Reconceptualising freedom in the 21st century: neoliberalism vs. degrowth

ABSTRACT The hegemonic role of neoliberal ideas in today’s political-economic thought and practice has shaped the common way of thinking about freedom in Western society and more generally in the international community. This involves a negative, individualistic and market-centred interpretation of the concept. In contrast, visions of a degrowth society offer a radical alternative based on Cornelius Castoriadis’ notion of individual and social autonomy. We present both positions and explain their differences. We then follow this up by reporting on a questionnaire conducted at the 2018 Degrowth Conference in Malmö, Sweden. This empirical study of the degrowth movement probes the extent to which advocates actually follow the Castoriadian as opposed to the hegemonic neoliberal theory. While participants were found to hold positions consistent with the Castoriadian theory, we also identify contradictory and under-conceptualised aspects in their understanding of freedom. This points to the need for the degrowth movement to directly address its theoretical foundations, and elaborate on and strengthen its vision of freedom compatible with a future degrowth society in order to avoid potential co-option and becoming sub-hegemonic.


Introduction
Criticism of capital accumulating economies as socially exploitative structures has a long history, to which the growing awareness of environmental degradation has added a new dimension. Gills (2020) points out that humanity now faces a 'triple conjuncture' of global crises: climate change and ecological breakdown; a systemic crisis of global capitalism and neoliberal economic globalisation; and the Coronavirus pandemic. Ideas of transformation have arisen that connect social-ecological crises to the growth critical literature in ecological economics (Spash 2021b). Associated visions found amongst advocates of degrowth connect to concepts such as basic income, sufficiency and voluntary simplicity (Kallis 2011, Paech 2012, Alexander 2013. 1 However, the constraints on 'free market' choice called for by degrowth advocatesunder a 'voluntary, smooth and equitable transition to a regime of lower production and consumption' (Schneider et al. 2010, p. 511)are likely to be intuitively associated with a reduction of freedom by a broader public.
Freedom has become strongly associated with individual choice, especially in the market place, which the neoliberalisation of Western society during the late twentieth century strongly promoted. The result has been to shape '[…] ways of thought and political-economic practices to the point where it is now part of the common-sense way we interpret, live in and understand the world' (Harvey 2007, p. 22; see also Hay 2004). Freedom is deeply intertwined with identity in (neo)liberalised Western democracies (Hay 2004, Karaba 2016. The concepts of the neoliberal thought collective have moulded economic, political and social structures and associated relations (see Mirowski and Plehwe 2009), and amongst those concepts freedom has played a crucial role in establishing and consolidating the neoliberal hegemony (Peck 2010). Indeed, as De Lissovoy (2015, p. 44) argues, the appeal of neoliberalism 'rests on the supposed symbiosisand even identificationof neoliberalism (and capitalism itself) with freedom'. The hegemonic neoliberal idea of freedom (i.e. liberation from coercion, individual choice, consumerism) appears to directly conflict with downscaling the biophysical size of the global economy (i.e. reduced production and consumption) to achieve the goals of degrowthdemocratic and redistributive transformation to socially just and environmentally sustainable futures.
That broad-based consent is seen as constituting a key prerequisite for a possible degrowth transformation (Buch-Hansen 2018), leads to the possibility of conformity to, rather than overthrowing of, hegemonic ideas. The tendency of revolutionary movements to become passive is already evident amongst growth critics (Spash 2021a). Thus, Schoppek (2020) argues that degrowth contains elements that are counter-hegemonic, but also those that are sub-hegemonic. She illustrates the point with two degrowth positions identified in the empirical work of Eversberg and Schmelzer (2018) on understanding diversity in the degrowth movement. The counter-hegemonic position is that of a politically informed progressive left, supporting an anarchistic continual struggle for freedom. Schoppek (2020) describes this as supplying a structural critique in addition to the kind of moral perspective found under the second position, termed self-sufficiency discourses. This latter position is argued to be compatible with neoliberal thought and so sub-hegemonic.
In total, the Eversberg and Schmelzer (2018) study identified five groups: (C1) sufficiency-oriented critics of modernity with an eco-radical aspect; (C2) techno-optimist reformers who think within existing structures, are sympathetic towards conservative politics and have weak personal practice; (C3) mostly German young female students believing in a kind of classic liberal individual agency and pacifism; (C4) mostly German urban male traditional left wingers holding a somewhat theoretical, techno-optimist position with a focus on redistribution; (C5) another left wing group against capitalism and social domination, experimenting with alternative living. In terms of the overall sample, clusters C1, C3 and C5 were 22-23 per cent each, C2 19 per cent and C4 13 per cent. The authors regard C5 as the most consistent with the degrowth ideal of mediating theory and practice through self-transformation. In terms of relating to the current paper, we can note the conservative politics and weak degrowth practices of C2 and the classic liberalism of C3, mean around 40 per cent of their sample, could hold a position consistent with neoliberal theories of freedom. Their groups also evidence some stark differences of opinion. For example, 45 per cent of C1 wanted a ban on long-haul pleasure flights, whereas two-thirds of C2 were against this and exhibited frequent flying behaviour. Their overall sample was also found wanting in several other environmental aspects with 69 per cent supporting long-haul flying for pleasure, 66 per cent pro-technology and 54 per cent against old lifestyles, 68 per cent holding social inequity above climate change and 75 per cent supporting individual consumer-based action (i.e. agency over structure). In addition, 34 per cent did not want degrowth to be distanced from conservative thought. There is then evidence not only of diverging and contradictory positions on a number of issues relating to freedom, but also of the presence of hegemonic concepts of freedom amongst a substantive part of their sample.
As shown, the empirical work of Eversberg and Schmelzer (2018) provides a valuable source for understanding and analysing diversity in the degrowth movement and the challenges it can come with. Yet, given that the 2014 conference was largely German, and the movement in general has been evolving since then, the results might not entirely represent current debates and positions within the community. Aiming to build on and complement the insights gained, our paper includes only the second such questionnaire to have been undertaken relating to the degrowth movement.
More specifically, we further probe how far the degrowth movement offers a really revolutionary challenge to neoliberalism and in particular to the hegemonic concept of freedom. In the expanding literature on degrowth the topic of freedom is seldom explicitly addressed. There is no dedicated entry on the topic in the 51 chapters of the definitional handbook Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era (D'Alisa et al. 2014), and while there is a chapter on 'autonomy' the relationship to freedom is unclear and unexplored. Similarly, other articles have emphasised the importance of autonomy in the context of democracy (Asara et al. 2013, Muraca 2013, but without linking explicitly to freedom. More recently, Kallis (2019) has argued that autonomy is manifest in acts of self-limitation, which he believes are a prerequisite for freedom. Autonomy is not then synonymous with freedom, but seems an integral aspect of creating a free society. However, the questions remains what, if anything, makes freedom in a degrowth society distinct from the hegemonic neoliberal concept? Indeed, appeals to individual self-limitation appear totally modernist and akin to liberal ideology where rational man achieves self-realisation and freedom through liberation from domination by others (whether other humans or Nature). In this respect, degrowth would then appear little different from pro-growth sustainable development, where the fundamental modernist assumption remains that human beings produce themselves independently of Nature, 'the other', over which they maintain mastery and control (Lumsden 2021).
