Theorising and illustrating plural policing models in countering armed banditry as hybrid terrorism in northwest Nigeria

Abstract Banditry constitutes about 40% of national insecurity in Nigeria. It is a composite crime manifesting in wanton killing, cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, levying of illegal tax on farming communities, sexual violence and trafficking of arms and drugs. Through qualitative and quantitative research methodology, this article attempts to theorise and illustrate policing models aimed at countering armed banditry in northwest Nigeria. Coordinates of attacks by bandits are georeferenced to show their spatial distribution and pattern. As Nigeria continues to experience the shocks of banditry, the national and subnational governments are providing counter measures to lessen the striking capability of the bandits through four distinct but complementary models of policing. The article offers direction on the policing imperatives for combatting armed banditry in Nigeria. It proposes a multilevel policing framework which encompasses the mainstream policing, hybrid policing and the joint task force models with the state police as the new layer on the existing security architecture. This is well suited to respond to the conceptual, practical and strategic dimensions of policing in Nigeria to combat armed banditry and other criminalities that envelop the country.


Introduction
some political goals. Such bandits are usually perceived as outlaws, desperate and lawless marauders who do not have a definite residence or destination but roam around the forest and mountains to avoid being identified, detected and arrested by policing actors.
Banditry is an ancient crime with varying historical antecedents across many countries. For example, banditry in Mexico was once conceived as a fall-out of the "narco culture", reminiscent of gang leader who emerges as a popular authoritarian figure, who can break and violate the law with utmost impunity. Such personality can break the law with the popular protection of those who see in him or her a hero of revolutionary emancipation (Castro, 2021). In Philippines, Southeast Asia, historical rendering draws on the same description of banditry as a complex crime. Whatever the name or attributes, the bandit might be a fugitive, a thief, a rustler, a highwayman, an assailant, an abductor, a rapist or a murderer. The bandit was difficult to classify, and colonial authorities simply used the generic term bandit to cover a multitude of people who, operating in bands, engaged in the frequent robbery and assault of travellers and the widespread pillage and plunder of rural communities (Bankoff, 1998).
According to Tiedemann (1982), banditry poses a major social problem for frontier societies. A sparsely populated land that lacks effective governance provides room for bandits to emerge and maneuver. In China's northeastern province of Heilongjiang, which borders Russia, banditry was pervasive from 1900 to 1931. According to local records, almost every country suffered raids. Despite the disruption caused, bandits did not possess sufficient cohesiveness or momentum to establish a regional power base. Rather, they tended to form relatively small bands of several dozens to a few hundred members, reaching a thousand men on rare occasions (Shan, 2006). Mburu (1999) argues that organized banditry is a symptom of regional problems. The study traces the causes, history, and implications of four families of brigands, Kafagne, Faloul, Ngoroko, and the Shifta that freely roam Horn of Africa, and shows that banditry is a symptom of wider political problems in a turbulent geopolitical environment.
Although the motive for contemporary banditry is the pauperization of people that live in a harsh physical environment, the opportunity and means emanate from existing political turmoil in the region where civil wars have made arms bearing a part of their material culture. The study locates banditry in the context of environmental determinism. In northwest Nigeria, banditry has over a century-long history, traced to a notorious incident in 1901 when bandits attacked 12,000 camel-laden caravans travelling between Hausaland and Tahoua region, stole goods worth £165,000 and killed 210 traders (Rufa"i, 2018). The resurgence of banditry in recent times started with a lone criminal gang in 2011 and grew from a single cell, mainly operating in Zamfara, to over 120 gangs across six states in 2021. There has been a progressive transformation from its rudimentary and isolated roots to a complicated transnational and rapidly spreading security threat. From Mexico to China; the Philippines to the Horn of Africa, and lastly Nigeria, the trajectory, structure and modus operandi of bandits follow the same practices throughout history, although with nuances specific to each region. Whereas, Creveld (1991) posits that bandits can attain a level of violence that is not easily stoppable by governments as state security actors visibly lose policing capabilities to keep societies safer.

