Politics of urban cultural preservation and regeneration: the case of South Korea and Taiwan

ABSTRACT This paper compares the cases of Seoul, Taipei and Keelung to illustrate the dynamics of the local state in leading the process of cultural preservation. We argue that political ambitions of local leaders, driven by economic and political incentives to boost local development, create policy networks centered around local bureaucracies. Various actors, such as local political elites, local bureaucracies, civic groups and developers, are involved in the process of political and economic entangling. The cultural preservation projects are thus the reflection of the political interpretation of memory, as well as the realization of local state power to implement innovative goals of urban rebranding and regeneration. The Korean and Taiwanese cases demonstrate that political functions, such as regime legitimacy and the formation of new identities, have been instrumental in the process of urban regeneration. This paper brings the “politics” back into local developmentalism in the democratic societies of South Korea and Taiwan. This paper also argues that central-local relationship matters as well. The local developmental states are not totally isolated from political entanglements at the central level. Policy supports from the central level are mainly out of political concerns to legitimize ongoing efforts of historical reconstruction and re-interpretation.


Introduction
South Korea and Taiwan are regarded as typical examples of the "developmental state" of East Asia. Such development-oriented momentum at the central level is also utilized to analyze the "local developmental state" at the sub-national level in the era of globalization. In the post-development, service-led process of urban rejuvenation under democracy, heritage and cultural sites are reused by the local state to boost local entrepreneurship through projects of "rebranding." Local states reconsolidate their capacities through complex policy networks with social actors.
On the other hand, these "cultural projects" are closely linked with political interpretations of historical heritage under the democratic rule of the game. Both South Korea and Taiwan experienced Japanese colonial rule in their modern history, but their respective political interpretations of this period of time are quite different. Taiwan's preservation efforts focus on creating a new local identity that is distinct from Chinese culture. In South Korea, attitudes toward Japanese cultural heritage sites are mingled with nationalism and drives for consolidating democracy. However, given these political considerations of cultural memory and preservation, local states adopt more pragmatic policies to promote local development. Urban regeneration plans are linked with cultural preservation projects. In the case studies introduced in this paper, community participation is limited and assertive local leaders and bureaucracies play key roles in the process of regeneration. This paper will discuss whether the local states in South Korea and Taiwan decentralize their power to social actors and develop mechanism of collaborative governance with the society in the era of globalization. The authors compare the cases of Seoul, Taipei and Keelung to illustrate the dynamics of the local state in leading the process of cultural preservation and urban regeneration. We argue that political ambitions of local leaders, driven by economic and political incentives to boost local development, create policy networks centered around local bureaucracies. This article finds that in contrast to the democratic trend of the decentralization of governance, the process of local development is power recentralization. The cultural preservation projects are thus the reflection of the political interpretation of memory, as well as the realization of local state power in implementing innovative goals of urban rebranding and regeneration. Adopting the qualitative methods of case studies, the authors conduct fieldwork, direct observation, and interviews in the three cities to collect insights from bureaucrats and experts. Printed official documents, policy reports, and speeches are included to buttress the main arguments in this paper. This article will first comment critically on existing literature of models of collaborative local governance, followed by the analysis of cases of Seoul, Taipei and Keelung. The concluding remarks will discuss the policy and theoretical implications of the case studies.

Democratic governance in the era of globalization
South Korea and Taiwan are facing new challenges related to democracy and globalization. This dual pressure may lead to new types of governance at the central as well as local level. The more optimistic viewpoint of globalization indicates that the rise of the local state and the empowerment of local social groups have become salient characteristics in this new era. Accompanied by trends of democratization, this new type of state-society relationship is characterized by the rise of civil groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the policy making process. These social actors, equipped with capacities of global linkages, push the local developmental state to accommodate to social demands and needs. The traditional ways of direct intervention and policy guidance common in the authoritarian era are no longer practical solutions to stimulate local incentives under democracy. Furthermore, instead of the manufacturing-oriented, export-led growth models that were prevalent in the initial stages, local states are now deeply involved in service-oriented fields such as medical care, education, and local culture industries. According to Peter Evans and Patrick Heller, the twenty-first century developmental state needs to undertake a more difficult task compared to that of its predecessors in the twentieth century: constructing shared coherent goals whose concrete implementation can be "co-produced" by public agencies and the communities themselves 1 . In brief, globalization and democratization collectively serve as driving forces for the developmental state to form new mechanisms of collaborative governance with social actors.
The existing literature also indicates that a new type of state-society interaction is needed to strike a balance between local empowerment and local entrepreneurism. To cope with the rising pressure of economic rejuvenation after periods of economic downturn, the new service industries have been selected by the Korean and Taiwanese states to boost up economic dynamics and resilience. In addition to traditional manufacturing sectors of globalization, both countries also endeavor to transfer the dynamics of a pluralistic and democratic society into cultural and creative industries (CCI). In contrast to the traditional thinking on state capacities and autonomy, promoting CCI is a collaborative effort between the state and society to foster dynamics of entrepreneurism at the grassroots. CCI is regarded as a platform to reflect social energies under a pluralistic and democratic society. It is also an interface to link globalization and localization in a hybrid but dynamic local culture. Such collaborative efforts involve multiple actors and policy networks between the local state and grassroots society. For instance, in Changwook Kim's study of the creative city projects undertaken in Yokohama and Seoul, he stresses the alternative models of post-developmentalism. Kim focuses on NPOs (nonprofit organizations) as new policy actors and puts forward the argument of "governance without politics." The differences between Yokohama and Seoul stem from how each society manages the different policy networks 2 . In brief, the rise of social interests and the formation of a collaborative mechanism with the state are salient characteristics of the young democracies of South Korea and Taiwan.