Our aim in this paper is therefore to clarify the meaning of the hegemonic neoliberal form of freedom and explore a possibly distinctive and alternative approach in relation to degrowth. We identify this alternative as constituted by the theoretical ideas of Cornelius Castoriadis (1922, whose work has formed a major source of inspiration and point of reference for many authors associated with the degrowth movement (Latouche 2009, Kallis 2011, Asara et al. 2013, Muraca 2013, D'Alisa et al. 2014, Deriu 2014b, Latouche 2014, even though he died before its establishment. However, first we start (Section 2.1) by investigating and clarifying the neoliberal understanding of freedom as based on the works of two key ideologues of the neoliberal thought collective, Friedrich von Hayek (1899Hayek ( -1992 and Milton Friedman (1912-2006. The alternative and largely unrecognised formulation of freedom in the work of Castoriadis is then presented, links to other degrowth thinkers established and the similarities to and differences from neoliberal freedom are discussed (Section 2.2). Next, we report on an original empirical investigation that administered a structured questionnaire to participants at the 2018 Degrowth Conference in Malmö (Section 3). The results are then interpreted and explored in terms of the presence and strength of beliefs about freedom (Section 4). This empirical work is taken as an exploratory analysis of the extent to which those associating themselves with the degrowth movement have adopted the Castoriadian degrowth theory of freedom, as opposed to conforming to the hegemonic neoliberal theory.

Conceptualising freedom: distinguishing the positions
We start this section by briefly contextualising the neoliberal and Castoriadian notions of freedom in political philosophy. The neoliberal position can be seen as arising out of opposition to State intervention and Marxist approaches. For Marx, capitalist exploitation, understood as forced surplus transfer, presupposes coercion in the process of worker domination. In addition, exploitation produces alienation of workers from the product of their labour and denies the free development of their capacities (Marx 1975(Marx [1844. Freedom, following Marx, requires self-determination in terms of autonomous self-creation beyond pre-defined bounds (Kioupkiolis 2012, pp. 26-35). Individuals operate within a structure of social relations and institutions that can be created to provide the potential for their individual self-realisation. Under capitalism, social structure takes form in material conditions, power and class relations, which prevent open choice and equal possibilities for self-creation. Legal institutions may then act on behalf of capitalists and against the freedom of common people (Hill 1997). Thus, for Marx, an emancipated society inhabited by free individuals requires the liberation from exploitation and the creation of a radically democratic, classless, post-capitalist society.
In contrast, various liberal traditions emphasise the volitional power of the individual as agent set within benevolent and just legal institutions. Contractarian theories, such as that of John Rawls (1972) going back to the classic liberalism of Thomas Hobbes (1651[1994), assume that individuals freely relinquish liberty for security within a legally constituted social order. In classical liberal conceptions such as the one offered by Isaiah Berlin (2007Berlin ( [1969 ), liberty is defined negatively as the absence ofor 'freedom from'acts of coercive interference. Republicans, like Philip Pettit (1997), go beyond this and define freedom as 'non-domination', including not only the absence of actual, but also of potential (intentional and arbitrary) interference. They see this as being secured by political and civic participation as well as rights and laws emerging from democratic procedures. Liberal variations include Amartya Sen's (1999) theory of 'substantive freedom' focussed on 'capabilities' and individual choice; an approach that remains compatible with market fundamentalism. Different liberal theories may advocate egalitarianism (e.g. Rawls theory of justice) or inequity (e.g. under meritocracy). However, such theories are united in their emphasis on individual responsibility and neglect of emergent, unintended social and economic structures that restrict personal freedom (Artiga 2012).
This brief overview of debates on freedom reveals the tension between, characterisation of, and importance attributed to, individual agency and social structure. As we show below, neoliberal freedom, sharing aspects of both the liberal tradition and of the republican notion of freedom as non-domination, considers emancipation primarily in terms of liberating individuals from the coercive power of State intervention and the interference in personal choice by other individuals. Marketlike structures are assumed to provide individuals with the greatest freedom and as such are not open to challenge (e.g. through politics or collective action). However, this structure can also be regarded as restricting the potential for self-emancipation and deliberate social transformation. This is done, for instance, by Marx, who highlights the threat posed by 'the impersonal domination embodied in the market' (Roberts 2017, p. 102)which is in line with the Castoriadian approach, as we will see. Similarly, Castoriadis' understanding of freedom as both individual and collective selfdetermination is reminiscent of Marx's position, while also showing some proximity to the republican ideal of active participation of citizens in political decision-making processes (Chrysis 2018).

A neoliberal theory of freedom
Heterogeneity amongst associated contributors and supporters complicates both the definition of neoliberalism itself and what constitutes its theory of freedom. Here we follow Mirowski and Plehwe (2009) in identifying neoliberalism with the thought collective of the Mont Pèlerin Society. Amongst the conceptual theoreticians of the thought collective the work of Hayek and Friedman is central as two of its most influential personalities. The ideas developed in Hayek's (2011Hayek's ( [1960) Constitution of Liberty combined with Friedman's (2002Friedman's ( [1962) Capitalism and Freedom provide the foundations for the common neoliberal understanding of freedom. Hayek, who stands in a tradition close to classic liberalism, provides the most elaborate and meticulous theory of freedom within the neoliberal collective. His deliberations inspired neoliberal scholars and prepared the ground for neoliberal policy (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). However, from the 1980s onwards, the second generation of the Chicago School dominated debates on the organisation of a neoliberal economy and society. Friedman then came to the fore as its most prominent exponent, combining monetarist macroeconomic beliefs with a concept of economic liberty.
Central to both Hayek's and Friedman's conceptualisation of freedom is a strong methodological individualism. Freedom is attributed only to an ontologically distinct self whose private sphere is to be protected against the coercive intrusion of the external world (i.e. society); that is the 'outside' as other, and in particular the other as constituted by other individuals and the State. Hayek (2011Hayek ( [1960, p. 58) and Friedman (2002Friedman ( [1962, p. 12) conceptualise social relations and collectives as, first and foremost, potential sources of coercion. Hayek (2011Hayek ( [1960, p. 71) defines coercion as the intentional imposition of another person's will on one's own. Freedom, as its analytical opposite, also takes the form of a relation. It describes a 'state in which a man is not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another or others' (Hayek 2011(Hayek [1960, p. 58).
