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Incentive Compatibility and Strategy-Proofness of Mechanisms of Organizational Behavior Control: Retrospective, State of the Art, and Prospects of Theoretical Research

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Abstract

We describe prerequisites for the emergence of the key concept of incentive compatibility in the theory of active systems and mechanism design and give a survey of approaches to this problem, which have led to stating the fair play and revelation principles, and of current trends in this branch of scientific knowledge. Potential difficulties and development prospects are discussed.

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Funding

The research was financially supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, project no. 19-17-50190.

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  1. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 117997, Russia

    V. N. Burkov, A. K. Enaleev & N. A. Korgin

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  1. V. N. Burkov
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  2. A. K. Enaleev
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  3. N. A. Korgin
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Correspondence to V. N. Burkov, A. K. Enaleev or N. A. Korgin.

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Burkov, V.N., Enaleev, A.K. & Korgin, N.A. Incentive Compatibility and Strategy-Proofness of Mechanisms of Organizational Behavior Control: Retrospective, State of the Art, and Prospects of Theoretical Research. Autom Remote Control 82, 1119–1143 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117921070018

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