Hybrid security governance in Liberia in the aftermath of UN intervention

ABSTRACT What can we expect in terms of security governance in targeted states as international peacebuilding interventions and security sector reform ends? Can we assume that years of reform and capacity building will result in formal security institutions whose function alone can explain stability or instability, sustainable peace or relapses into violence, or even war? In 2018, the United Nations ended its peacekeeping mission in Liberia. Celebrated as a success and role model for future undertakings, scrutinising the UN narrative may appear as a natural starting point for analysing Liberia’s relative stability. Yet, in the Liberian case, formal performance reviews will never be sufficient. This paper, with a conceptual point of departure in theories of hybrid security governance, recognises the continued entangled nature of formal and informal security provision in Liberia. It argues that post-intervention narratives of success should not keep us from assessing security beyond formal state capacity. Instead, holistic approaches are key to understand security governance as non-state security providers are, for better or worse, likely to remain relevant despite years of reform and capacity building.


Introduction
In March 2018, after 15 years of presence in the West African nation, the United Nations mission in Liberia (UNMIL) completed its peacekeeping mandate. Both rebel groups and state security forces had been complicit in the violence against Liberian citizens. For this reason, transformation of security institutions in the war-torn state was desperately needed. As in many contemporary post-conflict settings, security-sector reform (SSR) became an important aspect of peacebuilding and reconstruction in Liberia, with much of the international assistance funnelled through UNMIL. As the mission closed in 2018, future challenges for the Liberian people were indeed acknowledged. Yet, the UN narrative of success was unmistakable: This was a pivotal moment in history and the people and Government of Liberia welcomed the Mission's conclusion after having achieved its mandate. The withdrawal of UNMIL signifies that Liberia is strongly positioned on the path of lasting stability, democracy and prosperity. 1 As pointed out by Mats Berdal, there will always be limits to what outsiders can do in terms of securing stabilisation after war. Even in cases where the UN has been entrusted with extensive powers, this has not necessarily translated into effective control and influence. 2 While there are conflicting views on whether the UN mission in the Liberian case was in fact a success or not, and what impact it had on the conditions for long-term stability, this paper is based on the understanding that contemporary security governance in Liberia must be analysed from a broader perspective. To assess security, we must begin by asking what institutions, structures and actors are relevant to focus upon in that specific setting. In the Liberian case, this has been shaped by a history of civil war (where rebel groups, as well as state security institutions acted in a predatory fashion), but also long-term peacekeeping and internationally supported post-war recovery initiatives, including the SSR.
Conceptually, this paper takes as its point of departure the question of what exactly we should be able to expect from post-conflict states as peacebuilding efforts and SSR processes end, in particular when these interventions are celebrated as successes. Can we assume that years of reform and capacity building create formal security institutions whose performance and capacity alone can explain stability or instability, sustainable peace or relapses into violence or even war?
In this paper, based on empirical observations of the role of informal governance and informal security provision in Liberia, I firstly argue that it would be a mistake to assume that peacebuilding efforts and SSR processes have made non-state security actors irrelevant. Secondly, since such actors may still have a role to play in the security arena I explore how a context in the aftermath of international intervention, where non-state security actors such as vigilante groups (here interpreted as informally mobilised networks of individuals that have taken upon themselves, or have responded to calls of their home communities, to provide security) remain active, should be understood. Would such a lack of change in this regard imply that Liberia has achieved its relative security despite the continued presence of non-state security actors? Alternatively, could such actors paradoxically play a potential stability contributing role in a state emerging from a long period of war followed by peacebuilding and SSR?
In order to elaborate on above-raised questions, this paper theoretically builds on debates of hybrid security governance and hybrid political orders in relation to internationally supported security sector reform efforts. This strand of research challenges the failed state discourse as it illuminates how non-state and hybrid governance as well as non-state alternatives for security provision do not equate with disorder. As noted by Boege et al. rather than thinking in terms of fragile states, it might be more fruitful to think in terms of hybrid political orders. By doing so, the resilience embedded in the communal life of societies within so-called fragile regions of the global South can be taken into account. 3 Empirically, the paper draws on research focused on non-state security actors in sub-Saharan Africa as well as the role of vigilante groups and informal security providers in Liberia, specifically. This article examines the post-intervention situation in this country against the backdrop of the ongoing discussion about the limits of international stabilisation efforts in post-conflict contexts.
While the current security situation in Liberia is discussed, the focus of this paper is not on analysing security dynamics in Liberia following the withdrawal of UNMIL. Instead, it is written with the aim of providing a conceptual understanding of why holistic approaches to post-conflict security reforms are required, which take into account the potential, complementary role of existing non-state security providers, alongside efforts to strengthen and increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of formal security providers.
The remainder of this paper is organised into three sections. The first section critically examines the concept of SSR and introduces a set of theories of hybrid security governance, which spotlight the role of non-state security providers in many of the post-war contexts targeted by international peacebuilding interventions. The second part of the article examines the post-war Liberian case, beginning with a brief review of the UNsupported SSR process. The third and final section of the article focuses on the continued hybridisation of security governance in Liberia following the departure of UNMIL. Recent empirical observations confirm the continuing activity of non-state security actors such as vigilante groups. The concluding discussion considers the relative stability post-intervention Liberia now enjoys and the ambivalent role of non-state security actors in the country's post-conflict security sector.

