INTRODUCTION

Since the start of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the White House’s policy towards the Middle East has changed. The Biden administration began to be guided by a new set of motives and calculations to keep from losing influence in the region.

The consequences of the diplomatic crisis with Russia have been added to the familiar problems in relations with Middle Eastern countries. While it is too early to assess the full impact of the war on US Middle East policy, it is clear that the implications will be multifaceted.

First, the limited cooperation that remained between Washington and Moscow in the region ended. Across the region, governments and politicians have largely avoided openly aligning themselves with either Russia or Ukraine and the West, preferring to remain neutral for the time being. They are trying to balance by flirting with both Russia and the West, and even trying to take on a mediating role, as has been proposed by Israel and Saudi Arabia. Only the governments of Iran and Syria, as well as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, have expressed solidarity with Russia.

Second, the Russian–Ukrainian conflict has slowed down the course of US negotiations on resuming the nuclear deal with Iran. Although attempts to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by September 2022 have continued, there is a feeling that Tehran is trying to get the most out of it, given that America needs Iranian oil to put economic pressure on Russia and lower global prices.

Third, last but not least, the war in Ukraine has disrupted the global energy market and weakened postpandemic recovery efforts. Sanctions that isolate Russia are hurting the global economy, which has never recovered from COVID-19. They lead to a drop in global economic growth, which, as the IMF predicts, will slow down from 6.1% in 2021 to 3.6% in 2022.Footnote 1 Under these conditions, some countries in the Middle East and North Africa are heavily dependent on food and energy imports, making them particularly vulnerable to the economic shocks caused by the events in Ukraine.

SAUDI ARABIA HAS TURNED ITS BACK ON THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

In connection with the war in Ukraine, the United States especially needs Saudi Arabia and its neighbors. The United States and Europe would like their partners in the Middle East to produce more oil to drive down world prices, support various UN resolutions against Moscow, and help with sanctions against Russia. However, America has not been able to convince its allies to take its side.

Biden’s visit to Saudi ArabiaFootnote 2 and meetings with its leadership in July 2022 were a pragmatic and necessary step both for the United States and Saudi Arabia and for the region as a whole. By the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, relations between the Biden administration and the Gulf states had deteriorated noticeably, with Saudi officials criticizing American policy in the Persian Gulf and expressing particular concern about Washington’s efforts to revive the Iran nuclear deal. Against this background, the White House failed in an attempt to arrange telephone conversations on the Ukrainian agenda between President Biden, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman, and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan.Footnote 3

At the talks during Biden’s visit, Saudi Arabia did not side with his administration and ignored US requests for more oil production to enforce an embargo on Russian oil supplies to Europe. When it came to oil, US–Saudi relations went from more or less friendly to openly antagonistic. In May 2022, despite Western pressure on Moscow and a possible EU ban on Russian oil imports, Riyadh decided to continue cooperation with Russia within OPEC+. Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, the energy minister, said Riyadh hoped to “work out an agreement with OPEC+ which includes Russia,” insisting “the world should appreciate the value” of the alliance of oil producers.Footnote 4

Saudi Arabia and Russia are leading a group of oil producers who have figured out how to work together to keep prices high. The former leads the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), consisting of 13 members, and the latter leads a group of ten non-OPEC producers. Together they are called OPEC+.

Saudi Arabia has shown less and less interest in cooperating with the United States on oil issues as it has become a rival oil exporter. US companies currently export about three million barrels a day compared to Saudi Arabia’s  6.8 million barrels. At the same time, the Saudis deliberately limit production in order to keep prices rising.

At an emergency meeting on Wednesday May 23, 2022, producers voted to stick to their plan to increase joint production by just 400 000 barrels per day each month. OPEC approved this decision, distributed the increase in production volumes, and drew up a schedule for export deliveries. Thus, the decision to increase oil production by two million barrels per day as called for by the United States was not made.Footnote 5

Saudi Arabia has explained its position by the fact that OPEC+ is a trade and economic organization that manages markets, not geopolitics. However, it is precisely political considerations that clearly influence the current approach taken by Riyadh, in which they consider Russia a key partner in OPEC+. They do not want to abandon Russia or ignore its interests. It is believed that in this way both countries also send an implicit signal to Washington and Brussels that, if they impose sanctions on energy exporters, they will have to accept the consequences.