Theoretical perspectives on policing
Historically, the word "policing" is etymologically related to "politics", the governance of the city or state, and was used in broad terms to signify social regulation in the widest sense. In many societies, "policing" was not associated with the particular activities of a specific state institution. For instance, the historical development of the police in Britain shows that demand for a particular organization to police the society emerged in the country during the 18 th century (Rowe, 2014). Traditionally, policing in most communities was the responsibility of all adults. In medieval society, all adult males were obliged to contribute towards the prevention and control of crime and civil disorder under the systems of "hue, cry and pursuit" and the "watch and ward" that preceded the emergence of specialized police forces as organs of the state (Alemika and Chukwuma 2003). The emergence of the state as an entity with claims to a monopoly over the means of legitimate violence in society resulted in the creation of specialized agencies, such as the police, for controlling the use of violence by other groups. Therefore, policing in the narrow definition of state construct is a legitimate law enforcement institution charged with the maintenance of order and social norms and has become a permanent feature of every human society, as long as every nation has within its ranks disruptive elements that must be controlled (Hall, 1953).
The police constitute an essential civil component of the security architecture of any nation. The primary role of the police is policing-securing compliance with existing laws and conformity with the precepts of social order. But the police are not the only agency involved in policing, in the broad sense of the term. Policing has always been necessary in all societies for the preservation of order, safety and social relations. In Nigeria, the necessity of policing becomes even more evident in modern societies characterized by the conundrum of violent and orgranised crimes, such as terrorism and banditry. The heightened incidents of this insecurity coupled with the limited capacity of the state to deal with the issues effectively have given rise to extant debates and introduction of plural policing. The idea of plural policing has assumed a central position in the criminological literature since the 90s. The pluralisation of policing is taking place both within and outside the public police system. Therefore, policing services and operations are now delivered and carried out in the public, semi-public and private domains by public and private bodies and agencies, also referred to as the new security complex (Bayley & Shearing, 1996;Boels & Verhage, 2016;Crawford, 2008Crawford, , 2013Terpstra & van Stokkom, 2015). This ideal of plural policing also implies a shift away from a state-centred policing framework. This shift and the resulting changing position of the government in relation to policing (Terpstra et al., 2013), is also found in notions related to plural policing such as co-location (Atkinson, 2018), networked governance (Crawford, 2006) and security governance (Johnston & Shearing, 2003).
The philosophy of plural policing rests on the principle of collaboration as enunciated by Sir Robert Peele when he created the first professional police force in England. The overarching assumption is that the police cannot, by itself, solve the complex problems of crime and civil disorder, and that resources from outside the system are desperately needed, as well as new ways of thinking about diverse problems. Effective collaboration requires that police and community stakeholders work together by sharing responsibilities, resources, and decision making. Therefore, collaboration is more than outreach or information-sharing alone; it requires joint actions. Figure 1 illustrates the continuum of interaction to foster collaborative policing in any given community.
Collaboration is key to problem solving, an approach that requires police and community working together, proactively, to identify underlying problems that can be addressed to reduce crime at its roots. To achieve this, the creation of multi-agency partnerships that can bring distinctive but complementary skills and resources on board and can produce coordinated and targeted responses to public safety problems becomes pivotal (Rosenbaum, 2002). It is against this background that the state authorities in Nigeria and varied networks of communities are partnering to improve policing responses to armed banditry in northwest Nigeria.

Who are the armed bandits terrorising Nigeria's northwest?
Many scholars, media commentators and state officials have profiled the Fulani ethnic group as the major actor within the banditry mix in Nigeria (Ejiofor, 2021;Oyero, 2021). For instance, Ejiofor (2021) argues that armed banditry is the consequence of constraints on social mobility from nomadic pastoralism, and that most of the bandits are Fulani, the ethnic group that spreads across West Africa and is known for being nomadic pastoralists. Katsina State Governor, affirms most bandits are of the Fulani ethnic stock, adding that they speak Fulfulde and profess the same religious beliefs as himself (Oyero, 2021). Such singular labelling portends the danger of a single story, particularly in the face of contrary evidence (Moritz and Mbacke, 2022). In framing the connectivity of banditry to the Fulani tribe, media was used to create wider publicity against the Fulani people. However, many instances have shown how specific groups and unique prototypes were developed based on particular stereotypical special identities (Saminu et al., 2022). Thus, this paper signposts a critical departure from that narrow classification and argues that banditry is a composite crime with labyrinth of actors such as pastoralists, ethnic and religious militias, as well as unregulated vigilantes and other criminal gangs perpetrating violent crimes in Nigeria's northwest. The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) is Nigeria foremost executive organ with the mandates to ensure the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy and build capacity for the effective discharge of the functions of relevant security, intelligence, law enforcement and military services. ONSA in its national security strategy notes a correlation between armed banditry, militia groups, kidnapping and cattle rustling, in what appears to be a convergence of various illegal networks (National Security Strategy, 2019). The official description of banditry by ONSA broadens the perspectives and situates the crime in the broader context of insecurity which transcends the popular ethnic profiling of a particular tribe.
Although the identities of bandits remain largely contentious, the elevation of attacks and the atrocities they commit have created a pattern. The bandits are a heterogeneous collection of militants. While estimates are tenuous at best, there are probably at least 100 bandit groups operating in Nigeria's northwest constituting about 30,000 members (Centre for Democracy and Development). Their primary base of operations are the vast forest reserves-providing safe hideouts. Bandits maintain quasi structures, and a degree of cohesiveness with a discernible command structure like most militias (Goodluck Jonathan Foundation, 2021). They engage in illegal activity, are adaptable, and wield sophisticated weapons. According to Zamfara state governor, the bandits were more equipped than the entire security forces deployed to combat their activities, and had stockpiled as many as 500 AK-47 rifles in only one armoury in the state (Ogunmade, 2019). They are highly mobile, traversing the length and breadth of forests in Zamfara, Niger, Kaduna, Katsina, and the neighbouring Niger Republic. Considering the spate of attacks by bandits, outreach, sophistication, trajectory and associated toll on the citizens; the Nigerian Government designated bandits as terrorists on 29 November 2021 with the following official proclamation. Source: Smart Policing Initiative (2017) A notice is hereby given that [by] the order of the federal high court Abuja, . . . as per the scheduled to this notice, the activities of Yan Bindiga group, Yan Ta'adda group and other similar groups in Nigeria are declared to be terrorism and illegal in any part of Nigeria, especially in the northwest and northcentral regions of Nigeria and are proscribed, pursuant to section 1 and 2 of Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011. Consequently, the general public is hereby warned that any person or group of persons participating in any manner whatsoever in any form of activities involving or concerning the prosecution of the collective intention or otherwise of the groups referred to in paragraph 1 of this notice will be violating the provision of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act 2011 and liable to prosecution (Ochojila, 2022).
The above declaration is well situated in the extant legislation that criminalises terrorism in Nigeria. The country's Terrorism prevention Act (as amended) defines terrorism as an act which is deliberately done with malice aforethought and which may seriously harm or damage a country or an international organization. A terrorist act is committed when done with the requisite intent; it seriously destabilizes or destroys the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structure of a country or international organization by intimidation or coercion. It also amounts to a terrorist act where it involves or causes an attack upon a person's life that possibly results in serious bodily harm or death. Intimidating or coercing a government or international organization is a terrorist act, where it involves or causes the kidnapping of a person, or destruction of a government public facility, or private property amongst others (Ejeh et al., 2019).

