Navigating Hybrid Governance: Role of Pakistan National Security Committee (NSC) & Constitutional Outlook

The governing balance between civilian regime and military leadership has become an important aspect of governance in Pakistan. When military and civilian life are pragmatically in touch with each other, both become an asset, otherwise, they are an aggressor to each other. It is their integration that ensures the convergence of their goals and directions as well as values and ideologies, as both depend on each other. This not only leads to the consolidation of democracy but also fulfills the effective civilian oversight over the military. For this, an efficient governing structure can keep in check the state’s civil-military equation and ensure that the incidence of military intervention or influence is minimized. The theoretical and structural construction of this integration and ideological alignment is particularly relevant to civil-military interaction under the National Security Committee (NSC) in Pakistan. This paper analyzes the civil-military relations in Pakistan under two different models i.e., ‘control theory’ and ‘convergence theory’ to bring a new perspective to the analysis of the topic. The paper begins with a brief review of both theoretical frameworks, followed by the history of civil-military relations under military rule, civilian setup, and NSC governance in Pakistan. The paper then looks into the case of hybrid governance under the NSC in line with the tenets of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. It suggests that far-reaching national strategic concerns and governing balance issues can be addressed under NSC, which is currently not being utilized to its full potential; instead it should function as a regular forum of dialogue and consultation, and not as an irregular decision-making entity. A consistently functional consultative NSC can help diffuse the ideological differences between civil and military elements of governance, creating more prospects of integration and decreasing chances of outright interference, as postulated by Janowitz in the convergence theory.


Introduction
The long-standing civil-military challenge in Pakistan has gained particular salience in recent times as the civil-military have turned acrimonious and dissonant.This was manifested by public obloquy directed at the military exercising 'surplus authority' in political processes and political decisionmaking.The civilian narrative infers that civil-military relations in Pakistan are dominated by an 'insubordinate military'. 1Is it on account of the tendency of the military apparatus to veer away from civilian life, develop divergent ideological preferences, and trespass its subordinate role?Is it because the military became a strong and well-organized independent institution by having surplus authority, while civilian government, being induced to legitimize martial governance, has historically been devoid of any space to develop independently?Keeping this in view, in the context of Pakistan, as put by Feaver, 'the civil-military challenge is to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to do with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize them to do'. 2 Since 1947, the military has ruled over the country for 32 years.Consequently, the military has assumed de facto authority on various aspects of governance.Although the civilian administration has a great deal of autonomy in terms of managing the economy and exercising state power, it is nonetheless required to take the military's sensitivities into account constantly. 3On the other hand, without necessarily assuming power, the military influences political change.The reconciliation and civilian oversight of the military can be ascertained by an efficient governing structure which also ensures that the incidence of military intervention or influence is minimized.This draws attention to the theories, particularly of the pioneers like Samuel P. Huntington 4 and Morris Janowitz, 5 on civil-military relationship to understand this equation.The theoretical and structural construction of this integration and ideological alignment is particularly relevant to civil-military interaction under the NSC in Pakistan-a governing structure established to actualize Feaver's reconciliation and subordination.
In this paper, civil-military relations refer to the relationship that exists between civil society as a whole and the military organization or organizations that were established to safeguard it.The foundation of civil-military interactions is a quandary: what Peter Feaver refers to as the civil-military problematique, which necessitates a specific policy to balance two objectives.It must construct a military force, capable of protecting the state.However, it must ensure that this very military apparatus does not turn against the state that formed it. 6While, hybrid governance, under the scope of this study, means the hybridity in the balance of power, the governing hybridity between two drivers of political power i.e., the civilian and military entities.In the context of civil-military relations, hybrid governance is a type of governance in which the administration of state affairs and decision-making processes engage both civilian and military leadership. 7It stands for a system in which aspects of military and civilian power coexist and work together to govern a country.This system can take many different forms, such as combined decision-making committees, military advisory positions in civilian leadership, or a blurred demarcation between military and civilian authority in particular spheres of governance.
Based on these premises, the paper aims to answer the following question: how does the National Security Committee (NSC) operate under Pakistan's hybrid governance concerning civil-military balance?

Theoretical Framework
Many theorists and political scientists have provided theories for military interventions, as well as restoring the power balance between the civil and military elements of the state.The theories of the two pioneer political scientists i.e., Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz hold particular relevance to Pakistan's case.

