Rhetoric & Public Affairs

Avoiding the Quagmire: Alternative Rhetorical Constructs for Post-Cold War American Foreign Policy Timothy M. Cole Since the end of the Cold War, policy makers have been searching for a rationale to explain the circumstances under which American armed forces might be employed to accomplish foreign policy goals. This has been no easy task. Without the threat posed by the Soviet Union, some believe, the very coherence of American foreign policy has been undermined; certainly, no policy has replaced containment as a rationale for why the United States should resort to military force. What's more, the memory of the Vietnam War continues to haunt the political culture; a pervasive ambivalence about military involvement in a turbulent world has come to shape the attitude of the American people and the Congress, limiting support for military intervention. On the other hand, the American public is not isolationist, and it supports efforts to repel "classic" aggression and to alleviate dire humanitarian emergencies. The role the U.S. armed forces might play in bringing peace to war-torn Bosnia, thus, has presented two administrations with a rhetorical and policy paradox. How have these post-Cold War presidents attempted to define and legitimate U.S. policy in Bosnia to the American public? This essay outlines three rhetorical models, each with distinct appeals, that have been salient in the period 1992-98. Cold War appeals continue to resonate, particularly since they tap enduring features of the American political culture at a time when the United States enjoys its status as victor in the Cold War. In the immediate post-Cold War environment, however, President Bush recognized the implications of presenting a confrontational rhetoric to a skeptical public, and attempted to acknowledge a world that had fundamentally changed. Still, Bush's rhetoric remained centered on Cold War themes. President Clinton's rhetoric about the Bosnian conflict is very similar to that of his predecessor. It has focused on a humanitarian mission and eschewed central Cold War premises. It suggested restraint in objectives to be pursued in military intervention, and it particularly rejected the idea that American forces would be engaged in any effort to forge battlefield resolutions to internal conflicts. It was notable for its absence of a call for a Timothy M. Cole is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Maine in Orono, Maine. © Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 2, No. 3, 1999, pp. 367-393 ISSN 1094-8392 368 Rhetoric & Public Affairs new American crusade in the manner of the Truman Doctrine. It rejected the premise that the United States should "bear any burden" to bring the blessings of liberty to other nations, even as it presupposed continued American exceptionalism . As with his predecessor, a rhetoric of restraint was meant to soothe a wary public . Unlike Bush, however, Clinton's efforts to "compartmentalize" the conflict was part of a new post-Cold War rhetorical model. With no rhetorical crusade calling for heroic American action, the administration must make the case that it is in the interests of the United States to respond to the Bosnian crisis and others like it. Those instances become tests of presidential leadership, and, particularly in a case like Bosnia, where policy objectives are difficult to disentangle (and which include forging internal political change as well as effecting humanitarian goals), successful rhetorical appeals must run a gauntlet that reveals opportunities for action but imposes real limits on political tolerance. Though Clinton administration constructs have not fundamentally renounced a view that the international system as a whole is a dangerous place, they have reformulated central premises about the nature of U.S. security. They are the product of a political calculus that is highly sensitive to public opinion and the expectations of the American public. This study principally examines national public addresses by President Clinton from January 1993 to January 1998, where Bosnia is a subject. President Clinton is the principal rhetor of his administration; the electorate looks to the president to be "interpreter in chief," and we may properly look to these addresses to assess emerging post-Cold War foreign policy rhetoric.1 Foreign Policy Rhetoric: Establishing the Terms of Discussion This essay proceeds from four basic premises...