Collaborative cultural governance and local developmentalism: positive views
This paper selects cases of local cultural preservation and regeneration to discuss whether the model of "collaborative governance" could be applied to Seoul, Taipei and Keelung. Recent examples in the literature indicate that cultural preservation and culture projects have been utilized by local states as the main focus of service-oriented industries in the post-development era. As will be discussed in the following pages, local governments around the world, including those in South Korea and Taiwan, are emphasizing culture and creative business as the new boosters of local development and urban regeneration. Enhancing local entrepreneurship has become a major concern of local states. Yasukyki Motoyama and Jason Wines have introduced a community-based, bottom-up connective approach to promote local entrepreneurship. Instead of the top-down strategy of direct government involvement of local incubators and venture funds, Motoyama and Wines suggest that policy makers at the local level embrace a new approach that puts entrepreneurs at the center, creating communities characterized by dense connections among entrepreneurs and the organizations that support them 3 . Hyun Bang Shin's study in Guangzhou reveals that the entrepreneurial push by the local state and the upward accountability to meet performance goals by local leaders in China result in the production of a relatively narrow space for local residents' efforts to challenge or change the courses of government schemes. The case of Enning Road in Guangzhou, according to Shin, was a state-led project to improve the urban environment and to exploit the developmental potential that the historic neighborhood offered. Creating a "new heaven and earth" in Guangzhou was the urban vision held by the local leadership when promoting the redevelopment of Enning Road as a flagship project 4 .
On the other hand, local cultural preservation and regeneration projects are also related to the political issue of identity formation. State policies to preserve cultural heritage and cultural sites are closely linked with concerns to rebuild political identities. The political functions of cultural preservation are demonstrated by state efforts to connect the past with the present. The state thus reinforces its capacities of reinterpreting history, including local identities, to serve present purposes of political legitimation 5 . In this way, the state plays a pivotal role in forming these instrumental platforms. Mayes argues that historical places serve as commemorative sites, but also act as vortices for reinterpretation of history, for identification of difficult history, and for acknowledgment, reconciliation and social justice 6 . In the context of Asia, colonialism in the 20th century provided mixed memories and heritage. National humiliation and footprints of modernization make the historical memories more difficult, and sometimes contradictory. Forces of democratization lead to multiple interpretations based on competing political legacies of nationalism, local identity, and globalization.

Collaborative cultural governance and local developmentalism: skeptical views
Other scholars adopt more skeptical viewpoints about the feasibility of collaborative governance in urban cultural preservation and regeneration. Using the Shanghai urban sculpture planning projects as a case study, Jane Zheng argues that the growth machine theory does not fit in the Chinese environment. Instead, she indicates that public-private partnerships were enabled by certain unique conditions and were usually short-lived once the leadership changed. There is a more broadly defined concept of cultural capital that encompasses both pragmatic considerations and intuitive impulses when the private sector is engaged in cultural production 7 . Taking the Dihua Street neighborhood in Taipei as a case study, Lin and Chiu indicate that the Creative City Building agenda appears more concerned with sustaining a political rationality and legitimacy associated with being progressive and developed. They point out the alienation, mutation, and contradictions of local communities 8 . On the other hand, local states are becoming more sophisticated in pushing urban rejuvenation and cultural preservation projects. Wang, Zhang and Wu note that the Guangzhou city government uses the strategies of "microhabitation," or small pockets which differ in from the surrounding area, to maintain its power while taking advantage of the market. The redevelopment project is a rehabilitation of the built environment and upgrading the architecture according to the traditional style. The involvement of residents is limited as public participation is only rhetorically adopted 9 . Leng and Chen argue that tendencies of the politicization of cultural projects in China have been salient in recent years. Functions of cultural projects involve new space development, market maximization, as well as political indoctrination. The whole process is mainly top-down, and cultural relic preservation and rejuvenation reflect both economic and political momentum 10 .
Recent scholarly works also indicate that cultural heritage is utilized as well by the state to serve current social functions, especially rebuilding identity through political interpretation of historical memories attached to the heritage sites. For instance, Shu-mei Huang and Hyun-kyung Lee introduce the case of Lushun Prison in China and Seodaemun Prison in Seoul to demonstrate the functions of diplomacy and domestic identity formation of cultural relic sites. In the case of Seodaemun Prison History Hall, it is not merely a cultural heritage site for recollecting memories of the brutal Japanese colonial rule. In connection with the Independence Park, the prison is also a political symbol of South Korea's struggle for national independence, human rights, and democracy. Connecting the past with the present, the political utilities of historical preservation serve the purpose of political legitimation for the current regime 11 .
To sum up, economic globalization and democratization create new social actors in the policy making process. At the same time, cultural preservation is often connected with the political process of identity formation. This article challenges the "collaborative governance" model of local development and argues that the political calculations of local leaders serve as major driving forces of urban regeneration and preservation. The leadership-centered model of development prevails not just in authoritarian regimes like China, but also in democratic societies like South Korea and Taiwan. The policy goals of local cultural preservation and regeneration are not solely out of concern of economic globalization, but also for maximizing political interest. In other words, this paper emphasizes the "political nature" of local developmentalism in the context of cultural preservation. The strong political intentions, as well as market interests, push local leaders to enhance the capacities of bureaucracies in the process of linking cultural preservation and urban regeneration.

