The dynamics of Islamic education policies in Indonesia

Abstract Since Indonesia’s independence in 1945, policies related to Islamic education have undergone a shift from a domestication approach to an accommodation approach. This paper aims to examine the forms of government policies that have regulated Islamic education during this time period, and to analyze the underlying factors and consequences of these policies on Islamic education. This research employs a qualitative, historical approach, relying on a literature review for data. The findings indicate that the origins of the domestication policy can be traced to differences in views between the government and Muslims concerning the role of religion in state affairs, as well as the slow modernization of madrasas (Islamic schools) and pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), which led to a weak position for Islamic education within the national education system. On the other hand, the accommodative policy was influenced by a variety of factors, including the New Order regime’s efforts to strictly and consistently implement Pancasila as the state ideology; the need to maintain power by appealing to the majority Muslim population; the intellectual transformation of a new generation of Muslim political thinkers and activists towards a more harmonious relationship between Islam and the state, allowing for Islamic ideas to be more easily accepted; and the increased social, educational, economic, and political mobilization of Muslims, which allowed for more educated Muslims to be involved in policymaking.


Introduction
Indonesia is a state founded on the principles of Pancasila, which includes "Belief in the True Oneness of God" as the first of its five tenets. This belief is affirmed in Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution, which states in paragraph (1) that "The State is based on the True Oneness of God" and guarantees in paragraph (2) "the freedom of each citizen to embrace their respective religions and to worship according to their religions and beliefs." As such, Indonesia can be considered a religious nation state (MD, 2007), or a state with a religiously inclusive ideology. In terms of the relationship between religion and the state, Indonesia aligns more closely with a symbiotic or intersectional theory, rather than an integralistic or secularistic theory (Abdillah, 2013;Sjadzali, 1993). As a religious state, the government recognizes and supports the various religions practiced by its citizens, including through the recognition of religious institutions and funding for religious development (Budiyono, 2014). The government also promotes religious education in an effort to cultivate a citizenry that is both religious and tolerant of diversity. This support is reflected in various policies that regulate the implementation of religious education for followers of different religions.
In practice, however, government policies related to religious education have not always aligned with the expectations of followers of various religions. This is particularly evident in the policies related to Islamic education, which is the dominant religion in Indonesia, comprising 86.93% of the population as of 31 December 2021. These policies have included those related to Islamic education subjects in public schools, as well as to the education system in madrasas (Islamic schools) and pesantren (Islamic boarding schools). Over time, the government's approach to regulating these types of Islamic education has undergone changes, sometimes ignoring the interests of Muslims and causing disappointment and mistrust, and other times paying more attention to their needs and earning appreciation and support. The dynamics of these policies are influenced by a variety of factors, and the consequences of each policy decision have had significant impacts on the three forms of Islamic education.
This research aims to delve deeper into the government's policies related to the three forms of Islamic education from 1945 to the present. Specifically, the study aims to answer the following questions: What have been the government's policies for regulating Islamic education? What factors have influenced these policies? And what have been the consequences of these policies on the existence of religious education in public schools, madrasas, and pesantren? The results of this study are expected to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between politics and education, and specifically to the policies of a country in regulating religious education for its citizens.

Education policy
Education policy refers to the various strategies and measures taken to achieve the goals of education (Abbott et al., 2018). Along these lines, Tinanoff et al. (2019) argue that education policy must be understood as an effort to achieve the goal of human development as part of a country's overall development. Education policy is also a public regulation that governs the implementation of the education system, the allocation of resources, and the behavior and orientation of educational programs (Noothigattu et al., 2019). Therefore, it can be argued that education policy often reflects the attitudes and actions taken by the state in an effort to address issues or problems within the education system (Hanushek, 2020). However, Högberg (2019) suggests that education policy can be open to multiple interpretations, which can lead to a biased definition and orientation of education.
Education policy is a process by which the state formulates strategic steps to achieve the goals of education in a society (Kumar et al., 2019). According to Leal Filho et al. (2018), education policy is a form of evaluation of the values implemented in educational institutions, as agreed upon by society and the state. Ma and Zhao (2018) argue that education policy is characterized by three main classifications: (1) education policy is formulated by the state through educational institutions; (2) education policy aims to regulate common educational goals and interests; and (3) education policy must address the problems and collective interests of society. Thus, education policy represents the commitment of the state to ensure the sustainability of an education system that serves the interests of both society and the state.

