Institutionalization of corrupt activities among Indonesian rural household farmers in surround marginal teak forest areas

Abstract Institutionalization of petty corruption among farmer households in the villages around the forest has focused on large and productive state forest areas managed by the State Forest Company (SFC). The activities occurred simultaneously. There is no data to reveal the activities. This research aimed to analyze how the corrupt mechanism transpired. A qualitative method was induced to detail the occasion of petty corruption at the teak stands. In-depth interviews with key informants, participatory observation, and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with local communities demonstrated that marginal teak forests in Java, or at least in Lemah Gurih, are not accidental but seem “intentional” to support illegal logging practices. SFC’s conservatism in setting wood standards oriented to the global market’s needs and not adjusting to the increasing local market demand for teak wood triggered corruption. As a result, local forest officials can trade those wood products as personal income without violating company regulations. Simultaneously, together with the illegal wood collectors (IWCs), they also manipulate the calculation of timber yields to get unilateral benefits. The corrupt behavior is continuously institutionalized over generations by patron-client relationships, and they have become an integral part of the lives of local communities. The recommendation to reduce corrupt behavior is to improve forest management practices, a review of wood harvesting administration, wood quality standards, and changes in social relations between SFC and local communities to be a more formal relationship are critical.

"intentional" to support illegal logging practices. SFC's conservatism in setting wood standards oriented to the global market's needs and not adjusting to the increasing local market demand for teak wood triggered corruption. As a result, local forest officials can trade those wood products as personal income without violating company regulations. Simultaneously, together with the illegal wood collectors (IWCs), they also manipulate the calculation of timber yields to get unilateral benefits. The corrupt behavior is continuously institutionalized over generations by patron-client relationships, and they have become an integral part of the lives of local communities. The recommendation to reduce corrupt behavior is to improve forest management practices, a review of wood harvesting administration, wood quality standards, and changes in social relations between SFC and local communities to be a more formal relationship are critical.

Introduction
"go there (to the forest) if you want pocket money, stop playing around!" 1 Corrupt practices, certainly petty corruption, then give birth to illegal logging practices by the community and the elites within a system (Robbins, 2000). However, it is the poor being accused of damaging the productive forests even when they only take a small number of forest yields, compared to the elites who take so much and destroy larger areas of the forests (Sunderlin et al., 2003;Van Khuc et al., 2018). Although the debate continues, the research confirms that population growth and poverty around the forest are the leading cause of forest degradation (Kissinger et al., 2012;Tsujino et al., 2016;Duguma et al., 2019). At a certain level, poverty is a driving factor for forest degradation, yet evidence also shows that high income increases forestland demand for agriculture, causing more significant forest damage (Fisher, 2004;Santika et al., 2019;Wunder, 2001). For Indonesia, the current livelihood activities to improve welfare and food availability become the endogenous factors for forest degradation while increasing forest accesses, values commodities, and rainfall are the exogenous factors (Medrilzam et al., 2014).
The previous research on forest corruption has focused more on changes in agrarian structures, particularly the role of forests as a source of income for poor people and whether or not forests remain relevant to economic development and urbanization (Ali & Bahadur, 2018;Moeliono et al., 2017;Peluso, 2011;Rasmussen et al., 2017;Santika et al., 2019;Setiawan & Sunarto, 2019;Sunderlin et al., 2003;Thompson, 1999). The other research focuses more on the corruption forms (Meehan & Tacconi, 2017;Palmer, 2005;Robbins, 2000;Sundstrom, 2016b) that cause forest degradation, the affect the environment (Allnutt et al., 2013;Sinha et al., 2019;Van Khuc et al., 2018), and the socio-economy of local communities and the country's economy (Z. Wang et al., 2018;S. Wang et al., 2020). Researchers have also highlighted corrupt practices in local governments that facilitate illegal activities during the implementation of various global initiative projects, including the certification of forest products (Enrici, 2019;Kissinger et al., 2012;Maryudi & Myers, 2018;Setyowati & McDermott, 2017;Sheng et al., 2016;Williams et al., 2018). Studies on forest management corrupt processes, such as bribery and levies as the cause of illegality and forest degradation, remain minimal, particularly in developing countries (Meehan & Tacconi, 2017;Palmer, 2005;Sommer, 2017;Sundstrom, 2016b).
Additionally, former research focuses on significant cases and abundant forests, illegality facilitated by petty corruption involving local communities and field officials as an inherent part of forest management policies (Bratamihardja et al., 2005). The marginal forests received less attention. Research on how forests are systematically maintained to remain marginal as a method for deriving uniliteral benefits has also not received sufficient attention. Thus, by revealing the illegal activities driven by the corrupt actors, this research will provide information on how illegal and corrupt practices happen in marginal teak forests. At the same time, although the forms and patterns of forest corruption have been explained comprehensively, many studies have examined how to eradicate those corrupt practices from the sociology perspective with still less attention. Thus, we would also explore the normalization process of corruption-through which the deviated behavior has gradually become an integral part of society, including how they build legitimacy so that corruption is considered to constitute fairness in society. The micro-sociology approach would clarify how actors-IWCs, local communities, state forest company officials, and furniture entrepreneurs-jointly anticipate formal rules to avoid legal penalties and build legitimacy (Robbins, 2000;Urinboyev & Everyday Corruption and Social Norms in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan (No. 19), 2019). In the final section, we formulated practical recommendations for cutting out this corrupt behavior to improve teak forest management and sustainability, particularly in East Java's marginal forests.

