Is the liberal order on the way out? China’s rise, networks, and the liberal hegemon

Recent criticisms by leaders and scholars have raised questions about prospects for survival of the liberal world order as well as the relationship between American hegemony and order. The three books discussed in this essay have similar diagnoses of problems in the liberal order but differ in their prognoses. Yan’s Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers offers an alternative model for leadership of the world order – humane authority. Cooley and Nexon’s Exit from Hegemony maintains that US hegemony is gone for good and the liberal world order is unraveling due to the rise of great power challengers, changing behavior by smaller states, and anti-liberal transnational movements. Ikenberry’s World Safe for Democracy argues that current problems are due to attempted global extension of the liberal order. The liberal order should be restored to its original purpose of providing a protective environment for liberal democracies. All three books emphasize the role of domestic political governance and moral values in contributing to global leadership.

G. John Ikenberry.A World Safe for Democracy: Liberal Internationalism and the Crises of Global Order.New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020.432 pp.$30.00 hardback (ISBN:9780300230987).
The US-dominated world order has come under severe strain as a result of internal fractures such as Brexit and the presidency of Donald J. Trump and external challenges posed by China and Russia.Trump accused his top national security advisers and generals of being 'dopes and dummies' for advocating the benefits of the rule-based international order. 1 Vladimir Putin has claimed that liberalism is obsolete. 2In his speech on the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping declared that China's ascent could not be stopped nor would China tolerate 'lecturing' by foreign powers.Anyone who tried to 'bully' China would 'crack their heads and spill blood on the Great Wall of steel built from the flesh and blood of 1.4 billion Chinese people'. 3Such statements illustrate disillusionment with liberalism and what has been called the 'liberal world order'. 4hat explains attacks on the liberal foundations of the current world order?Can the liberal order be reformed or must it be replaced?Does the content of an order influence its durability?Will the outcome of the current struggle over world order be determined by structural forces such as the relative balance of power or can states exercise agency in influencing the content of the order?
These questions are particularly timely due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which threatens to upset the post-Cold War security order.Explanations for the challenges to the liberal world order include the incompetence of the liberal foreign policy establishment, 5 domestic inequality due to globalization, 6 domestic political polarization, 7 declining American power, 8 structural inequity, 9 violations of sovereignty by international institutions, 10 and backlash from excluded nations. 11Since the United States is generally viewed as responsible for the liberal order, the criticisms raise issues about the meaning of hegemony and the relationship, if any, between hegemony and order. 12an Xuetong argues that the liberal order is under siege because of US double standards in foreign policy and failures of leadership at home.The liberal order will not survive unless the United States can grow its economy as fast as China while shoring up its alliances.Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon assess that the liberal order is unraveling as part of a backlash by authoritarian powers to Washington's attempts to extend liberal democracy.To preserve elements of the liberal order, the United States will have to enlist the participation of other powers.In contrast, G. John Ikenberry judges that current problems derive from global extension of the liberal order after the Cold War despite lack of buy-in from newly admitted members.Ikenberry believes that restoring the liberal order will require returning to its original purpose of protecting the security and economic development of liberal democracies.
The authors have a surprising amount of commonality, given their disparate research paradigms.All perceive that the current world order is in trouble, although they differ on what is likely to replace it.Rather than focusing solely on material power, their theories highlight the need to consider the role of domestic political systems and moral values in contributing to global leadership.

Challenges to the liberal foundations of international order
What is called the liberal order has come under increasing criticism and overt challenges.Yan blames disillusionment with the liberal order on the hypocrisy and incompetence of US leadership.Cooley and Nexon attribute the recent authoritarian backlash against the liberal order to Washington's efforts to recruit new states after the breakup of the Soviet bloc, on the assumption that participation in the international economy and multilateral institutions would socialize recently admitted states to accept liberal democracy.Ikenberry also attributes the current crisis of the liberal order to its extension after the Cold War, whereby an increasing number and diversity of states have undermined its political and moral cohesion, but he terms this a product of the liberal order's 'success', rather than miscalculation by US policymakers.
