Two sides of a coin? The security-development nexus in Brazilian diplomacy and military

ABSTRACT The military and diplomacy would be two sides of a coin, two means of following the national interest. Regarding the security-development nexus, that should not be different: soldiers and diplomats are subordinate to the governments to which they respond. This article aims to compare how the nexus is articulated by Brazilian diplomacy and armed forces in official speeches and documents. The main hypotheses are that (1) a great deal of congruence is to be expected, and (2) different audiences would require Foreign and Defence Ministries to shape the security-development nexus differently. To investigate these hypotheses, the article relies on combined content and discourse analysis. The results indicate that the security-development nexus is differently articulated by diplomacy and the military, depending on their audiences and objectives.


Introduction
In 'Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations', Raymond Aron famously argues that '[s]trategy and diplomacy will both be subordinate to politics, that is, to the conception on the part of the collectivity or its leaders of the "national interest"'. 1 For Aron, military and diplomatic means would be two sides of a coin, two means of following the national interest. This article intends to investigate whether the same duality is identified in the security-development nexus as it is conceptualised in Brazilian defence documents and diplomatic speeches.
The emergence of the security-development nexus is usually identified in 1949, presented in Harry Truman's inaugural speech. During the Cold War, both superpowers made use of economic and development strategies to reward allies and promote their ideology. 2 Some authors, however, claim that the nexus can be identified even before Truman's speech. Hettne 3 argues that the security-development nexus can be traced back to the eighteenth century and it has been changing ever since. The author initially associates the idea of development with the illuminist ideal that emerged during the 1700s. The economic doctrines formulated at that time were primarily focused on enhancing national wealth, and state security would be a by-product of that process. In the nineteenth century, after the Industrial Revolution, the idea of development was shaped by economic and military rivalry and corresponded to the need to establish heavy industries, seen as a means to national strength and security. After the II World War, the concept of development was once again reformulated, internationalised and associated with economic processes, especially poverty in the Third World. 4 However, the US soon tried to associate the concept with security from the Cold-War perspective, claiming that underdevelopment would be a threat because it would open the country's doors to communism. 5 In the late 1980s, Hettne argues that development became associated with (neoliberal) globalisation. After the end of the Cold War, it is possible to identify a shifting of paradigms in security, which became to include not only states, but also individuals. In the 1990s, following the eruption of intrastate wars, collapsing states and 'new wars', and other threats to the idea of territorially defined state order, the concept of security became progressively broadened to encompass new ideas, that is, the security-development nexus was taking the shape it is usually understood today. After the end of the bipolar order, the security and development agendas were merged in a less opportunistic way -less associated with national interests. They became more inclusive, transparent, and attentive to social themes such as post-conflict reconstruction, eradication of poverty, human security or responsibility to protect. 6 In that context, Hettne argues that the development discourse was stretched to include governance and nation-building, justifying external interventions as a more coercive form of international assistance to development. Development became securitised, and 'the nexus' was taking form. The 'nexus', in these discourses, typically refers to mutually constitutive goals and strategies to achieve them, although this time with the 'subject' increasingly being the human instead of the state. As noted above, implied in concepts such as 'human security', 'human development', 'humanitarian emergency' and 'humanitarian intervention' was the idea of a transnational responsibility for human welfare: the responsibility to protect. 7 If the security-development nexus was stretched during the 1990s, the 11 September accelerated that process. Following the terrorist attacks on the US, the securitydevelopment nexus became even more securitised. The most extreme facet of that process would be the War on Terror, converting the nexus into counterinsurgency. 8 However, Jensen argues that the same process can be identified on a sub-national scale, in the case of the war on gangs in Cape Town. 9 To go beyond the US-centred narrative, Edmunds argues that European armed forces have historically played a number of domestic roles, especially those related to nationbuilding. The military has not only a symbolic contribution to the idea of the nation itself through conscription, but has also provided manpower to infrastructure projects, and aid in times of crises or catastrophes. 10 However, since the end of the Cold War, European national governments have aggregated new functions to the armed forces and the security-development nexus has intensified. 11 Those processes, nevertheless, assume different shapes and colours depending on internal and regional characteristics and contexts. Following the post-colonial critique, it would be imprecise to assume that there is a universal concept of security. 12 It is acknowledged that the connection between security and development is now a common consideration in national and global policymaking. 13 However, there is still little exploration into the multiple meanings and applications of this relationship, which can vary even between agencies within the same state. 14 The same is true for the nexus.
