The Universal Periodic Review: A Catalyst for Domestic Mobilisation

ABSTRACT At its introduction in 2006, scholars were sceptical of the United Nations (UN) Universal Periodic Review (UPR), doubting whether its cooperative, ‘soft law’ approach would be able to affect positive changes to states’ human rights practices. Yet research on its three cycles to date is replete with evidence of the mechanism’s impact. What accounts for this? The theory of acculturation, which highlights states’ socialisation, is the most salient explanation posed in UPR scholarship. This article argues that while acculturation is an otherwise compelling account, it fails to recognise the vital role domestic actors play in affecting state compliance and, particularly, the success of the UPR. The domestic mobilisation theory, which emphasises the influence of national politics and players on compliance, is forwarded as an alternative lens through which to grasp the UPR’s impact. A review of existing research on the UPR reveals the mechanism to be a catalyst for mobilisation, providing leverage and an opportunity for dialogue between domestic actors and governments. Appreciating the UPR’s value in this way has implications for scholars and practitioners engaging it.


Introduction
Legal scholars, having previously assumed the efficacy of international law, are now routinely engaging with the question of how, and under what conditions, international law and organisations have impact. 1 This reflects a so-called empirical turn in international legal scholarship in recent decades. In the realm of human rights, for instance, research has turned to an investigation of which factors drive compliance with human rights treaties 2 and monitoring mechanisms. 3 Receiving particular attention in this regard, since its introduction in 2006, is the United Nations (UN) Universal Periodic Review (UPR),an international peer review mechanism which engages all UN member states in an interactive dialogue with one another on their human rights performance. Recommendations are made to the state under review which, if it accepts them, should implement them before the next UPR cycle. In a reflection of international legal scholarship's empirical turn, scholars have queried whether the UPR is effective in driving states' compliance with their international obligations and, if it is, what accounts for that impact.
My central argument is that the UPR's impact can be explained in part by domestic actor mobilisation. That is, the mechanism has impact because it empowers a myriad of domestic actors such as civil society organisations and parliamentarians. It does so by, inter alia, providing them with valuable, high-level opportunities for dialogue with their governments and, through the issuing of recommendations, equipping them with political leverage with which they can push for changes in law and policy. Furthermore, the process of implementing recommendations, which is central to the UPR's success, should be understood as a political exercise dependent on various domestic actors' contributions. This article therefore proceeds as follows.
Part 2 sets out the UPR's modalities, principles, and objectives. This is important because it will provide context to this article, but also because an examination of the particulars of the UPR's operation are necessary to appreciate the explanations for its impact. Part 3 reflects on the most salient explanation in the literature for the UPR's impact: Goodman and Jinks' theory of acculturation. Although that theory is otherwise compelling, my reflection on the empirical record reveals that acculturation fails to account for the critical role that domestic actors play in affecting compliance, not least in the UPR process. Part 4 sets out the theory of domestic mobilisation, which sees state compliance as driven primarily by domestic actors and politics. I then defend my central argument that this theory is useful for understanding the impact of the UPR, primarily through a review of the existing empirical research on the mechanism. The fifth, concluding part of this article reflects on the implications of my argument for those engaged with the UPR, policymakers and researchers alike.

Universal Periodic Review: The Principles and Process
In 2006 the UN Commission for Human Rights was dissolved following decades of selectivity and bias, 4 giving way to the new Human Rights Council (UNHRC). To avoid the failures of its predecessor, a new human rights monitoring mechanism was created under its auspice: the Universal Periodic Review. This is a peer review process, operating in four-and-a-half-year cycles, which engages states in an interactive dialogue with one another on their human rights performances. A series of principles underpin the UPR, of which three necessitate mention for the purposes of this article.

Principles
Firstly, cooperation. The UPR is intended to be a ' … cooperative mechanism based on objective and reliable information and on interactive dialogue '. 5 This means that engagement with the UPR, and the implementation of its recommendations, as discussed below, is reliant upon states' goodwill. Though it is a point of contention, with some branding the mechanism 'toothless', 6 the cooperative nature of the process should not necessarily be associated with weakness. Indeed, my central argument, evidenced later in this article, is that UPR-facilitated collaboration between domestic actors may lend the mechanism its effectiveness.
Secondly, universality. This entails universal coverage of states, a unique feature whereby all states, simply by virtue of their UN membership, are scrutinised on their human rights commitments. To date no state has failed to participate in the UPR, making it the only UN-level human rights review process with 100% state engagement. This fact alone is clearly a success of the UPR. Universality also involves the discussion of all human rights, regardless of states' international obligations. 7 Therefore no human rights issue should be off the table for discussion at the interactive dialogues.
Third, stakeholder inclusivity. Whether, and to what extent, actors other than state governments should be involved in the UPR was a key question during the institution-building process. On one hand, some advocated for a wholly state-driven approach, leaving no room for the engagement of civil society aside from attendance as observers. 8 On the other, the European Union and some South American states wanted an interactive dialogue engaging various stakeholders, such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and national human rights institutions (NHRIs), in addition to states. 9 In the end, though these bodies were not afforded representation at the review itself, the UPR nevertheless aims to '[e]nsure the participation of all relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organisations and national human rights institutions'. 10 Parliaments, particularly their human rights committees, have also since been recognised as key stakeholders in the UPR. 11 The mechanism thus has potential to provide a high-level platform for dialogue between state governments and other domestic actors. The channels and avenues made available to non-state domestic actors may function as a catalyst for mobilisation and enhance their ability to hold their governments to account for the implementation of UPR recommendations. Although the UPR is principally a platform for state governments to engage in dialogue with one another, it also depends on the participation of other actors within the state for its success. With these principles in mind, the following section details the UPR process and pays particular attention to the roles domestic actors play in its operation.