Drivers of banditry
The northwest is highly susceptible to violent attacks by bandits due to a combination of mutually reinforcing factors such as poorly managed resource conflicts between pastoralists and farmers, the illegal mining of gold, declining rural livelihood support, poor management of Nigeria's international borders, inadequate presence of policing actors and failure of security intelligence. For instance, Nigeria's border with Niger spans 1,497 km and is poorly policed by the Nigeria Custom and Immigration Services (Yenwong-Fai, 2012). The porous nature of these borders heightens the potential spread of terrorists into Nigeria from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The vulnerability of the border to the infiltration of criminal groups is compounded by the forest reserves in the region. The vast, rugged terrain, sparse population, and dense vegetation make surveillance difficult as the forests become ideal hiding places and operational bases for the armed groups. These constitute ungoverned spaces, where the presence of the authorities is either nonexistent or, at best sporadic (Olaniyan, 2018). The bandits terrorizing northwest Nigeria are known to deploy sophisticated weapons in their operations; again, often due to the porous Nigeria-Niger border and subsequent arms trafficking (Mwangi, 2020). The illicit proliferation of weapons exerts a considerable impact on peace and security and increases the incidents of banditry (Ojo & Ojewale, 2019).
In many instances, the rising incidents of violent attacks are symptoms of weak, exclusionary, or exploitative governance systems in northwest Nigeria. Compounding factors include weak institutional capacity within the police; extreme inequality, poverty, unemployment; and citizens' alienation from the government (Olugbuo & Ojewale, 2018). Indeed, Katsina and Zamfara in Nigeria's northwest are two of the country's 10 poorest states (Chukwuemeka, 2022). Population explosion, poor governance, and high incidence of poverty render many unemployed youths vulnerable to recruitment by terror groups in the region (Abdulaziz, 2021;Jerry, 2019). Closely connected to this is climate change which is wreaking havoc on people's livelihoods and facilitating the recruitment of poor farmers and vulnerable youths into terror groups. In an attempt to stop these attacks, and due to failures on the part of the federal government, the state governments of Katsina and Zamfara initiated direct negotiations with these criminal groups. As part of these negotiations, the governors offered the criminal groups amnesties and other incentives to end violent attacks. These agreements have failed for a number of reasons. First, these criminal groups lack central command and a common goal, so it has been difficult to bring them all to a common negotiation. Moreover, agreements made with one group are not binding on others. Second, the dialogues excluded the local communities that bear the brunt of violence and expect the state to deliver forms of compensation, justice, and protection as a condition for durable peace. Collapsed negotiations have led to renewed attacks by the bandits (International Crisis Group, 2020). Also, competition over access to mineral resource deposits in Katsina and Zamfara states exacerbates already-existing tensions. Often, bandits control the mines and act with impunity because of the undue patronage they benefit from the authorities through connivance (Ogbonnaya, 2020).