Control Theory
Huntington views civil-military relations as an equation of 'competition' to acquire power, which he defined as the ability to influence people's behavior.The politico-military theories postulated by him for the military's compliant and apolitical role revolve around 'controlling' the military i.e., objective control and subjective control, under a democratic setup.Objective control by civilians is focused on ensuring and maximizing military 'professionalism' by recognizing its autonomy 8 and maintaining the separation of powers between civil and military decision-making.In the words of Huntington, 'objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state'. 9As a requirement of their professionalism, the military thus maintains political neutrality.Subjective control denies independent and autonomous military status and centers on maximizing civilian powers, in other words, the legislative power would be above the military. 10In the words of Huntington, 'subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state'. 11Keeping this in view, under subjective control, maximization of civilian power means the power maximization of a particular (governing) group or parties.It is the power distribution among civilian parties and not between civilian and military.On the other hand, objective controls mean that the military has to control itself via its professionalism.While professionalism inherently does not ensure keeping the military out of politics, especially when Huntington's assumption that the military will subjugate itself to the decisionmaking of legitimate state authority, is withdrawn, its attraction to militaries in developing countries and new democratic setups may justify their autonomous but unconstitutional actions.For example, in Brazil, during the coup of March 31, 1964, it is analyzed by Stephan and other scholars that Huntington's concept of military professionalism did not prevent them from seizing power, but rather the opposite. 13Finer also contends that Huntington's professionalism concept is failing as an explanatory variable for military intervention or influence. 14As said by Feaver, military compliance is not automatic, rather, it is determined by strategic considerations about whether Source: Compiled by author and data sourced from Samuel P. Militarizing the Military Civilianizing the Military civilians will detect and punish misconduct. 15Given the peculiar environment in Pakistan, the model's applicability is debatable.In the given context it appears that Pakistan's military cannot remain impartial and sterile via apolitical professionalism.Some scholars have also contended that Huntington's prescription for military neutrality and independence from politics may not be applicable beyond the first world countries. 16

Convergence Theory
Rejecting the idea of this division of labor in the civil-military equation and building on the risks of the military as an institution apart from society and civil life, Janowitz maintains that the military would eventually assume surplus autonomy through its apolitical professionalism as it would drift the military away from societal values. 17The core idea of convergence is to keep the 'military in touch with the civilian life'.It is because the 'more the military is in touch with the civilian life the less likely will be outright interference of the one side into the other as there will be no chance for an ideological difference to develop'. 18ntrary to apolitical professionalism, Janowitz gives the idea of 'pragmatic professionalism' i.e., a responsible role by military under the civilian oversight, and promotes the idea of an 'integration of the values of the military and the society' as the key to military professionalism and to ensure effective civil-military relations. 19The military is sociologically closer to civil life and the public through its interaction mechanisms.Therefore, as pragmatic professionalism and integration diffuse the ideological and value differences, the military is less likely to make an unconstitutional move or politically intervene.This infers that ideological differences are the underlying reasons why a country goes through civil-military dilemmas.Janowitz considers the military as a political asset when not segregated from society.On the contrary, when the military is segregated from civilian life, it is more likely to turn into a political aggressor.Integration of military and civilian life ensures that their objectives coincide and the leadership of both decides together the direction and implementation of national strategic, defense, security, and military goals, as both depend on each other.This leads to the consolidation of democracy and effective civilian oversight of the military.Finer also adds to this and suggests that thorough integration of civil-military relations, as in the first world states, is essential. 21 realize this integration, an efficient governing structure can work toward the state's civil-military equation and ensure that the need for military intervention or influence is minimized.The civil-military interaction under the Source: Compiled by author and data sourced Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait.