The liberal international order is a contested concept.Realists have questioned the very existence of a 'liberal world order', arguing that the post-World War II order led by the United States attempted to contain the Soviet Union rather than promote liberal principles. 13Other scholars, however, contend that while Washington made compromises during the Cold War in order to contain communism, the liberal order was robust and institutionalized. 14The consensus definition is that the liberal order includes three pillars -political liberalism, multilateralism, and economic liberalism. 15ven those who express skepticism about the liberal world order concede that the world order became more 'liberal' after the demise of the Soviet Union. 16International financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank promoted neoliberal economic principles such as opening up capital accounts, deregulation and privatization -the 'Washington Consensus'. 17In 2000, the World Trade Organization (WTO) was created to adjudicate disputes.The United Nations (UN) agreed on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention and the 'responsibility to protect' peoples against oppressive and bloodthirsty rulers. 18ince the 2008-2009 financial crisis, according to Yan, liberalism has lost its global dominance within both Western and non-Western countries in reaction to incompetent and hypocritical US leadership.After the financial meltdown caused by Wall Street's speculation and risky loans, Western regimes did not provide adequate stimulus for their economies to restore employment and production, damaging the career trajectories of recent graduates.As a result, the younger generation of Americans no longer has faith in the ability of democracy to meet their needs.Many young people have been impressed with Beijing's superior competence in managing the economy, which has enabled China to narrow the gap with the United States in capabilities.Besides the lackluster economic growth rates of the Western democracies, non-Western countries have become disillusioned with liberalism as a result of US hypocrisy and double standards in upholding democracy, exemplified by its support for Saudi Arabia despite its human rights abuses. 19or Cooley and Nexon, on the other hand, the crisis in the liberal order is not caused by loss of support for liberalism but its overextension to countries with different cultures and traditions.After the Cold War, the United States and Western Europe tried to integrate former communist countries into Western economic and security institutions, in the belief that international organizations and trade would eventually socialize these regimes into accepting liberal international norms and democracy. 20ashington assumed that the basic components of the liberal order were not only compatible but self-reinforcing, that liberal intergovernmentalism and economic liberalism would reinforce political liberalism at home. 21But the three components of the liberal order sometimes work at cross-purposes and do not create a virtuous circle.Multilateral organizations, for example, because of their emphasis on sovereignty, may reinforce authoritarianism.After states were admitted to multilateral organizations, the institutions did not 'lock in' democratic reforms, and there has been 'backsliding' from states such as Hungary and Poland. 22hile Yan and Ikenberry explain why the liberal order is under attack, Cooley and Nexon detail how this is happening.Where Yan and Ikenberry present a top-down theory in which the leading power shapes international norms and practices, Cooley and Nexon develop a bottom-up theory, where medium and smaller states and non-state actors in the form of transnational movements can also undermine the character of the international order by their departures from prevailing norms.Whereas Yan and Ikenberry have more traditional state-centric theoretical frameworks, Cooley and Nexon use network analysis, whereby the pattern of interactions between units constitutes an order.An order can 'unravel', Cooley and Nexon argue, without a hegemonic power shift or major war through incremental changes in state behavior. 23ower transitions weaken the order by enabling alternative providers of security and economic goods. 24Hegemons generally provide public and private goods in the form of economic assistance, rules for use of force and conducting trade, and a status hierarchy.After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the United States had a monopoly on providing goods to others.Washington made use of its leverage to encourage other states to adopt political and economic liberal reforms.International financial institutions and the United States imposed stringent political and economic conditions such as trade liberalization and observance of democratic norms on countries that were seeking investment and developmental assistance.Transnational activist movements promoted human rights through links with civil society and nongovernmental organizations. 25ut Western attempts at promoting democracy and human rights threatened the security of authoritarian regimes.China and Russia were particularly alarmed by 'color revolutions' in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union, and the 2010 Arab spring.During these 'color revolutions', authoritarian leaders were overthrown by popular protests against rigged elections.Fearing their own grip on power, the elites of China and Russia were motivated to combat the spread of liberal norms, and with their steady increase in economic and military power after the end of the Cold War, had the resources to do so. 26he rise of China and resurgence of Russia have reduced the US patronage monopoly and provided smaller and medium states with alternatives -exit options. 27'Exit options' refer to the ability of middle and small powers to elude the strictures and admonishments of the hegemonic power. 28China and Russia offer smaller and medium-size countries public and private goods, such as security and developmental assistance, without liberal conditions.For example, China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides loans to build roads, ports, highways, bridges, railways, and pipelines down China's coast through Southeast Asia to the Indian Ocean and overland from Central Asia to eastern Africa, the Mediterranean, and Europe. 29In addition to providing material assistance, Russia and China also rival the US hegemon by offering alternative non-liberal models for states to emulate -Russia's 'traditional' social values and China's state-led capitalist model of development. 30uthoritarian states are now using elements of the liberal order -multilateral organizations, transnational movements -to promote illiberal principles.Russia and China have established regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) that mimic the form of multilateral organizations while promoting non-liberal values, such as respect for sovereignty, noninterference, and civilizational diversity. 31Russia supports illiberal transnational movements, which promote principles such as national culture, sovereignty, traditional values, and closed borders. 32Russia acts as a broker among populist authoritarian parties (Jobbik, UKIP, Golden Dawn, the Freedom Party of Austria, Attack from Bulgaria, and Lega from Italy), helping to coordinate their activities, to drive a wedge inside Western liberal democracies. 33China is trying to weaken the liberal order from within, using its involvement in UN-related organizations to oppose human-right monitoring. 34t is unclear what Cooley and Nexon mean by states having 'exit options'.'Exit' could refer to states such as Italy or Greece receiving noncontingent loans from China, without affecting their ties to the United States or observance of liberal norms.In contrast, states that have supposedly exited the liberal order, such as the Central Asian members of the SCO (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan) were never really inside.
