The roles they play: change in China’s climate leadership role during the post-Paris era

ABSTRACT China’s rise has accelerated expectations for it to step up as a climate leader – a role that has thus far been expected from developed countries. This article explores how China communicates its role to the international audience: is the role of global climate leader being increasingly seen as an appropriate one for China? From a role-theoretical perspective, it studies how China’s expectations changed during the post-Paris era 2016–2021. The article shows that China adapted its climate-leader role 2016–2020. However, a more apparent change in the role in 2021 exemplifies role learning. The article concludes that China has shifted the auxiliary role of climate leader to a more central position in its role set, reinforcing its master roles of responsible great power and leader of the developing world. Understanding China’s emerging leadership is crucial for recognizing the global variability of climate leadership conceptions, particularly in non-western contexts.

intergenerational responsibility. However, Buzan admits that all of these would require significant symbolic and material changes. This article explores Buzan's (2021, p. 1) claim that the present climate leadership vacuum offers 'a golden opportunity for Beijing to assume the role of a global leader'. In this study, I address the following issue: how have China's expectations changed for its climate-leader role during the post-Paris era? In addition, given these expectations, how does China position itself vis-à-vis others in global climate governance?
Academic interest in China's position within global climate governance has recently accelerated with a shared understanding that China's power in global climate politics has undeniably increased in the post-Paris era. Regardless of this shared understanding, Zhang (2022) recognizes a research gap in how the change in China's position is interpreted, particularly how the dynamics and conditions of the change are understood. The symbolic interactionist approach to role theory offers a beneficial theoretical frame to capture these dynamics of role change. It does not define role change solely resulting from changes in the international structure like the more structural approaches of role theory suggest. Instead, the actor interprets and chooses the most appropriate role for the context and, through this, creates a role relationship in contrast to others (Wehner & Thies, 2021). The role-theoretical approach enables understanding that China might have the material capabilities to play the role of a climate leader, but how China plays and changes the role depends on social interaction (e.g. Wehner, 2015). Therefore, an analysis of China's climate leadership should also include a view of 'the meaning and implication of how China communicates itself to the world' (Yang, 2022, pp. 2-3). To grasp whether there is a change in how China communicates the appropriateness of its global climate-leader role during the post-Paris era, I analyzed China's climate-and developmentpolicy documents, speeches, and press conferences 2016-2021 with qualitative content analysis.
In this study, I claim that during the post-Paris era, China's climate-leader role has become an auxiliary role for China's two master roles previously identified in role literature: responsible great power and leader of the developing world (e.g. Duggan, 2020;Thies & Nieman, 2017). Auxiliary roles form the active components supporting the realization of the master role (Kesgin & Wehner, 2022). Climate leadership is an issue-specific role with a limited reach (e.g. Breuning & Pechenina, 2020); hence, I do not consider it a potential master role. With this approach, I recognize that China plays several foreign-policy roles simultaneously and contribute to the recent discussion about the dynamics between state's master and auxiliary roles (e.g. Breuning & Pechenina, 2020). This dynamic relation is analyzed by applying a role change typology  to China's auxiliary role. This study concludes that China adapted its climate leadership role for 2016-2020, but a more apparent change in the role specifically for 2021 exemplifies role learning. China has shifted the auxiliary role of climate leadership to a more central position in its role set, reinforcing its master roles as a responsible great power and a leader of the developing world. The concurrent reinforcement of these master roles suggests that instead of a conflict in China's role set, there seems to be a conflict between the internal and external expectations of who can play the role of a climate leader.

Constructivist role theory
Role theory has achieved prominence due to its abundant conceptual toolbox and its applicability for analysis on three levels, including individual, state, and the international system; however, it has received criticism for the excessive focus on structure and material power as role determinants (Wehner & Thies, 2014). This criticism is targeted mainly to the first and second waves of role theory: Wehner and Thies (2021) characterize the first wave with Holsti's (1970) categorization of roles states can play and the second wave (the 1980s-1990s) with a structural approach to great power rivalry and material power. With this study, I partake in the third wave of role theory (the 2010s-2020s) that has developed as a response to the earlier criticism (Wehner & Thies, 2014. Instead of socialization into pre-existing roles, this third wave, based on constructivism and symbolic interactionism, emphasizes the actor's agency in playing and changing the roles while shaping the social structure (Breuning, 2019;Wehner & Thies, 2021). Thus, it recognizes the actor's agency but simultaneously understands that structures enable and constrain the potential roles of a state (McCourt, 2012).
Much research relies on the role definition proposed by Harnisch (2011), who views roles as social positions or socially recognized categories of actors that explain how the actor views itself, who the actor is in relation to others, and how the actor should behave socially according to the role. Thus, roles are intertwined with the state's identity. To briefly explain the difference between a role and an identity, I value Thies's (2015, p. 295) clarification that active roles provide 'snapshots of identity at a particular time, while the full role set gives a larger sense of historical identity'. Harnisch (2011) distinguishes between roles that are, on the one hand, more constitutive of the group and, on the other, more functionally specific roles. A leadership role in climate politics combines both of these attributes, since leadership requires recognition by others, as the basis of legitimacy, but it also has a functional role, as a (metaphorical) verb between the leader and other actors (Nabers, 2011). Roles comprise ego expectations, meaning the 'domestic and/or individual expectations as to what the appropriate role is and what it implies' and alter expectations, defined as 'implicit or explicit demands by others (counter-roles or complementary roles, audience cues)' (Harnisch, 2011, p. 8). In role theory, the other is categorized as a generalized other as 'an abstract reference point' and a significant other, emphasizing those actors important for challenging or accepting the role conception (Harnisch, 2011, pp. 11-12).