Rising incidents of banditry and impacts
Nigeria's National Security Strategy shows that banditry constitutes about 40% of national insecurity in the country (National Security Strategy, 2019). Other forms of insecurity are herder-farmer conflicts, armed robbery, sectarian conflict, separatist violence, violent extremism and terrorism. Recently, bandits have become emboldened and carried out strategic attacks on the nation's foremost defence academy in Kaduna and a military base in Zamfara state . On both occasions, 14 officers were killed, one abducted and military weapons were carted away. These isolated cases marked a major setback in the campaign to curb violent crimes across the contiguous states. The banditry mix manifests as a constellation of complementary crime-killing, cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, levying of illegal tax on farming communities, sexual violence and trafficking of arms and drugs (Ojewale and Balogun, 2022). Cattle rustling has long been the hallmark of bandits in the northwest. It is described as an organised crime in which a group of individuals plan and steal livestock forcefully from another person or from the grazing field for the purpose of commercial gain. With the involvement of actors such as terrorists and bandits, the movement of cattle across national boundaries, is being recognized as a form of transnational crime (Aucoin and Omar, 2017). It has evolved as a major source of financing for bandits over the years. However, mass kidnappings for ransom have become more common in recent years. Bandits operate a kidnapping economy, using the ransoms they receive to fund their terror activities . Since January 2021, no fewer than 10 attacks by bandits relating to abduction of school children involving over 1,000 students have occurred (Nnachi & Isenyo, 2021). With respect to modalities of kidnapping in Nigeria (See Figure 2), six categories have been identified. These are routine model, invasion model, highway model, insider model, seduction model, and feigned model (Onuoha, 2021). Bandits often adopt three out of the six models which are routine model, invasion model, highway model.

Figure 2. Models of Kidnapping.
Source: Onuoha (2021) In the security vacuum left by the absence of effective governance, bandits have effectively taken over territories, imposing taxes and curfews and limiting people's movement. The most powerful bandits also act as warlords, exercising de facto sovereignty over multiple villages or even entire districts. They block roads, sack markets, seize food and any material, kills anyone who resists, levy taxes on communities and run a feudal system of government. This dimension of territorial capture by bandit warlords is well situated in Hobsbawm (1969) historical archetype of bands of men outside the range of law and authority, violent and armed, who impose their will by extortion, robbery or otherwise on their victims. In doing so, Hobsbawm argues that banditry simultaneously challenges the economic, social and political order by challenging those who hold or lay claim to power, law and the control of resources.
In 2021, banditry incidents increased by 32% compared to 2020, with 30% of the terror attacks occurring in Kaduna state. Operating from ungoverned forests, bandits killed more than 1,566 civilians in 2021 across the four states, an increase of 34% compared with 2020. From 2010 to 2017, attacks by bandits were sporadic and peaked with 52 incidents in 2014. Since 2018, attacks by bandits have assumed geometric progression rising from 70 incidents in 2018 to 508 in 2021. According to the estimate drawn from ACLED, 1,114 civilians have already been killed by bandits from January to June 2022. This represents 71% of the fatality recorded in the region in 2021. This trend shows that attacks and fatality for 2022 may likely outstrip the 2021 records. The data collected by ACLED relies on local groups and media reports, and many incidents may well go unrecorded. However, ACLED data shows 7,771 persons have died in targeted attacks by bandits since 2010 in the four states (See Figure 3). Dominant media narratives in Nigeria attribute banditry to the Fulani tribes. Although this remains largely contentious. The ACLED data corroborated by interviewed residents confirms that banditry is undertaken by a constellation of non-state armed groups drawn from various ethnic groups and cross-border criminals (Ojewale, 2021;Ojo, 2020). This information in the literature is validated by a key informant interview with a community leader who stated that "most of them (bandits) are youths (probably below 35 years) and are Fulani as well as Hausas, Kanuri and other ethnic nationalities based on their physical appearance and the language they speak . . . " 1 However, another respondent from Niger state revealed that "bandits who attack the communities in Niger state are of Hausa, Fulani, Gungawa, Kambari, Kabawa, or Dakkarawa ethnic groups". 2 The testimony of Nigeria's former Inspector-General of Police (IGP) quoted below alludes to the complexity of banditry in Nigeria and its transnational linkages.  Data for 2022 covers January to June Source: Author's compilation from ACLED We have realised that most of the banditry has an international dimension. The bandits come from outside the country. We arrested Sudanese, Nigerians and Malians, among other nationals. We also believe that because of what is happening in the northeast and the fact that the military troops are doing a great job in the fight against insurgency there, most of the bandits are running toward the northwest of the country and we have evidence. When we operated in Kaduna, Birnin Gwari, where we attacked a group of bandits, we realised that most of them came from Islamic State of West Africa, who are terrorists, kidnapping for ransom (Agency Report, 2020).
While some bandits of the Fulani tribe have attacked communities and kidnapped scores of citizens for ransom in the last decade in the four states, only 15% of such incidents can be attributed to the Fulani group according to ACLED. Bandits are usually described in mainstream media in Nigeria as unidentified armed groups. Since 2010, 27% of banditry is attributed to these groups of violent criminals with fluid identities. More than half (58%) of incidents of banditry across the four states are attributed to various militia armed groups since 2010. State failure as well as pastoral and sectarian conflicts among communities in the northwest have traditionally created crime-facilitative environments which outlawed militias are also exploring to engage in armed banditry (See Figure 4). Such militia groups emerged out of the power vacuum that is created by the absence of enforcement and good governance.