Islamic education
Islamic education is a form of instruction that aims to cultivate virtuous personal characteristics (Tolchah & Mu'ammar, 2019). It involves the creation of an education management system that is based on Islamic values as outlined in the Qur'an and hadith (Nurhadi, 2020). As such, according to Z. N. Suyadi and Fauzi (2020), Islamic education places a strong emphasis on the spiritual, intellectual, imaginative, physical, and linguistic dimensions of education, guided by Islamic values. In practice, Islamic education aims to promote appropriate behavior in individual and communal life (Sahin, 2018;S. Suyadi & Widodo, 2019). However, at its core, Islamic education is about upholding values of humility towards divine values (Aflisia et al., 2021).
In general, Islamic education has three main contexts: (1) it aims to increase individuals' awareness of their relationship with God (Amin, 2021); (2) it fosters faith and devotion in individuals (Alabdulhadi, 2019); and (3) it seeks to develop the intellect, spirituality, and emotionality of individuals based on Islamic values as outlined in the Qur'an and hadith (Anam et al., 2019). Therefore, the learning process in Islamic education should be grounded in spiritual or religious values that are rational, critical, and open (Usman et al., 2017). In the context of higher education, Kabir (2016) argues that Islamic education should rethink traditional teaching methods in order to achieve a balance between spiritual and social values. In other words, Islamic education should serve as a place where individuals can integrate Islamic teachings into their lives in society (Sewang & Halik, 2020).

State intervention
State intervention refers to the ways in which states excessively engage with and attempt to influence various aspects of society, including cultural, religious, and educational systems (Vollmer et al., 2017). This can involve actions such as legislation and taxation aimed at influencing resource allocation and social mechanisms (Bricker et al., 2022). However, according to Griffiths et al. (2019), not all state interventions are necessarily positive in their impacts and effects; some may be motivated by a desire to gain from specific problems or issues faced by a community, rather than a genuine desire to benefit that community. While much of the literature on state intervention focuses on economic contexts, state intervention can also occur in the realm of education (Harackiewicz & Priniski, 2018).
Intervention is a common aspect of the political process in many countries. It involves an authority taking actions or measures to address a problem and achieve specific goals (Garira, 2020). Luque et al. (2019) argue that state intervention is often used as a means of suppressing certain groups or systems in order to further the objectives of the government and gain acceptance from society, as has been done with the education system in the United States. However, Kraft (2020) suggests that state intervention can have positive effects, such as protecting and distributing resources for more effective and efficient education. In other words, state intervention can be utilized to address issues in educational, social, and cultural contexts (Ansa et al., 2019).

Methodology
This study is an examination of policies using a historical approach. Gilbert J. Garraghan (as cited in D. Abdurahman, 2007) defines the historical approach as a set of systematic guidelines and principles for collecting and critically evaluating historical sources and presenting the findings in written form. In the context of policy research, the historical approach is used to examine the underlying social phenomena that gave rise to a particular policy. The historical aspect of policy research is thus important as it helps to understand the context and origins of a policy.
This research utilizes two types of data sources: primary data and secondary data. Primary data sources include official documents such as the Indonesian Constitution, decrees of the People's Consultative Assembly, laws, government regulations, presidential regulations, presidential instructions, ministerial regulations/decisions, and decrees of the Director General of Primary and Secondary Education that pertain to the focus of the study. Secondary data consists of previously published studies in scientific journals, reference books, and other media that are relevant to the focus of the study.
The data collection technique for this study involves reading and reviewing relevant texts. The texts are then organized according to data categories. The data that has been categorized is analyzed using the content analysis method. Content analysis is a systematic and objective approach to analyzing the contents of laws and regulations related to the dynamics of Islamic education policies in Indonesia.

Policies on religious education in public schools
Following independence in 1945, the Indonesian government made efforts to improve education in order to cultivate an independent Indonesian population. One of these efforts was to include religious education in schools, as this subject had been prohibited during the colonial period (Assegaf, 2005). The first legal basis for religious education in schools was the Joint Regulation of the Minister of Education and Teaching and the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 1142/BHG.A (Teaching) and No. 1285/KJ9 (Religion) dated 12/12/1946, which stated: "Religious education in lower schools is given from grade IV and takes effect from 1 January 1947". This joint regulation was further codified in Law No. 4/1950 on Education and Teaching in Schools, specifically Article 20 paragraph (1) which states: "In public schools religious lessons are offered, the parents of the students decide whether their children will follow the lessons".
