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Cheating responses to tax evasion

Last registered on February 14, 2020

Pre-Trial

Trial Information

General Information

Title
Cheating responses to tax evasion
RCT ID
AEARCTR-0005459
Initial registration date
February 14, 2020

Initial registration date is when the trial was registered.

It corresponds to when the registration was submitted to the Registry to be reviewed for publication.

First published
February 14, 2020, 7:07 AM EST

First published corresponds to when the trial was first made public on the Registry after being reviewed.

Locations

Region

Primary Investigator

Affiliation
University of Salzburg and ifo Institute

Other Primary Investigator(s)

PI Affiliation
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Additional Trial Information

Status
On going
Start date
2020-02-14
End date
2020-03-15
Secondary IDs
Abstract
We generalise the findings of the experimental literature investigating conditional behaviours to the setting of tax compliance. In particular, we investigate conditional behavioural responses to tax malpractice in a survey experiment on a representative sample of the Italian population and examine whether cheating rates in a die rolling task differ according to whether the respondent receives information about high or low estimates of the share of unreported income in Italy. Our design allows us to investigate whether asymmetries arise in the incidence of cheating according to whether the estimates of unreported income are higher or lower among the top compared to the bottom income earners.
External Link(s)

Registration Citation

Citation
Martinangeli, Andrea and Lisa Windsteiger. 2020. "Cheating responses to tax evasion." AEA RCT Registry. February 14. https://doi.org/10.1257/rct.5459-1.0
Experimental Details

Interventions

Intervention(s)
Intervention Start Date
2020-02-24
Intervention End Date
2020-03-15

Primary Outcomes

Primary Outcomes (end points)
Cheating responses to tax evasion estimates in die-rolling task
Primary Outcomes (explanation)

Secondary Outcomes

Secondary Outcomes (end points)
Secondary Outcomes (explanation)

Experimental Design

Experimental Design
Random provision of information about tax evasion estimates to subgroups of the sample (see attached document)
Experimental Design Details
Randomization Method
Computer
Randomization Unit
Individual
Was the treatment clustered?
No

Experiment Characteristics

Sample size: planned number of clusters
1
Sample size: planned number of observations
4000
Sample size (or number of clusters) by treatment arms
800
Minimum detectable effect size for main outcomes (accounting for sample design and clustering)
IRB

Institutional Review Boards (IRBs)

IRB Name
Ethics Council of the Max Planck Society
IRB Approval Date
2019-12-03
IRB Approval Number
2019-29
Analysis Plan

Analysis Plan Documents

Cheating Responses to Tax Evasion

MD5: 06c288e2e4e7918e120729ab80fd23e2

SHA1: a676103e9531fabdc74e32253a30829e063e14c3

Uploaded At: February 14, 2020

Post-Trial

Post Trial Information

Study Withdrawal

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Intervention

Is the intervention completed?
No
Data Collection Complete
Data Publication

Data Publication

Is public data available?
No

Program Files

Program Files
Reports, Papers & Other Materials

Relevant Paper(s)

Reports & Other Materials