Should the Muslim President become a constitutional convention in Indonesia? Based on constitutional debates about Islam and state, and the constitutional practice

Abstract Since Soekarno to Joko Widodo, all of Indonesia’s presidents have been Muslims. This practice is based on Dicey’s theory of constitutional conventions, i.e. rules of conduct that can persist over time and gradually gain persuasive power before becoming mandatory. Is this a reasonable assumption? Furthermore, should a Muslim President be a constitutional convention? This article employs socio-legal studies in the form of law in context, a historical approach to the constitution-making debate and a practical approach to Indonesian political reality. The study’s findings indicate that having a Muslim President as a constitutional convention is appropriate not only in terms of long-standing customs and practices but also as a resolution to the constitutional debate on Islam and the state, particularly the religious requirements for the President. As a constitutional convention, the Muslim President is not the law in the strict sense that it is binding and enforceable in court. Instead, it is a positive morality, ethics, and comprehension that serves as a moral guide for state officials and politicians. The Constitutional Convention in the form of a Muslim President, as well as the appointment of state offices taking religious proportionality into account, is an informal accommodation in the division of power in the design of the Indonesian constitutional system that takes into account the factors of Indonesia’s plural and potentially divided society. As a result, the convention improves Indonesia’s integration function.


PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT
Constitutional conventions play an important function in written constitutions as informal rules. Constitutional conventions supplement and fill the gaps left by the written constitution. In addition, constitutional conventions can provide models of integration and accommodation that facilitate and bridge the problems of a divided plural society.

Introduction
As a Muslim-majority country (Na'im & Syaputra, 2012), 1 Indonesia's relationship between religion (Islam) and the state faces various struggles and dynamics, including the President's religious requirements. Historically, on 16 July 1945, the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia-BPUPKI) drafted a constitution, agreeing that the President be a Muslim. This agreement enacts the basis of a Godhead with the obligation to carry out Islamic Sharia for its adherents "Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya" (Kusuma, 2009). However, the presidential religious requirements clause was repealed on the next state journey, along with the seven words "dengan kewajiban menjalankan Syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya" at a meeting of the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia-PPKI) on 18 August 1945 (Kusuma, 2009).
In practice, from its independence in 1945 to the present, Indonesia has had seven presidents. Soekarno, Soeharto, Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarno Putri, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Joko Widodo are all Muslims. This practice is frequently assumed to be related to the constitutional conventions of Dicey's theory (Dicey, 1979), namely, a rule of conduct gradually and persuasively accepted as a binding obligation (Wheare, 1951). However, is this assumption correct, and should the practice of a Muslim president become a constitutional convention? So, what is the significance of a constitutional convention, particularly its "binding obligation"? Are non-Muslims barred from becoming president? Moreover, how does the convention relate to the context of Indonesia, which adheres to democratic principles with a plural society and provides respect in the form of equal rights for citizens?
When discussing the President's religious requirements, these questions become important in analyzing the relationship between religion and the state in Indonesia. On the one hand, the religious requirements for becoming President have been eliminated, and the 1945 Constitution adheres to the principle of equal citizenship. 2 However, it should be noted that Islam, as the religion practised by most Indonesians, teaches not only religious rituals but also guides social life. As stated in the Qur'an, Surah Al Maidah verse 51, Islam is a religion of complete integration, including the prohibition of choosing non-Muslim leaders (Chotban, 2018;Saeed, 1999;Syarif, 2006). 3 Although Ulema and Muslim scholars differ in the interpretation of the verse, Islamic teachings influence the leader's election (Bilhaq, 2018).
Manan previously stated that one of Indonesia's constitutional conventions is the President's religion (Manan, 2006). Manan explained that the President and Vice President have always been Muslims, even though the 1945 Constitution does not specify which religion they should follow (Manan, 2006). This practice does not violate the 1945 Constitution because the President and Vice President should be elected by the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat-MPR) or through general elections. According to Manan, the Muslim President is a constitutional convention based on the practices and influence of most of Indonesia's Muslim population.
This article has some similarities, but it tries to go deeper by discussing whether a Muslim president should be a constitutional convention, not only from a normative constitutional perspective but also, and more importantly, from the context of the constitutional debate in Indonesia, reflecting the relationship between Islam and the state. The discussion in this article is important not only to see how the practice of Indonesian presidents is always Muslim but also to the emergence of the phenomenon of presidential candidate contestation issues that are influenced by religious issues, which have strengthened in recent years. The last two presidential elections, in 2014 and 2019, revealed signs of a strengthening of "identity politics" based on religion, which divided society. While there has yet to be a conflict, let alone a civil war, the division of society will be detrimental to the long-term stability of democracy as Indonesia's chosen mode of governance. This article will consider constitutional design in the context of Indonesia's plural society, considering that plural societies are prone to division. This is because democracy must, on the one hand, care for the majority while protecting the minority. On the other hand, it also considers the advancement of human rights in Indonesia, which ensures equality and equality on the one hand, as well as freedom of expression, opinion, and political choice. Moreover, this article will also answer the assumption that the Muslim President is a discriminatory constitutional convention because it allows for exclusivity. As a result, this article will define the convention and explain its role and function as informal rules for democracy in a plural society.

Research methods
The method used in this research is the socio-legal approach, specifically in the form of the law in context, by borrowing social approaches and widely understood concepts about the research being conducted to understand the workings of law in practice (Banakar, 2015) and an interface with a context in which law exists (Wheeler & Thomas, 2000). According to the research topic, historical and practical approaches, as well as the theory of democracy in a plural society, are used to comprehend the issue of the Indonesian President's religious requirements, which has a majority Muslim population on the one hand but is also pluralistic on the other. As a result, understanding the research context of why the Indonesian constitution does not include a religious requirement clause for the President becomes a central point in understanding the history of constitutional debate, specifically regarding presidential religious requirements. In practice, however, the Indonesian President is always a Muslim.
Furthermore, doctrinal studies are not ignored in this study, as the theory of constitutional convention is the primary basis for analyzing the issue. Meanwhile, democratic theory bolsters the case, particularly the plural society model. Based on this, the research employs library data on the issue of religious requirements and religious practices by the Indonesian President. In addition, interviews were conducted with Indonesian politicians, such as Jussuf Kalla, the Vice President of Indonesia (2004-2009 and 2014-2019), and Zain Badjeber, who amended the 1945 Constitution. Azyumardi Azra, an Islamic history and politics expert, and constitutional law expert Bagir Manan were also interviewed.