Theoretical Underpinning
The corrupt practices of field forest officials are more relative to petty corruption since they involve small resources and bribery so that the actors can do their corrupt practices freely through illegal activities (Rose-Ackerman, 1999;Callister, 1999;Rowley, 2008). The illegality concept illustrates forest management not following the national standard and current regulations, starting from licensing, logging, transporting, auctioning, and so on (Sundstrom, 2016b;Kleinschmit et al., 2016). By definition, illegality is the result of corrupt activities of forest managers, which may happen by allocating forest land, during the process of forest operations, and during law enforcement activities which all open up opportunities to break the law and to gain personal benefit unilaterally (Callister, 1999;Tacconi et al., 2003;Kleinschmit et al., 2016). Illegal activities occur on a largescale, such as illegal logging, and small scale, through bribery, also known as rotten institutions (Robbins, 2000). Corrupt behavior such as bribery or letting forest degradation happen at a certain level frequently have local cultural legitimacy (Palmer, 2005;Robbins, 2000;Williams et al., 2018), which such practices have already become a daily habit and include clientelism (Sundstrom, 2016b).
In the present study, the illegal activities of illegal wood collectors (IWCs) represented their corrupt practices by bribing forest officials to get logs out of the standard mechanisms. We emphasized this fact since not all illegal activities are corruption, primarily related to the management of customary forests and other traditional accesses that sometimes are categorized as illegal by state law. Tacconi and Williams (2020) confirm that small illegal activities in forest management happen in many developing countries, including Indonesia, and are facilitated by forest officials" corrupt practices. The girdling or ring-barking to kill trees, so the trees are becoming legal to be cut down (Søreide, 2007), has the same pattern as destructing logs, so they do not fulfill the auction quality standard. Within this context, we use the corruption concept that facilitates illegal activities to analyze how actors work together at the operational level to commit illegal activities (Palmer, 2005;Robbins, 2000;Sundstrom, 2016a). Because it involves local communities and become an inseparable part of their livelihoods, there will be a process of social institutionalization involving traditional leadership, which Gore et al. (2013) call the development of "alternative norms" or rotten institution (Robbins, 2000). According to this definition, such corrupt practices will no longer be seen as deviant or commonplace, although, according to positive law, it cheats the prevailing regulations. Within this context, we translate corruption as activities that "outsmart" the law to gain unilateral benefits that illegal activities become normal.
Meanwhile, the principle of unilateral profit-taking must be accompanied by the ability to build practical legitimacy so that the community accepts the activity no matter how distorted it is (Sadigov, 2017;Urinboyev & Everyday Corruption and Social Norms in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan (No. 19), 2019). As we know, the normalization process of corrupt activities, particularly petty corruption, has become an acceptable activity by local communities or even a way of illegally accessing forest resources. From this perspective, corruption, usually discussed under a political ecology approach, is discussed from a sociological perspective. As such, we focused on the social process of how the corruption grows to become a generally accepted behavior by society. We used this sociological perspective to complement the ongoing research on illegality, which focused on structural studies, such as motives, patterns, sanctions, and punishments, with a behavioral approach, especially political ecology. The "normalization" theory was chosen because it is one of the concepts in the latest criminal sociology, so it is expected to explain how deviant behavior is done, becomes part of people's lives, and is seen as normal (Prabowo & Cooper, 2016).
Two processes can explain the normalization of corrupt activities, especially petty corruption, as a natural phenomenon in the community's social life: avoidance of stigma and normalization (Schoeneborn & Homberg, 2018). The former refers to the actor's was attempted to avoid the stigma of their illegal activity by obscuring the concept of "tip" with "bribery." The latter means building on the continuous legitimacy that there is a strong reason for their activity. Avoiding stigma is done by making particular rationalizations, such as norms that corrupt practices are done under specific considerations, for example, poverty. The actors may also use a comparison to defend their corrupt practices-that their activities are small and do not cause much loss compared to the ones by the elites, so the activities cannot be seen as destructive (Abood et al., 2015). Normalization refers to the process by which everyone recognizes corrupt activities as a typical form of tolerance for non-perpetrators, called "open secret." The discussion will include the normalization process of how actors developed social legitimacy and normalized their corrupt activities as part of community social institutions (Prabowo & Cooper, 2016;Fleming et al., 2020). Petty corruption will obtain legitimacy more quickly or be "internalized" and "normalized" more rapidly into normal activities or more quickly accepted, especially in the global south (Lindner, 2014;Sadigov, 2019;Suhardiman and Mollinga, 2017).