Policing response to banditry
As Nigeria continues to experience the shocks of banditry, the national and subnational governments are providing counter measures to lessen the striking capability of the bandits. Four distinct but complimentary models are discernible within the security mix and law enforcement responses to banditry by the state and non-state actors. They are mainstream policing, vigilante, hybrid policing and joint task force models. As counter measures against banditry, the adoption of the models by the state and non-state actors is dictated by security exigencies as discussed subsequently.

Mainstream policing model
The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is mandated to carry out maintenance of law and order within the constitutional framework of security in the country. The regular mandate of the NPF is mainstream policing. This involves the gathering of intelligence, identification and protection of vulnerable targets, and first response to sundry attacks. This is also expected to include strategic planning, risk alert, and collaboration with local communities. Mainstream policing points to the advantages possessed by local police in approaching these tasks, because in their day-to-day duties they have more opportunities for routine observations, and access to local sources of information. Their analysis of mainstream crime patterns may reveal activities that are precursors to attacks by  Source: Advanced Space Application Technology Laboratory (COPINE) through Google Earth software was also used for the study. Source: Author's compilation from ACLED recovered two AK-47 rifles, boxer motorcycles, arrested 10 suspects for various offences and rescued a kidnapped victim in Gummi local government area (Babangida, 2022).
In October 2021, the police tactical operatives on anti-banditry acted on intelligence report, and carried out operations in Gidan Bita, Malakar and Kagara forest, and arrested notorious bandits commander, and neutralised five others during a raid in Gummi Local Government Area of the state (News Agency of Nigeria, 2021). In December 2021, the police arrested a man supplying arms to bandits in Katsina and Zamfara states (Oyelude, 2021). In September 2021, the police arrested three women for selling fuel to bandits around the fringes of Jibia forest in Katsina state. The arrests followed a similar incident of arrest of cross-border criminals from Maradi in Niger for selling fuel to armed bandits in a forest in Katsina (Maishanu, 2021). The foregoing examples demonstrate intelligence measures as the core of mainstream policing model as a part of a comprehensive approaches intended for efficient prevention and repression of banditry.

Vigilante model
Most communities adopt the vigilante model of policing to compensate for a lack of police presence in managing crime particularly in areas of limited statehood. Vigilante organizations are described in this study as sustained associations of private citizens voluntarily seeking to provide quasi security functions by preventing crime or other social infractions in a planned, premeditated way, involving force or the threat of force. The inclusion of "quasi" becomes pivotal because the associations are formed voluntarily and are hardly backed by national legislation in their rudimentary operations. The spread of vigilante organisations across Nigeria, encompassing volunteers as well as state-sponsored groups, is both helping authorities to fight crime and combatting terrorism, insurgency and banditry. In many parts of the country, vigilantes essentially fill in for the NPF, which is under federal rather than local control. They have become so important in security provisioning that for now the country has little choice but to rely on them. The surge of new vigilante groups, mostly since the mid-2010s, can be attributed to several factors. These include the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria's northeast; long-standing ethno-religious conflict in the northcentral, coupled with the intensification of herder-farmer violence; and the rise of violent crime in cities, villages and the highway corridors. These challenges have overwhelmed the police force, which is considered underfunded, understaffed and under-equipped (International Crisis Group, 2022). For example, in Katsina, one of the worst-hit states by banditry, less than 3,000 police personnel serve its estimated 5.8 million residents. This translates to 52 police officers for every 100,000 residents-four times lower than the global recommended average. The story is more or less the same nationwide (Jamiu, 2022).
Vigilantes perform strategic duties like repelling attacks, rescuing kidnapped victims, arresting criminals, and sometimes participating in joint security operations with the police and army (Daily Trust, 2022). They operate in formations and hold weekly training sessions to improve their skills. In Zamfara, there are 4,200 community guards, drawn from ex-servicemen, vigilantes and volunteers, and funded by the state government on a monthly stipend of 10,000 naira ($24). This arrangement, however, does not cover all vigilante groups in the state. Most of their activities are financed through donations from the public. At night, the vigilante split into separate groups to man checkpoints and patrol within their community till dawn. Like their counterpart-Civilian Joint Task Force in Nigeria's northeast who rose to combat the Boko Haram insurgents, the vigilante of the northwest use crude weapons like knives, clubs and locally fabricated guns against the bandits, most of whom wield sophisticated rifles. This disadvantage increasingly puts the young vigilantes at immense risk of injuries and even death. However, there have been various reports of some vigilantes engaging in extrajudicial killings that target Fulanis, the ethnic group mostly labelled as bandits. 3 Many of these incidents have triggered reprisal attacks (International Crisis Group, 2022;Jamiu, 2022;Shehu, 2021). The different states blighted by banditry have responded to the controversies about the operations of vigilante through outright banning of their activities or modification of their operations and through legislation.