Modalities
Each four-and-a-half-year cycle can be understood as operating in four phases: prereview, the working group, post-review, and implementation. At the time of writing, there have been three full cycles of the UPR. 12 The pre-review stage involves the submission of three documents to inform the interactive dialogue. First is the national report submitted by the state in accordance with the UNHRC's general guidelines, 13 following a broad consultation with stakeholders. 14 Good practices seen here include the holding of workshops, seminars, and online discussion groups to raise awareness of the UPR and ensure the widest possible engagement. 15 An immediate opportunity is therefore available, at the start of each UPR cycle, for domestic actors to facilitate a dialogue with their governments on human rights. The second document is a compilation report that brings together the outcomes of the state's engagement with other UN entities such as the treaty bodies and special procedures. 16 The third document is a summary report of submissions made by individual stakeholders to the UPR. 17 This is yet another opportunity for these actors to engage with and inform the UPR process. It also appears to be a uniquely valuable one, as initial research suggests that the issues raised in these reports 'largely correlate' with the recommendations made by states at the interactive dialogue. 18 In 2010, Moss examined 16 states' reviews and found that 70% of the concerns raised by NGOs in their reports corresponded to state recommendations. 19 A 2013 study by McMahon found a similar rate of correlation. 20 Thus, it would appear that these submissions are an invaluable tool for stakeholders to relay concerns to their governments.
With the information in the three documents, a working group consisting of the UNHRC's 47 member states, supported by a troika of state rapporteurs, conducts the interactive dialogue. The aim of the review is to determine the state's compliance with the UN Charter, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the human rights instruments to which the state is party, voluntary pledges made by the state, and applicable international humanitarian law. 21 Throughout the dialogue, recommendations are made with a view to bringing the state into greater compliance with these instruments. As above, these appear to be largely informed by the issues raised by stakeholders, meaning their concerns are validated through the UPR process. When pursuing change in their state, stakeholders can therefore refer back to these recommendations to further legitimise their claims for improving human rights. Post-review, the working group report is adopted at a plenary session of the UNHRC, and a response of 'accepted' or 'noted' is given to each recommendation. This is a further chance for civil society to inform the process: NHRIs and NGOs are entitled to attend and make statements at the plenary. It has further been an opportunity to lobby other delegations who can also make statements on the responses of the state to its recommendations.
The final phase involves the implementation of recommendations by the state. Though potentially contested, 22 'implementation' can be understood simply as ' … the process of putting international commitments into practice'. 23 In the context of the UPR, it thus describes the actions taken by a state to translate recommendations into domestic law or policy. The latter reflects the fact that legal measures may not always be the most appropriate. 24 Implementation should be distinguished from the term 'compliance', which is used to describe, more generally, the extent to which a state's behaviour conforms to a particular international agreement. This may be conformity with international rules (first-order compliance) or the decisions of courts or observations from other monitoring mechanisms such as the UPR (second-order compliance). 25 In sum, the implementation of recommendations can bring the state into greater compliance with its human rights obligations and facilitate the improvement of human rights on the ground,both of which are the UPR's primary objectives.
As mentioned, the UPR is a cooperative process, and its recommendations are not intended to be binding on the state. While numerous recommendations might indicate ' … the emergence of new interpretations of existing human rights norms', 26 individually it is questionable whether they carry any (legal) consequences for nonimplementation. This was a point of concern during negotiations for the UPR, as it was suggested that it would be yet another UN mechanism without 'teeth', incapable of truly holding states to account. 27 Equally, the state-led nature of the UPR has attracted criticism. Freedman considers the UPR to be too politicised and undermined by states using it to achieve political aims, rather than to advance human rights globally. 28 These are, of course, well founded concerns, as the very reason for the former Commission's replacement was to de-politicise the UN's approach to human rights. 29 Nevertheless, as explored below, some consider the UPR's political approach to be its potential strength. 30 22  The impact of the UPR Despite the supposed flaws of the process, evidence appears to suggest that many states do cooperate with the UPR, that recommendations are implemented (albeit to varying degrees), and that improvements are being seen on the ground. The research of UPR Info is particularly revealing, demonstrating that, between 2011 and 2014, 48% of recommendations were either fully or partially implemented. 31 This, it concludes, was ' … very encouraging for the future of the Universal Periodic Review and, more importantly, for the future of human rights'. 32 Research by David Frazier likewise shows states' progress during the first UPR cycle, and concludes that ' … the UPR has been effective in promoting human rights in the short term'. 33 It could be queried whether this impact is truly the result of engagement with the UPR. Indeed, scholars make a further distinction between compliance and 'effectiveness', which relates to the degree that a state's behaviour is induced or caused by the rules in question. 34 It is thus possible that the improvements observed in the literature is merely evidence of compliance, rather than the effectiveness of the UPR specifically. Research nevertheless reveals that some changes flow directly from states' engagement with the mechanism. Milewicz and Goodin, for instance, have shown that states take action on a 'substantial proportion' of their recommendations in the run-up to their next UPR, suggesting that it was specifically engagement with the mechanism that affected these changes. 35 Case studies explored by UPR Info also identify improvements in human rights protections that have flowed directly from UPR recommendations. Its 2012 report demonstrates that many states adopted new laws in the aftermath of their reviews, strongly indicating the particular impact of the mechanism. 36 This means that there is likely something about the UPR and its recommendations that is successful in affecting second-order compliance. The question is: what factors or conditions account for that impact (or, in some cases, the lack thereof)?