Two processes can explain the normalization of corrupt activities, especially petty corruption, as a natural phenomenon in the community's social life: avoidance of stigma and normalization (Schoeneborn & Homberg, 2018). The former refers to the actor's was attempted to avoid the stigma of their illegal activity by obscuring the concept of "tip" with "bribery." The latter means building on the continuous legitimacy that there is a strong reason for their activity. Avoiding stigma is done by making particular rationalizations, such as norms that corrupt practices are done under specific considerations, for example, poverty. The actors may also use a comparison to defend their corrupt practices-that their activities are small and do not cause much loss compared to the ones by the elites, so the activities cannot be seen as destructive. Normalization refers to the process by which everyone recognizes corrupt activities as a typical form of tolerance for non-perpetrators, called "open secret." The discussion will include the normalization process of how actors developed social legitimacy and normalized their corrupt activities as part of community social institutions (Prabowo & Cooper, 2016;Fleming et al., 2020). Petty corruption will obtain legitimacy more quickly or be "internalized" and "normalized" more rapidly into normal activities or more quickly accepted, especially in the global south (Eckel and Eckel, 2012;Lindner, 2014;Sadigov, 2019;Suhardiman and Mollinga, 2017).
Normalization consists of three pillars: institutionalization, rationalization, and socialization. Institutionalization refers to habit-forming. Then rationalization refers to efforts to defend the (wrong) actions. Next, socialization refers to actions to spread the deviated behavior to the public or between generations so it is accepted as normal behavior. Since they are not aspects but pillars, the three processes must happen simultaneously. In other words, if one or two pillars do not take place, then the normalization process of corruption will not occur. Illegal activities in the form of corruption in the study site have the same characteristic, in which the stolen logs were not in such a significant volume. Yet, it happens quite often on low-quality logs or small logs. Our study was conducted on the marginal teak forest by analyzing the small yet intense illegal activities agreed upon by the local community (Maryudi and Krott 2012;Sahide et al., 2016). However, they know that those activities violate the law. Based on the definition above, the present study focused on illegal activities involving bribery done by ICWs to forest officials-practices that had been going on for a long time and have become an integral part of the communities around the forests. We will also discuss how corrupt practices are normalized and become a regular activity by local communities and state forest managers.
This approach is expected to provide a new explanation of how values and norms are built in such a way in the community to normalize illegal actions that violate the prevailing norms and laws. By analyzing several illegal activities in the marginal forest, we hope to add new knowledge that illegal activities also occur in marginal forests-where previously illegalities and corruption are mostly exposed in rich forests. In addition, this research also complements the previous analysis of petty corruption, which emphasizes individual motivation and behavioristic actions, such as responding to sanctions, and political ecology, which focuses on the power structure of corruption. We expected that this sociological approach could answer why something that violates formal regulations is still being done, not only from a "sanction" or "punishment" point of view but also from the complexity of social norm formation of these violations. Therefore, the concept of normalization or the process of introducing a norm is repeated. It was accepted as an integral part of society-the community considers corrupt behavior normal.

Materials and Method
Lemah Gurih village is located in Lembu Peteng District, East Java Province. Lemah Gurih is approximately 10 km from the nearest village and 25 km from its downtown area. Lemah Gurih village is situated in the middle of the state's forests, where 60% of the population relies on the forests for their livelihood. The limited legal access to the forests provides insight into how illegality facilitated by corruption affects the villagers' daily life. It is one of the villages that has grown and developed amidst forests controlled by the SFC since the colonial era. Lembu Peteng is a famous teak-producing region in Java because, geographically, its forest is an ecological unit containing the primary teak-producing forests in Java, namely Blora and Bojonegoro. Illegality is a sensitive issue, and researching the topic is tricky. We used a participatory observation approach to obtain accurate data (Routlet, 2017;Shah, 2017). We did not collect much data in the first three months -we merely strengthened our social relations with the community by participating in various social activities. We conducted interviews for sensitive issues individually at informants' homes after they completely trusted us not to report to the authorities about their activities. We used pseudonyms, including changing the names of villages and districts to respect and protect informants. This approach is vital for obtaining sensitive information without standard data collection, so participatory observation is needed (Pfadenhauer & Grenz, 2015).
Based on that situation, purposive sampling was chosen in Lemah Gurih village. The research was conducted over 12 months and divided into three stages: July to October 2018, January to March 2019, and July to October 2019. The informants selected were four key informants (FSO-4), 62 participatory observation (SFC-F, SFC-O, D-SFC, FR, Pol, CT, SFE, and BFE), and 50 local communities (IWCs). The total of Informants was 114.
The detailed list of interviewer numbers (114) and their role in forest governance are described in Table 1.
