Constructing Justice and Security after War

In the critical juncture between war and peace

The background of this important book edited by Charles T. Call is the ongoing reflection on how wars end and how peace starts. Ending hostilities is only the first step towards peace, and leaves the door open for a transitional period in which conflicting parties are no longer openly fighting, might even have reached a formal agreement, but would nevertheless still not acknowledge that peace is secured.

Peace within a society is not simply the absence of war. As Vasquez (1993, p. 264) put it in his seminal work, peace “can be conceptualized as a great reduction in the probability that political actors will resort to violence to achieve their ends”. This suggests that conflicts of interests – not only of a political nature, but also related to economic or social issues – are controlled within a system providing non‐violent mechanisms of decision making. Accordingly, peace is the social construction of a political and legal system. Peace has to be built and does not appear ex nihilo. Hence, the transitional period between war and peace includes a number of steps leading to the (re)construction of a political, economic, and social order – be it demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of the parties, landmine clearance, re‐building of destroyed facilities, setting up of a legal system, shift from war to market‐based economy, etc. More importantly, Vasquez (1993, p. 266) contended that “certain types of peace have been fairly successful in avoiding a repeat of the war, while others have actually promoted a war's recurrence.” There is indeed, in the wake of a conflict, a critical juncture whose characteristics are of tremendous importance to the peace that will follow, and especially to how long the latter will endure (Aurélien, 2000).

Shedding light on justice and security sector reforms

Within this critical juncture, one challenging dimension calls for more research and analysis: how to rebuild justice and security institutions and frameworks in the wake of an armed conflict? This volume edited by Charles T. Call offers a stimulating contribution in this respect. In a nutshell, this book addresses how post‐conflict societies, possibly with the support of external (international) actors, can “not only establish security in the immediate aftermath of war but also create self‐sustaining systems of justice and security” (p. 4) that ensure basic rights and apply the law effectively and impartially, with popular support, thus helping establish a long‐lasting peace. What is the appropriate role for international actors in these processes? What factors – political, social, and cultural – are to be taken into account? Which choices regarding the form, substance, and sequence of reforms seem to help or, on the contrary, impede the process? A number of other difficult questions are explored by the book, including: how does war transform or degrade security and justice systems? What patterns of violence and crime emerge when wars end? In what areas, police and justice reforms have been more effective than in others?

The book's focus is therefore on “justice and security sector reform” (JSSR). Some notes on definitions are important here, to illustrate how original the perimeter and scope of the book are. A starting point in the definition of that perimeter is the fact that, in most post‐conflict international interventions:

[…] the concept of security sector reform has in practice heavily emphasized the military and security issues, especially demobilization and reintegration, to the detriment of both citizen security and justice issues (p. 7).

Similarly, “international actors, including the United Nations, ineluctably privilege threats to international security, including stabilizing a society from future warfare, over threats to human security” (p. 352).

Taking this critique into account, the authors refer by “security” to “the safety of individual citizens, social groups, and the state” from a variety of kinds of physical violence – be they related to political, economic or social conflicts. Away from the traditional approach of order in international relations, the book addresses “internal security” and the well‐being of the inhabitants of post‐conflict societies. For instance, neither issues of transnational organized crime nor gender issues are ignored in the book.

By “justice,” the authors refer to “the ability of a society to resolve social disputes in a manner both non‐violent and accepted by disputing parties, even when they disagree with specific outcomes” (p. 8). They look at legal frameworks, courts and prosecution offices, law enforcement capabilities, oversight and accountability mechanisms, and traditional or informal conflict resolution systems.

Overall structure and contents: nine case‐studies

The book opens with a Foreword by Richard H. Salomon, President of the United States Institute of Peace, the nonpartisan institution funded by the US Congress in order to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post‐conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict‐management tools.

Following an Introduction by Charles T. Call, providing a state‐of‐the‐art synthesis on “what we know and don't know” in this area of research, the book gathers nine case studies. It is structured in four parts:

1. 1.

   Part I deals with Latin America and the Caribbean: El Salvador (by Charles T. Call), Guatemala (William D. Stanley), i.e. two civil wars which were ended by a negotiated settlement; and Haiti (Sandra Beidas, Colin Granderson, and Rachel Neild), where justice and police reforms were central to the international reconstruction efforts.

2. 2.

   Africa is the focus of Part II: South Africa (Janine Rauch), focusing on the post‐apartheid efforts to build multiethnic justice and security systems, in a context of very high‐criminal violence; and Rwanda (Charles Mironko and Ephrem Rurangwa), a post‐genocide context of transitional justice.

3. 3.

   Part III turns to “The Balkans and Beyond.” In Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Michael H. Doyle) illustrates the difficult creation of a multiethnic police force; the other case‐study is Kosovo (Colette Rausch), then an official international protectorate. Last, East Timor (Ronald A. West) helps understand the building of a new police and justice system in the aftermath of an independence, from Indonesia in 2002. This part also includes an interesting chapter on gender issues in post‐conflict societies from the viewpoint of JSSR (Tracy Fitzsimmons).

4. 4.

   Part IV provides a well‐structured conclusion by the editor, gathering the main results of the previous chapters in a brilliant manner.

