Quantum cryptography: Security criteria reexamined

Dagomir Kaszlikowski, Ajay Gopinathan, Yeong Cherng Liang, L. C. Kwek, and Berthold-Georg Englert
Phys. Rev. A 70, 032306 – Published 8 September 2004

Abstract

We find that the generally accepted security criteria are flawed for a whole class of protocols for quantum cryptography. This is so because a standard assumption of the security analysis, namely that the so-called square-root measurement is optimal for eavesdropping purposes, is not true in general. There are rather large parameter regimes in which the optimal measurement extracts substantially more information than the square-root measurement.

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  • Received 23 October 2003

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.70.032306

©2004 American Physical Society

Authors & Affiliations

Dagomir Kaszlikowski1, Ajay Gopinathan1,2, Yeong Cherng Liang1, L. C. Kwek1,2, and Berthold-Georg Englert1

  • 1Department of Physics, National University of Singapore, Singapore 117 542, Singapore
  • 2National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 637616, Singapore

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Issue

Vol. 70, Iss. 3 — September 2004

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