Comment: Differences and (In)Equalities

This chapter comments on the papers produced as part of the symposium on Law and the Imagining of Difference. The chapter observes that the diversity that marks the human species gives rise to differences across individuals and groups. These differences create a challenge for law, for legal rules, and categories tend, among other things, to flatten or suppress difference. How to ensure that law treats differences properly? One way is to require that legal rules be rationally related to a proper purpose. Another is to require that persons be treated equally. If the principle of equality solves certain problems of flattening, it also may create problems. The key to applying properly the principle of equality, then, is to answer a set of antecedent questions: “who” must be treated as equal to whom, “with respect to what” rights or interests, and “how”? Martha Minow has provided rubrics for addressing these questions in ways that uncover problematic applications of the principle of equality. The chapter addresses the distinct versions of equality presupposed in claims for Douglas NeJaime’s arguments for same-sex marriage, Julie C. Suk’s social and economic approach to sex-based equality, and Megan A. Conway’s and Zanita E. Fenton’s ambitious explorations of the value of equality in the law of disabled persons. The chapter concludes that law can be directly responsive to some claims of inequality, but that other claims will require something other than law.