The added value of symbolic interactionist approach to role theory concerns particularly role change. Particularly in the case of rising powers, the change in their social identities and foreign policies should not be presupposed to result explicitly from their strengthening material capabilities, but the analysis needs to recognize also other domestic and international events (Thies & Nieman, 2017). The scale of role change varies from adaptation to enacting a new role and can occur rapidly or more gradually with shifting nuances and adjustments (Wehner, 2020;Wehner & Thies, 2021). In contrast to the broader and arguably more stable concept of identity (see for example, Yang, 2022), approaching China's climate leadership as a role during a short period of 2016-2021 enables the exploration of the nuances and adjustments in how China's role is communicated.
One primary explanation for role change is tension, which can grow into an intra-role conflict between the ego-and alter expectations or an inter-role conflict between actors' different roles (Harnisch, 2011). Harnisch et al. (2011) develop a typology that divides role change into adaptation, learning, and transformation. They explain role adaptation as the 1st-degree role changeincluding dimensions of changing the instruments and strategies in playing the rolebut holding onto the old role rationale with stable foreign policy goals. Whereas the 2nd-degree role change, role learning, requires shifting or developing new beliefs or skills and changing one's foreign policy goals. Finally, transformation is the final 3rd-degree role change encompassing changing one's identity and interests. Harnisch et al. (2011) complement the typology with mechanisms causing the change. However, as this study is not a comprehensive exploration of the others' response to China's role, I only apply the degree and dimensions parts of their typology.
Although the mechanisms and sources of role change are well-theorized (Gurol & Starkmann, 2021), role change between different roles requires further understanding. To create awareness of foreign policy behaviour, Breuning (2011) calls for more research about the circumstances in which the role change occurs gradually and radically. In addition, more understanding is required about the difference between roles changing into new ones and roles becoming more apparent in the actor's role set (Breuning, 2011). If a role dissonance between the master and auxiliary roles becomes salient, it tends to lead to abandoning or modifying the auxiliary role (Breuning & Pechenina, 2020). In this study, I apply the role change typology by Harnisch et al. (2011) to analyze the dynamics between China's master and auxiliary roles. With this focus, this study contributes to understanding role change in a case where the master and auxiliary roles are compatible.

Climate-leader role and China
Since the 2009 Copenhagen summit, China has developed a more constructive strategy. For instance, during 2013-2016, China began to cooperate with the United States (US) in building momentum to reach an agreement at the 2015 Paris summit. In 2017, the same year that President Trump announced the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, President Xi Jinping claimed climate leadership for the first time by announcing that China would be taking a driver's seat in global climate action (Xi, 2017). The US withdrawal created an opportunity for China to strengthen its role in global climate governance (e.g. Gurol & Starkmann, 2021). Yet, in the material, China's efforts to show increasing climate ambition became more frequent only during 2020-2021. For example, in 2020, President Xi Jinping announced China's carbon neutrality goal for 2060 at the UN General Assembly. Then, in 2021, Xi promised that China would no longer build new coalfired power projects abroad. In addition, in the same year, the party-state published a 1 + N policy framework including several documents, which anticipate the achievement of peak emissions before 2030 and the attainment of carbon neutrality by 2060. The momentum intensified after the election of US President Biden; the two states published a joint declaration at the 26th UN Conference of the Parties (COP) in Glasgow in 2021 emphasizing the need to accelerate climate action.
Despite these changes, China's growing emissions are the world's greatest as measured in absolute terms, its short-term climate objectives are criticized as too weak, and the carbon-neutrality target year is projected too far into the future (CAT, 2022). China's role straddles the persistent dichotomy of developed and developing countries in global climate politics, even as it is, in its own words, 'the largest developing country' (CPAACC, 2019). Nevertheless, China's growing economic, military, and political capabilities have increased the demand for it to carry greater international climate responsibility.
The global variation in climate-leadership perceptions has been understudied, yet leadership's emergence, practice, and legitimacy rely on the cultural and temporal contexts (Case et al., 2015;Moan & Hetland, 2012). Thus, conceptions of global leadership vary among prospective leaders (Kristensen & Morgan, 2018). Considering the notable western-centrism of the current climate debate (Chakrabarty, 2017;Doyle & Chaturvedi, 2010), the degree to which others' positions are understood might facilitate negotiations by decreasing conflicts . Leadership studies have primarily focused on developed countries such as the US and the EU (Parker & Karlsson, 2018). However, recently scholars have shown increasing attention to China's climate leadership (see for a review, Zhang, 2022). Regardless of the recent interest, China's leadership role seems ambiguous as interpretations of its willingness to lead vary. On the one hand, China is interpreted as being a climate advocate for developing countries (Qi & Dauvergne, 2022), as a pick-and-choose climate leader (Gurol & Starkmann, 2021), or as a yinlingzhe (leading state) with shared leadership (Yang, 2022). On the other hand, there are suggestions that China could simultaneously play the part of climate leader and villain (Meidan, 2020). Regardless of the increasing interest in China's role, many studies conceptualize role more generally. Only a few studies analyze China's climate leadership following the role theoretical frame; Gurol and Starkmann (2021) focus on how compatible roles can reinforce climate cooperation between China and the EU. Hurri (2020) explores the alter expectations for China's climate leadership.
