Armed conflicts and wildlife decline: Challenges and recommendations for effective conservation policy in the Sahara‐Sahel

Increasing conflicts and social insecurity are expected to accelerate biodiversity decline and escalate illegal wildlife killing. Sahara‐Sahel megafauna has experienced recent continuous decline due to unsustainable hunting pressure. Here, we provide the best available data on distribution and population trends of threatened, large vertebrates, to illustrate how escalating regional conflict (565% growth since 2011) is hastening population decline in areas that were formerly refugia for megafauna. Without conservation action, the unique and iconic biodiversity of Earth's largest desert will be forever lost. We recommend: (1) establishing strong commitments for change in global attitude toward nature; (2) engraining a culture of environmental responsibility among all stakeholders; (3) fostering environmental awareness to drive societal change; (4) reinforcing regional security and firearms control; and (5) implementing local research and wildlife monitoring schemes. We identify relevant international partners needed to tackle these challenges and to make strong policy change for biodiversity conservation and regional stability.


INTRODUCTION
Conflict and social insecurity are known to accelerate biodiversity decline globally and escalate illegal killing of wildlife (Douglas & Alie, 2014;Gaynor et al., 2016). The recent increase in global conflicts (IEP, 2016) stresses the need for the identification of wildlife-declining areas and the development of effective policies to reduce the impacts of conflict on biodiversity (Brashares et al., 2014).
The Sahara-Sahel region of North Africa provides a case study on how wildlife killing may be boosted by the interactions of conflict with illegal activities, infrastructure development, and resource extraction activities. For millennia, the remoteness and harsh climatic conditions of this region have supported subsistence-hunting systems, deeply rooted in traditional cultures (OECD-SWAC, 2014). During the last century, the increased accessibility of previously remote areas (more roads and desert-capable vehicles) and firearms have dramatically amplified the impact of hunting activities ; Text S1). Growing global demands for natural resources have prompted regional mineral exploitation, which in turn has further contributed to greater accessibility and illegal wildlife hunting . As such, 12 large-sized vertebrates (out of 14 assessed in  have been listed as Extinct in the Wild or are globally threatened with extinction. Exacerbating this scenario, there is now an unprecedented growth in regional instability, characterized by extremist groups carrying out attacks, kidnapping, enslaving, and smuggling arms and drugs to finance their activities (OECD-SWAC, 2014). In Mali, the combination of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) activities with local autodetermination claims (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) is promoting regional conflict with recurrent attacks . In southern Niger, northern Cameroon, westcentral Chad, and northern Nigeria, Boko-Haram performed over 800 attacks between 2009 and 2013, with thousands of lives lost in the past 10 years (Akinola, 2015;OECD-SWAC, 2014). In Libya, the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 and the subsequent war have fragmented the country, which is now controlled by distinct groups imposing their own agendas (Beauchamp, 2014). Political instability in Tunisia and Egypt following social movements have also contributed to regional insecurity. Human migration movements from Libya to Mali/Niger or toward Europe (15% of all Libyans migrated in early 2011; OECD-SWAC, 2014) have been associated with social unrest. Accordingly, insecurity now spans across almost all the Sahara-Sahel OECD-SWAC, 2014). Although a quantitative assessment of biodiversity threats across the Sahara-Sahel is problematic in these circumstances, there is increasing evidence of an ongoing wildlife massacre resulting from growing instability ( Figure S1; Christy, 2015;Smith, 2015;Zedany & Al-Kich, 2013). Here, we aim to map the spatial and temporal occurrence of conflicts and other threatening factors in the Sahara-Sahel, including natural resource exploitation activities and implicit accessibility. Next, we contrast these threat factors with the distribution of 10 threatened large vertebrates. We support our analysis with three case studies where there is sufficient information on population trends to explore underlying relationships between conflict and wildlife decline in more detail. Finally, we identify the key policy players needed to effectively reduce wildlife-related conflicts and make recommendations for conservation practitioners.