Security sector reform and hybrid security governance
In states emerging from war, or where state security has been found wanting, SSR has become a crucial component of peacebuilding, and an important tool in the efforts of stabilising societies. The UN supports SSR in peace operations as well as in non-mission settings and in response to national requests. The UN is also active in transition settings, where peace operations are withdrawing but where ongoing security sector assistance is needed. 4 The SSR process 'has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law'. 5 The UN defines the security sector broadly, as 'structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country'. 6 Generally, defence, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for broader management, customs and civil emergencies are included in the security sector. Non-state actors, such as customary or informal authorities and private security services, could, as argued by the UN, however also be considered part of the security sector. 7 Yet, despite such acknowledgements of security as a good that not only formal state actors can provide, SSR processes have often been accused of being state centric. This is problematic as it may result in direct negative consequences for the general security situation on the ground. As expressed by Adedeji Ebo, SSR assistance that merely focuses on state institutions can indeed be successful in terms of enhancing the operational efficiency of state security forces and possibly the quality of oversight. While at the same time, it may not have a substantial effect on the sense of freedom from fear among the population, since the provision of security services to the people may have largely been made by a parallel informal structure of non-state actors. 8 SSR processes aim at comprehensively transforming the ways that states control the use of force and involve international operations that seek to foster international standards of democratic security governance. According to Schroeder et al. SSR operations are thus highly prescriptive enterprises that seek to diffuse a set of standardised assumptions about how a state's security sector should function and how these services ought to be controlled. As such, these processes are explicitly designed not only to strengthen the technical capacities of the security sector but they also bring with them a specific normative and organisational outlook on security governance. 9 This donordriven reform narrative is grounded in notions of democratic security governance that stand in sharp contrast to patterns of security governance in the contexts where SSR is typically being promoted by the international community. As a result, the realities of security provision often diverge considerably from the stated goals of this international narrative. 10 Relatedly, Jackson and Bakrania note how the concept of SSR rests upon unwritten assumptions that human security is best served by creating a functioning state responsible for security provision, and that development will provide benefits to the general population. Nevertheless, neither security in terms of an entitlement to protection by the state nor the state's responsibility to protect citizens, is a given for many people. 11 As Sukanya Podder points out, authority in post-conflict contexts is both fragmented and contentious, and exercised by multiple social organisations. Security provision in particular, she finds, offers a fertile arena for interaction and interdependence between state and non-state actors. 12 Accordingly, in reality, security governance can in fact be characterised by patronage politics or informal power structures where control is in some cases, monopolised by state leaders while, in others, it lies in the hands of individual security agencies. As noted by Schroeder et al. in such contexts, attempts to instil international standards of democratic security governance through SSR in order to change such realities have largely failed. 13 Furthermore, as Podder emphasises, the transition to a western concept of statehood is not easily achieved. While attempting to build capacity within the security sector, external actors can reinforce local dependency on international resources, complicating legitimacy and authority of the post-conflict state. 14

The hybridity of security governance?
Over the last two decades, the concepts of hybrid political orders and hybrid security governance have influenced thinking on interventions, state building and security transformation in post-conflict contexts, in particular. This strand of research points out the problems inherent in thinking about states emerging from wars as somehow 'incomplete' or 'not yet properly built', or 'having failed'. 15 As noted by Boege and colleagues, we cannot assume that in these contexts simply adopting Western state models is always the most suitable option. In promoting conflict prevention, security, development, and good governance, models of governance that draw on the strengths of social order and resilience embedded in the community life of the targeted societies deserve more attention. Interveners should accordingly work 'with the grain' of existing institutions on the ground. 16 Boege et al. emphasise the concept of hybrid political orders, characterised by nonstate indigenous societal structures as well as introduced state structures. In these settings, 'diverse and competing authority structures, sets of rules, logics of order, and claims to power co-exist, overlap, interact, and intertwine, combining elements of introduced Western models of governance and elements stemming from local indigenous traditions of governance and politics'. 17 In these environments, they suggest, the state is not in a privileged monopolistic position as the only agency providing security, welfare, and representation. Instead, authority, legitimacy, and capacity are shared with other institutions. In hybrid political orders informal and formal spheres do not exist in isolation from each other, instead they permeate each other.
Boege et al. argue that the security domain in particular diverts from the ideal type of western models as it is structured in a non-centric way. 18 The dominant tendency within security policy thinking is to promote formal state capacity only. Against such a backdrop, they emphasise the need to develop alternative non-state centric approaches to governance, the control of violence, peacebuilding, and development. Widening of perspectives and a change of focus can contribute to a deeper understanding of the issues at stake in the so-called fragile states they find. While problems need to be acknowledged, it is short-sighted to merely focus on such without also taking into account the strengths of the societies in question, acknowledging their resilience and encouraging indigenous creative responses to problems. 19 Themnér and Utas, with an eye to the Liberian case specifically, similarly note the dominant tendency to replace informal wartime governance structures with formal institutions as part of post-war reconstruction and international interventions. Such attempts have, however, as they point out, been rather unsuccessful. Governance and power remain largely concentrated and implemented through informal structures. Examples of this could include patronage-based systems or regional, ethnic political and military bonds between actors, which influence decision-making and the distribution of resources, for example.
