Reform to conserve: Europe and David Cameron’s Conservatism

ABSTRACT This article argues for the importance of considering ideology in any analysis of major political judgements. Through an exploration of British Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron’s judgement – an actor sometimes referred to as a pragmatist – the article shows that to understand why a referendum was held on Britain’s membership of the EU, we must consider Cameron’s ideology. His interpretation of conservatism showed an affinity with ‘reform to conserve’ – an idea that functions like a metaphor within British Conservative traditions for interpreting a core political concept within conservatism: that of managing what Freeden has called the ‘problem of change’. In setting out Cameron’s beliefs, and his perception of the beliefs and actions of others, the contingency of the referendum judgement is revealed – and existing explanations for the referendum decision are reframed. Narratives that approach an ‘inevitability thesis’ regarding Cameron’s decision should be resisted. Instead, we should recognize and consider the beliefs that inform such narratives and the assumptions they make. Outcomes based on ideological motivations can be unintended or even appear contradictory. For Cameron, a strategy of ‘reform to conserve’ resulted in something close to a political revolution.


Introduction
'Conservatism is not an alarming philosophy', the former Conservative Party leader and prime minister John Major wrote.'There is one way we could upset this, however: we could lose our sense of balance on Europe'. 1 Major was writing during William Hague's time as party leader -and in many ways the comment proved apposite regarding the fortunes of his successor.Following the Conservative Party's defeat at the 1997 election, Hague managed the move to opposition with an increasingly Eurosceptic electoral offer from his party -and lost again in 2001. 2 By the time David Cameron became leader of the Conservative Party at the end of 2005, following a further general election defeat, he too was conscious of the need for 'balance' on the place of Europe in the party's ideology.Cameron believed, following his election to parliament, both that 'the Conservative Party had become, and should remain, a Eurosceptic party', 3 and that Europe's prominence among the party's public-facing priorities needed to be reduced. 4NTACT Karl Pike k.pike@qmul.ac.uk the term within conservatism -one book aimed at the general reader, the other a work of political philosophy: Quintin Hogg's The Case for Conservatism and Michael Oakeshott's essay 'On Being Conservative'.I locate Cameron within this understanding of change.
The next section then moves to Brexit, and the explanations for Cameron's approach that can be seen from academic and journalistic accounts, as well as the reflections of political actors involved.I categorize these explanations into the following: the 'policy' explanation regarding the 'direction' of the EU, expressed most strongly by Cameron himself, and the account given by Sir Ivan Rogers, who advised Cameron as prime minister and served as UK Permanent Representative to the EU; the 'party' explanation, which focuses strongly on Eurosceptic opinion and pressure on Cameron from political actors within the Parliamentary Conservative Party at Westminster; and finally the wider 'electoral' explanation, typically emphasizing both the threat to the Conservatives posed by the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and trends in public opinion that were perceived as being negative towards the European Union.All three of these explanations are, I argue, relevant to understanding both Cameron's strategic context and his judgements -though all three can only be fully comprehended alongside an understanding of how Cameron perceived them, and therefore his existing ideological beliefs.
The final section of the article presents my empirical analysis, one that broadly follows a chronological account of Cameron's political strategy on Europe from 2005 to 2016.In analysing speeches, accounts of the time, and Cameron's memoir, I seek to take seriously the perceptions and ideological arguments put forward by Cameron and those close to him.The analysis in this third section looks at both the relationship between Euroscepticism and how to manage change (following Freeden's work on the 'location' of political concepts and interaction between them), 16 and the role of 'reform to conserve' as one of British Conservatism's 'historically transferred traditions of discourse'. 17The argument set out in this article is, broadly, a defence of considering ideology in any analysis of major political judgements -including, in the case explored here, with an actor often referred to as a 'pragmatist'. 18E.H.H. Green wrote that, 'a distrust of an "intellectual" approach to politics, or a definition of oneself as "non-ideological", are important ideological statements which express a distinctive Conservative view about the nature of and proper approach to politics'. 19There is a danger that this insight is still too often overlooked, or that analysis of Cameron's ideology remains at the programmatic level -policies -rather than seeking to comprehend his beliefs.
The outcomes of ideological battles can be unintended, or even appear contradictory.Indeed, ideas within ideologies are important for grasping the beliefs of political actors, but these ideas are not instructions, and certainly should not carry the expectation (from actors or observers) that they will be followed in a consistent way.Instead, interpretation is dependent upon the person and the political context. 20For Cameron, a strategy of 'reform to conserve' resulted in something close to a political revolution -and not one Cameron wished for.Meanings attached to Euroscepticism in 2005 by self-styled 'modernisers' stressed the need to quieten a tendency that was perceived as pushing the Conservative Party further from the everyday priorities of the electorate 21 ; by 2019 the meanings associated with the UK's relationship with the European Union, particularly in everyday discourse, were very different.This transformation was driven by the beliefs and actions of political actors.And the outcomes -however, undesirable these have turned out to be for those who took decisions -owe much to the interpretations of those decision-makers.

