Spatial (mis)alignment between climate-related risks and risk perceptions across the US


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The recent passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) reasserts the United States' legitimacy as a global player in the fight against climate change. Despite this, many places in the US continue to harbor social and political resistance to climate action. Over 45% of Americans believe they will not be personally affected by climate change, despite recent and recordbreaking wildfires, heat waves and long-term drought (Howe et al 2015). This (mis)alignment between actual and perceived risk varies spatially across the US and may undermine local and federal adaptation efforts. Without political strategies that account for the spatial (mis)alignment between climate change risks and perceptions across the US, implementation of key components of the IRA may be challenging.
Americans' general apathy around climate change has constrained policymaking. The landmark IRA contains critical climate provisions, but the climate focus of the legislation is mainly centered on emission reduction and low-carbon energy technologies. The US still does not have a national adaptation policy, and climate change adaptation planning is rarely incorporated into legislation. There are 139 public officials in the 117th Congress who have publicly denied the existence, human causation, or scientific consensus of climate change (Drennen and Hardin 2021). The limited adaptation response by the federal government devolves responsibility to state and local governments as the primary drivers for planning and implementing adaptation, leaving federal aid directed toward climate disaster recovery. Only 19 states currently have statewide climate change adaptation plans (Rai 2020), and these plans are often ambiguous, and lack the detail necessary for on-the-ground implementation. Enactment of these plans often requires changes to other management policies, which are themselves moderated by public support and perceptions of climate change (Rai 2020).
Climate action is mediated by perceptions of climate risk. These perceptions predict willingness to reduce climate change (Bouman et al 2020), adaptive responses (Zhang et al 2018) and support for adaptation policies (Houser et al 2022). Policymakers with heightened perceptions of climate hazards were more likely to adopt a comprehensive climate adaptation agenda in their cities (Lee and Hughes 2017). Citizens are more likely to support adaptation policy when their perceptions of risk match their experiences. Despite substantial research identifying the role of risk perceptions as a driver of behavior and public policy support, our understanding of these perceptions has not been used to inform comprehensive climate adaptation planning or policy implementation.
Climate action is further constrained by the spatial variation in climate change risks across the US, and how inconsistently those risks are perceived. Risks can vary substantially from regions to counties, and between urban and rural areas. As the American Southwest becomes more arid, the mid-Atlantic is projected to experience historical 100-year floods annually. Large US cities will likely experience comparatively longer and more intense heatwaves, whereas agriculture and recreation livelihoods of rural communities are more directly impacted by drought. People in southern states perceive higher heatwave risk whereas people at higher elevations perceive lower risk, regardless of their actual risk (Howe et al 2019). Risk perceptions vary substantially within states, and sometimes between neighboring counties. Variability in the perception of risks at such fine spatial scales underscores the challenge of developing local climate policies while also coordinating climate strategies for regional risks.
Here, we examine the spatial patterns of (mis)alignment between climate-related risks and risk perceptions across the conterminous US and Figure 1. Maps of distribution of risk perception and climate-related risk for climate hazards across the conterminous US. Maps display categories representing (A) the percentage of individuals in each county who perceive a moderate to high risk of personal damage due to climate change; (B) the level of risk of experiencing elevated drought, heatwave, flooding or wildfire risk levels (overall risk); and (C) the bivariate distribution of climate-related risk indicated by the red color scale (x axis) and the distribution of risk perceptions indicated by the blue color scale (y axis). The legend is labeled with three types of (mis)alignment identified: misaligned counties (red) have high projected risk and low risk perceptions; aligned counties (purple) have high projected risk and high risk perceptions; and proactive counties (blue) have low projected risk and high risk perceptions. discuss how (mis)alignment may affect climate efforts in these places. We use public data describing countylevel US public perceptions of personal climate risk developed by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication and derived via a multilevel regression with post-stratification on a national survey (Howe et al 2015) (figure 1(A)) and publicly available hazard risk data from the Federal Emergency Management Agency National Risk Index that quantifies and rates expected annual economic loss resulting from climate-related hazards (Zuzak et al 2021) for five major hazards (figure 1(B)): drought, heatwave, coastal flooding, riverine flooding and wildfire (figure 2) (Suppl. Mat). Although these risks do not account for all possible climate-related impacts a community might experience, these hazards are projected to impact social and ecological systems across broad geographic regions, globally. We identify counties with both high perception of risk and high projected risk to be in alignment (purple; figures 1 and 2), and counties with low risk perceptions but high risk to be in misalignment (red; figures 1 and 2). We also locate counties with high risk perceptions but low relative risk and identify these counties as places with opportunity for proactive mitigation (blue; figures 1 and 2).
Our analysis shows that broad swaths of the country across the Southeast, Midwest, and Northwest are misaligned, or projected to experience substantial climate impacts, while relatively few of the people living there perceive their risk-over 30% of all US counties. This high degree of misalignment between risk perceptions and climate-related risks is likely due to organized political opposition, polarized rhetoric, and the spread of misinformation (Stoddard et al 2021). The greatest concentration of misaligned counties is across the Midwest, which is affected most by drought risk followed by heatwave risk. There are also several misaligned counties in the West affected mostly by drought and wildfire. In the Southern US, counties are misaligned around the hazards of heatwave and flooding. Over 15% of US counties' risk perceptions are identified as proactive, and less than 5% of US counties are aligned with their projected level of risk across all climate-related hazards. To engage populations across misaligned counties and activate populations in aligned and proactive counties, we suggest using strategies such as targeting risk communication to be consistent with existing perceptions, leveraging alignment for innovation, and acting on mitigation opportunities.

