Abstract
Under study are the polytopes of (0, 1)-normalized convex and 1-convex (dual simplex) n-person TU-games and monotonic big boss games.We solve the characterization problems of the extreme points of the polytopes of 1-convex games, symmetric convex games, and big boss games symmetric with respect to the coalition of powerless agents. For the remaining polytopes, some subsets of extreme points are described.
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Original Russian Text © A.B. Zinchenko, 2016, published in Diskretnyi Analiz i Issledovanie Operatsii, 2016, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 97–110.
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Zinchenko, A.B. Polytopes of special classes of the balanced transferable utility games. J. Appl. Ind. Math. 10, 145–154 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1134/S1990478916010166
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S1990478916010166