'Reform to conserve' within British conservatism
'Reform to conserve' is an idea that, for the conservative political actor, operates like a metaphor in the sense 'it is illuminating by virtue of concentrating our attention and inviting us to look for parallels'. 22As with the 'imaginative and creative' metaphors discussed by Lakoff and Johnson, it is an idea outside of our everyday conceptual system, 23 yet still 'the analogy which motivates the extension is that we have . . .a grasp of A through B'. 24 Its purpose, drawn from the analysis of texts on conservatism that follows, is to assist in political strategies for managing change, in this case, that conserving means reforming.Such ways of thinking can come with a warning, however.Taylor wrote that 'we can be led seriously astray if we take certain of our templates as absolute . . .when we become obsessed with a certain template, and cannot see where it might mislead: indeed, fail to see it as a template, to which there might be alternatives'. 25 return to this argument in what follows, elucidating some of the 'caveats' that have been introduced in work on conservatism.
The idea of 'reform to conserve' is, by my understanding, closely related to Freeden's interpretation of 'the conservative understanding of organic change as a core concept, and its disavowal of other kinds of change, [which] postulates a specific diachronic reading -a construction of a tradition -as part of its ideological synchrony'. 26eeden added that a 'diachronic interpretation of the present, in which the structure rather than the contents of the diachrony requires protection, is a ubiquitous morphological feature of conservatism'. 27I take this to mean inserting the present into a narrative that connects it with (particular) interpretations of the past.As such, acceptable changefollowing this political concept -is 'in-keeping' with this connected present, and the meanings attached to it by those who maintain a political tradition.Particular plans, or political ideas to be opposed, have the potential to be narrated as in some way forced, without precedent, or even pointless.'Reform to conserve' then, following Freeden, does not suggest any programmatic consistency (over time) in what is being reformed or what is being conserved -nor, I would add, do the arguments for change necessarily need to be coming from the political left.Rather, to grasp the meanings attached to something like the 'problem of change' that Freeden described, 28 we can understand the construction of meaning as similar to 'the notion of culture as a conversation rather than as a structure erected upon foundations' 29 -and one that is inevitably situated within the context of the time.
We can see an example of this (where meanings attached to a political concept are narrated) in Quintin Hogg's The Case for Conservatism.Hogg, during the wartime coalition and following the 1945 election of a Labour government, had joined Conservative colleagues in 'seeking to innovate in areas of economic and social reform'. 30In a similar ideological position to Harold Macmillan's 'Middle Way', this form of conservatism -opposed by some Tories -sought to reorientate conservatism for the post-war world. 31Conservatism, in Hogg's argument, was not about opposition to change.'There is therefore no inconsistency in a Conservative describing himself as a reformer', he wrote. 32Yet any stance on reform was in some sense limited -limited, in part, by an interpretation of change sceptical of the capacity for humans to remake the world.'The Conservative does not believe that the power of politics to put things right in this world is unlimited.This is partly because there are inherent limitations on what may be achieved by political means, but partly because man is an imperfect creature with a streak of evil as well as good in his inmost nature'. 33As Freeden described, the idea of 'the organic theory of society' is proffered here. 34'If Conservatism meant "no change", clearly the only truly Conservative organism would be a dead one', Hogg wrote.'But Conservatives . . .do not mean anything so silly.They believe that a living society can only change healthily when it changes naturally'. 35t is on the matter of conservatism's survival, which Hogg noted that we move to an idea of something close to 'reform to conserve'.'Conservatives have observed a certain common pattern in the great revolutions of our own time', Hogg argued. 36These observations had resulted in an important insight -that where strong claims for change exist in a society, and where these are ignored, there is rupture, not order, and good intentions can lead to chaos. 37Hogg believed there were three lessons 'Conservatives cannot fail to draw'. 38First, 'to yield to legitimate pressure for reform is in reality the surest guarantee against revolution'; second, and of 'even greater importance', that change which does 'not make due concessions to tradition, to the living nature of society which requires changes to be made gently . . .usually end by producing a reaction which defeats the very objects which they mean to serve'; and third, that change is best achieved when the 'mystique' of a 'traditional authority' is preserved. 39his last point in Hogg's work was emphasized by Barnes, who read Hogg to mean that 'change is best brought about by a body known to be devoted to the traditions of their country and in an atmosphere where all are confident in the ability of a constitutional procedure to achieve reform'. 40This is an important point to dwell upon, particularly for the kinds of meaning writers on conservatism have attached to the problem of managing change.The lesson 'to yield' is, in a sense, caveated.From Hogg's perspective, not only must the change being considered 'fit' the conservative vision of the organic society, but it must (to use language quite common in politics today) be deliverable, using the established constitutional arrangements of the nation.Michael Oakeshott's essay, 'On Being Conservative' contains thinking along similar lines. 41For Oakeshott, a person of 'conservative temperament believes that a known good is not lightly to be surrendered for an unknown better.He is not in love with what is dangerous and difficult; he is unadventurous; he has no impulse to sail uncharted seas'. 42n Oakeshott's philosophy, politics is 'part of our practical life'. 43The conservative 'disposition' 44 is therefore considered alongside observations on 'governing': with regard to the latter, the list of what it is not to govern is extensive.The list of what it is to govern is short: 'the office of government is merely to rule'. 45n change, the conservative 'thinks that an innovation which is a response to some specific defect, one designed to redress some specific disequilibrium, is more desirable than one which springs from a notion of a generally improved condition of human circumstances, and is far more desirable than one generated by a vision of perfection'. 46dress when encountering 'specific disequilibrium' implies, if not a narrowness, then a very targeted form of political change within the conservative disposition.As Gamble noted, 'these are quite stringent conditions for innovations to surmount'. 47Thus, the conservative 'will be suspicious of proposals for change in excess of what the situation calls for'. 48To govern, then, is to introduce 'an ingredient of moderation; to restrain, to deflate, to pacify and to reconcile; not to stoke the fires of desire, but to damp them down'. 49Indeed, earlier in the essay, Oakeshott wrote: 'Is it not (the man of conservative disposition asks) an intelligible task for a government to protect its subjects against the nuisance of those who spend their energy and their wealth in the service of some pet indignation, endeavouring to impose it upon everybody, not by suppressing their activities in favour of others of a similar kind, but by setting a limit to the amount of noise anyone may emit?' 50 In a similar way to Hogg, Oakeshott expresses an approach to change which manages specific problems, or grievances, but places an emphasis on the (perceived) legitimacy of those grievances.There is, here, a reading of conservatism as change to maintain something that is -and should remain -unaffected by the activity of government.