While Cooley and Nexon stress the availability of alternative sources of goods as diminishing the hegemon's leverage, not all goods are equal.Security is more critical to a state's survival than is trade and foreign investment.Here the United States with its far-flung system of military bases and alliances has an advantage over China. 35hina does not offer such security goods because its long-standing policy is to refrain from entering into alliances that might involve a commitment to defend other states, preferring 'strategic partnerships' that do not have treaty obligations. 36Russia's February 24 invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated NATO and highlighted the need for American leadership.Even formerly pro-Putin leaders such as Hungary's Victor Orban voted for strict EU sanctions, and Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has abandoned his criticism of the EU while organizing resistance to Russia. 37Cooley and Nexon acknowledge the political and economic leverage afforded by America's 'security infrastructure', 38 but they fail to give sufficient weight to the US alliance system in predicting that states will 'exit' the liberal order.
In contrast to Yan and Cooley and Nexon, who emphasize external challenges, Ikenberry highlights internal strains in the liberal order as a result of its attempted globalization after the end of the Cold War.In the bipolar system, the liberal order was a small club of Western states, which supported US leadership in return for American promises to provide security, support economic openness, and uphold rules and institutions.After the Soviet Union and its alliance system broke up, the liberal order was extended outward, as more states made the necessary political and economic transitions.Without a Soviet threat, the democracies lost the sense of being a 'security community' with a shared set of values and commitment to progressive reforms.Expanded membership created the need for new bargains, roles, and responsibilities, when the United States had less leverage.Germany and Japan, with their own trading and production systems, were not as dependent on the US market.China took advantage of the openness of the international economy but did not carry out liberal domestic reforms.States within the liberal order have increasingly different interests and approaches to dealing with emerging global problems such as climate change, terrorism, and weapons proliferation. 39s the geographic scope of the liberal order increased, so did its breadth.Neoliberal expansion of markets to new areas of the economy in both industrialized and developing economies exacerbated economic inequality, reducing domestic support for the liberal order among its member states.This occurred beginning in the 1980s, when Washington and international financial institutions encouraged states to open up more sectors of their economies, loosen governmental regulation, and cut social spending.Such neoliberal orthodoxy violated the Bretton Woods compromise of 'embedded liberalism', which allowed states to intervene in their economies to manage economic openness by compensating the losers from free trade. 40he two books written Cooley and Nexon and Ikenberry trace the crisis in the liberal order to its expansion to former members of the communist bloc after the end of the Cold War, but they differ on causal mechanisms.For Cooley and Nexon, the liberal order is under attack due to an authoritarian state backlash against pressure to liberalize from Western states and international financial institutions, itself due to failure to realize that US dominance was an historical anomaly rather than the reflection of secular trends toward the spread of liberal values.In contrast, Ikenberry argues that the arc of history bends toward liberalism, 41 blaming tensions in the liberal order on greater diversity of its membership along with removal of the Soviet threat, which had made reaching agreement among alliance members easier.Yan holds that disillusionment with liberalism is a product of the failure of American leadership in both domestic and foreign policy, whereas Cooley and Nexon and Ikenberry believe that it is ultimately a reflection of structural forces related to changes in the balance of power which led to loss of American leverage.The differing diagnoses of the authors have implications for their views on whether the liberal order should be restored, reformed, or replaced.