Themnér and Utas suggest, furthermore, that for post-war governing elites it is particularly vital to reach out to war-affected groups in order to extend their rule over them. If unable to do so governing elites risk seeing war-affected groups -such as excombatants, youths, urban poor, refugees and IDPs -switch their allegiance to or become a ready pool of recruits for their military and political opponents. For governing elites, informal governance or 'governance through brokerage', as Themnér and Utas label it, is often the reality in post-war contexts as central state functions, such as upholding security, are transferred to influential individuals. 20 Strong incentives lead governing elites to outsource central state functions. On the one hand, the potential violent agency of actors, to whom power is transferred, may be more easily controlled in such a system. On the other, there are often grass-root demands for such systems of brokerage as it provides an alternative form of agency to groups that otherwise risk being marginalised in state-building processes. 21 As a response to state-centrism in the security and development debate, Luckham and Kirk called for a reframing and a recognition of hybrid political orders. As they point out, for some analysts, security concerns political power and the use of organised force, while for others security is about how individuals and communities are protected, or protect themselves, from violence, abuse of power and other existential risks. Luckham and Kirk call for an integration of both approaches in analyses in contexts where the state and its monopoly of violence are contested, as diverse state and non-state security actors coexist, collaborate or compete. 22 They point out that even as the realist conceptualisation of security, as understood largely through the eyes of the state, lost its monopoly in the early 2000s, as the idea of 'human security' was endorsed, SSR policy as promoted by many international donors has remained state-centred. Accordingly, the solution for citizens' insecurity is still often narrowly focused on the formal security sector and seen to depend on building legitimate, inclusive and capable institutions with 'good enough' governance. 23 While there is growing recognition of the concept of hybridity, there are still real debates on how this concept should be understood and how it can be helpful both analytically and operationally in SSR programmes. Assessing the usefulness, and limits, of the concept of hybridity, Albrecht and Moe suggest focusing on the enactment and exercise of authority, rather than on the interactions between for example donor agencies and traditional leaders and other forms of local agency. 24 With a focus on processes involving the constitution of order and authority, numerous sources of authority are active at the same time.
Against the backdrop of how political order was constituted by colonial and postcolonial state policies and local figures of authority on the African continent, Albrecht and Moe note furthermore how multiple sources of authority represent hybridity in this context. This was, however, not merely a merger of two separable forms of 'bureaucracy' and 'tradition'. Instead, hybridity in this sense is the culmination of different sources of authority operating simultaneously and becoming co-constitutive through order-making practices. As such, hybridity is a product of constantly evolving and contested sources of authority that empirically become inseparable. 25 One of the most important aspects of order-making centres on the control of territory as violence is monopolised through permanent and visible security forces. In reality, this monopoly by state sanctioned police does not exist. Instead, order-making in this regard is shared between centrallyadministered institutions and traditional leaders -each of whom, Albrecht and Moe argue, constitutes hybrid categories of actors. 26 Schroeder et al. build upon the concept of hybrid political orders as articulated by Boege and colleagues to account for situations where different forms of authority overlap and interact combining elements of the introduced western, as well as local, models of governance. Their notion of 'hybrid security governance' focuses on how domestic actors in SSR contexts only selectively adopt specific elements of the international security governance model and how hybrid security governance emerges as a consequence of external domestic security transformation. This selective approach towards external security transformation can, according to Schroder et al., result in a situation where norms and rules are adopted, but not implemented. The outcome can also be that organisational structures are created, but remain mostly symbolic.
Finally, they identify situations where the operational capacities of a security service are strengthened, yet without the parallel adoption of democratic security governance standards. 27 These outcomes cannot, however, be understood as SSR being undermined by a lack of engagement, lack of will or a lack of capacity by local actors. Domestic voices and interests simply shape reform processes on the ground. What, rather, should be questioned in the future research, Schroeder et al. conclude, is whether donor-driven reform narratives within the field of SSR are appropriate models for security transformation and whether ideal-typical notions of Weberian statehood are always transferable. 28 Based on ideas of hybrid security governance, the argument of this paper emerges. Drawing on the idea presented by of Albrecht and Moe that hybridisation can be studied as an ongoing process rather than an 'end product' 29 a continued hybridisation of Liberia's security governance is to be expected, despite years of efforts aimed at transforming and strengthening formal security institutions. If local actors tend to adopt external ideas of security sector reform selectively (as found in the research by Schroeder et al.), the strengthening of state security institutions may, in the best case, be one effect of international security transformation efforts. However, as argued for in this paper, continued dependency on non-state security provision is just as likely, no matter how state-centric the externally implemented ideas of security transformation are. A state monopoly of security provision seems unrealistic in contexts where, on the one hand, the state has a predatory history, and on the other, non-state security providers have always played a part. Local incentives by governing elites to outsource governance and security provision (as noted by Themnér and Utas referred to above) either in an attempt to control competing actors or in order to meet local needs and promote local forms of agency, should not be dismissed easily. The argument of this paper is in line with those who early on in the debate called for a recognition of hybrid political orders and hybrid security governance in discussions of international interventions, state building and conflict prevention.
However, in this case, we instead turn the attention towards a post-intervention context characterised by relative stability. What can we expect in terms of security governance in such a context, based on theories of hybrid security governance during times of interventions? While state building and processes of security reform are oftentimes informed by Western standards of governance, local needs and adaptation to the realities on the ground may divert reforms from intended security governance outcomes. In other words, despite years of security transformation initiatives, hybrid forms of security governance, where formal and informal forms of security provision remain entangled, are likely what we should be able to expect in these settings.