Ideologies 'appear as "lived" traditions of political thought'. 51They form part of a 'social background'. 52And as Jones has shown with a study of the 'interpretative construction' 53 that saw Edmund Burke, 'a Whig statesman cherished in the mid-19th century more for his powers of rhetoric than his principles . . .increasingly regarded as a great Conservative and/or Tory philosopher across the political spectrum in a way that was quite novel', 54 they are products of creative, and imaginative, ideational construction.When the Conservative politician Ian Gilmour wrote of Disraeli that his 'attitude to change was often anticipatory' 55 he then took this interpretation of a historical figure and applied it to the Conservative Party's future.'Anticipatory change is not only likely to help the Tory Party to stay in power and therefore to lead to less change of the sort that Conservatives think is undesirable', he wrote.'By removing grievances before they fester, it is also likely to lead to greater moderation by Labour Governments'. 56Political actors supplement their beliefs with further ideological construction and narrative.And they locate themselves within those constructions.As Bourke suggested, 'movements based around values are disposed to lay claim to a pedigree, or re-imagine a serviceable line of descent'. 57efore becoming prime minister, David Cameron was asked by a journalist about a 'favourite philosopher'.Cameron mentioned 'sceptical British philosophers', suggesting British Conservatives 'are sceptical of great utopian schemes and great plans'. 58And he took inspiration from the same Conservative figure as Gilmour: 'My favourite political quote, which I came across again the other day, and thought that is brilliant, is by Disraeli: he said the Conservative Party should be the party of change but change that goes along with the customs and manners and traditions and sentiments of the people rather than change according to some grand plan.That so sums up why the Conservative Party succeeded over the years, and what I think a Conservative government ought to do'. 59 elaborating his interpretation of Conservative traditions, Cameron showed the continued resonance of the 'lived' Conservative ideology -with language and concepts inherited, and reinterpreted by political actors.Others do it too, from colleagues to commentators on politics. 60Of course, none of this is to suggest any hint of determinism or that political actors 'read' these beliefs like rules.Rather, it is for political actors in an ideational context what Mary Midgley once said of culture: 'There is no prison.We can always walk on if we want to enough.What we cannot do is something which is no lossnamely, be nobody and nowhere'. 61essure from everywhere: explaining the referendum decision Summarizing David Cameron's strategic context over the period 2013/14, Seldon and Snowdon wrote that the then prime minister's 'three objectives -to pacify Eurosceptic critics, neutralise UKIP, and take the EU off the front pages -are all under heavy pressure . . .his leadership remains under strain'. 62Seldon and Snowdon's 'verdict' on Cameron's decision to call a referendum is clear: 'We believe he had little or no choice but to call a Referendum'. 63What could have been different, in their account, was the timing and (connected) substance of the renegotiation with the European Union. 64Shipman, in his authoritative account of the Brexit campaign, argued that with George Osborne, Cameron's Chancellor, strategist and friend, being against calling a referendum 'it is not possible to insist that the referendum was inevitable'. 65Yet he also noted the 'persuasive case' from some Conservatives that if the decision announced in Cameron's 'Bloomberg speech' -delivered in January 2013, where Cameron publicly committed to an in/out referendum in the next Conservative Party manifesto -had not happened, it may well have come anyway after UKIP won the 2014 European parliament elections. 66s he contemplated taking office in 2010, Cameron 'didn't expect Europe to form a big part of the agenda'. 67Instead, a crisis in the eurozone, and increasing activity from Eurosceptics on his backbenches (including votes on a prospective referendum in the House of Commons) meant 'battles over bailouts, the referendum motion and the fiscal compact', 68 the latter being the EU's response to growing questions about eurozone governance. 69'On Europe', Cameron wrote in his memoir, 'the Conservative Party (reflecting broader opinion in the country) was becoming increasingly ungovernable.And Britain's current status in Europe was becoming increasingly unsustainable'. 70ccounts of Cameron's decision -some quite brief, in part because of the understandable interest in the many pressing questions that followed Britain voting to leave -focus on these kinds of pressures discussed above, though not on the beliefs Cameron held and how those beliefs affected his interpretation at the time.