Outside China, more studies exist about conceptualizing climate leadership as a role. A study by Kilian and Elgström (2010) analyze the EU's climate-leader role. Following their conceptualization of a climate-leader role, as a starting point, I also rely on Underdal's (1994, p. 178) frequently applied definition of leadership as 'an asymmetrical relationship of influence, where one actor guides or directs the behaviour of others towards a certain goal over a certain period of time'. The possibilities of leadership studies to role theory are not yet fully explored (Wehner & Thies, 2021). Particularly the leadership perceptions of rising powers can provide an understanding of how they conceive the constraints and possibilities of their changing positions (e.g. Kesgin & Wehner, 2022).
Despite the still narrow scope of role-theoretical studies on China's climate leadership, the roletheoretical interest in China has been increasing, particularly since the 2000s (Duggan & Naarajärvi, 2015;Gottwald & Duggan, 2011;Harnisch et al., 2016;Thies, 2015; for an overview of China's roles, see Thies & Nieman, 2017, pp. 117-127). To understand the dynamics between China's various roles, I have taken my starting point from these role-theoretical studies focusing on China's role in global governance. In these studies, there is a widespread understanding that China has been playing two master roles: responsible great power and leader of the developing world. Duggan (2020) argues that in global economic governance, China aims to attain ontological security by simultaneously holding on to both historical identities. Therefore, I conceptualize China's climate leadership as an auxiliary role for both master roles, the leader of the developing world and responsible great power.

Material and method
Role theory has been criticized for its weak methodological discussion (Wehner, 2020). Wehner (2015Wehner ( , 2020 has been developing a more interpretative methodological take with the recognition that roles are discursively constructed. Following Wehner's example, this study focuses on the language the foreign-policy elite utilizes. While acknowledging the relevant critique by Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) that the question of whether the role conception of these elites can truly represent an entire country has mainly remained unanswered in many role-theoretical studies, I have scoped out the possible domestic contestation of this role. The intention is not to treat the Chinese foreign-policy elite as if they represented the entire country, particularly because studies have shown the complexity of the Chinese decision-making process (Demirduzen & Thies, 2021;Teng & Wang, 2021). Rather, the focus is on analyzing China as an international actor and, instead of the local and national levels, to explore the role China is playing vis-à-vis its significant others in global climate negotiations. The material comprises mostly official climate-policy statements (Table 1), and, in Breuning's (2011) words, they already represent the outcome of that domestic debate. Therefore, as I aspire to understand China's foreign-policy behaviour, rather than to focus on how socially shared the role is within China, Breuning recognizes this as an agreeable strategy. Due to the interest in how China communicates its position to an international audience, i.e. in the case of Five-Year Plans (FYPs), the analysis relied on the English translations of the documents. The focus is on the post-Paris era because China has not previously been required to reduce its emissions, so it views the Paris Agreement as having begun a new phase in global climate governance (CPAACC, 2016). The analysis was enhanced with observations on-site at COP24 in December 2018, the Bonn conference in June 2019, COP25 in December 2019, and COP26 in November 2021.
I analyzed the material with qualitative conventional content analysis because, according to Hsieh and Shannon (2005), such an analysis typically enables grasping the phenomenon on a deeper level as the categories are obtained from the data during the analysis. I coded the material into categories, describing leadership based on questions guiding the analysis: (1) Is climate leader seen as an appropriate role for China, and (2) Is the expectation positive (it is seen as an appropriate role, which China has at least partially enacted) or negative (it is seen as an appropriate role, but China has not yet achieved the leadership). In addition, I observed how China located itself in relation to the significant others in the material.

Change in China's climate-leader role
China explicitly defined its role in most documents as playing 'a positive and constructive role in international negotiations on climate change'. However, based on the analysis, how China played the climate-leader role changed during 2016-2021. In 2018, the idea of 'torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological civilization' was added to describe China's role together with the earlier concepts of 'important participant and contributor' (CPAACC, 2018). The claim for a leadership role became stronger, particularly in 2021; for instance, the torchbearer description was utilized increasingly. In addition, the development of China's role was described to have 'gradually moved onto the center stage of global climate governance' (CPA, 2021, p. 27). With the help of textual analysis, I formed categories based on how China's leadership role was constructed in the material. The analysis showed that some categories remained stable 2016-2021, some strengthened in 2021, and some new categories appeared in 2021. To clarify this dynamic, the results are presented with the help of the role change typology introduced earlier .