METHODS
Georeferenced data on attacks/battles (armed assaults, bombing/explosions, facility/infrastructure attacks) and violence against civilians (hostage taking and assassination) were extracted from global and African databases (data sources in Table S1) to quantify temporal trends in the occurrence of conflicts.
Georeferenced data on conflict events, smuggling and human migration routes, paved roads and tracks, human populated places, sandy areas (representing less accessible zones), and natural resource exploitation were used to map conflicts and extinction risk correlates (Table S1). Maps were con-trasted with the distributions of 10 extant Sahara-Sahel large vertebrates. Most species are regional endemics and all have suffered vast range and population declines during the past century . The threat assessment was further complemented by data compiled from multiple bibliographic sources (Table S1) and direct field observations made by authors (Table S2). Taken together, data were used to review current population status and identify extinction risks in the Sahara-Sahel region. Species distributions were intersected with protected areas (PAs) distribution to quantify their regional representation in PAs.
Local population trend data were available for the addax (Addax nasomaculatus), while data on illegal off-take were available for dorcas gazelle (Gazella dorcas) and African savannah elephant (Loxodonta africana; details in Text S2). Estimates of population size from the last known wild addax population surviving in the Termit & Tin-Toumma National Nature Reserve (TTNNR) in Niger were available in the period 1966-2000 and yearly after 2001. The number of dorcas gazelle illegally killed in Libya was estimated from data obtained through questionnaires to 40 international experts and from interviews made in September 2015 to c. 200 Libyan residents (Text S2). The number of elephants illegally killed in the Gourma region (Mali) between January 2012 and January 2016 was quantified using a community-based vigilance network living throughout the range of the northernmost and isolated elephant population (Text S2).

RESULTS
The absolute number of conflict events has grown within the Sahara-Sahel range countries over the last 19 years, escalating after 2011 (565% growth; Figure 1). Currently, it represents about 20% of total African conflicts and almost 5% of global conflicts. The portions of Sudan/South Sudan included in the Sahara-Sahel account for the largest proportion of conflict events (48%) within the time period, particularly during the Darfur crisis (2003)(2004)(2005)(2006). After 2011, conflict events increased dramatically in Libya and Mali and became widespread, forming multiple clusters (Figures 2 and S2). Numerous smuggling and human migration routes cross the Sahara-Sahel. The distribution of human population centres and major roads and tracks suggests that peripheral Sahara-Sahel areas are widely accessible and that only a few patches covered mostly by sand dunes remain less accessible. Clusters of natural resource exploitation activities are found in Algeria, Libya, Niger, and Egypt. Range fragmentation and population extirpation are common for the 10 species assessed here (Table 1; Figures 2 and S1). Illegal killing associated with increased accessibility and human activities (including mining, grazing, and infrastructure building) within the Sahara-Sahel are the most common pressures associated with wildlife FIGURE 2 Distribution of 10 threatened vertebrates and of PAs in the Sahara-Sahel (a) and distribution of extinction risk factors (b) attacks/battles and events of violence against civilians (including hostage taking and assassination) after 2011, of areas claimed as Azawad nation, under influence of AQIM and Boko-Haram, and affected by the Libya conflict (c) current major smuggling/migration routes (d) populated places and sand dunes (representing less accessible zones) (e) major roads and tracks (f) oil, gas, and other mining facilities Note: See Table S1 for data sources and Table 1 for species names. Common legend items to all figures are displayed in (f). population decline (Table 1). Importantly, six of the examined species have less than 40% of their distribution represented in PAs (Table 1).
Addax populations have experienced a marked population decline in Niger since 1997, as the region became affected by conflict, which escalated after 2015 ( Figure 3). After 2009, coinciding with the beginning of oil exploration activities, populations reached critically low numbers. Oil activities largely overlap the range of the extant addax population, which occurs in largely unpopulated areas. Similarly, the number of reported dorcas gazelles illegally killed in Libya increased after 2012, about 2 years after the start of the regional conflict, with killing events widespread across the country ( Figure 3). The reported number of elephants killed in Mali increased in the beginning of 2015 (Figure 3), 3 years after an increase in conflict and following violent attempts to derail the imminent peace process (Text S3). The current range of the surviving elephant population excludes the most densely human populated places ( Figure 2).