Evans and Menon argued that Cameron opted for a referendum 'for a variety of reasons, largely connected with the poisonous split' within the Tories. 71Hayton highlighted electoral support for UKIP and backbench unrest. 72There had been a 'narrowing of the parameters of ideological acceptability for the Conservative Party on Europe', which Cameron had sought to manage. 73Smith concluded, similarly, that Cameron took the decision for party management reasons -something that seemed to work, for a while. 74Bale elaborates further on Cameron's response to Euroscepticism within his party.As the Coalition Government with the Liberal Democrats got underway in 2010, a Conservative commitment to pass legislation triggering a referendum for any future transfer of powers from Westminster to Brussels survived negotiations, and was duly enacted.
Yet this 'did little to calm frayed nerves: as one MP put it, "once you start talking about Europe up go the barricades and out come the guns"'. 75Thus, 'by the spring of 2012, Cameron, if not Osborne, had all but come round to the idea' of announcing a referendum before party pressure became 'unstoppable'. 76This, Cameron duly did, discussing it with allies through the remainder of 2012, and announcing the commitment in the January 2013 Bloomberg Speech. 77Bale concluded that the Conservative parliamentary party -owing to 'principle', pressure from supporters, and fears over a rising UKIP -would 'carry on undermining his [Cameron's] authority . . .meaning Cameron might be deposed and/or his party might go down to defeat in 2015'. 78A referendum commitment could make all of that pressure go away, and 'in the long term, providing it were won (and Cameron was confident that it could be), settle an issue that had been plaguing and poisoning the Conservative Party for decades'. 79he specificity in Bale's summary of what I term the 'party' and 'electoral' explanations is important.In some accounts, the reader is left to infer that 'pressure' will (and did) automatically trigger a response -be that a threat to Cameron's leadership or authority within the Conservative Party from Eurosceptic MPs (the party explanation); the potential electoral challenges from the populist and Eurosceptic UKIP in seats the Conservative Party would need to win the 2015 general election (the electoral explanation); or the interaction between and combination of the two.Bale's is more specific: that the party explanation rests on concern that Cameron would be removed from office by his own party, or at least subjected to a damaging leadership contest, and that the electoral explanation rests on the fear that UKIP could lose the next election for the Conservatives.Craig Oliver, David Cameron's communications chief, reinforced the 'party' argument in his own campaign memoir, saying: 'In short, if he [Cameron] had not offered a referendum, it's likely someone else would have come along who was prepared to do it -and he would have been deposed'. 80his is an important, though not uncomplicated argument.Oliver's version, in particular, rests upon a (plausible, but not simple) prediction that a Conservative leadership contest would have been triggered (it is not clear when), leading to the election of a committed Eurosceptic candidate who would (in short order) receive a mandate from the electorate to hold a referendum.Cameron was undoubtedly concerned about such possibilities -something I return to in the analysis that follows.'Not once during eleven years as Conservative leader', Cameron later reflected, 'did I feel secure for any length of time'. 81But to be concerned about these scenarios is a matter of judgement, in this case, through gloomy predictions of Cameron's job security.
The challenge from UKIP in 2012 was clearer, though it remains a not entirely uncomplicated argument.UKIP's growing support in opinion surveys was leading to discussion from political analysts, speculating on what enduring public support for UKIP could mean for Cameron's chances at the next general election. 82UKIP's performance in by-elections was causing alarm for the Conservatives. 83And there was apprehension in Downing Street about the forthcoming 2014 European Parliament elections, with Andrew Cooper -a pollster and advisor to Cameron -concerned that a win for UKIP would necessitate a referendum anyway. 84Yet, while evidence of a growing electoral challenge from UKIP in 2012 was clear, it isn't obvious that it demanded Cameron's policy of renegotiation and a referendum.UKIP had yet to achieve the electoral success it would find 18 months later, 85 success that followed Cameron's policy announcement.Bale noted that while UKIP had always been Eurosceptic, what changed over time was 'a slightly greater emphasis on immigration' 86 from UKIP -yet Cameron's initial renegotiation policy, presented in his 2013 Bloomberg speech, did not address this. 87Instead, the electoral 'pressure' argument -specifically in 2012 and early 2013 -rests on the assumption that the referendum decision was a pragmatic response to the challenge from an established Eurosceptic party.