Misalignment: risk communication
Over 30% of US counties, representing 13.6% of the US population, are projected to experience high risks of drought, heatwave or wildfire, yet the populations impacted do not perceive their risk ( figure 1(C); red). Misaligned with the actual risk they face, residents of these counties will likely face substantial impacts from drought (564 counties, or 5.8% of the population), heatwave (416 counties, or 7.5% of the population), coastal flooding (16 counties, or 0.6% of the population), riverine flooding (306 counties, or 7.1% of the population) or wildfire (114 counties, or 2.1% of the population) (figure 2; table S1).
Risk communication based on the premise of a public information deficit has been ineffective (Pearce et al 2015). Communication which reiterates the danger of climate impacts and focuses on predictions of risk can stoke fear, trigger skepticism, and reduce climate program support, especially in climate skeptical communities. If evidence threatens people's cultural values or beliefs, the information is more likely to increase their belief in the alternative arguments, regardless of facts (Kahan 2010).
Communication from credible sources that is tailored to local risks and for existing mental models is more likely to engage the public in climate action (Bruine de Bruin and Bostrom 2013). Trusted opinion leaders or community members can engage specific populations, such as agricultural or religious social communities, with messages that align with and emphasize existing values and beliefs. Messages framed around binding moral values of authority or patriotism substantially shifted pro-environmental behavioral intentions of conservatives (Wolsko et al 2016). Messaging which focuses on climate cobenefits, such as societal well-being and progress may also garner more climate policy support (Bain et al 2016). Engaging a diverse set of community members in planning can ensure risk reduction policies are aligned with local priorities and capacity. Improved communication about salient risks can empower populations with low risk perceptions in high-risk areas to engage in adaptation and support climate policies.

Alignment: policy innovation and diffusion
Less than 5% of all US counties (37.7% of the population) are at high risk of impacts from droughts, heatwaves, floods or wildfires, while also accurately perceiving a high personal risk due to climate change ( figure 1(C); purple). The high risk perceptions of residents in these counties is aligned with the risk of projected impacts due to drought (44 counties, or 5.8% of the population), heatwave (38 counties, or 13.5% of the population), coastal flooding (19 counties, or 5.6% of the population), riverine flooding (79 counties, or 24.5% of the population) or wildfire (38 counties, or 14.1% of the population) (figure 2; table S1).
In places where perceptions are aligned with risk, the aftermath of a climate impact can act as a policy window for innovation. For example, following severe climate-related impacts across 10 US communities, people who experienced personal and community harm had higher levels of support for climate change policies (Giordono et al 2022). Residents of a drought-prone region of Arkansas who perceived that climate change caused water shortages were more likely to support state-level policy addressing water shortages (Craig et al 2019).
Identifying locations of alignment between actual and perceived risks may also enable more proactive facilitation of policy diffusion, where a policy employed by one entity is adopted by another. Policy diffusion can occur along pathways of low perceptual resistance across local, state and federal levels of government. States or counties that are geographically close and whose residents' perceptions of risk match projected risk are more likely to engage in adaptation. For instance, states nearby states that have started to engage in planned adaptation are more likely to engage in adaptation planning themselves (Miao 2019). Yet, without locating counties and regions in alignment and directing sufficient resources for policy development there, opportunities for climate innovation and diffusion of climate policies may be missed.