They emphasize to Western countries that energy geopolitics has changed and their economic interests are increasingly linked to Asia. However, by refusing to increase production, OPEC+ is abandoning its stated goal of market stability and appears to be ignoring the concerns of its biggest clients.Footnote 6

The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia spoke about this directly, calling for unity not in support of the United States, but in a joint fight against regional challenges, naming as the basis of the security of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf “Iran’s nuclear project, its arming of militias, its support for terrorism and its destabilizing behavior in the region.” As opposed to the United States confronting Tehran, he said “dialogue and communication with Iran should be based on a unified Gulf stance.”Footnote 7

ISRAEL AVOIDS AGGRAVATING RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

With regard to the war in Ukraine, the Israelis took a controversial position. Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has refrained from publicly condemning Russia, although his foreign minister, Yair Lapid, has allowed public condemnations of the Russian military operation. In general, officially, Israel did everything it could to avoid taking an unequivocal position so as to not to spoil relations with all parties involved in the conflict.

Israel signaled its nascent policy of complete ambiguity in the first week of the war. Israel’s approach, as some experts point out, is best described as erring on the side of caution in all areas to one degree or another related to the crisis.Footnote 8

This was done while keeping an eye on the reaction from Washington. The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign Ministry said for weeks that the Biden administration understands Israel’s need to fine-tune its response to the Russian invasion in order to maintain security coordination with Russia in Syria.

For example, Israel rejected a US request to cosponsor the February 25 UN Security Council resolution condemning the Russian invasion, prompting protests from the Biden administration. Israel hesitated while the United States gathered the cosponsors of the resolution and did not give a clear answer until the meeting began. An Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the decision not to accept the US request to cosponsor the resolution was because Israel is not a member of the UN Security Council and it was clear that Russia would veto it. However, other closes allies and partners of the United States supported the resolution.

After the vote, which was indeed vetoed by Russia, US Permanent Representative to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield delivered a message to Israeli Ambassador Gilad Erdan highlighting the Biden administration’s frustration. However, a week later, when it became clear that the vast majority of the world’s states were ready to condemn Russia, Tel Aviv turned around and voted for a similar resolution at the UN General Assembly.

In Washington, Israel is condemned for being too neutral towards Russia after the start of the war. One of Jerusalem’s most vocal supporters, Senator Lindsey Graham, was “very disappointed” by Israel’s refusal to sell the Iron Dome missile defense system to Ukraine. Former Trump National Security Adviser Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster said “Israelis ought to be embarrassed” because their government does not support Kyiv.Footnote 9

One reason Israel has been and is being reserved towards Russia is because of its military presence in Syria. Military coordination between Israel and Russia in Syria has remained uninterrupted since Israel condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia maintains huge influence in Syria, but, as many observers note, for the time being it allows Israel to act there against the expansion of the Iranian military presence. Israeli officials have said they need to be cautious about the Ukraine crisis to ensure that continues.Footnote 10

During a meeting in Riga on March 7, 2022, Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid assured US Secretary of State Blinken that Israel is on the side of the United States in the war in Ukraine, but it must consider its vital security interests in Syria, which cannot be ensured in a confrontation with Russia. “The way to stop a war is to negotiate. Israel is speaking with both sides, both with Russia and Ukraine, and we are working in full coordination with our greatest ally, the United States, and our European partners,” he said, explaining Tel Aviv’s position.Footnote 11 However, its own security and the desire to nullify Iran’s efforts to create missile bases near its borders remain the priority for Israel.Footnote 12

Economically, Israel is largely gas-independent of thanks to its large gas fields in the Mediterranean, and it is even considering shipping liquefied natural gas to Europe, although volumes will be limited. However, the country is facing rising flour prices as it imports half of its wheat from Russia and another 30% from Ukraine. Russia is also Israel’s main supplier of coal for generating electricity; buying coal from other sources will increase costs.