This definition goes beyond the classical liberal understanding of negative liberty as non-interference (Berlin [2007(Berlin [ [1969), which characterises Friedman's take on the matter. In fact, for Hayek, similarly to later neo-republican thinkers like Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, even the existence of potential arbitrary interference can render an individual unfree (Irving 2017). Friedman, instead, considers actual coercive interference to be the main source of unfreedom, even though he adds that 'the fundamental threat to freedom is power to coerce' (Friedman 2002(Friedman [1962, p. 21). What unites their conceptions is the shared believe that social processes have no bearing on the extent to which a person is free, as long as their effects are impersonal and not intended by any human agent (Hayek 2011[1960], p. 91f, Gamble 1996; see also Roberts 2017, p. 95). Freedom is then divorced from the operational outcomes of 'markets' as instituted processes, despite their consequences for such things as the distribution of wealth/poverty and working conditions. If the whole of social life is organised through competitive, market-like structures, then everybody is assumed to be free to act in accordance with their own wishes and capacities and, thus, to be self-responsible (Friedman 2002(Friedman [1962Friedman and Friedman 1980, p. 309). Over an unspecified time, such a society is supposed to produce an outcome that gives each person what they 'deserve' (i.e. meritocracy). By implication, centralised attempts to take action against structural constraints (related to, for instance, class, gender or wealth) are deprived of their legitimacy. They are rejected a priori as illegitimate encroachment by the State and, hence, as a threat to the paramount value of individual liberty (Ibid.: 160f).
The primary realm of neoliberal freedom is the economy. Both Hayek and Friedman are deeply convinced that economic liberty represents not only the single most important embodiment of freedom, but also an indispensable condition for all other forms. For example, in the context of employment, hiring and workplace regulation to prevent discrimination on grounds of race, colour or religion are regarded as deplorable, and such anti-discriminatory regulation should, from their point of view, be removed. Accordingly, Friedman (2002Friedman ( [1962, p. 111) references this as 'interference with the freedom of individuals to enter into voluntary contracts with one another', while such contracts are taken to be the defining aspect of freedom. This primacy of 'the economic' justifies the neglect of all other types of freedom, such as political liberty and autonomy. Going beyond and partially against Hayek, Friedman defines freedom primarily as choice and so essentially economic. 2 Only if enough similarly valuable alternatives are available, from which an individual can choose, can an individual be considered free in their decision (Ibid: 28). Freedom is thus reduced to choice, and choice means nothing but the ability to pick from a pre-selected number of alternatives in the marketplace (Ibid: 15). The individual's decision-making process and their formation of desires and preferences are treated as if they were a black box that cannot, and should not, be investigated. 3 Any decision an individual takes is regarded as an expression of their 'free will' (see Fellner and Spash 2015).
The primary societal objective of an idealised neoliberal society then becomes the pursuit of economic freedom as choice in the (metaphorical) market place, which presupposes establishing and protecting 'free' markets as actual institutions. A market is free, according to Friedman (2002Friedman ( [1962, p. 13f), if all of its transactions are undertaken by individuals or private firms and are strictly voluntary (i.e. if nobody is forced to enter into a transaction). The outcome produced by such markets is then conceived of as an unintended order that emerges spontaneously as the result of a multitude of human actions. Following Hayek's 'evolutionary', Austrian economics, understanding of social progress, markets are deemed to provide the best instrument to coordinate individual knowledge, interests and purposes for the benefit of society as a whole (Hayek 2011(Hayek [1960, p. 91f, Gamble 1996, p. 27f).
Two social institutions are claimed to be absolutely vital for a functioning market system. First, there needs to be a universal system of enforceable private property rights and contracts. Only if a person is certain about their exclusive control over some material objects (or they know who else is in control), are they assumed to be able to carry out a coherent plan of action (Hayek 2011(Hayek [1960, p. 207). Second, in order to curb coercive power in market interaction, competition is necessary between both sellers and buyers. It is the decisive mechanism through which markets are believed to produce spontaneous order (Hayek 1948, p. 21, 2011[1960], p. 88, Friedman 2002[1962], p. 14f, Gamble 1996. Under this political economy, any attempt to interfere with market mechanisms is regarded as likely to obstruct their ability to achieve spontaneous self-organisation, and hence carries the risk of reducing both individual liberty and social prosperity. In particular, concentrations of power are identified as a major threat preventing markets from fulfilling their full potential (Friedman 2002[1962], p. 15, Friedman and Friedman 1980. In this context, there is a clear prioritisation of capital over labour. Indeed, as Barry (1979, p. 50f) notes, Hayek regards trade unions as posing a much greater menace to liberty than the power of employers or monopolies on the side of capital. As a result, his vision of a free society deprives workers of their right to organise collectively and pool their bargaining power, while capitalist monopolies are accepted as legitimate (i.e. legitimising corporate power as natural).
Hayek and Friedman also consistently target government power and the role of State authorities as needing to be tamed and curtailed. Yet, despite their vigorous anti-State rhetoric, their conceptualisations of an ideal society require the existence of a strong neoliberal State, heavily involved in the lives of its citizens, even if this is legally restricted (Hayek 2011(Hayek [1960, p. 232f). The neoliberal State's main task is to enforce and safeguard the conditions required for markets to be operative (e.g. a functioning price system, property rights, contract law, judiciary and national security) and protect individuals against reciprocal acts of coercion (Ibid., p. 71f, 312). In addition, the State is responsible for spreading market logic to all spheres of social life, ultimately aiming at a social order entirely based on competitive, market-like structures.
In such an idealised neoliberal society, inequality is not only accepted as an outcome, but even deemed a necessary precondition for markets to function properly and society to flourish (Friedman 2002(Friedman [1962, p. 161f, Hayek 2011Hayek [1960, p. 96, 104). The only type of equality conceived as desirable is equality before the law, which is viewed as incompatible with material equality (Hayek 2011[1960], p. 150, Friedman 2002[1962. The two forms are regarded as mutually exclusive, because deliberately bringing about material equality would necessitate taking from some to give to others, which is to treat people differently and so, the argument goes, inequitably. In true trickledown fashion, Hayek contends that '[e]ven the poorest today owe their relative material wellbeing to the results of past inequality' (Hayek 2011(Hayek [1960, p. 98). Any form of social planning that attempts to balance out an unequal distribution of material endowmentsand, thus, ultimately also of actual opportunitiesis rejected by both Hayek and Friedman as an infringement on individual liberty. In the long run, for them, only if market mechanisms are left to operate 'freely' can society achieve freedom for the individual and generate the greatest public good.