Pragmatic Professionalism Integration
Diffusing Ideological Differences NSC, as that sort of governing structure in Pakistan is particularly relevant to the theoretical and structural construction of this integration and ideological alignment.
What Does the Constitution Say?
The 1973 constitution lays out the foundation for governance, including the sphere of influence and roles of institutions of the military and civilian.This institutional role has often been ignored in Pakistan's history.In contrast to its importance, the armed forces are given just an incidental mention in the national constitutional framework under the 'miscellaneous' part. 22The functions and obligations of Pakistan's military forces are covered under Articles 243, 244, and 245 of the constitution, all of which underscore the principle of civilian supremacy.
 Article 243 23 on 'Command of Armed Forces' states, 'The Federal Government shall have control and command of the Armed Forces'.This provision clearly states that the military is subject to the authority of the elected civilian government and establishes the superiority of the civilian government over the armed forces.Additionally, it designates the president of Pakistan as the 'supreme command' of the Armed Forces.As the president represents the civilian government in matters about the armed forces, this emphasizes the civilian rule over the military.
 Every member of Pakistan's armed services is required to take the 'Oath of Armed Forces,' as laid out in Article 244. 24It also contains a solemn pledge to not engage in any 'political activities whatsoever'.This clause emphasizes the idea of civilian supremacy by excluding military personnel from participating in politics.It also emphasizes the significance of loyalty and obedience to the state and the constitution.
 Article 245, 'Function of the Armed Forces,' outlines the fundamental role of the armed forces in Pakistan. 25It adds that their role is to 'defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war' and to 'act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so'.Importantly, the Constitution stresses that the military can only assist civil authority when specifically instructed to do so by the federal government.This means that their engagement in domestic matters, such as upholding law and order, requires a directive from civilian authorities.Thus, it pertains to civil power over the military as a state institution and ensures that such deployments are subject to civilian oversight and control.
These provisions collectively set out a definitive framework.In addition to direct mention of roles, these provisions do the following: 1. emphasize civilian supremacy and control over the military; 2. place the federal government as the center of authority; 3. define the military as an apolitical state institution; 4. emphasize the significance of loyalty, commitment, and obedience; 5. provide a legal boundary and safeguard against military coups and unlawful interference in civilian affairs; 6. maintain the balance between the essential defensive role of military and civilian control as a core element of democratic governance.
Although the aforementioned is stated in the constitution, there have been instances of direct military rule, military interventions, and varied degrees of military influence over civilian and governance affairs throughout the history of Pakistan.

History of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan
The two drivers of political power in the history of the country have prominently been politicians and the military leadership.The status of their integration and professionalism can be analyzed in three types of governance eras or experiments i.e., military rule, civilian setup, and National Security Council (NSC).In its initial years, the founder of Pakistan categorically defined the role of military on June 14, 1948, while addressing the armed forces at Staff College, Quetta -stating, 'Do not forget that the armed forces are the servants of the people and you do not make national policy; it is we, the civilians, who decide these issues and it is your duty to carry out these tasks with which you are entrusted'.-however,this principle has faced challenges over time, with shifts between military and civilian rule, often justified in the name of national security, national interest, or development, as shown in Table 1.The judiciary has also been influential in this dynamic, with the Supreme Court at times endorsing military coups and interventions to preserve the constitution and national stability.Thus, civil-military relations have evolved significantly over the years, reflecting the complex interplay between legal authority, military power, and civilian governance.

Military Rule
Under the direct rule of 17 years and indirect rule of 15 years, the military has always opted for ways to legitimize its rule and influence.During the first military intervention in 1958, the military ruler, by introducing a constitution and appointing politicians, tried to civilianize the dictatorship, 34 only to give the military's rule (which would continue through 1962-1969) legitimacy to continue once martial law was lifted.
During 1969-1971, the first NSC was founded under the reign of Gen. Yahya Khan, but it was largely inactive and had little impact on national decision-making.The reason was that the administrative thread was completely under the military ruler who was accustomed to making decisions with significant reliance on his close military and bureaucratic aides.
After the December 1971 war, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was appointed as the Civilian Martial Law Administrator until April 21, 1972.In 1976, he released a White Paper on Higher Defence Organisation (HDO), which outlined the institutional structure for managing defense and national security.With this, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) was established which provided for the civilian oversight over security decisions.
During 1977-1985, the military ruled over Pakistan for its longest period of martial law before handing over authority to a civilian administration, as Hasan Askari writes, through a 'carefully managed disengagement'. 35 1985, under military indirect rule, significant amendments were made to the 1973 constitution, emphasizing an all-powerful president and a weak prime minister. 36This paved the way for the military to act as a political actor.To establish a semblance of civilianized, participatory democracy, a parliament was created through non-party, regulated elections, and a civilian prime minister was appointed, with an ideology to coopt political leaders as adjuncts to the military. 37When the prime minister attempted to exercise his original powers, he was dismissed by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in May 1988, leading to the collapse of this participatory system.
Gen. Zia established the NSC, which was met with strong opposition. 38t the same time, to give the NSC legitimacy, Article 152-A 39,40 was introduced to the constitution as part of the revival of the Constitutional Order in March 1985, which was later omitted. 41This permitted high-ranking military officers to participate in policymaking.This NSC was heavily criticized and eventually abandoned in 1985.
Under the fourth military rule in 1999, Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf unraveled a new attempt to gain legitimacy and convergence by constructing a democratic structure i.e., in the form of the Legal Framework Order (LFO) and initiation of the formal procedure of creating the NSC. 42ring 2002-2004, the NSC was constitutionally established for the first time with the enactment of the National Security Council Act 2004.A noteworthy fact is that the constitution previously provided legitimacy to NSC through Article 152-A; however, the provision was repealed by the 17th Amendment. 43The 18th Amendment further says that Article 152-A omitted 'shall be deemed to always have been so omitted'. 44This provision was even inserted under a new article i.e., Article 267B (Removal of Doubt) in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, which says: For removal of doubt it is hereby declared that Article 152A omitted and Articles 179 and 195 substituted by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 2003 (Act No. III of 2003), notwithstanding its repeal, shall be deemed always to have been so omitted and substituted.