Israel still has not provided Ukraine with any military assistance, even defensive. The issue of arms supplies was not discussed in the government. Its aid has all been humanitarian, and in a limited amount.

The first delivery was made in April 2022; 2000 helmets and 500 bulletproof vests were approved for delivery to Ukrainian emergency services. Subsequent shipments included 1500 helmets, 1500 protective vests, hundreds of mine protection suits, and 1000 gas masks.Footnote 13

More than 100 t of humanitarian aid was also delivered from Israel, including 17 t of medical equipment and medicines; Israeli water purification systems and emergency water supply kits; and thousands of tents, blankets, sleeping bags, and outerwear. In addition, several teams of Israeli medical volunteers arrived in Ukraine, and Israel also formed a field hospital.

Israel has restricted the entry of Ukrainian refugees into its territory since the beginning of the war. According to the Knesset Committee on Labor and Welfare, 14 528 Ukrainian refugees arrived in the country that are not eligible for citizenship under the Israeli Law of Return. Since the beginning of the war, about 32 000 Ukrainians have entered the country; of them, only 15 000 Ukrainian Jews are eligible to apply for citizenship. Ukrainian refugees not eligible for citizenship were issued a three-month entry visa. According to the statement of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, visas will be extended automatically without the need for Ukrainian refugees to visit any state institution.Footnote 14

After unprecedented sanctions were imposed against Russia, including against its oligarchs, Israel found itself among the very few supposedly “Western” states that did not comply with them. There is a simple explanation why Israeli leaders decided to protect the fate and assets of “their” oligarchs. Many of them settled in Israel but retained significant assets in and around Russia and invested in local companies. It is estimated that over the past 30 years, the financial influence of these oligarchs has reached between 5 and 10% of Israel’s GDP.Footnote 15 This explains the desire to limit the effect of the sanctions to which they are subjected.

In July 2022, Naftali Bennett was replaced as prime minister by his coalition partner Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, who will have to build Russian–Israeli relations in the future. Since the beginning of the special military operation as head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yair Lapid was for Moscow perhaps the least acceptable Israeli politician for this post. President Putin sent a letter of congratulations when Lapid took office, but the new prime minister has not yet had telephone conversations or meetings with the Russian president, indicating, some experts say, a lack of previous interaction that his predecessors maintained.Footnote 16

President Biden’s July trip to the Middle East did little to change Israel’s position on Ukraine. The prevailing opinion is that the Americans made no significant achievements in this regard. Much of the trip was dedicated to containing Iran and repairing damaged ties with longtime Arab partners. In Israel, the president was forced to abandon part of his agenda, relegating the topic of Ukraine to the background.Footnote 17 The US concerns about Iran were the main motivation for negotiations not only with Israel, but also with the Arab states.

IRAN BACKS RUSSIA IN DETERRING US AND NATO

Moscow and Tehran have long cooperated when their interests overlap, especially in countering the United States in the Middle East, but recent actions underline a more concerted effort to strengthen their partnership. In recent months, senior Russian and Iranian officials have met frequently to step up cooperation and sign economic and military agreements. Presidents Vladimir Putin and Ebrahim Raisi have spoken at least four times since the beginning of the special military operation. Putin visited Tehran in July 2022, his first foreign trip outside the former Soviet Union since the war began.Footnote 18

The engagement between Moscow and Tehran now reflects a deepening and potentially more balanced relationship in which Russia is no longer the absolute dominant party. Both countries are moving towards a strategic partnership to challenge the interests of the United States and its allies, not only in the Middle East, but in Europe and around the world. It is important that in Tehran this approach is approved at the highest level by the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In the first days of the war, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei defined the position that Tehran, supporting efforts to end the conflict in Ukraine, lays the blame for what happened not on Russia, but on the United States. He considers the US policy in Ukraine to be the root cause of the crisis. The Iranian leader spoke about this in a televised address to the nation. “The solution to any crisis” lies in its “root cause,” he said, accusing Washington and its allies of fueling the Ukrainian crisis and calling Ukrainians “victims” of US policy.