Hybrid policing model
The spate of attacks by bandits and the acute challenges of policing manifesting in lower public trust in the central police, legitimacy crisis, poor funding of police, and the widespread human rights abuses by the members of the vigilante have made the governors of the four states to devise alternative modes of policing. These changes add weight to the argument that there is a need for a new anti-banditry policing model. This model becomes pivotal in a bid to anticipate and respond to the challenges that are posed by the evolutionary trajectory of banditry. It is envisioned to develop a greater array of proactive policing measures that place the local community at the center of policing and establish deep roots within the different sections of society. This is rooted in the sociology of policing that has shifted the former exclusive preoccupation with the (public) police towards a broader concern with law enforcement, order maintenance and regulation carried out by a range of governmental and community bodies, diverse networks, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, national and local governmental regulatory agencies, as well as the national police. The hybrid policing model is about community-focused engagement as shown in the study area.
For instance, Zamfara State Government recruited 7,500 youths from 14 local government areas of the state and trained them at police training colleges in Sokoto and Kaduna states to serve in community policing. The trainees were deployed in their respective localities to help the conventional security agents in the fight against armed banditry and other criminal activities (Altine, 2020). The state also commissioned a newly-established security outfit-Community Protection Guard to tackle banditry and kidnapping in parts of the state. The new outfit would give needed support to the conventional security agencies in their effort to end banditry and kidnapping (Thisday, 2022). Katsina State also commenced its community policing with 554 special constables. They are deployed for simple police routine duties such as crowd control, traffic and patrol duties, and intelligence gathering in their respective communities to help in reducing crime (Oyelude, 2020). The Niger state government also approved the recruitment and training of 4,000 youths across the 25 local government areas of the state for the establishment of community policing (Yahaya, 2021). Kaduna state began community policing with 272 constabulary recruited and trained by police command. The recruited officers are supporting the official policing system to gather local intelligence on armed banditry and related criminalities in the 23 local government areas in the state (Abdulsalam, 2020).

The joint task force model
This model is rooted in the idea of inter-agency collaboration among the various security outfits on a given security challenge in Nigeria. This is frequently constituted to achieve fast result through the combination of military and policing capabilities in security operation. Nigeria national security strategy, policy initiatives, presidential directives, military doctrine as well as the constitution of the country reflect a growing appreciation of the need to leverage representative elements of the instruments of national power such as interagency partners (the armed forces and police) and local communities as building blocks, for a more effective and balanced strategy to tackle urgent security concerns such as banditry. The joint task force model is a crisis response strategy forged to maneuver limited contingency operations. One of the primal mandates of the Nigeria armed forces as provided by Section 217 subsection 2(c) of the constitution is suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when directed by the president and commander in chief. This places the police and the military on a unique pedestal for mutual collaboration to ensure public safety and security in the face internal threats. As banditry festered in the country, in June 2020, the president approved joint military, police operations targeted at combing Niger, Kaduna, Katsina, and Zamfara states (See Figure 5 and 6) to rid the areas of bandits (Agency Report, 2020). The Nigerian security forces have responded to this presidential directive in the past by increasing the deployment of the military and police to the troubled zones. These deployments were under several code names and have produced mixed results (Campbell, 2020).
In January 2021, the joint security task force deployed to protect Erena town of Shiroro Local Government Area of Niger state repelled armed bandits trying to attack the town (Oladipo, 2021). In March 2021, not less than 15 suspected bandits were neutralised by the Joint Security Task Force in Bassa community in the Shiroro Local Government area of Niger state. Fifteen motorcycles belonging to the bandits and a number of sophisticated weapons, mostly AK47 rifles, were also recovered during the operation (Thisday, 2021). In March 2022, the joint security task force in Niger state neutralised 100 suspected bandits in an operation at Bangi village in Mariga Local Government Area of the state (Omonobi, 2022). In March 2021, security forces killed more than 200 bandits in four days operation in Niger state. The operatives also recovered scores of motorcycles and cattle (Obiezu, 2022). In October 2021, the joint security forces comprising the police and the military neutralised 32 bandits in their attempt to flee from Zamfara state forests to Niger state (Sahara Reporters, 2021). In June 2022, the joint task force comprising soldiers of Operation Yaki, and the Kaduna state police command killed four bandits, and arrested a female accomplice who supplied arms to the gunmen (Lere, 2022). As part of efforts by Operation Safe Haven to end criminality in the southern part of Kaduna state, the joint security task force has also trained 975 members of the Kaduna state vigilance group, on weapons handling and light combat. The training was necessitated by the shortfalls of personnel strength and the need for synergy amongst security agencies to combat armed banditry (Alabelewe, 2022). While the security forces have successfully pushed back bandit attacks, destroyed several hideouts, and killed or arrested hundreds of bandits, attacks by bandits have continued. In spite of the momentary gains of these policing models, banditry continues unabated. The intractable nature of this crime points in the direction of policing incompetence. This is undergirded by three factors. They are poor equipping of the police, centralized police control and the failure of security intelligence.

