Laos was thrown into civil war in late 1960, and when the Kennedy administration took over the Laotian crisis from the Eisenhower administration, the possibility of U. S. intervention in Laos created much controversy within the administration. In March 1961, the Kennedy administration adopted a two-track policy toward Laos. One course was pursuing negotiations for a political settlement among the Laotians or the “neutralization” of Laos. The other was providing military support to the anti-communists in Laos as well as planning for military intervention in case the negotiations failed. It has been generally believed that Kennedy opted for a neutral Laos abandoning the military option as soon as he became president. In fact, the military option was deemed no less important than the political option for some time, and there was much heated discussion within the U. S. government during the first several months of 1961 over executing some sort of intervention plan for Laos.
As part of its military intervention planning for Laos, the U. S. sought support from its major international ally—Great Britain. Two things have become clear that were little known in the past. First, the British government was formally and strongly committed to planning for intervention in Laos within the framework of SEATO and, however reluctantly, felt obliged to intervene into Laos with the U. S. when the negotiations for political settlement failed. At his meeting with President Kennedy at Key West, Florida, on March 26, 1961, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan made such a commitment, and consultations ensued between the American and British military. The consultations centered on detailing SEATO Plan 5—a military intervention plan for Laos. Second, despite the U. S. -U. K. agreement on SEATO intervention planning for Laos, subsequent discussions over U. S. military action in Laos within the Kennedy administration went far beyond what the British agreed to or SEATO Plan 5. A variety of intervention plans were proposed within the administration from April through August 1961. The nature of these plans and the discussions on them between President Kennedy and his officials throw into question their real understanding of the U. S. -U. K. alliance and foreshadow unilateral U. S. intervention in Southeast Asia.