Nevertheless, as Donais points out, while the notion of hybrid security governance can help us understand the messy reality on the ground, it is less helpful as a roadmap for how to achieve sustainable long-term transformation of security provision in conflictafflicted countries. 30 In the next section, I turn to non-state actors specifically -what role do they have, and should they have, in the security arena?

SSR and non-state security actors
Historically, due to the state-centred agendas, non-state actors have in practice often be seen as obstacles to future stability that needs to be removed in the context of international intervention. As noted by Christopher von Dyck, one of the first priorities of SSR policy-makers and practitioners is to restore order. 31 This firstly tends to be done by 'neutralising and delegitimising' so-called illegal, non-statutory armed groups such as militias, gangs, community defence groups, and so on. Thereafter, the focus is directed towards the re-establishment of formal state security forces to maintain public order within the rule of law. Finally, the efforts are centred on restoring, or establishing, state institutions that oversee and monitor these security forces to ensure that they act accordingly with formal rules and norms. 32 From such a post-war security reforming agenda, it is natural to assume that in order for security to be established formal security actors must be strengthened, while informal actors, at the same time, are to be actively marginalised or completely disbanded. The standard SSR narrative has accordingly been the need to re-consolidate coercive power within the hands of the state (in a Weberian sense) in accordance with the rule of law as pointed out by Timothy Donais. As this narrative affects how most SSR practitioners differentiate between successful and unsuccessful SSR, the unease, which the growing emphasis on non-state security provision brings with it can be explained. 33 However, as Donais finds one of the most important insights of SSR programming lately concerns the limited remit of the state's security and justice apparatus, as non-state actors traditionally have catered for a large majority of security provision. Given such realities conventional SSR processes have, in most cases, struggled to transfer power from non-state actors to the state. As Donais concludes, the failure of SSR to deliver on its core premise is a common theme in many post-conflict cases. 34 However, where the actual problem lies in regard to such failures can be debated. For instance, is the lack of a state monopoly of violence in itself always a problem? The question of legitimacy, but also accountability, thereby becomes highly relevant. While it is not necessarily easy to hold non-state security actors accountable nor is it the case either with state institutions, particularly those with a predatory history.
From western state-focused perspective informal security actors, such as vigilante groups, have often been seen as problematic. First of all, with the point of departure in the idea that states should hold a monopoly on the legitimate use of force in order to protect their territory and citizens, such informal security providing structures are inevitably seen as either competing with, or functioning in opposition to, formal security institutions. From such a perspective, the presence and actions of non-state actors active in the security arena would naturally constitute a threat to formal security institutions, challenging such a monopoly and thereby their legitimacy. As Boege et al. point out, non-state actors that do not fit neatly into civil society roles are more often than not perceived as '"spoilers"' whose power and influence have to be broken. 35 Secondly, the risk of mob violence and impunity are crucial factors that are impossible to ignore when these actors are being analysed. The threat of such a scenario, where vigilante groups take the law into their own hands, would furthermore speak against the use of such actors, calling for reforms to strengthen state security actors while ridding non-state, and thereby lesscontrollable, actors. However, from the viewpoint of a population with a long history of trying to protect itself from predatory state security actors, relying on informal security providers may be perceived as the best available option, also during ongoing security sector reforms, and perhaps even after.
As stressed by Abrahamsen and Williams in their analysis of private security, having the African context as its focus, an overly narrow vision of the state's monopoly on violence risks becoming a hindrance. 36 Such a perspective leaves only the option of seeing private security as a straightforward erosion of the state or as a delegation by a state whose monopoly and power remain essentially unaltered. Yet the transformations involved are more complex than such alternatives suggest and hence require multilayered concepts. 37 Others have also argued for a more holistic approach when examining security than a mere state-centric approach would allow for. Among those are Bruce Baker. Policing, he argues, is an organised activity that can be carried out by state as well as non-state groups, seeking to ensure the maintenance of communal order, security and peace through elements of prevention, deterrence, investigation of breaches, as well as punishment. Taking a point of departure on the African continent for his research, Baker notes how non-state policing agencies are valuable assets for safety and security among the poor. 38 A focus on government agencies, however, can, and often tends to, direct attention away from the full range of governmental authorisers and providers existing, particularly at the local level. Instead, there are advantages in adopting a broader approach, which examines the choices citizens face from a variety of policing providers to meet differing security needs. By asking questions concerning whom people turn to for protection and investigation of crime we can begin to piece out the extent of policing agencies, the degree of state control over such actors, and why individuals, groups, and sometimes even governments turn to alternatives to state policing. 39 'Vigilantes have arisen at many times in different parts of the world as defenders, often by force, of their view of the good life against those they see to be its enemies'. 40 As Ray Abrahams has observed, such actors may arise from the perception that the state, through its instrument of social order and control -the police and the courts -have failed to satisfy the needs of the people when it comes to the levels of security, policing, and punishment that people want. This, Abrahams points out, can in part be a question of resources and efficiency. However, such problems may also be accompanied by suspicion that the officers of the state are reluctant to act effectively, perhaps through fear or corruption. 41 Yet even though the very existence of vigilante groups can be interpreted as criticism against the state, the relationship between the state and vigilante groups is often a very ambivalent one. As Abrahams stresses, the state itself may actually create such groups even if they will have to work hard to maintain control over them. 42 Accordingly, it would be problematic to categorise non-state security providers, or in this case vigilante groups, as simply good or bad or legitimate or illegitimate both from the perspectives of the citizens in the areas in which they operate and from the viewpoint of the government of the state in which they are active.
