field they are hiring in, and so despite the apparent island violation the fragment answer here is fine. As further evidence that the conditions are not syntactic, consider the contrast between 18 and 19 (without prior and heavily loaded context), where the syntactic structures are the same.

(18) a. Q: Would their hiring a PHONETICIAN make Paul happy?

b. A: No, (only) an evolutionary biologist.

(19) a. Q: Would his inviting MARY bother Tom?

b. A: ?*No, only Sally.

To be sure, one can construct a context in which 19b is good, but it takes some work. But these facts are generally elucidated out of context, and it is much easier to conjure up the appropriate context for 18—in which it is assumed there is one correct alternative to *a phonetician*; it is much harder to dream this up out of the blue for 19. Ultimately, then, this entire issue needs careful scrutiny with respect to appropriate discourse contexts.

And even if island violations were the relevant generalization as to where the fragments are impossible, it turns out that this actually does NOT follow under the movement-plus-silencing approach. The reason has to do with the fact discussed in §4.3: SLM cannot require formal identity between the antecedent and the sister to Shh but only semantic identity. I leave open the question of how the grammar supplies an ‘antecedent’ for the silenced material in the cases at hand. But however that is done, nothing blocks the possibility that the sister to Shh contains a resumptive pronoun and hence engenders no island violation. In other words, the badness of 16b is supposed to be because it has to covertly be 20a. But it could just as well be 20b (which corresponds to a non-island-violating derivation); the sister to Shh in both cases is semantically the same, so any semantic condition on its silencing will allow 20b.

(20) a. *Sally [_{FP} Shh [~~I heard the rumor that they might hire t~~]].

b. Sally [_{FP} Shh [~~I heard the rumor that they might hire her~~]].

Of course, we have no direct way of knowing that a resumptive pronoun is allowed in an FP and in the sister to Shh since we never hear these structures, but since resumptive pronouns are allowed in all other movement cases, there is no reason to doubt that they should be allowed here. (Thus note that the full pronounced material in 20b is strange as follow-up to the question in 16a, but this is for the independent information-structure reasons discussed earlier: fully pronounced versions of these sentences are never good as answers. The overt sentences with fronting are ‘topicalized’ constructions (hence presumably contain a TopP rather than an FP) and have very different conditions for appropriateness in a discourse.) Notice that if one can construct a context in which there are multiple people, each of whom has an accompanying rumor about their hiring, one can certainly say 21, which involves a similar kind of focus.

(21) ?It’s (only) Sally that I heard the rumor that they might hire her.

In sum, then, the generalization seems to have nothing to do with islands, and if it did this would be mysterious (and problematic) for SLM in any case.

Finally, as noted above, it is unclear how SLM actually accounts for the island facts, even leaving aside the difficulty with resumptive pronouns. For the question arises: what is the identical antecedent allowing for the presence of Shh? In other words, returning to 14b, the full representation of this fragment presumably is 22.

(22) No, [_{FP} steak, [Shh [~~Sally ordered to~~]]].

But SLM crucially maintains that there must be actual linguistic material whose meaning (or, under some accounts, form) is identical to the sister of Shh. So what is the relevant material here? The obvious answer would be to assume that focused material raises at LF, and so the LF for the question in 14a would be 23 and hence be the appropriate antecedent. (Notice that the scope of the ‘Q’ operator here vis-à-vis the raised material *LOBSTER* could be reversed—the choice would depend on a careful formulation of the interaction of the question semantics and the role of focus—but this will not affect the analysis.)

(23) Q: [LOBSTER [(did) Sally order t]]?

However, if the only way to supply the requisite antecedent is to assume LF raising of the focused material, then the island facts are again mysterious. For it is well known that LF raising of focused material itself is not subject to island effects (see e.g. Rooth 1985 for this very point), so it is unclear why movement in the question should be immune to islands while movement in the answer obeys islands.

The alternative is to suppose that an IMPLICIT question licenses the fragment. But recall that it is crucial for SLM that there be an actual linguistic antecedent for the sister of Shh. In that case, we would need a theory as to when implicit questions are actually linguistically represented, and just what it is that allows them to be silenced. To my knowledge, no such theory has been put forth. In sum, then, the putative island facts also provide no evidence for SLM both because the generalization seems to be incorrect and because SLM cannot account for the lack of a resumptive pronoun source, nor can it account for the ‘source’ for fragment answers to implicit questions. Again I note that I have provided no analysis of the implicit question–fragment answer pairs, so this remains an interesting open area on either account. Undoubtedly, a fuller theory of sentence fragments is needed here (see e.g. Culicover & Jackendoff 2005 and Stainton 2005 for general discussion of fragments).

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