Role stability
During the analysis, many categories remained steady, suggesting that these parts of China's climate-leader role did not change during 2016-2021. One of these stable categories was China's support for multilateralism and UN-centrism, which is not a unique development for global climate governance, but aligns well with China's position more broadly in international relations. China has been strengthening its participation in international organizations since 1979, and the number  (2021) 1 + N policy framework documents: Action Plan (2021) Working Guidance (2021) 1st Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) (2016) Updated NDC (2021) Long-term Strategy (2021) China's speeches and press conferences at COP22, COP23, COP24, COP25, and COP26 of memberships has grown from 34 to 202 in 2002 (Duggan & Naarajärvi, 2015, p. 946). In the material, China also viewed the UN as a potential forum, where the developing countries' voices can be reinforced. In addition, UN-centrism was seen as a criticism of unilateralism and protectionism. For instance, the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the planned carbon border adjustment tax by the EU were listed as unilateral acts threatening the collective effort of addressing climate change (CPAACC, 2019).
In the material, China continuously affirmed the importance of the three major climate agreements, the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement, and defended them from being renegotiated. Although, as an attempt to support multilateralism, this also reveals much about China's long-term wish not to change the architecture of developing countries' differentiated positions (Qingzhi, 2017). Despite China's strengthening leadership claim in the material, it has continued to urge developed countries to fulfil their obligations and take the lead in tackling climate change. As an advocate of the developing world, particularly the historical responsibility for climate change was argued as the reason why one-size-fits-all solutions should not be adopted. In addition, China was frequently claimed to have shown instrumental leadership in the conclusion of the Paris Agreement.
China's responsibility was constructed in the material by underlining China's long-term commitment. China was highlighted as having always 'fulfilled its commitments 100% based on the national circumstances' (CPAACC, 2019, p. 32). In most cases when China's quantitative climate targets were mentioned, they were emphasized as having been reached ahead of schedule or as having exceeded the target level. As achieving targets ahead of schedule was such a distinguishable trend in the material, it suggests that the current targets could also be achieved successfully in advance. However, this trend questions the ambition level of the targets if they are frequently easy to achieve.
Another trend identified throughout the research period is the guidance of FYPs and the Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization. China's climate policies closely adhere to its development; China's strategic goal is 'to complete the construction of a moderately prosperous society in an allaround way by 2020 and to create a prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally developed and harmonious modern socialist country by the middle of this century' (NDC, 2016, p. 20). Besides the vision of a community with a shared future and sustainable development, the concept of ecological civilization has played an important role in China's climate policies and was added to the CCP constitution already in 2012 (Kopra, 2019). Instead of being reduced to a concept or a governmental framework, Hansen et al. (2018) have emphasized that ecological civilization should be understood as 'the most significant Chinese state-initiated imaginary of our global future' and the 'CCP's promise to the Chinese population' (196, 201, respectively), which continues to support economic growth and production, solve environmental challenges with technology and science, and to promote increased environmental awareness among the people through social control and education. Although having begun as a national vision, in the material, there is a continued effort to promote ecological civilization internationally. Hansen et al. (2018) have identified the same effort and argue that ecological civilization is a rare governmental example of global environmental foresight visions on the global level. Such foresight as to how an actor could be a different, ecological great power, for example, have been developed more in academia (for example for Russia, see Tynkkynen, 2019).

Role adaptation
During 2016-2021, the climate-leader role was increasingly viewed as an appropriate one for China, and this trend strengthened in 2021. These strengthening categories found in the analysis are examples of 1st-degree role change, role adaptation, meaning that China was changing the instruments and strategies of how it played the climate-leader role. One example of changing strategy was that the documents in 2021 made an increasing number of explicit leadership claims when in contrast, between 2016 and 2020 China's leadership was constructed more implicitly. This change was evident in energy claims. China was argued as: (a) being a global leader in wind power and PV power-generation technology and output; (b) having 'led the world in PV capacity additions for eight consecutive years', (c) having the largest installed capacity for new energy storage in the world; and (d) having a significant role in lowering the global prices for clean energy (CPA, 2021). Besides energy, the material included claims that China leads the world in, for instance, greening the planet with the highest growth in forest coverage and 'offering its approach to global climate governance through building a green silk road' (CPA, 2021, p. 29).
A second example of strategy modification is how domestic contestation was acknowledged in the material. After the announcement of the enhanced climate targets in 2020 and 2021, there was an increasing tendency in the material to gain more public support and avoid domestic contestation against the 2030 and 2060 goals by carefully justifying them. New targets were explained as a 'mustdo in order to relieve the serious constraints imposed by resources and the environment on China's economic growth and to achieve sustainable development' (CPA, 2021, p. 4). The claims targeted to avoid domestic contestation included ensuring that citizens' lives would remain normal, alleviating poverty, building awareness of the policy priorities for officials at all levels, and developing a performance system with sticks and carrots to guide regions, organizations, and individuals to accomplish their goals. The language concerning the burden-sharing on China's national-level also strengthened. For instance, all regions, departments, and enterprises were encouraged to shoulder more responsibility. Particularly, state-owned enterprises were called 'to strengthen their ability to take the lead' (Action Plan, 2021, p. 5). While the focus was on China as an international actor, this strengthening trend to gain public support for the climate goals is a critical reminder of how important national, social, and political stability is for China's leadership (e.g. Gottwald & Duggan, 2011).