The data was collected by short visits for unstructured observations and interviews within these intervals, especially to cross-check our data. Through in-depth interviews with key informants, including forest rangers and local communities, we deepened our knowledge of how legitimacy was built technically and socially and how these views were disseminated. Meanwhile, the snowball technique was used to trace the flow of teak wood to ascertain who the actors were, their interests, and how they built cooperation (Sadigov, 2019). Content analysis was conducted to illustrate the institutionalization of corruption, and that corruption is considered fair (Bengtsson, 2016). The descript analysis involved village community opinions, key informants, and legal reviews, including reviewing wood quality standards and auction mechanisms, interviews with the forestry service, and SFC officials, from field to provincial officials.
Triangulation was done to ensure information validity and avoid bias before proceeding to the next stage. Then, we organized a focus group discussion (FGD) to attain and confirm the same perceptions (Alejandro & Rodr, 2008) on the amount of bribe to be paid, the actors involved, the views they held, and their perceptions. Depending on the theme, the FGD involved nine to ten people from forest farmers, local communities, young people, and community leaders. There were three stages of FGD to focus our discussion: (1) how to access forest resources, discussing their perceptions of what is legal and illegal, including historical aspects of their relationship with local forest officials, (2) how to explore the prices of various types of teak and who are the actors involved in trafficking, and (3) how to explore the normative views of local communities on these corrupt practices. The FGD revealed how the actors established justification or legitimacy to allow "internalization" and "normalization" occur gradually and be accepted as fair by the community. Meanwhile, to ascertain whether corruption in the forest was genuinely institutionalized and normalized, we explored police officers' views on these corrupt cases, including which category of corruption would be investigated if there were public reports.

Result and Discussion
Since the 1990s, the teak wood processing industry, particularly furniture, has been mushrooming, marked by the emergence of hundreds of small and medium furniture entrepreneurs as the primary buyers of illegal wood from teak forests around the area. Lembu Peteng district plays a significant role as the leading supplier of furniture to Surabaya and Malang, two major cities in East Java. Cheap labor and proximity to big cities make the furniture industry relatively competitive compared to other regions. Figure 1 shows the growth of the Lembu Peteng District Furniture Industry from 2015 to 2019.
There were three critical points. First, we discussed how the marginal forest is maintained as it is so that the logs from this forest will not go to auctions for corrupt officials and the local community to take advantage of the logs. Second, we discussed the forms of illegal activities involving many teak forest management actors to gain unilateral advantages. Third, we discussed how deviated behavior is normalized and acceptable in the community and how the actors rationalize those corrupt activities so those illegal activities become an integral part of community life.

Forest Marginalization: Accidental or Intentional?
We did not definitively state that SFC intentionally or unintentionally caused marginal woods. Instead, we here illustrated how the marginal forest had provided many actors wider opportunities to gain a unilateral benefit, especially bribery in small amounts yet quite often. It is logical to ask why SFC, as big companies left thousands of hectares of their forest, remained marginal for a long time while other parts of their forests are so productive. Logically, the marginal forest condition produced low-quality logs that did not meet auction standards. The logs were considered waste, even though they were highly valued in the local market. It becomes an opportunity for corruption to occur where the officials deliberately downgrade the log quality of their logs so they can be taken illegally by paying a certain amount of money to the managers. People might think the situation-marginal forests-was normal due to unfavorable ecological conditions and poverty. Lembu Peteng District is geographically located in a wind channel, making it windier than most neighboring regions. Strong winds render good quality teak trees (straight, large, and tall) prone to collapse, and only teak wood with small and short diameters can survive. Thus, good quality teak is very vulnerable to collapse, and therefore planting local (low-quality) seedlings is considered the safest management approach, even though it is less productive. At a glance, this is very logical. The condition of marginal teak forests is ecologically reasonable. In reality, however, it is naïve since trees planted outside the state's forestland grow very well. Good quality teak can flourish and are not prone to collapse despite strong winds.
Besides being located in a wind channel, the forestland is considered arid, so it is challenging to grow good-quality teak, and only local varieties can survive. However, although the forest area may look poor in nutrients and is dominated by bushes, the forest area is very fertile, technically integrated, and belongs to productive agricultural land. The annual burning of forests was another reason forest lands in the area were critical. The condition of such land may continue to be maintained as a basis for justifying the non-productive forest. In the meantime, SFC does not apply any fertilizer, even during the first planting. Weeds thrive well in Sumber Gurih forests, which signifies the arid area. However, weeds grow because the forest areas are left open and are planted only with small teak. The canopy is also not too shady, so the lands are exposed to the sun for a long time. This intention is almost the same as the behavior of companies that do girdle or ring barking to kill trees so that they become legal for harvesting (Søreide, 2007).