As Buur and Jensen notes, ambivalence arises because vigilantism addresses issues of security and moral order that are of outmost importance to people living on the margins of the reach of the formal state apparatus. Vigilantism is therefore often accepted at local levels of the state. 43 Nevertheless, while vigilante groups can have the potential to contribute to security and stability at local levels, they can also resort to criminal activities. As expressed by Abrahams: 'the boundary between vigilante and criminal, like that between heroes and bandits or patriots and traitors, is both fluid and manipulable'. 44 However, as Finn Stepputat et al. argue, whether or not a particular institution, or actor, is primarily a source of security or insecurity to a given community depends on the concrete context and circumstances. Whether it is a state or non-state entity is, however, not the main issue. Those who control the means of violence are always Janus-faced, they state. This reveals a fundamental ambiguity, as we need to take into account that we are dealing with institutions and actors that have the potential to be, and often are, sources of security as well as insecurity. 45 Empirical case studies, particularly with Africa as its focus, have over the years given further evidence to the ambivalent and often complex position non-state security providers possesses. 46 Such empirically grounded research has simultaneously revealed how state-centric theories limit our understanding of everyday security provision.
In the next sections, we will come back to the Liberian case specifically. After a brief review of the SSR process that followed the end of the war, what can be interpreted as a continued hybridisation of security governance in Liberia post-UN intervention will be discussed. Acknowledging the lessons from previous work on security provision on the African continent, this section intends to give a background to how security can be provided for without limiting ourselves to state-centric perspectives. In so doing, we can perhaps come closer to an understanding of the relative stability Liberia today enjoys.

Security governance and reform in the Liberian case
Liberia's formal security institutions have a long history of predatory behaviour. Founded in 1847, by black American settlers, Liberia is Africa's oldest republic. Representing only 5% of the population, this settler elite established a corrupt, nepotistic system that oppressed the indigenous ethnic groups. In 1884, the Americo-Liberian rulers established the True Whig Party, which became a vehicle for total state control and brutal oppression. 47 Liberia's citizens accordingly also have a long history of trying to protect themselves against the security institutions of their own state. For instance, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) is a descendant of the notorious Frontier Force, which was known for pillaging local communities and crushing mass uprisings. 48 The continued aggressive and oppressive uses of the Liberian armed forces was also a contributing factor for the civil war later to emerge. Also, the Liberian national police (LNP) was similarly used as a tool of oppression before and during the civil war. Historically, but also particularly during the time of Charles Taylor's presidency, the security services were heavily politicised as Taylor placed many of his former rebel soldiers from the NPFL within the LNP. 49 In fact, all state agencies during the most intense periods of the war that ought to have delivered security as a public good either disappeared completely or served only partisan interests. During this turbulent time, rebels undertook quasi-state functions in areas where they were in command, while vigilante groups tried to maintain order in confined areas. 50 As noted by Ebo, even though Liberia was never colonised by another state, the freed slaves from the United States effectively appropriated the state and created and sustained a personalised security sector. 51 As he argues, what grew to be the Liberian security sector was sown by the elite to create a security structure for the preservation and protection of privileged interests. 52 This means that for ordinary Liberian citizens it was not the war that transformed the security sector into a threat. Protection of ordinary people was never a security sector priority in the first place.
However, this does not mean that Liberians historically have lacked access to security institutions. As pointed out by Thomas Jaye, from the days of modern state formation a dual system of governance was established, in which traditional authorities existed alongside state institutions. 53 Elders, quarters, towns, clans, and paramount chiefs were sources of justice, security and order. 54 As the war came to an end in 2003, hopes were high for lasting peace, and for that to materialise a transformation of the formal security structures was seen as necessary. In this process, due to a focus on the core security agencies, other actors and structures were neglected. As noted by Thomas Jaye and John Mark Pokoo, private security actors and traditional security institutions were largely left out in the SSR debate in the country, due perhaps to an unawareness of the role they play where there is a weak statutory security presence. 55 The SSR process following the declaration of peace in Liberia was focused on reforming what was seen as the critical security institutions. The UN itself took the lead when it came to rebuilding and reforming Liberia's civilian police capacity, particularly through its police contingent -the United Nations Police (UNPOL). American contractors were involved in the reform of the army. A police force of over 4,000 officers was trained and is now active throughout the country, while two special units are in place to support the LNP in case of riots, demonstrations and armed robberies. Yet the LNP has continued to face accusations of mismanagement and corruption, while it also remains severely constrained by logistical shortcomings. It is not uncommon for police officers to still lack everything from basic materials such as pens and papers to recording tapes and vehicles. 56 At the beginning of the reform process, all existing police officers who wanted to stay in the force had to re-enrol for a new police training programme after first having gone through a vetting process in their local communities. The aim of such vetting procedures was to exclude officers who had played an active part in the civil war in order to establish public trust in the new police force. But as Larsen et al. note, many observers have come to criticise this vetting process for not being thorough enough. Powerful police officers who had participated in the war were still able to intimidate community members who then did not dare to advise the vetting team to exclude these individuals. 57 When it came to the AFL, a big question was raised by Sean McFate: how does one transform the military from a symbol of terror to an instrument of democracy? 58 According to McFate, the underlying approach to security in Liberia was radically different from conventional military thought. The main objective for the new AFL was in reality not simply securing Liberia's borders, it was to consolidate democracy, achieve social justice and economic development, ensure a safe environment and substantially reduce the level of crime, violence and political instability. The success of the AFL was to be judged by its ability to protect the population from fear and want. 59 Considerable time and resources have been spent on first demobilising, then vetting and training the new AFL. Whether this reform has been successful has been debated.