This brings us to the final explanation offered -and one not often discussed in the existing literature, in part because it has been expressed later than other possible explanations, most clearly since 2017: the 'policy' explanation.Sir Ivan Rogers has argued that Cameron's 'thinking about the key permanent changes he needed, was set far earlier than other commentators have suggested, and was determined above all by his experiences in December 2011'. 88The experience Rogers is discussing here was the Fiscal Compact, referred to above, and ultimately included in what became the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. 89ameron had attempted to secure some changes regarding the relationship between euro states and non-euro states (of which the UK was one).Having gotten nowhere, vetoed EU treaty change, but seen an international treaty (as above) agreed instead, Cameron was concerned about the UK's ability to influence the direction of the EU.Rogers summarized: [Cameron] thought that public consent for UK membership on current terms was wafer thin . . .He saw major risks to the UK from the developing fault-lines over the potentially diverging interests of the eurozone from those of the eurozone non-members.His first attempt to address those issues head on had not cracked it . . .He increasingly thought that he needed not just to address the eurozone vs EU27 issues, but to deliver permanently different tiers or destinations of membership'. 90-level treaty change, that Cameron had 'very good grounds to hope, at the time of Bloomberg' 91 might happen owing to changes Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel was also considering, ultimately did not happen. 92Yet what Rogers described as Cameron's belief that 'the post financial crisis drive towards further integration imperilled the viability of the UK's position unless he secured permanent changes to entrench it' 93 seemed to remain.
The 'policy' explanation, then, relies -as with the 'party' and 'electoral' explanations -on the perceptions of Cameron and his close aides, and the judgements they reached.There is something that all three explanations share: a prediction of something negative happening -negative for Cameron's longevity as prime minister (something he readily admitted would not last longer than a decade anyway) 94 ; negative for the Conservative Party's path to power in Westminster; and negative for the UK's continued influence -or what Rogers described as Cameron's belief 'in defending and enhancing British exceptionalism' 95 -within the EU.For Cameron, the third, 'policy' threat was amplified less in the UK -though, interestingly, he places much greater stress on it in his own reflections, in part perhaps to resist the idea that the decision was purely an electoral calculation.The 'party' and 'electoral' threats were amplified much more -through Westminster intrigue, regular reporting in the media, and then the actions of others, particularly the two Conservative MPs who would go on to defect to UKIP in 2014. 96mportantly, these threats -or risks -became, in Cameron's mind, bigger than the risks involved in delivering a renegotiation and referendum.And it is this crucial judgement that was affected by Cameron's interpretation of conservatism: a belief that threats can be addressed if 'sensible' reforms are delivered through constitutional means.'Within this lifelong pragmatist', a commentator wrote of Cameron in 2015, 'there lurks a politician with an eye on posterity and prodigiously grander ambitions than he first declared.To save his party, save the union, save Britain's place in Europe'. 97In short, reform to conserve.

'The risks of playing with fire': cameron's conservatism
Discussing political judgement, Bourke and Geuss made two important points, highly relevant to the question of why, having sought to maintain a 'balance' on European policy, David Cameron ultimately proceeded with a renegotiation and referendum strategy that ended the UK's membership of the European Union.The first is that when considering political judgement, analysts must be mindful that a 'commitment to values is never completely divorced from an assessment of viability and a weighing up of consequences'. 98This is related to Geuss' own distinction between beliefs that 'look a bit like predictions' and those that 'look like value judgements'.'They are in fact', Geuss wrote, 'both at the same time . . .these two aspects are so interconnected that in actual political practice it is essential to see them together'. 99The analysis of Cameron's political judgement offered below adopts this approach -indeed, it is well suited to an examination of beliefs that, like Geuss' understanding of judgement, present both a values side and the assumption of an evaluative/predictive side.For 'reform to conserve' has been constructed to assist with both -first, speaking to beliefs about gradual, or 'organic' change in order to prevent change that appears 'out-of-step' from the historical tradition constructed by Conservative (and conservative) actors; and second, preparing people for the consideration of unexpected consequences that come from doing nothing -in other words, of refusing to engage with demands for change.It is, in a sense, both a prescription and a warning.
The second point from Bourke and Geuss perhaps speaks more to the existing explanations regarding Cameron's decision -particularly the 'party' and 'electoral' pressures.For as I suggest above, without the required specificity in the explanation, there is an assumption that any kind of electoral or party management pressure must inevitably lead to a response.For Bourke and Geuss: 'A historical understanding of political action, and the judgements of value that accompany it, is forced to proceed in the absence of guiding norms or determinate concepts'. 100The analysis which follows seeks to take on board this insight, resisting the temptation to assume that 'common wisdom' -in great supply in Westminster, and valued in conservatism too -can provide a ready explanation for why David Cameron risked so much.