This demonstrates that after independence, religious education in schools already had a legal basis, established through a joint regulation and subsequently reinforced by law. However, in practice, its status was weak as it was only a facultative subject, with parents able to decide whether their children would take religious lessons or not. This facultative status was further solidified through the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) Decree No. II/MPRS/ 1960, specifically Chapter II Article 2 paragraph (3) which states: "Religious education becomes a subject in schools from elementary school to state university, with the understanding that students have the right not to participate if their guardians/adult students express their objection". While this decree expanded the scope of religious education to include universities, it remained a facultative subject. Therefore, from 1947 to 1960, religious education retained its status as an facultative subject, albeit with an expanded scope. In summary, according to the 1947 joint ministerial regulation, religious education was only required in schools (elementary, junior high, high school) and started in grade IV. According to the 1950 Law, religious education started in grade 1 of elementary school and applied to high school. Based on the 1960 MPRS Decree, religious education applied from elementary school to university.
After the transition from the Old Order regime  to the New Order era , there was a shift in government policy concerning the legal status of religious education in schools. This change was reflected in MPRS Decree No. XXVII/MPRS/1966, specifically Chapter I Article 1, which states that "Religious education shall be taught in schools from elementary schools to state universities". This decree removed the provision allowing students to opt out of religious education if their guardians or the adult students objected. Thus, the issuance of this decree negated the facultative status, even though the subject was not yet declared mandatory.
The change in the legal status of religious education in schools was closely tied to the failure of the PKI rebellion on 30 September 1965 which led to the collapse of the Old Order regime. The New Order government subsequently made a concerted effort to strictly and consistently adhere to the Pancasila ideology and saw religious education as an essential component of this strategy. As such, the subject became mandatory rather than optional, and the amount of instructional time devoted to it was increased, as outlined in the 1968 Curriculum.
However, in 1982, the Decree of the Director General of Primary and Secondary Education No. 052/C/Kep/D/1982 was issued, which was interpreted (by the Muslim community) as a prohibition on the wearing of headscarves in schools. This regulation required schoolgirls who typically wore headscarves to remove them while at school and allowed them to put them back on after school. Those who violated this rule faced consequences ranging from reprimands to expulsion. This ban sparked strong and widespread opposition from Muslims in various regions, leading to a strained relationship between the government and the Muslim community for an extended period (Nuraeni, 2021;Saleh, 2010). The decision to "ban headscarves in schools" was eventually reversed through the Decree of the Director General of Primary and Secondary Education No. 100/ C/Kep/D/1991. The revocation of the "headscarf ban" was not only due to the widespread resistance from Muslims, but it was also closely tied to the passage of Law No. 2 of 1989 regarding the National Education System, which mandated the inclusion of religious education as a compulsory subject in all types, paths, and levels of education (Article 39 para. 2). With this mandatory status, the prohibition on the use of religious attire as a means of expressing one's faith was deemed unjustified.
Prior to its incorporation into Law No. 2 of 1989, the status of religious education in schools was unclear in the draft legislation. This is evident in Article 40 of the government's 1988 bill, which states: "The curriculum is prepared to realize national education by taking into account the stage of development of students and its suitability to the environment, technology and arts, according to the type and level of each educational unit." This language does not mention the role of religious education in the school curriculum. Additionally, in the explanation of Article 13 paragraph (1) of the bill, it is stated: "For this reason, basic education is organized by providing education that includes, among others, the growth of devotion to God Almighty, character building . . . ." This article also does not provide clarity on the implementation of religious education in schools, as efforts to cultivate devotion to God Almighty could be incorporated into other subjects, such as Pancasila Education. According to Islamic groups, these two articles represented a significant setback, as religious education had been included in the school curriculum up to the university level in the MPRS Decree of 1966 to the MPR Decree of 1988, although it was not yet mandatory (Kosim, 2020).
The push to make religious education mandatory in schools garnered significant support from Muslim organizations and leaders, who used advocacy, lobbying, and even protests to pressure the government and legislature to fulfill their demands. On the other hand, these Muslim demands were vigorously opposed by non-Muslim groups (particularly Christians) who argued against the compulsory status of religious education in schools on the grounds of religious freedom (Assegaf, 2005). Ultimately, the efforts of Muslims were successful, as Law No. 2 of 1989 mandated the inclusion of religious education as a compulsory subject in schools. In fact, in the explanatory section of Article 28 paragraph (2), it is specified that "The religious education received by students must be in accordance with the religion they profess and taught by educators of the same religion".