Other UN monitoring mechanisms, such as the treaty bodies and special procedures, are thought to rely largely on their 'naming and shaming' potential. 37 That is, they are effective because states take on their recommendations to avoid damaging their reputations. Scholars have questioned whether the UPR has a similar impact. 38 There is some substance to this argument. The HRC and UPR are invariably political forums, despite assurances that the new Council would move away from the politicisation that 31 UPR Info, 'Beyond Promises: The Impact of the UPR on the Ground' (2014) <www.upr-info.org/en/news/beyondpromises-study-and-side-event-assess-impact-upr> accessed 10 May 2022. 32  plagued its predecessor. 39 The recommendations made, and the subsequent response of the target state, are therefore likely to be affected by interstate relations. Existing research on the UPR certainly demonstrates this. It has been argued that some recommendations made at the UK's first UPR, for example, highlighted the ' … international political tensions and grievances' of reviewing states such as Sri Lanka and Algeria. 40 Similarly, the United States argued that its first review included recommendations that were political provocations and could not be taken seriously. 41 Yet Terman and Voeten suggest that recommendations shaming a state under review may be more likely to be accepted if they originate from a state with which it shares ' … strong political, economic, or security ties'. 42 The UPR is potentially effective because of its political nature. 43 On the other hand, as Etone argues, it is questionable whether the UPR process involves shaming in the conventional sense, because it does not involve ' … singling out states and publicly condemning their poor human rights record'. 44 Indeed, as he also notes, recommendations are more often congratulatory, encouraging, or constructive in tone, rather than condemnatory. 45 Furthermore, even in the case of recommendations involving shaming from political allies, those that Terman and Voeten highlight as more likely to be accepted, it is not clear whether these are equally likely to be implemented as those that do not involve shaming. The empirical record for naming and shaming may, in fact, suggests that they are not. 46 Scholarship has therefore turned to alternative explanations for the UPR's impact. I now turn to a review of the most salient theory proposed in the UPR literature: that its impact is a result of inter-state socialisation or 'acculturation'.

Impact through Learning and Acculturation: The Prevailing Logic
The UPR is often referred to as a platform for socialisation between states, an idea seemingly informed by constructivist theories of international relations that see states operating in an inherently social space. Terman and Voeten explain how ' … human rights are said to diffuse through "peer pressure": conformity brings praise, increased social worth and esteem, while violation is met with shame, disapproval and isolation'. 47 Milewicz and Goodin equally point to the function of peer pressure in the UPR process. 48 Cowan and Billaud argue that the implementation of recommendations might occur because, owing to its focus on cooperation and dialogue, states ' … learn from "best practice" that is "shared" by their peers; together they collaborate in a joint project of human American Journal of International Law 139. 42 Terman and Voeten (n 38) 8. 43 Domínguez-Redondo (n 30). 44 Etone, 'Theoretical Challenges' (n 6). 45  rights improvement'. 49 These depictions of the UPR as a social platform appear to reflect its constructive and dialogical nature. By engaging states in a conversation with one another on human rights, it is only logical to assume that they may learn from each other's views. Indeed, this reflects another key objective of the UPR: the sharing of best practice. 50 To date, the most notable and compelling application of social theory to the UPR is in the work of Etone, who argues that 'acculturation', a theory posed by Goodman and Jinks, is the more ' … suitable theoretical framework to understand the potential impact of the UPR'. 51 This is ' … the general process of adopting the beliefs and behavioural patterns of the surrounding culture', 52 occurring through 'identification with a reference group' which can ' … generate varying degrees of cognitive and social pressuresreal or imaginedto conform'. 53 It is questionable whether individual-level psychology applies similarly to states, though Goodman and Jinks' review of previous empirical research does demonstrate some support for this in the human rights context. Indeed, an entire chapter in their book Socialising States is geared toward evidencing acculturation. 54 Here, Goodman and Jinks reflect on evidence on a range of substantive human rights areas including constitutional design, children's rights, female suffrage, and domestic violence. 55 Together, these reveal acculturation to be a thorough and convincing theory which reveals how social processes influence states' behaviour.