Prospects for future survival of the liberal order
Yan does not believe that the liberal order can survive without a regeneration of US leadership and economic growth, a regeneration that he regards as unlikely due to the US democratic system and the rise of 'anti-establishmentarianism' or populism.Ikenberry believes that the liberal order will endure because it provides greater benefits to more states than any possible alternative.To deal with problems caused by its overextension, he recommends that the liberal order refocus on enhancing the security and prosperity of liberal democracies.Cooley and Nexon take a middle position in that they contend that the United States can still work for liberal ordering by consulting more with other states and building on areas of consensus.In general, none of the books proposes remedies for the flaws in the liberal order that they have identified, yet there are elements that are worth saving -rule-guided order, territorial integrity, multilateral institutions -that will be left by the wayside if the world reverts to competition among self-interested great powers.
Yan predicts that liberalism is unlikely to overcome the challenge from rival non-liberal ideologies, without a renewed commitment to domestic reform by the US president and restoration of US credibility.This may be difficult given the rise of 'anti-establishmentarianism' in the United States, as reflected in the election to the presidency of Donald Trump.Within 6 months, Trump had damaged US leadership, creating doubts among NATO allies about whether the United States would defend them. 42he successor to liberalism is likely to originate in a country that is more successful than the United States, with China the most likely candidate.Inhibiting China's ability to propose an alternative is the lack of consensus among the Chinese elite on an ideology to replace liberalism.The present Chinese leadership is trying to combine Marxism-Leninism with traditional Chinese values, although they are inherently contradictory in some respects, such as the Marxist concept of class struggle versus the value of harmony. 43With liberalism waning and the Chinese unable to propose a replacement, Yan foresees that there will be no one global ideology, but rather kaleidoscopic competition at the regional level among multiple ideologies -Sunni versus Shia in the Middle East, populism versus liberalism in the industrialized West, socialism versus capitalism in Latin America, communism versus pragmatism in communist states. 44or an improved world order, Yan recommends synthesis of the liberal values of equality, democracy, and freedom with Chinese traditional values of benevolence, righteousness, and li (rites).The liberal principle of equality does not allow for differences in power and wealth among states in the global system.Merging of equality with Chinese benevolence would be fairer.For example, there should be differentiated responsibilities for mitigating climate change for states at different levels of development.Similarly, use of democratic procedures for decision making may be regarded as more legitimate but does not ensure a just outcome, especially in the international system where the great powers have disproportionate influence.A synthesis of democracy with righteousness would require justice in both 'form and result', preventing the powerful from imposing their interests on others.Finally, Yan argues that freedom of speech should be tempered with the Chinese conception of rites, or following established social norms, to conduct future Sino-American competition with greater civility. 45Establishing 'rules of the game' for US-Chinese competition, analogous to those of the US-Soviet Cold War, would help prevent future conflicts.China, however, does not seem to be receptive to negotiating formalized restraints, for example, on cyber warfare or naval incidents, and has violated commitments that it has made. 46n contrast to Yan's pessimism, Ikenberry points to elements of 'resilience' in the liberal order -the inclusiveness of multilateral institutions, shared leadership of economic institutions, the benefits of an open economic system for most states, and the superiority of a rules-based system for dealing with the challenges of economic interdependence. 47This is an overly idealized view of the liberal order.
While the liberal order may be open in theory to all, in practice there are stringent requirements for admission to the most elite clubs. 48Prospective members must satisfy requirements for their political regimes and economic systems.States that want to join the EU, for example, must have democratic institutions, respect human rights, have a functioning market economy, and be able to withstand economic and market competition within the union. 49The process of accession requires making changes in 35 policy areas to meet EU standards, with continuous monitoring of the candidate country's judicial system, rule of law, and democratic institutions. 50The liberal world order has been criticized for solidifying racial, national, and ethnic hierarchies and for making invidious distinctions between insiders and outsiders. 51Further contributing to disillusionment with the rule-guided liberal order is its poor record in dealing with the problems of the post-Cold War system, such as civil wars, climate change, the Covid-19 pandemic, and the rise of global terrorism. 52o address lack of cohesion, Ikenberry recommends maintaining stricter democratic criteria for membership in the most important clubs. 53Exclusivity would enhance the ability of members to reach agreement but at the cost of increased conflict with nonliberal states. 54Permanent exclusion of rising powers from higher-status clubs may provoke anger, resentment, and geopolitically competitive actions. 55Cooperation from authoritarian states is needed to deal with global problems such as pandemics, energy security, or climate change.