In addition, analysing the conservative approach to change -a 'core' conceptrequires an understanding of how, as Freeden described, 'the core concepts of an ideology are non-specific, allowing for diverse interpretations to be attached to them through adjacent and peripheral concepts'. 101As such, the core concept of managing change can create different interpretations of conservatism depending on what ideas are 'decontested' at the interface between different concepts. 102This was something Freeden noted about conservatism and the EU. 103Eurocepticism within the Conservative Party, as Bale argued, comes in different forms: 'Whether those who continued to "bang on" about it were Little Englanders, obsessed with "sovereignty", or "hyper-globalisers", more concerned with the corporatist constraints that were supposedly preventing the country fulfilling its free-trading destiny, Cameron in opposition had never dared to confront them head-on, hoping instead that he could shut them up by conceding some of what they wanted'. 104meron's own interpretation of conservatism meant support for the UK's membership of the EU, rejecting alternatives on the basis of the economic strength and international influence that membership of the EU offered.Regarding the potential for Cameron to ever recommend leaving the EU -something he refused to rule out as part of his renegotiation strategy -one 'confidant' told Shipman that Cameron 'saw how much Britain's influence was magnified by "being in the room."He's an innate conservative in the small "c", not wanting to change stuff sense'. 105Yet he was also a Eurosceptic -albeit in a more 'attitudinal' than substantive way.Despite experiencing high profile dissent on his strategy as prime minister to keep Britain in the European Union, revealingly Cameron retold (in his memoir) an episode from his days as an advisor to Conservative Chancellor Norman Lamont in the early 1990s: 'Norman Lamont and I drafted a pamphlet . . .Membership of the EU was necessary for trade and cooperation, but Britain had never welcomed, and would never welcome, the political aspects of the Union.We wrote: "No one would die for the European Union."No. 10 asked us to take it out.We kept it in'. 106meron did not note that this kind of dismissal of Downing Street's wishes -in this instance, John Major's No. 10 hoping to maintain a semblance of governing unitywould also adversely affect Cameron decades later.Indeed, according to Craig Oliver, in early 2016 the prime minister believed 'that everyone, including him, has traded on having a go at "Europe" for years.He describes it as a kind of displacement activity, "using it to soothe our fevered brow"'.107 Cameron maintained the belief -one prevalent within the Conservative Party -that the EU was both an important part of Britain's economic and institutional world and that 'Europe' was not a political idea the Conservative Party would ever be committed to.
Philip Hammond, Cameron's Foreign Secretary during the renegotiation and referendum process, has set out this interpretation very clearly -an attitudinal Euroscepticism, though scepticism that went no further than that, following an interpretation of the core concept of managing change: 'I never was in the category of people like Ken Clarke [longstanding pro-European Conservative MP and Cabinet Minister] who were philosophically, ideologically committed to Britain being at the heart of the European project.For me, this was primarily about economics.For better or for worse the European Union existed and, for better or for worse, the UK had become a part of it . . .'As Defence Secretary, I found the European Union's posturing over a European defence policy to be beyond ridiculous, laughable . . .As Foreign Secretary, I discovered that the European Union was a very useful platform and a multiplier of British influence . . .' 108 Cameron's approach to European policy, therefore, demonstrated this interpretation of the European Union based on the interaction between the 'core' concept of his conservatism, and an attitudinal Euroscepticism that was committed to maintaining a 'pragmatic' UK membership.It was a position, The Times journalist Danny Finkelstein wrote, that was 'properly, robustly Eurosceptic while being completely at home with membership of the EU' 109 ; or 'small "e", small "s"' Euroscepticism as Cameron later called it. 110But how to deliver this as leader of a party that -Cameron perceived -increasingly represented a variety of more substantive Eurosceptic beliefs, and where the core concept of managing change seemed to suggest -at best from a pro-European perspective -that Britain could not live with a relationship that went much further than pre-Maastricht days?
Cameron's first significant decision as a candidate for the Conservative leadership in 2005 was to commit to withdrawing the Conservatives in the European Parliament from the European People's Party Group (EPP).The decision, news reports suggested, 'attracted many Eurosceptic Tory MPs to his candidacy'. 111Yet, while this would remain a significant decision, the first test of his overall strategy was the Lisbon Treaty being ratified in 2009, Cameron's last full year as leader of the opposition, and following a commitment Cameron had made to have a referendum on the Treaty prior to ratification.As Lynch noted, this commitment 'maintained the "soft" Eurosceptic position developed by his predecessors, his policy on the Lisbon Treaty mirroring [Michael] Howard's on the EU Constitutional Treaty'. 112Yet, perhaps in part because of the language Cameron invoked in making the pledge -a 'cast-iron guarantee' of a referendum -the detail of ratification was somewhat ignored by his critics.For Cameron, the news coverage around the event of ratification became about his 'attempt to appease Conservative Eurosceptics' 113 and 'retreat' from a referendum commitment. 