South Korea: traumatic historic memories, pragmatic urban regeneration in Seoul
Seoul, the capital city of South Korea, embraces both premodern history and moderncontemporary history. The issue of culture preservation is both complex and political. The cultural heritage of the Joseon dynasty from the premodern era includes objects to be protected as national culture, but the modern-contemporary cultural heritage seems to have more complicated aspects. This is because the modern-contemporary history of Korea includes both the dark history of the Japanese colonial rule and the glorious history of the rapid political and economic development achieved after independence.

Politics of historical memory and cultural preservation in South Korea
Since the establishment of the Joseon dynasty in 1392, Seoul has been the center of Korea's politics, economy and culture for over 600 years. In this context, examples of cultural heritage from the period of Japanese occupation located in Seoul have been targets for removal rather than conservation from the perspective of national identity. In 1990, the Korean government started restoration on the Gyeongbokgung palace, much of which had been systematically destroyed by Japan during the colonial era, and the Old Governor-General Building was removed in 1995. Despite some calls to preserve the building, which was an example of modern architecture, the Old Governor-General Building was according to some nothing but a vestige of Japanese imperialism that should be removed in the process of restoring traditional cultural heritage 12 .
In fact, not all cultural heritage from the Japanese occupation era, which is politically sensitive, was removed. In 1908, Seodaemun Prison, the first modern prison on the Korean Peninsula, was preserved in a form suitable for the reinforcement of national identity. Seodaemun Prison was where independence activists struggling against colonialist Japan were imprisoned, and it was remodeled as Seodaemun Prison History Hall in 1998 to preserve the site and to teach its history. The historical site where Japan suppressed independence activists has become a shrine for the local independence movement. What is interesting here is that the memory of the past cultural heritage is constantly reconstructed. From independence to the democratization period of 1987, Seodaemun Prison was used for the imprisonment of pro-democracy activists by the dictatorship, and from 2010, Seodaemun Prison History Hall started to exhibit the historic memory of the pro-democracy movement. Seodaemun Prison has hereby been reconstructed as a memory space that shows both the symbol of Korean independence against Japan and the history of the pro-democracy movement 13 .
Meanwhile, some architectural examples from the Japanese occupation era have been preserved without controversy, as long as the structures are nonpolitical. Examples of these include the Bank of Chosen (Bank of Korea Money Museum), Gyeongseong Station (Old Seoul Station), Gyeongseong Bucheong (Seoul Metropolitan Library), Gyungsung Court (Seoul Museum of Art), Mitsukoshi Department Store (Shinsegae Department Store Headquarters) and Gyeongseong Bumingwan (Seoul Metropolitan Council), which have been preserved in good condition, and acknowledged as possessing valuable modern cultural heritage 14 .

The local developmental state and top-down initiatives in Seoul
In Seoul, cultural preservation projects and urban regeneration plans sometimes clash. As the economy has begun to expand, promoting urbanization and creating a global city have become primary goals of the central as well as local governments in South Korea.
The issue of urban redevelopment has been used for the promotion of political leaders' political benefits. Especially in Seoul, extensive rebuilding and redevelopment projects were implemented under the so-called "New Town Wave," and this "New Town Policy" functioned as the most influential policy platform for the Grand National Party, a conservative party which as of early 2023 goes by the name Liberty Korea Party and promotes a neoliberalist economy, to garner overwhelming victories in major elections. In 2006, Oh Se-hoon, a candidate from the Grand National Party, was elected mayor of Seoul, Lee Myeong-bak was elected the 17 th president of South Korea by a landslide in 2007, and the Grand National Party won convincingly over the Democratic Party of Korea in the 18 th general elections 15 .
The New Town Policy achieved results in improving the residential environment in old urban areas with poor infrastructure and in supplying buildings with improved conditions. It also received strong support from major media outlets that gained profits from advertisements by developers and the construction industry. However, the urban plan led by the government faced civil resistance in this period as well. While the government-led urban plan during the period of rapid growth was to expand and develop urban areas on public land, the New Town Policy was to redevelop private land where citizens resided, so the overall pulling-down method caused social conflict. In addition, there was the side-effect of gentrification. Only about 10% of local residents of the areas moved into the New Town areas due to the higher real estate prices 16 .