Second, and given the quality of the case studies, it may disappoint some readers that cases which they might consider crucial are missing. In Africa alone, beyond the already well‐researched cases of South Africa and Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo would have provided a somehow more original case‐study; it is estimated that more than five million people died, directly or indirectly, from the civil war which has torn the country from 1998 to 2003, and the subsequent collapse of most state and public infrastructures; since then, a transition process has been in progress, in which JSSR is absolutely key. Similarly, with a death‐toll of 300,000 in the 1993 civil war, nearby Burundi provides observers with what appears to be quite a successful JSSR, following the Arusha peace treaty on August 28, 2000. Two other cases come to mind: Afghanistan and Iraq, both of which pose numerous challenging questions in terms of justice and security. With a few exceptions in the conclusion, too little is said on JSSR in Iraq and Afghanistan in the aftermath of the US‐led interventions. Nevertheless, the book's findings and conclusions help analyze the many failures and shortcomings of these interventions. The other cases might be included in a second edition, which would be welcome given current developments in this area of conflict management.

One of the interesting features of this book is the diversity of its contributors – scholars, but also criminal justice practitioners, and former senior officials from international post‐conflict missions (more biographical details on the contributors would have been appreciated). This mix provides the reader with a stimulating balance between theoretical background, impressive field study collecting a wealth of data, and personal experience.

A timely and relevant book

This book reflects the growing importance, since the 1990s, of issues of justice and security in international funding and public aid, rather than the more traditional programs in health and education. Security and justice institutions are no longer considered out of the scope of intervention, but at its core.

As an academic in the field of negotiation and conflict resolution, and as a field practitioner contributing to reconciliation efforts in diverse post‐conflict countries such as Burundi (Wolpe et al., 2004), the Democratic Republic of Congo (Aurélien and Alain, 2008), Macedonia‐FYROM or Tajikistan, I thoroughly enjoyed reading this edited volume. It reminded me for instance of a mission with all the members of the newly appointed High Command of the police and security forces in Burundi; equally shared between Hutus and Tutsis, as required by the peace agreement, this integrated high command brought together, evidently, former belligerents of the most acute kind. Building such an integrated security sector proves instrumental in successful transitions.

I found this book worth reading for a number of reasons. Thanks to its nine case studies, it provides an interesting account of some of the most important post‐war reconstructions efforts. Second, and which is more original, it addresses on an equal footing and in close interaction security and judicial issues; military and paramilitary forces, but also police, gendarmerie, and the personnel of judicial and penal systems. Lastly, it does not isolate “justice for past abuses on the one hand with justice in the present and justice in the future on the other hand” (p. 8), thus contributing to bridge a gap in the literature and reflection on post‐conflict societies.

The book produces many interesting results. Let me highlight a few. “Peace produces new sources of insecurity” (p. 377): behind that paradox lies a very important idea overlooked by the realist school of thought in International relations, and by its heirs. The end of war in a country does not mean the end of violence in a society: the authors demonstrate the existence of “post‐war crime waves,” as the dissolution of an order permits, as long as it has not been replaced by another one, a rise in all types of violent crimes. Political violence may recede in post‐conflict societies, but will tend to be replaced with social or economic violence, or violence related to organized crime. According to most of the case‐studies, another important finding is that justice reforms receive less planning, less coordination, and less support than they should. This reflects a bias in the international community's priorities, especially those of the USA at present:

[…] peace [in the sense of the absence of threat to international order] seems to offer easier, more immediate, and more prized benefits to powerful countries than the difficult provision of justice in divided societies (p. 396).

Another interesting approach in the book is to study post‐conflict situations as an extreme change management process. The aftermath of an armed conflict opens a window of opportunity for reforms, provided the right processes are set in motion. The clearer and the more specific peace agreements are on forthcoming reforms, the greater the chances of success. However, one of the results of this book is highlighting the great extent to which these reform processes are highly political, and not just technical. As a former project leader on change management in the public sector, I appreciated many aspects of this in the book, as for example that “successful police reform requires more than simply tinkering with policing organization; it requires transforming the relationships between police institutions and societies” (p. 387). Change requires a thorough understanding of a given political, social and cultural context, a strategy aiming at the long‐term and avoiding loud claims of “quick wins,” extensive efforts to build local buy‐in, and even more efforts to respect all the local elements and traditions deserving respect – all of which goes much beyond claiming an early victory and then drafting new institutions and imposing imported codes. Among the other points clearly supported by the book in terms of change management in post‐conflict contexts are for instance the importance of public awareness and citizen involvement, and the difficult balance between the need for consultation – usually time‐consuming – and the need for speedy results.

Throughout, strong field research is well‐linked with the existing literature – a well‐structured and accurate view of which is given in the Introduction. The index is also helpful. Including maps would have been helpful. Endnotes are precise, providing accurate references.

The book will be worth‐reading for a broad audience, ranging from scholars and students interested in the general theme or in the specific countries analyzed, to policymakers and practitioners involved in post‐conflict peace and reconciliation efforts. Policymakers will find here worthy inspiration for strategy and numerous practical recommendations. I share the editor's viewpoint that the book's findings, “had they been heeded […] might have made a positive difference in the early and midterm state‐building efforts in post‐Saddam Hussein Iraq” (p. 376).

Last but not least, one of the many striking findings of the book is evidence of how little international actors seem to learn from past experiences. Should this book contribute to inspire policymakers involved in present and future post‐conflict operations, it will have achieved a great deal. All this is even more important because post‐conflict reconstruction is, in essence, about the prevention of conflict recurrence.