The security-development nexus is a remarkably diverse topic, encompassing issues such as 'failed' states, peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, and counterinsurgency. 15 While recognising the plurality of the debate, this article focuses specifically on how this topic is treated in Brazil. 16 As noted by Jesperson, the combination of security and development into a nexus is not superficial: 'Actors are drawing on traditionally separate epistemological approaches and creating new policies and tools to address the complex challenges of post-conflict reconstruction'. 17 There is no natural, self-evident relationship between security and development, 18 and those concepts and the links constructed between them can be strong justificatory devices for policies and resource allocation. 19 Even though most of the scholarship tends to focus on the securitydevelopment nexus from a European standpoint, Latin America -and Brazil -have specificities.
Centeno and Ferraro argue that, in Latin America, the perception of low state capacity has been one of the driving forces behind greater military engagement in internal roles. 20 In the Brazilian case, as pointed out by De Carvalho and Lima in the introductory article, civilian and military elites played a significant role in promoting that perception. Therefore, in Latin America, the military has traditionally been seen as a development agent. 21 If, in Europe, the Cold War resulted in Armed Forces' greater attention to interstate threats -especially those resulting from the bipolar dispute -the same has not happened in Latin America, where those internal roles have never faded into the background. 22 In recent years, the high participation of the military in internal roles across Latin America remains. 23 This movement, however, results not only from the military sector, but the armed forces have been called by civil elites and society in general to assume those roles. Harig and Ruffa call this process 'pulling': 'empirical phenomenon of civilian governments that are expanding military roles or deferring political authority to the armed forces to the extent that potentially weakens civilian control of the armed forces'. 24 The 'pulling' can be attributed to the acceptance of the military's internal roles among political and military elites and society in general, usually associated with the perception of insufficient state capacity. 25 Brazil is no exception in Latin America. As demonstrated in the introductory article of this special issue, the search for development has been one of the most relevant objectives of the Brazilian government since the first half of the twentieth century, 26 with lasting consequences for diplomatic and military planning. D'Araujo argues that it was as early as the 1920s that the Brazilian armed forces started associating the preservation of sovereignty and modernisation with economic and technological development. That perception was strengthened during the II World War, when the inauguration of the country's first steel mill paved the way for the establishment of defence industries. To the Brazilian Armed Forces, industrialisation was a necessary condition for the maintenance of national independence. 27 When it comes to diplomacy, Cervo argues that it was during the 1930s that the Brazilian government articulated the 'developmentalist paradigm', and development has been the main goal of Brazilian foreign policy ever since. 28 Additionally, civilian elites have been paying less attention to the national security policymaking process -a process Lima, Silva and Rudzit call 'national security neglect'. Hence, the security sector has become increasingly militarised, inhibiting effective reforms that challenge military prerogatives. 29 This article intends to contribute to understanding the conditions of possibility for the 'pulling' and 'national security neglect' process to emerge in Brazil.
Nustad has shown how discourses of development are not simply responses to determined problems, but they actually shape the reality to which they refer. 30 McNeish and Lie argue that the security-development nexus can also present possibilities for responses, resistances and manipulation of power. 31 According to Buzan and Hansen, '[f]oreign and security policies therefore do not arise from objective national interests but become legitimated through particular constructions which are not free-floating or "just words", but follow a specific set of rule-bound games'. 32 While investigating the tensions that may arise from the security-development nexus, Jesperson argues that different actors or institutions may develop contrasting, even conflicting ideas of the nexuswhat the author calls 'institutional tensions'. 33 Kent has investigated this phenomenon in the United Kingdom when the government established Conflict Prevention Pools. 34 Bearing that in mind, this article compares how the nexus is articulated by Brazilian diplomacy and armed forces in official speeches and documents: National Defence Policy (NDP), National Defence Strategy (NDS) and Defence White Papers (WP), United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Brazilian opening speeches and Brazilian Foreign Ministers inaugural speeches.