Ikenberry advocates that liberal internationalism should return to its roots by focusing on establishing an environment conducive for the survival of democracies while avoiding overambitious attempts at democracy promotion through regime change. 56Such a 'modest' policy is impossible, according to some realist scholars: liberal internationalism has an inherent activist impulse to intervene in other states' internal affairs to promote democracy, rather than pursuing the national interest, resulting in endless wars and fiascoes.'Liberal imperialism' supposedly revealed its interventionist side after the end of the Cold War, when the United States was no longer restrained by bipolarity and the need to contain the Soviet Union. 57Realist scholars, however, do not engage alternative nonideological explanations for US interventions, such as anti-terrorism, nor do they take address those cases where the United States did not intervene, such as Rwanda or Syria. 58S post-Cold War military interventions may not have been caused by liberal ideology but rather the tendency for a state's interests to expand along with its power. 59he continuation of liberal democracies does not just depend on a peaceful international environment and avoidance of needless conflict, but also on enhancing governments' ability to advance the social and economic welfare of their peoples.Ikenberry prescribes strengthening the foundations of liberal democracy by returning to the compromises of 'embedded liberalism', allowing for government management of economic openness so that it does not undermine social equity. 60Governmental action to alleviate hardships derived from foreign competition and shipment of jobs overseas might counteract domestic erosion of support for the liberal order, but it might not be sufficient.States that have a strong safety net such as Germany and Sweden also have strong populist parties. 61ooley and Nexon also recommend a pared down version of the liberal order.While America's relative power has declined, Cooley and Nexon suggest that this need not mean the end of liberal ordering.Of the three pillars of the liberal order, Cooley and Nexon believe that there is greater international support for liberal intergovernmentalism than for political liberalism.A reformed liberal order, they suggest, might place more emphasis on multilateralism while respecting more varied conceptions of democracy from US allies. 62one of the three books provides detailed prescriptions for restoring the liberal order.
To contribute to a more robust liberal order, the United States should consult with other major powers, while demonstrating more modesty about the quality of its own democracy.Given that the principal challenges to the liberal order derive from authoritarian populism, measures to reform the liberal order will not be sufficient unless domestic grievances are addressed.The rules of the liberal order and the institutions that enforce them should recognize the need for limits to globalization, the need for governments to protect their population from destabilizing flows of people, capital, and trade.A liberal order should include a variety of clubs to deal with different challenges of interdependence, security, health, and climate change, some including non-liberal as well as liberal members to allow for a division of labor and sharing of responsibility.English school theorists would call this a pluralistic rather than a solidaristic order. 63e role of moral leadership Proposals for reform of the liberal order should address the relationship between the content of the order and its level of support and durability.The issue is whether a hegemon is distinguished by its material power preponderance or its legitimate authority.Yan and Ikenberry contend that to be enduring, the hegemon's order must be morally legitimate to followers.In contrast, Cooley and Nexon maintain that it is the hegemon's monopoly in the provision of goods -security, economic, cultural -that accounts for its authority.
Their disagreement over what makes an order stable has deeper roots in differing conceptions of hegemony -whether it refers to superior power or a social relationship between states.
In order to be a global leader, according to Yan, a state must carry out moral values and promote their observance by others.Those values must be attractive to other states.Drawing on moral foundations theory in psychology, Yan posits that there are universal moral codes, such as concern for others, loyalty, patriotism, respect for legitimate authority, and sanctity.Smaller states may be initially attracted to a global leader's value system because they want to emulate its success. 64he theory developed by Yan has been characterized as 'moral realism', because it gives morality importance along with power, capabilities, and interests. 65His emphasis on moral values and hierarchy reflects the influence of Confucianism.In his book, Yan combines ancient Confucian thought with classical realism and social science, part of a larger project with colleagues at Tsinghua University, which began in 2005, to study how Chinese philosophy from Spring and Autumn (770-476 BCE) and Warring States (475-221 BCE) periods might be applied to enrich contemporary international relations theory. 66During this era, several small kingdoms vied for hegemony and status before being replaced by the victorious Qin emperor (221 BCE), exemplifying 'inter-national' relations far from Europe.The Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods generated a 'hundred schools of thought', including Confucianism, legalism, and military strategy. 67Like classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and George Kennan, Yan argues that morality is instrumental to achieving the national interest and that it must be evaluated in terms of consequences. 