Civilian Setup
After the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, the military government under Gen. Yahya Khan handed over the power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto However, in 1977, the civilian government faced allegations of electoral fraud in the 1977 general election, followed by widespread protests and political unrest. 45Amidst this turmoil, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq imposed martial law on July 5, 1977, arresting Bhutto, claiming intervention was necessary to prevent further chaos. 46 the late 1980s, Pakistan was emerging from a period of prolonged military rule under General Zia-ul-Haq, which had started in 1977.The situation began to shift following Zia's sudden death in a plane crash in 1988, creating a power vacuum and an opportunity for a return to democratic governance.After the political assessment of the then-ongoing situation, the military apparatus backed democracy and emphasized 'professionalism' and the absence of direct political involvement.This shift was partly influenced by internal and external pressures, including the need for political stability and international legitimacy.The end of Zia's rule led to elections in 1988, which were the first to be held under relatively free and fair conditions, resulting in the transfer of power to a civilian administration.
In the post-1988, the governance structure in Pakistan emerged in the form of the Rule of Troika, 47 i.e., army chief, president, and prime minister, as an extra-constitutional arrangement for civil-military consensus-building under the civilian setup.Under this new setup, the military continued to play a role in the political process, which was hampered repeatedly as the four governments 48 struggled to balance democratic imperatives with the enduring legacy of military dominance.These governments, relying on volatile and disparate political factions, faced challenges not only from a strong and disciplined military but also from within the political sphere.The politicians often engaged in power struggles, factionalism, and short-term maneuvering, which undermined their ability to present a united front and govern effectively.This internal political instability further enabled the military to maintain its influence in civilian affairs.
In the late 1990s, the military reintroduced the notion of the civilmilitary consensus structure, 49 in the form of the Council for Defence and National Security (CDNS), as a role-playing component at this time, implying that the military would be involved in politics on the basis that it would bring political stability.It was, however, publicly regarded as a political intervention.Soon, the army chief was made to retire, demonstrating civilian control over the military. 50Then, in 1999, the democratic civilian supremacy was derailed once again for the nine years to come.These oscillations between civil supremacy and military dictatorship reflect the immature democratic institutionalization in Pakistan, which reveals that there was neither convergence nor integration.