DISCUSSION
Analyses of three Sahara-Sahel species clearly show an association between population loss with increased conflict (dorcas gazelle and elephant) and oil exploitation (addax). These  Restricted to scattered small populations in Chad's Soudano-Sahelian zone and to two transboundary populations. Most of the year is spent in Mali (Gourma) and Eritrea (Gash-Setit), crossing into Burkina-Faso and Ethiopia, respectively, during the wet season. The Gourma population was estimated by aerial census in 253 plus 51 individuals. Human encroachment was the biggest threat but since 2012 that insecurity emboldens poachers and traffickers. Waterholes surrounded by thicket forests are the preferred habitat of both elephants and poachers. The Eritrean population has never been formally assessed due to local conflict, but an informed guess numbers them at 100-120. Chad's heavily poached Sahelian elephants number around 150 (although greater numbers are found in the south of the country) Note: For each species, we report the IUCN Red List status (CR -critically endangered; EN -endangered; VU -vulnerable), the percentage of the global range included inside the Sahara-Sahel (%S-S), and the percentage of the Sahara-Sahel range included inside PAs (%PA). Distributions are mapped in Figure 2. Data compiled from nonacademic publications, published works (see Table S1), and direct field observations. patterns are likely to be representative of the wider catastrophic wildlife decline occurring in the region ( Figure S1). Specifically, the data collected here suggest that illegal killings accelerated around 2 to 3 years after armed conflicts ignited in Libya and Mali. It is difficult to know whether this time frame is significant but conflict and especially terrorism, human trafficking, and organized crime have all previously been related to the occurrence of illegal wildlife killing (Brashares et al., 2014;Christy, 2015;Douglas & Alie, 2014).
In the Sahara-Sahel, megafauna have been almost extirpated from the southern regions, where armed conflict endured the longest and where the highest regional densities of roads and human population are found. Furthermore, the rush of extremist groups and traffickers to control remote areas promotes human presence in places that previously were only occasionally crossed by nomads. The current conflict thus adds to disturbances already caused by other human activities (mining, grazing, agriculture, and urbanization), accelerating population decline and local extinction, and leaving largesized vertebrates with nowhere to go; a global trend observable in megafauna (Ripple et al., 2016).

Challenges to biodiversity conservation in the Sahara-Sahel
All Sahara-Sahel range countries are developing nations and most of them are ranked as Low Human Development (Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Sudan; UNDP, 2016); several are among the 40 most highly underfunded countries for biodiversity conservation (Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Sudan; Waldron et al., 2013). These countries currently lack the resources and capacities, and in some cases the commitment, to make the strong structural changes needed to reverse the reported extinction trend. The assistance to relieve human pressures that could be provided by NGOs is not present (https://www.ngoaidmap.org/) and, when existing, it is largely underfunded (Development Initiatives, 2016). The combined low income, lack of perspectives on social development, and poor human rights enforcement stimulate human migration (OECD-SWAC, 2014). Algeria, Mauritania, and Chad are among the top five countries unable to retain top talents and brain drain deprives them from the human resources needed to drive and implement change (WEF, 2014). Poor governance and high corruption levels  Table S1 for data sources.
are systemic to Sahara-Sahel countries (all are ranked as Highly Corrupt; Transparency International, 2017), which contribute to environmental destruction and lack of societal accountability. For instance, the oil exploitation prospection phase in Niger caused a significant decline in addax because the restrictions imposed by the health, security, and environment regulations were not respected by oil companies and subcontractors, including the army in charge of securing activities ; this represents an environmental crime that was left unpunished (INTERPOL-UN Environment, 2016). The uncontrolled circulation of firearms in the Sahara-Sahel also underpins the escalating level of conflict and arms trade thriving in the region. For example, between 2005 and 2014, EU member states granted licenses for arm exports to the Middle East and North Africa (including five Sahara-Sahel countries) worth over €82bn (Akkerman, 2016). The largest arm trade companies are also the key winners of EU border security contracts (building fences, providing equipment for border guards, and establishing surveillance systems) aimed at controlling human migration into Europe (Akkerman, 2016). The situation is likely to worsen as the military industry is currently shaping European border security policy and persuading the EU research and technology policy to start funding military-related research (https://www.ies.be/files/Milestone_or_Maelstrom_Report _HQ.pdf). The EU/US action in the Libyan conflict also demonstrated that third-party interferences often lack the proper consideration for the long-term risks and consequences of military operations. In a region subjected to stochastic drought , future climate-related adversities are also likely to boost regional conflict and further biodiversity loss given the fast-growing human population rates (United Nations, 2015) and the ethnically fractionalized societies that characterize Sahara-Sahel countries (Schleussner, Donges, Donner, & Schellnhuber, 2016).

