ABSTRACT
This study aims to elaborate on the chaotic problem of parking retribution management in Malang City from a local bossism approach. As a big city with abundant parking revenue potential, the target set is not rational. One of the determining factors is the local pressure of bossism with the characteristics of using violence, intimidation, and building alliances with power. With the attributes of power and a network of storied relations, local bossism contributes to the proliferation of illegal levies and illegal parking. To clarify the presence of local bossism, this study uses a rent-seeking-oriented political economy perspective. To clarify the research flow, a qualitative descriptive approach was used in this study. Data collection was passed through observation, depth interviews, and documentation. The results of this study confirm that local bossism takes the opportunity to take advantage of the chaos of uncontrolled parking management and good management in the city of Malang. They organize themselves to get access to parking management from the local government through an informal agreement that is mutually beneficial