National Security Council: Governance and Constitution
In the post-2008 structure, a space was created for political leadership, political freedom, and political processes, but sustaining that involved harmonious working with the military.This infers that on one hand, the top brass of the establishment concedes that governance is the task of civilian authority; while, on the other hand, it believes in playing an autonomous role and delivering its input in political decision-making.In return, the military supports the civilian government until and unless it derails stability, fails to perform its duties, and endangers or threatens the military's interests. 51is hybrid power-sharing arrangement between civilian and military leadership was enacted in the form of NSC, in 2013, as a new forum for hybridity and a bridge to balance the civil-military equation.The council serves as a forum for consultation and recommendations on matters of national security for the president and the federal government. 52e formation of the NSC was an important step towards the following: 1. institutionalizing civil-military consultation on national security strategies and actions; 2. bridging the gap between the perceptions of the civil and the military and resolving the conflicts in civil-military relations Analyzing the functioning of the NSC in the backdrop of the theoretical framework in a democratic setup with civilian oversight can make the status of hybrid governance and convergence clearer.The following table shows varying frequencies of NSC meetings and PM-COAS interactions across three periods from 2013 to 2023.Source: Compiled by author from various sources. 54 2013, the federal government set up a Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) and established it as a restructured replacement for the Defence Committee of Cabinet (DCC).The CCNS was later renamed as National Security Committee (NSC).Another major development was in 2014 when the NSC was transformed from a consultative body to 'a principal decision-making body'. 55or the next five years till 2018, the NSC 56 was mostly kept dormant with major reliance on individualized meetings between the PM and the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS).This may have also undermined the role of the Defence Minister and the National Security Advisor (NSA).The NSC meetings were held only 23 times in these five years. 57It could not develop a National Security Policy (NSP), the primary function assigned to it.Key decisions on national security were instead taken in one-on-one meetings instead of seeking consultation with the NSC.It also could not improve civilmilitary relations, which was one of the key objectives behind its formation.
During 2018-2022, the NSC's proactivity as a forum of regular discussion and consultation on the national security agenda did not improve.Only thirteen formal meetings were convened.No Minister was appointed by the then Prime Minister Imran Khan during the first year of his term to oversee the NSC and there were fifteen individual meetings.During 2022-2023, PM only convened five meetings of the NSC with long breaks in between and was only convened in view of various crises.
In recent times, the COVID-19 crisis highlighted the efficacy of hybrid governance forums, exemplified by the National Command and Operation Centre (NCOC) in 2020.Similarly, the establishment of the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) in 2023 underscores the benefits of integrating specialized bodies for targeted governance objectives, such as attracting foreign investment.These examples underscore the need as well as capacity for the NSC to evolve into a more consistently operational entity, aligning with contemporary challenges and opportunities.With this in view, the following features or functioning of NSC breed concerns.

A Consultative or Decision-Making Forum
The NSC was structured along the lines of a collective discussion forum to understand and converge each other's perspectives and perform due role under the following clause of the constitution.

The Article 245(1) of the 1973 constitution holds,
The Armed Forces shall, under the directions of the Federal Government defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and, subject to law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so. 58lso, the National Security Council Act says, There shall be established a National Security Council to serve as a forum for consultation on matters of national security including the sovereignty, integrity; defence, security of the State and crisis management.
The Act again states in Article 5(1) (Functions of the council) that the NSC is supposed to 'serve as a forum for consultation'. 59The same Act for the third time mentioned clearly that 'the Council shall formulate and make recommendations'. 60However, instituting NSC as a decision-making forum has obliterated its convergence spirit in terms of civil-military relations.It differs from how similar councils operate in other countries, where it typically focuses on providing strategic advice and support, while the decision-making authority remains with the elected government.

Questioning the Civilian Supremacy
The functioning of the NSC, as a primary decision-making body, breeds concerns over the relative exercise of executive authority, which by constitution, has to be exercised by civilians.It must follow the constitutional principle of civilian oversight, as Article 90 maintains, The executive authority of the Federation shall be exercised in the name of the President by the Federal Government, consisting of the Prime Minister and the Federal Ministers, which shall act through the Prime Minister, who shall be the chief executive of the Federation.
Similarly, Article 244, Oath of Armed Forces, written in the Third Schedule, states in this regard, 61 I, ____________, do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and uphold the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which embodies the will of the people, that I will not engage myself in any political activities whatsoever and that I will honestly and faithfully serve Pakistan in the Pakistan Army (or Navy or Air Force) as required by and under the law.

Institutional vs. Informal Decision-Making
For Pakistan, the NSC, along with the National Security Division (NSD) -a governmental body established to serve as the principal institution for coordinating NSP, were established to bridge the consultation gap between civil and military elements through formal, regular institutional interactions.However, the practice has remained characterized by informal, irregular decision-making, often bypassing the NSC's intended role. 62Despite the NSC's creation to provide a structured forum for national security dialogue, its underutilization and sporadic meetings have led to ad-hoc and informal decision-making.This inconsistency prevents the NSC from effectively institutionalizing and formalizing policy advice.