Short-term initiatives to immediately halt wildlife decline
There are a number of available tools to predict conflicts potentially affecting wildlife and to integrate broadscale environmental protection into peace strategies, including web-based resources that allow tracking conflict-related movements and human trafficking routes, and combating criminal networks for trafficking wildlife products ( We urgently need accountable and visionary governments and businesses that work in the best interest of societies and promote sustainable and equitable uses of natural resources, while fostering the recovery of threatened species. The EU and Chinese companies exploiting natural resources in Africa need to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR; Table 2) in the Sahara-Sahel, where economic growth, social progress, and environmental protection are all considered (Cheng & Liang, 2011). Together with the wildlife authorities of range countries, exploiting companies need to design a code of conduct to eradicate illegal hunting. This is critical, particularly for the survival of the last remaining wild addax and dama gazelle; while resources and enforcement is required to prevent elephant poaching for ivory. Together with global and regional conservation organizations, companies exploiting local resources need to support the management of PAs and effective capacity building of the wildlife services. Governments should foster trust between people and their armed forces by ensuring that discipline is maintained, and by responding swiftly to any reported abuse (https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/wps-sg_rep ort_crsv_-march_2015_0.pdf). Armed forces should set an example of biodiversity conservation to local communities and penalties on harvesting wildlife should be strictly enforced (INTERPOL-UN Environment, 2016; Table 2).