A theory of freedom for a degrowth society
There is no explicit formulation of a theory of freedom in the degrowth literature. However, it does address the closely related, but distinct, concept of autonomy with reference to Illich (1973), Gorz (1982) and Castoriadis (1987Castoriadis ( [1975). Autonomy in Illich and Gorz relates to negative freedom in that the former associates it with freedom from types of technology and associated infrastructure and bureaucracies, while the latter relates it to freedom from waged labour relations and capitalist productivism. Castoriadis (1991) goes beyond negative freedom for the individual, and conducts extensive discussions on different forms of and what constitutes freedom. His theory includes a central role for autonomy that operates at both the individual and societal levels. The wide acceptance of his deliberations on autonomy within the degrowth literature, and the almost canonical reference made to them, justify regarding his work as central to understanding freedom from the perspective of the degrowth movement.
Castoriadis defines autonomy as the lucid (i.e. conscious) self-legislation of both individuals and collectives (Castoriadis [ [1983], p. 308). At the individual level, being autonomous implies that the institutions (i.e. conventions, norms, rules and regulations) guiding a person in their action and thought are not imposed on them by some external force, but by the subjects themselves. However, individuals can never entirely evade the influence of their unconscious psyche and historical, cultural and social context, out of which they think and act. Indeed, absolute autonomy, total independence from these causal mechanisms, is neither desirable nor required for an individual to be free. Instead, what autonomy implies is a particular mode of being, in which a person rejects becoming a passive product of their psyche and history in favour of being an active co-author of their own life (Castoriadis 1991, p. 165). This presupposes practices of introspection, critical reflection and deliberation, that help an individual to step back from their own internalised behaviours, routines, beliefs and desires, in order to critically evaluate their meaning, validity and desirability (Kalyvas 1998, p. 170, Kioupkiolis 2012). An autonomous individual should aim to attain an active relationship to, and engagement with, their own psyche and societal influences, while accepting they are unable to fully control them.
According to Castoriadis, a reflective and deliberative subjectivity paves the way for a third element of vital importance for individual autonomy, 'radical imagination' (Castoriadis 1991, p. 165). As part of an individual's psyche this relates to acts of 'positing, creating and bringinginto-being' (Gezerlis 2001, p. 482). The enormous creative capacity innate to human beings enables them to envision alternatives in the construction of their identities, practices and how they live their lives that exceed the range of already available forms. This is vital, since it helps in the formation of resistance against social powers, which, in Castoriadis' opinion, are manipulative, in as far as they predetermine what one perceives as conceivable and eligible options (Kioupkiolis 2012, p. 153).
Against the backdrop of these considerations, being free is not then a status that can be achieved once and for all, but rather requires a sustained effort, a continuous struggle, or, as Kioupkiolis (2012, p. 151) puts it, an 'agonistic process'. This is understood as a fight against internal and external forces that constantly try to impose their meanings and laws on individuals, holding them captive in static patterns and thereby threatening to impede alternative possibilities (Castoriadis 1991(Castoriadis , p. 163, 1997. This requires more than autonomy and makes practices of self-engagement, emancipation and self-empowerment important mechanisms for achieving freedom. Individual autonomy also involves intersubjectivity (Castoriadis 1991, p. 164), which relates to the inextricable embeddedness of individuals in social relations (Castoriadis 1987(Castoriadis [1975, p. 108). This signifies a crucial difference from liberal theory and its methodological individualism. Castoriadis' notion of autonomy does not define an individual as an isolated person existing separately in society. Rather, it conceives of them as being inevitably social, socially connected and embedded, as a person of society. Consequently, following Castoriadis (1991, p. 166), an individual can neither be free on their own, nor under all forms of social structure. A specific type of society is needed that allows its members to realise autonomy both at the individual and collective level (Castoriadis 1987(Castoriadis [1975, p. 107). This implies the possibility of taking part in the processes whereby society is institutionalised. This is where negotiation and desires occur as to social meanings, or 'social imaginary significations' (Castoriadis 1991, p. 41), and their entailed societal rules, norms and objectives. This condition is linked to the second facet of autonomy, social autonomy.
For Castoriadis, social autonomy means that a society is self-governing in that it posits its own laws and institutions in a collective way, while its members know that they are the source of these laws. The institutions governing the lives of the members of a community are decided upon through democratic processes, and these institutions are themselves understood as selfimposed constructs. As a consequence, rather than permanent, they are perceived of as contingent, human-made structures open to interrogation, criticism and deliberate alteration (Castoriadis [ [1983], p. 310).
Politics is understood as 'the reflective and lucid collective activity that aims at the overall institution of society' (Castoriadis 1991, p. 169). Going beyond nation States and representative democracies, politics encompasses all the activities and processes in which the members of a society discuss, interpret and (re)define the norms, aims and limits of their own social institutions. All aspects of public life -'everything in society that is participable [sic] and shareable' (Ibid)should be politicised (i.e. be open to collective evaluation, debate and reconsideration). While autonomy does not require each and every social law to be approved by every single member of society, it implies that they have the 'effective possibility of participating actively in the formation and the implementation of the law' (Castoriadis 1991, p. 167). This is a key prerequisite for individuals to be able to endorse a particular social institution that reduces their individual autonomy by governing aspects of their lives and practices, e.g. to say, lucidly and reflectively, that 'this law is also mine'.
For Castoriadis (1991, p. 168), there is a 'reciprocal implication of equality and freedom', since freedom ought to be accessible to everybody in the same way. On the basis that there is a plurality of individual ends and goals, and, assuming that the value of autonomy as such is accepted, democracy becomes an indispensable condition for both social and individual autonomy, and, thus, a free society. Castoriadis refers to democracy as 'the effective possibility of equal participation of all in instituting activities as well as in explicit power' (Castoriadis 1991, p. 168). An autonomous society presupposes a wide-scale democratisation of social relations as well as an institutional framework which enables and encourages all individuals to take part in collective deliberation and decisionmaking. At the same time, a 'true' democracy is supposed to ensure and protect a free private sphere for their members, 4 and establish an economic sphere characterised by a variety of different modes of production and organisation (Castoriadis [1989. In order to ensure equal opportunities to participate in the instituting activities of a society, these economic institutions should be directed at providing a sufficient livelihood for every citizen, reducing disparities of wealth and power and increasing individual autonomy. Degrowth can then be placed within the context of Castoriadis thought, while also going beyond his ideas and including other literatures. Here new concepts enter the picture and offer a democratisation of the social and economic spheres. One example is 'commoning', which empowers local community and group organisations of resource use (Helfrich and Bollier 2014, Akbulut 2017, Euler 2019. Another is the adoption of 'tools for conviviality', relating to the work of Illich (1973), which rejects a range of modernist technologies and seeks simpler ones controllable and reproducible at a small scale. This has correspondence to Schumacher's (1973, Chapter 10) 'technology with a human face'. The role of technology and technologically driven change are brought into question and placed in the context of social relations (Deriu 2014a). Such concepts raise the potential for activating causal mechanisms to counter the disempowerment inherent in capitalist modes of (re)production and consumer society. For example, they raise the need to prevent the conversion of individuals into consumers dependent on industrial output and technocratic structures (Illich 1978). Moreover, in a social-ecological transformation that aligns social provisioning with needs, a society based on commoning and conviviality would empower its members to free themselves from capitalism and norms of consumerism and profit-maximisation.