The main hypotheses are that (1) the security-development nexus has a specific configuration in Brazilian diplomatic and military discourses, (2) a great deal of congruence is to be expected, however (3) the different audiences and political objectives would require Foreign and Defence Ministries to shape the security-development nexus differently, revealing an institutional tension between them.
'Security' and 'development' are not stable, neutral concepts. Instead, they are discursive constructions deeply embedded in social practices, able to empower subjects, design political possibilities and create the preconditions for action (or inaction). Following Stern and Öjendal, On the one hand, they ('security' and 'development') can be seen as the tools of scholars and policy analysts to describe and analyse macro processes in international affairs and to generate knowledge; on the other, they are used by actors applying these concepts to prescribe processes and determine outcomes. Importantly, as critical scholars have convincingly argued, they can also be seen as discursive constructions that produce the reality they seem to reflect, and thus serve certain purposes and interests. Surely, the power of definition over 'development' and 'security' also implies the power to define not only the relevant field of interest, but also the material content of practices, the distribution of resources, and subsequent policy responses. 35

Materials and methods
To contrast how the security-development nexus is articulated by Brazilian diplomacy and the military, two sets of documents will be analysed. The first consists of Brazilian opening speeches in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the available inaugural speeches of the Ministers of External Relations (shown in Table 1). On the one hand, the opening speeches in the UN are significant because they are the primary means of expressing the country's perspectives and beliefs on the world order to an external audience. On the other hand, the inaugural speeches offer the major guidelines orienting the diplomatic actions during each minister's term to the internal audience. The analysis starts in 1985, the year of the end of the military regime in Brazil.
The time frame of the analysis is restricted to the Brazilian current democratic period, which started in 1985, because was during the 1980s that the dominant idea of the security-development nexus took shape. 36 The analysis of the texts was carried out in two phases. Initially, the texts were subjected to qualitative content analysis. The documents were uploaded to the software Atlas.ti and descriptive codes 37 were manually added to significant excerpts. The primary code was 'Security-development nexus' and all the sentences that established a nexus between defence/security and development were highlighted. After that, codes for regions or themes that appeared associated with security and/or development were added. Finally, the excerpts in which the diplomatic discourse referred to the military or vice-versa were also coded. Codes were, then, aggregated into themes to facilitate the analysis: nexus, regions, themes, and cross-referencing. Table 2 presents the complete codebook. The objective of the coding was threefold: to organise the information, to facilitate accessing fragments of the documents and to allow the analysis of code cooccurrence. Note that, for the code to be applied, it is not sufficient for the term to be mentioned; it must also be an integrant part of a claim or argument developed in the document or speech.
The second phase of the investigation was to subject the texts to discourse analysis. Discourses are defined as 'systems of meaning production that fix meaning, however temporarily, and enable actors to make sense of the world and to act within it'. 38 To evaluate how the concepts of security and development (and their nexus) have been articulated since Brazilian democratisation, this article employs an 'elastic discourse  [T]he best way for the UN to work for peace is to work for democracy.
(UNGA opening speech 1985) Nuclear Sector Reference to the need for nuclear disarmament or the strategic importance the nuclear technology.
The nuclear sector is of strategic value. In its own nature, it transcends the limits between development and defence. (NDS 2008) Peacekeeping Reference to peacekeeping as a contribution to peace and security In such operations, the Armed Forces will act under the guidance of the United Nations, or in support of the initiative of multilateral organisations from the region, since the strengthening of a collective security system is beneficial to world peace and to national defence. (NDS 2008) Regional Integration Reference to regional integration as capable of promoting peace.