Proactive: opportunity for mitigation
Approximately 15% of US counties, representing only 5.3% of the population perceive high risk but have relatively low risk of hazard impacts (figure 1(C); blue). Among those counties with high risk perceptions, those counties with relatively low risk of drought (987 counties, or 56.1% of the population), heatwave (1098 counties, or 31.6% of the population), coastal flooding (1452 counties, or 68% of the population), riverine flooding (1021 counties, or 19.6% of the population), or wildfire (1286 counties, or 54.5% of the population) tend to be highly populated and might be proactively focused on mitigating climate change emissions (figure 2; table S1).
Neither international commitments such as the Paris Agreement, nor intentional, individual actions have been sufficient to curb emissions thus far. Denialism, powerful lobbying and a lack of political will among the wealthiest, heaviest emitters have resulted in lethally slow and ineffective mitigation efforts (Stoddard et al 2021). However, with the recent passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, the US is projected to reduce net emissions to 42% below the 2005 level by 2030-a substantial improvement. Although this estimate is shy of the 50% reduction by 2030 goal set by the Biden administration, targeted mitigation efforts by state and local communities are expected to be able to close this gap.
Research shows that cities, urban centers and citynetworks already act as entrepreneurs and innovation centers for climate mitigation. Cities provide regular communication about climate change impacts on weather, and energy and transportation efforts to reduce emissions (Boussalis et al 2018). Even when the Trump administration withdrew from the Paris Agreement, 468 mayors, representing 74 million Americans, reaffirmed their commitment to the pledge. Increased engagement with and support for climate mitigation policies in proactive urban centers with high risk perceptions may generate the political will required to increase mitigation efforts, both within cities and throughout the US to meet, and exceed, our climate mitigation goals.

Towards a future of climate action
Without political strategies that account for the spatial (mis)alignment between climate change risks and perceptions, comprehensive adaptation and implementation of the IRA may be difficult. We have demonstrated how an understanding of the spatial alignment of climate-related risks and public perceptions might guide policy implementation by informing the specific type of climate action likely to be effective in a particular location. Misaligned counties might focus on tailored risk communication to make adaptation to climate change hazards more relevant to local populations, whereas places in alignment might strategically enact climate policies and work to diffuse those policies to other places in similar alignment. Proactive communities with lower projected climate-related risk might focus on mitigation efforts by targeting climate emissions. Examination of the spatial (mis)alignment between climate-related hazards and risk perceptions has adaptation relevance beyond the US. In a cross-national survey of hazard-prone regions, worry about hazard impacts was a consistent driver of adaptation, suggesting that the spatial examination of (mis)alignment between risk perceptions and risk may reveal insights and opportunities for adaptation action internationally (Noll et al 2022). Although public risk perceptions are not the only social construct policymakers should consider, a fine scale spatial distribution of climate hazards and public perceptions of those hazards can help identify opportunities for improved climate engagement and localized policy support.
Despite divisive politics and absent a federal climate adaptation plan, the passage of the IRA marks a shift in federal policy towards concrete climate mitigation action. Strategic communication, policy innovation, and identification of mitigation opportunities across a landscape of variable climate-related risks and perceptions may help guide these new resources to places and populations for the most effective adaptation and mitigation action.

Data availability statement
No new data were created or analysed in this study.