68an contends that order based on humane authority is more likely to be stable because the leading state builds trust among states while refraining from aggression.Yan draws on the work of Chinese philosopher Xunzi (313-238 BCE), who ranks leadership in descending order of virtue.The highest form of leadership is a 'humane authority' or 'sage king' (wang) which demonstrates righteousness and benevolence to other states.A hegemon (ba) relies on coercion and intimidation.Worse than a hegemon is a tyrant, who uses military force and strategems.In sum, as Xunzi wrote: 'one who uses the state to establish justice will be a sage king; one who establishes trust will be a hegemon; and one who performs political deception will perish'.To these, Yan adds a fourth type of leadership -anemocracy, characterized by chaos and inconsistency. 69rom these categories, Yan develops a four-fold table based on the two dimensions consistency and strategic credibility.According to Yan, a state is better able to exercise global leadership if it carries out moral values consistently.Strategic credibility -observance of promises and commitments not allies -is essential for an international leader.Credibility is part of a universal moral code.A humane authority is trustworthy to all, whereas a hegemon observes commitments and promises only when dealing with allies and client states.In short, a hegemon is guilty of 'double standards', favoring friendly states while acting according to ruthless realpolitik toward outsiders.A tyrant relies on coercion and deception, but is at least consistent in pursuing realpolitik.Finally, an anemocracy is opportunistic, acting like a bully toward weaker states while accommodating stronger ones. 70hese four leadership types vary in their ability to elicit normative behavior from other states, which affects the stability of the order.A humane authority upholds international norms through setting a good example, rewarding norm followers, and punishing transgressors.But modeling good behavior is the most effective means of influencing others, because states that are not solely motivated by external inducements or threats may eventually internalize the norms.Yan argues that orders based on consent are more likely to endure than those derived from coercion or realpolitik. 71Tyranny undermines the prevailing morality by encouraging other states to practice realpolitik as well, leading to a Hobbesian 'war of all against all' that produces an order of limited duration.Yan cites the Qin dynasty, which was exceptionally brutal and survived only fourteen years after it took power in 221 BCE.Modern examples include the Nazi regime under Adolf Hitler and the Japanese militarist regime during World War II.A hegemony has mixed effects on the stability of the order.The hegemon upholds commitments consistently to its allies, but engages in double standards toward its enemies, forcing them to engage in realpolitik.Finally, an anemocracy is unreliable, which means that other states have to rely on their own military forces for security.Since there can be no predictability or security under an anemocracy, this type of system is doomed to fail. 72an regards the United States as a hegemon, while China has the potential to be a humane authority.Consistent with the importance of individual political leadership, however, under President Trump, the United States was an anemocracy, losing strategic credibility when the president withdrew from international treaties and attacked the value of alliances, preferring to put 'America first'. 73President Franklin D. Roosevelt exemplifies humane authority, as he led US troops to liberate nations that had been previously conquered by Nazi Germany and militarist Japan while sponsoring the creation of the UN. 74Ikenberry as well commends FDR for his recognition that preserving liberal principles required military power and institutions to uphold them, in contrast to President Woodrow Wilson's faith in the 'soft law' of public opinion and moral suasion as a restraining force against aggression. 75he main distinction in Yan's theory between a hegemon and a humane authority -whether a powerful state consistently observes moral values in dealing with other states -raises practical objections.How consistent must a state be in its observance of norms?Great powers frequently have to exercise hypocrisy or apply double standards because of geopolitical imperatives and conflicting values. 76Without a universal standard of state morality, there is a risk that a state pursuing power politics will engage in moral posturing. 77kenberry's description of US liberal hegemony resembles Yan's 'humane authority'. 78Just as the humane authority provides security and economic assistance that incur the gratitude of smaller states, so the United States made 'bargains' with Western Europe and Japan whereby America would provide security and markets in return for deference.A liberal hegemon provides public goods and carries out its commitments consistently. 79The moral aspect of the postwar liberal order was embodied in the security community of liberal democracies, which sought to contain further Soviet expansion.Their sense of having shared values and perspectives gave the members of NATO the feeling of being a 'moral community'. 80kenberry's liberal hegemon is a variant of hegemonic stability theory, which holds that a functioning world economy requires a single dominant power to act as a 'stabilizer'. 81Later, the logic of the theory was extended to the security realm, where the dominant state provides security and enforces the rules of the system. 82The hegemon can be either coercive 83 or benevolent. 84The coercive hegemon uses its capabilities to force other states to comply with the rules, whereas the benevolent hegemon provides public goods while allowing other states to free ride. 85A humane authority (wang) is equivalent to the benevolent hegemon, whereas the Chinese conception of hegemon (ba) is coercive.