114he speech Cameron gave outlining this new stance shows how aware he was, even in 2009, of the need to offer reform to conserve the UK's position within the EU.At this stage, of the 'pressures' discussed above, only his party was really present in his context.Importantly, the speech included what turned out to be a pretty accurate prediction of the scale of Cameron's concessions.Writers and scholars have noted his commitment to the referendum lock (later legislated for in government), alongside a strategy for the 'return of a specific set of powers'. 115His rhetoric of 'guarantees' that were 'essential, realistic and deliverable' 116 showed the importance of targeted, narrow reforms.He would not 'rush into some massive Euro-bust-up'. 117Yet it is rarely noted that he went further.Posing the question about what he would do if he could not deliver the above 'guarantees', Cameron stated: ' . . .this is not something we want to happen.Nor is it something we expect to happen.But if those circumstances were to occur, we would not rule out a referendum on a wider package of guarantees to protect our democratic decision-making, while remaining, of course, a member of the European Union.But that would be a judgment for the future, not for this election or for the next Parliament'. 118ile Cameron was certainly clear -in tone and substance -that he wanted this speech to be a 'move-on' moment for his party, it is important for the evaluative side of his judgement on Europe that in 2009 he indicated the possibility of a referendum (albeit of unspecified content).Cameron remarked on this himself in his memoir, noting that he 'could feel the pressure on Europe quietly building'. 119nto government, and the coalition years, Cameron focused on prioritization -and big reform of the UK-EU relationship was not a priority.'"Control the issue, rather than allowing it to control us" became my mantra', he wrote. 120Yet, following the debates and disagreements regarding management of the eurozone crisis that Cameron faced at the European level, and the place of non-eurozone states, how exactly to 'control' the issuethe management of change -was returning to the idea of a referendum.'By January 2012', Cameron said, 'my feelings on the issue had developed . . .As I explained on tape: "My long-term view is that Europe is changing and Britain is changing in its relation to Europe because of the creation of the euro and a multi-speed Europe." . . .As I said: "At some stage, altering Britain's relationship with the European Union in some regards and then putting it to a referendum I think would be good Conservative policy for the next Parliament." . . .Even then, I believed our goals should be limited and specific.As I put it: "I wouldn't alter [the relationship between Britain and the EU] as much as some of my colleagues.I think some of them are dishonest, in that they endlessly object to things that are actually part of the single market whilst at the same time saying that the single market is the key thing we want in Europe."' 121re, then, is the basis for what would become Cameron's political judgement to hold a referendum.To manage the issue of Britain's membership of the EU -with his party, with the country, and with the future direction of Europe -required 'limited and specific' change.The scope of this reform, at this stage, was not specific.But it clearly built, as noted with Ivan Rogers' argument above, on concerns about further integration among the majority of member states.What is striking, though, is the belief that deliverable reform, rather than some of the arguments he refers to as 'dishonest' from some colleagues, is the solution to a multi-faceted challenge that would become, in his view, a crisis.A very moderate 'reform to conserve' agenda was forming in Cameron's mind.Yet, it was an interpretation of reform to conserve that rarely appreciated any 'caveats' or limitations to the approach.If questions were posed, they were clearly rejected as concerns big enough to rethink.Would Cameron's reform be enough to conserve?Was a referendum the right strategy to achieve the reforms he had in mind?Were the risks too great to say, with confidence (accepting he thought a referendum could be won), that the change could be achieved?
On the risks of a referendum, Cameron's view returned to some of the more specific threats he perceived -to his leadership, and from a future Eurosceptic leader who 'might well recommend leaving'. 122Again, it was about controlling a process of (perceived) inevitable change.Cameron has also since suggested that a victory for UKIP in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament -which did go on to happen -could have been perceived as similar to the mandate received by the Scottish National Party for a referendum on Scottish independence. 123Overall, though, he doubled down on the 'policy' explanation in his memoir. 124My argument here is that it is impossible to disentangle what Cameron perceived as the many challenges to maintaining the UK's membership of the European Union -albeit challenges that could be interpreted very differently: for example, the complicated, imagined future scenario of a change in Conservative leader.Attitudinal Euroscepticism had only taken him so far, and the lack of trust he perceived within the Conservative Party had already led him to concede at least the possibility of a referendum before he'd become prime minister.Indeed, as he began setting out the case for what became the 'renegotiation and referendum' strategy from January 2013 onwards, his argument retained one core narrative: we should reform to conserve.