This integration not only will contribute to the defence of Brazil, but it will also allow the country to promote regional military cooperation.  ) analysis' 39 strategy, which maps meaning to search for changes in discourses over time, analysing how relations between signs change, emerge, or disappear over time. Different discursive arrangements mean different ways to make sense of the world and to act within it, and different political possibilities. Atlas.ti analytical tools were used to generate code-document and code co-occurrence tables. This computer-assisted analysis is designed to organise the textual data to support the discourse analysis and facilitate identifying links between ideas among the texts. This multi-method approach, combining computer-assisted content analysis with discourse analysis, can quickly identify themes and patterns in vast amounts of texts while at the same time advancing the analysis beyond simple quantification of terms. 40

Results
In general terms, there is remarkable consistency in the regional and thematic focus of both diplomatic and military documents. The differences, however, reveal the 'reality' the Foreign Ministry and the armed forces want to create and the policies they want to promote. It is important to note that the fact that one region or theme is absent is not indicative of the administration's preferences or actions, only that it was not used in the discursive articulation of the referred document or speech.

Defence documents
Amongst regions, the Amazon receives a great amount of attention from the military documents as a critical defence concern for several reasons: 'protection of biodiversity, mineral resources, water, and energy-production potential' (NDS 2020). That is hardly surprising, since there has been strong military interest in the region for more than a century, intensified after the second half of the twentieth century: Although military attention to the Amazon originated in the colonial and imperial periods and in the First Republic , it was only in the 1950s that more robust initiatives in relation to the Amazon were drafted by the Brazilian state, with the crucial participation of the Armed Forces. 41 Besides the valuable resources of the Amazon region, its large extension, low demographic density, precarious infrastructure and justify reinforced military attention: The Brazilian Amazon, with its great potential for mineral wealth and biodiversity, is the focus of international attention. The guarantee of the presence of the State and the vivification of the border region are hampered by the low demographic density and long distances, associated with the precariousness of the land transport system, which conditions the use of waterways and air transport as the main alternatives of access. These characteristics facilitate the practice of transnational illicit and related crimes, and enable the presence of groups with objectives contrary to national interests (NDP 2005).
The other critical defence concern is the South Atlantic region. Similarly to how the military documents approach the Amazon region, the South Atlantic is seen as valuable for its natural resources, but the relevance of the international maritime trade links is also highlighted. Furthermore, all the analysed documents stress the relevance of the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) (for more on that, see Edwards's article in this issue). In the last decade, defence documents started to refer to the Brazilian exploitable zones of the South Atlantic region -which include the country's exclusive economic zone and continental shelf -as the 'Blue Amazon', which evince the parallels the armed forces trace between the two regions: The South Atlantic is an area of geostrategic interest for Brazil. The protection of existing natural resources in the waters, in the bed and in the marine subsoil under Brazilian jurisdiction is a priority of the country. Deterrence should be the first strategic stance to be considered for the defence of national interests. The exploration and exploitation of the Blue Amazon® and the use of maritime communication lines in the South Atlantic will continue to be vital for the development of Brazil, requiring the intensification of capabilities to provide Maritime Security. In addition to this security, it is important to expand an environment of cooperation with beautiful countries in the South Atlantic, mainly through their Navies (WP 2020).