Civil society and policy networks under local leaders
When Mayor Park Won-soon, who has a background in NGOs, took over the political leadership of Seoul in November 2011, the capital city came to play a more active role in implementing urban regeneration policy than other local governments. Park Won-soon, an NGO activist in various social and economic fields based on People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy 17 , was selected as the sole candidate of a coalition of opposition parties to run in the 2011 by-election for Seoul mayor against the ruling Grand National Party. Park won the election held on October 26 2011 with 53.4% of the vote. Therefore, his political base was not only the Democratic Party he joined after the election, but also various progressive NGOs. In subsequent elections, he was elected with over 50% of the vote, so he had the political conditions for a stable administration. (Local election in June 2014: 56.12%; Local election in June 2018: 52.79%.).
It is noteworthy that the "urban regeneration" policy encompasses the ambivalent meaning of development and cultural preservation. The top-down initiative is still in effect at the current stage of urban regeneration. However, it includes the central government's intention to relieve social conflicts caused by the existing governmentled new town policy through the institutional strategy of collecting public opinion (Urban Regeneration Committee, etc.). According to the law, urban regeneration experts and civic groups can participate in relevant committees and present their opinions in the urban regeneration policy-making process 18 . However, the "Urban Regeneration Policy" promoted by the Democratic Party focuses on preservation rather than development.
What examples of cultural heritage should therefore be preserved under the scheme of urban regeneration? Furthermore, what identity will be rebuilt in the historical memory attached to cultural heritage site? Modern buildings with conservation value have also been the objects of liquidation under political leaders' calculations of gains and losses and development benefits of civil engineering and building contractors. Even though Dongdaemun Stadium, which was built in 1925 during the colonial era and had gained extensive cultural and historical value amongst Seoul civil society as a nonpolitical architectural structure, Mayor Oh Se-hoon, who implemented the "Design Seoul" policy, demolished the 83-year-old stadium in 2008 to make way for the Dongdaemun Design Plaza (DDP). Since there was the precedent of President Lee Myeong-bak, who was also from the Grand National Party, gaining public support by advocating for the contracting of industry in the restoration of Cheonggyecheon when he was the mayor of Seoul, Oh Se-hoon also tried to make it a steppingstone of political success by promoting the DDP as a new landmark of Seoul. However, strong criticism was voiced by progressive civil society and media outlets as Dongdaemun Stadium, which represented the history and regionality of Seoul, was demolished without the process of collecting the opinions of citizens 19 .
In contrast, Seoul Mayor Park Won-soon selected the Changsin and Sungin areas as the first urban regeneration and preservation area. This district, with its numerous sewing factories, developed as a production center for the Dongdaemun clothing manufacturing industry in the 1960s and 1970s. This not only expanded the scope of cultural heritage to be preserved from the Japanese colonial era to the industrialization era in the 1960s and 1970s, but also highlighted the role of the working class in Korea's economic development 20 . However, these urban regeneration plans had difficulties in achieving results only with short-term or government-led support 21 , and for this reason, Mayor Park tried to secure the continuity of the policy by expanding citizen participation and strengthening the grassroots communities. This shift resulted in complaints from developers, the construction industry, and conservative political forces. Figure 1 shows the master plan of Seoul's regeneration projects. The urban regeneration issue was at the core of Mayor Park Won-soon's administration while he was in office 22 . First, it was routinized that the director of the Urban Regeneration Center (a Grade 1 Civil Servant) be promoted to an administrative deputy mayor during the incumbency of Mayor Park, establishing the system that the operation of the bureaucratic organization of Seoul focuses on urban regeneration.
There was an institutional base for civic groups to participate in Seoul's administration during the incumbency of Mayor Park. As Mayor Park expanded Participatory Budgeting 23 , he had a 50 billion-won budget reviewed by citizen participation from 2012, and in 2021, he had a trillion-won budget reviewed by citizens. The citizenreviewed budget was operated by the Seoul Democracy Committee from July 2019. The committee members first selected the "deliberation type projects" of the 930 billion won budget. In addition, the Seoul Committee was in charge of the "Seoul- type citizen autonomy," "civic group support and collaboration" and "local community project," so that civilians with a background in NGOs could actively participate in urban regeneration projects. The "Seoul-type residents' association" was established as an autonomous organization to solve current issues in the community, so that relevant organizations can settle disputes in the local community as representative organizations of citizen autonomy. Since 2018, demonstration projects have been implemented in four Gu and 24 dong. This project can be considered as a part of a trial for grassroots communities to participate in local projects.
Nevertheless, these projects are becoming the targets of attacks by conservative political groups and the media. The main content of the attacks is that Mayor Park Wonsoon has established a "Lefty Ecology" with Seoul's budget 24 .

Limitations of top-down urban regeneration policy
In 2017, following the inauguration of Moon Jae-in, the urban regeneration project was implemented in 68 places. In 2019, that figure rose to 99 places and reached 117 places in 2020. In 2021, the project has been implemented in over 400 places. The budget for five years of finance, funds and public corporation investment is 50 trillion won. It seems that President Moon has kept his top presidential pledge conscientiously, but it is far from the goal of the policy to execute urban regeneration projects through a bottom-up style, as most urban regeneration projects continue to be done in a top-down style 25 .
For example, urban regeneration new deal projects are classified into five types by the characteristics of the area and project dimensions, namely "Town Regeneration," "Lowrise Residential Area Regeneration Project," "General Type of Neighborhood Regeneration," "Central City Type" and "Economy-Based Urban Regeneration Project." However, when areas are selected, identical legal indexes such as population decrease, the decrease in the number of businesses and the number of old buildings are used, which leads to difficulty in reflecting various characteristics of each area from the selection step. Furthermore, urban regeneration projects tend to be implemented from the critical perspective on new town policy. Therefore, the urban redevelopment in the overall pulling-down method is viewed negatively, and the focus is on the conservation of existing buildings and urban regeneration.
Regarding this, in the by-election for Seoul mayor in April, 2021 after Mayor Park passed away, Oh Se-hoon, the candidate from a conservative party (the People Power Party, the successor of the Grand National Party, Saenuri Party), was elected. Former Mayor Park's policy to expand citizen participation in city administration together with urban regeneration projects encountered a setback.
First of all, Mayor Oh Se-hoon abolished the Urban Regeneration Center, which was the department in charge of urban regeneration projects, and established a Housing Policy Office to establish a system in which the operation of Seoul's bureaucracy focuses on development rather than historical and cultural preservation. And this developed into a situation in which the alliance with developers was strengthened in the Seoul Metropolitan Government's policy network, and grassroots communities were excluded. For example, the criteria for withdrawal of renewable projects have been greatly lowered. In the past, more than 50% of land owners and more than half of the land area had to be agreed upon to withdraw the project, but from November 2021, the Seoul Metropolitan Government is able to withdraw the regeneration project even if it does not meet these requirements for residents' consent 26 . As a result, Changsin and Sungin, which were the first areas of urban regeneration during Mayor Park Won-soon's time in office, were selected as the first areas subject to private redevelopment in December 2021, after Mayor Oh took office 27 .
On the other hand, Mayor Oh Se-hoon cut the urban regeneration budget related to grassroots communities and stopped extending contracts to NGO private consignment companies 28 . Urban regeneration projects rely on the government's budget, so once the government support runs out, relevant projects can be stopped. Mayor Oh's policy shift is receiving strong support from major media outlets that gained profit from advertisements by developers and the construction industry, and Mayor Oh is also trying to expand the housing supply and use it as a stepping stone to political success 29 . Furthermore, Mayor Oh's urban development policy is gaining stronger momentum as the People Power Party has won consecutive presidential elections in March 2022 and local elections in May 2022.