The government's relationship with Muslims remained harmonious after the transition from the New Order regime  to the Reformation Order regime (since 1998), as demonstrated by the passing of Law No. 20/2003 on the National Education System, which further solidifies the legal foundations for religious education in schools. Article 12 of this law states: "Every learner in every education unit has the right to receive religious education in accordance with the religion he or she professes and is taught by educators of the same religion." This law not only mandates the implementation of religious education in schools as a compulsory subject, but also establishes it as a right of every learner that must be upheld in accordance with their professed religion and taught by educators of the same faith.
During the reformation era, the efforts to make religious education mandatory in schools were not as contentious as in previous periods. This was facilitated by the growing number of Muslim scholars and activists who held influential positions in executive and legislative bodies. Additionally, political Islam movements were declining, leading to a greater sense of collaboration between Muslims and the government in making Pancasila the foundation of the state (Bahtiar, 1998). While the discussions surrounding the education bill were marked by disagreement between Muslims and Christians over several "religious articles" (Syafi'i, 2020), ultimately the bill was passed in accordance with the desires of Muslims. This was despite the absence of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P) faction, the largest group in the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and was thought to be supportive of the efforts of Christians, from the plenary meeting to decide on the bill's passage into law (Sadzali, 2003).
Law No. 20/2003 represents a significant strengthening of the legal foundation for religious education in schools in comparison to Law No. 2/1989 in at least two ways. First, the provision that students' religious education should be provided by educators of the same religion is explicitly stated in the main body of Law No. 20/2003, namely in Article 12 paragraph (1a), rather than just being mentioned in the explanation section as it was in Law No. 2/1989, namely in Explanation of Article 28 paragraph (2). Secondly, the subject of "religious education" is given a higher priority in Law No. 20/2003, being mentioned first among the subjects of national education in Article 37 paragraph (1), whereas in Law No. 2/1989 it was mentioned second after "Pancasila education" in Article 39 paragraph (2). This demonstrates the central importance of religious education in achieving the goals of national education, as outlined in Law No. 20/2003, which include the development of students' potential to become "human beings who believe and are devoted to God Almighty" (Article 3).

Madrasa education policies
Following independence, the government adopted the educational system inherited from the colonizers as the model for the national education system with the aim of producing independent Indonesians. As a result, primary-level government schools were quickly established in various parts of the country. Meanwhile, madrasas, which had previously been established, continued to evolve with a diverse range of curricula and management systems that were largely traditional. As a result, two educational systems emerged in the early days of independence: government-run public schools and religious schools, particularly madrasas, operated by Muslims. Public schools were developed and implemented in a top-down manner by the government in order to achieve national goals, while madrasas grew and developed in a bottom-up manner driven by the desire of Muslims to educate a generation of Muslims who love their country.
The government's policy of establishing public schools as the model for the national education system presented a challenge to madrasas, which were characterized by a strong emphasis on religious content, the use of non-standardized curricula, a non-uniform structure, and management that was less amenable to government control (Rahim, 2005). In response to this, the Minister of Religious Affairs, who was responsible for religious education, made efforts to align madrasas with the standards of government schools following the establishment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs on 3 January 1946.
In 1946, Minister of Religious Affairs Regulation No. 1 was issued, defining a madrasa as any institution that primarily teaches religious knowledge, as well as some general subjects. This regulation also provided for the provision of facilities, infrastructure, and operational costs for madrasas that taught general subjects for at least one-third of their total teaching hours as an incentive for compliance. In addition, madrasas were restructured into two categories: elementary madrasas (madrasah tingkat rendah) with a minimum study period of 4 years for students aged 6-15, and advanced madrasas (madrasah lanjutan) with a minimum study period of 3 years after graduating from an elementary madrasa for students aged 11 and above. After undergoing several changes, including through Minister of Religious Affairs Regulation No. 7 of 1952 and Minister of Religious Affairs Decrees No. 15, 16, 17 of 1978, the structure of madrasas eventually became equivalent to that of public schools, with madrasah ibtidaiyah (MI) equivalent to elementary school, madrasah tsanawiyah (MTs) equivalent to junior high school, and madrasah aliyah (MA) equivalent to senior high school.
