Journal of the History of Philosophy

444 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3o:3 JULY 199~ course to fill the gap left by the argument" (138); when we accept the myth "the arguments will then be more likely to be persuasive" (238). What emerges, then, is an antirational or at least an extrarational Socrates, a Socrates who believes that reason by itself will not persuade us of anything important and that other than rational means must ultimately be employed. One's attitude toward this work, 1 imagine, will depend on how plausible one finds this picture of Socrates. Personally, I do not see that this portrait of Socrates corresponds to that of the devoted rational enquirer portrayed throughout the dialogues, nor do I think White's arguments are very compelling. To consider just one of the more crucial pieces of evidence: White thinks that Socrates' command to Simmias and Cebes after the first two proofs to "sing songs" and to "find an enchanter" means that he is telling them to turn to other grounds besides rational argument. Against the suggestion that by "singing songs" Socrates is merely exhorting them in a metaphorical way to continue the argumentative process, White argues that "to sing songs" can't mean to argue discursively because Socrates is telling them "to sing songs" in order to allay their fears regarding the afterlife. But since neither Simmias nor Cebes disputes the logic of the proof, "the fear that they now have will not be alleviated by the mere repetition of the argument that they have already accepted" 0o2). But clearly, in urging them "to sing songs" Socrates does not have to be insisting that they repeat the first two arguments over and over; rather, he could simply be urging them to continue the dialectical process in this matter, discussing these and other proofs. The Socratic claim that in their search for charmers they will "not easily find anyone more capable of doing this" (78a) than themselves suggests that this is precisely what he is doing, exhorting them to study these issues themselves by means of elenctic examination, much as he urged his fellow citizens in the Apology to discuss virtue among themselves every day. In sum, too much energy is devoted in this commentary to establishing this thesis and too little to a critical examination of the many crucial interpretative problems in the Phaed0. PETER VERNEZZE Weber State University Mary Louise Gill. Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989. Pp. xi + 284. Cloth, $29.95. The paradox of unity is how a substance can be both one in definition and one through time. Unity in definition requires that form and matter not be distinct components of substance's formula. Unity through time, according to Gill, requires a matter that is distinct from the form it acquires or loses: a persisting matter "avoid[s] the Parmenidean objection against sheer emergence" (241). To resolve the paradox Gill takes a close look at key passages from the Metaphysics's central books and Aristotle's physical and biological works. Drawing upon Metaphysics H 6, she maintains that Aristode equates form and matter in the composite by identifying matter as "functional matter," the organs, and form as a first actuality, the capacity of those organs to function. The BOOK REVIEWS 445 definition is then one because the substance is defined by its function. As for unity through time, Gill argues that substantial change involves not the persistence of a matter through the loss and acquisition of attributes but the working up of matter into different functional parts. The original matter persists in the composite not actually but potentially because the composite can be decomposed into it, and it accounts for unity through time. Gill appears to identify this matter with earth, air, fire, and water; and she maintains that these elements constantly threaten and ultimately undermine the unity of the composite because they can exist on their own. Though Gill accepts Aristotle's verdict that elements are not substances, she thinks they satisfy important criteria for substances and are, accordingly, close to being substances. In her treatment of definitional unity and in her use of actuality and functional matter to account...