Naturally, interfering in the internal affairs of that country, organizing rallies against governments, launching color revolutions, the presence of American Senators among the demonstrators, and toppling one government and putting another in power lead to such crises.

In my opinion, Ukraine is a victim of this policy as well,” he said. “It was the US that dragged Ukraine to this point. Naturally, interfering in the internal affairs of that country, organizing rallies against governments, launching color revolutions, the presence of American Senators among the demonstrators, and toppling one government and putting another in power lead to such crises.” He added that lessons could be learned from the crisis in Ukraine, adding that any government that relies on the United States should know that this is just a “mirage.”Footnote 19

At an emergency session of the UN General Assembly on March 2, 2022, 141 out of 193 member states voted in favor of a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. Only five voted against: Russia, Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria. Iran was among 35 countries, including China, that abstained. In his statement, Iran’s representative to the UN, Majid Takht Ravanchi, emphasized the need to respect both the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states” and Russia’s security concerns. His statement also argued that the resolution proposed by the UN secretariat lacked “impartiality and realistic mechanisms to resolve the crisis by peaceful means.”Footnote 20

As the crisis unfolds in Ukraine, Iran remains committed to this stance, which combines an understanding of Russia’s concerns about NATO expansion and a preference for diplomacy over war. Tehran calls on all parties to work towards a negotiated solution to the crisis and to cease hostilities. At the same time, according to the Iranian government, Ukraine is obliged to refuse to provide its territory for NATO expansion, which is a serious threat to stability and security, including the states of the Caucasus near Iranian borders.Footnote 21

This approach is not opportunistic; it is enshrined in Iran’s new Pivot to the East doctrine, which Tehran considers an ideological basis for a foreign policy that opens access to major world markets and provides resistance to Western sanctions.Footnote 22 In this way, Iran can pursue its policy of multilateralism, gradually abandoning a concept based primarily on trade and economic cooperation with Western Europe, which has supported the US sanctions policy against Tehran more than once. On this basis, Iran recognizes Russia as a vital link in the Eurasian balance, of which it wants to be a part. This requires better relations with Moscow.

At the same time, this position was criticized by some former politicians in Iran. Some of them point out that Russia’s position poses a threat to Iran’s national interests and makes it difficult to overcome the problem of sanctions. Ali Motahari, a moderate conservative politician and former member of parliament, for example, explained his position this way:

in the last stage of reviving the Barjam [the JCPOA], Iran must put aside its fears and resolve the remaining problems through direct negotiations with the United States. Russia is deeply concerned about the resumption of JCPOA and the improvement of Iran’s economic relations with the West, and wants Iran to continue to be its hostage and a shield against the West, Iran must put its national interests before Russian interests.Footnote 23

One can agree with the fact that the deepening of Russian–Iranian ties will almost certainly jeopardize the interests of the United States and its allies in the Middle East.Footnote 24 For example, Russian support for Iran’s nascent military space program and its air force could boost the Iranian offensive capabilities and strengthen its opposition to the United States and its partners in the region. In addition, the growing influence of Iran in Syria will allow Tehran to threaten Israel more effectively. Finally, Tehran’s position on Ukraine makes it possible to significantly expand beneficial economic ties with Russia, including those that will ease US sanctions.

One consequence of the war is the new circumstances in Syria that have arisen as a result of Moscow turning its attention to Ukraine. This raises questions about a vacuum in Syria that anti-Assad forces can exploit, and now Iran needs to adjust to ensure that the Syrian government does not suffer serious setbacks because Russia can do a little less for Damascus. We can agree with the forecast of what this might mean: the further expansion and strengthening of Iranian influence in Syria.Footnote 25

This factor is important to keep in mind when evaluating the results of the talks in Damascus of Iranian Foreign Minister Amir Abdollahian, in which Palestine occupied a central place in the discussions.Footnote 26 The focus on the Palestinian issue was a deliberate move by the Iranian side to emphasize Syria’s status as part of the so-called “axis of resistance” and that Damascus was not going to join the growing trend of Arab normalization with Israel. It is important that Damascus is not going to abandon or revise strategic relations with Tehran in order to appease the Arab states.