Observers have, on the one hand, indicated that the first phase of political consultation with stakeholders and the process of sensitising the public gave local legitimacy to the creation of the new AFL. 60 Others have strongly criticised the army reform process due to the lack of local influence and ownership. Loden noted, for instance, how many members of the fighting factions, as well as representatives of the Liberian Ministry of Defence, felt that they had not been consulted when the decision was taken to completely demobilise the AFL and recruit from scratch. 61 Furthermore, the Ministry of Defence also felt that its recommendations for army size and design had been ignored by the US State Department, which reinforced the impression that all reforms were driven by an external agenda. 62 In addition to such criticism about the army reform process and questions on whether these efforts were to create an efficient and capable force, there were also a fear concerning how an efficient and capable force could be used. As Mark Malan observed, the fear was that Liberia with its reformed army would be sitting on a time bomb, with a well-trained and armed force of elite soldiers, used to good pay and conditions of service, which the government of Liberia would be unable to sustain as the international actors withdraw their support. 63 There have also been strong critiques about the lack of local ownership levelled against the reform process. Morten Boås and Karianne Stig, for instance, noted in their reviews how the degree of parliamentarian and civil society involvement was minimal. When institutions were built, the strengthening of local capacity to oversee and regulate the process and the new institutions was neglected. Local actors were expected to govern in accordance with the principles of participatory democratic rule, while the international community itself did not feel obligated to adhere to the very same principles. 64 As Judith Smith-Höhn argues, there is a tendency to ignore whether those for whom security provision is intended actually feel protected. 65 This is very relevant because as Adedeji Ebo has pointed out, there is an increasing realisation that reform of the security sector, while often necessary, is hardly ever sufficient in making African states and societies feel safer. 66 While massive resources have been spent on the transformation of key formal security institutions, public trust in these institutions and the police in particular has remained low during the years following reform and many countries have continued to rely on the UN to guarantee national security. 67 In such an environment, there is, for better or worse, room for non-state actors to act as informal security providers.

The continued hybridisation of security governance in Liberia?
As in many parts of the world, vigilantism has historically played an important role in Liberian society. There have, however, been formalised attempts to include so-called people-oriented policing or community policing in the security sector. In 2004, the state introduced the 'community policing' model. 68 Local leaders were invited to establish local forums that could assist the police with intelligence gathering and patrols and interventions to settle local disputes. As Bruce Baker points out, some of these groups were previously autonomous local 'task forces'. 69 The Liberian state accordingly made use of already existing informal security structures in the post-war era.
In 2006, after a call by the Liberian Justice Minister to residents to protect themselves, most communities had set up vigilante groups against crime and criminal gangs the police were unable to handle. 70 In 2007, after heavy criticism by human rights groups, international aid agencies, the UN and the LNP, the Minister was, however, forced to issue a statement in which she explained that she had been misunderstood and that she had only meant for such groups to assist the police and not to act autonomously.
In practice, however, vigilantism continued. As Baker concluded, there are few neighbourhoods in Liberia where there are not anti-crime organisations, 'task forces', 'vigilantes' and youth groups, acting to various degrees in policing roles. 71 My own research, conducted with Ana Kantor in 2009, confirmed both the continued presence and active role vigilante groups played in both rural and urban areas of the country. 72 In these contexts, groups of ordinary citizens (usually young men) organised themselves along different structures, sometimes with formal permission from the authorities, identifying themselves as 'neighbourhood/community watch groups' or 'vigilantes. It was evident that many of them considered state security provision, at best, as complementary to their own security provision. 73 Franzisca Zanker, in regard to the formalised attempts to include community policing in the security sector reform process, has noted, however, that even though a common blue print existed on paper, in practice the very idea of community policing was legitimised in completely divergent manners, oriented either towards the state or the community. 74 In community policing forums organised by the UN and the LNP, civilian representatives and police officers were brought together with the aim to discuss local crimes and trust building by educating the public about the police reforms. Yet, as Zanker points out, there were competing visions about the idea of this practice as local adaptation indeed took place. Community policing could accordingly be interpreted as anything from public information meetings to vigilante groups. 75 As Zanker notes, according to Western tradition, policing has long been seen as the primary embodiment of the state. The police is thereby the guardians of the state monopoly of legitimate violence, and the Weberian state model is still a major reference in the implementation of police reforms. 76 However, as Zanker found, one important perception was, contrary to western ideas, that it was not only better community-police relationships that were needed but also additional security agents. UNPOL officers in general have adopted a top-down approach to community policing, with a focus on public education rather than complementing the official state police. For others, including some LNP officers, a complementary type of policing was an acceptable adaptation of the blueprint, where citizens help the police. 77 Accordingly, in the Liberian case, there seems to have been divergent, if not competing visions of what role non-state actors should play in the security arena, where in particular national and international perspectives differ. Despite blueprints, Liberians have adapted reforms to fit local realities. This is a fact we ought to remember when assessing post-UN security in Liberia.