That strategic interest and monitoring and surveillance needs are used to justify military investments and strategic projects both in the Amazon and the South Atlantic: 'The SISFRON [Integrated Border Monitoring System] will allow the Army to keep its borders monitored and respond promptly to any threat or aggression, especially in the Amazon region' (WP 2020); and 'An essential part of the Navy's Nuclear Program is the construction of the reactor for the Brazilian conventional nuclear-powered submarine, which will considerably increase Brazil's defence capability in the South Atlantic'. (WP 2020). Even though Brazil does not have an official territorial claim to Antarctica, the region is mentioned in all of the defence documents as a strategic maritime area of greater priority and importance, usually associated with Comandante Ferraz Antarctic Station, inaugurated in 1984 and operated by the Navy. 42 South America is considered strategic, but different from the Amazon, South Atlantic and Antarctica, not a region to be protected. The focus is on integration, which is seen as beneficial to national security and regional peace: South American integration remains a strategic objective for Brazilian foreign policy. The country acknowledges the deepening of political, social and economic relationships among South American countries as a fundamental element for social and economic development and for the preservation of peace in the region (WP 2012). Santos 43 argues that the idea that 'South America' constituted more than a geographic region has been constructed by Brazilian diplomacy in 1993, during the first term of Celso Amorim as Foreign Minister. 'South America' was designed as a conceptual and identitary response to the crisis of the idea of 'Latin America' that resulted from Mexico's participation in the North American Free Trade Agreement. Progressively, Brazilian diplomacy begin to promote South American identity in official speeches -as it is indeed seen in the UNGA -and palpable results were drawn: the first-ever summit of South American presidents was held in 2000; on that occasion, the countries created the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America, the first initiative of the kind to encompass the whole region; in 2004, the Community of South American States was created, and, in 2008, it increased its competences and changed its name to Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).
During the Lula and Rousseff administrations, special focus was placed on the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a regional organisation created in 2008, and its South American Defence Council. However, after the impeachment of Rousseff in 2016, UNASUR was labelled an ideological project of Lula and, in 2019, the country withdrew its membership. 44 After that, we read only generic mentions of the importance of regional integration. If South American integration is perceived as strategic, the same is not true for Latin America's.
Nuclear disarmament is recurrently claimed to be a necessary condition for peace, with justifies its presence in all defence documents. However, as Noda argues in this issue, the development of nuclear technology is regarded as strategic, usually associated with development: '[t]he nuclear sector for peaceful purposes is of strategic value. On its own nature, it transcends the limits between development and defence' (NDS 2008).
The participation in peacekeeping missions was highlighted by every government as a Brazilian contribution to world peace: 'in such operations, the Armed Forces will act under the guidance of the United Nations, [. . .] since the strengthening of a collective security system is beneficial to world peace and to the national defence' (NDS 2008). Furthermore, the country stresses that those operations should be based on four elements: 'security, institutional building, national reconciliation and development' (WP 2016). As stated by De Carvalho in his article about MINUSTAH in this special issue, Brazil transposed the idea of security-development nexus as perceived internally to the country's ideas about peacekeeping operations.
The last theme is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reform, a traditional topic in Brazilian international discourse. The reform is deemed necessary not only to reflect the emergence of actors from the Global South, but also to enhance the Council's legitimacy and efficacy in the pursuit of international peace in security.
A renewed Security Council should reflect the emergence of new actors, particularly from the developing world, who are able to contribute to overcoming the challenges of the international agenda. Only structural reform, with the creation of new permanent and nonpermanent seats and the improvement of its working methods, will contribute to the decision-making of the body, which affects the entire international community, to be taken in a more representative, transparent, legitimate, and effective manner (WP2016).
Finally, the analysis shows that the military frequently recognised the importance of diplomacy as strategic to the country's defence and security for promoting 'mutual trust, cooperation and closer ties of friendship, which favour that any differences are dealt with peacefully' (NDS 2016). Table 3 condenses the themes present in the defence documents, organised per year and administration.

The security-development nexus in the defence documents: the Amazon as nexus
The security-development nexus is recurrently mentioned in every military document, which is consistent with a pattern of action that was articulated during the Brazilian military regime . According to Rodrigues and Kalil, 'initiatives were developed to organise the economic exploration of the Amazonian biome based on the authoritarian regime's interpretation of the relationship between security and development'. 45 Since security is defined as 'the condition in which the State, society or individuals do not feel exposed to risks or threats' and defence as 'effective action to obtain or maintain the desired degree of security' (NDP 2005), to link defence with development is also to link security with development -as De Carvalho and Lima argue in the introductory article.