Initially, the Ministry of Religious Affairs encountered challenges in its efforts to promote madrasas, as Law No. 4/1950 only regulated education and teaching in public schools, which left the organization of madrasas without a formal legal foundation and outside the responsibility of the government. Consequently, madrasas did not receive any support from the government, except for a small amount, if any (Gultom, 2019). Additionally, many madrasa custodians at that time were entrenched in the dichotomy between religious and general subjects and were therefore reluctant to incorporate general subjects into the madrasa curriculum. Even when they were included, they were only supplementary and religion remained the primary subject.
The Ministry of Religious Affairs made further efforts to improve the quality of madrasas through the establishment of state-owned madrasas (Maksum, 1999). This not only represented a direct involvement of the government in the development of madrasas, but also aimed to use stateowned madrasas as a model for the development of private madrasas. The establishment of stateowned madrasas began in 1959 (for the elementary level) and in 1967 (for the junior and senior high school levels). The creation of state-owned madrasas has continued to the present day. By the end of 2021, the number of public or state-owned madrasas had reached 4,052 institutions, consisting of 1,713 elementary madrasas, 1,527 junior high madrasas, and 812 senior high madrasas. The number of public madrasas is much smaller than the number of private madrasas, which reached 49,241 institutions, comprising 24,103 elementary madrasas, 16,819 junior high madrasas, and 8,319 senior high madrasas (Religious Affairs, 2022).
Although the Ministry of Religious Affairs provided guidance to madrasas, they were not formally recognized as part of the national education system until 1975. Prior to this, madrasas were only recognized as religious schools under the supervision of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Maksum, 1999). As a result, madrasa graduates were only recognized within the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Outside the ministry, madrasa graduates and their certificates were not recognized, which prevented them from continuing their education at public universities and from obtaining employment outside the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In other words, madrasas remained second-class educational institutions that were undervalued by society and the government.
Furthermore, the inclusion of madrasas in the national education system was almost eliminated. This became evident in Presidential Decree No. 34/1972 on Functional Responsibility for Education and Training, which states in part that all educational institutions in Indonesia are the responsibility of the Ministry of Education & Culture, including religious educational institutions (madrasas). Muslims strongly opposed this decision, as it was viewed as an attempt by the government to ignore the role of madrasas, despite madrasas at the time being the only formal Islamic educational institutions serving as the primary forum for the education and development of Muslim students. In response to this strong opposition from Muslims, the decision was not effectively implemented until 1974, when President Soeharto issued Presidential Instruction No. 15 of 1974 instructing the immediate implementation of Presidential Decree No. 34 of 1972.
However, Muslims continued to resist the implementation of the presidential decree. Finally, based on the recommendations of the Limited Cabinet Meeting on 26 November 1974, which was attended by the Minister of Religious Affairs (A. Mukti Ali), the President issued the following implementation guidelines: (1) The development of general education is the responsibility of the Minister of Education and Culture, while religious education is the responsibility of the Minister of Religious Affairs; (2) In order to properly implement Presidential Decree No. 34 of 1972 and Presidential Instruction No. 15 of 1974, there needs to be cooperation between the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. As a result of this instruction, a three-department cooperation team was formed, which ultimately led to the Joint Ministerial Decree of the Ministers of Religious Affairs, Education and Culture, and Home Affairs No. 6/1975, No. 037/U/1975, No. 36/1975 on Improving the Quality of Education in Madrasas. The purpose of the joint decree was primarily to equalize madrasas with public schools, as stated in Article 2: " . . . so that the level of general subjects taught in madrasas reaches the same level as the level of general subjects taught in public schools of the same level, so that a) madrasa diplomas can have the same value as public school diplomas of the same level; b) madrasa graduates can continue to a higher level public school; c) madrasa students can transfer to public schools of the same level" (Daulay, 2001;Maksum, 1999).
