Abstract
A number of problems of the optimal organization for revenue collection and law enforcement inspections are considered: the selection of agents for the primary and repeated audit, the salaries and rewards of inspectors at different levels, and the total number of levels in the hierarchy. In each case, the optimal strategy for the organization of an inspection is determined depending on the parameters used.
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Original Russian Text © A.A. Vasin, P.A. Kartunova, A.S. Urazov, 2010, published in Matematicheskoe Modelirovanie, 2010, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 67–89.
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Vasin, A.A., Kartunova, P.A. & Urazov, A.S. Models for the organization of state inspections and the struggle against corruption. Math Models Comput Simul 2, 760–775 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1134/S2070048210060116
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S2070048210060116