Vigilantism evidently continues to be an integral, but disputed, part of security governance. While some have expressed worries about non-state security providers, others call for the strengthening of such actors. In 2020, Monrovia City Mayor Jefferson T. Koijee called for the establishment of the 'Citizens Action Unit', a vigilante force that could combat crime in Monrovia. The opposition political party, the United People's Party (UPP), however, raised concerns about the initiative. In a press release, the UPP party said that the proposal by Mayor Koijee could trigger the establishment of a variety of vigilante groups that could endanger the work of the LNP and other state security forces. Such calls could overshadow the LNP they warned. 78 Whether or not this political statement against vigilantism had an effect is unclear. In August 2021, local newspapers reported vigilante-related violence in a suburb of Monrovia. A local vigilante leader's home was set ablaze, allegedly by criminal gangs. The community's leadership had some time prior to the event decided to establish the vigilante team to protect the neighbourhood at night-time after continued harassments by criminal networks in the community. 79 A month later, in September 2021, oppositional politician Alexander Cummings, in an interview after reports about alleged ritual killings in the country, spoke out in support of local security initiatives. Cummings stated that 'It is clear that our security sector is under-staffed, under-paid and overwhelmed. This can not continue. I am calling on the President to redirect every penny he intends to spend on his elaborate and glamorous birthday celebration, into the security sector. We need to empower our community policing and night patrol and strengthen community vigilante groups to work with the Police in each community. This should include the distribution of basic materials and basic training. We need to also investigate these crimes with a sense of urgency and bring perpetrators to justice. The government needs to get to work'. 80 From a merely state-centric perspective, it is clearly problematic that vigilante groups have remained active and are even called for by formal state agents in Liberia despite years of security sector reform. Liberia from such a perspective is far from a success story. The presence of parallel informal security structures, even if complementing the formal security structures, is viewed by many as a threat to the state monopoly on the use of legitimate violence. However, should the presence of informal security structures automatically be seen as a threat to stability? There are no official records on how many active vigilante groups there currently are in Liberia, or how they have acted from case to case, nor how specific groups relate to formal security structures. In local newspapers and independent assessments, wrongdoings committed by mobs against suspected criminals have been reported frequently over the years. 81 As Kate Meagher has pointed out, previous condemnation of informal governance as institutionally destructive has increasingly been replaced by its celebration as a form of order and authority. 82 Yet we cannot take it for granted that non-state alternatives are perceived as more legitimate. Meagher argues that there is a need for a more nuanced, comparative approach to informal governance that is capable of distinguishing between constructive and corrosive forms of non-state order and that clarifies rather than blurs the relationship between local order and local legitimacy. 83 There are no doubt considerable risks posed by the presence of non-state security actors and they are by no means always viewed as legitimate by the local population. Nevertheless, such risks, as well as the question of legitimacy, must always be seen in broader perspective in terms of the accountability of both formal and informal security provisions while taking into account the security risks people face on an everyday basis in a country like Liberia. This is not always done in security assessments. As noted by Jackson and Bakrania, the international community continues to advocate, but also research, state building based on formal security structures without paying much attention to the accountability of these institutions. What is also lacking, they point out, are thorough understandings of the relationship between different security actors, the interrelationships of systems and the acknowledgement that there are individuals who can manoeuvre between these systems. 84 In the Liberian case, the often complex boundary-crossing aspects of security provision are indeed relevant, and if more closely examined, visible at all levels of security governance. In my own research in Liberia during the years of security sector reform, I spoke with both vigilante members and other informal security providers, many of whom had a violent past as rebel soldiers. 85 These groups and individuals had a very ambivalent position in their communities. They were sometimes welcomed in poor neighbourhoods as an alternative to the police, where the police could not or dared not enter the community. But they could simultaneously be a source of insecurity as they did not always refer suspected criminals to the police, and at times could take matters into their own hands, resorting to mob violence. Liberian vigilante groups are accordingly simultaneously potential protectors and perpetrators. 86 Yet Liberian state security actors can be seen in a similar light.
In late 2017 George Weah was peacefully elected as Liberia's new president. In a press statement, the members of the Security Council noted the significance of the first peaceful transfer of power between democratically elected leaders in Liberia in over 70 years. 87 Currently, there are no signs of a return to war. Yet, economic hardship has driven Liberians to rally against Weah and the economic politics in the country. In January 2020 thousands of protesters rallied in the capital Monrovia, causing police to fire tear gas and a water cannon. Civilian servants have been particularly upset by the government's failure to pay salaries and pensions. According to the Civilian Servant's Union a large percentage of the public service workers across the country was in late 2019 not paid in their full salaries, despite the government's promise to do so. Weah was also accused of enriching himself after taking office, causing anger among the population. 88 Furthermore, in 2020 local newspapers reported unconfirmed rumours of the overfilling of the Executive Protection Service (EPS) with untrained individuals from the governing coalition as a means of accommodating them based on promises made to them during the campaign period. Additionally, a pro-government secret security squad called the Sabu Unit was said to be active in the country, harassing civilians, but also AFL soldiers believed to be a threat against the government. 89 Such accusations were amongst others also issued by former Justice Minister Lavela Koboi Johnson, who in August 2020 claimed that a so-called Sabu Unit committed violence with impunity under government protection. 90 The ruling coalition furthermore denied the allegations. 91 Nevertheless, in 2011, years before George Weah came to power, he ran for the vice presidency under Winston Tubman. During the pre-election phase I conducted fieldwork in Liberia following networks of informal security providers, many of whom had previously fought as rebels in the Liberian civil wars. Some of the individuals I followed had been mobilised to function as the presidential candidate's informal security force, following him around the country as he campaigned. Many of these individuals, with few other opportunities of formal employment had high hopes about attaining formal security positions where Tubman to win the election.