Taipei and Keelung: competing models of cultural memories and local empowerment
The preservation of cultural heritage and the development of urban and rural areas in Taiwan are concerned with the interpretation of political memory and identity. The Cultural Heritage Preservation Act was passed in the 1980s, and since then the preservation of cultural heritage in Taiwan has taken on added importance (Liao, 2014) 30 . Similar to the case of South Korea introduced in the previous section, following much competition between preservation and development, the preservation and reuse of cultural heritage has become one of the tools of urban redevelopment. Also, party politics in the preservation of historic sites has become notable for its influence on local elections, especially in the 2014 local elections. Different stakeholders, including the central and local governments, residents, developers and other property owners, have struggled with the preservation or development of historical sites or historical structures.

Different interpretations of memories and identities in the context of urban preservation projects
The preceding case of Seoul demonstrates the intertwining of political memories, local state developmentalism, and the politicization of urban regeneration plans in the context of interaction between local state and civil society. The case of the greater Taipei metropolitan area, including the cities of Taipei and Keelung, provide similar trajectories of local elite momentum and political utilities of civil groups.
As a free and open society, Taiwan has increasingly seen policies on cultural heritage preservation becoming key issues in its local elections. In 2014, Ko Wen-je and Lin Yuchang, who were running for mayor in Taipei and Keelung respectively, presented their views on cultural policies, and demonstrated their commitment to cultural heritage: it should be preserved, restored and reused well at the original locations. Ko promised to preserve cultural heritage sites such as the Nangang Bottle Cap Factory, and Lin also stated that the West Wharf No. 2 warehouse in Keelung Port that dates back to the Japanese colonial period would also be preserved.
Meanwhile, the Taiwan's central government has tried to institute cultural policy support for local governments to preserve examples of heritage; for instance, the Ministry of Culture (MOC) implemented the Regeneration of Historic Sites (RHS), a policy to strengthen the historical inheritance connecting the land and residents, promote urban and rural development, and transcend conventional single-point preservation. Employing the concept of cultural governance, the MOC emphasized the bottom-up participation from local governments and citizens. Based on this, the Keelung city government applied RHS to the Tagana Story (TS) project, in the hopes that the rectification of cultural heritage would not only strengthen citizens' identity, but also stimulate cultural and economic development in Keelung. From the perspective of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), reinterpreting Keelung's history through culture preservation projects is seen as a model to establish new linkages of Taiwanese identity and world history. Mayor Lin Yu-chang, a young rising star in the DPP camp, is regarded as the ideal leader to implement the task of rebuilding Keelung's memory and identity.
Given this macro political consideration from the central level, Lin, together with the bureaucrats, use heritage near the east wharf to connect locals to the land and recall historical memories with the discovery of Fort San Salvador, under a parking lot on Heping Island 31 and the restoration of Keelung Fort Commander's official residence from the Japanese colonial period. The identity narrative is constructed not only through the 400-year history of Keelung, but also through the connection to world history, instead of a history connected to China. The main goal to construct Taiwan's subjectivity through cultural heritage is clearly showed in the RHS reference handbook 32 . MOC pointed out that when the media reports on Taiwan's history, it usually employs terms such as "Cross Strait Three Regions" or "mainland," yet MOC wanted to show that Taiwan's history is combined not only with China, but also with the U.S., Japan, and other countries in Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Europe centuries ago. Also, the Keelung Cultural Affairs Bureau's report demonstrates that Keelung has been connected with the world closely since the early modern period, and that Keelung's historic sites should represent Taiwan in conversations about world history. Since Keelung achieved the quality standards set by the project, it becomes a lab to construct Taiwan's subjectivity, instead of placing Taiwan's culture in China's periphery. The DPP's Taiwanization or nativization through cultural heritage 33 is quite different to former KMT President Ma Ying-Jeou's cultural policy that sought to revive Chinese nationalism from 2000-2008 34 .
In contrast to the Keelung case, Taipei Mayor Ko, who also serves as chair of Taiwan People's Party (TPP) that was established in 2019, emphasizes the importance of urban historical development and the accumulation of cultural heritage. However, he doesn't use any terms related to the DPP's interpretation of history, such as a 400-year history, nor does he try to construct an identity narrative. Instead, the city government tends to use terms like the "reappearance of grace" and "Old Taipei" to describe cultural buildings from different periods. Such ambiguous terms from Ko's administration can also be seen in his cultural policy from 2018 when he sought reelection. Comparing the two cities, the historical discourses are divergent due to the different positions of the mayors and their political parties. In contrast with Keelung, Taipei's West District Gateway Project (WDGP) is an urban renewal plan including the preservation of cultural heritage in Taipei's older districts. In both cases, we found that cultural heritage is still connected to urban development, and involves local leaders, government bureaucrats, developers and local groups.