Constitutional convention
This article employs the constitutional convention terminology used by the British Professor of Law, AV Dicey, in his book Introduction to the Study of Law of the Constitution (1985). 4 Dicey defined British constitutional law as "all rules directly or indirectly affecting the exercise of sovereign state power" ( (Dicey, 1979). The word "rules," which comprised the British constitutional code, included two maxims, "laws and convention," each with a distinct character. The first rules are courtenforced laws, such as the Magna Carta, Bill of Rights, and Parliament Act. The other is an unwritten rule of law derived from common law and resulting from a judge's decision (Dicey, 1979). As a result, the first rule is known as constitutional law, while the second is a collection of conventions, understandings, habits, or practices derived from the behaviour of the authorities. These rules are not laws, and the courts do not enforce them. The constitutional convention is the name given to the second rule (Dicey, 1979). Dicey also refers to it as political ethics and constitutional morality, which is consistent with Mill's term positive constitutional morality and Marshall's term positive convention morality (Marshall, 1987;Mill, 2010), which demonstrates the role of conventions as non-legal rules of constitutional behaviour.
How about obedience to the constitutional convention? Volunteerism and ethical encouragement reinforce convention obedience (Manan, 2006). This is based on the belief that conforming to conventions requires political guidance in state governance. Conventions, according to Alder, are political rules that are not legally binding unless accepted by those in power (Alder, 2015).
In this regard, how can we maintain obedience to conventions as moral and ethical principles? Dicey states that fear of impeachment and forced public opinion are two common factors (Dicey, 1979). Wade stated that the following motivations encourage adherence to constitutional conventions: the desire to carry on the traditions of government; the desire to keep the ship of taste in working order; and the desire to retain the public's trust and, with it, office and power (Wade, 1979). The breach or violation will elicit legitimate criticism, typically as an accusation of unconstitutional behaviour (Barnett, 2002) and a violation of constitutional law (Vetzo, 2018). Alex Carrol stated five reasons for conformity to conventions: (i) moral opprobrium because conventions are ideological constitutional principles; (ii) violation of the law because the perpetrator conflicts with the courts; (iii) political difficulties encountered as a result of a conventional violation; (iv) results in legislation because the convention is possibly enforced and included in the law and is not violated; and (v) self-interest, which is the public office's ambition that (Carrol, 2017). The fifth reason supports Wade and Phillips' contention that fear of losing office or reputation causes ministers to follow constitutional law to avoid fines or imprisonment (Wade & Phillips, 1970).
How do conventions arise? Wheare identifies two convention sources, including a pattern of behaviour that can persist for a long time and gradually gain persuasive and obligatory force (Wheare, 1951). This practice was later known as customs. Conversely, a convention emerges quickly as an agreement among people who follow a specific set of rules (Wheare, 1951). This provision is immediately binding and becomes a convention without regard to time as "customs". In the meantime, Heard stated that, in addition to practice and agreement, a constitutional convention could result from a declaration (convention by declaration) and state principles (convention by principle) (Heard, 2012). Powerful political actors carry out the declaration's conventions (Heard, 2012). Furthermore, conventions derived from state principles that emerge in new situations without precedent, agreement, or declaration have paved the way for a well-established convention (Heard, 2012).

Democracy and constitutional design in plural or divided society
Democracy has evolved as a government model from Ancient Greece (some argue even earlier) to the modern era. On the one hand, democracy demonstrates how the people rule with the symbol of government from the people, by the people, and for the people, with the majority rule as the guiding principle. Democracy, on the other hand, plays an important role in preserving social cohesion and unity. As a result, the implementation of democracy in each country will differ depending on the context of its society.
According to Lijphart, the most vital prerequisites for maintaining democratic stability are social homogeneity and political consensus (Lijphart, 1969). As a result, the United States can achieve democratic stability because its society is generally divided into two large political groups, each of which controls the government alternately. The United States successfully played the liberal democracy model characterized by full competition and majoritarian rule accompanied by the winner takes all because the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, as the largest parties, would take turns in power without ignoring the role of small parties and civil society. However, Lijphart objects to this majoritarian democracy if it is applied to a plural society that is divided and fragmented, which he believes will be difficult to achieve and maintain government stability (Lijphart, 1969).
Lijphart proposes a constitutional design in consociational democracy with two keywords: power sharing and group autonomy, considering the plural and divided society (Lijphart, 2004). Lijphart demonstrates how a plural and divided society such as Lebanon can still maintain a democratic government by sharing power based on religion, as regulated in the Lebanese constitution (formal consociationalism) and the unwritten National Pact (informal consociationalism), which gives the position of President to Maronite Christians, Prime Minister to Sunni Muslims, Speaker of Parliament to Shia Muslims, and Deputy Speaker to Christian Orthodox (Bogaards, 2019;Faour, 2007;Lijphart, 2004). Similarly, in Malaysia and Singapore, where society is divided along ethnic lines (Malay, Chinese, and Indian) and religion, the consociationalism model is used in government. Malaysia accords special rights to each ethnicity in practising cultural and religious traditions at the community level and forms a grand coalition in government based on ethnicity, with Malays serving as senior partners and other ethnicities serving as junior partners. As a result, while Islam is recognized as the official religion in Malaysia, the state recognizes and facilitates the worship of other religions. The Prime Minister of Malaysia is always elected by Malay Muslims, inviting all ethnicities into the cabinet (Lijphart, 1969).
Meanwhile, Singapore, where ethnic Chinese make up the majority of the population, has policies to respect, appreciate, and support the Malay community and its religion, which is the original ethnicity. Furthermore, to promote multiculturalism, Singapore implemented the Reserved Election Mechanism (REM) model, which granted minority groups the right to become President after the President had always been from the majority group (Osman & Waikar, 2019;Tan, 2019;Yim, 2018). Nigeria, whose population is divided between the Muslim North and the Christian South, developed a model of religiously rotating the office of the President in order to maintain political stability. The rotation is not governed by the Nigerian Constitution but rather by an informal agreement between politicians providing political conduciveness and stability for nearly three decades (Adamo, 2018;Adegbami & Charles, 2015;Oladele, 2018).
