The Journal of Military History

The first Total War, David Bell holds, comprised the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon. They involved conscription, the mobilization of the material resources of the nation, and propaganda to convince the people to support war against a "criminal" enemy (p. 280). To this familiar mix, Bell adds the element of ideological purpose, which the French abandoned in exchange for admiration of the "prowess of individual warriors" (p. 191).

The author writes that this model—now fully impressed on the Western mind—began to take shape during the Enlightenment, when major figures favored perpetual peace, but back-peddled. Then the revolutionaries hatched the idea of spreading liberté, égalité, fraternité to other Europeans, but discovered (to paraphrase Robespierre) that "No one loves armed missionaries"(p. 118). In the process, the French, then other western societies, [End Page 920] became militarized, developing respect for generals over politicians, and faith in citizen-soldiers.

Bell's method seems akin to that of Jules Michelet, who, for his Révolution française, reputedly read everything in the archives, but cast aside his notes (if any), and was guided by instinct. Perforce, this has led Bell to repeat some myths about the Revolutionary/Napoleonic period, and make mistakes. For example: The people "took up arms" (p. 85) and stormed the Bastille. (Few had arms, because of gun control under the monarchy; the rattled commander threw open the main gate for the people.) "From Portugal to the Tyrol to Russia, insurgents declared total war on [Napoleon's empire]" (p. 265). (Except in Spain, there was no sustained guerrilla activity, and by late 1810, the French conquest of Spain was all but complete. See Charles Esdaile's new Peninsular War [2003].)

Bell also exaggerates the bloodshed in Napoleon's wars, where—in fifteen years of war—the French lost only 86,500 killed in action, not one million, which is the casualty figure, including killed, wounded, deserters, captured, and missing. (See the works of Jacques Houdaille and Marcel Reinhard.) By contrast, in World War I, in four years, 1,400,000 French were killed in action.

However, these mistakes do not damage Bell's case. He makes his point, although the ideological motive may apply better to American than other wars. (President Wilson, not Clemenceau, decided the First World War Allies were making the world safe for democracy.) There is also the fact that warfare is changing, surely to dispense with masses of draftees in favor of highly trained forces using the latest military technology. (This explains why we sent enough troops to destroy Saddam Hussein's army, but not hordes of fanatic assassins.)

All that aside, Bell deserves praise for his knowledge of historiography and literature, and balanced views. He has a good word for military and diplomatic history—surprising in view of the honors heaped on him by postmodernist historical organizations. He makes a nod toward the nineteenth-century literary historians, such as Michelet and Macaulay. In many places, he expresses respect for the Ancien Régime, notably its gentlemanly warfare. The Enlightenment, French Revolution, and Napoleonic era are worth study, he says, "But we should not belittle what they destroyed" (p. 317).

David Bell has written a superb narrative history, deliberately aimed at the general reader. I hope he finds a large audience. More historians should write for the public; for too long, popular history has been the province of amateurs and journalists.