For most political scientists, the hegemon is benevolent, providing the public goods of free trade, an open market, and a reserve currency, even at the cost of its own interests. 86Some scholars characterize the hegemon's behavior as 'moral', especially the United States in its postwar role in establishing the Marshall Plan and international institutions after World War II.Charles Kindleberger, the author of hegemonic stability theory, argues that great powers have special responsibilities for maintaining the international economic order.Those great powers that rise to the challenge are motivated by the general interest, in contrast to others who are motivated by narrow self-interest.Such responsibilities are burdensome, because other states are prone to free-ride.The leader is 'paid in a different coin than material reward-prestige, or glory, or anticipated immortality'.The hegemon acts out of 'conscience, duty, obligation'. 87ore recent arguments for the morality of the hegemon are not concerned with its methods of influence but the means by which it elicits deference from followers.There are at least two conceptions of hegemony -material preponderance or a social relationship. 88For example, Robert Keohane defines hegemony as 'preponderance of material resources'. 89In contrast, according to English school theorists, hegemony is not the same as primacy; it is a status conferred by others through recognition of the state's right and responsibility to lead. 90Michael Mastanduno argues that persuading other states to defer to a hegemon's superior position requires the hegemon to show that its authority is legitimate because it is exercising power responsibly and morally. 91ooley and Nexon have a more materialist, transactional conception of the hegemon's role and interactions with medium and small states.The hegemon provides a selection of goods to other states -economic, security, technological, and status. 92For Cooley and Nexon, the content of the order does not matter so much as whether the 'infrastructure' (interactions and institutions) is congruent with the 'architecture' (principles, norms, rules, and values of the order).The architecture includes norms and rules for resolving disputes, use of force, and carrying out trade and finance.Interactions refer to everyday relations, flows, arrangements, and practices that constitute international orders, such as networks, alliances, military basing agreements, embassies, trade, and financial flows. 93hen the architecture is 'congruent' with the infrastructure, there is relatively little contestation of the norms.But when there is disagreement over architecture and infrastructure, there is likely to be conflict.After the Cold War, the United States expanded liberal infrastructure to include additional states that did not subscribe to liberal values.Authoritarian regimes objected to criticism of their domestic policies by Western states, nongovernmental organizations, and international institutions, leading to contestation and construction of alternative orders. 94Actions of smaller and medium-size states that are inconsistent with the values and norms of the order may cause it to disintegrate through a 'thousand paper cuts', even if they do not intend to destroy the order. 95n their focus on smaller states as key to the survival of the liberal order, Cooley and Nexon differ from the great-power orientation of Yan and Ikenberry.Inherent limits on a great power's ability to shape numerous interactions involving smaller powers helps to explain why Cooley and Nexon regard the rise and decline of international orders as largely due to structural forces rather than the policies of the hegemon or major states.But values can also make a difference.

Structure versus agency
Realists argue that whether the liberal order endures will not be determined by the content of that order but rather structural shifts in the relative balance of power, such as the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia. 96The three books under review in this essay agree that the era of unipolarity is gone but refrain from predicting the future world order.Yan grants the most agency to the United States and China, but in the end judges that neither state will attain global leadership because of domestic divisions and lack of will to pursue the policy that will attract the most followers.Ikenberry affirms that the United States and its allies have choices, but will be inclined to preserve the liberal order because of its benefits.Cooley and Nexon, in contrast, contend that the United States has limited agency because it cannot prevent China and Russia from undermining the liberal order through their provision of goods to smaller and medium states.
