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Coordinated Influence on the Opinions of Social Network Members

  • Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
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Abstract

This paper studies a model of coordinated influence in a social network in which several members, called players, can jointly affect the opinions of other members, called agents, during a finite period of time. The model is treated as a cooperative dynamic game. The influence of players is expressed by declaring their opinions which are then considered and weighted by the agents to form their own opinions. The goal is to find the declared opinions of players focusing only on associated costs as well as on the average deviation of agents beliefs from the desired ones. Under coordination, the total costs of players are distributed using the Shapley value. If there is no information about the degrees of trust of agents to each other, these degrees are estimated using a centrality measure. Numerical simulation is performed for a well-known social network of a university karate club and for a lattice graph often used for modeling of spatial networks.

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Funding

This work was supported by the Shandong Province “Double-Hundred Talent Plan,” project no. WST2017009.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, 199034, Russia

    M. A. Rogov & A. A. Sedakov

  2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University, Qingdao, 266071, China

    A. A. Sedakov

  3. Institute of Applied Mathematics of Shandong, Qingdao, 266071, China

    A. A. Sedakov

Authors
  1. M. A. Rogov
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  2. A. A. Sedakov
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Corresponding authors

Correspondence to M. A. Rogov or A. A. Sedakov.

Additional information

Russian Text © The Author(s), 2018, published in Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya, 2018, No. 4, pp. 30–58.

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Rogov, M.A., Sedakov, A.A. Coordinated Influence on the Opinions of Social Network Members. Autom Remote Control 81, 528–547 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117920030108

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117920030108

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