Rules of Businesses
Just as NSD is mandated under the Rules of Business to undertake a periodical review of NSP, NSC can also be mandated to review and hold its periodic meetings, something along the lines of Rule 20 of the Rules of Business, which states that NSD meetings 'shall normally be held once a week, on a day and time to be specified by the Prime Minister'. 63

Post-Crisis Discussions and Incomplete Structure
The continued practice of convening NSC meetings only after the crisis has hit does not fulfill the gap for which it was established.A major reason for this is the incomplete structure of the NSC, which was established along with two supporting bodies i.e., a planning committee and an advisory board, for effective functioning.However, it was not fully formulated.A decade down to 2023, NSC is still incomplete in its structure; 64 and therefore, functioning as an ineffective governing structure for the convergence and integration of civilmilitary elements.

National Security Policy 2022-2026: A Case Study of Convergence
Second to the decades of military experience is formal policy or doctrine that determines or directs the political behavior of military elites.As Janowitz writes, 'The political behavior of military leaders is a reaction to actual and immediate military experience, as well as an expression of explicit doctrine'. 65he NSP centers on the vision that the 'security of Pakistan rests in the security of its citizens'. 66The NSP underlines the need to establish national cohesion via inclusive government, equitable development, and the development of a cohesive national identity.It also entails economic policies and initiatives intended to assist national stability and security; this indirectly impacts the civil-military relationship by creating a stable socioeconomic climate that decreases the need for military intervention in domestic affairs.Moreover, NSP's section V defines Pakistan's comprehensive approach to maintain national security, territorial integrity, and resilience to all types of threats through integrating military and civilian measures. 67is infers that all national aspects of governance are to be ideologically and interest-wise aligned.In other words, following the convergence theory, the conventional boundaries between military and civilian organizations, interests, and ideals may gradually disintegrate as time goes on and result in integration with civilian life.This convergence, under NSP, can be particularly examined through the theorized shared interest in national security, the military's advisory role, and increased civilian involvement in policy formulation.Despite that things are different in practice as no meeting of the NSC has been convened to track progress on the implementation of the National Security Policy (NSP) 2022-2026, the NSP itself presents a prospective case of civil-military convergence because of its potential to grow integration and diffusion of values and ideologies between the civilian and military entities.Thus, the NSC can strike the governing balance by keeping the pragmatically professional military in touch with civilian life and diffusing ideological differences.For that, however, moving beyond the structural construction of this integration towards practical alignment is needed and significant.

National Command and Operation Centre (NCOC)
The COVID-19 crisis management model of the NCOC exemplified yet another hybrid governance through 'data-driven consensus-oriented decision making'. 68It combined the decision and policy-making capabilities of civilian authorities with the operational and logistical strengths of the military.Established in March 2020, it integrated both civilian and military resources and expertise to oversee the country's health response, including data collection, disease surveillance, vaccination management, and the implementation of public health measures such as smart lockdowns.This hybrid structure also extended to the local level, where regional army corps collaborated with provincial administrations to implement policy decisions while maintaining provincial autonomy effectively.
NCOC adhered to the principles of governance 'through stewardship, balancing civil-military relations, and promoting ethical and responsible decision making based on consensus of all stakeholders through its platform'. 69he NCOC practiced joint leadership and coordination as it was co-chaired by the federal minister for the Ministry of Planning, Development, & Special Initiatives (MoPDSI), and a senior military officer.The data-driven approach employed by NCOC utilized the military's advanced technology and surveillance systems to monitor and analyze the situation in real time.Also, both civilian and military media wings coordinated a unified communication strategy to ensure consistent messaging, updates, and public awareness campaigns.NCOC's operational efficiency was facilitated by the military's logistical and organizational strengths.This included the distribution of medical supplies, enforcement of lockdowns, and establishment of quarantine centers e.g., Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) leading the 'Track Test Quarantine' (TTQ) process. 70By leveraging the strengths of both civilian and military sectors, the NCOC was able to respond effectively to the pandemic, demonstrating the benefits of hybrid governance in managing national emergencies and complex challenges.

Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC)
Another recent example of hybridity in governance is the creation of SIFC.Approved in June 2023, it works as an oversight committee to 'facilitate, fasttrack and protect foreign investments' in Pakistan. 71It exemplifies hybrid governance as it integrates both civilian and military oversight in economic decision-making.It reflects a broader but unified response as a 'single window' to regulatory hurdles, investment needs, and investors' lack of confidence. 72It is headed by the prime minister and has a hybrid structure including the COAS alongside federal and provincial ministers.The goal of this hybrid structure is to increase investors' trust and policy coherence, especially in light of Pakistan's past political instability.The presence of the military in the facilitation terms is viewed as a stabilizing element that helps reassure international investors, particularly those from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
As stated by SIFC, it is an inclusive forum that represents multiple stakeholders, 'with facilitation support of the military'. 73However, it is the harmonizing balance between both that will determine whether this joint endeavor succeeds in creating a climate that strengthens policy predictability without undermining the fundamentals of democratic governance. 74

Conclusion
As explained by convergence theory, the division of labor between military and civilian elements of governance increases the risks of the development of the military as an institution apart from civil life and society.As a result, the military gets to assume surplus autonomy and apolitical professionalism.In the context of Pakistan's NSC, the application of convergence theory can be seen as relevant in several ways.The NSC can not only provide a sort of governing structure that keeps 'the military in touch with civilian life' but also has the capacity to 'diffuse ideological differences' by ensuring 'shared interests' of civil and military elements in national security, the 'military's advisory role,' and 'increased civilian involvement in policy formulation'.The NSC can work towards the state's civil-military equation and ensure that the need for military intervention or influence is minimized.Through consultations and dialogue, the military interacts with civilian leadership and ensures that their objective coincides.Under NSC, the military is to play a responsible role under civilian oversight.This promotes Janowitz's idea of an 'integration of values of the military and the society'.This diffuses ideological and value differences, making the military assume a professional role, closer to civil life.Thus, reducing the chances of any unconstitutional move or political intervention. 75e NSC is an ideal forum through which regular dialogue and discourse can be initiated to address long-term strategic issues.The formalized policy guidance and consultation would help bridge the gap in thinking of the military and elected civilian governments and thus improve not only the security-related response of the state but also the civil-military problematique.However, the NSC's institutional evolution throughout time reveals recurring flaws that have prevented it from taking on the shape that it had intended.It becomes imperative to define the NSC as a consultation body rather than a decision-making entity according to international practice and constitutional precepts.The lack of explicit guidelines on the frequency and content of NSC meetings highlights the necessity for a more organized approach and specific rules of business.Likewise, the NSC's capacity to perform as a forum for the development of comprehensive national security strategy is hampered by the absence of a practical planning committee and advisory board.
Moreover, the long-standing lack of trust in civil-military ties necessitates 'institutionalized instead of individualized efforts,' towards a structured, transparent, and policy advice-oriented processes.It presents a more optimistic path toward bridging these deeply ingrained gaps and actualizing the tenets of convergence theory.
Meanwhile, a newer demonstration of hybridity is emerging in the form of the SIFC, which was established 'to act as a 'Single Window' to stream the investment processes'. 76However, the induction of COAS in the structure of SIFC has ushered in a new era of military involvement beyond the defense and security domain, into economic governance.On one hand, it is considered an assurance of continuity of policies, while on the other hand, 'the initiative has 'institutionalised' the army's increasing role in the country's economic decision-making'. 77Although SIFC states that the military would give 'facilitation support,' 78 the de facto role of the military in almost every domain of governance opens up a new debate, particularly after the public statement given by the outgoing army chief in 2022.This directs, as mentioned earlier, to what Jinnah categorically defined for Pakistan's civil-military role on June 14, 1948, while addressing the armed forces at Staff College, Quetta.It is the right time to return to practically adhering to the Quaid's dictum.
Over more than 70 years, Pakistan has neglected, if not rejected, in practice all the policy prescriptions of Quaid-i-Azam, especially on governance. 79This selective engagement with Jinnah's ideas, in academics as well as practice, has provided no benefit to Pakistan.A lot of scholarly focus has been given to Jinnah's role in the politics of the Indian subcontinent and partition, little to no practical attention and heed has been given to Jinnah's statesmanship and views on governance as a builder of a state.The exploration of the fundamental causes behind this and the ways to realize them in practice remains an untapped avenue for future research.

Figure 1 :
Figure 1: Theoretical Framework of Control Theory 12
Huntington, The Soldier and the State.

Table 1 :
History of Military and Civilian Rules in Pakistan 26 October 1951 -September 1958 Non-parliamentary forces' supremacy under the formal parliamentary rule October 1958 -May 1962 Direct military rule -under Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan June 1962 -March 1969 Indirect military rule -under Ayub Khan