More generally, degrowth challenges the utopia of a continually growing, technologically driven material economy, whether capitalist or of any other form. The literature describes liberation from supposedly immutable, unquestionable economic (but also political and environmental) imperatives through a (re)politicisation and democratisation of the economy and society (Fournier 2008, p. 533f). Freedom is no longer allied with endless (consumption) possibilities. This is based on the acknowledgment of human embeddedness within social relations and ecological limits. However, the role of the latter is contested in the degrowth literature.
Kallis (2019) 2014, p. 8) repeat this and state that: 'Rather than limits to growth, the literature on [degrowth and] autonomy emphasises collective self-limitations.
[…] not invoked for the good of nature or to avoid an impeding [sic] disaster, but because living simply, […] is how the good life is conceived.' (emphasis original). This is meant to be a process of self-determination regarded as inherently emancipatory (Adams 2012, p. 316). For example, choosing a frugal life of sufficiency then corresponds to living the good life. Kallis (2019, p. 121) explicitly argues '[…] for self-limitation as a prerequisite for freedom and the search for the good or meaningful life'. The terminology of a good or meaningful life is Aristotelian which implies an objective value (i.e. the good), but this connection is absent, as is any discussion of value theory (i.e. what constitutes the good and guides moral conduct). In addition, this is strikingly similar to defining autonomy as an agent acting in accord with objective morality rather than the influence of desires, as found in Kantian moral philosophy. A potential contradiction arises here to the extent that external limitswhether biophysical structures and their mechanism, the good (life) or an objective moralityare non-negotiable and outside human control. That is limitation due to the basic physical, chemical and biological constitution of reality is not determined by humans, let alone self-determined (e.g. we eat food, drink water and breath air of certain qualities or we die). Similarly, if there is a philosophical good (as in the Aristotelian 'good life') then humans can partake of it, but do not determine the good.
Self-limitation may also correspond with neoliberal ideals of individuals achieving self-realisation through their purchases in the market place and refusing to buy one product in preference for another, e.g. Green consumerism. The key difference would then appear to be linked to the extent to which structural issues (e.g. connected to consumption and production) are recognised as problematic and questioned. In market capitalism, the structural dimension is concealed and posited as given, reducing individuals to mere consumers. In a possible degrowth society, instead, individuals are empowered to become proactive, self-constituting citizens. Such citizens would be involved in the creation of the structures and institutions which delimit their own range of action rather than being subject to predetermined market institutions. For them, well-being and prosperity would no longer be primarily tied to consumption (Soper 2020).
Ultimately, freedom in a degrowth society, in the Castoriadian sense, implies mindfulness, criticality and reflective thought in a life of self-determination within self-governing social communities. As noted above, Castoriadis (1991, p. 168) argues that equality and freedom are related, because freedom should be available for all on equivalent terms. Achieving this implies societal structuring (and limitations) based on actualising equal opportunities for self-awareness, political participation and self-realisation.

How do members of the degrowth community conceptualise freedom?
The conceptualisation of a Castoriadian inspired theory of freedom, as presented above, is compatible with central arguments in the degrowth literature, based on theoretical positions and considerations. The question then arises as to the extent to which this corresponds with actual understanding of freedom in the wider community of degrowth supporters. Therefore, an empirical study was conducted to explore this potential gap, and how the degrowth movement relates to the concept of freedom.
As degrowth is a diverse collection of individuals we followed the approach of Eversberg and Schmelzer (2018) in administering a questionnaire at the official international degrowth conference in our case at the 6th International Degrowth Conference for Ecological Sustainability and Social Equity in Malmö, Sweden, between the 21st and 25th of August 2018. Clearly participants represent a self-selecting group and there is uncertainty as to how representative they might be of an undefined degrowth movement. Thus, we regard the study as exploratory but indicative of the extent to which people, self-motivated to engage in degrowth debates, relate to the concept of freedom.

Methodology
The questionnaire was designed in three main sections and informed by the two pre-conceptualised theories of freedom. Part I consisted of two sets of questions. First, respondents were asked to imagine being in ten different scenarios relating to constraints on their personal freedom (CPF). They were asked the extent to which they would feel constrained by the scenario and to record on a five-level Likert item, from (1) 'not at all constrained' to (5) 'seriously constrained'. A separate score (0) was allowed for 'don't know' responses. Each scenario corresponded to a certain constitutive element of either the neoliberal or Castoriadian degrowth theory. The design took a common context in which the respondents might find themselves and introduced an aspect of freedom implicitly into a specific concrete example. The CPF scenarios are summarised in Table 1. The expected responses are from the perspective of an individual who is committed to the alternative Castoriadian degrowth theory of freedom, as described in Section 2.2.
Second, thirteen conceptual statements on freedom (CSF) were presented to respondents who were asked for their degree of agreement with each. Again, a five-level Likert item was employed for each, with the level of agreement being assessed from (1) 'completely disagree' to (5) 'completely agree', and again with (0) 'don't know'. Each item was based on a key assumption of either the neoliberal or the degrowth concepts of freedom. In contrast to the specific context of the CPF items, here the aim was to get respondents to address more general theoretical aspects. Table 2, summarising the CSF, shows their relationship to specific ideological positions and gives the expected response from a person committed to the degrowth conception of freedom. The order of both CPF and CSF items was randomised in the questionnaire.
Part II of the questionnaire consisted of three questions. First, respondents were asked to indicate the single most important condition for them to feel free by choosing one of six options. Each of the options reflected an underlying belief related to a dominant position in philosophical debates about freedom: non-interference, non-domination, positive freedom, autonomy, deliberate will-formation and self-emancipation. While, from a neoliberal theoretical viewpoint, negative libertybe it in the classical liberal (non-interference) or the republican (non-domination) formis clearly given priority over all other types of freedom, a person adopting a degrowth viewpoint would be expected to emphasise autonomy, positive freedom, deliberate will-formation or self-emancipation.