In the 2008 NDS, the nexus is clearly identified when the defence/security is paired with the development project and the claim that any development project should be linked with national independence and nation-building: The national strategy of defence is inseparable from the national strategy of development. The latter drives the former. The former provides shielding to the latter. Each one reinforces the other's reasons. In both cases, 'nationality' emerges and the nation is built. Capable of defending itself, Brazil will be in a position to say no when it has to say no. It will be able to build its own development model. (NDS 2008) The 2020 NDP articulates the same argument, although adding 'diplomacy' to the equation: [P]eace and stability in internal relations require integrated actions and cooperation in the spheres of Development, to reduce the structural deficiencies of the nations; diplomacy, for the combination of conflicting interests of countries; and Defence, for dissuasion or confrontation of hostile actions. These three pillars -Development, Diplomacy and Defencemust be explored with greater or lesser depth as the case may be, in order to ensure national Security and Defence (NDP 2020).
However, when we analyse specific projects and actions that reproduce or reinforce the nexus in the defence documents, there is a consistent reference to the Amazon and the role of the armed forces in that region. Even after the end of the military regime, the same discursive articulation about the Amazon formulated by the authoritarian government endures. The Amazon is presented as a vulnerable region, and the military as the primary means of protection. In the 2005 NDP, we read that '[t]he deepening of the presence of the State, and in particular of the Armed Forces, along our borders, is a necessary condition for achieving the objectives of stabilisation and integrated development of the Amazon'. A similar argument is present in 2008 NDS: 'the defence of the Amazon region requires the progress of a sustainable development project and also involves the trinomial of [military] monitoring/control, mobility and presence'.
Perhaps the most visible facet of the Amazon as embodying the security-development nexus is the military-led Northern Border Programme (Programa Calha Norte), created by the Federal Government in 1985, aimed at promoting the orderly and sustainable occupation and development of the region that lies north of the Amazon River with actions such as the construction of highways, ports, bridges, schools, nurseries, hospitals, aerodromes, potable water wells and electric power grids. The necessary step to justify military action in the development of the Amazon is the securitisation of the region. According to Weaver, there is nothing objective in the concept of security: it is the result of a discursive articulation by institutional voice, by the elites. 46 During the military regime, the armed forces were the primary source of that voice. The Amazon was articulated as a matter of national security, of maintaining and enforcing national sovereignty in the region. Agency was denied for the local communities, concentrated in federal action especially via the military instrument -something that has occurred since before the military regime. 47 Even after the democratisation, the defence documents reproduce that securitised representation of the Amazon. There is still the discursive construction of the Amazon as vulnerable and coveted, and the actions of the armed forces as a necessity to cope with those challenges.
Note that the point here is not to evaluate whether the Amazon is vulnerable or not, but that this representation -and no other -is dominant. Once meaning is discursively stabilised, it offers the conditions of possibility of action.

Diplomatic discourse
In the diplomatic speeches, there is also a recurrent reference to the Amazon, although articulated differently than in the military document. While the armed forces focus on the need to protect the region and national sovereignty and stress the region's vulnerability, diplomacy focuses on showcasing what the country is doing to preserve and develop the region and stress environmental accomplishments. The outward orientation of the message is clear: while the Ministers' inaugural speeches rarely mention the forest, most of the UN speeches intend to show the success of Brazilian environmental policies oriented towards the equatorial forest and reiterate that the international community has nothing to worry about.
When it comes to maritime regions, there are marked differences between the two sets of documents. Diplomacy does not mention the Antarctic and the mentions of the South Atlantic region revolved around the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS), with a long hiatus between Cardoso and Dilma administrations.