The model proposed by Lijphart, according to McGarry, O'Leary, and Simeon, is an accommodation model in constitutional design to solve the problems of a plural and divided society (McGarry et al., 2008). This accommodation model demonstrates the acceptance of differences to allow for affirmation policies and diverse legal systems. They also provide an integration model, which depicts a plural and divided society forming the same constitution and rules for them and a shared political identity (McGarry et al., 2008). However, in practice, countries do not follow these models exactly. Some use the integration and accommodation models, while others use both simultaneously (Choudry, 2008;Ginsburg, 2018;Horowitz, 1991;Lerner, 2010).

Presidential religious requirements: The impact of Islamic and state on constitutional debate in Indonesia
The President is the highest position in the Indonesian constitutional system. The President is both head of state and head of government. Therefore, the requirements for candidates for President of Indonesia result from political interests and the need for skills or abilities. One is the religious requirement for the president, which affects the debate on Islam and the state in constitutional making. As previously stated, the requirements for a Muslim President were agreed upon on 16 July 1945, but were repealed on 18 August 1945. In our opinion, continuing the constitutional debate is the key to understanding the Muslim President becoming a constitutional convention. Only the first of the five constitutional sequels (BPUPK) was formalized by Islamic law. The PPKI, Konstituante, Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959, and the Constitutional Amendments of 1999-2002 attempted to limit and neutralize Islamic law in the Indonesian national legal system (Butt, 2010). However, this does not negate the importance of Islamic law. Indonesia is neither an Islamic nor a secular country that keeps religion and state separate. On the contrary, it accepts religious influence in the public sphere within specific parameters, such as substantively incorporating Islamic values into law and government.

BPUPKI and PPKI 1945
The first sequel to the debate in the Indonesian constitution on Islam and the state occurred in 1945 at the BPUPKI meeting. It demonstrates how an Islamic nationalist group (golongan nasionalis Islam) successfully lobbied the secular nationalist group (golongan nasionalis sekuler) in two ways to include Islamic principles in the Indonesian constitution (Anshari, 1997;Kusuma, 2009). The first is in the Jakarta Charter of 22 June 1945, which contains the five Pancasila state principles, one of which is the Godhead, who is obligated to oversee Islamic Sharia for its adherents (Anshari, 1997). The Jakarta Charter represents a compromise or accommodation for the opposing views of secular and Islamic nationalist groups. The Jakarta Charter was used as the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, and it purposefully granted the greatest population privileges (Islam). It is reflected in Soepomo's speech on 15 July 1945 as Chair of the Small Committee for the Draft Constitution (Kusuma, 2009). Second, after a near-deadlock debate, the President's religious requirement in Islam was agreed upon on 16 July 1945. This debate is important and helpful in comprehending the constitutional conventions discussed in this article.
On 13 July 1945, Wachid Hasyim, an Islamic nationalist, was the first to propose that the President's requirement be Muslim. According to Hasyim, Islam is essential to the relationship between the government and society. As a result, the word "Muslim" should be added to Article 4, paragraph (2) (Kusuma, 2009). However, there was opposition from both secular and Islamic nationalist groups. The proposal, according to Agus Salim of the Islamic nationalist group, could compromise raw again (Kusuma, 2009). Sukiman, on the other hand, denied this and supported Hasyim's point of view because nothing would come of it (Kusuma, 2009). Djayadiningrat also questioned Sukiman's opinion, asking if it was confirmed that it would not result in anything (Kusuma, 2009). (Wongsonagoro, on the other hand, expressed surprise that the compromise had been rejected (Kusuma, 2009).
Even if it triggered a debate, Pratalykrama proposed the Muslim president's requirement again on 15 July 1945 (Kusuma, 2009). Soepomo responded to this proposal, which saw the President's religious requirement as a violation of the Jakarta Charter, and thus prevented the earlier compromise (Kusuma, 2009). Without mentioning the terms of the constitution, Soepomo stated that a 95 per cent Muslim population ensures that the President is also Muslim. However, the response is deemed inadequate (Kusuma, 2009). Masjkoer asked the Constitutional Drafting Committee if there is an article on implementing Islamic Sharia in Indonesian, but the President is not Muslim, could the process be adequately implemented, or could Muslims accept it, and is that not "evil"? (Kusuma, 2009) In response, Soekarno, as Chairman of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, stated: . . . When the state is based on Godhead and is obligated to oversee Islamic Sharia for its adherents, and the Head of State or President is a person with no Islamic knowledge, the rules in paragraph 1 of Article 28 are 5 not properly implemented. However, we believed those elected by the Indonesian people could carry out paragraph 1 of Article 28. If Mr Haji Maskoer asked me about Soekarno as a person, I am certain that the Indonesian President is a Muslim. That is because I see and know that the majority of the Indonesian population is Muslim. Even in my first session speech, I suggested that Indonesian Muslims work hard to spread Islam to Indonesians as Muslims. When the majority's souls are aflame with Islam's fire, their spirits should also be aflame. As a result, not only will the President of the Republic of Indonesia be a Muslim, but I also believe that representative bodies will produce every law with an Islamic character. . . . (Kusuma, 2009).
Members of the BPUPKI were dissatisfied with Soekarno's response. According to Moezakir of the Islamic nationalist group, "when the Islamic proposal was not accepted, all words related to Islam should be abolished in the constitutional draft, including Allah's name, religion, and mercy" (Kusuma, 2009). On the contrary, Soekardjo, a secular nationalist, rejected the Islamic proposal that the President be Muslim because it implied injustice. Furthermore, Soekardjo reminded the draft of Article 27, which states that all citizens have the same law and government position (Kusuma, 2009). As a result, from a legal standpoint, Soekardjo added that every Indonesian, regardless of religion, has the right to serve as President. The debate heated up when another Islamic nationalist, Hadikoesoemo, stated that it should be confirmed whether the state is based on Islam. To put it bluntly, Hadikoesoemo stated that small compromises like Soekarno's are unacceptable (Kusuma, 2009).