Etone's application of this theory to the UPR is equally persuasive. It is suggested that acculturation can work better through soft law, cooperative mechanisms like the UPR. Reflecting on the examples of Nigeria and Uganda, Etone explains how coercive measures can generate backlash, and that this might be avoided through a more cooperative approach. Through acculturation, the UPR may transform ' … the social and political culture through social and cognitive pressures' and ' … contribute to incrementally improving the human rights situation on the ground'. 56 Etone suggests that the mechanism's principles, discussed above, ' … can be effective in harnessing the social and cognitive pressures associated with acculturation'. 57 Empirical evidence for this is also found in this work, and the case study on South Africa's engagement with the UPR is particularly enlightening. The fact that the state had improved its approach to the UPR across the three cycles to date substantiates the claim that repeated interactions with peers contributes to compliance. 58 Glušac's research is also evidence for the applicability of acculturation. 59 Their finding that the UPR contributed to changing attitudes in Norway, Sweden, and Italy toward the establishment of NHRIs is indicative of the social and cognitive pressures that state peers can apply. The idea that the UPR's impact is affected by its ability to socialise states is compelling and well evidenced. Yet a potential limitation of this theory is that it appears to understate the mobilisation of domestic actors in shaping states' behaviour. This is problematic in the context of the UPR because they are, as alluded to above, central to its process. In considering the influence of domestic actors, Goodman and Jinks suggest that it is a ' … mistake to assume that effective international human rights efforts need support from local advocates or domestic publics'. 60 Instead, they suggest that compliance can occur 'top-down' even in absence of domestic support or mobilisation. 61 To support this contention, they cite a number of studies that they argue demonstrate the role of international socialisation as opposed to domestic political interactions. For instance, certain observations from Hawkins and Humes are highlighted, including their finding that ' … international socialisation is more important than domestic politics' in getting ' … nonconformist states to change their policies to meet the standards of new international norms'. 62 Also cited is a study on the granting of women's suffrage which found that ' … countries apparently are affected much less strongly by internal factors and much more strongly by shifts in the international logic of political citizenship'. 63 Both studies suitably evidence the role of acculturation, but neither conclusively support Goodman and Jinks' contention that the significant involvement of domestic actors is not necessary for affecting change. Hawkins and Humes' study actually emphasises the need to 'exercise caution', stating that in some circumstances ' … we should not expect socialization to have a profound impact, especially in the short term'. 64 Instead, they propose that ' … state interaction is likely to create an initial discursive commitment that can only be deepened over time through the efforts of interested domestic groups'. 65 Equally, on the matter of women's suffrage, while it is true that the later period examined by the authors  demonstrates the influence of international-level factors, the granting of suffrage in the earlier period (1890-1930) was believed to be driven by states' strong civil society. 66 So these studies, far from suggesting that the significant involvement of domestic actors is not pivotal, reveal that it is an essential factor in driving state compliance. I do not suggest that acculturation (or constructivist logic more widely) is not at all suitable for appreciating the UPR's impact. Rather, it is probable that domestic mobilisation and acculturation operate concurrently, influencing compliance in tandem. This is the view of Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, who have sought to integrate constructivist and rational choice models. 67  search for complements between these two often competing perspectives, 68 yet argue that domestic factors still appear to be more prominent causal mechanisms. 69 Goodman and Jinks do not engage with these claims in their work. 70 Considering this in the context of the UPR, it may be that acculturation could explain why states commit to accepting certain recommendations; this could be what Hawkins and Humes refer to as the 'initial discursive commitment' that socialisation can facilitate. Domestic mobilisation, on the other hand, might be better suited to explain the impact of the UPR on the ground. With a view to evidencing this, the following sections outline the theory of domestic mobilisation and elaborate my central argument that this is a suitable framework for appreciating the mechanism's impact.

The Influence of Domestic Politics in the UPR
Domestic institutions and politics affect states' compliance with their international human rights obligations. Scholarship in this area supposes that ' … important sources of compliance lie inside the state' rather than outside, on the international plane. 71 States should not be understood as unitary entities but 'the sum of many different parts', 72 and each of these parts, institutions, or actors will necessarily affect states' practices. These players include those of the stategovernments, parliaments, courtsas well as private actors such as non-governmental organisations, pressure groups, and the media.
The domestic mobilisation theory works on the premise that international law is effective because it empowers each of these actors and provides them with the leverage or preferences necessary to legitimise their respective interests. 73 Simmons highlights three categories of actor that may benefit in this regard. For governments, an international body's treaty or decision could be used to justify an otherwise unpopular rearrangement of the state's priorities. 74 For litigants, international law that is incorporated domestically might be used as a basis for an argument that wouldn't be available in absence of that law. 75 Finally, civil society may refer to a treaty or decision of an international body to bolster their calls for change and support their mobilisation. 76  the operation of individual actors and their use of international law to pursue mobilisation.
Evidence for the validity of this perspective can be found primarily in the scholarship on first-order compliance with human rights treaties. Neumayer's modelling shows that it is primarily states with democratic institutions and strong civil societies that are most likely to improve human rights following the ratification of treaties. 77 Hathaway equally shows that the ' … strongest democracies may be more likely to adhere to their treaty obligations because [of] the existence of internal monitors'. 78 Building on this, Simmons argues that it is primarily domestic actors that utilise human rights instruments to enhance the protection of rights on the ground. 79 Their case studies showing the use of treaties to inform domestic litigation are especially telling. The Convention Against Torture (CAT) was clearly influential in affecting landmark decisions in Israel and Chile. Similarly, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has been used to facilitate changes in Japan and Colombia. In explaining why this occurs, Simmons suggests that ' … no one has a more consistent, intense interest in whether and how a government complies with its human rights commitments than the human beings on the ground in that country'. 80 Treaties, she claims, ' … provide highly legitimate focal points that help to clarify reasonable demands'. 81 As set out below, similar conclusions can be drawn in relation to the UPR.
Though it has found its application primarily in the context of treaties, domestic mobilisation is also argued to be central to second-order compliance. Donald and Leach have led the way in highlighting the contributions that state parliaments make in affecting decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. 82 This research would appear to reflect a more general recognition, in recent decades, of parliaments' capacity to influence state compliance. 83 The engagement of parliamentarians with the UPR is likewise considered pivotal for its impact. 84 Other international entities, such as UN treaty bodies, are also believed to have influence through states' domestic political processes, though there is comparatively less research examining this. One exception is Krommendijk's case studies on the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Finland. Krommendijk found the effectiveness of UN treaty body concluding observations (COs) to be best explained by the mobilisation of domestic actors in these states. 85 The case of New Zealand is particularly compelling, as it was found that COs were instrumental in driving forward policy initiatives to change the law on corporal punishment against children. Some scholars have begun to highlight the role that domestic politics play in affecting the UPR's effectiveness. Moss has argued that the most significant opportunities provided by the UPR to non-governmental organisations were not in Geneva but ' … internally in societies around the world'. 87 Carraro's interviews with officials engaged in the process also reveal the UPR to be effective in generating public pressure and enabling stakeholders to hold their governments to account. 88 Though these are important insights, neither piece elaborates on domestic mobilisation in any depth. Building on these nascent observations, this article will offer a more comprehensive application of the theory to the UPR.