Local elite and political incentives from the central government
In 2014, before the local elections were held, Taipei and Keelung's mayoral candidates expressed how voters were disappointed with the former Kuomintang (KMT) mayors' cultural policies over the past eight years. This disappointment was manifested in the public protests against Hau Lung-bin in Taipei and Chang Tong-rong in Keelung 35 . Because cultural heritage had become a controversial issue, Ko and Lin, who were both supported by the DPP, expressed support for cultural heritage preservation during their campaigns. Both mayors won reelection again in 2018 and while they have implemented cultural policies differently, they have still shared some basic characteristics in the practice of cultural governance.
Ko promised to support cultural heritage preservation before the election, but he soon broke this promise as some examples of heritage were torn down by developers. Still, he has enjoyed a favorable reputation following the demolition of the Zhongxiao Bridge next to the North Gate, which is part of the West District Gateway Project (Figure 2) promoted by the city's Department of Urban Development in 2015. The project aims at managing "culture, history, and transportation" near the North Gate, activating the inner city through the construction of commercial buildings, creating an image of "Old Taipei" through the cultural heritage sites around the North Gate, and highlighting the historical value of the city. Yet in the process, the balance between preservation and preservation methods has remained controversial, particularly regarding the Taipei Post Office and Mitsui Warehouse. The Taipei Post Office is a municipal historic site, and is still used as a center for shipping and mailing services. The government plans to build the Chunghwa Post Towers (CHP Towers), which will be similar to Japan's JP Tower with its integrated retail and restaurant facilities. Mitsui Warehouse, built in 1929, was planned to be moved by the government and this drew strong reactions from local groups. From the disputes, we found that preservation is mainly driven by the government and local civil groups have no room to advocate for the way to preserve heritage.
In Keelung, Lin also wanted to manage an area of cultural heritage near the east wharf. Former Minister of Culture, Cheng Li-chun, who at the time was a legislator, supported him in this mission. With the backing of the Department of Urban Development and the Cultural Affairs Bureau, Lin emphasized to reconstruct history and renovate Keelung through heritage. When the DPP became the ruling party, the MOC presented various RHS projects.
The highlight of Keelung's cultural resources lies in the Japanese colonial buildings on the east bank, which also combines cultural heritage from different periods, such as the Taiping Steamer Memorial Park, the French cemetery that is dedicated to French soldiers who died in Taiwan during the Sino-French War (1884-1885, and the Spanish archeological relic, Fort San Salvador on Heping Island. These can be used to bolster the importance of the city of Keelung and its historical positioning in Taiwan. After the restoration of cultural heritage, Lin and the Cultural Affairs Bureau promoted the results through publications and lectures, which increased the city's visibility as well as his personal exposure. Lin used these as contents for his political achievements and the overall promotion of Keelung. During the first half of 2021, he went to universities in Taipei to give speeches and talk about Keelung's experience, the implementation of the Tagana Story (TS) project, successfully obtaining central government subsidies and breaking through bureaucratic inertia 36 . Figure 3 introduces major historical sites under the TS project. After delivering such a convincing performance, many media outlets speculated about whether he might become one of the candidates for the post of Minister of Transportation after his term of office expires.
Compared with the achievements in Keelung, Taipei faces a lot of controversies over its policy and implementation process. Many of Ko's pledges to preserve cultural heritage in 2014 were subsequently skipped 37 , and he revised the regulations for the organization and operation of the cultural heritage review committee, increasing the difficulty of preserving heritage sites for which only the owner can apply. Thus, cultural heritage in Taipei has again become a question of development versus conservation, and Ko can be blamed for threatening public interest in historic buildings 38 .