The debate over the President's religious requirements came dangerously close to a stalemate. It was finally resolved on 16 July 1945, when Soekarno, in tears, requested that Article 4 paragraph (1): "the President is a native Indonesian and a Muslim" be accepted. Moreover, those who oppose this appeal should accept it for the sake of Indonesian unity. Soekarno said: . . . For some nationalists, this is a faith sacrifice. However, because those present are certain that the Indonesian population is 90 or 95 per cent Muslim, as a result, whoever becomes President of Indonesia should be Muslim. . . it is a plea that this is accepted unanimously by the members; I ask that what I propose be accepted unanimously by the members, even though I know it is a great sacrifice, particularly on the part of the Patriot Latuharhary and Maramis brothers who are not Muslims. . . . (Kusuma, 2009).
Radjiman, the Chairman of the BPUPKI, asked whether Soekarno's proposal could be approved, and almost all members of the Islamic and secular nationalist groups stood up to agree. They included Maramis, Latuharhary, Dahler, and one Non-Muslim Chinese (all non-muslim), except for three Chinese representatives (Kusuma, 2009). As a result, the constitutional proposal agreed upon at the BPUPKI Meeting on 16 July 1945, requires that the President's religion be Islam.
The Jakarta Charter and the requirements for a Muslim President were established. However, the debate over Islam and the state resurfaced during the PPKI meeting on 18 August 1945, a day after Indonesian independence was declared. This is the second instalment of the Indonesian constitution's debate over Islam and the state. Hatta, the PPKI's Deputy Chairperson, proposed a change to the Jakarta Charter formulation, which was used as the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution. This is especially true in the clause "Godhead obligated to oversee Islamic Sharia for its adherents," to be changed with "Belief in the one and only God" (known as the seven-word abolition) (Kusuma, 2009). Hatta also proposed that the requirement that a president is Muslim be repealed because it is both offensive and ineffective. Another reason was that, with Muslims constituting 95 per cent of Indonesia's population, they automatically ascended to the presidency (Kusuma, 2009).
Hatta explains the proposal to abolish the seven words in his book "Memoir Mohammad Hatta" after receiving information from a Japanese Navy officer on 17 August 1945, the afternoon after reading the proclamation (Hatta, 1979). According to the officer, Protestant and Catholic representatives from Eastern Indonesia objected to the Jakarta Charter's seven-word clause (Kusuma, 2009). As a result, Hatta invited Islamic nationalist figures such as Hadikusumo, Hasyim, Singodimedjo, and Hasan to the PPKI Meeting on the morning of 18 August 1945. They discussed the objections of Protestant and Catholic representatives, and Hatta asked them to approve the removal of seven words (Hatta, 1979). Hatta's proposal was accepted as a result. According to Hatta, this agreement arose from Islamic leaders' tolerance. Furthermore, Hatta stated that removing the seven words from the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution does not remove the spirit of the Jakarta Charter (Hatta, 1979). Because Hatta successfully lobbied the Islamic nationalist group, there was no debate in the PPKI session about abolishing the implementation of Islamic law and the requirements for a Muslim president, as there was in BPUPKI.
Hatta's explanation sounded like the issue of Islam, and the state had been settled. In fact, the State Secretariat's official publication in 1998, the BPUPKI/PPKI book, concluded that Islamic nationalist groups such as Hadikusumo, Sanusi, Hasyim, Hasan, and Singodimedjo welcomed Hatta's proposal. This entailed repealing the clause on implementing Islamic law and the President's requirements as a Muslim (Sekretariat Negara, 1998). Furthermore, the book stated that on the morning of 18 August 1945, with the full approval of the Islamic leaders, the obligation to implement Islamic Sharia was resolved (Sekretariat Negara, 1998).
Based on Kusuma, the conclusion in the State Secretariat's book was refuted. Sanusi, according to Kusuma, is not a member of the PPKI and was not invited to the meeting on 18 August 1945 (Kusuma, 2009). Hatta claimed that Hasyim, another meeting participant, was also sceptical because they were on their way to East Java (Anshari, 1997;Kusuma, 2009;Mangkusasmito, 1970). As a result, only Hatta, Hadikusumo, Singodimedjo, and Hasan were present. Singodimedjo is not a member of the BPUPKI and does not understand the struggle of the Islamic nationalist group (Anshari, 1997). Hasan is not affiliated with any Islamic nationalist organization, but he was present to assist Hatta in lobbying the adamant Hadikusumo (Anshari, 1997). Hasan was purposefully presented because the Acehnese are known for their staunch Islamic religious beliefs (Kusuma, 2009). Finally, Hadikusumo agreed to remove the clause prohibiting the implementation of Islamic Sharia because Hasan promised it would be temporary. Furthermore, Hatta promised that the People's Consultative Assembly, which would be formed later, would discuss a permanent Constitution (Kusuma, 2009).
The abolition of Islamic Sharia is not a final agreement from there. 6 It is evident in Soekarno's remarks at the PPKI meeting on 18 August 1945. "The constitution that has been made now is a provisional constitution. . . a lightning constitution -(revolutie grondwet-konstitusi/undangundang dasar kilat)-. . . in a calmer atmosphere, we will undoubtedly reassemble the People's Consultative Assembly, which can make a more complete and perfect constitution," Soekarno said (Kusuma, 2009). However, drafting a new constitution proved difficult due to Dutch military aggression. The Indonesian and Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference resulted in the formation of the Constitution of the United States of Indonesia (RIS), which the 1950 Constitution replaced. The two constitutions were irrelevant to this article because they did not address Islam or state contestation in Indonesia. 1956-1959and Presidential Decree 1959 The purpose of the 1955 General Election was to elect a representative body, and a Konstituante tasked with creating a new constitution. In the Konstituante, there was a third sequel to the battle between Islam and the state. The Islamic nationalists proposed reintroducing seven words into the constitution's preamble. However, secular nationalists opposed it because it violated the noble agreement of 18 August 1945. (Kusuma, 2009;Nasution, 2009). Muzakkir, an Islamic nationalist, responded to the accusation by stating that they were present at the BPUPK session when the noble agreement of the Jakarta Charter was drafted (Kusuma, 2009). Furthermore, Muzakkir charged the secular nationalist group with breaching this noble agreement (Kusuma, 2009). This demonstrates a serious debate in the Konstituante between Islamic and secular nationalists.