Despite empirical support, the domestic mobilisation theory is not free from critique. Posner contends that domestic pressure would occur even in the absence of a human rights treaty, 89 accepting that domestic litigation may be influenced by human rights treaties but submitting that this 'happens rarely'. 90 The essence of Posner's argument is that international human rights are not effective tools to be utilised by domestic actors: they do not add anything valuable to the equation. It is questionable whether this claim can be substantiated, especially if we consider of empirical research noted above. At least in the text cited, Posner does not point to any research to evidence his claim. Simmons' work set out above clearly illustrates the potential for international law to influence the reasoning of courts in select countries. Far from being a rarity, international human rights instruments can and frequently have dramatically impacted the development and interpretation of domestic law, even where these are not directly effective in a state. 91 As shown below, UPR recommendations similarly enable improvements on the ground through, for instance, the development of action plans. Until it can be evidenced otherwise, it is therefore difficult to contend that international human rights have not proved an asset in domestic actors' toolboxes.
A second critique, as identified by Hathaway, is that the theory is of little use in research as it ' … has difficulty generating predictions' and could ' … be reduced to the unenlightening truism that if a country acts in a particular way, it must be because domestic politics made it do so'. 92 Admittedly, it can be difficult to draw a causal link between the acceptance or ratification of a certain instrument and activity within a states' political processes. It is not always clear, even upon close examination of, for instance, policy documents or parliamentary proceedings, whether international human rights considerations have informed a state's policies or laws. Yet scholars, including those noted above, have adopted multiple methods to evidence the validity of domestic mobilisation. When focusing on numerous states, for instance, research has turned to quantitative analyses of data to observe correlations between human rights and democracy 'scores'. 93  the other hand, have utilised document analyses or interviews to identify whether domestic actors utilise international human rights commitments to strengthen their claims. 94 For these reasons, domestic mobilisation is a suitable framework for understanding state compliance. I now set out why this is an especially strong lens through which to appreciate the UPR's impact.

Application to the UPR
The following two arguments serve to illustrate this. First, I expand on the initial observations from Part 2 on how the UPR's principles and modalities engage domestic actors at all stages of the process. This engagement has two effects: it initiates a continual dialogue between domestic actors on human rights in the state, which may in itself improve rights on the ground, and it provides those actors with information and recommendations which may empower them to push for change. Thus the mechanism can be understood as a catalyst for domestic mobilisation. Second, I suggest that the implementation of recommendations, an endeavour central to the UPR's impact, is largely dependent on the cooperation of various domestic actors. This further supports the notion that mobilisation is key determinant of success.
The UPR as a catalyst for domestic actor mobilisation As highlighted in Part 2, there are several opportunities for domestic actors to engage with the UPR process, reflecting the principle of stakeholder inclusivity. There is also a mass of scholarship and guidance on how stakeholders can participate in the process. 95 Yet to be considered, however, is how this involvement contributes to UPR's impact on the ground. I suggest that there are two ways the UPR may enhance domestic actor mobilisation and improve states' human rights compliance.
First, the UPR makes available a dialogue on the human rights situation between state governments and a myriad of other public and private actors which may, in itself, affect improvements on the ground. This is facilitated at all four UPR stages. During the prereview phase, discussions will be initiated through the 'broad consultation' required prior to the drafting of the national report. UPR Info's analysis of 84 national reports from the second cycle revealed that 94% of these included a specific section on the consultation methodology. 96 Though the credibility of states' claims in these reports could be open to question, this nevertheless indicates some level of dialogue broached between states and stakeholders at this phase. At the working group, the opportunity for inter-actor dialogue may not be immediately obvious given that civil society are excluded from presenting. However, the recommendations made by states, as noted earlier, often reflect those forwarded by domestic actors in their stakeholder submissions. 97 Thus the recommendations and responses to them from the state under review could be conceived as a form of discourse between governments and civil society. Post-review comes another 94 e.g. Krommendijk, 'The Domestic Effectiveness' (n 3). 95  avenue for dialogue as NHRIs and civil society organisations are offered the opportunity to present at the HRC plenary. Finally, during implementation, various domestic actors will necessarily be in conversation with governments to facilitate the translation of recommendations into law and policy. Voluntary mid-term reporting by states, though admittedly not commonplace, 98 is frequently observed to be undertaken in consultation with stakeholders. 99 Furthermore, as explored in more depth below, many domestic actors, not just state governments, contribute directly to the implementation of recommendations.
These avenues, made available through the UPR, facilitate ongoing communication between domestic actors and governments throughout its four-and-a-half-year cycles. Its cyclical nature may in fact make it particularly advantageous for domestic actors to utilise over other mechanisms. Kathryn McNeilly, focusing on the temporal ontology of the UPR, suggests that actors can develop ' … strategic action in harmony with the UPR cycle at the national level'. 100 Undoubtedly, the regularity with which its cycles run means that organisations can better plan and allocate their often-limited resources efficiently. Their roadmap for engagement is already mapped out. 101 This is not the case with other international mechanisms, such as the treaty bodies, largely because their review cycles do not operate with as much consistency as the UPR.