Apart from the two natural conditions above, acute poverty is used to legitimate forest marginalization. The reason is that giving the poor almost complete access to use the area and extract forest products is legal and the obligation of the authorized parties. However, if we examine the twists and turns behind this community access, there is a substantial collusive relationship involving the poor. The situation provides poor people access to illegal logs and involves them as partners in corruption by using them as illegal teak wood collectors (IWCs). The poor communities around the forest become social forestry partners (Peluso, 1992b;Afroz et al., 2016;Rakatama and Pandit, 2020), but they are also positioned as the black sheep why the forest is marginalized. They are accused of disobeying the agreement because they destroy teak to slow the canopy's growth to use the land under the stands for food crops requiring lots of sunlight. Under the agreement, farmers may use the land under the stands for two to three years before the canopy covers the entire land. Farmers may cultivate the land for five or even ten years, especially in fertile lands with adequate infrastructure to transport their crops. SFC officials allow this condition for two main reasons: (1) to make it easier to find cheap labor and (2) to get an annual budget.
During in depth-interviews with SFC officials, it can be revealed that wood fell under the auspices of local officials with compensation to provide various services to both internal company and higher-level SFC officials visiting or conducting official activities in the forest area. Initially, it was used as additional income for local SFC officials because their wage was relatively low, although the company was rich. Thus, for internal companies, such corrupt practices are a regular or public secret known by local and higher-level officials. Corruption has become an integral part of social interaction where understanding that corruption is an activity violating the norm has been lost. Clearing fallen trees on roads, fire extinguishing, and theft patrols often require fast cash, while the disbursement of company operational funds is relatively tight and slow. It is common for field officials to get paid for their job three months later. Even the company's routine activities, such as planting and plant care, are funded using loans to pay workers based on local customs. The situation has forced the officials to manage the available resources-at least they have some money to fund operational activities at the beginning of each fiscal year while waiting for the company's money. As such, corrupt practices seem to gain moral and technical legitimacy by the company. Therefore, individual motives and a work environment that supports such practices to thrive drive the institutionalization of corruption. SFC field officials also find it difficult to get reimbursement for some expenses they pay-they must be financially independent. Usually, such expenses are borne entirely by field staff, so they have to look for other income sources-and the easiest is corruption. The field level of SFC officials often has to provide direct social services such as cash donations for community activities, such as holiday celebrations, village governments, police, and various parties, to ensure its smooth operation. These funds cannot all be claimed as company expenses, especially if the amount and intensity are big enough to be borne by field officials. The unexpected operational costs borne by the field officials make the higher-level officials lose their authority when dealing with the corrupt practices of the field officials. Besides, the field officials have good community sociology skills because they contact the community daily. From the explanation above, marginal forests existing amid fertile forests have opened up many petty corruption opportunities. Thus, the marginal situation seems to be "maintained" because it involves many parties systemically. Nevertheless, to conclude straightforwardly that this condition is "intentional" seemed to be too speculative-yet, findings tend to direct our conclusions that way.
SFC has different marketing schemes for different quality classes based on the lengths and diameters regulated in the national standard of SNI Number 7535:1:2010. Larger and smaller logs do not go to auctions; they are sold directly at the prices SFC officials determined. The lowest standard to meet the SFC criteria for auctions is specified at 1.8 to 2 meters. However, this does not fit with what is required by local furniture industries producing chairs, tables, and other household appliances that only require a shorter length of 50 to 100 cm. Using SFC timber with the company specification would be costly for the local industries. In order to get SFC timber at lower prices, IWCs bribe the officials to damage the teak without facing criminal charges. Locally referred to as "uang rokok" or "cigarette money," the forest officials usually receive bribes of IDR 20,000-30,000 (approximately 1.5-2 USD) per log. For a bundle fitting for motorbike transport, they obtain a sum of IDR 100-150,000.

Manipulating Wood Quality Standards
SFC has different marketing schemes for different quality classes based on the lengths and diameters regulated in the national standard of SNI Number 7535:1:2010. Larger and smaller logs do not go to auctions; they are sold directly at the prices SFC officials determined. The lowest standard to meet the SFC criteria for auctions is specified at 1.8 to 2 meters. However, it does not fit with what is required by local furniture industries producing chairs, tables, and other household appliances that only require a shorter length of 50 to 100 cm. Using SFC timber with the company specification would be costly for the local industries. In order to get SFC timber at lower prices, IWCs bribe the officials to damage the teak without facing criminal charges. Locally referred to as "uang rokok" or "cigarette money," the forest officials usually receive bribes of IDR 20,000-30,000 (approximately 1.5-2 USD) per log. For a bundle fitting for motorbike transport, they obtain a sum of IDR 100-150,000.