Poorly equipped police
According to the section 14(2) (b) of 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of the government. In performing this role, the state delegates the fundamental duty of internal security operations to the Nigeria Police Force. These include the constitutional mandate to detect and prevent crime, preserve peace and order and enforce laws and regulations. However, poor funding, battered organizational culture, unprofessional conducts, poor training, inadequate logistics and armaments continue to limit the capacity of the police to perform their roles efficiently and effectively in Nigeria. Poor funding which has become a major challenge to the effectiveness and efficiency of the Nigeria police has a long history. In 2008, the presidential panel on police reform recommended an estimate of N2.8 trillion to effectively reform and transform the Nigeria Police Force for a period of five years. The sum translates to 560 billion annually. The reform estimate is expected to be utilized for communication and information technology infrastructure; patrol/operational vehicles, crafts and other facilities; provision of full complement of arms/ammunition, riot control equipment, protective gears, armoury and shooting range. Other areas include forensic technology aids for investigation; construction, rehabilitation and modernization of facilities for capacity building (training); rehabilitation/construction of police stations; and personnel welfare among others (Nigeria Police Force, 2017). Compared to the 560 billion annual estimate, the budgetary commitment and allocation for this capital project by the Federal government has remained abysmally low over the years with an average of 20 billion or less for capital projects mentioned above. On this note, a key informant interview with a senior officer of the NPF reveals the complexity of the funding challenge which affects procurement of armament and training of police officers.
Poor funding of the Police undoubtedly contributes immensely to limited capacity of the state to end banditry in the northwest. This assertion is borne out of the conspicuous general knowledge of the dearth of cultivation of informants. Intelligence is very key in combating any form of crime the world over which may come by way of human intelligence, signals intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, imagery intelligence, etc, all of which are capital intensive. For example, in the recent past, informants are cultivated and paid to assist the police with credible information. Again, security gadgets such as CCTV should be procured and mounted in strategic black spots and areas for intelligence gathering. However, the pretense of the political class on the allegation of paucity of funds for effective policing has hampered the capacity of the Police to end or at least reduce to the barest minimum banditry in the northwest. Inadequacy or lack of necessary operational equipment unequivocally contributes to the limited capacity. Equipments such as the armoured personnel carrier, general-purpose machine guns, etc are required to match the sophistication of bandits. These items are not produced here in Nigeria. A whole lot of procedures are involved in procuring them at whooping amount of foreign currencies which the Nigeria government claims it cannot afford enough to prosecute the war against banditry. Requisite training is capital intensive in areas of learning the use of the equipments which may require sending a number of officers abroad or bringing in experts to conduct the training. Subsequently, the training acquired by the few should cascade to those who are not privileged to attend. All these require adequate funding and the result will be increased police capacity to fight [banditry and] sundry crimes. 4 The Nigeria police force is central to the task of internal security provisioning, and in a country with vast territory and huge population of multiple ethnic and religious backgrounds such responsibility is enormous, and requires adequate and sustainable funding from the police. Poor funding in yearly budgets of the police has undermined its capacity to protect life and property in many parts of Nigeria, especially in the northwest zone blighted by banditry. Inadequacy of funds has resulted in limited availability and functionality of critical force multipliers such as logistics and equipment. For instance, the police suffer acute shortage of vehicles for effective patrols. Worst still, the available helicopter that is needed for aerial surveillance and quick interdiction operation is not in optimal functional state, if at all operational 5 .

Failure of security intelligence
This is a major factor that stunts the Nigeria's war on armed banditry. This is compounded by the challenges of poor funding and interagency competition by security forces. The former has hampered the timely gathering of intelligence. Given the nature of security challenges, the Nigeria Police Force relies largely on human sources to gather actionable information that support effective security operations. In the face of poor funding, coupled with corruption, the Nigeria Police Force has been unable to incentivize its human sources for steady flow of critical information and intelligence. Furthermore, weak inter-agency cooperation and collaboration, which manifest in the failure of strategic security institutions such as the military, police and state security service to share intelligence and work together to advance the national security interests of the country continue to undermine public safety and security in Nigeria. However, certain facts remain sacrosanct. First, inter-agency friction constitutes a major threat to internal security and national cohesion. Second, it accounts for budgetary wastage, duplication of functions, mutual suspicion, and encroachment on each other's legal and operational space by competing agencies. Therefore, the security agencies in Nigeria compete rather than collaborate many times (Ukaibe et al., 2021). In essence, the challenge of inter-agency rivalry must be seen and acknowledged as a global challenge which haunts internal security of modern states. Wong (2022) argues that terrorism intelligence by its very nature remains highly confidential. To overcome information barriers and prevent information leakage, law enforcement agencies involved in counterterrorism must strike a fine balance between sharing intelligence and ensuring that it is securely protected. This calls for a collaborative approach between agencies, a high degree of trust and a shared understanding about dissemination and storage of confidential information. This can be difficult to achieve because security agencies have traditionally worked in silos.