One question is whether dialogue alone can enable improvements in human rights on the ground. Evidence suggests that it may: multi-actor dialogue is believed to ' … establish a joint understanding between actors of their respective needs, opportunities and challenges' which may enable a ' … baseline for continued cooperation'. 102 Parallels can be seen in the literature on constitutional dialogue theory. It is moved that continual back-and-forth discussions between actors can improve the practice of interpreting, reviewing, writing, or amending constitutional text. 103 Though most often applied in the context of interactions between state institutions, notably courts, it applies equally in the case of other domestic actors. 104 In the case of the UPR, existing research provides a number of examples where dialogue in itself has proven fruitful. One is the conversations facilitated between the Kenyan executive and Kenya's Stakeholder Coalition for the UPR (KSC). Etone explains how the UPR enabled discussions on issues such as sexual orientation and the death penalty, 105 which, UPR Info claim, ' … contributed to building a mutual understanding of each other's needs, opportunities and challenges in the implementation phase'. 106 Admittedly, Kenya's subsequent UPR revealed few improvements on the ground for LGBT persons, and the death penalty remains a lawful sanction for certain crimes. 107 Over time, however, repeated conversations and increased domestic actor mobilisation could facilitate change.
UPR Info's research is also replete with examples of effective multi-actor dialogue stimulated by the mechanism. In Botswana, recommendations to hold debates on the death penalty, though not implemented by the government, led to civil society events and a subsequent government commitment to commission a study on the issue. 108 Côte d'Ivoire, too, found discussions on human rights between the government, NHRI, civil society, and parliamentarians to be invigorated following its third UPR in 2019. 109 This led to the creation of an action plan for implementing UPR recommendations. Other notable cases in this regard include strengthened alliances between civil society organisations in India, 110 the use of UPR recommendations to inform advocacy in Canada, 111 and the adoption of an action plan following the 'Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue on UPR Implementation' in Sierra Leone.
It is also important to note that the discursive avenues created by the UPR may not have been available in its absence. The principle of universality means that all states are subject to the process, and that all human rights issues, regardless of states' treaty obligations, are up for discussion. Reflecting again on the example of Kenya, the issues of sexual orientation and the death penalty, discussed at the UPR meetings, are particularly divisive. Given this, the domestic actors making up the KSC may have found it difficult to engage individually with the government without the avenues provided through the UPR. Indeed, the fact that governments appear more inclined to engage with the UPR when compared with other monitoring mechanisms is most reliably demonstrated by the fact that all member states have participated in the process. Greater receptivity to the mechanism has also been noted in existing research on the UPRs of other sub-Saharan African states, 112 Australia, 113 China, 114 and Egypt, 115 and in relation to specific human rights issues such as minorities and Indigenous peoples. 116 Reflecting this evidence, UPR Info claim that [w]hile it may be true that governments are not willing to engage with civil society on human rights that they are actively undermining, the UPR has, like no other UN human rights mechanism, called upon states to engage in dialogue with civil society. 117 Consequently, even if domestic actors were to find other means to facilitate a dialogue on human rights, it is possible that these engagements would not be as fruitful at those offered through the UPR.
The second way that the UPR facilitates mobilisation is by bringing transparency to states' human rights performances, thereby empowering domestic actors. Through their engagement with the process, they are likely to benefit from an enhanced understanding of human rights and the issues faced in their realisation. Furthermore, this information is easily accessible through the public database of UPR documentation held on the OHCHR's website. 118 As the only international mechanism with 100% participation to date, the UPR has shed light on human rights issues in all 193 UN member states. The literature on domestic mobilisation suggests that this may contribute to state compliance. Simmons and Creamer explain that ' … transparency and human rights appear to be mutually reinforcing'. 119 Greater transparency may ' … encourage more organisation and mobilisation by civil society groups, who use this information to put pressure on the government to change its human rights practices'. 120 Dai equally considers that international institutions that provide information can ' … facilitate compliance with international agreements'. 121 The wealth of material produced through the UPR process may therefore empower domestic actors to better hold decisionmakers to account. Recommendations, especially, may be referred to in political discourse to legitimise and bolster actors' calls for change.
One critique of this view is that information from the UPR process, along with its recommendations, may not be viewed as especially strong or legitimate leverage. This partly echoes Posner's earlier scepticism over whether international law is really empowering. In the context of the UPR, there is some substance to this. Its state-led, politicised nature has sometimes led its recommendations to be criticised rather than utilised by domestic actors. A notable example are the views of some UK parliamentarians on the UK's second UPR recommendations. One is noted to have referred to the UPR as ' … like being lectured by Attila the Hun on the peaceful co-existence of nations', while another said it was 'breath-taking' for states with 'appalling records' to 'lecture' the UK. 122 Such views evidence scepticism over the legitimacy of the UPR's recommendations.