The third example of role adaptation shows how the criticism towards the Global North strengthened in 2021. In the material, it became evident that the closer it came to 2020, the less trust there was in global climate governance; this year was the deadline for developed countries to provide the promised new and additional climate funding to developing countries. China argued that achieving the pre-2020 commitments was a key building block for trust 1 and that developed countries' support should correspond to developing countries' actions. 2 Failure to provide funding support strengthened the criticism towards the Global North, which occurred in statements such as 'the strong should not abuse the weak' (CPA, 2021, p. 30).

Role learning
The previous examples of role adaptation suggest that China's climate-leader role was only modified in 2021, while the role rationale remained the same in the examples. However, the year 2021 stood out in the material with new categories appearing on how the leadership role was communicated. Instead of role adaptation, these new categories can be seen as examples of a greater change in the role, suggesting a 2nd-degree role change in 2021. Role learning manifests as shifting or developing new beliefs or skills and changing one's foreign policy goals (e.g. Harnisch et al., 2011).
One example of changing policy goals was the carbon neutrality announcement in 2020, which partially explains the new categories in 2021. The announcement enabled the emphasis on the Chinese exceptionality. President Xi argues that if the 2030 and 2060 goals are achieved, then China, the largest emitter in the world in absolute terms, would achieve 'the world's "sharpest drop" of carbon emissions, using the "shortest time" to go from the carbon peak to carbon neutrality' (Carbon Brief, 2022). According to the claims, this achievement would distinguish China from the developed countries' development paths, as it would accomplish neutrality 'in a much shorter time span than what many developed countries might take' (NDC, 2021, p. 5). China's announcements in 2020 and 2021 were argued to urge and inspire other nations to act accordingly.
In addition, an example of a new belief was that climate leadership was no longer argued as having been achieved. Instead, the analysis showed that new, more transparent claims appeared in 2021 about what China could achieve. For instance, in 2021, there were several promises to make more significant contributions, move faster, and redouble China's efforts. Moreover, these claims did not occur only in climate policy documents, but also in the 14th FYP mentioning that China would lead international cooperation on climate change.
Another example of developing new beliefs or skills in 2021 was the weight granted to implementation: China emphasized that commitments are nothing without action. At COP26, Xie Zhenhua stated that China is different in the sense that 'whenever we make a commitment, we take real action and honor commitment 100%'. 3 China was justified in 'walking the talk' as it had already started ensuring the achievement of 2030 and 2060 goals by releasing the 1 + N policy framework (CPA, 2021). Bringing increased credibility to these goals, they were often personified in the figure of President Xi, for example, when major announcements were specifically described as being made by Chairman Xi Jinping.
Finally, a third example of shifting beliefs in 2021 concerns how China's strengthening climate contributions were justified by China having entered a new stage of development. In this new stage, development must be green, and to achieve high-quality development, China is required to respond to climate change (CPA, 2021). The aim is not only to reduce emissions, but the attempt is a more comprehensive transition in which climate goals permeate 'the whole process and every aspect of economic and social development' (Action Plan, 2021, p. 1). This new development philosophy does not represent a step away from former conceptions, but is thoroughly applying Xi Jinping's Thought on Ecological Civilization. The fact that the ideas concerning China's new development philosophy are also included in the documents submitted to the UNFCCC makes the philosophies an inherent part of how China plays its leadership role in global climate governance.

Discussion
The analysis results showcase the explanatory power of the third-wave role theory as they combine a role's material and ideational elements. Climate leadership is increasingly demanded of China in the institutional setting of the UNFCCC: because of the diversifying, developing country group; China's growing emissions and capability; accelerating climate change; and due to the collective responsibility that the Paris Agreement requires. All these reasons compel China to review its position. In addition, China has an interest in climate leadership in the material sense in consequence of its renewable development; finally, more and more countries rely on China's renewable technology and rare earth materials. Besides the material factors, from an ideational perspective, the auxiliary role of a climate leader has potential to strengthen, as it is highly compatible with China's two important master roles: responsible great power and leader of the developing world.

Climate leader as China's auxiliary role
Despite the changes occurring in 2021, there were no signs in the material of 3rd-degree role change, role transformation, which would have required evidence of changing identity or interests. Instead of an identity change, in the material, the climate-leader role formed an active component advocating the realization of the responsible great power and leader of the developing world master roles. Hence, the analysis supported my claim of climate leadership being an auxiliary role for these two master roles. The combination of playing a developing-country role and a great-power role simultaneously was visible in the material, as China emphasized the unification with developing countries regardless of its rise to great-power status. This combination was crystallized well in the explanation as to why President Xi promised to reject new coal-fired power projects abroad in 2020: this decision was described in terms of China stepping up 'support for other developing countries in developing green and low-carbon energy' and as 'manifesting China's sense of responsibility as a major country' (CPA, 2021, p. 28). Therefore, to understand the change in the climateleader role during the post-Paris era, such a change needs to be viewed in the larger context of master roles.