There is a stark contrast in the treatment reserved for Latin America, absent in military documents but ever present in diplomatic speeches, usually associated with economic integration. The relevance of creating regional organisations, however, is not placed in preserving peace, but in a pre-existing Latin-American identity, which is reinforced by the joint search for democracy, economic development, and international political voice. That integration-identity pattern is further reinforced by the South American identity, an innovation brought by the Franco administration. 48 Villafañe argues that, before 1993, South America was presented simply as a geographical region. During the Franco administration, however, there were systematic efforts to promote a specific South American identity, which were followed by the next governments. The success of that diplomatic enterprise can be seen in the creation of UNASUL, and, even during the Bolsonaro government, South American identity is still celebrated.
Democracy is a theme frequently mentioned in the diplomatic speeches, not only as a value to be protected, but as a precondition for peace and development: The first path to peace is freedom. And the political organisation of freedom is democracy. Free people do not wage war; there will be no war between democratic peoples who decide their own destinies without submission to personal authoritarianism and ideological fanaticism (UN opening speech 1985).
That same pattern in other administrations: 'The consolidation of democracy on a planetary scale is, therefore, a decisive contribution to building a more peaceful international system' (UNGA opening speech 1992); 'True peace will spring from democracy, respect for international law, the dismantling of deadly arsenals and, above all, the definitive eradication of hunger'. (UNGA opening speech 2003); 'We will be attentive to the defence of democracy, freedoms and human rights in any country, in any political regime[. . .]'. (2016 inauguration speech) and 'Brazil reaffirms its uncompromising commitment to the highest standards of human rights, the defence of democracy and freedom, expression, religion and the press' (UNGA opening speech 2019).
Nuclear disarmament receives the same treatment as that offered by the military: it is a precondition for world peace. Brazilian participation in peacekeeping missions, however, is converted into an asset to show Brazil's commitment to multilateralism: Brazil's participation, together with other Latin American and Caribbean countries, in the Stabilization Mission in Haiti symbolises our commitment to strengthening multilateralism. In Haiti, we are showing that peace and stability are built on democracy and social development (UN opening speech 2007).
Whereas we identify remarkable consistency in most of the themes among governments, Bolsonaro has introduced some unique themes. He was the only president to mention the Brazilian armed forces in the UNGA opening speech. In 2019, he referred to the military participation in receiving Venezuelan refugees: '[o]f the more than 4 million who fled the country, a part migrated to Brazil, fleeing hunger and violence. We have done our part to help them, through Operação Acolhida [Operation Welcome], carried out by the Brazilian Army and praised worldwide' (UNGA opening speech 2019). In 2020, Bolsonaro explicitly mentioned the work of the armed forces to protect the Amazon: I remember that the Amazon region is larger than all of Western Europe. Hence the difficulty in combating not only the outbreaks of fire, but also the illegal extraction of wood and biopiracy. Therefore, we are expanding and improving the use of technologies and improving interagency operations, including the participation of the Armed Forces (UNGA 2020 opening speech).
Additionally, in 2019 and 2021, Bolsonaro explicitly claims that, before him, Brazil was on the brink of socialism: Not only was that the first time in the span of the analysis that a president refers to a socialist threat, but the strong religious references were also unprecedented. The same arguments were repeated in 2020: Brazil has a president who believes in God, respects the Constitution and its military, values the family and owes loyalty to its people. That's a lot, it's a solid foundation, if we take into account that we were on the verge of socialism (UNGA 2020 opening speech). This alleged socialist threat gains conspiratorial contours in Bolsonaro's Foreign Minister's inauguration speech, who claim to be fighting 'globalism': 49 'For a long time Brazil said what it thought it should say. It was a country that spoke to please the administrators of the global order. We wanted to be good a student in the school of globalism' (2019 inauguration speech). According to Casarões and Lopes, the introduction of 'socialism' and 'globalism' in foreign policy speeches during Bolsonaro's administration correspond to the use of foreign policy as a populist tool to mobilise the president's intern supporters, converting diplomacy into political propaganda. 50 Furthermore, the anti-globalist discourse is part of a Reactionary Internationalist project for the global arena, that is, the idea that the international system should be redesigned to reject the liberal institutional architecture (which includes the UN, WHO, WTO etc). 51 Finally, a noteworthy absence was 'nuclear disarmament', a theme that was ever present in other UNGA and some of the Foreign Ministers' speeches. This surely does not mean that Brazil has abandoned this goal -military documents during the Bolsonaro administration still emphasise the need to ban nuclear weapons. Table 4 condenses the themes present in the diplomatic speeches, organised by the administration.