Yet these remarks are ill-founded. Civil society contributes significantly to the UPR process and its influence over recommendations means it is hardly devoid of legitimacy. This is reflected in the practice of many actors who use the outcomes of their states' UPRs to develop human rights action plans. A survey of these suggests that the recent surge in their adoption is actually the result of the UPR, and that many utilise its recommendations as the basis of these plans' indicators or outcomes. 123 This was the case in Scotland, where ' … outstanding recommendations from international human rights bodies' (such as the UPR) were used as the basis for the 'National Action Plan for Human Rights' (SNAP). SNAP was facilitated through discussions with domestic and international NGOs and has enabled improvements in human rights through, for instance, the integration of human rights into the policy and practices of health and social care bodies. 124 New Zealand adopted a similar approach following its second UPR. 125 That states' recommendations are utilised in this way shows that the UPR is viewed as a legitimate and useful tool. By empowering civil society like this, and by supplying avenues for dialogue, the UPR catalyses and facilitates the mobilisation of domestic actors.
Thus far, the opportunities for domestic actor engagement have been analysed. The article now turns to a deeper look at the final phase of the UPR cycle. I suggest that the implementation of UPR recommendations,a factor critical to the mechanism's impact,is dependent on the collaboration of an array of domestic actors. This further corroborates the claim that the mobilisation of these actors is central to the UPR's success.

Implementation and the necessity of inter-actor mobilisation
The successful implementation of UPR recommendations can contribute to state compliance and improve human rights on the ground. It is no surprise therefore that scholars highlight this phase of the UPR cycle as being of particular importance. Sweeney and Saito rightly suggest that this ' … is most critical as it will answer the question whether the UPR is capable of fulfilling its primary objective of "improving the situation on the ground"'. 126 Yet implementation is not something that can be achieved at the international level,only domestic actors can facilitate it. Moreover, it is not something that governments alone can do. They will, of course, have a critical role to play in developing and actioning relevant policy but, as Hillebrecht reflects in the context of international tribunals, '[n]o single domestic actor, not even the strongest executive, can satisfy all of the tribunals' mandates, legally or logistically'. 127 The same can be said of the UPR: the mobilisation and cooperation of numerous actors is fundamental for achieving implementation. This was highlighted at the 2018 'Annual high-level panel discussion on human rights mainstreaming', which insisted on ' … the need for strong coordination of implementation efforts at the national level'. 128 The UNHRC equally encourages states to establish 'National Mechanisms for Reporting and Follow-up' (NMRFs) which, inter alia, enable coordinated working between actors. 129 Illustrating implementation to be an exercise of coordinated mobilisation can be done by pointing at the role of three actors, as follows.
First, state parliaments. These institutions have not previously featured much in the literature on state compliance, 130 though this may be because they have only recently been recognised as central human rights actors. Parliaments are primarily important in the context of the UPR because they hold responsibility for the passage of legislation and play a key role in holding executives to account. On the former, it is estimated that over 50% of recommendations require parliamentary intervention. 131 Most notable are those concerned with the ratification of treaties, 132 a task that often requires the passage of legislation. Some UPR recommendations may also entail the creation or amendment of states' bills of rights, a constitutional matter that will likely necessitate the assent of parliaments. For this reason, UNHRC Resolution 35/29, on the 'Contribution of parliaments to the work of the Human Rights Council and its universal periodic review', acknowledges ' … the crucial role that parliaments play in, inter alia, translating international commitments into national policies and laws'. 133 Even where legislation is not necessitated for implementation, parliaments, particularly their human rights committees, will assist with the work of the executive. Their role is reflected in the HRC's Draft Principles on Parliaments and Human Rights (Draft Principles), which specify the mandates, responsibilities, and composition of effective human rights committees. 134 Key here is the function of overseeing ' … the work of the Government in implementing recommendations of international and regional human rights mechanisms' (such as the UPR). 135 This oversight includes scrutiny of the government's work, but can also involve a more collaborative element through the provision of expert advice to departments. 136 Parliaments thus carry out undoubtedly important functions in the context of implementation, and their mobilisation is necessary to maximise the impact of the UPR across states.
The second key actor involved in implementation are NHRIs. These are bodies ' … established by a Government under the constitution, or by law or decree, the functions of which are specifically defined in terms of the promotion and protection of human rights'. 137 The Paris Principles is the key international instrument elaborating the competences and responsibilities for NHRIs, one of which is contribution to implementation. They suggest that NHRIs should ' … promote and ensure the harmonization of national legislation, regulations and practices with the international human rights instruments to which the State is a party, and their effective implementation'. 138 In practice, this is often achieved by monitoring and advising on states' fulfilment of their human rights obligations. A constant dialogue with parliament in this regard is particularly important, with the Belgrade Principles emphasising that a joint strategy for following up international recommendations should be developed. 139 Numerous examples exist of NHRIs actively contributing to the UPR's impact. Most notable are those that have enabled the development of action plans which outline concrete steps for the implementation of recommendations. Both the plans developed in Scotland and New Zealand, mentioned above, were headed by their states' NHRIs and were informed by UPR recommendations. 140 These institutions are also believed to help ' … stimulate dialogue between government and civil society'. 141 Furthermore, numerous recommendations directly implicate NHRIs. Glušac has noted that '[r]ecommendations relating to NHRIs are in the group of the 15 most repeated issues in the UPR, making up 3.71 per cent of all recommendations in the first two UPR cycles'. 142 It is clear that these recommendations could not be implemented successfully without the cooperation of NHRIs. For this reason, and for their work facilitating the implementation of other recommendations, these bodies are fundamental in ensuring the success of the UPR.