Yan's Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers seeks to explain (and prescribe) how China can replace the United States as the leading power. 97Yan's thesis is that the quality of a state's political leadership, including its morality, is the dominant factor in determining the success or failure of aspiring powers.Political capability, in his view, is the most important contributor to a state's comprehensive capabilities, outweighing economic, military, and cultural components. 98A would-be global leader, to be sure, must have a minimal level of hard power so that it can use rewards and punishments to enforce observance of international norms.But hard power is not sufficient.An aspiring global leader will have to recruit support from other powers and socialize them into accepting new norms and rules of the system. 99Moral actions enhance the legitimacy of a state's efforts to mobilize support and therefore its global authority.Morality involves not only provision of material goods but setting a good example for other states by acting in accordance with humane values. 100Yan acknowledges that China will likely fall short of the ideal of humane authority because of its failure to follow humane values in its domestic affairs as well as its foreign policy, consistency that is required in Confucian thought.On the other hand, Yan suggests that the rise of China may lead to increased prominence for the values of humane authority, depending on the needs of world leadership. 101an recommends that China form alliances with weaker states, a public good and a 'moral strategy', a view that aligns him with Ikenberry.Offering security increases a great power's strategic credibility and international influence, essential to global leadership. 102Despite the advantages of having allies, however, China is unlikely to abandon its nonalignment policy in the next decade.The United States has more followers than China because of its large and diverse alliance network, but the election of Trump and popularity of his 'America first' policy indicate declining resolve to defend American allies.With more uncertain alignments by smaller states, Yan predicts that neither the United States or China will be able to exercise global leadership.Instead, there is likely to be a strategic rivalry between them, centered on East Asia. 103hereas Yan gives central importance to the competition between the United States and China, Ikenberry believes that the crisis in the liberal order stems from internal problems of governance and community rather than geopolitical competition.To restore the order, the United States needs to reach new 'bargains' with its allies and reformulate the goals of the order.The United States will face a series of tradeoffs in reforming the liberal world order, such whether to emphasize free trade versus social equity, national sovereignty versus human rights, inclusivity versus universalism in international organizations.Ikenberry favors less openness, restriction of intervention to the most egregious human rights violations, and liberal conditionality for clubs dealing with security, human rights, and management of industrial economies. 104kenberry proposes a new synthesis of liberal internationalism to deal with the emerging problems of the 21st century such as climate change, hypersonic weapons, automatization of production, and artificial intelligence.While these are unprecedented issues, in his view the liberal order is uniquely suited to dealing with challenges of complex interdependence. 105Ikenberry's case for the liberal order in dealing with interdependence assumes, however, that states and leaders are solely motivated by economic interest, rather than power and status, which has not proved to be the case for China and Russia -the leading challengers to the liberal world order. 106nlike Ikenberry, Cooley and Nexon are not sanguine about reversing the decline of the liberal order because they do not believe that interdependence reinforces liberal intergovernmentalism.The extension of the liberal world order was made possible by the unexpected and complete collapse of the Soviet bloc, which gave the United States a temporary monopoly over providing economic and security goods.The decline of US hegemony cannot be reversed by increased military spending, because it is due to norm contestation.The United States could enhance its soft power by investing more in neglected areas -human capital, physical infrastructure, research, and development.Cooley and Nexon, however, assume that US influence over other states' policies is mainly derived from its provision of goods, overlooking other sources of influence, such as the shared values emphasized by Ikenberry. 107ecipient states have agency in deciding whether to accept Chinese aid or seek assistance from more traditional sources.China's aid through the BRI comes with substantial costs and risks, such as corruption, environmental damage, delays, high-cost, and unsustainable indebtedness. 108Some projects have created domestic political controversies within the recipient countries, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Serbia.A massive $900 million Chinese tire factory in Serbia has become an object of political controversy, as Vietnamese employees have toiled under inhumane working conditions while the Chinese government refuses to allow inspections or visitors. 109Aid recipients have been 'pushing back' in the last few years against exorbitant costs, preference given to Chinese contractors, corruption, and terms that favor Chinese state-owned enterprises. 110hile recognizing the importance of the policies that states adopt to reverse the decline of the liberal order, the three books do not identify many solutions to the problems that they identify.That China will become a humane authority, attracting supporters through its benevolence, seems unlikely.Ikenberry has narrowed the goals of the liberal order from projecting liberal principles to protecting liberal democracies.Cooley and Nexon do not propose any means of countering the spread of right-wing authoritarianism or upending of the order by Russia and China.
Given their pessimism about maintaining the post-Cold War liberal order, what subsequent scholarship needs to do is to identify those elements of the liberal world order that are most worth preserving -for example, institutions, rules, free or fairer trade, territorial integrity, self-determination -and devise a strategy for achieving that goal.

Conclusion
From this review, we infer the importance of domestic political governance to a great power's status as hegemon.Smaller states emulate major powers that have higher growth rates and improve the standard of living of their citizens.On this measure, the books agree that the United States has fallen short, neglecting long-needed reforms in its economy necessary to improve the social and economic well-being of Americans.
The three books differ on whether the quality of a state's leadership affects its global authority.Ikenberry views individuals such as Wilson and FDR as important for formulating alternative approaches to liberal internationalism, but in his view, the ideas that they promoted matter more than their leadership qualities, in contrast to Yan's stress on a leader's competence and consistency.Despite their disagreement on the importance of individual leadership, the three books concur that Trump's withdrawal from international institutions and dismissal of alliances, 'geopolitical suicide', 111 caused the United States to lose moral standing and influence.The authors agree on the key role of America's alliance network in reinforcing the liberal order.