Security-development nexus in the diplomatic documents: security-developmentdemocracy
The security-development nexus is also present in the Brazilian opening speech at the United Nations General Assembly, although with different intensity, as shown in Figure 1. Lula has mentioned the theme 16 times, and, since 2011, the mentions are less frequent. Among the Foreign Ministers, there were only three mentions in the analysed period, twice in 1985 and once in 1992.
If the Amazon materialises the security-development binomen in the military documents, the same articulation is not found in the diplomatic ones. However, another clear complement to the nexus is present in the speech of Brazilian presidents and Foreign Ministers: democracy. The trinomen security-developmentdemocracy is present in every administration, apart from Bolsonaro's. Just to mention a few examples, for Sarney, democracy is 'an instrument for stability and development' (UNGA opening speech 1989). Celso Amorim, acting as Franco's Foreign Minister, states that 'the international agenda is again structured around three Ds: Democracy, Development, Disarmament, with its developments in the areas of human rights, environment and International Security' (UNGA opening speech 1993). The same Celso Amorim, then Lula's Foreign Minister, claims that '[h]uman security results mainly from just and equitable societies that promote and protect human rights, strengthen democracy and respect the rule of law, while creating opportunities for economic development with social justice' (UNGA opening speech 2005).

Discussion
Security-development nexus is present in both military and diplomatic discourse. However, depending on the audience and political objectives of the agents, it is articulated differently.  Mentions to the security-development nexus In the national arena, the historical action of the armed forces in the Amazon region is paired with the search for development to justify more investment in the military even in the absence of traditional territorial interstate security threats: 'A broad spectrum of military missions serves Latin America's armed forces' corporate interests in that it justifies defence spending in a context that has rendered traditional territorial defence increasingly obsolete'. 52 As Santos and Siman argued, naturalising the participation of the military outside the realm of external defence converts political debates about the limits to military action into seemingly technical and neutral challenges of coordination and cooperation between military officials, civilian state agencies, and Brazilian society. 53 To call the Brazilian Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf in the South Atlantic 'the Blue Amazon' intends to offer a discursive shortcut, presenting as natural the need for increased investments in the Navy to protect the region -as reinforcing the need for a nuclear propulsion submarine -a significative and controversial investment (see Noda's article in this special issue). De Carvalho identifies this 'semantic loan', stressing its strategic potential: The obvious association between the Blue Amazon and the 'Green Amazon' is advantageous and strategic in many ways. The national awareness around the richness of that territorial region and the need for its sustainable exploitation, as well as the unmistakable sense of ecological importance and national pride in sovereignty over the Amazon Forest is already deeply ingrained in the Brazilian national identity, as the survey quoted above shows. Translating, or transposing, the semantic value of the word 'Amazon' onto the ocean brings with it all the values the Brazilian Navy intends to build into a Brazilian maritime mentality. 54 In the international arena, Brazil has traditionally stressed the need to increase the financing for development. Likewise, to try to discursively link development to other themes that are a high priority in the Global North security agenda is not something unusual in Brazilian diplomacy: during the Juscelino Kubitschek administration (1956)(1957)(1958)(1959)(1960)(1961), Brazil launched the 'Pan-American Operation', in which development promotion was defended as the best way to keep socialism at bay.
Many authors have argued that security and development are not objectively defined. The content of those terms varies in space and time. This work has shown that, even within the same country, the security-development nexus may be articulated differently, depending on audiences of political objectives. Both development and security are strong political motivators, being used to justify or promote governmental and societal action.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor
Felipe Estre holds a PhD in International Relations from the joint degree programme between King's College London and the University of São Paulo.