The joint decree was an attempt to resolve the legal impasse at the time, as the implementation of education was still guided by Law No. 4 of 1950, which did not provide a place for madrasas. Therefore, while waiting for a new education law, the joint decree served as a foundation for the development of the quality of madrasas. As a result of the joint decree, the madrasa curriculum underwent significant changes, as the structure of lessons was dominated by general subjects. In the 1976 Madrasa Curriculum based on the Decree of the Minister of Religious Affairs No. 75 of 1976, the structure of religious subjects was only approximately 30%, while the structure of general subjects reached approximately 70%. In hindsight, the dominance of general subjects in madrasas had previously been attempted through the 1973 Madrasa Curriculum, but many madrasas did not fully implement it. However, with the 1976 Madrasa Curriculum, which was established with the intervention of the joint decree of the three ministers, madrasas had no choice but to comply. Otherwise, madrasas would not be considered equal to public schools, and their graduates would still face obstacles in continuing their education at public universities or in applying for jobs at agencies outside the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
The adoption of the 1976 Curriculum, which prioritized general knowledge over religious knowledge, presented a new challenge for madrasa students. This shift resulted in a decrease in their mastery of religious knowledge, while their mastery of general subjects remained suboptimal at approximately 70%. As a result, madrasa graduates were perceived as less proficient in religious studies compared to pesantren graduates and less knowledgeable in general subjects compared to public school graduates. Muhaimin (2004) further notes that this percentage was often understood in an incongruously quantitative and symbolic manner, rather than a holistically qualitative and substantive one, exacerbating the dichotomy between different types of knowledge and leading to a reduced understanding of religious material among madrasa students and weaker mastery of general subjects compared to public school students.
The adoption of Law No. 2 of 1989 significantly strengthened the legal foundation for the operation of madrasas, as it moved beyond the previous reliance on the joint decree issued by three ministers. Under this law, madrasas became recognized not simply as religious schools, but as public schools with an Islamic focus. This change is reflected in the regulatory provisions of Law No. 2 of 1989, specifically Government Regulation No. 28 of 1990 and Decree of the Minister of Education and Culture No. 489/U/1992, which specify the status and responsibilities of madrasas in greater detail.
The conversion of madrasas into public schools with an Islamic focus helped to bridge the gap between madrasas and traditional public schools, as both were now recognized as having equal standing within the national education system. This policy was widely welcomed by Muslim figures, who saw it as a recognition of the cultural identity of the nation, rooted in the nation's motto of Unity in Diversity. According to A. Malik Fadjar (1999), this recognition represented a sympathetic expression of cultural identity, while Azyumardi Azra (2002) argued that it signaled the gradual erosion of the dichotomy between madrasas and public schools. Maksum (1999) viewed the recognition of madrasas as public schools as an effort to integrate Islamic education into the national education system.
Law No. 20/2003 further solidified the legal foundation of madrasas by explicitly mentioning their various levels (MI, MTs, and MA) alongside the levels of public schools (SD, SMP, and SMA) in the law's nomenclature. For instance, Article 17 paragraph (2) states that basic education includes both primary schools (SD) and madrasah ibtidaiyah (MI), as well as junior high schools (SMP) and madrasah tsanawiyah (MTs), among other equivalent forms. This represents a departure from Law No. 2/1989, which only mentioned the levels of public schools and simply referred to madrasas as "other equivalent educational units" in the explanations of Article 13 paragraph (1) and Article 15 paragraph (1).
However, the passage of Law No. 2/1989 did not completely resolve the challenges faced by madrasas. As a result of being placed on equal footing with public schools, madrasa students were required to take a heavier curriculum load, which included not only 100% of the general knowledge taught in public schools, but also religious subjects such as Qur'anic and hadith studies, Islamic doctrine and ethics, Islamic jurisprudence, Islamic history and culture, and the Arabic language. This became a significant undertaking for madrasa students, especially given that many madrasas have limited infrastructure and resources, as they are often privately run and have limited funding, facilities, and teaching staff.

Pesantren education policies
Like madrasas, pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) were not regulated under Law No. 4/1950 and thus operated independently of government oversight. During the early years of the New Order government, one of its priority programs was to expand access to primary education throughout the country by building primary schools and hiring large numbers of teachers (Beeby, 1982). These schools gained popularity among the general population, and posed a challenge to pesantren, which are typically located in rural areas and often have a traditional Islamic curriculum focused on the study of classical texts (kitab kuning). As the government sought to standardize national education using the public school system as a model, it became clear that the pesantren education system could not compete due to its weaknesses in curriculum, teaching staff, teaching methods, and infrastructure.