Besides furniture, illegal logs are also used for wood flooring materials that do not require long timbers, so small and big furniture businessmen prefer buying from IWCs rather than obtaining from SFC auctions. Tiny-sized old teak wood is also an excellent raw material for carving doors, frames, and high artistic value crafts. Corruption is triggered by high wood standards, while the local market also needs high quality and low-quality wood. The situation opens up corruption opportunities because timbers from marginal forests are classified as low-quality logs not feasible for auctions. As such, SFC officials can sell the logs themselves, and the money goes into their pockets. According to Ali and Bahadur (2018), this strategy obscures the value of violations by these actors because there is a very slight difference between "uang rokok" and bribery. The example of side products below the SFC quality standards sold as firewood is presented in Figure 2.
There are two mechanisms by which ICWs obtain timber. First, they buy the available "low quality" timber regardless of whether they have orders. In this case, they have to keep the timber in their storage. Secondly, IWCs buy timber from SFC officials when they receive orders from artisans. They ask SFC officials to enter the forest to find the required wood. Usually, before cutting, ICWs inform officials of their activities-they give details on the number of trees cut, where they cut the trees and the number of motorcycles or personnel involved. Sometimes, SFC officials tell IWCs the patrol area and when patrols will take place so that the ICWs can avoid them.
When demand is high, they need help to fulfill the orders, and ICWs invite friends to help by transporting the timber using motorbikes. The use of motorbikes is crucial as it camouflages illegal activities. Transporting timber using trucks can be easily detected; they are considered as considered illegal loggers or criminals. However, the reality is that the many motorbikes going back and forth multiple times also can damage the forest. Using traditional tools is an alibi to show that the timber taken is only for household needs, such as firewood. Their skills are excellent, so cutting trees with machetes can be as precise as using a saw. Additionally, IWCs said that SFC officials did not limit the time and amount of wood as long as it comprised fallen wood or old and dead wood with a diameter of no more than 20 cm and a length of no more than 90 cm. Teak is sold for furniture and cut to pieces to give the impression that it will be used as firewood.
IWCs can easily take the logs illegally because they help the company in teak management, such as planting, logging, repairing damaged roads during the rainy season, or cutting falling trees blocking the roads. SFC officials may ask residents to plant trees for free or with low wages as compensation from IWCs. The involvement of IWCs in repairing forest roads for free is also a form of compensation because they are allowed to access the forest at any time. The officials argued that the IWCs, actually also community members, were involved in improving road access because they also used the roads for transportation, even though these roads were often purely forest roads, not community roads. Another compensation provided by IWCs for being allowed to access the forest illegally is becoming loggers with low wages. IWCs, as a member of the community, also become members of forest farmers' groups. It is why they are also the SFC partners in forest social management, so they have a close relationship with SFC officials.

Manipulating Wood Taxation
Another corrupt practice by FSC officials is manipulating wood quantities -they report fewer logs going to the auctions. The rest is sold in the local market, so the proceeds do not need to be sent to the company because it is considered waste wood. This practice involves at least one logging official, IWC, local SFC official, district-level SFC official, and small and big furniture businessman. The calculated logs are sent to the auction office to be analyzed by the officials. Then, an order to cut the logs is sent to the field officials. As requested by the field officials, the transportation officials leave the logs to be taken by IWCs when the target is fulfilled. IWCs are being used as camouflage, a strategy to disguise logging as merely firewood collecting so that the officials can escape criminal charges. The reality shows that these officials sell the logs to IWCs or furniture businessmen. Besides getting money from selling the logs, IWCs are given easier access to other forest areas and prioritized in farming area distribution and land tenure extension. Land tenure formally lasts three years but can be extended to five years if the tree canopy has not met the standard and the cultivated plants under the stands can still grow well. IWCs also find it easy to access forest yields, legally and illegally, with the help of SFC officials. Teak without marks (a length of 200 cm and a diameter of 20 cm sold to local markets) are shown in Figure 3.
The unrecorded logs have a diameter of 10 to 20 cm and a length between 2 to 3 meters, so they are relatively unnoticeable. We saw logs of 10 to 20 cm in diameter at the businessman workshop's furniture. However, the logs differed from those taken from the community forest, signed by the uniformity of age and diameter. Teak from community forests is rarely uniform in size since farmers rarely sell large quantities of teak simultaneously. The furniture businessman buys the wood from the forest officials to reduce production costs to sell the products within affordable price ranges. They must do this because they must compete with big companies selling furniture products from wood and iron. A Teak 320 cm long and 10 cm diameter that passes the SFC standard is shown in Figure 4.
Besides being sold to other regions with the help of ICWs as the local people, record manipulation is also done to fulfill on-site direct purchases without going through the auction process. IWCs must bribe the field officials-they have to pay double: for the wood price and bribery. SFC and ICWs confirmed that the activity was allowed if the wood was for personal use and was not sold to other regions. The facts showed that the wood is kept to be sold in the following year or as furniture. This type of wood is not recorded, and the money from selling the wood is not paid to the company. The wood price is relatively lower. They could buy the best quality teak at a price below the market price in small quantities, a maximum of 5 to 10 trees from one felling location. IWCs even can take the smaller logs as bonuses. Buyers must be ready with cash after receiving the invoice before fellingusually, they are informed two to three weeks in advance. Since the best quality teak is costly and can only be sold after it is changed into furniture, only the rich can afford it. It means only  entrepreneurs buy such teak, and only three to four people in Sumber Gurih can do so. The law enforcement efforts by the government within the last five years are depicted in Table 2.