Konstituante
The lengthy debates in the Konstituante did not result in a new constitution. Nasution revealed that the failure of the Konstituante was caused by more than just debates about Islam and the state without considering the socio-political context (Nasution, 2009). A divided crisis resulted from deteriorating economic and political conditions, a divided nation, and government insecurity (Nasution, 2009). As a result, political power shifted from parliament to the President by initiating an extra-parliamentary cabinet and an influential military (Nasution, 2009). Furthermore, President Soekarno suggested that the 1945 Constitution be reinstated to support the army fully (Nasution, 2009). The Konstituante rejected this recommendation until President Soekarno issued a decree on 5 July 1959. The Presidential Decree dissolved the Konstituante, declared the 1950 Provisional Constitution invalid, and reintroduced the 1945 Constitution (Nasution, 2009).
The Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 stated that the Jakarta Charter of 22 June 1945, which animates the 1945 Constitution, is a series of unity with the constitution. This consideration, it appears, calms the hearts of Islamic nationalists. It contains the five principle states (Pancasila) in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution, which will be interpreted and animated by the Jakarta Charter. However, there is a different interpretation of the Presidential Decree's considerations (Kusuma, 2016;Suma, 2004). According to Ahmad Syafi'i Maarif, including the Jakarta Charter in consideration was a political compromise between Pancasila and Islam's supporters (Maarif, 1985). As a result, even though it is implicit in the discussion, the idea of implementing Syariah Islam for its adherents is not abandoned (Maarif, 1985). This Presidential Decree is the fourth instalment in the debate over Islam and the state, demonstrating that while Islam is not formal state law, it is an important part of Indonesian constitutional and legal matters. (1999)(2000)(2001)(2002) The fifth sequel to the controversy between Islam and the state in Indonesia appeared in the 1945 Constitution Amendment from 1999 to 2002. At least two political parties, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan-PPP) and the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang-PBB), have fought tenaciously to restore the seven words in the Jakarta Charter by amending Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution (Hosen, 2005). However, these efforts were unsuccessful, as the two parties only had 12% of the votes (Hosen, 2005). Furthermore, all three Islamic parties, the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa-PKB), the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional-PAN), and the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan-PK), do not intend to return the seven words in the Jakarta Charter. Instead, to demonstrate respect for pluralism in Indonesia, the three parties chose another option: "State based on the one and only Godhead with the obligation of every religious adherent to carry out their religious teachings" (Hosen, 2005). This alternative change proposal was rejected, and the old formula, "State based on a single Godhead", was reinstated. As a result, there was no discussion about the President's religious requirements.

Amendments of the 1945 Constitution
The five sequels reflect the journey of more than a half-century of Indonesian independence efforts to limit the formalization of Islamic law. This is not to say that Islamic law is completely rejected in the Indonesian legal system. Nadirsyah investigated the debate on religion and the state in the 1945 Constitution Amendment and concluded the relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia, employing a third alternative based on Hollenbach's approach, claiming that religious communities influence public life (Hollenbach, 1993). This does not, however, imply that all political institutions are subject to religion in the way that they should be in a theocratic state. This viewpoint demonstrates that, while Indonesia is not a religious or secular state, it does provide an important and strategic position toward religion within specific parameters. Nadirsyah also stated that this stance is consistent with the substantive sharia approach. Sharia is interpreted as a path or guide in this approach rather than a detailed legal code that must be formalized in state law (Hosen, 2005). According to Nadirsyah, in the 1945 Constitution, Pancasila is the foundation of the state, beginning with the principle of One Godhead: it allows and encourages religion to inspire people's lives in terms of humanity, national unity, representative democracy, and social justice (Hosen, 2005).
According to Baswedan, in Indonesia, the relationship between religion and state is "no longer focused on bringing Islam into the foundation of the state, but on how to bring Islamic colouration into policies produced by the state" (Baswedan, 2004). Other categorizations of Islam-State relations follow Arskal Salim's lead, with religion and state institutions in mutual symbiosis: "the state needs religion to progress, while religion needs the state because religion will not develop without the state's support" (Salim, 2008). Various sources show that Muslim presidents' and vice presidents' religious status is widely known. However, no one has thoroughly and comprehensively studied the relationship between religious status and the level of righteousness of Indonesia's President and Vice President. Geertz divides Indonesian Muslims into three groups in an anthropological context: santri (pious and obedient); priyayi (noble and less obedient); and abangan (peasants and less obedient) (Geertz, 1976). The santri and abangan dichotomy, according to Mujani, Liddle, and Ambardi, is more accurate in analyzing Islamic political orientation (Mujani et al., 2018). As a result, of the seven Indonesian Presidents, only one, Abdurrahman Wahid, is from the santri group, and only two Vice Presidents, Hamzah Haz and Ma'ruf Amin are from the santri group. Are the others considered abangan in the sense that they are less obedient to religious teachings? Further research has not been conducted because, on the one hand, all Indonesian Presidents and Vice Presidents maintain their Muslim identity by still performing prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, and so on, and, on the other hand, do not fully support exclusive Islamic politics, but rather a substantive Islam embodied in Pancasila. This will not be discussed in the context of this article because it is not the subject of the research. Instead, this article only discusses the formal Indonesian President's religious beliefs.

How can a Muslim President be justified as a constitutional convention?
There are several arguments for making a Muslim President a constitutional convention in Indonesia. The first argument is that most of Indonesian society (87 per cent) is Muslim. As mentioned in the introduction, Bagir Manan used the first argument, which shows the majority dimension as the main factor for the convention (Manan, 2006). According to Manan, a President from the majority will facilitate political acceptance and government stability (Interview With Bagir Manan, personal communication, 27 January 2022). Meanwhile, Azyumardi Azra mentions the Muslim President's considering political-religious demography as a convention (Interviewed With Azyumardi Azra, personal communication, 13 September 2021).
On the one hand, political-religious demography shows that the majority of religions in Indonesia are Muslim. On the other hand, the level of religiosity of people who believe in religion is important enough to choose the highest leader based on religion. As a result, Azra emphasized that electing the President of a country from the majority religion is politically correct. On the other hand, choosing a supreme leader who is not from the majority is politically incorrect (Interviewed With Azyumardi Azra, personal communication, 13 September 2021). According to Azra, a Muslim President as a constitutional convention, means respect for the principles of freedom and equality because there is no formal requirement for a particular religion. It also guarantees the right to choose a leader based on religious considerations. Not least because there are still teachings in Islam that it is forbidden to elect non-Muslim leaders, so it makes no sense if the Muslim majority community elects a non-Muslim President.