Long-term measures for building resilient societies
Conservation scientists need to increase collaboration with politicians and researchers focused on conflict and the military to find innovative ways of dealing with the multitude of challenges in conflict areas (Canney, 2007). Communitybased wildlife management and community-based natural resource management allow building awareness of the environment and the cultural, economic, and ecological importance of biodiversity and ecosystem services (www.un.org/ africarenewal/magazine/august-november-2017/new-facesahel), and developing a deeper understanding of the local contexts. Both are required for designing management approaches that successfully preserve the remaining biodiversity in conflict areas (Berkes, 2004; Table 2). The formation of extremist groups is often fuelled by the need to belong to a cause (Bjørgo, 2011). Natural heritage can provide a constructive and positive identity to be proud of, especially through inspiring young future "green activists" . Increased societal valuation of the local natural capital can also help reduce illegal killing to sustainable levels (Duffy, St. John, Büscher, & Brockington, 2015), especially as a large proportion of the killing documented here ( Figure S1) is for sport/leisure reasons. Innovative approaches are needed to build environmental awareness. For instance, faith groups have the potential to mobilize mass support for biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation (Bhagwat, Dudley, & Harrop, 2011). In the Sahara-Sahel, Islamic religious authorities in particular have the credibility to reshape ethical attitudes toward biodiversity and promote environmental-friendly thinking and lifestyles.
PAs together with local community engagement in conservation are key tools in securing the survival of Sahara-Sahel megafauna, and in sustainably developing the economy, and regional peace and stability (Table 2). At the local level, responsible/sustainable ecotourism-based industry may contribute to alternative livelihoods and to improve  socioeconomic welfare of populations, and ultimately to conserve traditional activities, cultural and natural heritage, and to promote peace (https://www2.unwto.org/publication/ tourism-and-biodiversity-achieving-common-goals-towardssustainability).
Research and monitoring activities need adequate financing and should be undertaken swiftly in critical cases, such as the potential addax population reported from Mauritania . Reintroduction is an option in regions where security is assured (Ripple et al., 2016; Table 2). Such operations, however, require detailed decision processes (McGowan, Traylor-Holzer, & Leus, 2017) and are costly, lengthy, and logistically difficult, magnifying the need to avoid whenever possible local extinction in the first place.
Countries producing arms and ammunition need to change their present attitude toward the revenues generated from the military industry and acknowledge the negative relationships between international efforts to protect biodiversity and arm trades. Building civic consciousness is urgently needed among citizens from arms manufacturing countries (www. photographersagainstwildlifecrime.com), for clear understanding of the vicious circle established between arms trade, conflict, migration, and biodiversity decline to build up societal pressure for change. NGOs can play a critical role in exposing these links (e.g., https://www.tni.org; https://www. transparency.org; https://controlarms.org/en; https://www. sipri.org/).
Globally rising economic inequalities have been identified as major threat to social stability (Oxfam, 2017). Reversing the current wildlife extinction trend is a problem embedded in a larger and much more complex web of global societal challenges. Tackling current biodiversity loss requires the equitable and sustainable use of natural resources, which should be regulated by good governance (including transparency and accountability over natural resource use), and to improve the socioeconomic welfare and access to education for local human populations. While there is no doubt that support is needed to effect major societal and policy change, including from organizations such as the World Bank/GEF, United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, European Development Fund, Economic Community of West African States, or African Union, we still need to understand how to better integrate environmental conservation with equitable socioeconomic development into efficient peace strategies (Table 2). Embracing human economy values where governments work for the 99% and cooperate (not just compete), where leadership comes with moral authority, and where companies work with social responsibility and contribute to end the extreme concentration of wealth and end extreme poverty, is increasingly advocated as a needed fundamental global change (Oxfam, 2017;Seidman, 2017; https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs). Well-targeted international assistance has the potential to reduce biodiversity decline and alleviate poverty (Waldron et al., 2013).

CONCLUSION
Appropriate policy instruments that incentivize conservation and sustainable use of natural resources are urgently needed along with raising awareness and pride within communities of the value and uniqueness of the Sahara-Sahel wildlife. Financial penalties on extractive industries that do not respect conservation guidelines need to be enforced. Such steps need to be taken now, before the unique and iconic biodiversity of the world's largest desert is lost.

Figure S2
Spatial and temporal distribution of conflict events (attacks/battles and violence against civilians) after 2011 in the Sahara-Sahel. Data is from  and START (2015).

Table S1
Sources of mapped data and description of data. All data were represented in a geographical information system (datum WGS84) and a Sahara-Sahel polygon was used as analysis mask.    Text S2 Methodological details on population data.