Cameron's 'Bloomberg speech' restated Cameron's 'small e, small s' Euroscepticism before moving to the negative consequences of avoiding change.'We come to the European Union with a frame of mind that is more practical than emotional', he said, adding: 'For us, the European Union is a means to an end . . .not an end in itself'. 125If reforms were not delivered (he identified three problems in this speech: eurozone governance changes; competitiveness; democratic consent), then 'the danger is that Europe will fail and the British people will drift towards the exit'. 126Arguing that consent for the EU in Britain was 'now wafer thin', Cameron said that 'ignoring it won't make it go away.In fact, quite the reverse.Those who refuse to contemplate consulting the British people, would in my view make more likely our eventual exit'. 127'I believe' he told his audience, 'in confronting this issue -shaping it, leading the debate.Not simply hoping a difficult situation will go away'. 128ollowing the Conservative Party's victory at the 2015 general election, 'confronting' the issue was now set to dominate the remainder of Cameron's time as prime minister.Again, he reiterated the 'reform to conserve' message to the 2015 Conservative Party conference: 'We all know what's wrong with the EU . . .but we also know what's right about it . . .Now, some people say: "take what we've got and put up with it."Others say: "just walk away from the whole thing."I say: no.This is Britain.We don't duck fights.We get stuck in.We fix problems'. 129Meanwhile, Cameron's renegotiation strategy -his attempt to 'fix' this problem -was soon in need of a defence.In a speech at Chatham House in November 2015, Cameron summarized the politics of his specific and -to critics -quite narrow set of reforms: 'I have thought very carefully about what is needed to fix those problems, and I have come up with a carefully-designed package to do so.It is not outlandish or absurd.It is right, and it is reasonable.But I must be very, very clear.I don't want this reasonable approach to be misunderstood.Reasonable does not mean lacking in resolve'. 130meron's renegotiation was ultimately presented in what he called four 'baskets' of reform: sovereignty, competitiveness, fairness (mostly about the City of London), and immigration. 131In November 2015, he was said to be 'optimistic' about the coming referendum campaign, believing the EU saw him as a 'reasonable reformer'. 132Yet, ultimately, the belief in a targeted package of reforms -the kind of moderate changes Cameron had long been considering -did not deliver a campaign-ready message. 133His reform package barely featured in the referendum campaign that followed. 134Cameron's perception that 'putting it off, ignoring the grievances, letting the EU move in a direction we didn't want . . .would have made leaving . . .inevitable', 135 alongside his strategy of specific, targeted reforms to ensure the continuation of Britain's membership of the EU, led to the referendum decision.'I knew it was high-wire stuff', he has since said.'But . . .As I put it on tape at the time: "The risks of playing with fire are now safer than sitting and watching the fire burn."' 136ollowing Geuss' understanding of political judgement, these were the two sets of beliefs: the evaluative, based on the perceived challenges to Cameron's leadership, alongside the future directions of both the Conservative Party and the European Union; and the values-based judgement that what he called 'limited and specific' change would conserve Britain's membership of the EU.The two sides are inseparable.Without the perception of the risk of uncontrolled change, there would have been no renegotiation; without the reform package, the potential to 'fix' the issue through a referendum would not have been attractive to Cameron.Yet, he profoundly misjudged how effective a 'reform to conserve' strategy would be with regards to what became known as 'Brexit'.The extent to which the problem Cameron perceived could be 'fixed' was overstated, the challenges to achieving meaningful reform overlooked.The outcome ended Cameron's time as prime minister and precipitated a period of political turbulence.That wasn't, of course, Cameron's objective.He sought to reform to conserve.But his strategy also involved a big gamble -and one he lost.

Conclusion
There was an alternative plan on offer to David Cameron.George Osborne's approach, so long part of the Conservative 'modernising' team, was to continue with Cameron's previous strategy: 'avoid talking about it' and maintain the pragmatic, attitudinal Euroscepticism of limits to further EU integration. 137Indeed, Osborne did not hold to one of Cameron's beliefs in relation to Brexit: that a specific set of reforms could win the day.Osborne's 'fears over the business community's reaction and the timing, and about not being able to negotiate a good deal, led him to caution against the referendum pledge'. 138A different interpretation of how to manage Europe can be detected herethat support for Europe meant economic stability, support from the business community and therefore governing credibility.An achievable deal was unlikely to end Euroscepticism, so why try?The difference between these two judgements -Cameron's and Osborne's -is critical to understanding how ideology interacts with political judgement, and how what political actors perceive and prioritize is the product of their beliefs, situated within the context of the 'pressures' described above.
This article has sought to add ideology to our existing explanations for why a referendum was held on Britain's membership of the EU.It has shown how, consistently, Cameron's conservatism showed an affinity with the 'reform to conserve' approach to managing change -an idea that acted like a metaphor, or template 139 for interpreting a 'core' concept within conservative ideology; an area of theoretical inquiry that could be applied much more widely in studies of ideology.In setting out Cameron's beliefs, and his perception of the beliefs and actions of others, the contingency of this political judgement is revealed.Narratives that approach an 'inevitability thesis' regarding Cameron's decision -including from Cameron himself -should be resisted.Instead, we should recognize and consider the beliefs that inform such narratives -and the assumptions they make.As Geuss argued, 'even the deepest kind of political conformism and any defence of the status quo require acts of imagining'. 140That is true of Cameron's approach to Europe -both in the evaluative aspect (what he was concerned would happen without his intervention) and in the values aspect (what he believed would 'fix' the problem).It is also true of explanations that accept -even if only by default -the likelihood of challenges to Cameron's leadership, or the potential success of UKIP at the 2015 general election.
The argument presented here represents a defence of ideology in political analysis.In applying it to a politician often labelled a 'pragmatist', and one who has declared -as Conservative actors have in the past -a distaste for ideology, 141 I have sought to show how ideological meanings are still, of course, important for those who wish otherwise.Craig Oliver argued that: 'The issue of whether we should remain in or leave the EU had been a slow train coming for years.It just happened to arrive in the station on David Cameron's watch'. 142hile it is certainly possible to argue that Euroscepticism, and longstanding questions over the UK's membership of the EU had been like a 'slow train', the idea of a referendum as a chance arrival during Cameron's tenure is less convincing.The contingency of the decision, and the beliefs that led to it, should not be lost in this political drama.