Second, Part II included an open-ended question that gave respondents the opportunity to share what they believed were other preconditions necessary for them to be free, beyond the ones Third, another closed-ended question focused on the role of freedom in a possible degrowth society. The aim was to discover whether participants considered the pursuit of freedom compatible with degrowth and, if yes, what role they assigned to it in the value hierarchy of an ideal degrowth society. For this purpose, respondents were requested to pick one of four statements that held freedom should be either: (i) the single most important value in a degrowth society; (ii) one of its central principles, together with others; (iii) secondary to other, more important values; or (iv) rejected as a guiding principle due to its incompatibility with degrowth.
Part III consisted of a set of seven questions focusing on demographic and socio-economic information: age, gender identity, level of education, employment status, income, religious beliefs and nationality. These factors could potentially link to a person's understanding of freedom. However, the primary use in the current context is to report on the socio-economic make-up of the sample.
Due to the non-random probability sampling, and the heterogeneity of the degrowth spectrum (Eversberg and Schmelzer 2018), the sample cannot be considered representative of the conference participants, let alone the wider degrowth community. Nonetheless, the results allow for preliminary conclusions and working hypotheses, in terms of shared beliefs and attitudes among degrowth supporters concerning the conceptualisation of freedom, which indicate avenues for further investigation and future research. Our choice of individually administered surveys might be criticised for imposing an individualistic mentality on participants, excluding possibilities for exchange and collective sense-making that might yield different results. However, this would misinterpret the aim of extensive research design which does not probe into underlying structures; that would require an intensive research design, e.g. case study, focus groups (Sayer 2010, Chapter 9). Use of a questionnaire is also justified to test for the influence of hegemonic imaginaries on degrowth supporters and to meet our main research objectives, (i.e. identifying the presence of the two pre-conceptualised Degrowth theories of freedom, and assessing whether the Castoriadian based theory could be considered a reasonable starting point for future discussions on freedom in the degrowth community). A focus group discourse approach might have adversely impacted the willingness of individual participants to express their actual beliefs due to perceived peer pressure. Placing respondents in an individual context appeared both legitimate and potentially advantageous. That a questionnaire requires the framing and wording of statements might be regarded by some as unduly influencing outcomes. However, our aim in survey design was to convey the conceptualisations of freedom as developed from our theoretical research. Like all empirical research caution in the interpretation of the results is always necessary, and different explanations for people's responses areconceivable. Our application of extensive research design does not exclude the potential for qualitative intensive research designs in follow-up research (e.g. for probing further certain aspects of interpretation and results).

Results
In total, 300 hard copies of the questionnaire were distributed amongst the 800 participants, of which 146 (49 per cent) were returned (i.e. a sample slightly above 18 per cent). The majority (76 per cent) of respondents were aged under 34 years old, and highly educated (91 per cent having a university degree, N = 145). The gender distribution was relatively equal (52 per cent female vs. 43 per cent male, N = 145). Nationality (N = 139) was biased with 51 per cent Germanic (43 per cent German, 8 per cent Austrian), followed by French (8 per cent) and Italian (7 per cent). In a Likert item assessment, as in Part I, respondents who lack a strong belief are expected to tend to the middle option (see Nadler, Weston, and Voyles 2015). Therefore, in the analysis, emphasis is placed on the more extreme answers for each scenario or statement. Following this approach, Table  3 lists the codes of the ten CPF scenarios as well as the expected and obtained responses presented as four groups: (i) those who felt more than moderately constrained (scores 4 and 5), (ii) those who felt moderately constrained (score 3), (iii) those who felt not at all or less than moderately constrained (scores 1 and 2), and (iv) those who answered 'don't know' (item score 0). The scenarios are arranged in order of their mean rating, starting with the cases that respondents regarded as posing the greatest threat to their personal freedom.
Comparing the expected with the actual answers shows that, apart from CPF-N1 and CPF-D3, the outcome is in line with the values predicted. This implies an overall inclination among respondents towards the notion of freedom conceptualised on the basis of Castoriadis' concept of autonomy. The two exceptions were also the only cases that did not yield an absolute majority on either side of the item scale (i.e. seriously constrained or unconstrained). In fact, assessment of these items was quite divided and will be discussed further in Section 4.
A similar presentation of results is given in Table 4 for the CSF items. There is a majority position among questionnaire participants as to their conceptualisations, as evident from there being only one item that was neither agreed nor disagreed upon by more than 50 per cent of respondents. However, this statement refers to the interpretation of freedom as autonomy, a central element of the Castoriadian conceptualisation of freedom. Apart from this item, all of the statements were accepted by the majority of respondents and support the anticipated degrowth position, while all of the statements that were broadly rejected are connected to the neoliberal concept of freedom.
The answers to the first question from Part II of the questionnaire show that approximately a quarter of participants reported that the single most important condition for their freedom was the ability to deliberately form and endorse one's beliefs and desires (i.e. deliberate will-formation), while a fifth selected the capacity to be in control over one's own life (i.e. autonomy). These positions are constitutive of the Castoriadian theory and highlight the origin and nature of a person's desires and beliefs, a domain completely excluded from consideration by the neoliberal theory. At the same time, however, there does remain a substantive minority committed to the negative and neoliberal consistent concept of freedom, with 20 per cent opting for the independence from the arbitrary 4 Note: 1 A = agree; D = disagree; 2 Excluding 'Don't know'; 3 Sum for Likert score 1/2 (disagree), 3 (neutral), and 4/5 (agree). Marked in bold are absolute majorities (i.e. more than 50% of all respondents agreeing or disagreeing with a statement).
power of others (i.e. non-domination) and 15 per cent for the absence of external coercion (i.e. noninterference). Part II also asked an open-ended question on pre-conditions for freedom, in addition to those already mentioned in the preceding question. In comparison to the closed-ended question, the number of non-respondents was relatively high (30 per cent). Respondents could give more than one answer, and the 102 respondents gave a total of 120 suggestions. These answers were analysed in terms of their content, by means of a quantitative frequency analysis (Mayring 2014, p. 22), and classified into seventeen categories. The three categories subsuming the most frequently mentioned answers were the following: free and equal access to education and knowledge (22 per cent), being able to satisfy basic human needs (16 per cent) and acceptance, support and self-efficacy in a community and/or social relationships (9 per cent). None of the remaining categories crossed the 5 per cent threshold. The main outcome supports an interpretation of freedom that is grounded in material and social conditions for leading a meaningful and self-determined life. This implies a more substantive, positive notion of freedom as compared to the rather formal, negative, neoliberal one. The focus in the highest frequency categories on actualising opportunities and their equal distribution is compatible with the pre-conceptualised degrowth theory, while being at odds with central assumptions on which the neoliberal interpretation rests. The results also indicate support for the embeddedness of individuals in social relations and the entailed view of humans as inherently social beings.