In this context, exercising this right does not constitute discrimination because it is exercised when selecting a leader, which takes place in a closed room in a voting booth rather than in an open space. However, it is discrimination if religious requirements in the constitution and laws contradict the principles of equality and equality, as well as open campaigns that advocate selecting leaders based on religion, accompanied by hate speech.
The second argument is the practice of Indonesia's seven Muslim presidents. According to the constitutional convention theory, conventions can emerge gradually from continuous practices (Wheare, 1951). Therefore, regardless of the seven Presidents' level of faith, it is easy to claim the Muslim President as a constitutional convention in this context, based solely on their status as Muslims. This is because Indonesia's President is always a Muslim.
The third argument, and, in our opinion, the most important of our findings, is that a Muslim president as a constitutional convention is more than just a continuing practice; it is an alternative solution to Islamic political debate and contestation in Indonesia. This reflects the third Indonesian alternative, which holds that religion can have a significant impact on people's lives in the public sphere (Hollenbach, 1993;Hosen, 2005) This means that a Muslim president is not a legally binding requirement that could be enforced in court. Instead, as stated by Soekarno, Hatta, and Soepomo in BPUPK and PPKI, this requirement becomes constitutional ethics and understanding. According to their statements, most Indonesians are Muslims, and the President should also be one (Kusuma, 2009). Soekarno, Hatta, and Soepomo's statements in BPUPK and PPKI that the President should be Muslim are viewed from two perspectives. First, the three figures lobbied the Islamic nationalist group, implying that there is no need for a formal requirement that the President be a Muslim. Second, the three figures recognize that it is sociologically difficult for non-Muslims to become Indonesia's President. This is consistent with the A.M. Fatwa, which states that the President must be a Muslim because Islam is the majority religion (Fatwa, 2000). However, according to Slamet Effendi Yusuf, while legally anyone could become President, it is politically impossible (Syarif, 2006). Furthermore, Azzyumardi Azra does not question non-Muslims becoming President because Indonesia is a democracy, not an Islamic state. However, Azra stated that it is politically unethical for the minority to lead the majority (Interviewed With Azyumardi Azra, personal communication, 13 September 2021). This is what the convention means by constitutional ethics and understanding. It demonstrates an understanding of political ethics in the state and government.
As conveyed by Heard, the statements of Soekarno, Hatta, and Soepomo are conventions of the declaration (Heard, 2012). Without the imposition of religious requirements in the 1945 Constitution, the constitutional framers stated that the President of Indonesia must automatically be a Muslim because most of Indonesia's population is Muslim. Muslims, this ensures the declaration of people's policies based on a majority vote. The context at the time of the statement lobbied Islamic nationalist groups, but relevance now is because Indonesia is based on Pancasila, which makes Indonesia a state that supports multiple religions, particularly Islam.
The Pancasila in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution originates from the Jakarta Charter, which contains the phrase "Obligation to implement Islamic Sharia for its adherents". Although this clause was abolished on 18 August 1945 through a Presidential Decree dated 5 July 1959, it is an inseparable part of the 1945 Constitution. Although the Presidential Decree interpretations differ (Kusuma, 2016;Maarif, 1985;Suma, 2004), based on Pancasila, religion can influence the public sphere. Furthermore, Pancasila does not mention one religion that shows pluralism (multiple religions). However, it does not mean religion should not influence Indonesia's public policy, including President's contestation. Through Pancasila, religion, including Islam, can exert influence in determining the President through constitutional and civilized methods. Asshiddiqie stated that Indonesia's relationship between religion and state is more than friendly to include "brotherly" or "fraternally" (Asshiddiqie, 2020).
Furthermore, this category demonstrates that the state is interested in assisting all religions in growing and shaping each adherent's personality with quality and integrity (Asshiddiqie, 2008). As a result, Islam may influence the President's decision through constitutional and civilized means. Pancasila's status, which demonstrates the brotherly relationship between religion and the state, is a state principle. This principle corresponded to the Baswedan and Salim approach (Baswedan, 2004;Salim, 2008). As a result, the Muslim President is a constitutional convention borrowed from Heard because Pancasila is the brotherly principle between Islam and the state in Indonesia (Heard, 2012).

The meaning and obedience of the Muslim President as a constitutional convention
What does the Muslim President mean as a constitutional convention? According to Dicey, Mills, and Marshall, a constitutional convention is not law but positive morality (Dicey, 1979;Marshall, 1987;Mill, 2010). So, the Muslim President as a constitutional convention, in our opinion, is not law but obligatory morals because Pancasila allows the religion, particularly Islam, to influence the public. Whether it is a matter of religious beliefs, ethics, or proportionality, Indonesia's leaders must come from the majority. This is primarily due to the Jakarta Charter's inclusion in the 1945 Constitution and the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959. Although there appears to be a symptom of forgetting the Presidential Decree's consideration, historical and legal facts show that it was never revoked. As a result, certain Islamic groups reveal their religion's substantive values, including preferences in choosing the President. According to Nadirsyah, Islamic Sharia could be widely applied in Indonesia (Hosen, 2005). This implies that, as a constitutional convention, the Muslim President implements Syariah substance without formalization in state law.
This article clarifies the meaning of constitutional conventions because there have been many discussions of Muslim presidents as a convention issue without understanding the meaning of the constitutional convention. The reason for this is a misunderstanding between constitutional lawbased conventions and other meanings (Black, 1979). Syarif, for example, stated that it is not true that all Indonesians accept the convention that the President be a Muslim (Syarif, 2006). Syarif's viewpoint is incorrect because the term convention refers to selecting a leader who is acceptable to all elements (Syarif, 2006).