Finally, various non-state actors contribute considerably to implementation. This is reflected in Resolution 5/1, which specifies UPR outcomes are to be ' … implemented primarily by the State concerned and, as appropriate, by other relevant stakeholders'. 143 It is likely due to privatisation, among other factors, that non-state actors have been drawn into the provision of public services and, as a result, the realisation of human rights. Fraser explains that the roles of state and non-state actors have changed as a result of this. 144 Certain human rights areas, Fraser suggests, are particularly affected, including ' … water, electricity, prisons, transport, education, and healthcare'. 145 A fair proportion of UPR recommendations concern these areas: those relating to detention and the right to education are the sixth and seventh most prominent across the UPR's three reviews to date, together accounting for 11% of all recommendations. 146 Some recommendations even specify that certain actions are to be carried out by private-sector actors. 147 In sum, without the contribution of various players at the national level, implementation, and thus the success of the UPR, is likely to be limited. This further illuminates my central argument that domestic mobilisation is a suitable framework for appreciating the impact of the UPR.

What about transnational actors and advocacy?
A reasonable critique of the arguments forwarded so far is that they fail to recognise the functions played by transnational players. Other theories of state compliance highlight the important function played by these advocacy groups, either alone or in tandem with domestic actor mobilisation. Most notable is Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink's 'Five-Stage Spiral Model' which understands compliance to be driven by transnational advocacy networks who work with domestic actors to influence state governments. 148 Particularly where domestic actors find themselves repressed and unable to challenge their governments alone, these networks can work with international organisations and more liberal states to apply bilateral and multilateral pressure. The most notable example of transnational advocacy in the UPR process is that carried out by UPR Info, an international NGO working to enhance the role of civil society in the UPR. Their Pre-Sessions, taking place in advance of states' working groups, are a clear example of the synergy between domestic and international human rights organisations. Transnational advocacy has proven especially critical in the UPR process when governments have restricted the contributions of domestic civil society. Although there are other cases, Sudan is a prime example. During the UPR Info Pre-session, in advance of its second UPR, civil society representatives were prevented from attending and delivering their submissions. 149 Domestic mobilisation was therefore stymied by the Sudanese government. In response, various transnational actors (UPR Info, the International Federation for Human Rights, the African Center for Justice and Peace Studies, and Birmingham City University's Centre for Human Rights) formed a coalition to deliver a statement in their absence. 150 Thus transnational advocacy was vital for ensuring that the UPR of Sudan received input from stakeholders.
Despite evidence of the impact of transnational advocacy, it is questionable whether this theoretical lens can explain the UPR's impact in most cases. Simmons explains that while transnational advocacy may be the ' … only possible compliance mechanism in cases of extremely repressive regimes', most states are not at that extreme. 151 The ' … chain of demands is attenuated and likely to be weak' with transnational advocacy, 152 while domestic actors, who are the actual beneficiaries of the rights elaborated at the international level, ' … are the ones who carry the ball and take the risks'. 153 They are also the actors with the strongest incentive to mobilise. 154 It is perhaps for these reasons that Donald and Leach posit that ' … theories based upon the transnational dynamics of compliance … have given way to a focus on compliance as the outcome of domestic political bargaining and collaboration'. 155 If it is those on the ground who benefit from their state's engagement with the UPR and the implementation of its recommendations, they are the actors most empowered by the UPR process, and the most likely to push for states to take appropriate action following their reviews. In sum, while the work of transnational advocacy should not be discounted, domestic mobilisation plausibly plays a greater role in affecting the UPR's impact.

Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to argue that the UPR's impact can, at least in part, be explained by domestic actor mobilisation. This is a departure from current literature on the UPR, which emphasises the mechanism of acculturation, a theory that appears sceptical about the power of domestic actors. I suggest that this scepticism is questionable, not least in the context of the UPR, where such actors play a significant role. Two arguments, informed by evidence in existing research on the mechanism, have served to illustrate this.
First, the UPR can be understood as a catalyst for mobilisation. It stimulates domestic actors by providing them with an effective and often otherwise unavailable avenue for dialogue with their governments. This in itself can generate improvements in human rights. Furthermore, the provision of information and recommendations on states' human rights performances can empower domestic actors to use this as a tool to legitimise and bolster their claims for change. Second, the process of implementation is an inherently national exercise that will, in some cases, only be achievable through the collaborative mobilisation of various domestic players, not least parliaments, NHRIs, and non-state actors.
If we appreciate, as I have argued, that the UPR's impact is shaped significantly by domestic actor mobilisation, then there are implications for both practitioners and scholars. Regarding scholarship, work on the UPR to date has been largely state-centric in its approach. That is, its focus has been on examining the engagement of 'the state', as a unitary entity, with the mechanisms; it has neglected the actions (or inaction) of the important domestic actors highlighted above. Admittedly, civil society organisation engagement with the UPR has received generous attention, 156 but other actors, such as parliaments, 157 NHRIs, 158 and private actors require more study. In particular, empirical research could be carried out to investigate whether the practice of these actors is consistent with UN guidance and resolutions. If it is not, then deducing why may enable domestic mobilisation to be enhanced and the impact of the UPR to be maximised. Similarly, if further reform to the modalities of the mechanism is contemplated, providing further avenues for domestic actor engagement should be a priority.
For human rights practice and advocacy, greater change could be achieved by actors banding together to form coalitions,a practice already encouraged by UPR Info. 159 This creates a louder voice for change which may affect political pressure on governments to act. Equally, for those organisations and advocates not yet engaging with the UPR, it should be seriously considered whether and how resources could be allocated to utilise the mechanism. Integrating the UPR into their work may be a useful means to further pursue policy objectives. As a catalyst for mobilisation, the UPR has the potential to empower domestic actors and maximise states' compliance with their international human rights obligations. This would fundamentally contribute to the promotion and protection of rights on the ground.