Pesantren then showed varied responses to the government's policy of standardizing education (Kosim, 2015;Mahfudh, 2012). Some chose to open formal schools within their own facilities, either as regular schools or madrasas, that followed the government curriculum while still maintaining their primary mission of teaching Islamic religious sciences through the study of classical texts (kitab kuning). This allowed students (santri) to receive formal education within a pesantren setting while still participating in the pesantren's Islamic studies program and earning formal certificates that might be useful for further studies or employment in the formal sector. Other pesantren continued to prioritize the study of kitab kuning and rejected the formal school system altogether. A third group of pesantren attempted to integrate the formal school system with the pesantren system into a cohesive whole. This pattern of integration was already in practice at Pesantren Gontor in East Java, which implemented the kulliyatul mu'allimin al-Islamiyyah (KMI) system in 1936 (Saifulloh, 2019)-long before Indonesia's independence-and at Pesantren al-Amien, also in East Java, which instituted the tarbiyatul mu'allimin al-Islamiyyah (TMI) system in 1971 (Jauhari, 2002).
Prior to the 1988 General Assembly of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), there was a proposal to include pesantren in the Guidelines for State Policy (GBHN) in order to clarify their role in nation-building. However, this idea faced opposition from both inside and outside the pesantren community and did not come to fruition (Mahfudh, 2012). After the passage of Law No. 2/1989, pesantren were recognized as a form of out-of-school or non-formal education through Article 11 paragraph (6), and were permitted to participate in the 9-year compulsory education program, a national priority at the time. This recognition was further affirmed in Presidential Instruction No. 1/1994 (especially No. 7 point c), which states: "Educational units known as pesantren may establish their own basic education program whose equivalence with basic education is approved by the Minister of Education and Culture".
Starting in 1998, the government began a policy of recognition (mu'adalah) for certain pesantren that had integrated their curricula, as had been done by Pesantren Gontor (using the KMI system) and Pesantren al-Amien (using the TMI system). This recognition was formalized through the Decree of the Director General of Islamic Institutional Development of the Ministry of Religious Affairs No. E.IV/ PP.032/K.EP/80/1998 and the Decree of the Minister of National Education No. 106/0/2000, which stated that graduates of KMI Gontor and TMI al-Amien were equivalent to high school/madrasah aliyah graduates and had the same rights to pursue further studies at public universities or apply for jobs that required high school/madrasah aliyah qualifications (Hamzah, 2018).
The legal status of pesantren as part of the national education system was further strengthened with the passage of Law No. 20/2003, which specifically addressed the role of pesantren in "Part IX on Religious Education," particularly in Article 30 paragraphs (1) to (5). This law recognizes pesantren as Islamic religious education institutions that can offer both formal and non-formal education according to their unique characteristics. The technical implementation of pesantren education was regulated through Government Regulation No. 55/2007 on Religious Education, which granted pesantren the authority to offer formal education in the forms of mu'adalah and diniyyah education units. The mu'adalah education units are based on either the salafiyyah or mu'allimin education model at the primary and secondary levels, while the formal diniyyah education is offered at the primary (awaliyyah and wustha), secondary ('ulya), and higher education (ma`had aly) levels.

Discussion
This research found that the government's education policies from the early days of independence until the enactment of Law No. 2/1989 tended to neglect the interests of Muslims, causing disappointment and strained relations between the two groups (Azis, 1996). There are at least two reasons for this. Firstly, there were differences in the views and perspectives of nationalist groups and Muslims on the role of religion in the life of the state, with some Muslims advocating for religious formalism while most (such as western-educated Muslims and abangan or syncretic Muslims) aligning more with the nationalists who rejected it. As a result, debates over the role of religion in the state were often won by the majority nationalist group, which had the support of western-educated Muslims, abangan Muslims, Christians, and communists. Secondly, Muslims were slow to respond to the government's educational reform efforts, particularly in the traditional madrasas and pesantren. In other words, the neglect of Muslim interests in education was influenced by internal factors (the lack of a unified stance on religious formalism and a slow response to educational reform) and external factors, such as strong state intervention that had the backing of the majority of western-educated and abangan Muslims, Christians, and communist groups. The policies that tended to disappoint Islamic groups had consequences for the weaker position of Islamic education within the national education system, as demonstrated by the status of religious education in schools as a facultative subject for a long time, the perception of madrasas as second-class education institutions, and the limited recognition of pesantren as educational institutions.