Institutionalization of Illegal Practices
The first pillar of normalization of corrupt practices is institutionalization, through which the new and old actors start by introducing the activities, making the activities part of forest management, and making the activities a routine. IWCs introduce the activities by taking other people, including children, in felling, cutting, or transporting logs so they understand the forest management system. Through the process, IWCs inculcate values that what they do is normal and acceptable. Every new resident is introduced to the value, including new SFC officials who learn from their seniors. It took only five to six months to convince new officials, especially those from other districts, that what they did was acceptable. If SFC had a new leader, they would reduce their frequency of taking wood from the forest until they were sure that the new leader could accept what they did.
The next pillar is rationalization. Rationalization refers to efforts to defend the (wrong) actionsat least, making the other parties see the actions as acceptable or not so harmful. One of the crucial reasons is community empowerment under social forest management. It is a form of compensation to forest farmer group members whom SFC employs in forest management with low wages. Community involvement strengthens the reason for poverty alleviation, so corrupt practices can be socially accepted. The labour wage who work in forest management are not fulltime but part-time workers, so their wages are below the government's minimum standard. Compared to other sectors, such as farm labourers, the relatively low wages in forest labour sectors are expected to be compensated by the right to take forest products below the auction standard, especially firewood. In practice, however, they take firewood and other wood to sell to furniture entrepreneurs in return for a certain amount of tribute to the officials. The descriptive term to validate such corrupt activities is "manggulo jati sak kuatmu nek mung kanggo kayu

Note Fine Imprisonment
Cutting trees with a length of less than 100 cm for firewood 0 3 It is considered a minor violation and tends to be ignored. Those caught by the SFC patrol were released. given because the people were caught by a joint patrol between SFC and the police.
Taking teak stumps after felling 0 2 The officials caught them, and one person is still in jail.
Cutting the whole teak 0 2 They were caught because they used a truck to transport the logs.
Helping oficcials taking the logs hacing auction standards, but not marked during harvest. 0 0 No one wa caught since it was seen as compensation for lowpaid lumberjacks and bribery for SFC officials.
Cutting down living trees for building houses.
1 2 Perpetrators will be arrested if they keep doing the same thing after being warned three times.
bakar" or "take teak as much as you can if you only use it for firewood," as if the behavior of corruption is part of their daily life and routine. It is an elegant practice since local officials rarely communicate directly with workers, but they know each other's rights and obligations once the practice of taking wood is completed.
If institutionalization and rationalization have been done, socialization follows. Socialization refers to actions to spread the deviated behavior to the public or between generations, so it is accepted as normal behavior. Socialization is the system that guarantees values and beliefs are transferred well among the people. Socialization consists of three stages: cooptation, incrementalism, and compromise stage. In the cooptation stage, new members are crammed with continuous corrupt values by other group members with no comparative values-introduce and inculcate norms, values, and beliefs to new members of ICWs and SFC. Besides vertical communication on forest management, corrupt activities are also socialized between generations in the household of farmer group members from childhood. With the model of farmer group membership inherited from generation to generation, there is a transformation of values through this organization, allowing corrupt habits to be naturally socialized between generations. Since individuals can access the forest resources if they join farmer groups, they will inevitably be co-opted by the situation known as the "cooptation stage" (Prabowo & Cooper, 2016) that the corrupt values are passed on in such a way that all group members are accustomed to these values and the corruption becomes sustainable.
The next stage is the incrementalism stage. The crammed values attached to the forest farmer groups' daily activities become more entrenched. If cooptation deals with accepting existing values, the corruption begins to take a new form in the incrementalism stage. The community even encourages young people to enter the forest if they need money for snacks or cigarettes. They say, "kono mlebu kono nek pingin dapat uang ojo dolan ae" or "go there (forest) if you want pocket money, stop playing around." In the context of normalizing corruption, this is an effort to integrate corrupt values into daily activities so that local communities' activities in illegally accessing teak wood appear normal. If a person has been directed toward corruption, the next step of social compromise has been exceeded, with corruption repeated continuously on a broader scale. At the research location, local communities are usually involved in almost all forms of corruption, ranging from wood destruction, illegal wood harvesting, and reducing the reported number of logs. Table 3 illustrates the legitimacy and type of illegality in teak forests.