In the material, the leader of the developing world was one of the most powerful themes. The stability of China's developing-country identity was emphasized with statements such as: 'Remarkable socio-economic progress has been achieved since China launched reform and opening-up 40 years ago. Yet China's international status as the world's biggest developing country remains unchanged' (China's Policy Paper on the EU, 2018, p. 1). Being the advocate for the Global South was justified also by frequently positioning China as a builder of fairer global climate governance and adhering to the CBDR principle. In the 14th FYP, it is evident that China's request for fairer governance not only covers global climate politics, but indeed covers the whole global governance system. In the FYP, China promotes 'the construction of a new type of international relations 'a concept utilized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also in the past (Kopra, 2019). In the material, the request for fairer governance is still constructed as part of China's peaceful development by avoiding conflicts and supporting the UNFCCC and multilateralism.
China's role as the leader of the Global South has a long institutional history and spans beyond global climate governance and the post-Paris era. China has acted as 'the self-declared voice of developing and emerging nations' not only at the World Trade Organization (WTO) but also at the G20 forum (Gottwald, 2016, p. 133). Regardless of the growing international pressure and developing countries' increasingly differing interests, China has managed to present its interests as common priorities of the Global South at the UNFCCC (Qi & Dauvergne, 2022). Qi and Dauvergne conclude that the leading developing country role benefits China in building trust, preserving its negotiation alliances, and strengthening its discursive power at the UNFCCC. China's soft power within the Global South (for example, in the forms of loan offers, debt relief, and infrastructure projects) is important for China, particularly in international organizations where the developing countries offer vast potential support for China, for instance, in voting (Kopra, 2019). Although China has actively supported the differentiated responsibilities for developed and developing countries, the material indicates that the South-South cooperation increasingly targeted the most vulnerable groups within the Global South, including small island developing states, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and African countries. In the material, the role of leader of the developing world is one that is carefully being played, not in terms of a hegemonic leader role butregardless of its superior soft and hard poweras a partnership between equals.
Although the argument for developed countries' historical responsibility remained stable throughout the material, China's adherence to the other master role, the responsible great power role, seemed to advance particularly in 2021. This responsibility was constructed, not on the basis of its high level of emissions but, rather, strengthened during the same year that the US returned to the negotiation table, pinpointing the importance of Sino-American cooperation. The material demonstrates that the responsible great-power role was constructed particularly in relation to the US. The key figure in China's climate politics, the special climate envoy Xie Zhenhua, said at the COP26 that 'as the two major powers in the world, China and the US shoulder special international responsibilities and obligations' 4 in addressing climate change. Before COP26 and the China-US Glasgow Declaration, their special international responsibilities were previously proclaimed in the Sino-American climate declarations of 2013-2016 before the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. In the material, the great-power role was also constructed together with the increasingly important significant other, the G20. For instance, China positioned itself as having the power to push for and to set the agenda for the G20 (14th FYP; CPAACC, 2019).
In previous studies, China's close alignment with the developing-country group G-77 has been considered evidence that, instead of climate leadership, China wishes to play the role of climate advocate for developing countries (see for a review, Qi & Dauvergne, 2022). This similar assumption is visible, for instance, in the expected role conflict between China's developing country and major power roles (Gurol & Starkmann, 2021). As both of these master roles were simultaneously reinforced in the material together with the climate-leader role, the analysis suggests that from China's perspective, there is no role conflict between its roles. Therefore, viewing China's alignment with the South only as a refusal not to carry out its international obligations in climate politics leads to a narrow view of China's interests in positioning itself within the arena of global climate governance. Instead of an inter-role conflict in China's role set, there seems to be an intra-role conflict between the internal and external role expectations. While it might be possible that China will abandon its master role of leader of the Global South at some point, the mentioned role conflict should not be taken for granted without a justification or a clarification about the nature of the role conflict.
Regardless of the greater change, in 2021, the auxiliary role is still utilized to fulfil the same foreign-policy goals of building responsibility as a great power and leading the Global South. Hence, if the auxiliary role is analyzed in the broader context of these two master roles, then the role rationale seemed not to change even in 2021. The little-researched changing dynamics between the master and auxiliary roles, their interwoven nature, and the recency of the change complicate understanding whether the role change in 2021 can be explicitly explained by role adaptation or learning as there are signs of both. Previous studies have also identified this challenge (e.g. Gurol & Starkmann, 2021). The boundary between 1st-and 2nd-degree role change, between role adaptation and role learning, is not explicit because roles seldom change rapidly, but the centrality of a role in an actor's role set strengthens or weakens gradually (e.g. Breuning, 2019). The 2021 change can be better explained with role learning than role adaptation because the 2021 results demonstrate a greater change in the auxiliary role than role adaptation, which would require only the changing of instruments and strategies with a stable role rationale. However, the change in 2021 does not represent a radical, sudden change but strengthens the gradual development of 2016-2020, during which the auxiliary role of climate leadership emerges as a more central element of China's role set. It is in China's interest to pursue this auxiliary role consistent with its master roles because, otherwise, China could be socialized out of either the auxiliary or master roles.

Review of China's role
China's strengthening claims on climate leadership in 2021 can be questioned from the viewpoint of saying one thing and doing another. This incoherence was visible, for instance, in promoting an increase in oil and gas reserves and production (14th FYP 2021), while arguing ambitiously for climate aims. Differences between role conception and actual role behaviour not only concerns China but has also been disclosed in many role-theoretical studies . I assume this to be particularly true with climate-leader role since no power declared as a leader has managed to reduce emissions sufficiently (e.g. Plehwe, 2022).