The responses to the third question from Part II on the role of freedom in a possible degrowth society show that the vast majority (97 per cent) selected an option that finds freedom is compatible with degrowth. Most (76 per cent) believed freedom should constitute a guiding principle. Although few (2 per cent) considered it to be the single most important value. Instead, the importance of other fundamental principles was emphasised, and for some respondents (19 per cent) these exceeded the importance of freedom. Only 3 per cent believed that the pursuit of freedom is incompatible with the idea and goals of degrowth and should thus be abandoned.

Interpretation and discussion
General agreement with the 'degrowth theory of freedom' Overall, there was a clear majority position amongst respondents that is compatible with the understanding of freedom conceptualised on the basis of Castoriadis' theory. This is most evident in the results for the CPF items. Having to work extra hours under the pressure of losing one's job (CPF-D1) was voted by more than half of the respondents to be severely constraining their freedom. Additionally, more than a third stated that they would feel more than moderately constrained in a similar situation. This represents the role of structural power constraints (such as social and economic pressures) operating without any overt coercion but as a significant factor influencing the extent to which respondents feel free/unfree. This view contradicts Hayek's negative definition of freedom. It involves a much broader understanding that includes structures, societal arrangements and the specific social-economic context of an individual. The high ratings for the scenario in which lacking material means make it impossible to attend dance classes (CPF-D2) support this claim.
In terms of the central role of markets given to freedom by the neoliberal position, this is also broadly rejected. Most respondents stated they would perceive a situation in which they were fully reliant on market structures to satisfy their needs as seriously constraining (CPF-N2). The firm belief in a causal relationship between markets and freedom, embraced by both Hayek and Friedman, appears to be rejected by the bulk of participants. In fact, they seem to oppose the central neoliberal assumption that markets present the most important precondition for individual freedom. Similarly, the fact that more than 50 per cent fail to consider their freedom limited when presented with only one pair of shoes to buy (CPF-N3) indicates that consumption alternatives, a precondition for freedom defined as choice by Friedman (2002Friedman ( [1962), are mostly regarded as unnecessary in order to feel free.
The obligation to pay taxes, combined with the threat of punishment (CPF-N4), is a prime example of coercion and thus considered a major constraint on individual freedom by many neoliberals. Yet, this is only regarded as gravely impacting on freedom by 14 per cent of respondents. This outcome might be grounded in a different understanding of freedom, one that is non-individualistic and avoids the defining aspect of coercion, while being closely tied to the well-being of others and society overall. The inclusion of collective responsibility and actual opportunities into the web of conditions for individual freedom implies the need for some degree of material equality, necessitating a distributing mechanism other than the market and an assumed meritocracy. This could be one plausible explanation why an obligation to pay taxes is, overall, not judged as a threat to individual freedom.
The answers strongly support the central position of political participation being constitutive for the degrowth conceptualisation of freedom (CPF-D5). Similarly, they reflect a general agreement with the interpretation of the capitalist mode of production and the entailed dependence on industry and experts as a key source restricting freedom (CPF-D6). Moreover, the majority of respondents regard being free as implying a certain degree of deliberate will-formation, self-awareness and reflexivity (CPF-D4), marking a proximity to Castoriadis' notion of autonomy.
This overall agreement with the Castoriadian degrowth theory can also be observed in the assessments of the CSF items. The results here reflect a general consensus which is based on the rejection of central aspects of neoliberal freedom. These include: the threat to freedom connected to redistributional policies (CSF-N4), the assumption of a self-regulating market mechanism and its priority over human planning (CSF-N3), the centrality of economic freedom (CSF-N5), the right to possess private property (CSF-N2), the priority of competitive markets over political rights (CSF-N6) and the consequentialist justification of an unequal distribution of freedom (CSF-N1). Simultaneously, the results are grounded on the affirmation of core characteristics of the Castoriadian degrowth concept of freedom. These are the identification of freedom with a continuous effort and agonistic process (CSF-D7), the condition that all societal rules, norms and principles need to be open to collective scrutiny and reconsideration (CS-D5), the importance of political participation and self-determination (CS-D3), the sympathy for collective ownership and commoning (CS-D4), the interpretation of self-limitation as an act of freedom (CS-D2) and the relevance of self-emancipation, openness and creativity (CS-D1).

Indicators of contradictory positions in relation to freedom
Despite the general agreement outlined above, some of the results bring into question an alignment with the pre-theorised conceptualisation of freedom for degrowth. This is the case for the two scenarios that were rated by a majority as 'moderately constraining' (an item score of 3). The fact that most people, in judging these situations, opted for the middle option, might signify either that many respondents lacked a strong belief about the scenarios or that they were too uncertain about their evaluation of the situation to choose a stronger position. This could apply especially to the referendum scenario (CPF-N1), where 42 per cent picked the median option. However, there also appears to be a strong disagreement between respondents, pointing at the heterogeneity of ideological positions among conference participants more broadly (see Eversberg and Schmelzer 2018, p. 245). This is most obvious in the scenario about the environmentally motivated decision to stop flying (CPF-D3), where 29 per cent rated it as seriously constraining, whereas 36 per cent rated it as not very constraining. Remarkably, while almost 75 per cent of respondents endorsed the abstract idea of freedom as self-limitation (CFS-D2), many were unable to confirm their commitment when confronted by this concrete example. Thus, we hypothesise that the underlying understanding of freedom of a non-negligible share of respondents is still based on internalised principles regarding self-imposed limits as a constraint rather than a source of freedom (i.e. consistent with neoliberal freedom).
If we turn next to the thirteen CSF items, only one was neither agreed nor disagreed upon by a total majority. Unexpectedly, this was the statement on autonomy (CFS-D6), a key concept for Castoriadis. The statement was phrased as follows: 'In a degrowth society, being free primarily means to be autonomous (i.e. self-governing)'. A third of participants actually disagreed with the statement. Rejection might indicate departure from Castoriadis' political philosophy and his project of autonomy. However, this is not necessarily the case, because 40 per cent did actually agree with the statement. Furthermore, many of the key characteristics of Castoriadis' interpretation of autonomy were approved of by respondents (e.g. CFS-D7, CFS-D5, CFS-D3 and CFS-D1). Also, the first question of Part II resulted in 20 per cent of respondents declaring that 'being in control of my own life' constitutes the most essential condition for them to be free, while 26 per cent chose 'forming and endorsing my beliefs and desires deliberately, not blindly'. Respondents appear to be more likely to endorse autonomy when it is more implicit, rather than explicitly stated.