Central-local relationship and local state empowerment on cultural preservation projects
In addition to mayors' political considerations, appointed administrative bureaucrats have also become important promoters of the cultural and urban renewal plans. The Taipei Urban Regeneration Center (TURC) 39 and its competent authority, the Department of Urban Development, designed the plan to build the CHP Towers behind the post office, which is slated to become a postal museum in a public-private partnership 40 . Based on the government-led urban renewal project, the CHP Towers would reach a height of 50 floors, but local groups thought that the skyline would be impacted again and the plan runs contrary to the demolition of the Zhongxiao Bridge. As the CHP Towers dispute continues, Chunghwa Post took charge of the plan in 2019, yet the company's plan still conforms with the government's original plan 41 .
Another Taipei case, that of the Mitsui Warehouse, also shows that cultural heritage preservation in Taipei is mainly led by the local government. The commissioner of the Department of Urban Development, Lin Jou-min, suggested that the Mitsui Warehouse be moved 51 meters to the east, in consideration of the traffic situation near the North Gate. This proposal was strongly criticized by local groups, who could not accept the sacrifice of historic value for the sake of road traffic 42 . After the Cultural Heritage Review Committee met several times, the Mitsui Warehouse was still relocated per Lin's proposal, and the anger of local groups toward the Taipei city government flared up further when the latter said that citizens and the government had reached an agreement on this case 43 . This example of government-led cultural heritage preservation reveals the limited participation of citizens in preservation issues.
In Taipei, the dispute of cultural heritage is not mainly over the demolition and interpretation of Japan's colonial history; rather, it is the moving of the Mitsui Warehouse by the government and the CHP Towers threatening to break up the skyline of the heritage sites nearby that has sparked the dispute over the West District Gateway Project. Figure 4 shows the CHP project near Taipei's historic North Gate. To decide whether to move the Mitsui Warehouse, the government and local groups held four deliberations and one public hearing and debated 15 proposals 44 . The conclusion was that the road adjustment would be carried out as originally planned, and the Cultural Heritage Review Committee was merely a presentation for urban development. This resulted in a campaign calling to "Rescue Bei-Bei-San" that citizens wanted to preserve the North Gate, the three-lane road that surrounded the inner city 45 , and the Mitsui Warehouse at its original site 46 .
On the other hand, the Taipei City Government went into competition with the MOC over the CHP Towers. The MOC believes that the CHP Towers, to be built by the city government and the Chunghwa Post company, did not seek the opinion of the MOC in accordance with the provisions of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act when the plan was drafted. In addition, in 2019, the MOC proposed a draft of the "Preservation Plan for the North Gate of Taipei City Walls and the Railway Department of the General," which divided the preservation area and buffer zone around the North Gate, and restricted the volume and height of the buildings; thus, it impacted the West District Gateway Project, especially the CHP Towers. Ko accused the central government of delaying progress on the North Gate project intentionally, and it has become an impasse for the local and the central government on cultural heritage and urban development.
In the case of Keelung, due to a lack of enthusiasm by bureaucrats to apply for subsidies from the central government in the past, coupled with local financial deterioration, Keelung has been stagnant for decades during the KMT rule 47 . After the DPP's Lin Yu-chang took office, he decided that commissioners of the Cultural Affairs Bureau and the Department of Urban Development be political appointees, seeking professional assistance in addressing these issues in Keelung. Peng Chun-heng, who was CEO of the National Culture and Arts Foundation, became deputy minister of the MOC after resigning from the Cultural Affairs Bureau of Keelung. Also, Hsu Yen-hsing worked in Taipei's Urban Regeneration Office, directing many well-known urban regeneration projects in Taipei. They were recruited to Keelung not only to restore cultural heritage combined with spatial governance, but also to influence the former Minister of Culture, Cheng Li-chiun, to come up with RHS policies.
Encountering the strong leadership of the bureaucracy in the process of cultural preservation, local civic groups have consistently organized protests and advocated for cultural preservation. Since the DPP came to power, the MOC has attached great importance to cultural preservation through policies and amendments, as well as the preservation of national monuments. Therefore, it has also become an important actor when promoting cultural preservation at the local level.
After the DPP's ascendency to the mayorship in 2016, Keelung's urban regeneration projects regained the attention and substantial support of the central government. Not only does Lin have advantages due to his affiliation with the DPP, he is also a rising political star in his own right with a more promising political future in the party. Taiwan's president and premier have also inspected the implementation results of the Keelung project several times, and they have also provided financial support for the regeneration of Keelung Port. As a provincial-level city, Keelung has a more difficult time raising funds to renovate and preserve cultural heritage. Thus, under the framework of cultural governance proposed by the MOC, subsidies provided by the central government can enable such cities to obtain resource support, but they are also regularly subjected to performance evaluations. In contrast, after Ko was reelected mayor of Taipei, although President Tsai Ing-wen and Ko met at the North Gate, and talked about cooperating on the West District Gateway Project, the CHP Towers project still faces hurdles from the government and the contradiction with the MOC's plan for national historical monuments 48 .
In the case of Keelung, the empowerment of civil society and local groups are relatively weak compared to a more intrusive local government. It has been reported that around 90,000 of 370,000 people commute from Keelung to Taipei for work and school every day, which makes it difficult to form a strong grassroots civil society to care about local issues. Yu pointed out that after Taiwan's Sunflower Movement in 2014 49 , members of the younger generation tended to go back to their hometowns to establish civic groups. They were concerned about local issues in a moderate way, including societal movements, political and cultural fields. These new cultural groups, such as Keilang Camino and Keelung For A Walk, provide walking tours and exhibitions by doing research and interviewing elders to inform local residents or visitors about Keelung's history. Based on valuable resources about Keelung's history, they started to cooperate and work with Lin's cultural policies as a way to get financial support, although some of them cannot maintain mutual cooperation with the government 50 . For Lin, since he needs to keep his election promises and move forward in his political career, his government has to embrace the opportunity to collaborate with new cultural groups on the TS project, arts exhibitions and preservation activities. For the TS project, Keilang Camino is contracted to be the tour guide for various routes along the cultural heritage trails based on their research. This kind of participation is the most convenient channel for non-government organizations to influence the interpretation of local cultural memories. In the case of Keelung's TS project, cultural and historical studios are mainly contracted by the local government to serve as the tour guides of historical sites in the project, yet they do not launch any protests as their counterparts did in Taipei.
According to our research, without strong financial support from the central government, Keelung is unable to launch any new projects of historical preservation. Using cultural preservation projects to re-interpretate the history of Keelung as well as Taiwan as a whole has become a major source of financial support from the central level. The central government tries to interpret the history of Keelung as a miniature of Taiwan history. The triangular alliance among the mayor's office, Bureau of Urban Development, and Bureau of Culture seizes the unique opportunity to initiate new cultural preservation projects. The DPP administration in Keelung also overcomes the passive attitude of bureaucratic inertia in favor of more aggressive attitudes in obtaining more financial support from the central government. Moreover, due to the fact that the property rights of most of the historical sites belong to the central ministries such as the Ministry of Defense, Keelung faces less pressures from the local interests. Relocation of private residents, which is a common headache for cultural preservation projects, is not an issue in the case of Keelung. With the support of the central government, these stateowned spaces and properties are transferred into the hands of the Keelung government in a relatively smooth way.
In the case of Keelung, leadership and human factors matter. Mayor Lin adopts a low profile to avoid ideological confrontation on issues of preserving examples of Japanese colonial heritage. Lin keeps in close contact with senior local leaders of both the DPP and KMT camps and forms various coordinative platforms with local elites 51 . Lin's political communication efforts are not limited in Keelung City. He frequently joins seminars and give speeches in Taipei to introduce his Keelung projects. Such efforts help boost the creation of a national image of a brand-new, culture-based Keelung. Last but not least, as the only DPP mayor serving two terms totaling eight years in Keelung, Lin has accumulated political support at both the central and local level to initiate long-term projects. Utilizing Keelung as his power base, Lin's political ambitions will ultimately be at the central level.