Symbolic interactionist role theory emphasizes that besides the social structure, China has the agency to play and change its role acknowledging its capabilities and alter expectations (Wehner, 2020;Wehner & Thies, 2021). Therefore, China's leadership role is shaped in the social ego-alter interaction and can be only partially understood by analyzing China's argumentation. Although a comprehensive analysis of alter expectations falls outside this article's scope, how China plays the leadership role still requires a brief critical review.
Throughout the material, the number of significant others that China named increased. This increase highlights its attempt to construct a position of a bridgebuilder in global climate governance: a strategy that China has been developing since the Copenhagen Summit in 2009 (Shen & Xie, 2018). How China positions itself crosses the traditional Global North-South division by reinforcing cooperation in both directions but also with the major economies of the G20. China frequently mentioned fully subscribing to the statements made by the developing-country grouping G-77, which created an impression of it as China's most important significant other. Other coalitions appearing as significant others were the BASIC group encompassing emerging countries Brazil, South Africa, India, and China and the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) comprising a block of 24 developing countries. In addition, the material indicated that developed countries (particularly the US) and the EU appeared as China's significant others. Among all these diverse actors, China's bridgebuilder role was constructed as being important, describing it as essentially to 'extensively coordinate and communicate with all parties on key issues and guide key parties to reach consensus' (CPAACC, 2019, p. 28). The contradiction in how China criticizes the developed countries, but still aligns with the US and other major economies, easily exemplifies not only the challenging Sino-American relationship but also China's unique position, where it needs to carefully balance alter expectations from the Global North and South.
The material depicts China's increasing claims on achieving climate leadership particularly in 2021. However, developed countries have not acknowledged China's climate leadership during 2016-2018; by contrast, they have only recognized China's potential for structural leadership (Hurri, 2020). Did the changes in 2021 alter the external expectations or is it too early to tell? Due to the recency of 2021, COP26 provides one of the few possibilities to review how China's significant others respond to the change in the UNFCCC context. At the COP26 press conferences by the US and EU, China was criticized for lack of leadership on two matters. Firstly, President Xi's absence at the COP26 was castigated by President Biden when he challenged: 'how do you do that and claim to be able to have any leadership mantle?'. 5 Secondly, China's carbon-neutrality pledge was disrespected, as the target year was 2060 instead of 2050 (many, particularly developed countries, have promised similar pledges for 2050). In addition, the LDCs highlighted in their press conference that the G20 nations should aim for carbon neutrality by 2050. However, regardless of the critical stances of the US and EU, when asked if the LDCs were worried about President Xi not attending the COP26, their response was to characterize a multilateral process as one that does not single out one country but, rather, the fact that the big emitters reduce their emissions sufficiently. 6 Furthermore, China justified President Xi's absence with the ongoing global covid pandemic during the conference.
On a more positive note, in 2021, China was also credited with demonstrating leadership in renewable development and the China-US Glasgow Declaration. The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted that the US is falling behind China in the renewable energy revolution and emphasized that 'if we don't catch up, America will miss the chance to shape the world's climate future in a way that reflects our interests and values' (Blinken, 2021, p. 4). The China-US Glasgow Declaration at the COP26 was well received for its great political importance by Executive Vice-President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans. However, he also emphasized that the EU was many steps further along in climate action than the US and China. 7 Furthermore, the US Special Presidential Envoy for Climate, John Kerry, commended President Xi's interest in climate change and hoped that their bilateral cooperation would accelerate China's climate action, pushing for the emission peak to be reached sooner. 8 Particularly the Chinese claim of making the sharpest drop from an emission peak to carbon neutrality seems not to be acknowledged as ambitious by China's significant others. Nevertheless, great powers are often reluctant to grant leadership to other powers, a situation challenging the analysis of the leader-follower relationship (Hurri, 2020). In China's case, the situation is even more complex, as its soft power is frequently rejected on the global level since it does not share the ideas and norms of democratic states (Kopra, 2019). These differences in worldview increase misunderstanding of the role signals and -identification (Harnisch, 2011). For instance, there is plenty of evidence on the challenges in the China-US relation in situations where one has tried to altercast the other into a role; but these efforts have failed due to the lack of a shared sense of identity (Thies, 2016). On the one hand, this might complicate the two major emitters in cooperating with one another. On the other hand, Buzan (2021) views this as an opportunity for the climate; if China attaches its climate ambition too closely to Sino-American cooperation, it only follows business-as-usual politics, i.e. inaction. Therefore, Buzan emphasizes China's superior abilities in implementing significant changes rapidly on the large scale, which it could utilize in its clean energy transition and, through this, gain followers from both the Global South and North. This optimism is welcomed since, in 2022, Sino-American cooperation faced new challenges after Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Nancy Pelosi's (the speaker of the United States House of Representatives) visit to Taiwan. All in all, others' recognition of China's climate leadership seems to require greater changes in China's contributions and rhetoric than the ones presented in the material in 2021. However, analysis of others' responses to the 2021 change needs to have a longer time perspective than it was possible in this research's scope.