During the Ukrainian crisis, Iran is not refusing to closely cooperate with Russia in negotiations on restoring the JCPOA, which continue in Vienna between Iran and representatives of Russia, China, Great Britain, France, and Germany (the United States is not directly involved in the process).

The United States tried through its European allies to convince the Iranian delegation that, due to the conflict in Ukraine and rising tensions with the West, the Russian government was no longer interested in making progress on the Iranian nuclear deal. In fact, Russia has urged the US to be more committed to the deal. In addition, the Russians demanded guarantees that sanctions related to the conflict in Ukraine would not affect trade between Moscow and Tehran. Russia’s last-minute call for a written US guarantee put the talks on hold, because Washington was unwilling to accept the condition.

On March 14, 2022, Iranian Foreign Minister Amir Abdollahian met with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov. They held a joint press conference at which they said that Moscow had received written guarantees from Washington regarding cooperation in the framework of the Iranian nuclear deal and that the US guaranteed that sanctions against Russia would not affect its trade with Iran. During the meeting, Lavrov and Amir Abdollahian stressed the strong ties between Russia and Iran, as well as the interest of the two countries in long-term cooperation, especially in the field of economic relations. The joint statement asserts that US sanctions will not prejudice Russia’s right to “free trade, economic and investment cooperation, and military–technical cooperation” with Iran.Footnote 27

This Russian–Iranian initiative was also triggered by the fact that, in the United States, a group of Republican senators called on President Biden to stop negotiations with Iran on a nuclear deal. They stressed that the deal would mean a “big concession” to Russian President Putin at the height of the war. However, American representatives at the Vienna talks considered Russia’s demands “appropriate” and mentioned that sanctions against Russia and the JCPOA are separate issues and “there is no connection between them.” Negotiations have continued and additional provisions have been included in the text of the upcoming agreement to ensure that all projects and activities envisaged in the JCPOA, including cooperation with Iran at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, are protected from the negative impact of the United States and EU sanctions against Russia.Footnote 28

By supporting Moscow in containing the United States and NATO, Tehran is taking steps to develop its relations with many countries, in some cases, raising them to a strategic level. This can be judged by the diplomatic steps taken by Iran during the presidency of Ebrahim Raisi. Since taking office in August 2021, Raisi has begun to strengthen Iran’s ties with neighboring countries and non-Western world powers.

In the first weeks of his presidency, Raisi managed to pave the way for Iran to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The process of granting Iran the status of a full member began last year and was completed at the SCO summit, which took place in Samarkand on September 15 this year. Iran’s full participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was approved at the summit. In addition to the SCO, Iran seeks to join the group of emerging economies called BRICS. Iranian Foreign Minister Amir Abdollahian said that Iran is one of the first countries to become a member of BRICS+. BRICS currently includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

Parallel to its efforts to join prestigious international institutions, President Raisi’s government is making diplomatic efforts to normalize relations with some Arab countries in the West Asian region. Raisi and Amir Abdollahian have visited Arab countries. Now, those efforts appear to be bearing fruit as America’s closest allies, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, have decided to send ambassadors to Iran soon. As for relations with Riyadh, a meeting of the foreign ministers of Iran and Saudi Arabia is being prepared in Baghdad.Footnote 29

Work on restoring the JCPOA on the Iranian nuclear program in the Vienna format is reaching the finish line, but not all issues have been resolved. On August 15, 2022, Amir Abdollahian stated that “if an agreement is not reached, the world will not end.” Responding to the Biden administration’s military threats, Iran’s foreign minister said: “They talk about a plan B, but we have our own plan B. In the end, I believe that all issues should be resolved through negotiations.”Footnote 30 Tehran is not abandoning its defense and regional policies and intends to maintain its sovereign nuclear rights.

CONCLUSIONS

The Biden administration is trying to reset US relations with important Middle Eastern partners. The previous model of their cooperation, which is often referred to as an “oil agreement for the West in exchange for the security of the Persian Gulf states,” is less and less applicable. According to the Biden administration, Washington needs a renewed partnership on new terms, where the Arab states would have clear obligations and specific responsibilities in allied relations with the United States.