However, the other question is whether the Muslim President, as a constitutional convention, does not violate the 1945 Constitution's law of equality. This question, according to Wilson, is incorrect because the relationship between law and convention is symbiotic rather than adversarial (Wilson, 1992). Furthermore, Whittington asserted that a convention fills the legal void left by written constitutions (Whittington, 2013). Because the requirements to become a Muslim President were debated in the 1945 Constitution, the Muslim President as a constitutional convention fills the void of aspirations through political morals without a formal formulation in the constitution. This is consistent with Wheare's viewpoint; the convention supplements the constitution and the law (Wheare, 1951). As a result, the Muslim presidential convention attempts to finalize the constitution without using formal channels.
What about making the Muslim President's binding and obedience a constitutional convention? The first question is, whom is this convention binding on? Public officials and political actors are bound by a constitutional convention, not the general public (Phillips, 1978). As a result, as a convention, the Muslim President binds only state officials, particularly politicians. This convention is not legally binding but is based on the authorities' acceptance. Does this imply that the Muslim President can be violated as a constitutional convention? Regrettably, there is no definitive answer regarding violations of this convention. "Many rules of conduct supported by public opinion are violated every day," according to Dicey (Dicey, 1979). This means that when the law is not guaranteed not to be violated, there are no guarantees that the constitutional convention will not be violated.
So, why is obedience to the Muslim president a constitutional convention? By considering that Indonesia is not an Islamic and secular state but guarantees religion has a significant influence on public lives, and the majority of the population is Muslim, we believe that obedience to the Muslim President as a constitutional convention aligns with three of Carrol's five reasons (Carrol, 2017). First, violating the Muslim President as a constitutional convention is moral opprobrium because the Jakarta Charter animates the 1945 Constitution based on a Presidential Decree issued on 5 July 1959. Until today, this Presidential Decree has never been revoked. As a result, the Jakarta Charter must be regarded as part of the 1945 Constitution's ideology. According to Vetzo, a convention violation is unconstitutional because "convention is a normative expression of fundamental constitutional values" (Vetzo, 2018). The interpretation that the Jakarta Charter has no effect because it is mentioned in the considerations but not in the decision in the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 was, in our opinion, incorrect. However, in our opinion, religion, including Islam, influences public spaces due to the brotherly relationship between religion and state based on Pancasila, the belief in the one and only God. This is an ideological principle and a national creed that must be upheld. According to Liav Orgad, the Preamble to the Constitution contains a state's national creed and philosophy, which can be used for legal interpretation and substantive law implementation (Orgad, 2010).
Second, there are political difficulties. With Muslims constituting the majority of Indonesia's population, a non-Muslim President may face political rejection due to religious factors, resulting in difficulties in running the government. This is consistent with Wade's belief that the motivation for convention observance is "the desire to keep the intricate machinery of the ship of state in working order, the anxiety to retain the public's confidence, and with it office and power" (Wade, 1979). In Indonesia, religion can influence public life even though the country is neither Islamic nor secular. However, implementing Islam's state duties, such as the Waqf and Sharia Banking Law, is difficult for a non-Muslim president. President Joko Widodo, for example, encountered rejection as a Muslim while launching the National Movement for Cash Waqf and Sharia Economic Brands (Mirsan, 2021;Skretariat Kabinet Ri, 2021). Therefore, it is inconceivable that a non-Muslim President would face resistance and political difficulties when implementing laws governing Islam in Indonesia.
Third, there is self-interest. This argument demonstrates that, with Muslims constituting the majority of Indonesia's population, non-Muslims are unlikely to be elected in general elections. As a result, individuals aspiring to run for President or political parties that constitutionally nominate a Presidential Candidate should consider the Muslim population's majority vote. Furthermore, political parties or coalitions can nominate pairs of presidential and vice-president candidates under Article 6A paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution. As a result, it is difficult for a political party to present a presidential candidate who has a chance of losing. Although not identical, this agrees with Wade and Phillips' belief that the ultimate sanction is fear of losing office or reputation (Wade, 1979). Furthermore, as a constitutional convention, losing one's position or reputation and not being elected is the primary reason for obedience to the Muslim President. As a result, presidential candidates and political parties carefully calculate their chances of winning the general election based on the majority of votes cast.
According to Manan, the essential factors of conformity to the convention are the actors' ethical attitude and the public's ability to act and defend interests (Manan, 2006). As a result, as a constitutional convention, obedience to the Muslim President is dependent on state officials, particularly politicians, and the public's ethical attitudes. Do you still want the President of Indonesia to be Muslim, either because of the Jakarta Charter, which animates the 1945 Constitution, or because of the brotherly relationship between religion (Islam) and state, or for other reasons.

What impact does a Muslim President have as a constitutional convention on non-Muslim rights and the constitutional design for a pluralistic Indonesian society?
It has previously been argued that the Muslim President has the meaning of positive morality and constitutional ethics as a constitutional convention. In the true sense, this convention is not a law. Because the 1945 Constitution guarantees all citizens equal rights, Muslims and non-Muslims are eligible to become President of Indonesia. As a result, the phenomenon of non-Muslim Indonesians demanding the principle of equality to fill the position of President is a natural occurrence. In a 2016 speech titled Building a Pancasila House, for example, Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok) stated that minorities could become President in this country because the 1945 Constitution guarantees equal rights (Atriana, 2016). Prior to Ahok, during the 1988 New Order era, Catholic General Military Benny Moerdani aspired to become President of Indonesia (Zein, 2004). Hutasoit, the General Chair of the Prosperous Peace Party (PDS), volunteered to run as Indonesia's presidential candidate following the Reformation in 2004 (Syarif, 2006). Although not an official candidate for the 2004 elections, this fact demonstrates the desire of non-Muslims to run for president to demand citizens' equality. This demand is natural in the context of Indonesia, which is neither an Islamic nor a secular state because the country adheres to democracy. It calls for equality and understanding of a formal constitution that does not govern the President's religious beliefs.