Finally, it was evident that China is aware of the expectations for its role. Nevertheless, being aware of these expectations does not straightforwardly mean that China would follow them. In the material, China strongly opposed the idea that it would be a follower of others' requests; but addressing climate change is China's initiative due to domestic requirements for sustainable development and 'to fulfill its due obligation to build a community with a shared future for mankind' (NDC, 2021, p. 1). China wanting to highlight domesticrather than internationalforces as the primary influence on its foreign policy is not unique to climate governance, but is recognized also in the communist view of China (Gottwald & Duggan, 2011). Argumentation for domestic motives exemplifies China's effort to reject being socialized or altercasted by its significant others. The possibility of the EU and US socializing China into the prevailing order diminishes with China's rise (Harnisch, 2016). Instead of developed countries' expectations, China's position seems to be even more dependent on the developing countries' support if it wishes to uphold its master role as the leader of the developing world. Developing countries are voicing increasing criticism of China and China's South-South policies should not be presumed to undeniably lead to inclusive developments (Qi & Dauvergne, 2022;Verkhovets & Karaoğuz, 2022).

Conclusions
In this study, I have analyzed, from the perspective of role change, how China communicates its expectations for its global climate-leader role on the international level during the post-Paris era. According to the results, there are no signs of change in China's identity in 2016-2021, which would be required for the 3rd-degree role change, role transformation. Instead, the results supported my claim that, during the post-Paris era, the climate-leadership role can be analyzed as an auxiliary role for China's master roles of responsible great power and leader of the developing world. The leadership role was often utilized to reinforce these master roles. By strengthening climate leadership, China can better gain support from the Global South and increase its hard and soft power as a great power. Coming back to the claim mentioned earlier by Buzan (2021), these results seem to suggest that China is increasingly aware of the 'golden opportunities' that climate leadership could offer for its potential role as a global leader.
According to the analysis, the 2016-2020 period exemplifies the 1st-degree of role change, that of role adaptation. During this time, the Chinese foreign-policy elite increasingly constructed climate leadership as an appropriate role for China. Role adaptation was visible in the way that China changed its strategies in playing the role. For instance, China added torchbearer to its self-description and attempted to receive international recognition for its vision of ecological civilization. During this time, however, the change can be described as rather moderate with many elements remaining stable 2016-2020. The visible change in the material in 2021 represents the 2nd-degree of role change, role learning. Role learning requires changing foreign-policy goals, evidence of which in the material included both abandoning China's 'previous development model that damaged or even destroyed the eco-environment' (CPA, 2021, p. 3) and aiming for the sharpest drop from emissions peak to carbon neutrality. Role learning occurs also as shifts or developments in new beliefs or skills, which includes justifying that the new development stage enables China to carry greater responsibility.
Nevertheless, the change in the material cannot be described as a radical one, nor as a claim for hegemonic climate leadership. Instead, China emphasizes the rejection of unilateralism and hegemony, and underlines China's peaceful development. These can be seen as counterarguments to the China-threat discourse, proving that China is carefully balancing the risks and opportunities of expanding its role. China has hesitated to claim a leadership role in international politics (Chen et al., 2018;Qi & Dauvergne, 2022). Therefore, it is unlikely to see any hegemonic climate leadership claims by China, but instead an effort to build collective leadership (Yang, 2022).
Understanding how China plays and changes the leadership role in the ego-alter interaction and on the limits of its material capabilities is important for understanding how it is expected to behave (e.g. Thies, 2015). As this study covered China's expectations, further research is required to improve the understanding of how China's significant others respond or accept these strengthening leadership claims. Based on the few examples of COP26, although China's leadership was welcomed in renewable energy development and bilateral cooperation with the US, a greater change is needed for others to acknowledge China as a climate leader. This change is also required from the perspective of the Paris Agreement goals in order to reach the 1.5°C path.
Climate change will remain on the agenda of international politics; therefore, it is increasingly important to understand the interface of how China communicates its role and how other key players of global climate governance position China. In this context, this study discussed a conflict between the internal and external expectations in how China's role is interpreted. In China's communication, the roles of responsible great power, leader of the Global South, and climate leader were played simultaneously without salient tension. However, the external expectations suggest a conflict in China's role set. If China's alignment with the Global South is unequivocally considered an example of China's unwillingness to lead, it implies that an actor could not simultaneously play the roles of a climate leader and a developing country. This difference in internal and external expectations underlines the importance of building awareness of who can play the role of a climate leader and how China's rise constrains and allows its role choices. Can China hold onto its developing country identity and simultaneously play a climate-leader role, or can these roles be justified as mutually exclusive?
In this study, I have analyzed the dynamics of a role change in a case where the master and auxiliary roles are compatible; hence, the auxiliary role strengthens. Increasingly complex challenges (such as climate change) generate the need for more functional specialization; thus, the number of roles that states play is growing . Therefore, understanding role change between different auxiliary roles or between master and auxiliary roles is increasingly relevant and deserves more scrutiny in the future. Besides role theory, understanding China's emerging leadership is crucial for recognizing the global variability of climate leadership conceptions, particularly in non-western contexts.