According to Harry J. Benda's analysis of Islam in Java, the education policies that neglected the concerns of Muslims can be considered as domesticative policies, in which the position of Muslims was typically powerless in relation to the government and their interests were disregarded (Bahtiar, 1998;Harnisch, 2009). Benda's perspective suggests that, although Islam flourished in Indonesia, local forces consistently held sway, leading to the domestication and helplessness of Islamic dynamics in the face of local elements. Additionally, Benda argued that the failure of Islamic groups to advocate for Islam as the foundation of the state and the removal of the seven words ("with the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its adherents") from the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta, the forerunner of Pancasila) on the day after Indonesia's independence on 17 August 1945, represented the triumph of Javanese power. According to Benda, "Pancasila, the official ideology of the state, is Javanese, theistic, vaguely monotheistic, and certainly not Islamic" (Bahtiar, 1998). Therefore, the strong state intervention that resulted in policies that weakened Islamic education in schools, madrasas, and pesantren can be seen as a form of domesticative policy that hegemonized Muslims.
After implementing domesticative policies, the government began to pay increasing attention to the interests of Muslims, resulting in policies that accommodated the regulation of Islamic education. This process began with the passage of Law No. 2 of 1989, followed by Law No. 20 of 2003 and Law No. 18 of 2019. These accommodative policies established a harmonious and mutually beneficial relationship between Muslims and the state, with Muslim interests being taken into consideration and the state receiving support from the majority population. The government's decision to adopt accommodative policies was influenced by several factors. First, following the collapse of the Old Order regime, the New Order regime was committed to strictly and consistently implementing Pancasila. This aligned with the desires of Muslims, who had grown unhappy with the Old Order regime, which had become influenced by communists who downplayed the role of religion. Therefore, the shared principles between the government and Muslims made it easier to implement accommodative measures towards the aspirations of Muslims. Second, the New Order government learned from the experiences of the Old Order regime, whose policies had disappointed and disadvantaged many Muslims, and sought to embrace Muslims as the majority group. This effort was undertaken by the government, particularly President Soeharto, in response to a decline in support for the President, particularly from the military wing, which, along with the bureaucracy in Golkar, had become a key support base for the New Order government.
Third, there was a shift in the thinking of a new generation of Muslim political intellectuals and activists towards a harmonious and complementary political relationship between Islam and the state, making it easier for Islamic ideas to be accepted. This shift was particularly evident in Nurcholish Madjid's concept of "Islam yes, Islamic party no." With this transformation in thought, the suspicion underlying the relationship between the Muslim community and the state could be gradually minimized and even transformed into a relationship of mutual need (Azra & Umam, 1998). Fourth, Muslims were undergoing a process of rapid social, educational, economic, and political mobilization due to Indonesia's economic development under the New Order government and widespread access to modern higher education both domestically and abroad. As a result, an increasing number of educated Muslims became involved in the government. Through the government bureaucracy, this group was able to play a significant role in influencing policies that were more favorable to Muslims (Bahtiar, 1998;Hefner, 2001).
As a result of accommodative policies, the presence of Islamic education has become more established in the national education system. This is demonstrated by the requirement for religious education to be offered in public schools, the recognition of madrasas as educational institutions equivalent to public schools, and the integration of pesantren into the national education system, allowing for the organization of formal education at the primary, secondary, and higher levels in accordance with the vision of pesantren. These developments suggest that domesticative policies, which tended to diminish the role of Islamic education, led to strained relations and mistrust between the government and Muslims, potentially impacting the stability of the government. On the other hand, accommodative policies that have supported the growth of Islamic education have fostered positive relationships with Muslims and contributed to a harmonious atmosphere. Therefore, it is advisable for governments to prioritize accommodative policies, particularly when it comes to the religious education of their majority population, in order to effectively address the needs for religious education of their citizens.

Conclusion
This research highlights the complex relationship between religion, state, and education in countries that adopt a symbiotic approach to the intersection of these domains. The findings suggest that the quality of government relations with the dominant religious community can significantly influence the success and acceptance of policies regulating religious education. Additionally, the paper emphasizes the interconnected nature of politics and education, with education reliant on state recognition and the state utilizing education to cultivate the skills and knowledge of its citizens in line with its goals. It is clear that the government plays a significant role in shaping the education system in a given country, including in the realm of religious education. Without intervention from authorities, it is unlikely that education, including religious education, would be able to exist and function effectively. However, it should be noted that this study is limited in scope and focuses specifically on the case of Islamic education policies in Indonesia. Further research is necessary to more fully explore the policymaking process and other factors that may impact the existence of religious education in the country.