Highly centralized command structure
The highly centralized command structure of the Nigeria Police seems antithetical to the diverse nature of the country. It disallows subnational governments' participation in police decision making. The states' commands only take orders from headquarters but cannot take decisions on their own. This slows down efficiency of service delivery and creates bottlenecks during periods of emergencies (Bakare & Aderinola, 2019). A critical mass of Nigerians including the officials of subnational governments, general public, the academia and the public policy analysts believe that the Nigeria Police Force as presently constituted cannot effectively carry out the core mandate of policing-to serve and protect citizens. Those persuaded by this argument insist that the NPF is grossly incapacitated and under-resourced to police the entire landscape without recourse to the local communities. Their argument is hinged on the fact that the police officers must be recruited from the local environment in which they are trained to police. Such proponents are of the view that the would-be police officers are better placed because of their knowledge of the culture and familiarity with their environment. For instance, the governors of Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and Zamfara states have called for the adoption of state police to rid their states of armed banditry (Adewole, 2021;Chima, 2021;Isenyo, 2021). They argue that the centralised policing system in a federation is a contradiction. Regardless, what is clear from the nature and trajectories of armed banditry) in Nigeria is that it stretches the NPF as the institution principally responsible for the maintenance of law and order to the limit. Armed banditry in the northwest is hardly a stand-alone crisis; it is linked to broader contradictions of governance with the proliferation of ungoverned spaces where the presence of police is mostly required but least felt.

Policing imperatives for combatting armed banditry
Addressing the rising incident of terror attacks by bandits cannot be treated independent of the call for broader security sector reform in Nigeria. Therefore, policing remains critical in rolling back the mayhem of armed banditry and the wider insecurity that envelops the entire country. Nigeria needs to urgently embrace multi-layered policing architecture that prioritizes the capacitation of local policing outfits to respond effectively to local enablers and drivers of banditry. An extensive review and amendment of section 214 of the 1999 constitution which centralises policing power with the federal government must take place. The national assembly must respond to the sustained clamour for a subnational form of policing in which there is devolution of security operations in the hands of the federating units other than the central government. This step will accord the constituent units the constitutional right to provide security for life and property of people within the state. Decentralised policing can create a system of localised and communityfocused policing system that affords community's organisational, operational and human resources input into the policing outfits that secure the people. This article proposes a multilevel policing framework which encompasses the mainstream policing model, hybrid policing model and the joint task force model with the state police as the new layer of security architecture (see, Figure 7). This is well suited to respond to the conceptual, practical and strategic dimensions of policing in Nigeria to combat armed banditry in the northwest and other criminalities that envelop the country.
The proposed framework is primarily based on reconstructing a police system that cut across the federal and subnational governments as indispensable feature of a federal system of governance. The federating units ultimately need to take greater charge of security within their own jurisdiction by giving them the constitutional power to operate a multi-level policing system in which the federal government also maintains a critical level of management, and support the devolution of police power to the states. It does not connote the revocation of federal police. It is a complimentary level of police in addition to federal police. The role of police in modern day battlefield is something that has been recognised as a necessity for many years. The significance of policing activities in conventional operations is regarded as something that goes hand in hand with security and stability in the climate of terrorism. Therefore, the joint task force model of policing remains pivotal in combatting armed banditry in Nigeria's northwest. Also, the hybrid and vigilante models must be positioned to further assist the joint security forces at the tactical level of operations in providing credible intelligence to aid counter operations against armed banditry. Furthermore, the Federal government of Nigeria must expedite a transparent implementation of the Nigeria Police Trust Fund Act. Essentially, the Trust Fund is designed to provide funds for the training and retraining of the personnel of the Nigeria Police Force. It is also aimed at financing state-of-the-art security equipment and machinery for the NPF, improving the welfare of the personnel, and enhancing their preparedness to effectively discharge their constitutional duties of protection of lives and property, among other objectives.

Conclusion
This paper provides a theoretical premise to illustrate the evolving practices of plural policing within a networked setting. It shows that as Nigeria continues to experience the shocks of banditry, the national and subnational governments are providing counter measures to lessen the striking capability of the bandits through four distinct but complimentary models of policing. The efficiency and effectiveness of the models are also examined. The paper argues that the adoption of the models are often dictated by security exigencies. This article proposes a multilevel policing framework which encompasses the mainstream policing model, hybrid policing model and the joint task force model with the state police as the new layer of security and policing architecture. This is well suited to respond to the conceptual, practical and strategic dimensions of policing in Nigeria to combat armed banditry and other criminalities that envelop the country.

Funding
The author received no direct funding for this research.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.