At this stage, the White House is making political efforts to unite as many Middle Eastern states as possible around its leadership in confronting Russia in Ukraine. In this regard, the ability of the American government to impose its will in the vast region of the Middle East raises questions.

The war in Ukraine has put the Arab states of the Persian Gulf in a difficult diplomatic position. They have largely taken a neutral, ambiguous stance, urging both sides to exercise restraint. While remaining close partners with the US, most of them have developed closer ties with Russia in an attempt to diversify their international relations and are therefore unwilling to openly oppose either side.

As for Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, their reactions to the Ukraine crisis have been unfolding against the background of growing dissatisfaction with the Biden administration and growing doubts about the reliability of Washington in its role as a guarantor of their security. Both countries fear the inevitable withdrawal of the United States from the region and are reconsidering their policies, and not in America’s favor. While no Gulf state wants to give the impression that it is on Russia’s side, without fear of irritating the West, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not hesitating to show their displeasure with the US during this crisis.

Rising oil prices have forced the US to put pressure on the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf to increase production. Despite heavy lobbying from the Biden administration in the weeks following the start of events in Ukraine and the visit of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, neither country supported them in their sanctions against Russia.

There is a broader trend in which Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region are unhappy with the change in the US position in the Middle East without considering the needs of their partners, especially in the field of security. Saudi Arabia and the UAE expected more support from the Biden administration in the war in Yemen and in dealing with the associated risks, such as Houthi missile attacks. The Gulf monarchies have criticized the White House’s attempts to return to the nuclear deal with Iran without affecting the Iranian ballistic missile program and regional influence through intermediaries in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

The US has repeatedly called on the Israelis to oppose Russia, but so far Israel has refused to supply weapons to Ukraine or join in sanctions against Moscow. Out of all of America’s allies, Israel’s silence on the Ukrainian crisis is the loudest; Israeli leaders do not want to directly confront the Kremlin, with which they are connected by strategic and economic interests.

Kyiv is frustrated by Israel’s repeated refusal to provide Ukraine with the Iron Dome missile defense system and other weapons. Israeli military experts believe that the delivery of the Iron Dome components requires the dispatch of Israeli specialists, which would mean Israel’s military intervention in the war against Russia. Such a scenario is not up for debate by the politicians of the Jewish state.

Iran’s close relationship with the Russian Federation, along with Tehran’s efforts to maintain ties with Ukraine, has complicated the Iranian leadership’s approach to the special military operation. Although Iran did not recognize the independence of the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhansk People’s Republic, it did not criticize the military operation and abstained from voting on a UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Tehran, like Russia, opposes NATO expansion and is concerned about the possible negative consequences of the war for negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. Ukrainian leadership considers Iran an ally of Russia in this conflict and is passive in its relations with Tehran.

If the JCPOA is restored and the US lifts sanctions, Iran will be open again for business in energy, shipping, metallurgy, automotive, insurance, and other sectors. The country could increase its oil production by 900 000 barrels a day within three months after the sanctions are lifted, and within six months it could reach full capacity of about 3.7 million barrels a day. Iran also has approximately 100 million barrels of crude oil and condensate in storage that could be released to the market almost immediately. All of this could ease the tension in the global market, which was shaken by the conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

Iran could probably bring up to 1 million barrels per day to the market by the end of this year; however, despite its economic interest, Tehran did not become involved in the sanctions pressure on Russia, strategic considerations prevail, and anti-Americanism remains their base.

As for gas, despite having the second largest gas reserves in the world (after Russia), Iran does not yet have the infrastructure or capacity to supply gas to Europe, even after the lifting of sanctions. It will not be possible to replace Russian gas with Iranian gas in Europe in the short term. However, the war in Ukraine benefits the Iranian economy in terms of rising oil and gas prices.

At the end of August 2022, the UN vote on the anti-Russian resolution proposed by Ukraine showed that the number of countries that were ready to unconditionally support Kyiv had decreased by two and a half times in six months. Less than a third of countries are ready to support the policy of the United States and NATO, including the majority of the countries of the Middle East.