Data
Local population trend data were available for addax (Addax nasomaculatus) and data on illegal off-take were available for dorcas gazelle (Gazella dorcas) and African savannah elephant (Loxodonta africana).
Addax nasomaculatus: Data were collected from the last known wild addax population surviving in the Termit & Tin-Toumma National Nature Reserve, Niger. This region is affected by oil exploitation activities since 2009 ) and by human migration from Libya since 2011 (Brachet et al. 2011). Intermittent point estimates of population size were available in the period 1966-2000 and yearly after 2001. Data were collected by different research groups (Dolan 1966;Newby 1981;Newby & Grettenberger 1986;Beudels-Jamar et al. 2005;Wacher et al. 2008;) and were integrated and reviewed by  and .
Gazella dorcas: Data included number of dorcas gazelles reported as illegally killed in Libya, a country in conflict since 2011 (Beauchamp 2014). Data were estimated by questionnaire survey conducted by one of the co-authors (W.A.). Questionnaires were made using two methodologies: 1) The first questionnaire was designed to be answered by international experts on biodiversity conservation in North Africa and Libya, and also by experts on antelopes within these regions. The questionnaire included 19 closed and open questions with additional space to add-in personal views and comments. Questionnaires were sent by e-mail to 40 experts after prior arrangement. A total of 13 returned questionnaires contain data about occurrence of illegal killing of dorcas gazelle in Libya; 2) The second questionnaire was designed to be answered by Libyan residents during face to face interviews.
This questionnaire aimed to investigate the current status of dorcas gazelle in Libya and to understand the attitudes of residents towards human-wildlife conflict. The questionnaires were undertaken with a focal group of people from multiple settlements within the Green Mountains (North-East Libya) and included individuals interested in hunting, wildlife conservation, as well as employees of Protected Areas and members of the public. Several respondents were individuals who lived close to areas where dorcas gazelle used to be found. In the Gourma region of Mali, poaching began in January 2012 but the reported number of elephants killed escalated in 2015, three years after the increase in regional conflict. The range of the surviving elephant population almost excludes populated places with most elephants following a migration route divided into concentration areas where they spend over 95% of their time, which are joined by corridors through which they move rapidly to reach the next favoured "concentration area" (Canney et al. 2007;Wall et al. 2013).
Concentration areas tend to be areas of refuge from human activity close to water and thicket forest. In the 1970s the range included the lake region of the Niger inner delta to the west, but this has since become densely populated and the lakes holding little water (Canney et al. 2007). Before 2012 aerial surveys consistently estimated elephant numbers at around 300-400 animals, while a photographic mark-recapture study in 2004-2005 estimated numbers between 357 and 710. Since the 2007 aerial census estimate of 344 (Bouché 2007), 36 elephants died when 180 individuals suddenly left Lake Banzena to try to find water in the lake region to the west, thought to be due to the high cattle numbers at the lake .
There is always elephant mortality at the end of the dry season, particularly of the young, but this was an extreme event. Between January 2012 and January 2016, 119 elephants were illegally killed.
Data collected suggests that illegal killing of dorcas gazelle and elephant increased about two years after conflicts igniting in Libya and Mali, respectively. It is difficult to know whether this is significant. In the case of Mali, illegal killing of elephants began after heavily armed Tuareg mercenaries returned from Libya in 2011.
The first incident occurred in January 2012 and shortly after, in March 2012, the elephant range became lawless (as government retreated to Bamako) occupied by rebel and jihadist armed groups. Another two elephants were killed. The Mali Elephant Project worked with local communities to establish a social sanction that elephant killing was shameful and mobilised a network of young "eco-guardians" to watch for elephant killing and discover the identity of perpetrators. Elephant killing remained at a low level until the beginning of 2015 when a decrease in security coincided with increased attention from trafficking networks seeking local accomplices. It is still unclear as to the identity of the poachers and the networks as there is much overlap and interchange between different groups, but it is clear that insecurity fosters the conditions for elephant poaching (Canney 2014).
Securing biodiversity requires the acknowledgement and reinforcement of cultural principles in conjunction with other values. An example is demonstrated in Mali whereby local populations express multiple aspects of value (Canney 2014) generally regarding elephants as an indicator of ecosystem integrity -"if elephants disappear it means the environment is no longer good for us" -as well as having an intrinsic value and right to exist. Here elephant habitat and the migration route are protected through empowering communities to establish systems that protect against resource degradation and over-exploitation. Local communities benefit from sustainable natural resource management integrated with elephant conservation that increases the quantity and quality of available resources, thereby improving livelihoods, as well as increasing environmental and societal resilience.
In Mali, radicalisation occurred through the unemployed youth who were attracted by both financial gain and identity. In the elephant range of Mali, the 520 young "eco-guardians" recruited to watch out for elephant poaching discovered the identities of poachers during the period of lawlessness following the insurgency of 2012. At the same time community elders established a sanction that anyone who killed elephants was stigmatised as a thief. The "eco-guardians" also conducted resource protection activities such as building firebreaks, planting trees, preventing abusive tree-cutting, preventing over-hunting. Although jihadist groups were paying $30-$50/day, none joined despite only receiving the equivalent of food, as the work of ecoguardian provided status within the local community and was less risky (Canney & Ganamé 2014).