Conclusion
The preceding pages illuminate the Korean and Taiwanese cases in promoting urban regeneration through re-utilization of historical heritage. Various actors, such as local political elites, local bureaucracies, civic groups and developers, are involved in the process of political and economic interweaving. In the case of Seoul, cultural and historical preservation is closely connected with urban regeneration schemes led by strong local bureaucracies and ambitious local leaders. Seoul's mayor, with his close grassroots and civic group connections, enhances his popularity and consolidates his chances for political promotion in the future. However, the combination of a capable local bureaucracy and strong political incentives lead to a flawed outcome of urban regeneration, which focuses mainly on short-term instead of long-term goals of historical preservation. Support from the central government also plays a key role in realizing new plans for urban regeneration. However, the transfer of political power and the mayor from the conservative camp have reversed the trend and shifted the trajectory of development back to the top-down manner.
The case of Taiwan, as introduced by the projects in the cities of Taipei and Keelung, also shows the ambition of local leaders and competence of top-down methods of bureaucratic prevalence. Keelung tries to reconstruct modern history and connect it to the world, instead of being predominantly a part of mainland Chinese history. Taipei, by contrast, adopts a more pragmatic way to reinterpret local history. Mayor Lin of Keelung incorporates local civic groups and consolidates the bureaucratic powers of implementation. The ruling DPP government at the central level provides sufficient financial and personnel support for Keelung's regeneration plans. Mayor Ko of Taipei, who is not a member of the ruling DPP, adopts a more arbitrary way to challenge the central government and resist pressure from civic groups. The two Taiwanese cases demonstrate that the direction, tempo, and style of historical preservation and regeneration plans are closely linked with political concerns. Input from civil society and non-governmental organizations is limited.
The Korean and Taiwanese cases demonstrate that political functions, such as regime legitimacy and the formation of new identities, have been instrumental in the process of urban regeneration. This paper brings the "politics" back into local developmentalism in the democratic societies of South Korea and Taiwan. The promotion of public-private partnership, as described in the introductory section of this paper, does not seem to be a major consideration of local leaders. Political parties' agendas dominate the process of urban regeneration and cultural projects. Selection of cultural preservation sites is also a political process. The discourse power is dominated by political forces of the ruling parties at the central level.
Furthermore, based on the findings of this study, this paper contributes to the literature of governance of cultural preservation and the local developmental state in three major dimensions. First, the current literature of urban regeneration and cultural preservation neglects the "human factor," especially the individual political figures, in leading the process of development. Our study demonstrates that political incentives of local leaders, who may aspire to higher appointments in future elections, serve as a major impetus for calculated re-interpretation of cultural relics for urban regeneration. On the other hand, the political ideology and party affiliation of local leaders will re-construct the relationship between local civil society and the local state. In brief, leadership does matter.
Secondly, the central-local relationship matters as well. The local developmental states are not totally isolated from political entanglements at the central level. In the case of Seoul, politics at the central level have major impacts on the state-society interaction in the policy making process at the local level. For the case of Taipei, preservation projects are utilized as an instrument to show the mayor's autonomy from the intervention of the central level. In the case of Keelung, the central government buttresses the financial, political and cultural foundations of the weak local state. These examples of support are mainly out of political concern to legitimize ongoing efforts of historical reconstruction and re-interpretation.
Thirdly, the cases of South Korea and Taiwan demonstrate the weakness of democratic governance. The two countries are facing dual challenges of deepening globalization and democracy. Traditional wisdom of democratic governance, as discussed in the introductory section of this paper, focuses on the collaboration among the public sector, NGOs, and private players. On the other hand, globalization implies the decentralization of power from the state to the society. However, the South Korean and Taiwanese cases show the "recentralization" of power to the local state, into the hands of democratically elected local politicians. The transfer of power in Seoul shifts the power away from the civil groups to the mayor's office. In Taipei and Keelung, public consultation on regeneration and preservation projects are rare. NGOs and civil groups are co-opted, if not neglected, in the policy making process. The cases analyzed in this paper provide a distorted picture of democratic governance in South Korea and Taiwan. Public participation in the policy-making and implementation process is limited. The developmentoriented model of urban rejuvenation is still the leading mind-set of democratically elected local leaders. Last but not least, party alternation through democratic elections also leads to the discontinuity of existing policies. This has happened in Seoul and Taipei as well as in Keelung. The lack of policy coherence is certainly a negative factor in a more stable model of urban regeneration and cultural preservation for these two young democracies.
Based on the preceding findings, we believe that a more comprehensive research scheme could be developed to cover cases of other young democracies at the subnational level in the future. Field researches and in-depth person-to-person interviews faced serious constraints in the past two years due to the pandemic. Looking toward the future, as the world gradually returns back to the normality, cross-national, comparative studies and the formation of international teams of analysis will certainly shed lights to elaborate further the theoretical as well as policy insights.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Tse-Kang Leng is a Research Fellow of Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica and Professor of Political Science of National Chengchi University, Taiwan
Kuan-Hsuan Wu is an Assistant at Keelung For A Walk (a Non-governmental Organization), Taiwan.