Conclusion and Recommendation
Marginal teak forests in Java, or at least in Lemah Gurih, were not accidental but seemed to be "intentional" to support illegal practices. Although we cannot conclude that the situation is intentional, findings direct us that way. Marginal forests produce low-quality logs but at high prices, leading to corrupt practices of forest managers. The transpired of corruption was start with the SFC officials abusing authority by providing opportunities for the poor, then becoming IWCs, to access forest wood for selling to furniture businessmen. Simultaneously, SFC officials take advantage of the permits they give to the community to illegally take wood products from the forest in various forms of circumvention to avoid formal legal snares. Community empowerment is the main reason for allowing people to access the forest, even though these activities are invisibly manipulated to benefit forestry officials. The reason is that field staff are often burdened with various operational costs, while both formal and informal financing is also a way of avoiding stigma so that the internal corrupt practices are tolerated by the structure above (Gorsira et al., 2018;Prabowo & Cooper, 2016). Therefore, the poor, positioned as the black sheep for forests to become marginal, are invited to become partners by forest managers to take unilateral advantages. Poor people are more vulnerable to bribery because they are highly dependent on the government's various social services (Peiffer & Rose, 2018).
Illegal practices caused by corruption vary. The most common illegal practice is damaging the logs, so they do not fulfill the auction standard. The findings supported Søreide (2007), stating that harvesters intentionally did girdle or ring-barking to harvest trees after the trees were dead. Another pattern is field forest officials record fewer logs in the harvest time so that woods will not go to auctions. The case in Sumber Gurih showed that the trees that did not fulfill the auction standard could be sold in the public market. As such, they got personal benefits from the money received after selling the logs. The finding supported Huberts et al. (2006) that corruption comprises various patterns of misuse and manipulation of information, with officials underreporting the amount of wood and claiming the remaining wood as their personal property (Huberts et al., 2006). Although this corruption is only small-scale and involves only field officials, the pattern is so pervasive and widespread that it can no longer be categorized as petty corruption but is more rooted in systematic corruption. Sundstrom (2016a) and Palmer (2005) call this situation institutionalized forest corruption, where corruption is considered normal and is seen as normal in the social system, or what Prabowo and Cooper (2016) refer to as a rationalization process to gain legitimacy or rotten institutions by Robbins (2000).
The community considered the corrupt practices of ICW as normal and acceptable. Although some villagers were caught by the police and imprisoned, and one person was still in jail when the article was written, their families did not consider it shameful. There is a growing perception that income from forests is only additional income even though it contributes a considerable amount to the household economy; thus, these activities are eventually considered normal. Even collecting wood in the forest is considered work training for young people before entering the real world of work-this activity is entirely seen as normal for the people around the forest. The perpetrators can build collective awareness that the corruption process violates the law so that it comes to be considered reasonable, or what Schoeneborn and Homberg (2018) call "avoiding stigma" by normalizing the activity. Illegal practices have become an integral part of the community, and IWCs are seen as a regular profession, just like a farmer, a teacher, or a driver. It may be because the community sees the corrupt practices as minor with low harmful impacts, as it merely meets the firewood needs. Hence, the behavior seems to attain strong legitimacy. The findings supported Palmer (2015), Sundstrom (2016b), and Sundstrom (2016a) that continuous illegal practices will gradually be accepted as normal by the community.
The phenomenon of corruption in the marginal teak forest was complex, involving actors ranging from field officials, SFC officials, local communities, stolen wood collectors, and furniture businessmen. It cannot be understood with an economic or political approach. By keeping the forest marginal, the forest products enter the informal trade system, and the income does not go directly into the company's account. The practices root in communities and involve various parties, complete with almost perfect legitimacy, ongoing socialization, intergeneration, and institutionalization. Prabowo and Cooper (2016) refer to this as the normalization of the process whereby corrupt activities become socialized in the community, gain strong legitimacy, and are institutionalized through continuous habituation to become normal activities. Simultaneously, the practice of leaving teak forests as marginal can be seen from the ecological side as stemming from the limitations of natural resources and as a condition that is "maintained" so that poor forests can be used as a source of corruption (Peluso, 1992a;Rahut, 2016;Widianingsih, 2016). Unlike abundant forests, poor forests produce a great deal of wood that falls below company standards, and the wood yield is considered waste. The wood yield is not included in the company's account but in the field officials' account. SFC's conservatism in setting wood standards oriented to the global market's needs and not adjusting to the increasing market demand for local teak wood triggered corruption. The most reasonable way to reduce corrupt behavior is to change the standard of teak woods dealing with local markets that teak woods with low quality must be recorded in the auction process. It will affect the determination of more complete wood standards based on local market needs and not just global markets. Besides, to cut the dependency cycle, the social forestry relationship would no longer be used as a relationship of interdependence but rather as a professional relationship in that forest workers are valued following the labor market and not as compensation for their access to forest resources. Thus far, this dependency relationship has become a reason for the SFC to employ workers with illegal compensation, i.e., by providing access to taking teak from the forest illegally. The next research and management recommendation to reduce corrupt behavior is how to improve forest management in wood administration practices, a review of wood harvesting administration, wood quality standards implementation, and changes in social relations between SFC and local communities to be a more formal relationship.