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Inference and auction design in online advertising

Published:26 June 2017Publication History
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Abstract

Econometrics is a key component to gauging user satisfaction and advertisers' profits.

References

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        cover image Communications of the ACM
        Communications of the ACM  Volume 60, Issue 7
        July 2017
        89 pages
        ISSN:0001-0782
        EISSN:1557-7317
        DOI:10.1145/3116227
        Issue’s Table of Contents

        Copyright © 2017 ACM

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        • Published: 26 June 2017

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