Finally, 23 per cent stated that they 'didn't know' whether they consider economic freedom as more essential for a free society than political rights (CFS-N6). In addition, 18 per cent opted for the neutral middle option. From a Castoriadian degrowth perspective this widespread doubt is problematic. Equal political rights are a cornerstone of such a degrowth theory of freedom, and were supported by other responses of conference participants. Almost 80 per cent felt their freedom would be seriously constrained if they had no possibility for political participation (CPF-D5). Similarly, 82 per cent said they could not consider themselves free if they had no say in the making of the rules and principles that determine their own scope of action. At the same time, the dependence on markets is clearly perceived as freedom-constraining (CPF-N2). Also, the claim that economic freedom is essential because it makes markets work (CFS-N5) was univocally dismissed by 72 per cent of respondents.
How can the evidence for a failure to decide between economic freedom and political rights be explained?
The most plausible answer is to be found in the original phrasing of statement CFS-N6, which left economic freedom implicit and formulated it as an 'economic system that guarantees that no one is being forced into transactions'a definition employed by Friedman (2002Friedman ( [1962). Respondents appear to have found judging and rejecting a specific statement, explicitly using the term 'economic freedom', easier than a more abstract paraphrase of the concept. This might be due to the negative associations the notion evokes in some degrowth supporters. Rejecting a concept they can clearly associate with a worldview opposing their own (e.g. neoliberal market fundamentalism) is easier than recognising the same concept left implicit in a statement. We might then speculate that the apparent dependence of judgements on the wording of a particular sentence is likely to be linked to an emotional rejection of some key concepts, rather than a sound personal understanding of what it means to be free for themselves and implications for their practices. Such apparently contradictory positions would need to be probed further via intensive research methods that could also explore and differentiate the structural aspects.
Combined, the above evidence hints at a partial under-conceptualisation of freedom, reflected in the incomplete and sometimes inconsistent interpretation of freedom and its central constituents. While there is no single causal explanation, the lack of conceptual clarity is aided by the absence of thematic discussion and debate concerning freedom in the degrowth discourse. Furthermore, the results provide some evidence for the 'multiplicity of degrowth' (Barca et al. 2019, p. 5), in relation to conceptions of freedom, as well as the contradictory positions it can come with (Paulson 2017). Although, being considered a core strength of degrowth, this openness can become problematic if socially predominant, growth-based discourses are reproduced, increasing the possibility of conformity to, rather than overthrowing of, hegemonic neoliberal ideas (Schoppek 2020, Spash 2021a. This is the case, for instance, if freedom is conceptualised purely in terms of individual opportunities and self-responsibility, without reflecting the structural context in which individuals are embedded. In this case, the idea of freedom is prone to lose its immanent potential for collective emancipation and deliberate social transformation. Instead of challenging incumbent structures, such an understanding of freedom would risk being incorporated in hegemonic imaginaries and serve a stabilising function for the neoliberal political economy. In order to navigate the existing plurality and reduce the danger of becoming sub-hegemonic, the degrowth movement would then need to openly and explicitly explore and engage with the meaning(s) of freedom in a future, socially and ecologically sustainable and equitable society, differentiating alternative understandings within the community and scrutinising them for their compatibility with hegemonic discourses and central degrowth concerns. Along the lines of a Castoriadian understanding of freedom, this process would presuppose practices of critical self-reflection, a reevaluation of deeply ingrained values and principles as well as a continuous politicisation of the debate (see also Barca et al. 2019). Eventually, such an active engagement could pave the way for both a theoretical clarification and the internalisation of a new framework to make sense of freedom in the context of a social-ecological transformation.

Conclusion
There is an implicit conceptualisation of freedom in the degrowth movement. We have sought to make this explicit and contrast it with the hegemonic neoliberal interpretation of freedom, combining a conceptualisation of the two with an exploratory empirical study employing original questionnaire design. We found that the prevalent understanding of freedom amongst those who participated in the 2018 Degrowth Conference is largely in line with the theory based on Castoriadis' notion of autonomy. Neoliberal positions and arguments were firmly rejected by the majority of respondents. For this majority, freedom clearly goes beyond the narrow negative definition and the sole focus on markets implied by the neoliberal model. Instead, they embrace a positive, more substantive interpretation of freedom that encompasses the awareness of and engagement with external and internal constraints, while also emphasising the importance of reflective and creative acts of self-determination, both in the individual and collective dimensions.
However, the empirical study also revealed a partial under-conceptualisation of freedom, which can be explained in part by the neglect the topic has so far received in the discussion of degrowth. Moreover, we identified contradictory positions on freedom amongst respondents, hinting at the plurality of degrowth, with some of the positions being compatible with neoliberal thought. This is hardly surprising due to the dominance of the hegemonic structure in pushing a neoliberal interpretation of freedom. However, this also implies that alternative conceptulaisations require far better articulation than so far appears to have taken place. The nature and role of freedom in a future, socially and ecologically sustainable and equitable society takes on added significance when considering concrete actions. In order to avoid potential co-option and becoming sub-hegemonic, the degrowth movement would need to directly address its theoretical foundations, and elaborate on and strengthen a vision of freedom that is compatible with conscious, voluntary self-limitation placed within an economic and social provisioning system outside of market choice and structures. Our paper provides an initial exploration and starting point for such an endeavour. Notes 1. In this paper we use the term degrowth to cover the movement that is also referred to as décroissance and postgrowth. While diverse there are concepts and ideas held in common and identifiable groups and individuals articulating common theoretical positions (e.g. see Muraca 2013, D'Alisa et al. 2014. What unites its proponents is the identification of the capitalist growth imperative as a root cause of the current social-ecological crisis, and a shared common understanding of the kind of society they envision, including the desirable institutions, modes of organisation, values and social objectives. 2. Here economics itself is redefined as the study of individual choice based on Lionel Robbins (1984Robbins ( [1932 prescriptive definition relating to human behaviour and the fulfilling of ends based on scarce means which have alternative uses. 3. That preferences should go unquestioned aligns with the tradition in mainstream economics of regarding preferences as being exogenous and given either a priori or as innate. Even when preferences are treated as endogenous, their role and meaning has remained unquestioned and unquestionable (see discussion in an environmental context by Spash 2008). 4. Hence, autonomy presupposes a system of (negative) rights which licence and protect a diversification of being and safeguards individuals from infringements by other individuals or the community (Kioupkiolis 2012, p. 167).