Furthermore, the demands of the 1998 reform in Indonesia prompted the passage of Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights, which served as the model for the 1945 Constitutional Amendment. As a result, the principle of recognition, respect, and fulfilment of human rights in the 1945 Constitution is strengthened, particularly regarding the right to equality. As a result, there will almost certainly be objections to the Muslim President as a constitutional convention because it is considered discrimination. As a result, it bears repeating that discrimination occurs when it is prohibited by both the constitution and the law. This convention is extra-legal in the sense of positive morality and constitutional ethics. As a result, this convention is not intended to discriminate but rather to interpret the morality of the constitution and the context of Indonesia's plural society with a Muslim majority. This is consistent with the views of constitutional law experts, who believe that understanding a country's constitutional system should always include non-legal dimensions. Furthermore, there is an element of limitation in exercising human rights in Article 28J paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution, namely based on "laws with the sole purpose of guaranteeing recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and to fulfil just demands following moral considerations, religious values, security, and public order in a democratic society." The limitation clause is nearly identical to the SIRACUSA Principles but differs in one important aspect: religious values. The perpetrators of the 1945 Constitution amendment, Badjeber, stated that the "religious values" clause is the identity and character of Indonesian human rights, which are not liberal but based on divinity (Interview With Zain Badjeber, personal communication, 12 February 2022). Thus, when reading the human rights articles in the 1945 Constitution and the Human Rights Law, one must always consider religiosity as one of the fundamental limitations.
Aside from that, we contend that the Muslim President as a constitutional convention is an informal accommodation of power-sharing in the Indonesian constitutional design. On the one hand, the Indonesian constitution's text does not require the President to be a Muslim, making it integrative. On the other hand, it must formally accept Indonesia's political-religious demography, which is predominantly Muslim. We define an integrative constitution as a way for all citizens, regardless of religion, to have the 1945 Constitution as a shared constitution. As a result, because all citizens are equal before the law and the government, no citizen's constitutional rights are violated. Meanwhile, a Muslim President as a constitutional convention is an informational accommodation that allows Indonesia's Muslim majority to exercise their constitutional rights in selecting leaders. As previously stated, in Islam, disliking non-Muslim leaders is not only unwelcome but also forbidden (haram). Although different interpretations of religious teachings exist, religious teachings can be implemented with a Muslim President as a constitutional convention. In the context of Indonesia, it is worth considering why laws such as the Halal Product Guarantee Law, Sharia Banking Law, Hajj and Umrah Law, Pesantren Law, Zakat Law, Religious Courts Law, and others have emerged to ensure that Muslims are not forced to submit to something that is haram (forbidden) in religion. This may not be an issue in other Indonesian religions.
In a broader sense, the 1945 Constitution's integrative character, with a Muslim President as an informal constitutional convention, has found its context in post-reform governance. Therefore, strengthening religious sentiments in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections and even ahead of the 2024 general elections must be considered. Tom Pepinsky's data on the results of the 2014 and 2019 general elections demonstrates the impact of identity politics based on religion in several regions (Pepinsky, 2019). Aceh, which has a Muslim majority, saw a significant drop in Joko Widodo's votes in 2019 compared to 2014. West Sumatra, which is predominantly Muslim and has a high religious observance, followed the same pattern. In Hindu-majority Bali, however, Joko Widodo's vote increased significantly in 2019 compared to 2014. Similar patterns were observed in the most populous Christian provinces, including East Nusa Tenggara, North Sulawesi, and Toraja. This suggests that religious cleavages exist in Indonesian elections.
This demonstrates that religious sentiment is growing in Indonesian elections. This is something that needs to be handled carefully. As a result, the argument presented in this article is a hypothesis worth considering. If Indonesia's President and Vice President candidates are all Muslims, religious sentiments will always emerge and even strengthen, potentially causing community division. This cannot be imagined if the President and Vice President are not Muslims. This hypothesis does not imply forbidding non-Muslims from running for President or Vice President, but rather in the context of morality and political ethics, which will consider the majority factor on the one hand and the factor of plural and potentially divided Indonesian society on the other.
As a side effect, a Muslim President as a constitutional convention does not stand alone. There are also other conventions. For example, Jussuf Kalla, who has served as Vice President twice, revealed that religious considerations are considered when forming a government cabinet (Interview With Jusuf Kalla, personal communication, 15 November 2021). Therefore, the government cabinet should reflect religious, regional, and cultural diversity in addition to meritocracy. According to us, the aspect of cabinet formation based on religious considerations is also a constitutional convention that demonstrates the application of informal accommodation-sharing power. Thus, the President and Vice President are Muslims, but the ministers cannot all be Muslims. They must include elements of other religions so that the government demonstrates the dimension of plurality to strengthen the integration dimension of society and the state motto Unity in Diversity (Bhineka Tunggal Ika).
Our argument about the 1945 Constitution's integrative character, but the need to consider informal accommodation in the religious aspect of Indonesia's President, is consistent with the perspective of democracy in plural societies practised in several other countries. Although not the same as in Lebanon, where public officials are appointed based on religious sects; Malaysia, where ethnic Malays who are Muslims are senior partners, and other ethnicities are junior partners; Singapore, with the Reserved Election Mechanism model; and Nigeria with Presidential rotation, based on Indonesia's experience and our offer of a Muslim President as a constitutional convention along with other conventions in appointing public officials based on religion. This aspect considers plurality and the possibility of a divided society.

Conclusion
Should the Muslim president become a constitutional convention, based on the discussion? The answer is yes. This is because it is based not only on the seven Muslim Presidents of Indonesia since independence but also on resolving constitutional debates about the President's religious requirements. Furthermore, it is critical to focus on the statements of the nation's founders, Soekarno, Hatta, and Soepomo; although the requirements of the Islamic religion were not included in the 1945 Constitution, the majority of Indonesia's population being Muslim meant that the President of Indonesia was automatically Muslim. Furthermore, the brotherly relationship factor between religion (Islam) and the state allows all religions, including Islamic values, to be substantially applied without formalization in the 1945 Constitution. This article demonstrates how the Muslim President emerged as a constitutional convention from constitutional practices, statements, declarations, and principles. This constitutional convention also fills a legal void, which has sparked heated debate.
We argue that the Muslim President, as a constitutional convention, contributes to understanding the Indonesian constitutional system based not only on constitutional law (the 1945 Constitution) but also on the constitution's practice, understanding, and morality. This convention is also a resolution for Indonesian society, which is plural and prone to division, requiring an accommodation approach, both formal and informal, and an integrative approach. We hope that our arguments will be helpful not only for scholars but also for Indonesian politicians. Scholars can further their research on the relationship between constitutions, conventions, and democracy in a plural and divided society by considering our argument. Meanwhile, politicians can consider our arguments in resolving the problem of increased public tension in the Presidential election due to religious factors.