Journal of the History of Philosophy

542 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY to be part of diverse experiences, the Principles does not. To resolve this contradiction, James required an account of experience which, as in the Essays, allowed for the continued presence or reappearance of certain mental facts, but which also sanctioned the view of the Principles that the moment of experience is an instance of a peculiar kind of unity in complexity. The above remarks suggest that the humanistic themes that Dooley finds in James's work are capable of forming matrimonial alliances with diverse (empirical) doctrines. This further suggests that if the experience and aspirations of the "whole man" were used to "set parameters" or "suggest hypotheses" that were then checked against our perceptual experience, then James's mature philosophy could have consisted of a very different set of doctrines about the world and experience. We do not get an explanation of why he framed the particular set of doctrines that comprise his mature philosophy by reference to the supposed demands of the "whole man." In short, James's work is given unity and coherence by the nature of the philosophic problems he attempted to solve, some of them generated by his own work, as well as by his attempt to save empiricism by making it radical while attempting to articulate the resulting epistemic and metaphysical consequences. Only when one approaches James's work in this way can be begin to appreciate why it evolved into the doctrines that comprise James's mature philosophy. DAVm CwI lohns Hopkins University Edmund Husserl" Philosopher o/Infinite Tasks. By Maurice Natanson. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973) This is indeed a very good book, perhaps one of the best books, in the English language, on Husserl as a whole. It is exceedingly well-written. Professor Natanson has a style, and he writes with a passion. Besides, he does what most writers on philosophy do not: he illustrates his (or, rather Husserl's) points with examples drawn from everyday life. He is thereby more likely to succeed in bringing home to the readers the real import and significance of many otherwise seemingly abstract theses. Although dealing with Hussed as a whole, Natanson nevertheless does not pay equal attention to all his writings. The logical writings are especially neglected. Natanson knows this, and writes that "it is not Husserl the logician nor even Husserl the epistemologist who impresses me most, but the Husserl whose philosophy of transcendental subjectivity offers a theory of consciousness, world, and history" (p. xvi). However, he seems to have overlooked the fact that Husserl's logical investigations are essential preparations, and also indispensable elements, of his philosophy of consciousness and world (and possibly, of his philosophy of history). The analysis of the speech act (Investigation I), the theory of the ideality of meaning (Investigations I and II) and analysis of the intentional act (Investigation V) lay the foundation for his philosophy of consciousness ; the doctrine of part and whole (Investigation III) and the doctrines of pure apophantic forms and formal ontology (Investigation IV) lay the basis of his first conception of the world. Sokolowski has recently, with admirable skill, drawn attention to the centrality, even for Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, of the doctrine of part For the story of James's struggle and a characterization of his problems and the nature of his attempted solution, see especially Perry, Thought and Character, II, 393ff., 588ff., 763; Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies (New York: Longmans, Green, 1929), pp. 366-368; James, A Pluralistic Universe (New York: Longmans, Green, 1909), chaps. 5-7; and Victor Lowe's neglected article "William James's Pluralistic Metaphysics of Experience," in bz Commemoration of William lames (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942). BOOK REVIEWS 543 and whole and of the distinction between 'empty' and 'filled'. It is not without reason that Husserl began his Ideen I with a section on logical considerations. And it is perhaps instructive to recall that even after the fully developed transcendental phenomenology had come into being, Husserl returned to logical enquiries twice. In fact, one may say that just as the Ideen were followed by the Formal and Transcendental Logic, so the Cartesian Meditations was followed by Experience and Judgment, and...