In 2011, Tubman and Weah lost the elections to Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and the informal security providers loyal to Tubman lost their opportunity to attain state security positions. 92 After winning the presidential election in 2017 Weah would, however, have been in a position where he had the possibility to provide security positions for those previously loyal to him and the CDC party. As emphasised by Jaye, Liberia, constitutes a hybrid political order where traditional authorities have, and continue to provide security, peace and justice in their locales. 93 In such a context, it is not surprising if informal security providers are incorporated in formal security structures as an example of continued hybridisation of security governance. However, whether this is simply problematic or not is not easily determined. If formally untrained or perhaps previously violent individuals are given the status as formal security providers without a vetting process, it may have dangerous effects. At the same time, incorporating marginalised individuals with few other opportunities that do have experiences from the security arena, albeit informally, as a post-conflict state is rebuilt, might even have conflict mitigating effects. 94 It could accordingly be a way to better control such actors, which may in turn contribute to overall stability in states emerging from war.

Conclusion: explaining relative stability
One of the most central questions raised as the UN left Liberia in 2018 was whether the relative stability that had been established in the country would last, and whether the Liberian security institutions themselves could handle potential renewed instability and violence. After years of security sector reform, it is natural to turn to the formal security institutions and to measure success depending on their performance and capacity. In regard to SSR evaluations, there is a tendency to 'measure what can be measured' as, for instance, the performance of formal institutions. Knowledge about the performance of informal institutions and linkages between formal and informal bodies is on the other hand inadequate. 95 In this paper, I argue that a narrow focus on formal state capacity, despite years of security sector reform, leaves us with an incomplete understanding of the everyday security climate in Liberia. Liberian citizens have, and will continue to face everyday security challenges due to economic hardship, domestic violence, street violence, theft and armed robbery, to mention a few. Recent research by Blair and Morse reveals that SSR may help post-war security institutions, such as the police, overcome some of the legacies of wartime state predation, and that citizens in the Liberian case increasingly trust police officers and are likely to update previous negative perceptions of the police in response to mutually respectful and just contact with them. 96 Yet, it is, nevertheless, reasonable to assume that ordinary Liberians will continue to rely on both the state police and non-state security actors such as vigilante groups in order to protect themselves against these numerous threats. Local solutions to insecurity, such as vigilantism, existed prior to the war, and during the years of international interventions. Liberia constitutes a hybrid political order. 97 It is likely to remain as such despite years of intervention. Formal and informal initiatives for security provision will remain entangled in such a way that it would make sense to talk about a continued hybrid security governance long after the UN has left the country. Indeed, hybrid security governance involves great perils. Nevertheless, we need to remember that ordinary Liberian citizens may see risks attached to relying on non-state as well as state options. Trust built during years of security transformation, reform and absence of war can easily be lost if not carefully cared for.
In future assessments of everyday security in Liberia, but also elsewhere where there has been a substantial UN peacekeeping presence, it is not sufficient to evaluate the progress of reformed formal security actors and institutions alone. Security reform processes should not be seen as a zero-sum game in which as the strengthening of formal security actors (the police in particular) will result in the weakening of non-state security providers or, for that matter, will mean they are no longer required. As Ebo has argued, the starting point to understand insecurity in Africa is the recognition that the postcolonial African state has never had a full monopoly of legitimate force at any point in time. The security sector has always been made up of both formal and informal security providers. Even in states that are ostensibly stable, statutory institutions have never been able to meet the security needs of all sectors of the population. 98 Understanding security and the relative stability that Liberia today enjoys requires the same recognition. If post-war Liberia is a success story, as it is often said to be, the stability, which has prevailed does not merely stem from the strengthening and reform of formal security structures. Such reforms, if locally anchored and adopted, can be vital for state institutions with a predatory history. This has also been true in the Liberian case, where the formal security institutions have come a long way since the days of war. Yet, as Liberia illustrates, reform takes time, resources and a very long-term commitment by both national and international actors. Even then, we must not assume that such internationally driven initiatives will ever lead to a situation where the monopoly over the means of legitimate coercion will lie exclusively in the hands of the state only. And maybe it should not. What both state and non-state security providers in Liberia have in common is that they have a long way to go before they will be fully trusted by the Liberian people. Until they are, the Liberian people are arguably justified in navigating among these many state and non-state actors to find the security arrangements that best meet their needs.
As noted by Christian Lund in his important work on public authority and local politics in Africa, it is difficult to ascribe exercised authority to the 'state' as a coherent institution. 99 Rather, he argues, public authority becomes the amalgamated result of the exercise of power by a variety of local institutions and the imposition of external institutions, combined with the idea of a state. The practice of governance, when it relates to security, can vary from place to place. 100 This must be taken into account by future security assessments that are bound to be conducted in Liberia following UNMIL's departure, which must be holistic in nature. We must also be open to the fact that Liberia has today achieved relative stability not in spite of the continued presence of non-state security actors, but because of the hybrid security arrangements, which continue to exist in the country.